Richard Feynman What Do You Care What Other People Think Challenger Investigation

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"What Do
You Care
What Other
People Think?"
Further Adventures of a
C uri ous C harac ter
Richard P. Feynman
as told to Ralph Lei ghton
P r e f a c e
A CURIOUS CHARACTER 11
The Ma king of a Scient ist 11
"What Do Y ou Care W h a t
Ot her People Th ink?" 20
It 's as Simple as One, Two,
Three . . . 54
Get t ing Ahead 60
Hot el Cit y 63
Who the Hell Is Herman? 69
Feynma n Sexist Pig! 72
I Ju st Shook His Ha nd, Can
You Believe It ? 76
Let t ers, Ph o t o s, a nd D ra wings 83
Part 1
Contents
MR. FEY NMAN GOES TO
WASHINGTON:
INVESTIGATING THE
SPACE SHUTTLE
C HALLENGER DISASTER 113
Preliminaries 113
Co mmit t ing Su icide 116
The Cold Fact s 119
Check Six! 154
Gu msh o es 159
Fantastic Figures 177
An Infla med Appendix 189
The Tent h Reco mmenda t io n 199
Meet the Press 206
Aft ert h o u gh t s 212
Appendix F: Persona l
Observations on the
Relia bilit y of t h e Sh u t t le 220
Part 2
6
EPILOGUE
Preface
The Valu e of Science
Index
C ontents
239
239
240
249
BEC AUSE of t h e appearance of "Surely
You're Joki ng, Mr. Feynman!" a few
t h ings need to be explained here.
First , a lt h o u gh t h e cent ra l charac-
ter in this book is the same as before,
t h e "advent u res of a cu rio u s ch a ra ct er"
here are different : some are light and
some t ra gic, bu t most of t h e t ime Mr.
Feynma n is su rely not jo kinga lt h o u gh
it's o ft en h a rd to tell.
Second, t h e stories in t h is book fit
together more loosely than those in
"Surely You're Joki ng . . . ," where t h ey
were arranged chronologically to give a
semblance of order. (That resu lt ed in
some readers get t ing t h e mist aken idea
t h a t SYJ is an a u t o bio gra ph y.) My mot i-
va t io n is simple: ever since h ea ring my
first Feynman stories, I have had the
po werfu l desire t o share t h em wit h o t h -
ers.
Fina lly, mo st of t h ese st ories were
no t told at dru mming sessions, as
befo re. I will ela bo ra t e on t h is in t h e
brief o u t line t h a t follows.
Part 1, "A Cu rio u s Ch a ra ct er," be-
gins by describing t he influ ence of
those who most shaped Feynman's per-
so na lit yh is fa t h er, Mel, and his first
love, Arlene. The first st ory was
a da pt ed fro m "The Pleasu re of Finding
Things Ou t ," a BBC progra m pro-
du ced by Ch rist o ph er Sykes. The st ory
of Arlene, fro m which t h e t it le of t h is
book was taken, was painfu l for Feyn-
ma n t o reco u nt . It was assembled over
Preface
8 Prefac e
t h e pa st t en years o u t of pieces fro m six di fferent stories.
When it was fina lly co mplet e, Feynma n was especially fo nd
of this story, and h a ppy to share it wit h others.
The o t h er Feynma n st ories in Part 1, a l t h o u gh gener-
a lly ligh t er in t o ne, are inclu ded h ere beca u se t h ere wo n't
be a second vo lu me of SYJ. Feynma n was pa rt icu la rly
pro u d of "It's as Simple as One, Two, Three," wh ich he
occasionally t h o u gh t o f wri t i ng u p a s a psych o lo gy pa per.
The let t ers in t h e la st ch a pt er of Part 1 h a ve been pro vided
co u rt esy o f Gwenet h Feynma n, Freeman D yso n, a nd Henry
Bet h e.
Part 2, "Mr. Feynma n Goes t o W a sh ingt o n," is, u nfo r-
t u na t el y, Feynma n's l a st big a dvent u re. The st o ry is pa rt ic-
u l a rl y lo ng becau se it s co nt ent is st ill t imely. (Sh o rt er ver-
sions have appeared in Engi neeri ng and Sc i enc e and Physi c s
Today.) It was no t pu blish ed sooner becau se Feynma n u n-
derwent h is t h ird a nd fo u r t h ma jo r su rgeriesplu s ra dia -
t i o n, h ypert h ermia , a nd o t h er t rea t ment ssince serving o n
t h e Ro gers Co mmissio n.
Feynma n's decade-long ba t t l e a ga inst ca ncer ended o n
Febru a ry 15, 1988, t wo weeks a ft er he t a u gh t h is la st class
at Ca lt ech. I decided t o inclu de one of his mo st elo qu ent
a nd i nspi r a t i o na l speeches, "The Va lu e of Science," as an
epilo gu e.
Ra lph Leigh t o n
Ma rch 1988
'WhatDoYi u C are
What Other People Thi nk?"
IN THIS STORY I'm go ing t o t a lk a lot
a bo u t NASA,* bu t wh en I say "NASA
did t h is" a nd "NASA did t h a t ," I do n't
mea n a ll o f NASA; I ju st mea n t h a t pa rt
o f NASA a sso cia t ed wi t h t h e sh u t t l e.
To remind yo u a bo u t t h e sh u t t l e,
t h e large cent ra l pa rt is t h e t a nk, wh ich
h o lds t h e fu el: liqu id oxygen is a t t h e
t o p, a nd liqu id h ydro gen is in t h e ma in
pa rt . The engines wh ich bu rn t h a t fu el
a re a t t h e ba ck end o f t h e o rbit er, wh ich
goes int o space. The crew sits in t h e
fro nt of t h e o rbit er; beh ind t h em is t h e
cargo ba y.
D u ri ng t h e la u nch , t wo so lid-fu el
ro cket s bo o st t h e sh u t t l e fo r a few min-
u t es befo re t h ey sepa ra t e a nd fa ll ba ck
int o t h e sea. The t a nk separat es fro m
t h e o rbit er a few mi nu t es la t ermu ch
h igh er in t h e a t mo sph erea nd brea ks
u p a s it fa lls back t o ea rt h .
The solid ro cket bo o st ers are
ma de in sect io ns. There are t wo t ypes
o f jo i nt s t o h o ld t h e sect io ns t o get h er:
t h e perma nent " fa ct o ry jo int s" are
sealed a t t h e Mo rt o n Th io ko l fa ct o ry in
Ut a h ; t h e t empo ra ry "field jo int s" are
sealed befo re each flight "in t h e
field" a t t h e Kennedy Space Cent er in
Florida.
Part 2
MR. FEY NMAN GOES
TO WASHINGTON:
INVESTIGATING
THE SPACE SHUTTLE
CHALLENGER
DISASTER
Preliminaries
* T h e Na t i o na l Aero na u t i cs a nd Space Admi ni st r a t i o n.
114
"What Do You C are What Other People Thi nk?'
FIGURE 1. The spac e shuttle Challenger. The fuel tank, flanked by two
soli d-fuel roc ket boosters, i s attac hed to the orbiter, whose mai n engi nes burn
li qui d hydrogen and li qui d oxygen. ( NASA.)
Preli mi nari es
115
No zzle-t o -Ca se Jo i nt
Igni t er Jo int s Field Joints
FIGURE 2. Loc ati ons and c lose-up vi ews of booster-roc ket fi eld joi nts.
C ommi tti ng Sui c i de
117
AS YOU pro ba bly kno w, t h e space sh u t -
tle C hallenger had an a ccident on Tu es-
da y, Ja nu a ry 28, 1986. I saw t h e explo-
sion on TV, bu t a pa rt fro m t h e t ra gedy
of losing seven people, I di dn't t h ink
mu ch a bo u t it .
In t h e newspa per I u sed t o read
a bo u t sh u t t les going u p and do wn all
t h e t ime bu t it bo t h ered me a lit t le bit
t h a t I never saw in a ny scient ific jo u rna l
a ny resu lt s o f a nyt h ing t h a t h a d ever
come o u t of t h e experiment s on t h e
sh u t t l e t h a t were su pposed t o be so im-
po r t a nt . So I wa sn't pa ying very mu ch
a t t ent io n t o it .
Well, a few da ys a ft er t h e a ccident ,
I get a t eleph o ne call fro m t h e hea d of
NASA, Willia m Gra h a m, a ski ng me t o
be o n t h e co mmit t ee invest iga t ing wh a t
went wrong wit h the shu ttle! Dr. Gra-
h a m sa id he ha d been a st u dent of mine
a t Ca lt ech , a nd la t er h a d wo rked a t t h e
Hu gh es Aircra ft Co mpa ny, wh ere I
gave lect u res every Wednesda y a ft er-
no o n.
I st ill wa sn't exa ct ly su re wh o h e
wa s.
Wh en I h ea rd t h e invest iga t io n
wou ld be in Washingt on, my immedi-
a t e rea ct ion was no t t o do it : I have a
principle of no t going a nywh ere near
Wa sh ingt o n o r h a ving a nyt h ing t o do
wi t h go vernment , so my immedia t e re-
a ct io n wa s--h o w a m I go nna get o u t o f
t h is?
I called va rio u s friends like Al Hibbs a nd Dick Davies,
bu t t h ey explained t o me t h a t invest iga t ing the C hallenger
accident was very impo rt a nt fo r the na t io n, and t h a t I
shou ld do it .
My la st chance was t o convince my wife. "Look," I said.
" Anybo dy cou ld do it . They can get somebody else."
"No," said Gwenet h . "If yo u do n't do it , t h ere will be
t welve people, all in a gro u p, going a ro u nd fro m place t o
place t o get h er. Bu t if yo u jo in t h e co mmissio n, t here will
be eleven peoplea ll in a gro u p, going a ro u nd fro m place
to place togetherwhile t he t welft h one ru ns arou nd all
over t h e place, checking all kinds of u nu su a l t h ings. There
pro ba bly wo n't be a nyt h ing, bu t if t h ere is, yo u 'll find it ."
She sa id, "There isn't a nyo ne else wh o can do t h a t like yo u
can."
Being very immo dest , I believed h er.
Well, i t 's one t h ing t o figu re o u t wh a t went wro ng
wit h t h e sh u t t l e. Bu t t h e next t h ing wo u ld be t o find o u t
wh a t was t h e ma t t er wit h t h e o rga niza t io n o f NASA. Then
there are qu estions like, "Should we continu e wi t h t h e
sh u t t l e syst em, or is it bet t er t o u se expenda ble ro cket s?"
And t h en come even bigger qu est io ns: " Where do we go
fro m here?" " Wh a t shou ld be o u r fu t u r e goals in space?"
I cou ld see t h a t a co mmissio n wh ich st a rt ed o u t t rying t o
find o u t wh a t h a ppened t o t h e sh u t t le cou ld end u p a s a
co mmissio n t rying to decide on na t io na l po licy, a nd go on
forever!
That ma de me qu it e nervo u s. I decided t o get o u t a t
t h e end of six mo nt h s, no ma t t er wh a t .
Bu t I also resolved t h a t wh ile I was i nvest i ga t i ng t h e
a ccident , I sh o u ldn't do a nyt h i ng else. There were some
ph ysics problems I wa s pla ying wit h . There wa s a co mpu t er
class a t Calt ech I was t ea ch ing wi t h a no t h er pro fesso r. (He
o ffered t o t a ke over t h e cou rse.) There was t h e Th inking
Ma ch ines Co mpa ny in Bost on I wa s going t o co nsu lt fo r.
Committing
Suicide
118 "What Do You C are What Other People Thi nk?"
(They said t h ey wo u ld wa it .) My ph ysics wou ld h a ve t o wa it ,
too.
By t h is t ime it was Su nda y. I said t o Gwenet h , "I'm
gonna co mmit su icide fo r six mo nt h s," a nd picked u p t h e
t eleph o ne.
WHEN I called Gra h a m a nd accept ed,
h e didn't kno w exactly wh a t t h e com-
missio n was going t o do, wh o it was
go ing to be u nder, or even if I wo u ld be
accepted o nt o it . (There was still
hope!)
Bu t t h e next da y, Mo nda y, I got a
t elephone call at 4 P.M.: "Mr. Feynma n,
yo u h a ve been accepted o nt o t h e com-
missio n" wh ich by t h a t t ime was a
"president ial commission" headed by
Willia m P. Rogers.
I remembered Mr. Rogers. I felt
sorry fo r h im when he was secret ary of
st a t e, because it seemed t o me t h a t
President Nixon was u sing t h e na t io na l
secu rit y adviser (Kissinger) more a nd
more, t o t h e po int wh ere t h e secretary
of st a t e was no t really fu nct io ning.
At a ny rate, t h e first meet ing wo u ld
be on Wednesday. I figured there's
no t h ing to do on Tu esdayI cou ld fly
t o Wa sh ingt o n Tu esday nigh t so I
called u p Al Hibbs and asked h im to get
some people at JPL* wh o kno w some-
t h ing a bo u t t h e sh u t t l e project t o brief
me.
On Tu esday mo rning I ru sh over
to JPL, fu ll of st ea m, ready to roll. Al
sits me do wn, a nd different engineers
come in, one a ft er t h e o t h er, and ex-
pla in t h e variou s pa rt s of t h e sh u t t le. I
do n't kno w how t h ey knew, bu t t h ey
knew all a bo u t t h e sh u t t le. I got a very
*NASA's Jet Propu lsion La bo ra t o ry, locat ed in
Pa sa dena ; it is a dminist ered by Ca lt ech .
The
Cold Facts
FIGURE 3. The begi nni ng of Feynman's notes from hi s i nformal JPL
bri efi ng.
t h o ro u gh , high-speed, int ense briefing. The gu ys a t JPL
h a d t h e sa me ent h u sia sm t h a t I did. It wa s rea lly qu i t e
excit ing.
When I look at my notes now, I see how qu ickly t h ey
gave me h int s a bo u t wh ere t o look fo r t h e sh u t t le's prob-
lems. The first line of my no t es says " Inh ibit bu rning.
Liner." (To inh ibit pro pella nt fro m bu rni ng t h ro u gh t h e
met a l wall of each bo o st er ro cket , t h ere's a liner, wh ich was
no t wo rking righ t .) The second line of my not es sa ys "O-
rings sh o w scorching in clevis check." It was no t iced t h a t
h o t gas o cca sio na lly bu rned past t h e O-rings in boost er-
ro cket field jo int s.
On t h e same line it says "Zn CrO
4
ma kes bu bbles."
(The zinc ch ro ma t e pu t t y, packed a s a n insu la t o r beh ind
the O-rings, makes bu bbles which can become enlarged
The C old Fac ts
121
FIGURE 5. Photograph of bubbles i n zi nc c hromate putty, whi c h c an
lead to erosi on of the O-ri ngs.
very fa st wh en h o t gas leaks t h ro u gh , eroding t h e O-rings.)
The engineers t old me h o w mu ch t h e pressu res
change inside t h e solid rocket boost ers du ring fligh t , wh a t
t h e pro pella nt is made of, h o w t h e pro pella nt is ca st a nd
t hen baked at different t empera t u res, t h e percent ages of
a sbest o s, po lymers, a nd wh a t no t in t h e liner, and all kinds
o f o t h er st u ff. I learned a bo u t t h e t h r u st s a nd fo rces in t h e
engines, wh ich are t h e mo st po werfu l engines fo r t h eir
weigh t ever bu ilt . The engines ha d ma ny difficu lt ies, espe-
cially cracked t u rbine bla des. The engineers told me t h a t
some of t he people wh o worked on t h e engines a lwa ys ha d
t h eir fingers crossed on each flight , a nd t h e mo ment t h ey
saw t h e sh u t t le explode, t hey were su re it was t h e engines.
If t h e engineers didn't kno w so met h ing, t h ey'd say
so met h ing like, "Oh, Lifer kno ws a bo u t t h a t ; let 's get hi m
in." Al wou ld call u p Lifer, wh o wo u ld come righ t a wa y. I
co u ldn't have h a d a bet t er briefing.
It 's called a briefing, bu t it wa sn't brief: it was very
intense, very fa st , and very complete. It's the only way I
kno w t o get technical info rma t io n qu ickly: you do n't ju st sit
t here wh ile t h ey go t h ro u gh wh a t they t h ink wo u ld be int er-
est ing; inst ea d, yo u ask a lot of qu est ions, yo u get qu ick
a nswers, a nd soon you begin t o u nderst a nd the circu m-
stances a nd learn ju st wh a t t o a sk t o get t h e next piece of
information you need. I got one hell of a good education
t h a t da y, a nd I su cked u p t h e info rma t io n like a sponge.
Th a t nigh t I t ook t h e red-eye* t o Wa sh ingt o n, a nd got
t h ere early Wednesda y mo rning. (I never took t h e red-eye
a ga inI learned!)
I checked into the Holiday Inn in downt own Washing-
t o n, a nd got a cab t o t a ke me t o t h e first meet ing of t h e
co mmissio n.
"Where t o?" t h e driver says.
*No t e fo r fo reign readers: a fligh t t h a t leaves t h e West Co a st a ro u nd 11 P.M. a nd
a rrives o n t h e Ea st Co a st a ro u nd 7 A.M., five h o u rs a nd t h ree t i me zo nes la t er.
The C old Fac ts
123
All I have is a lit t le piece of paper. "1415 8th Street."
We st a rt o ff. I'm new in Wa sh ingt o n. The Capit ol is
over here, t h e Wa shingt on Mo nu ment is over there; every-
t h ing seems very close. Bu t t h e t a xi goes on and on, fa rt h er
and fa rt h er int o worse a nd worse t errit o ry. Bu ildings get
smaller, and t h ey begin t o look ru n do wn a lit t le bit . Finally,
we get o nt o 8th St reet , and as we go a long, t h e bu ildings
begin t o disa ppea r a lt o get h er. Finally we find t h e a ddress
by int erpo la t io n: it 's a n empt y lot bet ween t wo bu ildings!
By t his t ime I realize so met h ing is complet ely cock-
eyed. I do n't kno w wh a t t o do, becau se I've only got t h is
slip of pa per, a nd I do n't kno w wh ere t o go.
I say t o t h e t a xi driver, "The meet ing I'm going t o h a s
so met h ing t o do wit h NASA. Can yo u t a ke me t o NASA?"
"Su re," he sa ys. "You kno w wh ere it is, do n't yo u ? It 's
righ t wh ere I picked yo u u p!"
It was t ru e. NASA I cou ld h a ve wa lked t o fro m t h e
Holida y Inn: it was righ t across t h e street! I go in, pa st t h e
gu ard at the gate, and st a rt wa ndering a ro u nd.
I find my way t o Gra h a m's o ffice, a nd ask if t h ere's a
meet ing a bo u t t h e sh u t t le.
"Yes, I kno w where it is," somebody says. "I'll t a ke yo u
do wn there."
They t a ke me t o a room a nd, su re eno u gh , t h ere's a big
meet ing going on: there are bright lights and television
cameras down in fro nt ; t h e room is complet ely fu l l , bu rst -
ing wit h people, and all I can do is barely squ ash my wa y
int o t h e ba ck. I'm t h inking, "There's only one door t o t his
place. How t h e hell am I gonna get down t o t h e fro nt fro m
here?"
Then I overhear something a little bitit's so fa r down
t h ere t h a t I ca n't ma ke o u t exactly wh a t it isbu t it 's evi-
dent ly a different su bject!
So I go back to Gra h a m's o ffice a nd find his secretary.
She calls a ro u nd a nd finds o u t wh ere t h e commission is
meeting. "I do n't kno w, either," she says to t h e person on
t h e ot her end. "He simply wa ndered in here!"
The meet ing was in Mr. Rogers' la w o ffices, at 1415
H Street. My slip of paper said 1415 8th St reet . (The ad-
dress ha d been given over t h e t eleph o ne.)
I finally got t o Mr. Rogers' officeI was t h e only one
la t ea nd Mr. Rogers int ro du ced me t o t h e o t h er co mmis-
sioners. The o nly one I h a d ever h ea rd of besides Mr.
Rogers was Neil Armst ro ng, t h e mo o n ma n, wh o was serv-
ing as vice-ch a irma n. (Sally Ride was on t h e co mmissio n,
bu t I didn't rea lize wh o she was u nt i l la t er.*) There was a
very h a ndso me-lo o king gu y in a u ni fo r m, a Genera l Ku t yna
(pro no u nced Ko o -TEE-na ). He looked fo rmida ble in his
o u t fi t , wh ile t h e o t h er people ha d o n o rdina ry su it s.
This first meet ing was really ju st a n info rma l get -t o -
get h er. Th a t bo t h ered me, becau se I wa s st ill wo u nd u p like
a spring fro m my JPL briefing t h e da y befo re.
Mr. Ro gers did a nno u nce a few t h ings. He read fro m
t h e execu t ive order t h a t defined o u r work:
The Co mmissio n shall:
1. Review t h e circu mst a nces su rro u nding t h e a ccident a nd est ab-
lish t h e pro ba ble cau se or cau ses of t h e a ccident ; a nd
2. Develop reco mmenda t io ns fo r co rrect ive o r o t h er a ct io n
based u po n t h e Co mmissio n's findings a nd det ermina t io ns.
Mr. Rogers also said we wo u ld complet e o u r invest iga -
t io n wi t h i n 120 da ys.
Th a t wa s a relief: t h e scope of o u r co mmissio n wo u ld
be limit ed t o invest iga t ing t h e a ccident , a nd o u r wo rk migh t
be finished before I wa s do ne co mmi t t i ng su icide!
Mr. Rogers asked each of u s how mu ch of ou r t ime
we cou ld spend on t h e co mmissio n. Some of t h e co mmis-
sioners were ret ired, a nd almost everybody said t h ey h a d
rea rra nged t h eir sch edu les. I said, "I'm ready t o wo rk
*No t e fo r foreign readers: Sa lly Ri de was t h e first Amer i ca n wo ma n in space.
The C old Fac ts
125
100 percent , st a rt ing righ t no w!"
Mr. Rogers a sked, "Who will be in charge of writ ing
t h e repo rt ?"
A Mr. Ho t z, who had been t he edit o r of Avi ati on Week
ma ga zine, vo lu nt eered t o do t h a t .
Then Mr. Rogers brou ght u p another ma t t er. "I've
been in W a sh ingt o n a lo ng t ime," he sa id, "and t h ere's one
t h i ng yo u all mu st kno w: no ma t t er wh a t we do, t h ere will
a lwa ys be lea ks t o t h e press. The best we can do is ju st t ry
t o minimize t h em. The proper wa y t o deal wit h leaks is t o
h a ve pu blic meet ings. We will have closed meet ings, of
course, bu t if we find anyt hing impo rt a nt , we will have an
open meet ing righ t a wa y, so t h e pu blic will always kno w
wh a t is go ing on."
Mr. Rogers co nt inu ed, "To st a rt t h ings off righ t wi t h
t h e press, o u r first o fficia l meet ing will be a pu blic meet ing.
We'll meet t o mo rro w at 10 A.M."
As we were leaving the get-together, I heard Genera l
Ku t yna sa y, "Where's t h e nea rest Met ro st a t io n?"
I t h o u gh t , "This gu y, I'm go nna get along wi t h h im
fine: he's dressed so fa ncy, bu t inside, he's st ra igh t . He's
no t t h e kind o f general wh o 's lo o king fo r his driver a nd h is
special car; he goes ba ck t o t h e Pent agon by t h e Met ro."
Righ t away I liked h im, and over t h e cou rse of t h e commis-
sion I fo u nd my ju dgment in t his case was excellent .
The next mo rning, a limo u sine called fo r mesome-
one had arranged fo r u s t o arrive at ou r first o fficia l meet ing
in limo u sines. I sat in t h e fro nt seat, next t o t h e driver.
On t h e way to t h e meet ing, t h e driver says to me, "I
u nderst a nd a lot of impo rt a nt people are on t his commis-
sion . . ."
"Y eah, I s'pose . . ."
"Well, I collect a u t o gra ph s," he says. "Could yo u do
me a fa vo r?"
"Sure," I say.
I'm reaching fo r my pen wh en he says, "When we get
t h ere, cou ld yo u po int o u t t o me wh ich one Neil Armst ro ng
is, so I can get his a u t o gra ph ?"
Before t h e meet ing st a rt ed, we were sworn in. People
were milling a ro u nd; a secretary h a nded u s each a ba dge
wit h o u r pict u re on it so we cou ld go a nywh ere in NASA.
There were also some fo rms to sign, sa ying you agree to
t h is a nd t h a t so yo u can get yo u r expenses pa id, and so on.
Aft er we were swo rn in, I met Bill Gra h a m. I did recog-
nize h im, and remembered h im as a nice gu y.
This first pu blic meet ing was going t o be a general
briefing a nd present a t io n by t h e big cheeses of NASAMr.
Moore, Mr. Aldrich , Mr. Lo vingo o d, a nd o t h ers. We were
seat ed in big lea t h er ch a irs on a dais, a nd t h ere were brigh t
ligh t s a nd TV cameras po int ing a t u s every t ime we
scra t ch ed o u r noses.
I h a ppened t o sit next t o General Ku t yna . Ju st befo re
t h e meet ing s.tarted, he leans over a nd sa ys, " Co-pilot t o
pilo t : co mb yo u r hair."
I sa y, "Pilot t o co-pilot: can I bo rro w yo u r co mb?"
The first t h ing we had t o learn was t h e cra zy a cro nyms
t h a t NASA u ses all over t h e place: "SRMs" are t h e solid
rocket mo t o rs, wh ich ma ke u p mo st of t h e "SRBs," t h e
solid rocket bo o st ers. The "SSMEs" are t h e space sh u t t le
ma in engines; t h ey bu rn "LH" (liqu id h ydro gen) and
"LOX" (liqu id o xygen), which are st ored in t h e "ET," t h e
ext erna l t a nk. Everyt h ing's got letters.
And no t ju st t h e big t h ings: pra ct ica lly every va lve has
an a cro nym, so t h ey said, "We'll give yo u a dict io na ry fo r
t h e a cro nymsit 's really very simple." Simple, su re, bu t
t h e dict io na ry is a great, big, fa t book t h a t yo u 've go t t a keep
lo o king t h ro u gh fo r t h ings like "HPFTP" (h igh -pressu re
fu el t u rbo pu mp) a nd "HPOTP" (h igh -pressu re oxygen
t u rbo pu mp).
Then we learned a bo u t "bu llet s"lit t le bla ck circles
in fro nt of phrases t h a t were su pposed t o su mma rize
The C old Fac ts 127
S T S 5 1 -L C A R G O E L E M E N T S
T R A C K I N G A N D DA T A R E L A Y S A T E L L I T E - B / I N E R T I A L UPPE R S T A G E
S P A R T A N - H A L L E Y / M I S S I O N P E C U L I A R S U P P O R T S T R UC T UR E
C R E W C O M PA R T M E N T
- T I S P - T E A C HE R I N S P A C E P R O G R A M
- C HA M P - C O M E T HA L L E Y A C T I V E M O N I T O R I N G P R O G R A M
- FDE - FL UID D Y N A M I C S E X P E R IM E N T
- S T UDE N T E XPE R IM E N T S
- R M E - R A D I A T I O N M O N I T O R I N G E X P E R IM E N T
- PPE - PHA S E P A R T I T I O N I N G E XPE R IM E N T
FIGURE 6. An example of "bullets. "
t h ings. There was o ne a ft er a no t h er o f t hese lit t le go dda mn
bu llet s in o u r briefing books a nd on t h e slides.
It t u rned o u t t h a t a pa rt fro m Mr. Rogers a nd Mr. Ach e-
son, wh o were la wyers, a nd Mr. Ho t z, wh o wa s a n edit o r,
we all h a d degrees in science: General Ku t yna h a d a degree
fro m MIT; Mr. Armst ro ng, Mr. Covert , Mr. Ru mmel , a nd
Mr. Su t t er were all a ero na u t ica l engineers, while Ms. Ride,
Mr. Wa lker, Mr. Wh eelo n, a nd I were all ph ysicist s. Mo st
of u s seemed to have done some prelimina ry wo rk on o u r
o wn. We kept a sking qu est io ns t h a t were mu ch more t ech-
nical t h a n some of t h e big cheeses were prepa red for.
When one of t h em co u ldn't a nswer a qu est io n, Mr.
Ro gers wo u ld reassu re h im t h a t we u nderst o o d h e wa sn't
expect ing su ch det a iled qu est io ns, a nd t h a t we were sa t is-
fied, for t h e t ime being a t least , by t h e perpet u a l answer,
"We'll get t h a t info rma t io n t o yo u later."
128 'What Do You C are What Other People Thi nk?"
The ma in t h ing I learned a t t h a t meet ing was h o w
inefficient a pu blic inqu iry is: mo st of t h e t ime, o t h er people
are a sking qu est io ns you already kno w the a nswer toor
are no t int erest ed ina nd yo u get so fogged o u t t h a t
yo u 're h a rdly list ening wh en impo rt a nt po int s are being
pa ssed over.
W h a t a co nt ra st t o JPL, where I ha d been filled wit h all
so rt s of info rma t io n very fa st . On Wednesda y we h a ve a
" get -t oget her" in Mr. Ro gers' o fficet h a t t akes t wo
h o u rsa nd t h en we've got t h e rest of t h e da y t o do wh a t ?
No t h i ng. And t h a t ni gh t ? No t h ing. The next da y, we have
t h e pu blic meet ing" We'll get ba ck t o yo u o n t h a t "
wh ich equ a ls no t h ing! Alt h o u gh it looked like we were do ing
so met h ing every da y in W a sh ingt o n, we were, in rea lit y,
sit t ing arou nd doing no t h ing most of the time.
Th a t nigh t I gave myself so met h ing t o do: I wro t e o u t
t h e kinds o f qu est io ns I t h o u gh t we sh o u ld ask du ri ng o u r
invest iga t io n, a nd wh a t t o pics we sh o u ld st u dy. My pla n
wa s t o find o u t wh a t t h e rest o f t h e co mmissio n wa nt ed t o
do, so we co u ld divide u p t h e wo rk a nd get going.
The next da y, Frida y, we ha d o u r first real meet ing. By
t h is t ime we h a d a n o fficewe met in t h e Old Execu t ive
Office Bu ildinga nd t h ere was even a gu y t h ere t o t ra n-
scribe every wo rd we sa id.
Mr. Ro gers was delayed fo r some reason, so wh ile we
wa it ed fo r h im, General Ku t yna o ffered t o t ell u s wh a t a n
a ccident invest iga t io n is like. We t h o u gh t t h a t wa s a good
idea , so h e got u p a nd expla ined t o u s h o w t h e a ir fo rce ha d
proceeded wit h it s invest iga t io n of a n u nma nned Tit an
ro cket wh ich h a d fa iled.
I was pleased t o see t h a t t h e syst em he described
wh a t t h e qu est io ns were, a nd t h e wa y t h ey went a bo u t find-
ing t h e a nswerswa s very mu ch like wh a t I h a d laid o u t t h e
nigh t befo re, except t h a t it was mu ch mo re met h o dica l t h a n
I h a d envisio ned. General Ku t yna wa rned u s t h a t some-
The C old Fac ts
129
t imes it looks like t h e cau se is obviou s, bu t wh en yo u inves-
t iga t e mo re ca refu lly yo u have t o change yo u r mind. They
had very few clues, and changed their minds t hree t imes in
t h e case of t h e Titan.
I'm all excited. I wa nt t o do t his kind of invest iga t io n,
a nd figu re we can get st a rt ed right awayall we have to do
is decide wh o will do wh a t .
Bu t Mr. Ro gers, wh o came in pa rt wa y t h ro u gh General
Ku t yna 's present a t io n, says, "Yes, yo u r invest iga t io n was a
great su ccess, General, bu t we wo n't be a ble t o u se yo u r
met h o ds here becau se we ca n't get as mu ch info rma t io n as
yo u had."
Perhaps Mr. Ro gers, wh o is no t a t ech nica l ma n, did
no t realize h o w pa t ent ly false t h a t was. The Tit a n, being a n
u nma nned ro cket , didn't h a ve a nywh ere near t h e nu mber
of check gadget s t h e sh u t t le did. We h a d t elevision pict u res
sh o wing a flame co ming o u t t h e side of a bo o st er ro cket a
few seco nds befo re t h e explosion; all we cou ld see in Gen-
eral Ku t yna 's pict u res of t h e Titan was a lo u sy dot in t h e
sky-ju st a lit t le, t iny fla sh a nd h e was a ble t o figu re st u ff
o u t fro m t h a t .
Mr. Rogers sa ys, "I h a ve a rra nged fo r u s t o go t o
Florida next Th u rsda y. We'll get a briefing t h ere fro m
NASA o fficia ls, and t h ey'll t ake u s o n a t o u r o f t h e Kennedy
Space Cent er."
I get t h is pict u re o f t h e cza rina co ming t o a Po t emkin
village: everyt h ing is all a rra nged; t h ey sh o w u s h o w t h e
ro cket looks and how t h ey pu t it t oget her. It 's no t the way
t o find o u t how t h ings really are.
Then Mr. Armst ro ng says, "We ca n't expect t o do a
t ech nica l invest iga t io n like General Ku t yna did." This
bo t h ered me a lo t , becau se t h e o nly t h ings I pict u red myself
do ing were t ech nica l! I di dn't kno w exa ct ly wh a t h e mea nt :
perh a ps h e was sa ying t h a t all t h e t ech nica l la b wo rk wo u ld
be done by NASA.
I began su ggest ing t h ings I cou ld do.
Wh ile I'm in t h e middle of my list , a secret a ry comes
in wit h a let t er fo r Mr. Rogers t o sign. In t h e int erim, wh en
I've ju st been sh u t u p a nd I'm wa it ing t o come ba ck, va rio u s
o t h er co mmissio n members o ffer t o wo rk wit h me. Then
Mr. Ro gers looks u p again t o co nt inu e t h e meet ing, bu t h e
calls on so mebo dy elseas if he's a bsent minded a nd fo rgo t
I'd been int erru pt ed. So I h a ve t o get t h e floor a ga in, bu t
wh en I st a rt my st u ff again, a no t h er "accident " h a ppens.
In fa ct , Mr. Rogers bro u gh t t h e meet ing t o a close
wh ile I was in midst rea m! He repeat ed his wo rry t h a t we'll
never really figu re o u t wh a t h a ppened t o t h e sh u t t le.
This was ext remely discou ra ging. It 's h a rd t o u nder-
st a nd no w, becau se NASA has been t a king a t least t wo
years t o pu t t h e sh u t t le back o n t ra ck. Bu t a t t h e t ime, I
t h o u gh t it wo u ld be a ma t t er of days.
I went over to Mr. Rogers a nd said, "We're going to
Florida next Th u rsda y. That means we've got no t h ing t o
do for Ji ve days: wh a t 'll I do fo r five da ys?"
"Well, wh a t wou ld yo u have done if yo u h a dn't been
on t h e co mmissio n?"
"I was going to go to Bo st o n to co nsu lt , bu t I canceled
it in order to wo rk 100 percent."
"Well, wh y do n't you go t o Bost on fo r t h e five days?"
I co u ldn't t a ke t h a t . I t h o u gh t , "I'm dead already! The
goddamn t hing isn't wo rking right." I went back t o my
hot el, deva st a t ed.
Then I t h o u gh t of Bill Gra h a m, and called h im u p.
"Listen, Bill," I said. "You got me int o t his; now yo u 've
go t t a save me: I'm complet ely depressed; I ca n't st a nd it."
He says, "What 's the ma t t er?"
"I wa nt to do so met h ing! I wa nt to go a ro u nd and talk
to some engineers!"
He says, "Sure! W h y no t ? I'll arrange a t rip fo r you .
Y ou can go wherever yo u wa nt : you cou ld go to Jo h nso n,
you could go to Ma rsha ll, or yo u cou ld go to Kennedy ..."
I t h o u gh t I wo u ldn't go t o Kennedy, becau se it wou ld
look like I'm ru sh ing to find o u t everyt h ing ahead of t h e
ot hers. Sally Ride worked a t Jo h nso n, a nd ha d offered t o
wo rk wit h me, so I said, "I'll go to Johnson."
"Fine," he says. "I'll tell David Ach eso n. He's a per-
sonal friend of Rogers, a nd he's a friend of mine. I'm su re
everyt h ing will be okay."
Half an hou r later, Acheson calls me: "I t hink it's a
great idea," he sa ys, "and I told Mr. Rogers so, bu t he says
no. I ju st do n't kno w wh y I ca n't convince h im."
Mea nwhile, Gra h a m t h o u gh t of a co mpro mise: I wou ld
st a y in Wa sh ingt o n, a nd he wo u ld get people to come to his
o ffice a t NASA, righ t across t h e st reet fro m my h o t el. I
wo u ld get t h e kind of briefing I wa nt ed, bu t I wo u ldn't be
ru nni ng a ro u nd.
Then Mr. Rogers calls me: he's a ga inst Gra h a m's com-
promise. "We're all going t o Florida next Th u rsda y," he
says.
I say, "If t h e idea is t h a t we sit a nd listen to briefings,
it wo n't wo rk wit h me. I can wo rk mu ch mo re efficient ly if
I t a lk t o engineers direct ly."
"We h a ve t o proceed in an o rderly ma nner."
"We've h a d several meet ings by no w, bu t we st ill h a -
ven't been assigned a nyt h ing t o do!"
Rogers sa ys, "Well, do yo u wa nt me t o bo t h er all t h e
o t h er co mmissio ners a nd call a special meet ing fo r Mo n-
da y, so we can ma ke su ch a ssignment s?"
"Well, yes!" I figu red o u r jo b was t o wo rk, a nd we
should be bo t h eredyo u kno w wh a t I mea n?
So he changes t h e su bject , na t u ra lly. He sa ys, "I u n-
derst a nd yo u do n't like t h e h o t el yo u 're in. Let me pu t you
in a good hot el."
" No, t h a nk yo u ; everyt h ing is fine wit h my hot el."
Pret t y soon he tries again, so I sa y, "Mr. Rogers, my
personal co mfo rt is no t wh a t I'm concerned wit h . I'm t rying
to get to wo rk. I wa nt to do somet hing!"
Finally, Rogers says it 's okay to go across t h e st reet to
t a lk t o people a t NASA.
I wa s o bvio u sly qu it e a pain in t h e ass for Mr. Rogers.
La t er, Gra h a m t ried to explain it to me. "Suppose you , as
a t echnical perso n, were given t h e jo b as ch a irma n of a
co mmit t ee t o look int o some legal qu est io n. Y o u r co mmis-
sion is mo st ly lawyers, a nd one of t h em keeps sa ying, 'I can
wo rk mo re effect ively if I t a lk direct ly t o ot her la wyers.' I
a ssu me yo u 'd wa nt t o get yo u r bea rings first , before let t ing
a nybo dy ru sh o ff invest iga t ing o n his own."
Mu ch la t er, I a pprecia t ed t h a t t h ere were lo t s of prob-
lems wh ich Mr. Rogers h a d t o a ddress. For example, a ny
piece of info rma t io n a ny of u s received ha d to be ent ered
i nt o t h e record a nd ma de a va ila ble t o t h e o t h er commis-
sio ners, so a cent ra l libra ry h a d t o be set u p. Things like
t h a t t o o k t ime.
On Sa t u rda y mo rning I went t o NASA. Gra h a m
bro u gh t in gu ys t o tell me all a bo u t t h e sh u t t le. Alt h o u gh
t h ey were pret t y h igh u p in NASA, t h e gu ys were t echnical.
The first gu y t o ld me all a bo u t t h e solid ro cket bo o st -
erst h e pro pella nt , t h e mo t o r, t h e wh o le t h ing except t h e
seals. He said, "The seals expert will be h ere this a ft er-
noon."
The next gu y t old me all a bo u t t h e engine. The basic
o pera t io n was more o r less st ra igh t fo rwa rd, bu t t h en t h ere
were all kinds o f co nt ro ls, wi t h ba cking a nd h a u ling fro m
pipes, h ea t ing fro m t h is a nd t h a t , wit h h igh -pressu re h y-
dro gen pu sh ing a lit t le propeller wh ich t u rns so met h ing
else, wh ich pu mps oxygen t h ro u gh a vent va lvet h a t kind
of st u ff.
It was interesting, and I did my best to u nderst and it ,
bu t a ft er a wh ile I told t h e fella , "That 's a s mu ch a s I'm
going t o t a ke, no w, on t h e engine."
"Bu t t here are ma ny problems wit h t h e engines t h a t
yo u sh o u ld hear a bo u t ," he says.
I was h o t on t h e trail of t h e boost er ro cket , so I said,
"I'll h a ve t o pu t off t h e main engines t ill la t er, when I h a ve
mo re time."
Then a guy came in to tell me abou t t h e orbiter. I felt
t errible, becau se he ha d come in on a Sa t u rda y to see me,
a nd it didn't look like t h e o rbit er had a nyt h i ng t o do wit h
t h e a ccident . I was h a vi ng enou gh t ro u ble u nderst a nding
t h e rest of t h e sh u t t let h ere's o nly a cert a in a mo u nt of
info rma t io n per cu bic inch a bra in can holdso I let h im
t ell me so me o f t h e st u ff, bu t soon I h a d t o t ell h im t h a t it
was get t ing t oo det a iled, so we ju st h a d a plea sa nt conver-
sa t io n.
In t h e a ft erno o n, t h e seals expert ca me inh is na me
was Mr. Weeksa nd gave me wh a t a mo u nt ed t o a con-
t i nu a t i o n o f myJPL briefing, wit h st ill mo re det a ils.
There's pu t t y a nd o t h er t h ings, bu t t h e u lt ima t e seal is
su ppo sed t o be t wo ru bber rings, called O-rings, wh ich a re
a ppro xima t ely a qu a rt er of an inch t h ick a nd lie on a circle
12 feet in dia met ert h a t 's so met h ing like 37 feet long.
Wh en t h e seals were o rigina lly designed by t h e Mo rt o n
Thiokol Co mpa ny, it was expected t h a t pressu re fro m t h e
bu rni ng pro pella nt wo u ld squ a sh t h e O-rings. Bu t becau se
t h e jo i nt is st ro nger t h a n t h e wall (it 's t h ree t imes t h icker),
t h e wall bows o u t wa rd, ca u sing t h e jo i nt t o bend a lit t le
eno u gh t o lift t h e ru bber O-rings o ff t h e seal area. Mr.
Weeks t o ld me t h is ph eno meno n is called "joint ro t a t io n,"
a nd it wa s discovered very ea rly, befo re t h ey ever flew t h e
sh u t t l e.
The pieces of ru bber in t h e jo i nt s are called O-rings,
bu t t h ey're no t u sed like no rma l O-rings are. In o rdina ry
circu mst ances, su ch as sealing oil in t h e motor of an a u t o -
mobile, t h ere are sliding pa rt s a nd ro t a t ing sh a ft s, bu t t h e
gaps are a lwa ys t h e same. An O-ring ju st sits t here, in a
fixed po sit io n.
Bu t in t h e case of t he sh u t t le, t h e gap expands as t h e
pressu re bu ilds u p in t he rocket . And t o ma int a in t h e seal,
t h e ru bber has t o expand fast eno u gh t o close t h e ga pa nd
du ri ng a la u nch , t h e gap o pens in a fra ct io n of a second.
SOLID ROC KET BOOSTER
FIGURE 7. Joi nt rotati on i s c aused by pressure from i nsi de the roc ket
pushi ng the walls out farther than the joi nts. A gap opens, and hot gas
flows past one or both of the 0-ri ngs.
Thu s t h e resilience of t h e ru bber became a very essent ial
pa rt of t h e design.
When t h e Thiokol engineers were disco vering t hese
pro blems, t h ey went t o t h e Parker Seal Co mpa ny, which
ma nu fa ct u res t h e ru bber, t o ask fo r advice. The Parker Seal
Co mpa ny told Thiokol t h a t O-rings are no t mea nt t o be
u sed t h a t wa y, so t h ey cou ld give no advice.
Alt h o u gh it was kno wn fro m nea rly t h e beginning t h a t
t h e jo int was no t wo rking as it was designed t o, Thiokol
kept st ru ggling wit h t he device. They ma de a nu mber of
ma kesh ift impro vement s. One was t o pu t shims in t o keep
t h e jo int t igh t , bu t t h e jo int st ill leaked. Mr. Weeks showed
me pict u res of leaks on previo u s fligh t swh a t t h e engi-
neers called "blowby," a bla ckening beh ind an O-ring
where hot gas leaked t h ro u gh , a nd wh a t t h ey called "ero-
sion," where an O-ring ha d bu rned a lit t le bit . There was
a ch a rt sh o wing all t h e fligh t s, and h o w seriou s t h e blo wby
a nd erosion were on each one. We went t h ro u gh t h e whole
h ist o ry u p t o the flight , 51-L.
I said, "Where does it say t h ey were ever discu ssing t h e
pro blemh o w it 's going along, or wh et h er t h ere's some
progress?"
The o nly place was in t h e " fligh t readiness reviews"
bet ween flights t h ere was no discu ssion of t h e seals prob-
lem!
We looked a t t h e su mma ry o f t h e repo rt . Everyt h ing
was behind lit t le bu llet s, as u su a l. The t o p line says:
The lack of a good secondary seal in t h e field jo int is mo st
crit ica l and wa ys t o redu ce jo int ro t a t io n sh o u ld be incorpora-
ted as soon as possible to redu ce crit ica lit y.
And t h en, nea r t h e bo t t o m, it says:
Ana lysis of exist ing da t a indica t es t h a t it is sa fe t o co nt inu e
flying exist ing design as long as all jo int s are leak checked*
wi t h a 200 psig st a biliza t io n . . .
I was st ru ck by t h e co nt ra dict io n: "If it 's 'mo st crit ical,'
how could it be 'sa fe t o co nt inu e flying'? W h a t 's t h e logi c
of t h is?"
Mr. Weeks sa ys, "Yes, I see wh a t you mean! Well, let 's
see: it says here, 'Ana lysis of exist ing da t a . . .''
We went back t h ro u gh t h e report and fo u nd t h e a na ly-
sis. It was some kind of co mpu t er model wit h variou s as-
*La t er in o u r invest iga t io n we disco vered t h a t it wa s t h is leak check wh ich was
a likely cau se o f t h e da ngero u s bu bbles in t h e zi nc ch ro ma t e pu t t y t h a t I had h ea rd
a bo u t a t JPL.
138
"What Do You C are What Other People Thi nk?"
su mpt io ns t h a t were no t necessarily righ t . Y ou kno w t h e
da nger of co mpu t ers, it's called GIGO: garbage in, garbage
o u t ! The a na lysis co nclu ded t h a t a lit t le u npredict a ble leak-
age here a nd t here cou ld be t olerat ed, even t h o u gh it
wa sn't pa rt of t h e original design.
If all t h e seals had leaked, it wo u ld h a ve been o bvio u s
even t o NASA t h a t t h e problem was seriou s. Bu t o nly a few
of t h e seals leaked on o nly some of t h e fligh t s. So NASA
h a d developed a pecu liar kind of a t t i t u de: if one of t h e seals
leaks a lit t le a nd t h e fligh t is su ccessfu l, t h e pro blem isn't
so seriou s. Try pla ying Ru ssia n ro u let t e t h a t way: you pu ll
t h e trigger a nd t h e gu n do esn't go o ff, so it mu st be safe
t o pu ll t h e t rigger again . . .
Mr. Weeks said t here was a ru mo r t h a t t h e h ist o ry of
t h e seals pro blem was being leaked t o t h e newspa pers.
Th a t bo t h ered h im a lit t le bit , becau se it ma de NASA look
like it was t rying t o keep t h ings secret .
I t old h im I was ent irely sa t isfied wit h t h e people Gra-
h a m ha d bro u gh t in t o t a lk t o me, a nd t h a t since I h a d
a lrea dy h ea rd a bo u t t h e seals pro blem a t JPL, it wa sn't a ny
big deal.
The next da y, Su nda y, Bill Gra h a m t ook me wit h his
fa mily t o t h e Na t i o na l Air a nd Space Mu seu m. We had a n
early brea kfa st t o get h er, and t hen we went across t h e street
t o t h e mu seu m.
I was expect ing t o see big crowds t here, bu t I h a d
fo rgo t t en t h a t Gra h a m wa s su ch a big sh o t . We ha d t h e
whole place t o ou rselves fo r a wh ile.
We did see Sally Ride t here. She was in a displa y case,
in an a st ro na u t 's su it , h o lding a h elmet and everyt h ing. The
wax model looked exa ct ly like her.
At t h e mu seu m t h ere was a special t h ea t er wit h a mo vie
a bo u t NASA a nd it s a ch ievement s. The movie was wo nder-
fu l. I ha d no t fu lly a pprecia t ed t h e eno rmo u s nu mber o f
people wh o were wo rking o n t h e sh u t t le, a nd all t h e effo rt
t h a t had gone int o ma ki ng it . And yo u kno w how a movie
is: t h ey can ma ke it dra ma t ic. It was so dra ma t ic t h a t I
a lmo st began to cry. I cou ld see t h a t the accident was a
t errible blow. To t h ink t h a t so ma ny people were wo rking
so h a rd t o ma ke it goand t h en it bu st sma de me even
mo re det ermined t o help st ra igh t en o u t t h e pro blems of
t h e sh u t t le as qu ickly as possible, t o get all t h o se people
ba ck on t ra ck. Aft er seeing t his movie I was very changed,
fro m my semi a nt i-NASA a t t i t u de t o a very st ro ng pro-
NASA a t t it u de.
Th a t a ft erno o n, I got a t eleph o ne call fro m General
Ku t yna .
"Professor Feynma n?" he says. "I h a ve some u rgent
news for yo u . Uh , ju st a minu t e."
I h ea r some milit a ry-t ype ba nd mu sic in t h e ba ck-
gro u nd.
The mu sic st o ps, a nd General Ku t yna says, "Excu se
me, Pro fesso r; I'm a t a n Air Force Ba nd co ncert , a nd t h ey
ju st pla yed t h e na t io na l a nt h em."
I cou ld pict u re h im in his u nifo rm, st a ndi ng a t a t t en-
t io n wh ile t h e ba nd is pla ying t h e "Star Spa ngled Ba nner,"
sa lu t ing wi t h one h a nd a nd h o lding t h e t eleph o ne wit h t h e
o t h er. " Wh a t 's t h e news, Genera l?"
"Well, t h e first t h i ng is, Rogers t old me t o t ell yo u no t
to go over to NASA."
I di dn't pay a ny a t t ent i o n t o t h a t , becau se I ha d a lrea dy
gone over t o NASA t h e day before.
He co nt inu ed, "The o t h er t h ing is, we're going t o have
a special meet ing t o mo rro w a ft erno o n t o hear fro m a gu y
wh o se st o ry came ou t in t he New York Ti mes t oday."
I la u gh ed inside: so we're go ing to h a ve a special meet -
ing o n Mo nda y, a nywa y!
Then he sa ys, "I was wo rking on my ca rbu ret o r t his
mo rning, and I was t h inking: t h e sh u t t le t o o k o ff wh en t h e
t empera t u re was 28 or 29 degrees. The coldest t empera -
t u re previou s t o t h a t was 53 degrees. Y o u 're a professor;
what, si r, i s the effec t of c old on the O-ri ngs?"
"Oh!" I said. "It ma kes t h em st iff. Y es, of cou rse!"
Th a t 's all he had t o t ell me. It was a clu e fo r wh ich I
got a lot of credit la t er, bu t it was his o bserva t io n. A pro fes-
sor of t h eo ret ica l ph ysics a lwa ys h a s t o be t old wh a t t o look
fo r. He ju st u ses h is kno wledge t o expla in t h e o bserva t io ns
of t h e experiment ers!
On Mo nda y mo rning General Ku t yna and I went over
t o Gra h a m's o ffice a nd asked h im if h e ha d a ny info rma t io n
on t h e effect s of t empera t u re on t h e O-rings. He didn't
h a ve it on h a nd, bu t said he wo u ld get it t o u s as soon as
possible.
Gra h a m did, h o wever, h a ve some int erest ing ph o t o -
gra ph s t o show u s. They showed a fla me gro wing fro m t h e
righ t -h a nd solid rocket boost er a few seconds befo re t h e
explo sio n. It wa s h a rd t o t ell exa ct ly wh ere t h e fla me wa s
co ming o u t , bu t t h ere wa s a model o f t h e sh u t t le righ t t h ere
in t h e o ffice. I pu t t h e mo del o n t h e flo o r a nd wa lked
a ro u nd it u nt il it looked exa ct ly like t h e pict u rein size,
a nd in o rient a t io n.
I not iced t h a t on each bo o st er ro cket t here's a lit t le
holecalled t h e leak t est po rt wh ere yo u can pu t pres-
su re in to t est t h e seals. It 's between t h e t wo O-rings, so if
it 's no t closed righ t a nd if t h e first O-ring fa ils, t h e gas
wo u ld go o u t t h ro u gh t h e hole, a nd it wo u ld be a ca t a st ro -
phe. It was ju st a bo u t wh ere t h e fla me wa s. Of cou rse, it was
st ill a qu est io n wh et h er t h e fla me wa s coming o u t of t h e
lea k t est po rt or a larger fla me was co ming o u t fa rt h er
a ro u nd, a nd we were seeing o nly t h e t ip of it .
Th a t a ft erno o n we ha d o u r emergency closed meet ing
t o hear fro m t he gu y wh o se st o ry wa s in t he Ne w York Ti mes.
His na me was Mr. Cook. He wa s in t h e bu dget depa rt ment
of NASA wh en he was asked to look int o a possible seals
pro blem a nd to est ima t e t he costs needed to rect ify it.
By talking to the engineers, he fo u nd o u t t hat the seals
had been a big problem for a long time. So he reported t hat
it wou ld cost so-and-so mu ch to fix ita lot of mo ney.
From t he po int of view of t h e press a nd some of t h e com-
missioners, Mr. Cook's st ory so u nded like a big expose, as
if NASA was h iding t h e seals problem fro m us.
I had t o sit t h ro u gh t h is big, u nnecessa ry excit ement ,
wondering if every time t here was an article in the newspa-
per, wo u ld we have t o h a ve a special meet ing? We wo u ld
never get a nywh ere t h a t wa y!
Bu t la t er, du ring t h a t same meet ing, some very int er-
est ing t h ings h a ppened. First, we saw some pictu res wh ich
showed pu ffs of smoke coming out of a field joint ju st after
ignition, before the sh u t t le even got off the pad. The smoke
was co ming o u t of t h e same placepossibly t h e leak test
po rt wh ere t h e fla me appeared later. There wa sn't mu ch
qu est ion, no w. It was all fit t ing t o get h er.
Then so met h ing h a ppened t h a t was completely u nex-
pected. An engineer fro m t h e Thiokol Co mpa ny, a Mr.
McDo na ld, wa nt ed to tell u s so met h ing. He had come to
o u r meet ing on his o wn, u ninvit ed. Mr. McDona ld re-
po rt ed t h a t t h e Thiokol engineers had come to t h e conclu-
sion t h a t low t empera t u res had so met h ing t o do wit h t h e
seals pro blem, a nd t hey were very, very worried a bo u t it.
On the night before t h e la u nch , du ring t he flight readiness
review, t hey told NASA the shu t t le shou ldn't fly if the tem-
pera t u re was below 53 degreest he previou s lowest t em-
pera t u rea nd on t h a t mo rning it was 29.
Mr. McD o na ld said NASA wa s " a ppa lled" by t h a t
statement. The man in charge of the meeting, a Mr. Mulloy,
argu ed t h a t t h e evidence was "incomplete"some fligh t s
wit h erosion a nd blowby had occu rred at hi gher t h a n 53
degreesso Thiokol shou ld reconsider its opposition to
flying.
FIGURE 12. Progressi on of a flame, possi bly from the leak test port
area. ( NASA.)
Th io ko l reversed it self, bu t McDo na ld refu sed t o go
a lo ng, sa ying, "If so met h ing goes wro ng wi t h t h is fl i gh t , I
wou ldn't wa nt to stand u p in fro nt of a board of inqu iry and
say t h a t I went ahead and told them to go ahead and fly this
t h i ng o u t side wh a t it was qu a lified to."
Th a t wa s so a st o nish ing t h a t Mr. Rogers ha d t o a sk,
"Did I u nderst a nd yo u correct ly, t h a t yo u said . . . ," a nd
he repeated t h e st o ry. And McDo na ld says, "Yes, sir."
Th e wh o le co mmissio n was sh o cked, because t h is
was t h e first t ime a ny o f u s h a d h ea rd thi s st o ry: not o nly
was t h ere a fa ilu re in t h e seals, bu t t h ere ma y h a ve been
144
a fa i l u r e in ma na gement , too.
Mr. Rogers decided t h a t we sh o u ld look ca refu l l y int o
Mr. McD o na ld's st o ry, a nd get mo re det a ils befo re we
ma de it pu blic. Bu t t o keep t h e pu blic i nfo rmed, we wo u ld
h a ve a n open meet ing t he fo llo wing da y, Tu esday, in wh ich
Mr. Cook wo u ld t est ify.
I t h o u gh t , "This is going to be like an act : we're going
t o say t h e sa me t h i ngs t o mo rro w a s we did t o da y, a nd we
wo n't lea rn a nyt h i ng new."
As we were leaving, Bill Graham came over with a stack
of pa pers fo r me.
"Geez! That's fast!" I said. "I only asked you fo r t he
i nfo rma t i o n t h is mo rning!" Gra h a m wa s a lwa ys very coop-
erative.
The C old Fac ts
145
FIGURE 14. Puffs of
blac k "smoke" (fi ne,
unburned parti c les)
were seen esc api ng from
the same plac e where
the flame was observed.
( NASA.)
146
The paper on t o p says, "Professor Feynma n of t h e
President ial Co mmissio n wa nt s t o kno w a bo u t t h e effect s
over t ime of t empera t u re on t h e resiliency of t h e O-rings
. . ."it's a memo ra ndu m addressed t o a su bo rdina t e.
Under t h a t memo is a no t h er memo: "Professor Feyn-
ma n of t h e President ia l Co mmissio n wa nt s t o kno w . . ."
fro m t h a t su bo rdina t e t o hi s su bo rdina t e, a nd so o n do wn
t h e line.
There's a pa per wit h some nu mbers on it fro m t h e
poor ba st a rd at t h e bo t t o m, a nd t h en t h ere's a series of
su bmissio n pa pers which explain t h a t t h e a nswer is being
sent u p t o t h e next level.
So here's t h is st a ck of pa pers, ju st like a sa ndwich , a nd
in t h e middle is t h e a nswert o t he wro ng qu est io n! The
a nswer was: "You squ eeze t h e ru bber fo r t wo h o u rs a t a
cert a in t empera t u re a nd pressu re, and t h en see how long
it t akes t o creep back"over hours. I wa nt ed t o kno w h o w
fa st t h e ru bber responds in mi lli sec onds du ring a la u nch . So
t h e info rma t io n was of no u se.
I went back t o my hot el. I'm feeling lo u sy a nd I'm
ea t ing dinner; I look at t h e t able, a nd t h ere's a glass of ice
wat er. I say t o myself, "Damn it , / can find o u t a bo u t t h a t
ru bber wi thout h a ving NASA send not es back a nd fo rt h : I
ju st have to try it ! All I h a ve to do is get a sample of t h e
ru bber."
I t h i nk, "I could do t his t o mo rro w while we're all sit t in'
a ro u nd, list ening to t his Cook crap we heard t o da y. We
always get ice wa t er in t hose meetings; t h a t 's so met h ing I
can do to save time."
Then I t h ink, "No, t h a t wo u ld be gau che."
Bu t t hen I t h ink of Lu is Alvarez, t h e ph ysicist . He's a
gu y I a dmire fo r his gu t siness a nd sense of h u mo r, and I
t h ink, "If Alvarez was on t his commission, he wou ld do it,
a nd t h a t 's good enou gh fo r me."
There are stories of physicist sgreat heroeswho
have got t en info rma t io n one, t wo, t h reeju st like t h a t
wh ere everybody else is t rying to do it in a complicat ed wa y.
For example, a ft er u lt ra vio let ra ys and X-ra ys ha d been
disco vered, t here was a new t ype, called N-ra ys, discovered
by Andre Blo ndel, in France. It wa s h a rd t o det ect t h e
N-ra ys: o t h er scient ist s ha d di ffi cu l t y repea t ing Blondel's
experiment s, so someone asked the great America n ph ysi-
cist R. W. Wood to go to Blondel's la bo ra t o ry.
Blondel gave a pu blic lect u re and demo nst ra t io n. N-
ra ys were bent by a lu minu m, so he ha d all kinds of lenses
lined u p, followed by a big disk wit h a n a lu minu m prism in
t h e middle. As t h e a lu minu m prism slowly t u rned, t h e N-
ra ys came u p t h is way and bent t h a t wa y, a nd Blo ndel's
a ssist a nt repo rt ed t heir int ensit ydifferent nu mbers fo r
different angles.
N-ra ys were a ffect ed by ligh t , so Blondel t u rned o u t
t h e ligh t s t o ma ke his rea dings more sensit ive. His a ssist a nt
co nt inu ed t o repo rt t h eir int ensit y.
When t h e ligh t s came back on, t here's R. W. Wood in
t h e fro nt row, h o lding t h e prism h igh in t h e a ir, balanced
on t h e t ips of his fingers, fo r all to see! So t h a t wa s t h e end
of t h e N-ra y.
I t h ink, "Exact ly! I've got t o get a sa mple of t h e ru b-
ber." I call Bill Gra h a m.
It 's impossible t o get: it 's kept somewhere down a t
Kennedy. Bu t t h en Gra h a m remembers t h a t t h e mo del o f
t h e field jo i nt we're going t o u se in o u r meet ing t o mo rro w
h a s t wo samples of t h e ru bber in it . He says, "We could
meet in my o ffice before t h e meet ing a nd see if we can get
t h e ru bber ou t ."
The next mo rning I get u p early and go o u t in fro nt
of my h o t el. It 's eight in t h e mo rning a nd it 's snowing. I
find a t a xi a nd say to t h e driver, "I'd like to go to a h a rdwa re
store."
"A h a rdwa re st ore, sir?"
"Yeah. I go t t a get some tools."
"Sir, t h ere's no h a rdwa re stores a ro u nd here; t h e Cap-
itol is over there, the White House is over therewait a
minu t e: I t h i nk I remember pa ssing one t h e o t h er day."
He fo u nd t h e h a rdwa re st ore, a nd it t u rned o u t it
di dn't open till 8:30it was a bo u t 8:15so I wait ed o u t -
side, in my su itcoat and tie, a costume I had assumed since
I came t o W a sh ingt o n in order t o move a mo ng t h e na t ives
wi t h o u t being too co nspicu o u s.
The su it co a t s t h a t t h e na t ives wear inside t h eir bu ild-
ings (wh ich are well h ea t ed) are su ffi ci ent fo r wa lking fro m
o ne bu ilding t o a no t h ero r fro m a bu ilding t o a taxi if t h e
bu ildings are t oo fa r a pa rt . (All t h e t a xis are h ea t ed.) Bu t
t h e na t ives seem t o h a ve a st ra nge fea r of t h e cold: t h ey pu t
overcoat s on t o p of t h eir su it co a t s if t h ey wish t o step
o u t side. I h a dn't bo u gh t a n overcoat yet , so I was st ill ra t h er
co nspicu o u s st a nding o u t side t h e h a rdwa re st ore in t h e
snow.
At 8:30 I went in a nd bo u gh t a co u ple of screwdrivers,
some pliers, a nd t h e sma llest C-clamp I cou ld find. Then
I went t o NASA.
On t h e wa y t o Gra h a m's o ffice, I t h o u gh t ma ybe t h e
cla mp was t o o big. I di dn't h a ve mu ch t ime, so I ra n do wn
t o t h e medical depa rt ment of NASA. (I knew wh ere it wa s,
becau se I h a d been going t h ere fo r blood t est s ordered by
my ca rdio lo gist , wh o was t ryi ng t o t rea t me by t elephone.)
I a sked fo r a medical cla mp like t h ey pu t on t u bes.
They didn't h a ve a ny. Bu t t h e gu y sa ys, "Well, let 's see
if yo u r C-clamp fits inside a glass!" It fitted very easily.
I went u p t o Gra h a m's o ffice.
The ru bber came o u t of t h e model easily wi t h ju st a
pa ir of pliers. So t h ere I was wit h t h e ru bber sa mple in my
h a nd. Alt h o u gh I knew it wou ld be mo re dra ma t ic and
h o nest t o do t h e experiment fo r t h e first t ime in t h e pu blic
meet ing, I did so met h ing t h a t I'm a lit t le bit a sh a med of.
I cheated. I co u ldn't resist . I tried it . So, fo llo wing t h e
example of h a ving a closed meet ing before an open meet -
FIGURE 15. The fi eld-joi nt model from whi c h Feynman got the O-ri ng
sample.
ing, I disco vered it wo rked befo re I did it in t h e open
meet ing. Then I pu t t h e ru bber ba ck int o t h e model so
Gra h a m could t ake it t o t h e meet ing.
I go t o t h e meet ing, all rea dy, wit h pliers in one po cket
a nd a C-clamp in t h e o t h er. I sit down next t o General
Ku t yna .
At t h e previo u s meet ing, t h ere was ice wa t er fo r every-
bo dy. This t ime, t h ere's no ice wa t er. I get u p a nd go over
to somebody who looks like he's in charge, and I say, "I'd
like a glass of ice wa t er, please."
He says, " Cert a inly! Cert a inly!"
Five minu t es la t er, t h e gu a rds close t h e doors, t h e
meet ing st a rt s, a nd I h a ven't got my ice wat er.
I gest u re over t o t h e gu y I ju st t a lked t o. He comes
over and sa ys, " Do n't wo rry, it's coming!"
The meet ing is going a lo ng, and no w Mr. Mu llo y be-
gins t o t ell u s a bo u t t h e seals. (Appa rent ly, NASA wa nt s t o
t ell u s a bo u t t h e seals before Mr. Cook does.) The mo del
st a rt s t o go a ro u nd, a nd each co mmissio ner looks at it a
lit t le bit .
Mea nwh ile, no ice wa t er!
Mr. Mu llo y expla ins how t h e seals a re su ppo sed t o
wo rkin t h e u su a l NASA wa y: h e u ses fu n n y words a nd
a cro nyms, a nd it's h a rd fo r a nybo dy else t o u nderst a nd.
In order t o set t h i ngs u p wh ile I'm wa it ing fo r t h e ice
wa t er, I st a rt o u t : " D u ring a l a u nch , t h ere are vibra t io ns
wh ich cau se t h e rocket jo int s t o move a lit t le bit is t h a t
correct?"
"That is correct , sir."
"And inside t h e jo int s, these so-called O-rings are su p-
posed t o expa nd t o ma ke a sealis t h a t righ t ?"
"Yes, sir. In st a t ic co ndit io ns t h ey sh o u l d be in direct
co nt a ct wi t h t h e t a ng a nd clevis* a nd squ eezed t went y-
t h o u sa ndt h s o f a n inch ."
" W h y do n't we t a ke t h e O-rings o u t ?"
"Becau se t h en yo u wo u ld h a ve h o t gas expa ndi ng
t h ro u gh t h e jo int . . ."
" No w, in o rder fo r t h e seal t o wo rk co rrect ly, t h e O-
rings mu st be ma de o f ru bberno t so met h ing like lea d,
wh i ch , wh en yo u squ a sh it , it stays."
"Yes, sir."
"Now, if t he O-ring wa sn't resilient fo r a second or
t wo , wo u ld t h a t be eno u gh t o be a very da ngero u s sit u a -
t io n?"
"Yes, sir."
Th a t led u s righ t u p t o t h e qu est io n of cold t empera -
t u re and the resilience of t h e ru bber. I wa nt ed to prove t h a t
Mr. Mu llo y mu st h a ve kno wn t h a t t empera t u re ha d a n ef-
fect , a lt h o u gh a cco rding t o Mr. McD o na ldh e claimed
t h a t t h e evidence was " incomplet e." Bu t st ill, no ice wa t er!
So I had to st op, a nd somebody else st art ed a sking qu es-
t ions.
*The t a ng is t h e male pa rt o f t h e jo int ; t h e clevis is t h e fema le pa rt (see Figu re
13).
The mo del comes a ro u nd t o Genera l Ku t yna , a nd t h en
t o me. The cla mp a nd pliers come o u t of my po cket , I t a ke
t h e mo del a pa rt , I've got t h e O-ring pieces in my h a nd, bu t
I st ill h a ven't got a ny ice wa t er! I t u r n a ro u nd a ga in a nd
signa l t h e gu y I've been bo t h ering a bo u t it , a nd h e signa ls
ba ck, "Don't wo rry, yo u 'll get it!"
Pret t y soon I see a yo u ng wo ma n, wa y do wn in fr o nt ,
bringing in a t ra y wit h gla sses on it . She gives a glass of ice
wa t er t o Mr. Ro gers, she gives a glass of ice wa t er t o Mr.
Armst ro ng, she wo rks h er wa y ba ck a nd fo r t h a lo ng t h e
ro ws of t h e da is, giving ice wa t er t o everybo dy! The poor
wo ma n h a d go t t en everyt h ing t o get h erju g, glasses, ice,
t ra y, t h e wh o le t h ingso t h a t everybo dy cou ld h a ve ice
wa t er.
So finally, wh en I get my ice wa t er, I do n't drink it! I
squ eeze t h e ru bber in t h e C-cla mp, a nd pu t t h em in t h e
glass of ice wa t er.
Aft er a few mi nu t es, I'm rea dy t o sh o w t h e resu lt s o f
my lit t le experiment . I rea ch fo r t h e lit t le bu t t o n t h a t a ct i-
va t es my micro ph o ne.
Genera l Ku t yna , wh o 's ca u gh t o n t o wh a t I'm do ing,
qu ickly lea ns over t o me a nd sa ys, "Co-pilot t o pilo t : no t
no w."
Pret t y soon, I'm reaching fo r my microphone again.
"Not now!" He po int s in o u r briefing bo o kwit h all
t h e ch a rt s a nd slides Mr. Mu llo y is going t h ro u gh a nd
sa ys, "When h e comes t o t h is slide, h ere, t h a t 's t h e righ t
t ime t o do it ."
Fina lly Mr. Mu llo y comes t o t h e pla ce, I press t h e
bu t t o n fo r my micro ph o ne, and I sa y, " I t ook t h is ru bber
fro m t h e model a nd pu t it in a cla mp in ice wa t er fo r a
while."
I t a ke t h e cla mp o u t , hold it u p in t h e air, a nd loosen
it a s I t a lk: " I discovered t h a t wh en yo u u ndo t h e cla mp, t h e
ru bber do esn't spring ba ck. In o t h er wo rds, fo r mo re t h a n
a few seconds, t h ere is no resilience in t h is pa rt icu la r ma t e-
ria l wh en it is at a t empera t u re of 32 degrees. I believe t h a t
152
FIGURE 15A. The O-ri ng i c e-water demonstrati on. ( MARILYNN K.
YEE, NYT PICTURES.)
has some significance fo r o u r problem."
Before Mr. Mu llo y cou ld say a nyt h ing, Mr. Rogers
sa ys, "That is a ma t t er we will consider, of cou rse, at lengt h
in t h e session t h a t we will hold on t h e wea t h er, a nd I t h ink
it is a n impo rt a nt po int wh ich I'm su re Mr. Mu llo y a ckno wl-
edges a nd will co mment on in a fu r t h er session."
D u ring t h e lu nch break, report ers came u p t o me a nd
asked qu est io ns like, "Were you t a lking a bo u t t h e O-ring,
or t h e pu t t y?" a nd "Would yo u expla in t o u s wh a t an O-
ring is, exa ct ly?" So I was ra t h er depressed t h a t I wa sn't
able t o ma ke my po int . Bu t t h a t nigh t , all t h e news shows
ca u gh t on t o t h e significa nce of t h e experiment , a nd t h e
next da y, t h e newspa per art icles explained everyt h ing per-
fect ly.
MY cou sin Frances edu cat ed me a bo u t
t h e press. She ha d been t h e AP Wh it e
Ho u se co rrespo ndent du ring t h e
Nixo n and Ford a dminist ra t io ns, a nd
was now wo rking fo r CNN. Frances
wo u ld tell me st ories of gu ys ru nning
o u t ba ck doors becau se t h ey're a fra id
of t h e press. From h er I got t h e idea
t h a t t h e press isn't doing a nyt h ing evil;
t h e repo rt ers are simply t rying t o h elp
people kno w wh a t 's going on, a nd it
do esn't do a ny h a rm t o be co u rt eo u s t o
t h em.
I fo u nd o u t t h a t t h ey're really qu it e
friendly, if yo u give t h em a chance. So
I wa sn't a fra id of t h e press, a nd I wo u ld
a lwa ys a nswer t h eir qu est io ns.
Repo rt ers wo u ld explain t o me
t h a t I cou ld sa y, " No t fo r a t t ribu t io n."
Bu t I didn't wa nt a ny h o cu s-po cu s. I
di dn't wa nt it t o sou nd like I'm lea king
so met h ing. So wh enever I t a lked t o t h e
press, I was st ra igh t . As a resu lt of t h is,
my na me was in t h e newspa per every
da y, all over t h e place!
It seemed like I was a lwa ys t h e one
a nswering t h e repo rt ers' qu est io ns.
Oft en t h e rest of t h e commissioners
wo u ld be a nxio u s t o go off t o lu nch ,
and I'd st ill be t here, a nswering qu es-
t io ns. Bu t I figu red, " Wh a t 's t h e po int
of h a ving a pu blic meet ing if yo u ru n
away when t h ey ask you wh a t a wo rd
mea nt ?"
Wh en we'd finally get t o o u r lu nch ,
Mr. Rogers wo u ld remind u s t o be care-
C hec k Si x!
155
fu l no t t o t a lk t o t h e press. I wo u ld say so met h ing like,
"Well, I wa s ju st t elling t h em a bo u t t h e O-rings."
He wo u ld sa y, " That 's o ka y. Y o u 've been do ing all
righ t , Dr. Feynma n; I h a ve no pro blem wit h t h a t ." So I
never did figu re o u t , exa ct ly, wh a t h e mea nt by "not t a lking
t o t h e press."
Being on t h e commission wa s ra t h er t ense wo rk, so I
enjo yed h a ving dinner once in a wh ile wit h Frances a nd
Ch u ck, my sist er's son, wh o wa s wo rking fo r t h e Washi ngton
Post. Beca u se Mr. Ro gers kept t a lking a bo u t lea ks, we ma de
su re we never said a word a bo u t a nyt h i ng I wa s doing. If
CNN needed t o find o u t so met h ing fro m me, t h ey'd h a ve
t o send a different repo rt er. The same went fo r t h e Post.
I told Mr. Rogers a bo u t my rela t ives wo r ki ng fo r t h e
press: "We've agreed no t t o t a lk a bo u t my wo rk. Do yo u
t h i nk t h ere's a ny pro blem?"
He smiled a nd said, " It 's perfect ly all righ t . I h a ve a
co u sin in t h e press, too. There's no pro blem at all."
On Wednesda y t h e co mmissio n h a d no t h ing t o do, so
General Ku t yna invit ed me over t o t h e Pent a go n t o edu ca t e
me o n t h e rela t io nsh ip between t h e a ir fo rce a nd NASA.
It wa s t h e first t ime I ha d ever been in t h e Pent a go n.
There were all t h ese gu ys in u ni fo rm wh o wo u ld t a ke or-
dersno t like in civilia n life. He says to one of t h em, "I'd
like to u se t h e briefing room . . ."
"Y es, sir!"
" ... a nd we'll need t o see slides nu mber su ch -a nd-su ch
a nd so-a nd-so."
"Yes, sir! Y es, sir!"
We've got all t h ese gu ys wo rking fo r u s while General
Ku t yna gives me a big present a t io n in t h is special briefing
ro o m. The slides are sh o wn fro m t h e ba ck on a t ra nspa rent
wa ll. It was really fa ncy.
General Ku t yna wo u ld say t h ings like, "Senator So-
a nd-so is in NASA's po cket ," and I wo u ld sa y, h a lf-jo king,
L
Check Six!
156
'What Do You C are What Other People Thi nk?"
" Do n't give me t hese side rema rks, General; yo u 're filling
my h ea d! Bu t do n't wo rry, I'll fo rget it all." I wa nt ed t o be
na ive: I'd find o u t wh a t h a ppened t o t h e sh u t t l e first ; I'd
wo rry a bo u t t h e big po lit ica l pressu res la t er.
Somewhere in h is present a t io n, General Ku t yna ob-
served t h a t everybo dy o n t h e commission h a s so me weak-
ness beca u se of t h eir connect ions: h e, h a ving wo rked very
closely wi t h NASA perso nnel in his fo rmer po sit io n a s Air
Force Space Sh u t t le Program ma na ger, finds it di ffi cu l t , if
no t impo ssible, t o drive h o me some of t h e t o u gh er qu es-
t io ns on NASA ma na gement . Sally Ride st ill has a jo b wit h
NASA, so she ca n't ju st say everyt h ing she wa nt s. Mr. Cov-
ert h a d wo rked on the engines, and h a d been a co nsu lt a nt
to NASA, a nd so on.
I sa id, "I'm a sso cia t ed wi t h Ca lt ech , bu t I do n't con-
sider t h a t a wea kness!"
"Well," h e sa ys, " t h a t 's righ t . Y o u 're invinciblea s fa r
as we can see. Bu t in t h e air force we h a ve a ru le: check six."
He expla ined, "A gu y is flying a long, lo o king in a ll
direct io ns, a nd feeling very sa fe. Ano t h er gu y flies u p be-
h ind h im (at 'six o 'clo ck''t welve o'clock' is direct ly in
fr o nt ), a nd sh o o t s. Mo st a irpla nes are sh o t do wn t h a t wa y.
Th inking t h a t yo u 're safe is very da ngero u s! Somewhere,
t h ere's a wea kness yo u 've got t o find. Y ou mu st a lwa ys
check six o'clock."
An u nderling comes in. There's some mu mbl i ng a bo u t
so mebo dy else needing t h e briefing room now. General
Ku t yna sa ys, "Tell t h em I'll be finished in t en minu t es."
"Yes, sir!"
Fina lly, we go o u t . There, in t h e ha ll, are TEN GEN-
ERALS wa it ing t o u se t h e ro o ma nd I ha d been sit t ing in
t h ere, get t ing t h is personal briefing. I felt grea t .
For t h e rest of t h e da y, I wro t e a let t er h o me. I began
t o wo rry a bo u t "check six" when I described Mr. Rogers'
rea ct io n t o my visit ing Frances a nd Ch u ck. I wrot e,
C hec k Si x!
157
. . . I wa s pleased by Rogers' react ion, bu t no w a s I writ e t h is
I h a ve second t h o u gh t s. It wa s too ea sya ft er h e explicit ly t a lked
a bo u t t h e impo rt a nce of no leaks etc. at earlier meet ings. Am I
being set u p? (SEE, D ARLING, WASHINGTON PARANOIA IS
SETTING IN.) . . . I t h ink it is possible t h a t t h ere are t h ings in
t h is somebody migh t be t rying t o keep me fro m finding o u t and
migh t t ry to discredit me if I get too close. . . . So, rel u ct a nt l y,
I will h a ve t o no t visit Frances and Ch u ck a ny more. Well, I'll
a sk Fran first if t h a t is too pa ra no id. Rogers seemed so agreeable
a nd rea ssu ring. It wa s so easy, yet I am pro ba bly a t h o rn in his
side. . . .
Tomorrow at 6:15 am we go by special a irpla ne (t wo pla nes)
t o Kennedy Space Cent er t o be "briefed." No do u bt we shall
wa nder a bo u t , being sh o wn everyt h inggee wh i zbu t no t ime
t o get int o t ech nica l det a ils wi t h a nybo dy. Well, it wo n't wo rk. If
I am no t sa t isfied by Frida y, I will st a y o ver Sat & Su n, or if t h ey
do n't wo rk t h en, Mo nda y & Tu esda y. I a m det ermined t o do t h e
jo b o f finding o u t wh a t h a ppenedlet t h e ch ips fa ll!
My gu ess is t h a t I will be a llo wed t o do t h is, o verwh elmed
wi t h da t a and det a ils . . . , so t h ey h a ve t ime t o so ft en u p da nger-
ou s wit nesses etc. Bu t it wo n't wo rk beca u se (1) I do t ech nica l
i nfo rma t i o n exchange and u nderst a ndi ng mu ch fa st er t h a n t h ey
ima gine, a nd (2) I a lrea dy smell cert a in ra t s t h a t I will no t fo rget ,
beca u se I ju st love t h e smell of ra t s, fo r it is t h e spoor of excit ing
a dvent u re.
I feel like a bu ll in a ch ina sh o p. The best t h i ng is t o pu t t h e
bu ll o u t t o wo rk o n t h e plow. A bet t er met a ph o r will be a n o x in
a china shop, becau se t h e china is t h e bu ll, of cou rse.*
So, mu ch as I wo u ld ra t h er be h o me and do ing so met h ing
else, I am h a ving a wo nderfu l t ime.
Love,
Rich a rd
The press was repo rt ing ru mo rs t h a t NASA wa s u nder
great polit ical pressu re t o la u nch t h e sh u t t le, a nd t here
were va rio u s t heories as t o wh ere t h e pressu re was coming
*The t h i ng Feynma n wa s going t o brea k u p wa s t h e ba lo ney (t h e " bu ll " )
a bo u t h o w good everyt h i ng was a t NASA.
from. It was a grea t big world of myst ery t o me, wit h tre-
mendou s forces. I wou ld investigate it , all righ t , a nd if I
pro t ect ed myself, no t h ing wo u ld happen. Bu t I hadda
wa t ch o u t .
FINALLY, early on Th u rsda y mo rning,
we get to Florida . The original idea was
t hat we wou ld go arou nd t he Kennedy
Space Cent er at Cape Canaveral a nd
see everyt h ing on a gu ided t o u r. Bu t
because informat ion was coming ou t in
t h e newspapers so fa st , we h a d a pu blic
meet ing first .
First, we saw some detailed pic-
t u res of t h e smoke coming o u t of t h e
sh u t t le wh ile it was st ill o n t h e la u nch
pad. There are cameras all over the
place wa t ch ing t h e la u nch so met h ing
like a h u ndred of t h em. Where t h e
smoke came o u t , there were t wo cam-
eras looking st ra igh t a t it bu t bo t h
fa iled, cu riou sly. Nevert h eless, fro m
other cameras we could see fo u r or five
pu ffs o f bla ck smoke coming o u t fro m
a field jo i nt . This smoke was no t bu rn-
ing mat erial; it was simply carbon and
mu cky st u ff t hat was pushed ou t be-
cau se of pressu re inside t h e rocket .
The pu ffs stopped a ft er a few sec-
onds: the seal got plugged up some-
h o w, t empo ra rily, only t o brea k open
again a minu t e later.
There was some discussion abou t
h o w mu ch ma t t er came ou t in t h e
smoke. The pu ffs of smoke were a bo u t
six feet long, and a few feet thick. The
a mo u nt of ma t t er depends on h o w fine
t h e pa rt icles are, and there cou ld al-
ways be a big piece of glop inside the
smoke clou d, so it 's hard to ju dge. And
because t h e pict u res were t a ken fro m
Gumshoes
160
"What Do You C are What Other People Thi nk?'
FIGURE 16. Detai led pi c ture, taken from the launc h pad, of the
"smoke. " ( NASA.)
Gumshoes 161
t h e side, it was possible t h ere was more smoke fa rt h er
a ro u nd t h e ro cket .
To est ablish a minimu m, I a ssu med a pa rt icle size t h a t
wou ld pro du ce as mu ch smoke as po ssible o u t of a given
a mo u nt of ma t eria l. It came o u t su rprisingly sma lla p-
proximately one cubic inch: if you have a cubic inch of st u ff,
yo u can get t h a t mu ch smoke.
We asked fo r pict u res fro m other launches. We fo u nd
o u t later t h a t t here ha d never been a ny pu ffs of smoke on
a ny previo u s fligh t s.
We also heard a bo u t t h e low t empera t u res befo re t h e
la u nch fro m a ma n named Charlie St evenso n, wh o wa s in
charge of the ice crew. He said t he t emperat u re had gone
do wn t o 22 degrees du ring t h e nigh t , bu t his crew got
readings as low as 8 degrees at some places on the lau nch
pa d, a nd t h ey co u ldn't u nderst a nd wh y.
D u ring t h e lu nch brea k, a repo rt er fro m a local TV
st a t io n asked me wh a t I t h o u gh t a bo u t t h e low t empera t u re
rea dings. I said it seemed t o me t h a t t h e liqu id h ydro gen
and oxygen had chilled the 22-degree air even fu rt h er as it
flo wed do wn t h e big fu el t a nk o nt o t h e ro cket bo o st er. For
some reason, the reporter t h o u gh t I had ju st told him some
impo rt a nt , secret info rma t io n, so h e didn't u se my na me in
his repo rt t h a t evening. Inst ea d, he said, "This expla na t io n
comes fro m a No bel Prize winner, so it mu st be right ."
In t h e a ft erno o n, t h e t elemet ering people gave u s all
kinds of informat ion on t he last moments of the shu ttle.
Hu ndreds of t h ings ha d been mea su red, all of wh ich indica-
ted t hat everything was working as well as it could u nder
t h e circu mst a nces: t h e pressu re in t h e h ydro gen t a nk su d-
denly fell a few seconds a ft er t h e flame had been observed;
t h e gyros wh ich steer t h e sh u t t l e were wo rking perfect ly
u nt il one h a d t o wo rk h a rder t h a n t h e o t h er beca u se t h ere
were side forces fro m the flame shooting ou t of the side of
t h e boost er rocket ; t h e ma in engines even sh u t t hemselves
down when the hydrogen t ank exploded, because there was
a pressu re dro p in the fu el lines.
Th a t meet ing lasted u nt i l 7:30 in t h e evening, so we
po st po ned t h e t o u r u nt il Friday and went st ra igh t t o a
dinner set u p by Mr. Rogers.
At t h e dinner I happened to be seated next to Al Keel,
wh o ha d joined the commission on Mo nda y as its execu t ive
o fficer t o help Mr. Rogers organize a nd ru n o u r work. He
came to u s from the Wh it e Ho u sefro m so met h ing called
t h e OMB*and had a good repu t a t io n fo r doing a fine jo b
at t his a nd t h a t . Mr. Rogers kept saying how lu cky we were
to get somebody wit h su ch high qu alificat ions.
One t h ing t h a t impressed me, t h o u gh , was t h a t Dr.
Keel had a Ph.D. in aerospace, and had done some post-doc
wo rk at Berkeley. When he int rodu ced himself on Monda y,
he joked t h a t t h e last "honest work" he had done fo r a
living was some aerodynamics work fo r t h e sh u t t l e pro gra m
ten or t welve years ago. So I felt very comfort able wit h h im.
Well, I h a ven't been t a lking to Dr. Keel fo r mo re t h a n
five minu t es, when he tells me he's never been so insu lt ed
in his life, t h a t he didn't t ake t his jo b t o be so insu lt ed, a nd
t h a t he do esn't wa nt t o talk t o me anymore!
No w, I have a way of no t remembering t h ings when I
do so met h ing du mb or a nno ying t o people, so I fo rget wh a t
I said t h a t pu t him o u t . Wha t ever it was, I t h o u gh t I was
jo king, so I was very su rprised by his react ion. I had u n-
do u bt edly said some boorish, bra sh , da mn-fool t h ing,
wh ich I t h erefo re ca n't remember!
Then t here was a ra t h er tense period of five or ten
minu t es, wit h me apologizing a nd t rying t o get a conversa-
tion going again. We finally got to t a lking again, somewha t .
We were no t big friends, bu t at least there was peace.
On Friday mo rning, we had a no t h er pu blic meet ing,
t his t ime t o h ea r people fro m Thiokol and NASA t a lk a bo u t
*The Office of Ma na gement a nd Bu dget .
Gumshoes
163
t h e nigh t before the la u nch . Everyt h ing came o u t so slowly:
t h e wit ness do esn't really wa nt t o t ell yo u everyt h ing, so
yo u h a ve t o get t h e a nswers o u t by a sking exa ct ly t h e righ t
qu est io ns.
Ot her gu ys on t h e commission were complet ely
a wa keMr. Su t t er, fo r inst a nce. "Exact ly wh a t were yo u r
qu a lit y crit eria fo r acceptance u nder su ch -a nd-su ch and
so-and-so?"he'd a sk specific qu est io ns like t h a t , and it
wo u ld t u rn o u t t h ey didn't h a ve any su ch crit eria . Mr. Co v-
ert a nd Mr. Wa lker were t h e same wa y. Everybo dy was
a sking good qu est io ns, bu t I wa s fogged o u t most of t h e
t ime, feeling a lit t le bit beh ind.
Then t his bu siness of Thiokol ch a nging it s po sit io n
came u p. Mr. Rogers a nd Dr. Ride were a sking t wo Thiokol
ma na gers, Mr. Ma so n a nd Mr. Lu nd, h o w ma ny people
were a ga inst t h e la u nch , even a t t h e la st mo ment .
"We di dn't poll everyone," says Mr. Ma so n.
"Was t h ere a su bst a nt ia l nu mber a ga inst t h e la u nch , o r
ju st one o r t wo ?"
"There were, I wo u ld sa y, pro ba bly five or six in engi-
neering wh o a t t h a t po int wo u ld h a ve said it is no t a s con-
serva t ive t o go wit h t h a t t empera t u re, and we do n't kno w.
The issu e wa s we didn't kno w fo r su re t h a t it wo u ld wo rk."
"So it was evenly divided?"
"That's a very est ima t ed nu mber."
It st ru ck me t h a t t he Thiokol ma na gers were wa ffl i ng.
Bu t I only knew h o w to a sk simpleminded qu est io ns. So I
sa id, "Could yo u t ell me, sirs, t h e na mes of yo u r fo u r best
seals expert s, in order of a bilit y?"
"Roger Boisjoly a nd Arnie Th o mpso n are one a nd
t wo. Then t h ere's Ja ck Ka pp a nd, u h . . . Jerry Bu rns."
I t u rned t o Mr. Bo isjo ly, wh o was righ t t h ere, a t t h e
meet ing. "Mr. Boisjoly, were yo u in a greement t h a t it wa s
okay to fly?"
He says, " No, I was not."
I a sk Mr. Th o mpso n, wh o was also t here.
"No, I wa s no t ."
I say, "Mr. Ka pp?"
Mr. Lu nd sa ys, "He is no t here. I t a lked t o h im a ft er
t h e meet ing, a nd h e sa id, 'I wo u ld h a ve ma de t h a t decision,
given t h e i nfo rma t i o n we h a d.' '
"And t h e fo u r t h ma n?"
"Jerry Bu rns. I do n't kno w wh a t his po sit io n was."
"So," I sa id, "of t h e fo u r, we have one 'do n't kno w,'
o ne 'very likely yes,' a nd t h e t wo wh o were ment io ned righ t
away as being t h e best seal expert s, both sai d no. " So t h is
"evenly split " st u ff was a lot of crap. The gu ys wh o knew
t h e most a bo u t t h e sea lswh a t were they sa ying?
Lat e in t h e a ft erno o n, we were sh o wn a ro u nd t h e
Kennedy Space Cent er. It wa s int erest ing; it wa sn't a s ba d
as I h a d predict ed. The o t h er co mmissio ners a sked a lo t of
i mpo r t a nt qu est io ns. We didn't h a ve t ime t o see t h e
bo o st er-ro cket a ssembly, bu t nea r t h e end we were go ing
t o see t h e wrecka ge t h a t h a d been recovered so fa r. I wa s
pret t y t ired o f t h is gro u p st u ff, so I excu sed myself fro m t h e
rest o f t h e t o u r.
I ra n do wn t o Ch a rlie St evenso n's place t o see mo re
pict u res o f t h e la u nch . I also fo u nd o u t mo re a bo u t t h e
u nu su a l l y low t empera t u re rea dings. The gu ys were very
co o pera t ive, a nd wa nt ed me t o wo rk wi t h t h em. I h a d been
wa it ing fo r ten days t o r u n a ro u nd in one of t h ese places,
a nd h ere I was, at last!
At dinner t h a t nigh t , I said t o Mr. Rogers, " I was t h i nk-
ing of st a ying here over t h e weekend."
"Well, Dr. Feynma n," he said, "I'd prefer you come
back t o Wa sh ingt o n wi t h u s t o nigh t . Bu t o f cou rse, yo u 're
free t o do wh a t ever yo u wa nt ."
"Well, t h en," I said, "I'll st a y."
On Sa t u rda y I t a lked t o t h e gu y wh o ha d a ct u a lly t a ken
t h e t empera t u re readings t h e mo rning of t h e la u nch a
nice fella named B. K. Davis. Next to each t empera t u re he
Gumshoes 165
h a d writ t en t h e exact t ime h e h a d mea su red it , and t hen
t ook a pict u re of it . Y ou cou ld see large gaps bet ween t h e
t imes as he climbed u p a nd down t h e big la u nch t ower. He
mea su red t h e t empera t u re of t h e air, t h e rocket , t h e
gro u nd, t h e ice, a nd even a pu ddle of slu sh wit h a nt ifreeze
in it. He did a very co mplet e jo b.
NASA h a d a t heoret ical calcu lat ion of how t h e t emper-
a t u res shou ld va ry a ro u nd t h e la u nch pa d: t h ey shou ld h a ve
been more u nifo rm, a nd h igh er. Somebody t h o u gh t t h a t
h ea t ra dia t ing t o t h e clear sky ha d so met h ing t o do wit h it .
Bu t t h en someone else not iced t h a t BK's rea ding fo r t h e
slu sh wa s mu ch lower t h a n t he ph o t o gra ph indica t ed: a t 8
degrees, t h e slu sheven wit h a nt ifreeze in it sh o u ld h a ve
been fro zen solid.
Then we looked at t h e device t h e ice crew u sed fo r
mea su ring t h e t empera t u res. I go t t h e inst ru ct io n ma nu a l
o u t , a nd fo u nd t h a t yo u 're su pposed t o pu t t h e inst ru ment
o u t in t h e enviro nment fo r a t least 20 minu t es befo re u sing
i t . Mr. Davis said he ha d t a ken it ou t of t h e boxa t 70
degreesand began ma king mea su rement s righ t a wa y.
Therefore we ha d t o find o u t wh et h er t h e errors were re-
produ cible. In o t h er wo rds, cou ld t h e circu mst a nces be
du plica t ed?
On Mo nda y I called u p t h e co mpa ny t h a t ma de t h e
device, a nd t a lked to one of t heir technical gu ys: "Hi, my
na me is Dick Feynma n," I said. "I'm on t h e commission
invest iga t ing t h e C hallenger a ccident , and I h a ve some qu es-
t ions a bo u t yo u r infra red sca nning gu n . . . "
"May I call yo u righ t ba ck?" he says.
"Sure."
Aft er a lit t le while he calls me back: "I'm sorry, bu t it 's
pro priet a ry info rma t io n. I ca n't discu ss it wit h you ."
By t h is t ime I realized wh a t the real difficu lt y was: t h e
co mpa ny was sc ared green t h a t we were going t o blame t h e
accident on their inst ru ment . I said, "Sir, yo u r scanning
gu n has no t h ing t o do wit h t h e accident . It was u sed by t h e
people here in a wa y t h a t 's co nt ra ry t o t h e pro cedu res in
yo u r inst ru ct io n ma nu a l , a nd I'm t ryi ng t o figu re o u t if we
can repro du ce t h e errors and det ermine wh a t t h e t empera -
t u res really were t h a t mo rning. To do t h is, I need t o kno w
more a bo u t yo u r inst ru ment ."
The gu y fina lly came a ro u nd, a nd became qu it e coop-
era t ive. Wit h his h elp, I a dvised t h e ice-crew gu ys on an
experiment . They cooled a room do wn to a bo u t 40 de-
grees, a nd pu t a big blo ck of ice in it wit h ice, yo u can be
su re t h e su rfa ce t empera t u re is 32 degrees. Then t h ey
bro u gh t in t h e sca nning gu n fro m a room wh ich was 70
degrees inside, a nd ma de mea su rement s of t h e ice blo ck
every 30 seconds. They were a ble t o mea su re h o w fa r o ff
t h e i nst ru ment was a s a fu nct i o n o f t ime.
Mr. Da vis h a d wri t t en his mea su rement s so ca refu lly
t h a t it wa s very easy t o fix all t h e nu mbers. And t h en,
rema rka bly, t h e reca lcu la t ed t empera t u res were close t o
wh a t was expect ed a cco rding t o t h e t h eo ret ica l mo del. It
looked very sensible.
The next t ime I t alked t o a repo rt er, I st ra igh t ened
everyt h ing o u t a bo u t t h e t empera t u res, a nd info rmed h im
t h a t t h e ea rlier t h eo ry expo u nded by t h e No bel Prize win-
ner was wro ng.
I wro t e a repo rt fo r t h e o t h er co mmissio ners o n t h e
t empera t u re pro blem, a nd sent it t o Dr. Keel.
Then I invest iga t ed so met h ing we were lo o king int o as
a po ssible co nt ribu t ing cause of t he a ccident : wh en t h e
bo o st er rocket s h it t h e ocean, t h ey beca me o u t o f ro u nd a
lit t le bit fro m t h e impa ct . At Kennedy t h ey're t a ken a pa rt ,
a nd t h e sect io nsfo u r fo r each ro cket a re sent by rail t o
Th io ko l in Ut a h , wh ere t h ey are packed wit h new propel-
la nt . Then t h ey're pu t ba ck o n a t ra in t o Florida . D u ring
t ra nspo rt , t h e sect io ns (wh ich are h a u led on t h eir side) get
squ a sh ed a lit t le bi t t h e so ft ish pro pella nt is very h ea vy.
The t o t a l a mo u nt of squ a sh ing is o nly a fra ct i o n of an inch ,
Gumshoes
167
bu t when you pu t the rocket sections ba ck t oget her, a small
gap is enou gh to let h o t gases t h ro u gh : t h e O-rings are only
a qu a rt er of an inch t hick, and compressed only t wo -h u n-
dredt h s of an inch!
I t h o u gh t I'd do some ca lcu la t io ns. NASA gave me all
t h e nu mbers on how fa r ou t of ro u nd t h e sections can get,
so I t ried to figu re o u t how mu ch t h e resu lt ing squ eeze wa s,
a nd where it was lo ca t edma ybe t h e minimu m squ eeze
was wh ere t h e leak occu rred. The nu mbers were measu re-
ment s t a ken along t hree dia met ers, every 60 degrees. Bu t
t h ree ma t ch ing dia met ers wo n't gu a ra nt ee t h a t t h ings will
fit; six dia met ers, or any ot her nu mber of dia met ers, wo n't
do, either.
For example, yo u can ma ke a figu re somet hing like a
t ria ngle wit h ro u nded corners, in which t h ree dia met ers, 60
degrees a pa rt , have t h e same lengt h .
I remembered seeing su ch a t rick at a mu seu m wh en
I wa s a kid. There was a gear rack t h a t moved back a nd fo r t h
perfect ly smo o t h ly, while u ndernea t h it were some no ncir-
cu la r, fu nny-lo o king, cra zy-sh a ped gears t u rning o n sh a ft s
t h a t wo bbled. It looked impo ssible, bu t t h e rea son it
wo rked wa s t h a t t h e gears were shapes whose diamet ers
were always t h e same.
So t h e nu mbers NASA gave me were u seless.
D u ring t h a t weekend, ju st a s I ha d predict ed in my
let t er home, I kept get t ing not es fro m t h e commission
h ea dqu a rt ers in Wa sh ingt o n: "Check t h e t empera t u re
rea dings, check t h e pict u res, check t h is, check t h a t . . ."
t here was qu it e a list . Bu t as t h e inst ru ct io ns ca me in, I ha d
done mo st of t hem already.
One no t e had to do wit h a myst erio u s piece of paper.
Someone at Kennedy had repo rt edly writ t en "Let 's go fo r
it" while a ssembling one of t h e solid booster rocket s. Such
langu age appeared to show a certain recklessness. My mis-
sion: find t h a t piece of paper.
168
FIGURE 17. Thi s fi gure has all i ts di ameters the same
lengthyet i t i s obvi ously not round!
Well, by t h is t ime I u nderst o o d how mu ch pa per t h ere
wa s in NASA. I was su re it wa s a t rick t o ma ke me get lo st ,
so I did no t h i ng a bo u t it .
Inst ea d, I pu rsu ed something su rrept it iou sly.
It was ru mo red t h a t t h e reason NASA t ried t o ma ke t h e
sh u t t l e fly o n Ja nu a r y 28t h , in spit e o f t h e cold, was t h a t t h e
president wa s go ing t o give h is St a t e o f t h e Unio n a ddress
t h a t nigh t . Acco rding t o t h e theory, the Whit e House had
it all cooked u p so t h a t du ri ng t h e St a t e o f t h e Unio n a d-
dress, t h e t ea ch er, Mrs. McAu l i ffe, wo u ld t a lk t o t h e presi-
dent a nd Congress fro m space. It wa s gonna be grea t : t h e
president wo u ld sa y, "Hello! Ho w are yo u doing?" And she
wo u ld sa y, " Fine" so met h ing very dra ma t ic.
Gumshoes 169
Since it so u nded logica l, I bega n by su ppo sing it was
very likely po ssible. Bu t wa s t h ere any evidence? This kind
o f t h i ng I didn't kno w h o w t o invest iga t e. I cou ld o nly t h ink
of t h is: it 's very h a rd t o get t h ro u gh t o t h e president ; I also
ca n't ju st call u p a n a st ro na u t a nd t a lk t o h erif she's in
space. Therefore, swi t ch i ng t h e signa ls do wn fro m t h e
sh u t t l e over t o t h e president wh ile he's t a l ki ng t o Congress
mu st be a co mplica t ed bu siness.
To find o u t wh et h er a nybo dy h a d set u p t o do t h a t , I
went down t o t h e lo west levels a nd asked gu ys a t t h e bo t -
t om some t ech nica l qu est io ns.
They showed me t h e a nt enna s, t h ey t old me a bo u t t h e
frequ encies, t h ey showed me t h e big ra dio syst em a nd t h e
co mpu t er syst em; t h ey sh o wed me all t h e wa ys t h ey did
t h ings.
I said, "If yo u ha d t o send a t ra nsmissio n so mewh ere
elset o Ma rsh a ll, sa yh o w wo u ld yo u do it ?"
They sa id, "Oh, we're ju st a rela y st a t io n. Everyt h ing
is a u t o ma t ica lly sent over to Ho u st o n, a nd t hey swit ch ev-
eryt h ing o u t fro m t h ere. We do n't do a ny swit ch ing here."
So I didn't find a ny evidencea t lea st a t Kennedy. Bu t
t h e gu ys t h ere were so nice t o me, a nd everyt h ing wa s so
pleasant, t h a t I feel bad. I don't like to cheat people. It was
a lit t le snea ky, wh a t I wa s doing. Nevert h eless, I t h o u gh t I'd
bet t er do t h e sa me t h i ng wh en I got t o Ho u st o n.
On Monday, Mr. Hot z came down to Florida to work
wi t h me. (He t old me la t er t h a t h e ha d been sent do wn wi t h
specific i nst ru ct i o ns t o see wh a t I was do ing, a nd t o keep
me fro m "going wild." ) Mr. Ho t z bro u gh t a list o f t h ings
to look into: "There are a lot of t hings on this list," he said,
"so I'd be h a ppy t o split t h e wo rk wit h yo u ." Some t h ings
he said he cou ld do mo re ea sily, and t h e rest of t h e t h ings
I h a d a lrea dy doneexcept fo r t h a t piece o f pa per wh ich
said "Let's go for it." Mr. Hot z hint ed arou nd t ha t it might
h a ve come fro m t h e dia ry of someone in t h e bo o st er-ro cket
assembly. That wa sn't enou gh of a clu e fo r me; I ju st wa sn't
gonna do it . Inst ea d, I went to see a Mr. La mbert h , wh o had
said he wa nt ed to t a lk to me.
Mr. La mbert h was way u p in t h e works, a big cheese in
charge of a ssembling t h e solid-rocket boosters. He wa nt ed
to tell me a bo u t some pro blems he h a d. "The workers u sed
t o have mu ch bet t er discipline," he explained, "bu t no wa -
da ys t h ey're no t like t h ey used t o be." He gave me a cou ple
of examples.
The first incident ha d t o do wit h t a king t h e bo o st er
ro cket s a pa rt a ft er t h ey ha d been recovered fro m t h e sea.
The rocket sect ions are held t o get h er by 180 pinsea ch
a bo u t a n inch a nd a ha lf in dia met er a nd t wo inches long
all t h e way a ro u nd.
There was some kind of procedu re fo r t a king sections
a pa rt , in which t h e workers were su pposed t o pu ll t h e
ro cket u p a cert a in dist a nce. They ha d go t t en t o pa ying
a t t ent io n o nly t o t h e a mo u nt f o r c e t h ey were a pplying
a bo u t 11,000 po u nds. Th a t was a bet t er met h o d, fro m a
ph ysica l st a ndpo i nt , becau se t h e idea is t o t a ke t h e load off
t h e pins.
One t ime t h e force gau ge wa sn't wo rking righ t . The
wo rkers kept pu t t i ng mo re force o n, wo ndering wh y t h ey
weren't rea ch ing 11,000 po u nds, wh en all of a su dden one
of t h e pins broke.
Mr. La mbert h reprima nded t h e workers fo r no t fol-
lo wing procedu res. It reminded me of when I tried to
ma ke t h ings wo rk bet t er a t my a u nt 's hotel: yo u r met h o d
is bet t er t h a n t h e regu lar wa y, bu t t h en yo u have a lit t le
a ccident . . .*
The second st o ry Mr. La mbert h t old me had t o do wit h
pu t t i ng t h e rocket sect io ns t oget her. The regu la r proce-
du re was t o st a ck one section on t o p of t h e ot her a nd ma t ch
t h e u pper section t o t h e lower one.
*The reference is t o Feynma n's met h o d of slicing st ring bea ns, reco u nt ed in
Surely You're Joki ng, Mr. Feynman!
Gumshoes 171
If a section needed to be reshaped a lit t le bit , t h e
pro cedu re wa s t o first pick u p t h e sect ion wit h a crane and
let it h a ng sideways a few da ys. It 's ra t h er simpleminded.
If t h ey co u ldn't ma ke a sect ion ro u nd eno u gh by t h e
h a nging met h o d, t here was a no t h er procedu re: u se t he
" ro u nding machine"a rod wit h a h ydra u lic press on one
end a nd a nu t o n t h e o t h era nd increase t h e pressu re.
Mr. La mbert h told me t h e pressu re sh o u ldn't exceed
1200 po u nds per squ a re inch (psi). One t ime, a section
wa sn't ro u nd enou gh at 1200 psi, so t h e wo rkers t ook a
wrench a nd began t u rni ng t h e nu t o n t h e ot her end. When
t h ey fina lly got t h e section ro u nd eno u gh , t h e pressu re was
up to 1350. "This is a no t h er exa mple of t h e lack of disci-
pline a mo ng t h e wo rkers," Mr. La mbert h said.
I had wa nt ed t o t a lk wit h t h e assembly wo rkers a nywa y
(I love t h a t kind of t h ing), so I a rra nged to see t h em t h e
next da y a t 2:30 in t h e a ft erno o n.
At 2:30 I wa lk int o t h is room, a nd t h ere's a lo ng t a ble
wi t h t h irt y o r fo rt y peo plet h ey're all sit t ing t h ere wit h
morose fa ces, very serio u s, rea dy t o t a lk t o The Commis-
sioner.
I was t errified. I h a dn't realized my t errible power. I
cou ld see t h ey were worried. They mu st h a ve been t old I
wa s invest iga t ing t h e errors t h ey had made!
So right a wa y I sa id, "I had no t h in' to do, so I t h o u gh t
I'd come over and t a lk t o t h e gu ys wh o pu t t h e rocket s
t oget her. I di dn't wa nt everybo dy t o st o p wo rking ju st
'cau se I wa nna find o u t so met h ing fo r my own cu riosit y; I
o nly wa nt ed t o t a lk wi t h t h e wo rkers . . . "
Mo st of t h e people got u p a nd left . Six or seven gu ys
st a yedt h e crew wh o a ct u a lly pu t t h e rocket sections to-
get h er, t h eir fo rema n, a nd some boss wh o was higher u p
in t h e syst em.
Well, t hese gu ys were st ill a lit t le bit scared. They
didn't really wa nt t o open u p. The first t h ing I t h ink t o say
is, "I h a ve a qu est io n: wh en you mea su re t h e t h ree diame-
ters a nd all t h e dia met ers ma t ch , do t h e sections really fit
t o get h er? It seems t o me t h a t yo u cou ld have some bu mps
on one side and some flat areas direct ly across, so t h e t h ree
dia met ers wo u ld ma t ch , bu t t h e sect io ns wo u l dn't fit ."
"Yes, yes!" t h ey say. "We get bu mps like t h a t . We call
t h em nipples."
The o nly wo ma n t h ere said, "It's got no t h ing t o do
wit h me!"and everybo dy la u ghed.
"We get nipples all t h e t ime," t h ey co nt inu ed. "We've
been t ryin' t o t ell t h e su pervisor a bo u t it , bu t we never get
a nywh ere!"
We were t a lking det a ils, a nd t h a t wo rks wonders. I
wo u ld ask qu est io ns based on wh a t cou ld h a ppen t h eo ret i-
cally, bu t t o t h em it lo o ked like I was a regu la r gu y wh o
knew a bo u t t h eir t echnical pro blems. They loosened u p
very ra pidly, a nd told me all kinds of ideas t h ey h a d t o
impro ve t h ings.
For example, wh en t h ey u se t h e ro u ndi ng ma ch ine,
t h ey h a ve t o pu t a rod t h ro u gh holes exact ly o ppo sit e each
ot her. There a re 180 holes, so t h ey h a ve t o ma ke su re t h e
o t h er end of t h e rod goes t h ro u gh t h e hole 90 holes a wa y.
No w, it t u rns o u t yo u have t o climb u p int o a n a wkwa rd
place t o co u nt t h e holes. It 's very slow a nd very di ffi cu l t .
They t h o u gh t it wou ld be very h elpfu l if t h ere were
fo u r pa int ma rks, 90 degrees a pa rt , pu t o n a t t h e fa ct o ry.
Th a t wa y, t h ey wo u ld never have t o co u nt more t h a n 22
holes t o t h e nea rest ma rk. For example, if t h ey pu t t h e
rod t h ro u gh a hole which is 9 holes clockwise fro m a
pa int ma rk, t h en t h e ot her end of t h e rod wou ld go
t h ro u gh t h e hole which is 9 holes clockwise fro m t h e op-
posite ma rk.
The fo rema n, Mr. Fich t el, said he wro t e a memo wi t h
t h is su ggest ion t o his su periors t wo years ago, bu t no t h ing
ha d ha ppened yet . Wh en he asked wh y, he was told t h e
su ggest ion was too expensive.
Gumshoes
173
"Too expensive to pa int four li ttle li nes ? " I said in disbe-
lief.
They all la u gh ed. " It 's no t t h e pa int ; it 's t h e pa per-
wo rk," Mr. Ficht el sa id. "They wo u ld h a ve t o revise all t h e
ma nu a ls."
The a ssembly wo rkers had ot her o bserva t io ns and
su ggest io ns. They were concerned t h a t if t wo rocket sec-
tions scrape a s t h ey're being pu t t o get h er, met a l filings
cou ld get int o t h e ru bber seals and da ma ge t h em. They
even h a d some su ggest ions fo r redesigning t h e seal. Those
su ggest io ns weren't very good, bu t t h e po int is, t h e wo rkers
were thi nki ng! I got t h e impressio n t h a t t h ey were not u ndis-
ciplined; t h ey were very int erest ed in wh a t t h ey were do ing,
bu t t h ey weren't being given mu ch enco u ra gement . No-
bo dy was pa ying mu ch a t t ent i o n t o t h em. It wa s rema rka ble
t h a t t h eir mora le was a s h igh a s it wa s u nder t h e circu m-
st a nces.
Then t h e wo rkers bega n t o t a lk t o t h e boss wh o ha d
st a yed. "We're disa ppo int ed by so met h ing," one of t hem
said. "When t h e commission was going t o see t h e bo o st er-
rocket a ssembly, t h e demo nst ra t io n was go ing t o be do ne
by t h e ma na gers. W h y wo u l dn't yo u let u s do it ?"
"We were a fra id yo u 'd be frigh t ened by t h e co mmis-
sio ners a nd yo u wo u l dn't wa nt t o do it."
" No, no," said t h e wo rkmen. "We t h ink we do a good
jo b, a nd we wa nt ed t o show wh a t we do."
Aft er t h a t meet ing, t h e boss t ook me t o t h e ca fet eria .
As we were ea t ingt h e wo rkmen weren't wit h u s a ny-
mo reh e said, "I was su rprised t h ey were so concerned
a bo u t t h a t ."
La t er, I t alked t o Mr. Ficht el a bo u t t h is incident of
increa sing t h e pressu re pa st 1200. He showed me t h e no t es
he ma de a s he went along: t h ey weren't t h e fo rma l papers
t h a t are st a mped; t h ey were pa rt of a n info rma l bu t care-
fu lly writ t en dia ry.
174 "What Do You C are What Other People Thi nk?" Gumshoes
175
I said, "I hear t h e pressu re got u p to 1350."
"Yes," h e sa id, "we h a d t igh t ened t h e nu t a t t h e o t h er
end."
"Was t h a t t h e regu lar procedu re?"
"Oh, yes," he sa id, "it's in t h e book."
He opens u p t h e ma nu a l a nd shows me t h e pro cedu re.
It says, "Build u p t h e pressu re on t h e h ydra u lic ja ck. If t h is
is insu fficient t o o bt a in desired ro u ndness, t h en very care-
fu l l y t igh t en nu t o n o t h er end t o get t o t h e desired ro u nd-
ness"it said so in bla ck a nd wh it e! It didn't say t h a t t igh t -
ening t h e nu t wo u ld increase t h e pressu re pa st 1200 psi;
t h e people wh o wro t e t h e ma nu a l pro ba bly weren't qu it e
a wa re of t h a t .
Mr. Ficht el h a d writ t en in h is dia ry, "We very ca refu lly
t igh t ened t h e nu t " exa ct ly t h e same la ngu a ge a s t h e in-
st ru ct io ns.
I said, "Mr. La mbert h told me he a dmo nish ed yo u
a bo u t go ing a bo ve 1200."
"He never a dmo nish ed me a bo u t t h a t wh y sh o u ld
h e?"
We figu red o u t wh a t pro ba bly h a ppened. Mr. Lam-
bert h 's a dmo nish ment went do wn t h ro u gh t h e levels u nt i l
so mebo dy in middle ma na gement realized t h a t Mr. Fich t el
h a d gone by t h e bo o k, a nd t h a t t h e erro r was in t h e ma nu a l .
Bu t inst ea d o f t elling Mr. La mbert h a bo u t t h e erro r, t h ey
simply t h rew a wa y t h e a dmo nish ment , a nd ju st kept qu iet .
Over lu nch , Mr. Ficht el t old me a bo u t t h e inspect io n
pro cedu res. "There's a sheet fo r each pro cedu re, like t h is
o ne fo r t h e ro u nding procedu re," he said. "On it t h ere are
boxes fo r st a mpso ne fro m t h e su perviso r, o ne fro m qu a l-
it y co nt ro l, one fro m t h e ma nu fa ct u r er , a nd fo r t h e bigger
jo bs, o ne fro m NASA."
He co nt inu ed, "We ma ke t h e mea su rement s, go
t h ro u gh one cou rse o f ro u nding, a nd t h en ma ke t h e mea -
su rement s a ga in. If t h ey do n't ma t ch well eno u gh , we re-
peat t h e steps. Finally, wh en the diameter differences are
small eno u gh , we go fo r it."
I woke u p. "What do you mean, 'go fo r it '?" I said. "It
sou nds sort of cavalier . . . "
"No, no," he says. "That's ju st the lingo we u se when
we mean t h a t all t he conditions are sat isfied, and we're
ready to move to the next phase of the operation."
"Do you ever writ e t h a t downt hat 'go fo r it '?"
"Yes, sometimes."
"Let's see if we can find a place where yo u wro t e it."
Mr. Fichtel looked t h ro u gh his diary, and fou nd an
example. The expression was completely na t u ra l to himit
wa sn't reckless or cavalier; it was ju st his way of speaking.
On Monday and Tu esday, while I was ru nning a ro u nd
do wn at Kennedy, Mr. Rogers was in Wa sh ingt o n appear-
ing before a Senate commit t ee. Congress was considering
wh et h er it shou ld have its own invest igat ion.
Senator Hollings, fro m Sou th Carolina, was giving Mr.
Rogers a hard t ime: "Secretary Rogers," he says, "I'm anx-
iou s t h a t you have an adequ at e st aff t h a ya h . How ma ny
i nvesti gators does yo ' commission have?"
Mr. Rogers says, "We don't have invest igat ors in the
police sense. We're reading docu ments, u nderst a nding
wh a t t h ey mean, organizing hearings, t alking t o wit -
nessest h a t sort of thing. We'll have an a dequ a t e st a ff, I
assu re you ."
"Well, t h a t 's t h e point ," Senator Hollings says. "From
my experience in invest iga t ing cases, I'd wa nt fo u r or five
invest igat ors steeped in science and space technology
going arou nd down t here at Canaveral t a lking to every-
bo dy, ea t ing lu nch wit h t hem. Y ou 'd be amazed, if you eat
in the rest a u ra nt s a ro u nd t here fo r t wo or three weeks,
wh a t you 'll find o u t . Y ou can't ju st sit and read wh a t 's given
to you."
"We're no t ju st going to sit and read," Mr. Rogers says
776 "What D o You C are What Other People Thi nk?"
defensively. "We've go t t en a lot of people in a room a nd
asked t h em qu est io ns a ll a t t h e same t ime, ra t h er t h a n h a ve
a gu msh o e wa lking a ro u nd, t a lking t o people one a t a
t ime."
"I u nderst a nd," says Sena t or Ro llings. "Yet I'm con-
cerned a bo u t yo' pro du ct if yo u do n't h a ve so me
gu msh o es. Th a t 's t h e t ro u ble wi t h president ia l co mmis-
sions; I've been on 'em: t h ey go on wh a t 's fed t o 'em, a nd
t h ey do n't look beh ind it . Then we end u p wi t h invest iga -
t ive repo rt ers, people wri t i ng bo o ks, a nd everyt h ing else.
People are sti ll invest iga t ing t h e W a rren Co mmissio n Re-
po rt a ro u nd t h is t o wn." *
Mr. Rogers ca lmly says, " I a pprecia t e yo u r co mment s,
Sena t o r. Y o u 'l l be int erest ed t o kno w t h a t o ne o f o u r com-
mission membersh e's a No bel la u rea t eis do wn t h ere in
Florida t o da y, invest iga t ing in t h e way yo u 'd like h im t o
invest iga t e."
(Mr. Rogers di dn't kno w it , bu t I was a ct u a l l y ea t ing
lu nch wi t h some engineers wh en h e said t h a t !)
Sena t or Ro llings sa ys, "I'm no t qu est io ning t h e com-
pet ence o f t h e Nobel la u rea t e; I've been rea ding wi t h grea t
int erest wh a t h e said. There's no qu est io n a bo u t t h e com-
pet ence o f t h e co mmissio n it self. It 's ju st t h a t wh en yo u
invest iga t e a case, yo u need invest iga t o rs. Y ou h a ve a lrea dy
bro u gh t t o t h e pu blic's a t t ent io n a lot o f very int erest ing
fa ct s, so I t h ink yo u h a ven't been negligent in a ny fa sh io n."
So I saved Mr. Ro gers a lit t le bit . He saw t h a t he had
a n a nswer fo r Mr. Rollings by t h e good luc k t h a t I st ayed in
Florida a nywa y, a ga inst h is wish es!
*No t e fo r fo reign readers: t h e W a rren Repo rt wa s issu ed in 1964 by t h e W a rren
Co mmissio n, h ea ded by ret ired Su preme Co u rt Chief Ju st i ce Earl W a rren, wh ich
invest iga t ed t h e a ssa ssina t io n o f President Jo h n F. Kennedy.
O N Tu esda y a ft erno o n I flew ba ck t o
W a sh ingt o n, and went t o t h e next
meet ing of t h e co mmissio n, on
W ednesda y. It was a no t h er pu blic
meet ing. A ma na ger of t h e Thiokol
Co mpa ny na med Mr. Lu nd wa s t est ify-
ing. On t h e ni gh t befo re t h e la u nch ,
Mr. Mu llo y had told h im t o pu t o n his
" ma na gement h a t " inst ea d of his "en-
gineering h a t ," so he cha nged his op-
po sit io n t o la u nch a nd o verru led his
o wn engineers. I was a sking h im some
h a rsh qu est io ns wh en su ddenly I ha d
t h is feeling o f t h e Inqu isit io n.
Mr. Rogers h a d po int ed o u t t o u s
t h a t we o u gh t t o be ca refu l wit h t hese
people, wh o se careers depend on u s.
He sa id, "We h a ve all t h e a dva nt a ges:
we're si t t i ng u p here; t h ey're si t t i ng
do wn t h ere. They h a ve t o a nswer o u r
qu est io ns; we do n't h a ve t o a nswer
t h eir qu est io ns." Su ddenly, all t h is
ca me ba ck t o me a nd I felt t errible, and
I co u ldn't do it t h e next da y. I went
ba ck t o Ca lifo rnia fo r a few da ys, t o
recover.
While I was in Pasadena, I went
over t o JPL a nd met wi t h Jerry Sol-
omon a nd Meemo ng Lee. They were
st u dying t h e fla me wh ich appeared a
few seconds befo re t h e ma in fu el t a nk
exploded, a nd were able t o bring ou t
all kinds of det a ils. (JPL has good en-
h a ncers of TV pict u res fro m all t heir
experience wit h pla net a ry missio ns.)
La t er, I t o o k t h e enh a ncement s over t o
Fantastic
Figures
Charlie Stevenson a nd his crew at Kennedy to expedite
t h ings.
Somewhere along t h e line, somebody fro m t h e st a ff
bro u gh t me somet hing t o sign: it said t h a t my expenses
were so-and-so mu ch , bu t t h ey weren't t h ey were more.
I said, "This is no t t h e a mo u nt I a ct u a lly spent."
The gu y said, "I kno w t h a t , sir; yo u 're only allowed a
ma ximu m of $75 a day for t he hotel and food."
"Then wh y did you gu ys set me u p in a hotel wh ich
costs $80 or $90 a nigh t , and t hen yo u give me o nly $75 a
da y?"
"Yes, I agree; it 's too ba d, bu t t h a t 's t h e way it goes!"
I t h o u gh t of Mr. Rogers' o ffer to pu t me in a "good
hotel." Wh a t did he mean by t h a t t h a t it wou ld cost me
more?
If yo u 're asked t o co nt ribu t e mo nt h s of t ime and effo rt
to t h e government (and you lose money you wou ld have
ma de co nsu lt ing fo r a co mpa ny), t h e government ou ght t o
appreciate it a lit t le more t h a n t o be cheap a bo u t paying
you back. I'm not t rying t o make money off t h e govern-
ment , bu t I'm not wa nt ing t o lose money, either! I said, "I'm
no t going to sign this."
Mr. Rogers came over and promised he wou ld
st ra igh t en it ou t , so I signed the paper.
I really t h ink Mr. Rogers tried to fix it, bu t he was
u na ble to. I t h o u gh t of figh t ing this one t o the end, bu t then
I realized it 's impossible: if I ha d been paid for my a ct u a l
expenses, t h en of cou rse all t h e other commissioners
wou ld have to be paid, too. That wou ld be all right, bu t it
wou ld also mean t h a t t his commission was the only com-
mission t o be paid it s a ct u a l expensesand pret t y soon,
word wou ld get o u t .
They have a saying in New Y ork: "You ca n't fight Cit y
Hall," mea ning "It's impossible." Bu t this time, it was a hell
of a lot bigger t h a n Cit y Hall: the $75 a day ru le is a law
of the Unit ed States! It might have been fu n to fight it to
Fantasti c Fi gures 179
t h e end, bu t I gu ess I was t iredI'm no t as yo u ng as I u sed
t o beso I ju st gave u p.
Somebody t o ld me t h ey h ea rd commissioners ma ke
$1000 a da y, bu t t h e t ru t h is, o u r government do esn't even
pa y t h eir cost s.
At t h e beginning o f Ma rch , a bo u t a mo nt h a ft er t h e
commission st a rt ed, we fina lly split u p int o wo rking gro u ps:
t h e Pre-Lau nch Act ivit ies gro u p was headed by Mr. Ache-
son; Mr. Su t ler was in charge of t h e Design, Develo pment ,
a nd Pro du ct io n panel; General Ku t yna wa s leader of t h e
Accident Ana lysis grou p; a nd Dr. Ride wa s in charge of t h e
Missio n Pla nning a nd Opera t io ns gro u p.
I spent mo st of my t ime in Ku t yna 's gro u p. I was in
Ride's gro u p, t oo, bu t I ended u p no t do ing very mu ch fo r
h er.
General Ku t yna 's gro u p went t o Ma rsh a ll Space Flight
Cent er in Hu nt sville, Ala ba ma , t o do it s wo rk. The first
t h ing t h a t h a ppened t h ere wa s, a ma n na med Ullia n came
in t o t ell u s so met h ing. As ra nge sa fet y o fficer a t Kennedy,
Mr. Ullia n ha d t o decide wh et h er t o pu t dest ru ct ch a rges
on t h e sh u t t le. (If a ro cket goes o u t of co nt ro l, t h e dest ru ct
cha rges enable it t o be blo wn u p int o sma ll bit s. Th a t 's
mu ch less perilou s t h a n a ro cket flying a ro u nd loose, rea dy
t o explo de wh en it h it s t h e gro u nd.)
Every u nma nned ro cket h a s t h ese charges. Mr. Ullia n
told u s t h a t 5 o u t of 127 ro cket s t h a t he looked at ha d
fa ileda ra t e of a bo u t 4 percent . He t o o k t h a t 4 percent
a nd divided it by 4, beca u se h e a ssu med a ma nned fligh t
wo u ld be safer t h a n a n u nma nned one. He came o u t wit h
a bo u t a 1 percent cha nce of fa ilu re, a nd t h a t wa s eno u gh
t o wa rra nt t h e dest ru ct cha rges.
Bu t NASA t o ld Mr. Ullia n t h a t t h e pro ba bilit y o f fa ilu re
was more like 1 in 10
5
.
I t ried t o ma ke sense o u t of t h a t nu mber. "Did yo u say
1 in 10
5
?"
" Tha t 's righ t ; 1 in 100,000."
180
"That means you co u ld fly t he sh u t t l e every day for an
average of 300 years bet ween a ccident severy da y, one
flight, fo r 300 yea rswh ich is o bvio u sly crazy!"
"Yes, I kno w," said Mr. Ullia n. "I moved my nu mber
u p to 1 in 1000 to a nswer all of NASA's cla imst h a t t h ey
were mu ch more ca refu l wit h ma nned fligh t s, t h a t t h e t ypi-
cal ro cket isn't a valid co mpa riso n, et cet era a nd pu t t h e
dest ru ct charges on a nywa y."
Bu t t h en a new problem came u p: t h e Ju pit er pro be,
Gali leo, was go ing t o u se a power su pply t h a t ru ns o n h ea t
genera t ed by ra dio a ct ivit y. If t h e sh u t t l e ca rrying Gali leo
fa iled, ra dio a ct ivit y cou ld be spread over a large area. So
t h e a rgu ment co nt inu ed: NASA kept sa ying 1 in 100,000
a nd Mr. Ullia n kept sa ying 1 in 1000, a t best .
Mr. Ullia n also t o ld u s a bo u t t h e pro blems h e h a d in
t ryi ng t o t a lk t o t h e ma n in ch a rge, Mr. Kingsbu ry: h e co u ld
get a ppo i nt ment s wit h u nderlings, bu t h e never co u ld get
t h ro u gh t o Ki ngsbu ry a nd find o u t how NASA go t it s figu re
of 1 in 100,000. The det a ils of t h e st o ry I ca n't remember
exa ct ly, bu t I t h o u gh t Mr. Ullia n wa s do ing everyt h ing sen-
sibly.
Ou r pa nel su pervised t h e t est s t h a t NASA was do ing
t o discover t h e propert ies o f t h e sea lsh o w mu ch pressu re
t h e pu t t y co u ld t a ke, a nd so o nin o rder t o find o u t exa ct ly
wh a t ha d h a ppened. General Ku t yna didn't wa nt t o ju mp
t o co nclu sio ns, so we went over a nd over t h ings, ch ecking
all t h e evidence a nd seeing how well everyt h ing fit t ed t o-
get her.
There wa s an a wfu l lot of det ailed discu ssio n a bo u t
exa ct ly wh a t h a ppened in t h e la st few seconds o f t h e fligh t ,
bu t I didn't pay mu ch a t t ent io n t o a ny o f it . It wa s a s t h o u gh
a t ra in ha d crashed becau se t h e t ra ck h a d a gap in it , and
we were a na lyzing which cars bro ke a pa rt first , wh ich cars
bro ke a pa rt second, a nd wh y some car t u rned over on it s
side. I figu red once t h e t ra in goes o ff t h e t ra ck, it do esn't
ma ke a ny differenceit 's done. I became bored.
So I ma de u p a game fo r myself: "Imagine t h a t some-
t h ing else h a d fa iledt h e ma in engines, fo r inst a ncea nd
we were ma king t h e same kind of int ensive invest iga t io n as
we are now: wo u ld we discover t h e same slipping sa fet y
criteria and lack of co mmu nica t io n?"
I t h o u gh t I wo u ld do my st a nda rd t h ingfind o u t fro m
t h e engineers how t h e engine wo rks, wh a t all t he dangers
are, wh a t pro blems t h ey've h a d, and everyt h ing elseand
t hen, wh en I'm all loaded u p so I kno w wh a t I'm t a lking
a bo u t , I'd co nfro nt whoever was cla iming t h e pro ba bilit y o f
fa ilu re was 1 in 100,000.
I asked to t alk to a cou ple of engineers abou t the en-
gines. The gu y says, "Okay, I'll fix it u p. Is nine t o mo rro w
mo rning o ka y?"
This t ime t h ere were t h ree engineers, t heir boss, Mr.
Lovingood, a nd a few a ssist a nt sa bo u t eight or nine peo-
ple.
Everybo dy ha d big, t h ick no t ebo o ks, fu ll of pa pers, all
nicely o rga nized. On t he fro nt t h ey said:
REPORT ON MATERIAL GIVEN TO COMMISSIONER
RICHARD P. FEY NMAN ON MARCH WA-WA,* 1986.
I said, "Geez! Y ou gu ys mu st h a ve wo rked h a rd all
night !"
"No, it 's no t so mu ch wo rk; we ju st pu t in t he regu la r
papers t h a t we u se all t h e time."
I said, "I ju st wa nt ed to t a lk to a few engineers. There
are so ma ny problems to wo rk on, I ca n't expect yo u all to
st a y here and talk to me."
Bu t t his t ime, everybody st a yed.
Mr. Lovingood got u p a nd began t o explain everyt h ing
t o me in t h e u su a l NASA wa y, wit h ch a rt s a nd gra ph s wh ich
ma t ched t h e info rma t io n in my big bookall wit h bu llet s,
of course.
*Feynma n's wa y o f sa ying, " wh a t ever it was,"
I wo n't bo t h er yo u wit h all t h e det a ils, bu t I wa nt ed t o
u nderst a nd everyt h ing a bo u t t h e engine. So I kept asking
my u su a l du mb-so u nding qu est io ns.
Aft er a wh ile, Mr. Lovingood says, "Dr. Feynma n,
we've been going fo r t wo h o u rs, now. There are 123 pages,
a nd we've only covered 20 so fa r."
My first reaction was t o say, "Well, it isn't really going
t o t a ke su ch a long t ime. I'm a lwa ys a lit t le slow at t h e
beginning; it t a kes me a wh ile t o ca t ch on. We'll be a ble t o
go mu ch fa st er nea r t h e end."
Bu t t h en I ha d a second t h o u gh t . I said, "In order t o
speed t h ings u p, I'll tell yo u wh a t I'm do ing, so yo u 'll know
where I'm a iming. I wa nt t o kno w wh et h er t h ere's t h e sa me
lack of co mmu nica t io n bet ween t h e engineers a nd t h e ma n-
a gement wh o are wo rking o n t h e engine a s we fo u nd in t h e
case of t h e bo o st er rocket s."
Mr. Lo vingo o d says, "I do n't t h ink so. As a ma t t er of
fa ct , a lt h o u gh I'm no w a ma na ger, I was t ra ined a s a n
engineer."
"All righ t ," I said. "Here's a piece of pa per each.
Please writ e o n yo u r pa per t h e a nswer t o t h is qu est io n:
wh a t do yo u t h i nk is t h e pro ba bi l i t y t h a t a fl i gh t wo u ld be
u nco mplet ed du e t o a fa ilu re in t h is engine?"
They writ e down t h eir a nswers a nd h a nd in t h eir pa -
pers. One gu y wro t e "99-
44
/100% pu re" (copying t h e Ivory
soap slo ga n), mea ning a bo u t 1 in 200. Ano t h er gu y wro t e
so met h ing very t ech nica l and h igh ly qu a nt i t a t i ve in t h e
st a nda rd st a t ist ica l wa y, ca refu lly defining everyt h ing, t h a t
I ha d to t ra nsla t ewh ich also mea nt a bo u t 1 in 200. The
t h ird gu y wro t e, simply, "1 in 300."
Mr. Lo vingo o d's pa per, h o wever, sa id,
Ca nno t qu a nt i fy. Relia bilit y is ju dged fro m:
pa st experience
qu a lit y co nt ro l in ma nu fa ct u r i ng
engineering ju dgment
"Well," I said, "I've got fo u r a nswers, and one of them
weaseled." I t u rned to Mr. Lovingood: "I t h ink yo u wea-
seled."
"I do n't t h ink I weaseled."
"You didn't t ell me what yo u r co nfidence wa s, sir; you
told me how yo u det ermined it . Wh a t I wa nt t o kno w is:
a ft er yo u det ermined it , wh a t was it ?"
He sa ys, "100 percent " t h e engineers'ja ws drop, my
ja w drops; I look a t h im, everybody looks a t h im" u h , u h ,
minu s epsilon!"
So I say, "Well, yes; t h a t 's fine. No w, t h e o nly pro blem
is, WHAT IS EPSILON?"
He says, "10~
5
." It was t h e same nu mber t h a t Mr.
Ullian had told u s a bo u t : 1 in 100,000.
I showed Mr. Lovingood t h e o t h er a nswers a nd said,
"Y ou 'll be int erest ed t o kno w t h a t t here i s a difference
bet ween engineers a nd ma na gement herea fa ct o r of
more t h a n 300."
He sa ys, "Sir, I'll be glad t o send yo u t h e do cu ment
t h a t co nt a ins t h is est ima t e, so yo u can u nderst a nd it."*
I said, "Thank yo u very mu ch . No w, let 's get back t o
t h e engine." So we co nt inu ed a nd, ju st like I gu essed, we
went fa st er near t he end. I had t o u nderst a nd h o w t h e
engine wo rkedt h e precise shape of t h e t u rbine bla des,
" La t er, Mr. Lovingood sent me t h a t repo rt . It said t h ings like "The pro ba bilit y
of missio n su ccess is necessa rily very close to 1.0"does t h a t mean it is close
to 1.0, or it ought to be close to 1.0?and " Hist o rica lly, t h is h igh degree of
missio n su ccess h a s given rise t o a difference in ph ilo so ph y bet ween u n-
ma nned a nd ma nned space fl i gh t pro gra ms; i.e., nu merica l pro ba bilit y versu s
engineering ju dgment ." As fa r a s I can t ell, "engineering ju dgment " means
t h ey're ju st go ing t o ma ke u p nu mbers! The pro ba bi l i t y o f a n engine-bla de
fa ilu re was given as a u niversa l co nst a nt , as if all t h e blades were exa ct ly t h e
same, u nder t h e same co ndit io ns. The wh o le paper was qu a nt i fyi ng everyt h ing.
Ju st a bo u t every nu t a nd bo l t wa s in t here: "The cha nce t h a t a HPHTP pipe
will bu rst is 10~
7
." Y ou ca n't est i ma t e t h ings like t h a t ; a pro ba bilit y of 1 in
10,000,000 is a lmo st impo ssible t o est imat e. It was clear t h a t t h e nu mbers fo r
each pa rt of t h e engine were ch o sen so t h a t wh en you add everyt h ing t o get h er
you get 1 in 100,000.
exa ct ly h o w t h ey t u rned, a nd so o nso I cou ld u nderst a nd
it s pro blems.
Aft er l u nch , t h e engineers t old me all t h e pro blems o f
t h e engines: bla des cra cking in t h e oxygen pu mp, blades
cra cking in t h e h ydro gen pu mp, ca sings get t ing blist ers a nd
cra cks, a nd so on. They looked fo r t h ese t h ings wi t h peri-
scopes a nd special i nst ru ment s wh en t h e sh u t t l e came
do wn a ft er each fl i gh t .
There wa s a pro blem called " su bsynch ro no u s wh irl,"
in wh ich t h e sh a ft get s bent i nt o a sligh t ly pa ra bo lic sh a pe
a t h igh speed. The wea r on t h e bea rings was so t erribleall
t h e no ise and t h e vi br a t i o nt h a t it seemed hopeless. Bu t
t h ey h a d fo u nd a wa y t o get rid o f i t . There were a bo u t a
do zen very serio u s pro blems; a bo u t h a lf o f t h em were
fixed.
Mo st a irpla nes are designed " fro m t h e bo t t o m u p,"
wi t h pa rt s t h a t h a ve a lrea dy been ext ensively t est ed. The
sh u t t l e, h o wever, was designed " fro m t h e t o p do wn" t o
sa ve t ime. Bu t wh enever a pro blem was disco vered, a lo t of
redesigning was requ ired in order t o fix it .
Mr. Lo vingo o d i sn't sa ying mu ch no w, bu t di fferent
engineers, depending o n wh ich pro blem it is, are t elling me
all t h i s st u ff, ju st like I co u ld h a ve fo u nd o u t if I went do wn
t o t h e engineers at Thiokol. I gained a great deal of respect
fo r t h em. They were all very st ra i gh t , a nd everyt h ing wa s
great . We went a ll t h e wa y do wn t o t h e end o f t h e bo o k. We
ma de it .
Then I said, " Wh a t a bo u t t h is h igh -frequ ency vibra -
t io n wh ere some engines get it a nd o t h ers do n't ?" *
There's a qu ick mo t i o n, a nd a lit t le st a ck of papers
*I h a d h ea rd a bo u t t h i s fro m Bill Gra h a m. He sa id t h a t wh en h e wa s first o n t h e
jo b a s h ea d o f NASA, h e wa s lo o king t h r o u gh some repo rt s a nd no t iced a l i t t l e
bu l l et : " o 4,000 cycle vi bra t i o n is wi t h i n o u r da t a base." He t h o u gh t t h a t wa s a
fu nny-l o o ki ng ph ra se, so h e bega n a sking qu est i o ns. W h en h e go t a ll t h e wa y
t h r o u gh , h e discovered it wa s a ra t h er serio u s ma t t er: some o f t h e engines wo u ld
vi br a t e so mu ch t h a t t h ey co u l dn't be u sed. He u sed it a s a n exa mple o f h o w
di ffi cu l t it is t o get i nfo r ma t i o n u nless yo u go do wn a nd ch eck o n it yo u rself.
Fantasti c Fi gures
185
a ppea rs. It 's all pu t t o get h er nicely; it fit s nicely int o my
book. It 's all a bo u t t h e 4000-cycle vibra t io n!
Ma ybe I'm a lit t le du ll, bu t I t ried my best no t t o a ccu se
a nybo dy of a nyt h ing. I ju st let t hem show me wh a t t h ey
showed me, and acted like I didn't see t h eir t rick. I'm no t
t h e kind of invest iga t o r yo u see on TV, wh o ju mps u p a nd
accu ses t h e co rru pt o rga niza t io n o f wit h h o lding info rma -
t io n. Bu t I was fu l l y a wa re t h a t t h ey h a dn't t old me a bo u t
t h e pro blem u nt il I asked a bo u t it . I u su a lly acted qu it e
na ivewh ich I wa s, fo r t h e mo st pa rt .
At a ny rate, t h e engineers all leaped fo rwa rd. They got
all excit ed a nd bega n t o describe t h e problem t o me. I'm
su re t h ey were deligh t ed, beca u se t echnical people love t o
discu ss t ech nica l pro blems wit h t ech nica l people wh o
migh t h a ve a n opinion o r a su ggest io n t h a t cou ld be u sefu l.
And o f co u rse, t h ey were very a nxio u s t o cu re it .
They kept referring t o t h e pro blem by some co mpli-
cat ed na mea " pressu re-indu ced vo rt i ci t y o scilla t o ry wa -
wa," o r so met h ing.
I sa id, "Oh, yo u mea n a wh ist le!"
"Yes," t h ey sa id; "it exh ibit s t h e ch a ra ct erist ics of a
wh ist le."
They t h o u gh t t h e wh i st l e cou ld be co ming fro m a pla ce
wh ere t h e gas ru sh ed t h ro u gh a pipe a t h igh speed a nd split
int o t h ree smaller pipeswh ere t h ere were t wo pa rt it io ns.
They expla ined how fa r t h ey ha d go t t en in figu ring o u t t h e
pro blem.
Wh en I left t h e meet ing, I h a d t h e definit e impressio n
t h a t I h a d fo u nd t h e same ga me a s wi t h t h e seals: ma na ge-
ment redu cing crit eria a nd a ccept ing mo re a nd mo re errors
t h a t weren't designed int o t h e device, while t h e engineers
are screa ming fro m belo w, "HELP!" and "This is a RED
ALERT!"
The next evening, on my way home in t h e airplane, I
wa s h a ving dinner. Aft er I fi ni sh ed bu t t eri ng my roll, I t ook
t h e lit t le piece o f t h in ca rdbo a rd t h a t t h e bu t t er pa t comes
on, a nd bent it a ro u nd in a U shape so there were t wo edges
fa cing me. I held it u p and st a rt ed blo wing on it , a nd pret t y
soon I got it to ma ke a noise like a whist le.
Back in Ca lifo rnia , I got some more info rma t io n on t h e
sh u t t le engine a nd it s pro ba bilit y of fa ilu re. I went t o Rock-
et dyne a nd t a lked t o engineers wh o were bu ilding t h e en-
gines. I also t a lked t o co nsu lt a nt s fo r t h e engine. In fa ct one
of t h em, Mr. Co vert , was on t h e commission. I also fo u nd
o u t t h a t a Ca lt ech pro fesso r had been a co nsu lt a nt fo r
Ro cket dyne. He wa s very friendly a nd info rma t ive, a nd told
me a bo u t all t h e pro blems t h e engine h a d, a nd wh a t h e
t h o u gh t t h e pro ba bilit y o f fa ilu re was.
I went t o JPL a nd met a fellow wh o h a d ju st writ t en
a repo rt fo r NASA on t h e met h o ds u sed by t h e FAA* a nd
t h e milit a ry t o cert ify t h eir gas t u rbine a nd ro cket engines.
We spent t h e wh o le day going ba ck a nd fo rt h over
h o w t o det ermine t h e pro ba bilit y of fa ilu re in a ma ch ine.
I learned a lot of new na meslike "Weibu ll," a pa rt icu la r
ma t h ema t ica l dist ribu t io n t h a t makes a cert a in sh a pe
o n a gra ph. He said t h a t t h e origina l sa fet y ru les fo r t h e
sh u t t l e were very similar t o t hose o f t h e FAA, bu t t h a t
NASA ha d mo dified t h em as t h ey began t o get pro b-
lems.
It t u rned o u t t h a t NASA's Ma rsh a ll Space Cent er in
Hu nt sville designed t h e engine, Ro cket dyne bu ilt t h em,
Lockheed wro t e t h e inst ru ct io ns, a nd NASA's Kennedy
Space Cent er inst a lled t h em! It ma y be a geniu s syst em of
o rga niza t io n, bu t it was a complet e fu zda zzl e, as fa r as I was
co ncerned. It got me t erribly co nfu sed. I didn't kno w
wh et h er I was t a lking t o t h e Ma rsh a ll ma n, t h e Ro cket dyne
ma n, t h e Lockheed ma n, o r t h e Kennedy ma n! So in t h e
middle of all t h is, I got lo st . In fa ct , all du ring t h is t imein
Ma rch a nd AprilI was ru nni ng ba ck a nd fo rt h so mu ch
bet ween Ca lifo rnia , Ala ba ma , Ho u st o n, Florida , a nd Wa sh -
*No t e fo r fo reign readers: Federal Avi a t i o n Admi ni st ra t i o n.
Fantasti c Fi gures
187
ingt o n, B.C., t h a t I o ft en didn't kno w wh a t day it wa s, o r
wh ere I wa s.
Aft er all t h is invest iga t ing on my own, I t h o u gh t I'd
writ e u p a lit t le repo rt on t h e engine fo r t h e o t h er com-
missioners. Bu t wh en I looked a t my no t es on t h e t est ing
schedu les, t h ere was so me co nfu sio n: t here wou ld be t a lk
a bo u t "engine #12" a nd how long "the engine" flew.
Bu t no engine ever was like t h a t : it wou ld be repaired all
t h e t ime. Aft er each fligh t , t echnicia ns wo u ld inspect t h e
engines and see how ma ny cracked blades t h ere were on
t h e ro t o r, how ma ny split s t h ere were in t h e ca sing, a nd
so o n. Then t h ey'd repair "the engine" by pu t t i ng on a
new casing, a new ro t o r, or new bea ringst h ey wou ld re-
place lots of pa rt s. So I wo u ld read t h a t a pa rt icu la r en-
gine h a d ro t o r #2009, wh ich h a d ru n fo r 27 minu t es in
fligh t su ch -a nd-su ch , a nd ca sing #4091, wh ich ha d ru n
fo r 53 minu t es in flight s su ch -a nd-su ch a nd so-and-so. It
was all mixed u p.
Wh en I finished my repo rt , I wa nt ed t o check it . So t h e
next t ime I wa s a t Ma rsh a ll, I said I wa nt ed t o t a lk t o t h e
engineers a bo u t a few very t ech nica l pro blems, ju st t o
check t h e det a ilsI di dn't need a ny ma na gement there.
This t ime, t o my su rprise, no bo dy came bu t t h e t h ree
engineers I h a d t a lked t o befo re, and we st ra igh t ened ev-
eryt h ing o u t .
Wh en I was a bo u t t o leave, one of t h em sa id, "You
kno w t h a t qu est io n yo u asked u s la st t imewit h t h e pa -
pers? We felt t h a t was a loaded qu est io n. It wa sn't fa ir."
I said, "Yes, yo u 're qu it e righ t . It was a loaded qu es-
t io n. I had an idea of wh a t wo u ld ha ppen."
The gu y sa ys, "I wo u ld like t o revise my a nswer. I wa nt
t o say t h a t I ca nnot qu a nt i fy it." (This gu y was t h e one wh o
ha d t h e mo st det a iled a nswer befo re.)
I said, "That's fine. Bu t do yo u agree t h a t t h e ch a nce
of fa ilu re is 1 in 100,000?"
"Well, u h , no , I do n't . I ju st do n't wa nt t o answer."
Then one of the other guys says, "I said it was 1 in 300,
a nd I still say it 's 1 in 300, bu t I do n't wa nt to tell you h o w
I got my nu mber."
I said, "It's okay. Y ou do n't have to."
ALL du ring t h is t ime, I ha d t h e impres-
sion t h a t somewhere a lo ng t h e line t h e
whole commission would come to-
get her again so we co u ld t a lk to each
o t h er a bo u t wh a t we had fo u nd o u t .
In order to aid such a discussion, I
t h o u gh t I'd writ e lit t le repo rt s a long
the wa y: I wro t e a bo u t my wo rk wit h the
ice crew (a na lyzing t h e pict u res and t h e
fa u l t y t empera t u re rea dings); I wro t e
a bo u t my co nversa t io ns wit h Mr. Lam-
bert h a nd t h e a ssembly wo rkers; a nd I
even wro t e a bo u t t h e piece of pa per
t ha t said "Let's go for it." All these lit-
tle repo rt s I sent to Al Keel, t h e execu-
tive o fficer, t o give t o t h e o t h er com-
missioners.
No w, t h is pa rt icu la r a dvent u re
invest iga t ing t h e lack o f co mmu nica -
tion between t h e managers and the en-
gineers wh o were wo rking o n t h e
engineI also wro t e a bo u t , o n my lit t le
IBM PC at home. I was kind of tired, so
I di dn't h a ve t h e co nt ro l I wa nt edit
wa sn't writ t en wit h the same care a s my
other reports. Bu t since I was writ ing it
only as a repo rt t o t h e o t h er commis-
sioners, I didn't change t h e la ngu a ge
before I sent it on to Dr. Keel. I simply
a t t a ch ed a no t e t h a t said "I t h ink t h e
o t h er commissioners wou ld be int er-
est ed in t his, bu t yo u can do wit h it wh a t
yo u wa nt it 's a lit t le st ro ng a t t h e
end."
He t ha nked me, a nd said he sent
my report t o everybody.
An
Inflamed
Appendix
Then I went t o t h e Jo h nso n Space Cent er, in Ho u st o n,
t o look int o t h e a vio nics. Sally Ride's gro u p wa s t here,
invest iga t ing sa fet y ma t t ers in co nnect io n wit h t h e as-
t ro na u t s' experiences. Sally int ro du ced me t o t h e so ft wa re
engineers, a nd t h ey gave me a t o u r of t h e t ra ining fa cilit ies
fo r t h e a st ro na u t s.
It 's really qu it e wo nderfu l. There are different kinds o f
simu la t o rs wi t h va rying degrees o f so ph ist ica t io n t h a t t h e
a st ro na u t s pra ct ice on. One o f t h em is ju st like t h e rea l
t h ing: yo u climb u p, yo u get in; a t t h e windo ws, co mpu t ers
are pro du cing pi ct u res. Wh en t h e pilo t mo ves t h e co nt ro ls,
t h e view o u t o f t h e windo ws ch a nges.
This pa rt icu la r simu la t o r ha d t h e do u ble pu rpo se o f
t ea ch ing t h e a st r o na u t s a nd ch ecking t h e co mpu t ers. In t h e
ba ck of t h e crew area, t h ere were t ra ys fu ll of cables ru n-
ning do wn t h ro u gh t h e cargo ba y t o so mewh ere in t h e
ba ck, wh ere i nst r u ment s simu la t ed signals fro m t h e en-
ginespressu res, fu el flow ra t es, a nd so on. (The cables
were accessible beca u se t h e t ech nicia ns were ch ecking fo r
"cross t a lk" int erferences in t h e signa ls go ing ba ck a nd
fo rt h .)
The sh u t t l e it self is opera t ed essent ia lly by co mpu t er.
Once it 's lit u p a nd st a rt s t o go, no bo dy inside does a ny-
t h i ng, becau se t h ere's t remendo u s a ccelera t io n. Wh en t h e
sh u t t l e rea ches a cert a in a l t i t u de, t h e co mpu t ers a dju st t h e
engine t h ru st do wn fo r a lit t le wh ile, a nd a s t h e a ir t h i ns
o u t , t h e co mpu t ers a dju st t h e t h ru st u p again. Abo u t a
mi nu t e la t er, t h e t wo solid ro cket boost ers fa ll a wa y, a nd a
few mi nu t es a ft er t h a t , t h e ma in fu el t a nk fa lls a wa y; each
o pera t io n is co nt ro lled by t h e co mpu t ers. The sh u t t l e gets
int o o rbit a u t o ma t ica llyt h e a st ro na u t s ju st sit in t h eir
sea t s.
The sh u t t l e's co mpu t ers do n't h a ve eno u gh memo ry
t o hold all t h e pro gra ms fo r t h e wh o le fligh t . Aft er t h e
sh u t t l e get s int o o rbit , t h e a st ro na u t s t a ke o u t some t a pes
a nd lo a d in t h e pro gra m fo r t h e next ph a se o f t h e fligh t
An Inflamed Appendi x 191
t h ere are as ma ny as six in all. Nea r t h e end of the flight,
t h e a st ro na u t s load in the progra m for co ming down.
The sh u t t le has fo u r compu t ers on board, all ru nning
t h e same pro gra ms. All fo u r are normally in agreement. If
one co mpu t er is ou t of agreement , t h e flight can still con-
t inu e. If only two compu t ers agree, t h e flight has to be
curtailed and t h e sh u t t le brou ght back immediately.
For even more sa fet y, there's a fifth compu t er
located a wa y fro m the ot her fo u r compu t ers, wit h its wires
going on different pa t h swh ich has only t h e pro gra m fo r
going u p and the program fo r coming down. (Bot h pro-
grams can barely fit int o it s memory.) If somet hing happens
to the ot her compu t ers, this fifth co mpu t er can bring t h e
sh u t t le back down. It 's never had to be used.
The most dramat ic t h ing is t h e landing. Once the as-
t ro na u t s kno w wh ere t h ey're su pposed t o land, t hey pu sh
one of t hree bu t t o nsma rked Edwa rds, Wh it e Sands, a nd
Kennedywh ich tells t he co mpu t er where the sh u t t le's
going to land. Then some small rockets slow t h e sh u t t le
down a lit t le, and get it int o t h e a t mo sph ere at ju st t h e righ t
angle. That 's t h e dangerou s pa rt , where all t h e tiles heat
u p.
D u ring t his time, t h e a st ro na u t s can't see a nyt h ing,
and everyt h ing's changing so fa st t h a t t h e descent has t o be
done a u t o ma t ica lly. At a ro u nd 35,000 feet the sh u t t le slows
do wn to less t h a n the speed of so u nd, a nd t h e steering can
be done ma nu a lly, if necessary. Bu t at 4000 feet so met h ing
h a ppens t h a t is not done by t h e co mpu t er: t h e pilot pu shes
a bu t t o n t o lower t h e la nding wheels.
I fo u nd t h a t very odda kind of silliness h a ving to do
wit h t h e psychology of the pilots: t h ey're heroes in the eyes
of the pu blic; everybo dy has t h e idea t h a t t h ey're steering
t h e sh u t t le a ro u nd, whereas t h e t ru t h is they do n't have t o
do a nyt h ing u nt il t hey pu sh t h a t bu t t o n t o lower the land-
ing gear. They ca n't stand t h e idea t h a t t h ey really have
no t h ing to do.
I t h o u gh t it wo u ld be safer if t h e co mpu t er wo u ld
lower t h e la nding wh eels, in case t h e a st ro na u t s were u n-
consciou s fo r some reason. The so ft wa re engineers agreed,
a nd added t h a t pu t t i ng do wn t h e la nding wheels a t t h e
wro ng t ime is very da ngero u s.
The engineers t old me t h a t gro u nd co nt ro l can send
u p t h e signa l t o lower t h e la nding wheels, bu t t h is ba cku p
gave t h em some pa u se: wh a t h a ppens if t h e pilo t is h a lf-
co nscio u s, a nd t h inks t h e wheels sh o u ld go down at a cer-
t a in t ime, a nd t h e co nt ro ller o n t h e gro u nd kno ws i t 's t h e
wro ng t ime? It 's mu ch bet t er t o h a ve t h e wh o le t h ing done
by co mpu t er.
The pilo t s also u sed t o co nt ro l t h e bra kes. Bu t t h ere
was lot s of t ro u ble: if yo u bra ked too mu ch at t h e begin-
ning, yo u 'd h a ve no mo re bra ke-pa d ma t eria l left wh en yo u
reached t h e end of t h e ru nwa ya nd yo u 're st ill mo ving! So
t h e so ft wa re engineers were asked t o design a co mpu t er
pro gra m t o co nt ro l t h e bra king. At first t h e a st ro na u t s ob-
ject ed t o t h e ch a nge, bu t no w t h ey're very deligh t ed be-
cau se t h e a u t o ma t i c bra ki ng wo rks so well.
Al t h o u gh t h ere's a lot o f good so ft wa re being wr i t t en
a t Jo h nso n, t h e co mpu t ers o n t h e sh u t t l e are so obsolet e
t h a t t h e ma nu fa ct u rers do n't ma ke t h em a nymo re. The
memo ries in t h em are t h e old ki nd, ma de wi t h l i t t l e ferrit e
cores t h a t have wires go ing t h ro u gh t h em. In t h e mea nt ime
we've developed mu ch bet t er h a rdwa re: t h e memo ry ch ips
of t o da y are mu ch , mu ch smaller; t h ey h a ve mu ch grea t er
ca pa cit y; a nd t h ey're mu ch mo re relia ble. They h a ve int er-
na l erro r-co rrect ing codes t h a t a u t o ma t i ca l l y keep t h e
memo ry good. W it h t o da y's co mpu t ers we can design sepa-
ra t e pro gra m mo du les so t h a t ch a nging t h e pa ylo a d do-
esn't requ ire so mu ch pro gra m rewrit ing.
Becau se o f t h e h u ge invest ment in t h e fligh t simu la t o rs
a nd all t h e o t h er h a rdwa re, t o st a rt all over a ga in a nd re-
place t h e millio ns of lines of code t h a t t h ey've already bu ilt
u p wo u ld be very co st ly.
I learned how t h e so ft wa re engineers developed t h e
avionics fo r t h e sh u t t le. One gro u p wo u ld design the so ft -
wa re pro gra ms, in pieces. Aft er t h a t , t h e pa rt s wo u ld be pu t
t o get h er int o h u ge pro gra ms, and t est ed by a n indepen-
dent grou p.
Aft er bo t h gro u ps t h o u gh t all t h e bu gs ha d been
wo rked o u t , t h ey wo u ld h a ve a simu la t io n of an ent ire
flight, in which every pa rt of t h e sh u t t le syst em is t est ed. In
su ch cases, t h ey h a d a principle: t h is simu la t io n is no t ju st
an exercise to check if t h e pro gra ms are all righ t ; it is a real
f l i g h t if a nyt h i ng fa ils no w, it 's ext remely serio u s, a s if t h e
a st ro na u t s were really o n bo a rd a nd in t ro u ble. Y o u r repu -
t a t io n is on t h e line.
In t h e ma ny yea rs t h ey ha d been do ing t h is, t h ey ha d
h a d o nly six fa ilu res a t t h e level of flight simu la t io n, and no t
o ne in an a ct u a l flight .
So t h e co mpu t er people looked like t h ey knew wh a t
t h ey were do ing: t h ey knew t h e co mpu t er bu siness was vit a l
t o t h e sh u t t le bu t po t ent ia lly da ngero u s, a nd t h ey were
being ext remely ca refu l. They were writ ing pro gra ms t h a t
o pera t e a very complex ma ch ine in an enviro nment wh ere
co ndit io ns a re ch a nging dra st ica llypro gra ms wh ich mea-
su re t h o se ch a nges, are flexible in t h eir responses, a nd
ma i nt a i n high sa fet y and a ccu ra cy. I wou ld say t h a t in some
wa ys t h ey were once in t h e fo refro nt o f h o w t o ensu re
qu a lit y in ro bo t ic o r int era ct ive co mpu t er syst ems, bu t be-
ca u se o f t h e obsolet e h a rdwa re, it 's no longer t ru e t o da y.
I didn't invest iga t e t h e avionics as ext ensively as I did
t h e engines, so I migh t h a ve been get t ing a lit t le bit of a
sales t a lk, bu t I do n't t h ink so. The engineers a nd t h e
ma na gers co mmu nica t ed well wit h each ot her, a nd t h ey
were all very ca refu l no t t o ch a nge t h eir crit eria fo r sa fet y.
I t old t h e so ft wa re engineers I t h o u gh t t h eir syst em
An Inflamed Appendi x
195
a nd t h eir a t t it u de were very good.
One gu y mu t t ered so met h ing a bo u t h igh er-u ps in
NASA wa nt ing t o cu t ba ck on t est ing t o save mo ney: "They
keep saying we a lwa ys pa ss t h e t est s, so wh a t 's t h e u se of
h a ving so ma ny?"
Before I left Ho u st o n, I co nt inu ed my su rrept it io u s
invest iga t io n o f t h e ru mo r t h a t t h e W h it e Hou se h a d pu t
pressu re on NASA t o la u nch t h e sh u t t le. Ho u st o n is t h e
cent er of co mmu nica t io n, so I went over to t h e t elemet ry
people a nd asked a bo u t t heir swit ch ing syst em. I went
t h ro u gh t h e sa me st u ff a s I did in Floridaand t h ey were
ju st a s nice t o mebu t t his t ime I fo u nd o u t t h a t if t h ey
wa nt ed t o t ie in t h e sh u t t le t o t h e Congress, t h e W h it e
Hou se, or to a nywh ere, t h ey need a t h ree-minu t e wa rn-
ingno t t hree mo nt h s, no t t h ree da ys, no t three h o u rs
t hree minu t es. Therefore t h ey can do it wh enever t h ey
wa nt , a nd no t h i ng has t o be writ t en do wn in advance. So
t h a t was a blind alley.
I talked t o a New York Ti mes report er a bo u t t h is ru mo r
one t ime. I asked h im, "How do yo u find o u t if t h ings like
t his are t ru e?"
He says, "One of t h e t h ings I t h o u gh t to do was to go
down and t a lk t o t h e people wh o ru n t h e swit ch ing syst em.
I t ried t h a t , bu t I wa sn't able t o come u p wit h a nyt h ing."
D u ring t h e first half of April, General Ku t yna 's gro u p
received t h e final resu lt s of t h e t est s NASA was ma king at
Ma rsh a ll. NASA inclu ded it s own int erpret a t io ns of t h e
resu lt s, bu t we t h o u gh t we sh o u ld writ e everyt hing over
again in o u r own way. (The only except ions were wh en a
t est didn't show a nyt h ing.)
General Ku t yna set u p a whole syst em a t Ma rsh a ll fo r
writ ing ou r grou p's report . It last ed a bo u t t wo da ys. Before
we cou ld get a nywh ere, we got a message fro m Mr. Rogers:
"Come back t o Wa sh ingt o n. Y o u sh o u ldn't do t h e writ ing
down there."
So we went back t o Wa sh ingt o n, and General Ku t yna
gave me a n o ffice in t h e Pent a go n. It was fine, bu t t here was
no secret ary, so I co u ldn't wo rk fa st .
Bill Gra ha m ha d always been very cooperative, so I
called h im u p. He a rra nged fo r me t o u se a gu y's o fficet h e
gu y was o u t of t owna nd his secret ary. She wa s very, very
h elpfu l: she cou ld writ e u p so met h ing as fa st as I could say
it , and t hen she'd reva mp it , correct ing my mist a kes. We
wo rked very h a rd fo r a bo u t t wo or t h ree da ys, and got large
pieces of t h e report writ t en t h a t wa y. It worked very well.
Neil Armst ro ng, wh o was in ou r grou p, is extremely
good at writ ing. He wo u ld look at my wo rk and immedia t ely
find every wea k spo t , ju st like t h a t h e was righ t every
t imea nd I was very impressed.
Each gro u p was writ ing a cha pt er or t wo of t h e main
repo rt . Ou r gro u p wro t e some of t h e st u ff in "Chapt er 3:
The Accident," bu t ou r ma in wo rk was "Chapt er 4: The
Ca u se of t h e Accident ." One resu lt of t his syst em, however,
was t h a t we never ha d a meet ing t o discu ss wh a t each of o u r
gro u ps fo u nd o u t t o co mment o n each o t h er's findings
fro m o u r different perspect ives. Inst ea d, we did wh a t t hey
call " wo rdsmit h ing" o r wh a t Mr. Ho t z la t er called "t omb-
st one engra ving" co rrect ing pu nct u a t io n, refining
ph ra ses, a nd so on. We never had a real discu ssion of ideas,
except incident a lly in t h e cou rse of t his wo rdsmit h ing.
For example, a qu est io n wou ld come u p: "Shou ld this
sentence a bo u t the engines be worded t h is wa y or t h a t
wa y?"
I wo u ld t ry to get a lit t le discu ssion st a rt ed. "From my
own experiences, I got t he impressio n t h a t t h e engines
a ren't as good as yo u 're saying here . . ."
So t h ey'd say, "Then we'll u se t h e more conserva t ive
wo rding here," and t hey'd go on to t h e next sentence.
Perhaps t h a t 's a very efficient wa y t o get a report o u t
qu ickly, bu t we spent meet ing a ft er meet ing do ing t h is
wo rdsmit h ing.
Every once in a wh ile we'd i nt erru pt t h a t t o discu ss t h e
t ypo gra ph y a nd t h e color of t h e cover. And a ft er each dis-
cu ssion, we were asked t o vo t e. I t h o u gh t it wo u ld be mo st
effi ci ent t o vo t e fo r t h e same color we ha d decided on in t h e
meet ing befo re, bu t it t u rned o u t I was always in t h e mino r-
it y! We finally chose red. (It came o u t blu e.)
One t ime I was t a lking t o Sally Ride a bo u t so met h ing
I ment io ned in my report on t h e engines, a nd she di dn't
seem t o kno w a bo u t it . I sa id, " Didn't yo u see my repo rt ?"
She sa ys, "No, I didn't get a copy."
So I go over to Keel's o ffice a nd sa y, "Sally t ells me she
di dn't get a copy of my report ."
He lo o ks su rprised, a nd t u rns t o h is secret a ry. "Please
ma ke a copy of Dr. Feynma n's repo rt fo r Dr. Ride."
Then I disco ver Mr. Acheson h a sn't seen it .
"Make a copy a nd give it t o Mr. Acheson."
I finally ca u gh t on, so I said, "Dr. Keel, I do n't t h i nk
a nybo dy has seen my report."
So he says to his secret ary, "Please ma ke a copy fo r all
t h e commissioners a nd give it t o t hem."
Then I said to h im, "I appreciat e how mu ch wo rk
yo u 're doing, a nd t h a t it 's di ffi cu l t t o keep everyt h ing in
mind. Bu t I t h o u gh t yo u t old me t h a t yo u showed my repo rt
t o everybody."
He says, "Yes, well, I mea nt all of t h e st a ff."
I lat er discovered, by t a lking t o people on t h e st a ff, t h a t
t h ey h a dn't seen it eit her.
Wh en t h e o t h er commissioners finally got to see my
repo rt , mo st of t h em t h o u gh t it was very good, a nd it o u gh t
t o be in t h e commission report somewhere.
Encou ra ged by t h a t , I kept bringing u p my report . "I'd
like t o have a meet ing t o discu ss wh a t t o do wit h it ," I kept
sa ying.
"We'll have a meet ing a bo u t it next week" was t h e
st a nda rd a nswer. (We were too bu sy wo rdsmit h ing a nd
vo t ing on t h e color of t h e cover.)
Gra du a lly I realized t h a t t h e way my repo rt wa s writ -
t en, it wo u ld requ ire a lot of wo rdsmit h inga nd we were
ru nning o u t of t ime. Then somebody su ggest ed t h a t my
repo rt cou ld go in as an appendix. That wa y, it wo u ldn't
h a ve t o be wo rdsmit h ed t o fit in wit h a nyt h ing else.
Bu t some of t h e co mmissio ners felt st ro ngly t h a t my
repo rt sh o u ld go in t h e ma in repo rt somehow: "The ap-
pendices wo n't come o u t u nt i l mo nt h s la t er, so no bo dy will
read yo u r repo rt if it 's an a ppendix," t h ey sa id.
I t h o u gh t I'd co mpro mise, h o wever, a nd let it go in as
an a ppendix.
Bu t no w t h ere wa s a new pro blem: my repo rt , wh ich I
h a d writ t en o n my wo rd pro cesso r a t h o me, wo u ld h a ve t o
be co nvert ed fro m t h e IBM fo rma t t o t h e big do cu ment
syst em t h e co mmissio n was u sing. They h a d a wa y of doing
t h a t wit h a n opt ical sca nning device.
I ha d t o go t o a lit t le bit of t ro u ble t o find t h e righ t gu y
t o do it . Then, it didn't get do ne righ t a wa y. Wh en I asked
wh a t h a ppened, t h e gu y said h e co u ldn't find t h e copy I ha d
given h im. So I h a d to give h im a no t h er co py.
A few da ys la t er, I finish ed writ ing my repo rt a bo u t t h e
avionics, and I wa nt ed t o combine it wit h my report on t h e
engines. So I t ook t h e avionics report to t h e gu y a nd I said,
"I'd like t o pu t t h is in wit h my o t h er report."
Then I needed to see a copy of my new repo rt fo r some
reason, bu t t h e gu y gave me an old co py, befo re t h e avion-
ics was added. "Where's t he new one wit h t h e avionics?"
I said.
"I can't find it " a nd so on. I do n't remember all t he
det a ils, bu t it seemed my repo rt was always missing or
half-cooked. It could easily h a ve been mist a kes, bu t t here
were too ma ny of t h em. It was qu it e a st ru ggle, nu rsi ng my
report along.
Then, in t h e la st cou ple o f da ys, wh en t h e ma in repo rt
is rea dy t o be sent t o t h e print er, Dr. Keel wa nt s my repo rt
t o be wo rdsmit h ed t oo, even t h o u gh it 's going in as an
a ppendix. So I t ook it to t h e regu la r edit or t h ere, a ca pa ble
ma n na med Hansen, and h e fixed it u p wi t h o u t ch a nging
t h e sense of it . Then it wa s pu t ba ck int o t h e ma ch ine as
"Version #23" t h ere were revisions a nd revisions.
(By t h e wa y: everythi ng h a d 23 versions. It has been
no t ed t h a t co mpu t ers, wh ich are su ppo sed t o increase t h e
speed at wh ich we do t h ings, h a ve no t increa sed t h e speed
a t wh ich we writ e repo rt s: we u sed t o ma ke only t h ree
versio nsbeca u se t h ey're so h a rd t o t ypea nd no w we
ma ke 23 versions!)
The next da y I no t iced Keel wo rking on my repo rt : he
h a d pu t all kinds o f big circles a ro u nd wh o le sections, wit h
X's t h ro u gh t h em; t h ere were all kinds o f t h o u gh t s left o u t .
He expla ined, "This pa rt do esn't h a ve t o go in becau se it
says mo re or less wh a t we said in t h e ma in repo rt ."
I t ried t o expla in t h a t i t 's mu ch easier t o get t h e logic
if all t h e ideas are t o get h er, inst ea d of everyt h ing being
dist ribu t ed in lit t le pieces all over t h e ma in repo rt . " Aft er
a ll," I said, "it 's o nly go nna be a n a ppendix. It wo n't ma ke
a ny difference if t h ere's a lit t le repet it ion."
Dr. Keel pu t back so met h ing h ere a nd t h ere wh en I
asked h im t o , bu t t h ere was st ill so mu ch missing t h a t my
report wa sn't a nyt h i ng like it was befo re.
SOMETIME in Ma y, at one of o u r last
meet ings, we got a ro u nd to ma king a
list of possible recommenda t ions.
Somebody wou ld sa y, " Maybe one of
t h e t h ings we shou ld discu ss is the es-
t a blish ment of a sa fet y board."
"Okay, we'll pu t t h a t down."
I'm t h inking, "At la st ! We're going
t o have a discu ssion!"
Bu t it t u rns o u t t h a t t his t ent a t ive
list of t opics bec omes t h e recommenda -
t io nst h a t t h ere be a sa fet y boa rd, t h a t
t h ere be a t his, t h a t t h ere be a t h a t . The
o nly discu ssion was a bo u t which
reco mmenda t io n we shou ld writ e first ,
which one sh o u ld co me second, a nd so
fo rt h .
There were ma ny t h ings I wa nt ed
to discu ss fu rt h er. For example, in re-
gard t o a sa fet y bo a rd, one co u ld a sk:
" W o u ldn't su ch a co mmit t ee ju st add
a no t h er layer t o an already overgrown
bu rea u cra cy?"
There h a d been sa fet y boards
before. In 1967, a ft er t h e Apo llo acci-
dent , t h e invest iga t ing co mmit t ee a t
t h e t ime invent ed a special panel fo r
sa fet y. It worked fo r a while, bu t it
didn't la st .
We didn't discu ss wh y t h e earlier
sa fet y boards were no longer effect ive;
inst ea d, we ju st ma de u p more sa fet y
bo a rds: we called t h em t h e " Indepen-
dent Solid Ro cket Mo t o r Design Over-
sigh t Co mmit t ee," t h e " Sh u t t le Trans-
po rt a t io n Syst em Sa fet y Adviso ry
The Tenth
Recommen-
dation
Panel," a nd t h e " Office o f Sa fet y, Rel i a bi l i t y, a nd Qu a lit y
Assu ra nce." We decided wh o wo u ld oversee each sa fet y
bo a rd, bu t we di dn't discu ss wh et h er t h e sa fet y boards
created by o u r co mmissio n h a d a ny bet t er chance of wo rk-
ing, wh et h er we cou ld fix t h e exist ing bo a rds so t h ey would
wo rk, o r wh et h er we sh o u ld h a ve t h em a t all.
I'm no t as su re a bo u t a lot of t h ings as everybo dy else.
Things need t o be t h o u gh t o u t a l i t t l e bi t , a nd we weren't
do ing eno u gh thi nki ng t o get h er. Qu ick decisio ns o n impo r-
t a nt ma t t ers are no t very go o da nd a t t h e speed we were
going, we were bo u nd t o ma ke so me impra ct ica l recom-
menda t io ns.
We ended u p rea rra nging t h e list o f possible recom-
menda t io ns a nd wo rdsmi t h i ng t h em a lit t le, and t h en we
vot ed yes or no . It was an odd wa y of doing t h ings, and I
wa sn't u sed t o it . In fa ct , I got t h e feeling we were being
ra ilro a ded: t h ings were being decided, so meh o w, a l i t t l e
o u t o f o u r co nt ro l.
At a ny rat e, in o u r la st meet ing, we agreed t o nine
reco mmenda t io ns. Ma ny o f t h e co mmissio ners went h o me
a ft er t h a t meet ing, bu t I was go ing t o New Y o rk a few da ys
la t er, so I st a yed in W a sh ingt o n.
The next da y, I h a ppened t o be st a ndi ng a ro u nd in Mr.
Ro gers's o ffice wi t h Neil Armst ro ng a nd a no t h er co mmis-
sio ner wh en Rogers says, " I t h o u gh t we sh o u ld h a ve a t ent h
reco mmenda t io n. Everyt h ing in o u r repo rt is so nega t ive;
I t h i nk we need so met h ing po sit ive a t t h e end t o ba la nce
it ."
He shows me a piece of pa per. It sa ys,
The Co mmissio n st ro ngly reco mmends t h a t NASA co nt i nu e t o
receive t h e su ppo rt o f t h e Admi ni st r a t i o n a nd t h e na t io n. The
a gency co nst i t u t es a na t io na l reso u rce a nd pla ys a crit ica l role in
space explo ra t io n a nd develo pment . It also pro vides a symbo l o f
na t i o na l pride a nd t ech no lo gica l lea dersh ip. The Co mmissio n
The Tenth Rec ommendati on 201
a ppl a u ds NASA's spect a cu la r a ch ievement s o f t h e pa st a nd a n-
t icipa t es impressive a ch ievement s t o come. The findings a nd rec-
o mmenda t io ns present ed in t h is repo rt are int ended t o co nt rib-
u t e t o t h e fu t u r e NASA su ccesses t h a t t h e na t io n bo t h expect s
a nd requ ires a s t h e 21st cent u ry a ppro a ch es.
In o u r fo u r mo nt h s of wo rk a s a co mmissio n, we ha d
never discu ssed a po licy qu est io n like t h a t , so I felt t h ere
was no reason t o pu t it in. And a lt h o u gh I'm no t sa ying I
disa greed wi t h it , it wa sn't o bvio u s t h a t it wa s t ru e, eit h er.
I said, " I t h i nk t h is t ent h reco mmenda t io n is ina ppro pri-
a t e."
I t h i nk I heard Armst ro ng sa y, "Well, if so mebo dy's
no t in fa vo r o f it , I t h i nk we sh o u ldn't pu t it in."
Bu t Ro gers kept wo rking o n me. We a rgu ed back a nd
fo rt h a lit t le bi t , bu t t h en I h a d t o ca t ch my fligh t t o New
Y o rk.
Wh ile I was in t h e a irpla ne, I t h o u gh t a bo u t t h is t ent h
reco mmenda t io n some mo re. I wa nt ed t o la y o u t my a rgu -
ment s ca refu lly o n pa per, so wh en I got t o my h o t el in New
Y o rk, I wro t e Rogers a let t er. At t h e end I wro t e, "This
reco mmenda t io n reminds me of t h e NASA flight reviews:
'There are crit ical pro blems, bu t never mindkeep o n fly-
ing!' '
It was Sa t u rda y, a nd I wa nt ed Mr. Rogers t o read my
let t er befo re Mo nda y. So I called u p h is secret a ryevery-
bo dy was wo rking seven da ys a week t o get t h e repo rt o u t
in t imea nd I said, "I'd like t o dict a t e a let t er t o yo u ; is t h a t
a ll righ t ?"
She says, "Sure! To save yo u some mo ney, let me call
yo u righ t back." She calls me ba ck, I dict a t e t h e let t er, a nd
sh e h a nds it direct ly t o Ro gers.
Wh en I came ba ck on Mo nda y, Mr. Ro gers said, "Dr.
Feynma n, I've read yo u r let t er, a nd I a gree wit h everyt h ing
it sa ys. Bu t yo u 've been o u t -vo t ed."
202 "What Do You C are What Other People Thi nk?" The Tenth Rec ommendati on 203
" Ou t -vo t ed? How was I o u t -vo t ed, wh en t h ere wa s no
meet ing?"
Keel was t here, too. He says, "We called everybo dy,
a nd t h ey all agree wit h the reco mmenda t io n. They all vot ed
for it."
"I do n't t h i nk t h a t 's fa ir!" I prot est ed. "If I cou ld h a ve
present ed my a rgu ment s t o t h e ot her commissioners, I
do n't t h ink I'd h a ve been o u t -vo t ed." I didn't kno w wh a t t o
do, so I sa id, "I'd like to ma ke a copy of it."
When I came ba ck, Keel says, "We ju st remembered
t h a t we di dn't t a lk t o Ho t z a bo u t it , becau se he was in a
meet ing. We fo rgo t t o get his vote."
I di dn't kno w wh a t t o make o f t h a t , bu t I fo u nd o u t
la t er t h a t Mr. Ho t z was in t h e bu ilding, no t fa r fro m t h e
copy ma ch ine.
La t er, I t alked t o Da vid Acheson a bo u t t h e t ent h
reco mmenda t io n. He explained, "It do esn't really mean
a nyt h ing; it 's o nly mo t h erh o o d a nd apple pie."
I said, "Well, if it do esn't mean a nyt h ing, it 's no t nec-
essary, t hen."
"If t h is were a commission fo r t h e Na t io na l Aca demy
of Sciences, yo u r o bject io ns wo u ld be proper. Bu t do n't
fo rget ," he sa ys, "this is a president ia l co mmissio n. We
sh o u ld say so met h ing fo r t h e President."
"I do n't u nderst a nd t h e difference," I said. "Why c an't
I be c areful and sc i enti fi c when I'm wri ti ng a report to the Presi -
dent?"
Being na ive do esn't always work: my a rgu ment ha d no
effect . Acheson kept t elling me I was ma king a big t h ing o u t
of no t h ing, a nd I kept sa ying it wea kened o u r report a nd
it sh o u l dn't go in.
So t h a t 's wh ere it ended u p: "The Commission
st ro ngly reco mmends t h a t NASA co nt inu e t o receive t h e
su ppo rt of t h e Administ ra t io n a nd t h e na t io n . . ."all
t h is " mo t h erh o o d and apple pie" st u ff t o "balance" t h e
repo rt .
Wh ile I was flying h o me, I t h o u gh t t o myself, "It's
fu nny t h a t t h e only pa rt of t h e report t h a t was genui nely
ba la nced was my own report : I said nega t ive t h ings a bo u t
t h e engine, and po sit ive t h ings a bo u t t h e avionics. And I
h a d t o st ru ggle wit h t hem t o get it in, even as a lou sy
a ppendix!"
I t h o u gh t a bo u t t h e t ent h reco mmenda t io n. All t h e
o t h er reco mmenda t io ns were based on evidence we ha d
fo u nd, bu t t h is o ne h a d no evidence wh a t so ever. I could see
t h e wh it ewa sh dripping do wn. It was obvi ously a mist a ke! It
wo u ld ma ke o u r report look ba d. I wa s very dist u rbed.
W h en I got h o me, I t a lked t o Jo a n, my sist er. I told her
a bo u t t h e t ent h reco mmenda t io n, a nd how I ha d been
" ou t -vot ed."
"Did yo u call a ny of t h e o t h er co mmissio ners a nd t a lk
t o t h em yo u rself?" she said.
"Well, I t a lked t o Acheson, bu t he was fo r it ."
" Any o t h ers?"
"Uh, no." So I called u p t h ree o t h er co mmissio ners
I'll call t h em A, B, and C.
I call A, wh o sa ys, "What t ent h reco mmenda t io n?"
I call B, wh o sa ys, "Tenth reco mmenda t io n? W h a t are
yo u t a lking a bo u t ?"
I call C, wh o sa ys, "Don't yo u remember, yo u do pe? I
was in t h e o ffice wh en Ro gers first told u s, a nd I do n't see
a nyt h i ng wro ng wi t h it ."
It a ppea red t h a t t h e o nly people wh o knew a bo u t t h e
t ent h reco mmenda t io n were t h e people wh o were in t h e
o ffice wh en Ro gers t old u s. I didn't bo t h er t o ma ke a ny
mo re t eleph o ne calls. Aft er all, it 's eno u gh I didn't feel
t h a t I h a d t o open all t h e safes t o check t h a t t h e co mbina -
tion is t h e same!*
Then I told Joa n a bo u t my repo rt h o w it was so ema s-
cu la t ed, even t h o u gh it was going in as an a ppendix.
"This refers t o " Sa fecra cker Meet s Sa fecra cker," a no t h er st ory t old in Surely
You're Joki ng, Mr. Feynman!
She sa ys, "Well, if t h ey do t h a t t o yo u r repo rt , wh a t
h a ve yo u a ccomplished, being o n t h e co mmissio n? W h a t 's
t h e resu lt of all yo u r wo rk?"
"Aha!"
I sent a t elegra m to Mr. Rogers:
PLEASE TAKE MY SIGNATURE OFF THE REPORT UNLESS
TWO THINGS OCCUR: 1) THERE IS NO TENTH RECOM-
MEND ATION, AND 2) MY REPORT APPEARS WITHOUT
MODIFICATION FROM VERSION #23.
(I knew by t h is t ime I had t o define everyt h ing care-
fu l l y.)
In o rder t o get t h e nu mber of t h e versio n I wa nt ed, I
called Mr. Ho t z, wh o wa s in charge of t h e do cu ment a t io n
syst em a nd pu blish ing t h e repo rt . He sent me Version
#23, so I ha d so met h ing defi ni t e t o pu blish on my o wn, if
wo rse came t o wo rst .
The resu lt of t h is t elegra m was t h a t Ro gers a nd Keel
t ried t o nego t ia t e wit h me. They asked General Ku t yna t o
be t h e i nt ermedi a ry, becau se t h ey knew h e wa s a friend o f
mine. W h a t a good friend o f mine h e wa s, t h ey didn't kno w.
Ku t yna says, "Hello, Professor, I ju st wa nt ed t o t ell
yo u t h a t I t h i nk yo u 're do ing very well. Bu t I've been given
t h e jo b of t ryi ng t o t a lk yo u o u t of it , so I'm going t o give
yo u t h e a rgu ment s."
"Fear not !" I sa id. "I'm no t gonna change my mind.
Ju st give me t h e a rgu ment s, a nd fea r not ."
The first a rgu ment was t h a t if I do n't accept t h e t ent h
reco mmenda t io n, t h ey wo n't accept my repo rt , even as an
a ppendix.
I di dn't wo rry a bo u t t h a t one, beca u se I cou ld always
pu t o u t my repo rt myself.
All t h e a rgu ment s were like t h a t : no ne of t h em was
very good, a nd none of t h em ha d a ny effect . I h a d t h o u gh t
t h ro u gh ca refu lly wh a t I was doing, so I ju st st u ck t o my
gu ns.
The Tenth Rec ommendati on 205
Then Ku t yna su ggested a compromise: t h ey were will-
ing t o go a lo ng wit h my repo rt as I wro t e it , except fo r one
sent ence near t h e end.
I looked at t h e sent ence a nd I realized t h a t I ha d al-
rea dy ma de my po int in t h e previo u s pa ra gra ph . Repea t ing
t h e po int a mo u nt ed t o polemics; remo ving t h e ph ra se
ma de my repo rt mu ch bet t er. I a ccept ed t h e co mpro mise.
Then I o ffered a co mpro mise on t h e t ent h reco mmen-
da t io n: "If t h ey wa nt t o say so met h ing nice a bo u t NASA a t
t h e end, ju st do n't call it a reco mmenda t io n, so peo ple will
kno w t h a t it 's no t in t h e same cla ss a s t h e o t h er reco mmen-
da t io ns: call it a 'co nclu ding t h o u gh t ' if yo u wa nt . And t o
avoid co nfu sio n, do n't u se t h e wo rds 'st ro ngly recom-
mends.' Ju st say 'u rges''Th e Co mmissio n u rges t h a t
NASA co nt inu e t o receive t h e su ppo rt o f t h e Admi ni st ra -
t ion and t h e na t io n.' All t h e o t h er st u ff can st a y t h e same."
A lit t le bit la t er, Keel calls me u p: "Can we say 'strongly
u rges'?"
" No. Ju st 'u rges'."
"Okay," h e sa id. And t h a t was t h e fina l decision.
Meet the Press
207
Meet the
Press
I PUT my na me on t h e ma in repo rt , my
o wn repo rt got in as an a ppendix, a nd
everyt h ing was all righ t . In early Ju ne
we went back t o Wa sh ingt o n a nd gave
o u r report to t h e President in a cere-
mo ny held in t h e Rose Ga rden. That
was on a Th u rsda y. The report was no t
t o be relea sed t o t h e pu blic u nt il t h e
following Mo nda y, so t h e President
cou ld st u dy it .
Mea nwh ile, t h e newspa per repo rt -
ers were wo rking like demons: t h ey
knew o u r repo rt was finish ed and t h ey
were t ryi ng t o scoop each o t h er t o find
o u t wh a t wa s in it . I knew t h ey wo u ld be
ca lling me u p da y a nd nigh t , a nd I was
a fra id I wo u ld say so met h ing a bo u t a
t ech nica l ma t t er t h a t wo u ld give t h em a
h int .
Reporters are very clever and per-
sist ent . They'll sa y, "We heard su ch -
a nd-su ch is it t ru e?" And pret t y soon,
wh a t yo u 're t h i nki ng yo u di dn't tell
t h em sh o ws u p in t h e newspa per!
I was det ermined no t t o say a word
a bo u t t h e repo rt u nt i l it was ma de pu b-
lic, on Mo nda y. A friend of mine con-
vinced me to go on t h e " MacNeil/
Lehrer Newshou r," so I said yes fo r
Mo nda y evening's show.
I also ha d my secret a ry set u p a
press co nference fo r Tu esda y a t Cal-
t ech. I said, "Tell t h e repo rt ers wh o
wa nt t o t a lk t o me t h a t I h a ven't a ny
co mment o n a nyt h ing: a ny qu est io ns
t h ey have, I'll be glad to answer on
FIGURE 18. The C ommi ssi on Report was presented to the presi dent i n
the Rose Garden at the Whi te House. Vi si ble, from left to ri ght, are
General Kutyna, Wi lli am Rogers, Eugene C overt, Presi dent Reagan,
Nei l Armstrong, and Ri c hard Feynman. ( PETE SOUZA, THE WHITE
HOUSE.)
FIGURE 19. At the rec epti on. ( PETE SOUZA, THE WHITE HOUSE.)
to be released
208 "What Do You C are What Other People Thi ti k?" Meet the Press 209
Tu esda y a t my press co nference."
Over t h e weekend, wh ile I was st ill in W a sh ingt o n, it
leaked so meh o w t h a t I h a d t h rea t ened t o t a ke my na me o ff
t h e repo rt . Some paper in Mia mi st a rt ed it , a nd soon t h e
st ory was r u nni ng all over a bo u t t h is a rgu ment bet ween me
a nd Ro gers. Wh en t h e repo rt ers wh o were u sed t o co vering
W a sh ingt o n heard "Mr. Feynma n has no t h ing t o say; he'll
answer all yo u r qu estions at his press conference on Tues-
da y," it so u nded su spicio u sa s t h o u gh t h e a rgu ment wa s
st ill on, a nd I wa s going t o h a ve t h is press co nference o n
Tu esda y t o explain wh y I t o o k my na me off t h e repo rt .
Bu t I didn't kno w a nyt h i ng a bo u t i t . I iso la t ed myself
fro m t h e press so mu ch t h a t I wa sn't even rea ding t h e
newspa pers.
On Su nda y nigh t , t h e co mmissio n ha d a go o dbye din-
ner a rra nged by Mr. Rogers a t so me clu b. Aft er we finish ed
ea t ing, I said t o Genera l Ku t yna , " I ca n't st a y a ro u nd a ny-
mo re. I h a ve t o leave a l i t t l e early."
He sa ys, "What can be so i mpo rt a nt ?"
I didn't wa nt t o sa y.
He comes o u t side wit h me, t o see wh a t t h is " impo r-
t a nt " so met h ing is. It 's a br i gh t red spo rt s car wit h t wo
bea u t i fu l blo nds inside, wa i t i ng t o wh i sk me a wa y.
I get in t h e car. We're a bo u t t o speed o ff, lea ving
General Ku t yna st a nding t h ere scra t ch ing his h ea d, wh en
one of t h e blo nds sa ys, "Oh! General Ku t yna ! I'm Ms.
So-and-so. I int erviewed yo u on t h e ph o ne a few weeks
ago."
So he cau ght on. They were reporters fro m the "Mac-
Neil/Leh rer Newsh o u r."
They were very nice, a nd we t a lked a bo u t t h is a nd t h a t
fo r t h e sh o w Mo nda y nigh t . So mewh ere a lo ng t h e line I
t old t h em I was go ing t o h a ve my o wn press co nference on
Tu esda y, a nd I was going t o give o u t my repo rt even
t h o u gh it was going t o a ppea r a s a n a ppendix t h ree mo nt h s
la t er. They said my repo rt so u nded int erest ing, a nd t h ey'd
like t o see it . By t h is t i me we're all very fri endl y, so I gave
t h em a copy.
They dro pped me off a t my co u sin's h o u se, wh ere I
was st a ying. I told Fra nces a bo u t t h e show, a nd how I gave
t h e repo rt ers a copy of my repo rt . Frances pu t s her h a nds
t o her head, h o rrified.
I sa id, "Yes, t h a t was a du mb mist a ke, wa sn't it ! I'd
bet t er call 'em u p a nd t ell 'em no t t o u se it ."
I cou ld tell by t h e wa y Frances sh o o k her head t h a t it
wa sn't go nna be so easy!
I call o ne of t h em u p: "I'm so rry, bu t I ma de a mist a ke:
I sh o u ldn't h a ve given my repo rt t o yo u , so I'd prefer you
didn't u se it."
" We're in t h e news bu siness, Dr. Feynma n. The goal
of t h e news bu siness is t o get news, a nd yo u r repo rt is
newswo rt h y. It wo u ld be co mplet ely a ga inst o u r inst inct s
a nd pra ct ice no t t o u se it ."
" I kno w, bu t I'm na ive a bo u t t hese t h ings. I simply
ma de a mist a ke. It 's no t fa ir t o t h e o t h er repo rt ers wh o will
be a t t h e press co nference o n Tu esda y. Aft er all, wo u ld yo u
like it if yo u came t o a press co nference and the gu y had
mist a kenly given h is repo rt t o so mebo dy else? I t h ink yo u
can u nderst a nd t h a t ."
"I'll talk t o my colleagu e a nd call yo u back."
Two h o u rs la t er, t h ey call ba ckt h ey're bo t h o n t h e
lineand t h ey t ry t o explain t o me wh y t h ey sh o u ld u se it :
"In t h e news bu siness, it 's cu st o ma ry t h a t wh enever we get
a docu ment fro m somebody the way we did from you , it
means we can u se it."
" I a pprecia t e t h a t t h ere are co nvent io ns in t h e news
bu siness, bu t I do n't kno w a nyt h ing a bo u t t h ese t h i ngs, so
as a co u rt esy to me, please do n't u se it."
It went ba ck a nd fo rt h a lit t le more like t h a t . Then
a no t h er "We'll call yo u ba ck," and a no t h er long delay. I
cou ld t ell fro m t h e long delays t h a t t h ey were h a ving a lot
o f t ro u ble wi t h t h is pro blem.
I was in a very good fet t le, fo r some reason. I h a d
a lrea dy lo st , a nd I knew wh a t I needed, so I cou ld fo cu s
easily. I h a d no di ffi cu l t y a dmi t t i ng co mplet e idio cywh ich
is u su ally t he case when I deal wit h the worldand I didn't
t h ink t h ere was a ny law of na t u re wh ich said I had t o give
in. I ju st kept going, a nd di dn't wa ver a t all.
It went la t e int o t h e nigh t : one o'clock, t wo o'clock,
we're st ill wo rking o n it . "Dr. Feynma n, it 's very u npro fes-
sional to give someone a st ory and t h en ret ra ct it . This is
no t t h e wa y people behave in Wa sh ingt o n."
"It's obviou s I do n't kno w a nyt h i ng a bo u t Wa shing-
t o n. Bu t t his is t h e way I beh a velike a fo o l. I'm so rry, bu t
it wa s simply an error, so as a co u rt esy, please do n't u se it."
Then, somewhere along t h e line, one of t h em sa ys, "If
we go ahead a nd u se yo u r repo rt , does t h a t mean yo u wo n't
go on t h e show?"
"You said it ; I didn't ."
"We'll call yo u back."
Ano t h er delay.
Act u a lly, I h a dn't decided wh et h er I'd refu se to go on
t h e show, becau se I kept t h inking it was possible I cou ld
u ndo my mist a ke. Wh en I t h o u gh t a bo u t it , I didn't t h ink
I cou ld legit ima t ely pla y t h a t card. Bu t when o ne of t h em
ma de t h e mist a ke of pro po sing t h e po ssibilit y, I said, "You
said it ; I didn't " very coldas if t o say, "I'm no t t h rea t en-
ing yo u , bu t yo u can figu re it o u t fo r yo u rself, honey!"
They called me ba ck, a nd said t h ey wo u ldn't u se my
repo rt .
When I went on t h e show, I never got t h e impression
t h a t any of t h e qu est io ns were based on my report . Mr.
Lehrer did ask me wh et h er t h ere ha d been a ny problems
bet ween me and Mr. Rogers, bu t I weaseled: I said t h ere
ha d been no problems.
Aft er t he show was over, t h e two reporters told me
Meet the Press 211
t h ey t h o u gh t t h e show went fine wi t h o u t my repo rt . We left
good friends.
I flew back t o Ca lifo rnia t h a t nigh t , a nd had my press
conference on Tu esda y at Calt ech. A large nu mber of re-
po rt ers came. A few a sked qu est io ns a bo u t my repo rt , bu t
most of them were interested in the ru mor t h a t I had
t h rea t ened t o t a ke my na me off t h e commission repo rt . I
fo u nd myself t elling t hem over and over t h a t I ha d no
pro blem wit h Mr. Ro gers.
Afterthou ghts
NOW t h a t I've ha d mo re t ime t o t h i nk
a bo u t it , I st ill like Mr. Rogers, and I
st ill feel t h a t everyt h ing's o ka y. It 's my
ju dgment t h a t he's a fine ma n. Over t h e
cou rse of t h e co mmissio n I got to ap-
preciate his t a lent s and his abilities, a nd
I h a ve great respect fo r h im. Mr. Ro-
gers h a s a very good, smo o t h wa y a bo u t
h im, so I reserve in my hea d t h e possi-
bilit yno t a s a su spicio n, bu t a s a n u n-
kno wnt h a t I like him beca u se h e
knew how to make me like him. I prefer
t o a ssu me h e's a genu inely fine fello w,
a nd t h a t h e is t h e wa y h e a ppea rs. Bu t
I was in W a sh ingt o n lo ng eno u gh t o
kno w t h a t I ca n't tell.
I'm no t exact ly su re wh a t Mr. Ro-
gers t h inks of me. He gives me the im-
pressio n t h a t , in spit e o f my being su ch
a pain in t h e ass t o h im in t h e begin-
ning, he likes me very mu ch . I ma y be
wro ng, bu t if he feels t h e way I feel
t o wa rd h im, it 's good.
Mr. Rogers, being a la wyer, h a d a
di ffi cu l t jo b t o ru n a co mmissio n inves-
t iga t ing wh a t was essent ia lly a t ech nica l
qu est io n. Wit h Dr. Keel's help, I t h ink
t h e t ech nica l pa rt of it was h a ndled
well. Bu t it st ru ck me t h a t t h ere were
several fish inesses associat ed wit h t h e
big cheeses at NASA.
Every t ime we t a lked t o h igh er
level ma na gers, t h ey kept sa ying t h ey
di dn't kno w a nyt h ing a bo u t t h e prob-
lems below t h em. We're get t ing t h is
kind o f t h ing again in t h e Ira n-Co nt ra
Afterthoughts 213
hearings, bu t a t t h a t t ime, t his kind of sit u a t io n was new t o
me: eit h er t h e gu ys at t h e t o p didn't kno w, in wh ich case
t h ey sh o u ld h a ve kno wn, or t h ey did kno w, in which case
t h ey're lying t o u s.
Wh en we learned t h a t Mr. Mu llo y h a d pu t pressu re o n
Thiokol to launch, we heard time a ft er time t hat t he next
level u p a t NASA knew no t h ing a bo u t it . Y o u 'd t h ink Mr.
Mu llo y wo u ld h a ve no t ified a h igh er-u p du ring t h is big
discu ssio n, saying so met h ing like, "There's a qu est io n as t o
wh et h er we sh o u ld fly t o mo rro w mo rning, a nd t h ere's been
some object ion by t h e Thiokol engineers, bu t we've de-
cided t o fly a nywa ywh a t do yo u t h ink?" Bu t inst ea d, Mu l-
loy said so met h ing like, "All t h e qu est io ns have been re-
solved." There seemed t o be some reason wh y gu ys at t h e
lower level didn't bring pro blems u p t o t h e next level.
I invent ed a t h eo ry wh ich I h a ve discu ssed wit h a con-
siderable nu mber of people, and ma ny people have ex-
pla ined t o me wh y it 's wro ng. Bu t I do n't remember t heir
expla na t io ns, so I ca nno t resist t elling yo u wh a t I t h ink led
t o t h is lack of co mmu nica t io n in NASA.
Wh en NASA was t rying t o go t o t h e mo o n, t here wa s
a great deal of ent h u sia sm: it was a goal everyo ne was
a nxio u s t o a ch ieve. They di dn't kno w if t h ey cou ld do it , bu t
t h ey were all wo rking t o get h er.
I h a ve t h is idea becau se I wo rked at Los Ala mo s, a nd
I experienced t h e t ensio n a nd t h e pressu re of everybody
wo rking t o get h er t o ma ke t h e a t o mic bo mb. When some-
bo dy's h a ving a pro blemsa y, wit h t h e det o na t o revery-
body kno ws t h a t it 's a big pro blem, t h ey're t h inking o f wa ys
t o bea t it , t h ey're ma king su ggest ions, and wh en t h ey hear
a bo u t t h e solu t ion t h ey're excited, becau se t h a t mea ns their
wo rk is no w u sefu l: if t h e det o na t o r didn't wo rk, t h e bo mb
wo u l dn't work.
I figu red t h e same t h ing had gone on at NASA in t h e
early days: if t h e space su it didn't wo rk, t h ey co u ldn't go t o
t h e moon. So everybo dy's int erest ed in everybody else's
problems.
Bu t t h en, wh en t h e moon pro ject was over, NASA h a d
all t h ese people t o get h er: t h ere's a big o rga niza t io n in
Ho u st o n a nd a big o rga niza t io n in Hu nt sville, no t t o men-
t io n a t Kennedy, in Florida. Y ou do n't wa nt t o fire people
and send t h em o u t in t h e street when yo u 're done wit h a
big pro ject , so t h e pro blem is, wh a t t o do ?
Y ou h a ve t o co nvince Congress t h a t t here exists a pro-
ject t h a t o nly NASA can do. In order to do so, it is neces-
sa rya t least it wa s apparently necessary in t h is caset o
exaggerate: to exaggerate how economical t h e sh u t t le
wo u ld be, t o exaggerat e how o ft en it cou ld fly, t o exagger-
a t e how safe it wo u ld be, t o exaggerat e t he big scient ific
fa ct s t h a t wo u ld be discovered. "The sh u t t le can ma ke so-
a nd-so ma ny fligh t s a nd i t 'l l cost su ch -a nd-su ch ; we went t o
the moon, so we can do it!"
Mea nwh ile, I wo u ld gu ess, t h e engineers a t t h e bo t t o m
are saying, "No, no! We ca n't ma ke t h a t ma ny flight s. If we
h a d t o ma ke t h a t ma ny fligh t s, it wo u ld mea n su ch -a nd-
su ch !" And, "No, we ca n't do it fo r t h a t a mo u nt o f money,
becau se t h a t wou ld mea n we'd h a ve t o do t h u s-a nd-so !"
Well, t he gu ys wh o are t rying t o get Congress t o o ka y
t h eir pro ject s do n't wa nt t o hear su ch t a lk. It 's bet t er if t h ey
do n't h ea r, so t h ey can be more " h o nest " t h ey do n't wa nt
to be in t h e po sit io n of lying to Congress! So pret t y soon
t h e a t t i t u des begin t o ch a nge: info rma t io n fro m t h e bo t t o m
which is disagreeable"We're h a ving a problem wit h the
seals; we shou ld fix it befo re we fly again"is su ppressed
by big cheeses a nd middle ma na gers wh o say, "If yo u t ell
me a bo u t t h e seals pro blems, we'll have t o gro u nd t h e
sh u t t l e and fix it ." Or, "No, no, keep on flying, becau se
otherwise, it'll look bad," or "Don't tell me; I do n't wa nt
t o h ea r a bo u t it ."
Ma ybe t h ey do n't say explicit ly " Do n't tell me," bu t
t h ey discou rage co mmu nica t io n, wh ich a mo u nt s t o t h e
same t h ing. It 's no t a qu est io n o f wh a t h a s been writ t en
do wn, or who shou ld tell wh a t to whom; it's a qu estion of
Afterthoughts 215
wh et h er, wh en yo u do t ell somebody a bo u t some pro blem,
t h ey're deli ghted t o hear a bo u t it and t h ey say "Tell me
more" a nd "Have yo u t ried su ch -a nd-su ch ?" or t h ey say
"Well, see wh a t yo u can do a bo u t it " wh ich is a com-
plet ely different a t mo sph ere. If you t ry once or t wice t o
co mmu nica t e a nd get pu sh ed ba ck, pret t y soon yo u decide,
"To hell wit h it ."
So t h a t 's my t h eo ry: becau se of t h e exa ggera t io n at t h e
t o p being inco nsist ent wit h t h e rea lit y a t t h e bo t t o m, com-
mu nica t io n got slowed u p and u lt ima t ely ja mmed. That's
h o w it 's po ssible t h a t t h e h igh er-u ps didn't kno w.
The ot her po ssibilit y is t h a t t h e h igh er-u ps did kno w,
a nd t h ey ju st sai d t h ey didn't kno w.
I looked up a former director of NASAI do n't re-
member h is na me no wwh o is t h e head of some co mpa ny
in Ca lifo rnia . I t h o u gh t I'd go and t a lk to him wh en I was
on one of my breaks at home, a nd sa y, "They all say t h ey
h a ven't heard. Does t h a t ma ke a ny sense? How does some-
one go a bo u t invest iga t ing t h em?"
He never ret u rned my calls. Perh a ps h e didn't wa nt t o
t a lk t o t h e co mmissio ner invest iga t ing h igh er-u ps; ma ybe
he h a d had eno u gh of NASA, a nd didn't wa nt t o get in-
vo lved. And becau se I was bu sy wit h so ma ny o t h er t h ings,
I didn't pu sh it .
There were all kinds of qu est io ns we didn't invest iga t e.
One wa s t his myst ery of Mr. Beggs, t h e fo rmer direct o r of
NASA wh o wa s removed fro m his jo b pending a n invest iga -
t io n t h a t had no t h i ng t o do wit h t h e sh u t t le; h e was re-
placed by Gra h a m sh o rt ly befo re t h e a ccident . Nevert h e-
less, it t u rned ou t t h a t , every da y, Beggs came to his old
o ffice. People came in t o see h im, a lt h o u gh he never t a lked
t o Gra h a m. W h a t was h e do ing? Was t h ere some a ct ivit y
st ill being directed by Beggs?
From t ime to t ime I wo u ld t ry to get Mr. Rogers int er-
ested in investigating such fishinesses. I said, "We have
la wyers o n t h e co mmissio n, we h a ve co mpa ny ma na gers,
we h a ve very fine people wi t h a large ra nge of experiences.
We h a ve people wh o kno w how t o get an a nswer o u t of a
gu y when h e do esn't wa nt t o say so met h ing. I don't kno w
h o w t o do t h a t . If a gu y t ells me t h e pro ba bilit y of fa ilu re
is 1 in 10
5
,1 kno w he's fu ll of cra pbu t I do n't kno w wh a t 's
na t u r a l in a bu rea u cra t ic syst em. We o u gh t a get some of
t h e big sh o t s t o get h er a nd a sk t h em qu est io ns: ju st like we
asked t h e second-level ma na gers like Mr. Mu llo y, we
sh o u ld a sk t h e first level."
He wo u ld sa y, "Yes, well, I t h ink so."
Mr. Ro gers told me la t er t h a t h e wro t e a let t er t o each
of the big shots, bu t they replied t ha t they didn't have
a nyt h i ng t h ey wa nt ed t o say t o u s.
There was also t h e qu est io n of pressu re fro m t h e
W h it e Ho u se.
It wa s t h e President 's idea t o pu t a t ea ch er in spa ce, a s
a symbo l o f t h e na t io n's co mmit ment t o edu ca t io n. He h a d
pro po sed t h e idea a yea r befo re, in h i s St a t e o f t h e Unio n
a ddress. No w, one yea r la t er, t h e St a t e o f t h e Unio n speech
was co ming u p again. It wou ld be perfect to have the
t ea ch er in space, t a lking t o t h e President a nd t h e Congress.
All t h e ci rcu mst a nt i a l evidence was very st ro ng.
I t a lked t o a nu mber of people a bo u t it , a nd h ea rd
va rio u s o pinio ns, bu t I fina lly co nclu ded t h a t t h ere wa s no
pressu re fro m t he Whit e Hou se.
First of a ll, t h e ma n wh o pressu red Thiokol t o ch a nge
it s po sit io n, Mr. Mu llo y, wa s a second-level ma na ger.
Ah ea d o f t ime, no bo dy cou ld predict wh a t mi gh t get in t h e
wa y of a la u nch . If yo u ima gine Mu llo y was t old "Make su re
t h e sh u t t le flies t o mo rro w, beca u se t h e President wa nt s it ,"
yo u 'd h a ve t o ima gine t h a t everybody else a t his level h a d t o
be t o lda nd t h ere are a lot of people at his level. To tell
t h a t ma ny people wou ld ma ke it su re t o leak o u t . So t h a t
way of pu t t i ng on pressu re was very u nlikely.
Afterthoughts
217
By t h e t ime t h e co mmissio n wa s over, I u nderst o o d
mu ch bet t er t h e ch a ra ct er o f o pera t io ns in Wa sh ingt o n a nd
in NASA. I lea rned, by seeing h o w t h ey wo rked, t h a t t h e
peo ple in a big syst em like NASA know wh a t h a s t o be
do newi t h o u t being t o ld.
There wa s already a big pressu re t o keep t he sh u t t le
flying. NASA had a flight schedu le t h ey were t rying t o meet ,
ju st to show the capabilities of NASAnever mind wh et h er
t h e president wa s go ing t o give a speech t h a t nigh t o r no t .
So I do n't believe t h ere wa s a ny direct a ct ivit y or a ny special
effo rt fro m t h e W h it e Hou se. There wa s no need t o do it ,
so I do n't believe it wa s do ne.
I cou ld give yo u an analog of t h a t . Y ou know those
signs t h a t appear in t h e ba ck windo ws o f a u t o mo biles
t h o se lit t le yellow dia mo nds t h a t say BABY ON BOARD ,
a nd t h ings like t h a t ? Y ou do n't have t o tell me t h ere's a ba by
on bo a rd; I'm gonna drive ca refu lly anyway! W h a t a m I
su ppo sed to do wh en I see t here's a ba by on bo a rd: act
di fferent l y? As if I'm su ddenly gonna drive mo re ca refu lly
a nd no t h it t h e car beca u se t h ere's a ba by o n bo a rd, wh en
all I'm t ryi ng t o do is no t h it it a nywa y!
So NASA was t rying to get the shu t t le up anyway: you
do n't h a ve t o say t h ere's a ba by on bo a rd, or t h ere's a
t eacher on bo a rd, or it 's impo rt a nt t o get t h is one u p fo r
t h e President .
No w t h a t I've t a lked t o so me people a bo u t my experi-
ences o n t h e co mmissio n, I t h i nk I u nderst a nd a few t h ings
t h a t I didn't u nderst a nd so well ea rlier. One of t h em has t o
do wit h wh a t I said t o Dr. Keel t h a t u pset him so mu ch .
Recently I was talking to a ma n wh o spent a lot of t ime in
W a sh ingt o n, a nd I asked him a pa rt icu la r qu est io n wh ich ,
if h e didn't t a ke it righ t , cou ld be considered a grave insu lt .
I wo u ld like t o expla in t h e qu est io n, beca u se it seems t o me
t o be a real po ssibilit y of wh a t I said t o Dr. Keel.
The only wa y to h a ve real success in science, the field
I'm familiar wit h , is to describe the evidence very carefu lly
wi t h o u t regard t o t h e way you feel it sh o u ld be. If yo u have
a t h eo ry, yo u mu st t ry t o explain wh a t 's good and wh a t 's
bad a bo u t it equ a lly. In science, you lea rn a kind of st a n-
da rd int egrit y and h o nest y.
In o t h er fields, su ch as bu siness, it 's different . For ex-
ample, a lmo st every a dvert isement you see is o bvio u sly
designed, in some way or a no t h er, t o fool t h e cu st o mer: t h e
print t h a t t h ey do n't wa nt yo u t o read is small; t h e st a t e-
ment s are writ t en in a n obscu re wa y. It is o bvio u s t o a ny-
bo dy t h a t t h e pro du ct is no t being present ed in a scient ific
a nd balanced way. Therefore, in t h e selling bu siness,
t h ere's a lack of int egrit y.
My fa t h er ha d t h e spirit a nd int egrit y o f a scient ist , bu t
h e was a salesman. I remember a sking h im t h e qu est io n
"How can a ma n of int egrit y be a sa lesma n?"
He said to me, "Frankly, ma ny salesmen in t h e bu si-
ness a re no t st ra igh t fo rwa rdt h ey t h i nk it 's a bet t er way t o
sell. Bu t I've t ried being st ra igh t fo rwa rd, a nd I find it has
it s a dva nt a ges. In fa ct , I wo u ldn't do it a ny o t h er wa y. If t h e
cu st o mer t h inks a t all, h e'll realize he has ha d some bad
experience wi t h a no t h er sa lesma n, bu t h a sn't h a d t h a t ki nd
of experience with yo u . So in the end, several cu st o mers
will st a y wit h yo u fo r a lo ng t ime a nd a pprecia t e it."
My fa t h er was no t a big, su ccessfu l, fa mo u s sa lesma n;
he was the sales manager fo r a mediu m-sized u nifo rm co m-
pa ny. He was su ccessfu l, bu t no t eno rmo u sly so.
Wh en I see a co ngressma n giving h is opinion on some-
t hing, I always wonder if it represents his real opinion or if
it represent s an o pinio n t h a t h e's designed in order t o be
elect ed. It seems t o be a cent ral pro blem fo r po lit icia ns. So
I often wonder: what is the relation of integrity to working
in t h e go vernment ?
No w, Dr. Keel st a rt ed o u t by t elling me t h a t h e h a d a
degree in physics. I always assu me t h a t everybody in phys-
ics h a s int egrit yperh a ps I'm na ive a bo u t t h a t so I mu st
Afterthoughts 219
have asked him a question I oft en think about: "How can
a ma n of int egrit y get along in Wa sh ingt o n?"
It 's very easy t o read t h a t qu est io n a no t h er wa y: "Since
you 're getting along in Wa shingt on, you ca n't be a man of
int egrit y!"
Ano t h er t h ing I u nderst a nd bet t er no w has t o do wit h
wh ere t h e idea came fro m t h a t cold a ffect s t h e O-rings. It
was General Ku t yna wh o called me u p a nd said, "I was
wo rking on my ca rbu ret o r, a nd I was t h inking: wh a t is t h e
effect of cold on t h e O-rings?"
Well, it t u rns ou t t h a t one o f NASA's own a st ro na u t s
told h im t h ere was info rma t io n, somewhere in t h e wo rks of
NASA, t h a t t h e O-rings ha d no resilience wh a t ever a t low
t empera t u resa nd NASA wa sn't sa ying a nyt h i ng a bo u t it.
Bu t General Ku t yna ha d t h e career o f t h a t a st ro na u t t o
wo rry a bo u t , so t h e real qu est io n t h e General was t h inking
a bo u t wh ile h e wa s wo rking o n his ca rbu ret o r wa s, "How
can I get t h is info rma t io n o u t wi t h o u t jeo pa rdizing my as-
t r o na u t friend?" His so lu t io n was t o get t h e pro fesso r ex-
cit ed a bo u t it , a nd his pla n wo rked perfect ly.
Appendix F:
Personal
Observations
on the
Reliability
of the Shuttle
Introduc ti on
It appears t h a t t h ere are eno rmo u s dif-
ferences of opinion as to t h e pro ba bil-
it y of a fa ilu re wi t h loss of vehicle a nd
of h u ma n life.* The est ima t es ra nge
fro m ro u gh ly 1 in 100 to 1 in 100,000.
The higher figu res come fro m wo rking
engineers, and t h e very low figu res
come fro m ma na gement . W h a t are t h e
cau ses a nd consequ ences of t h is lack of
a greement ? Since 1 pa rt in 100,000
wo u ld imply t h a t one co u ld la u nch a
sh u t t l e each da y fo r 300 yea rs expect -
ing t o lose o nly one, we co u ld pro perly
ask, " Wh a t is t h e cau se of ma na ge-
ment 's fa nt a st i c fa it h in t h e ma ch in-
ery?"
We h a ve also fo u nd t h a t cert ifica -
tion crit eria u sed in flight rea diness re-
views o ft en develop a gra du a lly de-
crea sing st rict ness. The a rgu ment t h a t
t h e same risk was flo wn befo re wi t h o u t
fa ilu re is o ft en accept ed a s a n a rgu ment
fo r t h e sa fet y of a ccept ing it a ga in. Be-
cau se of t h is, o bvio u s weaknesses are
accept ed again and a ga inso met imes
wi t h o u t a su fficient ly seriou s a t t empt t o
remedy t h em, so met imes wi t h o u t a
flight dela y becau se of t h eir co nt inu ed
presence.
There are several sou rces of info r-
*Leigh t o n's no t e: The versio n pri nt ed a s Appendi x F
in t h e co mmissio n repo rt does no t a ppea r t o h a ve
been edit ed, so I took it u po n myself t o smo o t h it o u t
a l i t t l e bi t .
Appendi x F 221
ma t io n: t h ere are pu blish ed crit eria fo r cert ifica t io n, in-
clu ding a h ist o ry of mo difica t io ns in t h e fo rm of wa ivers
a nd devia t io ns; in a ddit io n, t h e records of t h e flight rea di-
ness reviews fo r each fligh t do cu ment t h e a rgu ment s u sed
t o accept t h e risks of t h e flight . Info rma t io n was o bt a ined
fro m direct t est imo ny and repo rt s of t h e range safety of-
ficer, Lou is J. Ullia n, wit h respect t o t h e h ist o ry o f su ccess
of solid fu el ro cket s. There wa s a fu rt h er st u dy by him (as
ch a irma n of t h e La u nch Abo rt Sa fet y Panel, LASP) in an
a t t empt t o det ermine t h e risks involved in po ssible acci-
dent s lea ding t o ra dio a ct ive co nt a mina t io n fro m a t t empt -
ing t o fly a pl u t o ni u m po wer su pply (called a ra dio a ct ive
t h erma l genera t o r, o r RTG) o n fu t u r e pla net a ry missio ns.
The NASA st u dy of t h e same qu est io n is also a va ila ble. For
t h e h ist o ry o f t h e space sh u t t l e ma in engines, int erviews
wit h ma na gement a nd engineers a t Ma rsh a ll, a nd info rma l
int erviews wi t h engineers a t Ro cket dyne, were ma de. An
independent (Ca lt ech ) mech a nica l engineer wh o co nsu lt ed
fo r NASA a bo u t engines was also int erviewed info rma lly. A
vi si t t o Jo h nso n was ma de t o ga t h er i nfo rma t i o n o n t h e
relia bilit y o f t h e avionics (co mpu t ers, senso rs, a nd effec-
t o rs). Fina lly, t h ere is t h e repo rt "A Review of Cert ifica t io n
Practices Po t ent ia lly Applica ble t o Ma n-ra t ed Reu sa ble
Rocket Engines," prepa red at t h e Jet Propu lsion La bora -
t o ry by N. Moore et al. in Febru a ry 1986 fo r NASA Hea d-
qu a rt ers, Office of Space Fligh t . It deals wit h t h e met h o ds
u sed by t h e FAA a nd t h e milit a ry t o cert ify t h eir gas t u rbine
and rocket engines. These a u t h o rs were also int erviewed
info rma lly.
Soli d Roc ket Boosters (SRB)
An est ima t e of t he relia bilit y of so lid-fu el rocket boost-
ers (SRBs) was made by t h e ra nge sa fet y o fficer by st u dying
t h e experience of all previo u s rocket flights. Ou t of a t o t a l
of nea rly 2900 flights, 121 failed (1 in 25). This inclu des,
h o wever, wh a t may be called "early errors"rocket s flown
fo r t h e first few t imes in wh ich design errors are discovered
a nd fixed. A mo re rea so na ble figu re fo r t h e ma t u re rocket s
migh t be 1 in 50. W it h special care in select ing pa rt s a nd
in inspect io n, a figu re below 1 in 100 migh t be a ch ieved,
bu t 1 in 1000 is pro ba bly no t a t t a ina ble wit h t o da y's tech-
no lo gy. (Since there are two rockets on the sh u t t le, these
rocket fa ilu re ra t es mu st be do u bled t o get sh u t t l e fa ilu re
ra t es du e t o SRB fa ilu re.)
NASA o fficia ls a rgu e t h a t t h e figu re is mu ch lo wer.
They po int o u t t h a t "since t h e sh u t t l e is a ma nned veh icle,
t h e pro ba bi l i t y of missio n su ccess is necessa rily very close
t o 1.0." It is no t very clear wh a t t h is ph ra se mea ns. Does
it mean it i s close to 1 or t ha t it ought to be close to 1 ? They
go on t o expla in, " Hist o rica lly, t h is ext remely h igh degree
of missio n su ccess h a s given rise t o a difference in philoso-
ph y bet ween ma nned space fligh t pro gra ms a nd u nma nned
pro gra ms; i.e., nu merica l pro ba bilit y u sage versu s engi-
neering ju dgment ." (These qu o t a t i o ns are fro m "Space
Sh u t t l e D a t a fo r Pla net a ry Missio n RTG Sa fet y Ana lysis,"
pages 3-1 a nd 3-2, Febru a ry 15, 1985, NASA, JSC.) It is
t r u e t h a t if t h e pro ba bilit y of fa ilu re was a s lo w a s 1 in
100,000 it wo u ld t a ke a n ino rdina t e nu mber of t est s t o
det ermine it : yo u wo u ld get no t h ing bu t a st ring o f perfect
fligh t s wit h no precise figu reo t h er t h a n t h a t t h e probabil-
it y is likely less t h a n t h e nu mber o f su ch fligh t s in t h e st ring
so fa r. Bu t if the real pro ba bilit y is not so sma ll, flights
wo u ld show t ro u bles, nea r fa ilu res, and possibly a ct u a l fa il-
ures wit h a reasonable nu mber of trials, and standard statis-
t ica l met h o ds cou ld give a reasonable est ima t e. In fa ct ,
previo u s NASA experience ha d sh o wn, on occasion, ju st
su ch difficu lt ies, nea r a ccident s, a nd even a ccident s, all giv-
ing wa rning t h a t t h e pro ba bi l i t y of flight fa ilu re was no t so
very sma ll.
Anot her inconsist ency in t h e a rgu ment no t t o det er-
Appendi x F 223
mine relia bilit y t h ro u gh h ist o rica l experience (as t h e ra nge
sa fet y o fficer did) is NASA's a ppea l t o h ist o ry: "Hist ori-
ca lly, t h is high degree of mission su ccess . . ." Finally, if we
are t o replace st a nda rd nu merica l pro ba bilit y u sa ge wit h
engineering ju dgment , wh y do we find su ch a n eno rmo u s
dispa rit y bet ween t h e ma na gement est ima t e and t h e ju dg-
ment o f t h e engineers? It wou ld a ppea r t h a t , fo r wh a t ever
pu rpo sebe it fo r int erna l or ext erna l co nsu mpt io nt h e
ma na gement of NASA exaggerates t h e relia bilit y of it s
pro du ct t o t h e po int of fa nt a sy.
The h ist o ry of t h e cert ifica t io n a nd flight rea diness
reviews will no t be repeated h ere (see o t h er pa rt s of t h e
commission repo rt ), bu t t h e ph eno meno n o f a ccept ing
seals t h a t h a d sh o wn erosion and blo wby in previo u s flight s
is very clear. The C hallenger flight is an excellent example:
t h ere are several references t o previo u s flight s; t h e a ccept -
ance and success of t hese flights are t a ken as evidence of
sa fet y. Bu t erosion and blo wby are no t wh a t t h e design
expected. They are wa rnings t h a t so met h ing is wro ng. The
equ ipment is no t o pera t ing as expect ed, and t h erefo re
t here is a danger t h a t it can opera t e wit h even wider devia-
t ions in t h is u nexpect ed a nd no t t h o ro u gh ly u nderst o o d
wa y. The fa ct t h a t t his da nger did no t lead t o a ca t a st ro ph e
befo re is no gu a ra nt ee t h a t it will no t t h e next t ime, u nless
it is complet ely u nderst o o d. Wh en pla ying Ru ssia n ro u -
let t e, t h e fa ct t h a t t h e first shot got o ff safely is o f lit t le
co mfo rt fo r t h e next . The origin a nd consequ ences of t h e
erosion and blo wby were no t u nderst o o d. Erosion a nd
blo wby did no t occu r equ ally on all flight s or in all jo int s:
sometimes there was more, sometimes less. Why not some-
t ime, wh en wh a t ever co ndit io ns det ermined it were righ t ,
wo u ldn't t h ere be still more, leading t o ca t a st ro ph e?
In spit e of t h ese va ria t io ns fro m case t o case, o fficia ls
beh a ved as if t h ey u nderst o o d t h em, giving a ppa rent ly logi-
cal a rgu ment s to each o t h ero ft en cit ing t h e "success" of
previo u s flights. For example, in det ermining if flight 51-L
was sa fe t o fly in t h e fa ce of ring erosion in flight 51-C, it
was no t ed t h a t t h e ero sio n dept h was o nly o ne-t h ird o f t h e
ra diu s. It h a d been no t ed in a n experiment cu t t i ng t h e ring
t h a t cu t t i ng it a s deep a s one ra diu s was necessa ry befo re
t h e ring fa iled. Inst ea d o f being very concerned t h a t va ria -
t io ns o f po o rly u nderst o o d co ndit io ns migh t rea so na bly
create a deeper erosion t h is t ime, it was a ssert ed t h ere was
"a sa fet y fa ct o r of t h ree."
This is a st ra nge u se of t h e engineer's t erm " sa fet y
fa ct or." If a bridge is bu ilt to wit h st a nd a certain load wit h -
o u t t h e bea ms perma nent ly defo rming, cra cking, o r brea k-
ing, it ma y be designed fo r t h e ma t eria ls u sed t o a ct u a lly
st a nd u p u nder t h ree t imes t h e loa d. This " sa fet y fa ct o r"
is t o a llow fo r u ncert a in excesses of loa d, or u nkno wn ext ra
loads, or weaknesses in the material t h a t might have unex-
pect ed flaws, et cet era. Bu t if t h e expect ed load comes on
t o t h e new bridge a nd a crack a ppea rs in a bea m, t h is is a
fa i l u re o f t h e design. There was no sa fet y fa ct o r a t a ll, even
t h o u gh t h e bridge did no t a ct u a lly co lla pse becau se t h e
crack only went o ne-t h ird o f t h e wa y t h ro u gh t h e bea m.
The O-rings of t h e solid ro cket bo o st ers were no t designed
t o erode. Ero sio n was a clu e t h a t so met h ing was wro ng.
Ero sio n was no t so met h ing fro m wh ich sa fet y co u ld be
inferred.
There wa s no wa y, wi t h o u t fu ll u nderst a ndi ng, t h a t
o ne could h a ve co nfidence t h a t co ndit io ns t h e next t ime
migh t no t pro du ce erosion t h ree t imes mo re severe t h a n
t h e t ime befo re. Nevert h eless, o fficia ls fooled t h emselves
i nt o t h inking t h ey h a d su ch u nderst a ndi ng a nd co nfidence,
in spit e of t h e pecu lia r va ria t io ns fro m case t o case. A
mat hemat ical model was made to calcu late erosion. This
wa s a mo del based no t o n ph ysica l u nderst a nding bu t o n
empirica l cu rve fit t ing. Specifically, it was su ppo sed t h a t a
st rea m of h o t gas impinged on t h e O-ring ma t eria l, a nd t h e
h ea t was det ermined a t t h e po int o f st a gna t io n (so fa r, wit h
reasonable physical, thermodynamical laws). Bu t to deter-
A p p e n d i x F 225
mine h o w mu ch ru bber eroded, it was a ssu med t h a t t h e
erosion varied as t h e .58 po wer of h ea t , t h e .58 being det er-
mined by a nea rest fit . At a ny ra t e, a dju st ing some ot her
nu mbers, it was det ermined t h a t t h e model agreed wit h t h e
erosion (t o a dept h of o ne-t h ird t h e ra diu s of t h e ring).
There is no t h ing so wro ng wit h t h is analysis as believing
t h e answer! Uncert a int ies appear everywh ere in t h e model.
How st ro ng t h e gas st rea m migh t be was u npredict a ble; it
depended on holes fo rmed in t h e pu t t y. Blo wby showed
t h a t t h e ring migh t fail, even t h o u gh it wa s o nly part ially
eroded. The empirical fo rmu la wa s kno wn t o be u ncert a in,
fo r t h e cu rve did no t go direct ly t h ro u gh t h e very da t a
po int s by wh ich it was det ermined. There was a clou d of
po int s, some t wice above and some twice below t h e fitted
curve, so erosions twice those predicted were reasonable
fro m t h a t ca u se alone. Similar u ncert a int ies su rro u nded
t h e o t h er co nst a nt s in t h e fo rmu la , et cetera, et cetera.
Wh en u sing a ma t h ema t ica l model, ca refu l a t t ent io n mu st
be given t o t h e u ncert a int ies in t h e mo del.
Spac e Shuttle Mai n Engi nes (SSME)
D u ring t h e flight of t h e 51-L t h e t h ree space sh u t t l e
ma in engines all wo rked perfect ly, even beginning t o sh u t
do wn in t h e la st mo ment s a s t h e fu el su pply began t o fail.
The qu est io n arises, however, as t o wh et h erh a d t h e en-
gines fa iled, and we were t o invest iga t e t h em in as mu ch
det a il as we did t h e solid rocket bo o st erwe wo u ld find a
similar lack of a t t ent io n t o fa u l t s a nd det erio ra t ing sa fet y
crit eria . In other words, were t h e organization weaknesses
t h a t co nt ribu t ed t o t h e a ccident confined t o t h e solid ro cket
bo o st er sector, or were t h ey a more general ch a ra ct erist ic
of NASA? To t h a t end t h e space sh u t t le ma in engines a nd
t h e avionics were bo t h invest iga t ed. No similar st u dy of t h e
orbiter or the external t ank was made.
The engine is a mu ch more complicat ed st ru ct u re t h a n
t h e solid rocket bo o st er, a nd a great deal more det ailed
engineering goes int o it . Generally, t h e engineering seems
t o be of h igh qu a lit y, and a ppa rent ly co nsidera ble a t t ent io n
is paid t o deficiencies a nd fa u lt s fo u nd in engine o pera t io n.
The u su a l way t h a t su ch engines are designed (fo r
milit a ry or civilian a ircra ft ) may be called t h e co mpo nent
syst em, or bo t t o m-u p design. First it is necessary t o t h o r-
o u gh ly u nderst a nd t h e properties a nd limit a t io ns of t h e
ma t eria ls t o be u sed (t u rbine bla des, fo r exa mple), a nd
t est s are begu n in experiment a l rigs t o det ermine t hose.
W it h t his knowledge, larger co mpo nent pa rt s (su ch as
bearings) are designed a nd tested individu a lly. As defi-
ciencies a nd design errors are no t ed t h ey are corrected a nd
verified wi t h fu rt h er t est ing. Since one t est s o nly pa rt s a t a
time, these t est s and mo difica t io ns are no t overly expen-
sive. Finally one wo rks u p to t h e final design of t h e ent ire
engine, to t h e necessary specifications. There is a good
cha nce, by t his t ime, t h a t t h e engine will generally su cceed,
or t h a t a ny fa ilu res are easily isolat ed a nd a na lyzed becau se
t he fa ilu re modes, limit a t io ns of ma t eria ls, et cet era , are so
well u nderst o o d. There is a very good chance t h a t t h e
mo difica t io ns t o get a ro u nd final difficu lt ies in t h e engine
are no t very h a rd to make, fo r mo st of t h e seriou s pro blems
have already been discovered and dealt wit h in t h e earlier,
less expensive stages of t h e process.
The space sh u t t l e main engine was h a ndled in a dif-
ferent mannertop down, we might say. The engine was
designed a nd pu t t oget her all a t once wit h relat ively lit t le
detailed prelimina ry st u dy of t h e materials a nd compo-
nent s. Bu t now, when trou bles are fo u nd in bearings, t u r-
bine blades, coolant pipes, et cetera, it is more expensive
a nd difficu lt t o discover t h e causes a nd ma ke changes. For
example, cracks have been fo u nd in t h e t u rbine blades of
t h e high-pressu re oxygen t u rbo pu mp. Are t h ey caused by
flaws in t h e mat erial, t h e effect of t he oxygen a t mo sph ere
Appendi x F
227
on t h e propert ies of t he ma t eria l, t h e t herma l stresses of
st a rt u p or sh u t do wn, t h e vibra t io n and stresses of steady
ru nning, or mainly at some resonance at certain speeds, or
so met h ing else? How long can we ru n fro m crack init ia t io n
to crack fa ilu re, a nd how does this depend on power level?
Using t h e completed engine as a test bed to resolve su ch
qu est io ns is ext remely expensive. One does no t wish t o
lose ent ire engines in order to find o u t where a nd how
fa ilu re occu rs. Y et , an a ccu ra t e kno wledge of t h is info rma -
tion is essential to a cqu iring a confidence in t h e engine
reliability in u se. Wit h o u t det a iled u nderst a nding, co nfi-
dence ca nnot be a t t a ined.
A fu r t h er disa dva nt a ge of t h e t o p-do wn met h o d is t h a t
if an u nderst a nding of a fa u lt is o bt a ined, a simple fixsu ch
as a new shape fo r t he t u rbine hou singmay be impossible
t o implement wit h o u t a redesign of t h e ent ire engine.
The space sh u t t le ma in engine is a very rema rka ble
ma ch ine. It has a greater ra t io of t h ru st t o weigh t t h a n a ny
previou s engine. It is bu ilt at t h e edge o fso met imes o u t -
side o fprevio u s engineering experience. Therefore, as
expect ed, ma ny different kinds o f fla ws and difficu lt ies have
t u rned u p. Because, u nfo rt u na t ely, it wa s bu ilt in a t op-
down ma nner, t h e flaws are difficu lt t o find and t o fix. The
design aim of an engine lifet ime of 55 mission equ iva lent s
(27,000 seconds of operat ion, eit her in missions of 500
seconds each or on a t est st a nd) has no t been o bt a ined. The
engine no w requ ires very frequ ent ma int ena nce and re-
placement of impo rt a nt pa rt s su ch as t u rbo pu mps, bear-
ings, sheet met al h o u sings, et cetera. The h igh -pressu re
fu el t u rbo pu mp ha d t o be replaced every three or fo u r
mission equ iva lent s (a lt h o u gh t his may h a ve been fixed,
no w) and t h e h igh -pressu re oxygen t u rbo pu mp every five
or six. This was, at mo st , 10 percent of t h e original design
specifica t io ns. Bu t ou r main concern here is t h e determina-
t ion of relia bilit y.
In a t o t a l of 250,000 seconds of operation, the ma in
engines have failed seriou sly perha ps 16 t imes. Engineers
pay close a t t ent io n t o these fa ilings a nd t ry t o remedy t h em
as qu ickly as possible by test st u dies on special rigs experi-
ment a lly designed fo r t h e fla w in qu est io n, by ca refu l in-
spection of t h e engine fo r su ggest ive clues (like cra cks),
a nd by considera ble st u dy a nd a na lysis. In t his wa y, in spit e
o f t h e difficu lt ies o f t o p-do wn design, t h ro u gh h a rd wo rk
many of the problems have apparently been solved.
A list of some of t h e problems (and t h eir st a t u s) fo llo ws:
Tu rbine blade cracks in h igh -pressu re fu el t u rbo pu mps
(HPFTP). (May have been solved.)
Tu rbine blade cracks in h igh -pressu re oxygen fu el t u r-
bo pu mps (HPOTP). (No t solved.)
Au gment ed spark ignit er (ASI) line ru pt u re. (Probably
solved.)
Pu rge check valve fa ilu re. (Probably solved.)
ASI chamber erosion. (Proba bly solved.)
HPFTP t u rbine sheet metal cracking. (Pro ba bly solved.)
HPFTP coolant liner fa ilu re. (Pro ba bly solved.)
Ma in co mbu st io n chamber o u t let elbow fa ilu re. (Probably
solved.)
Ma in co mbu st io n cha mber inlet elbow weld o ffset . (Proba-
bly solved.)
HPOTP su bsynch ro no u s wh irl. (Probably solved.)
Flight acceleration sa fet y cu t o ff syst em (pa rt ia l fa ilu re in a
redu nda nt syst em). (Pro ba bly solved.)
Bearing spalling. (Partially solved.)
A vibra t io n at 4000 h ert z ma king some engines inoperable.
(No t solved.)
Ma ny of these a ppa rent ly solved problems were the
early difficu lt ies of a new design: 13 of t hem occurred in t h e
first 125,000 seconds and only 3 in t h e second 125,000
Appendi x F 229
seconds. Na t u ra lly, one can never be su re t h a t all t h e bu gs
are o u t ; for some, t h e fix may not have addressed t h e t ru e
cause. Thu s it is no t u nrea sona ble to guess t here may be
at least one su rprise in t h e next 250,000 seconds, a proba-
bilit y of 1/500 per engine per missio n. On a mission t here
are three engines, bu t it is possible t h a t some accidents
wo u ld be self-cont a ined a nd a ffect only one engine. (The
sh u t t le can a bo rt its mission wit h only t wo engines.) There-
fore, let u s say t h a t t h e u nkno wn su rprises do no t , in a nd
of t hemselves, permit u s to guess t h a t t h e pro ba bilit y of
mission fa ilu re du e t o t h e space sh u t t le ma in engines is less
t h a n l/500. To t his we mu st add the chance of fa ilu re fro m
kno wn, bu t a s yet u nso lved, problems. These we discu ss
below.
(Engineers at Rocketdyne, t h e ma nu fa ct u rer, estimate
t h e t o t a l pro ba bilit y a s 1/10,000. Engineers a t Ma rsh a ll esti-
ma t e it a s l/300, wh ile NASA ma na gement , t o wh o m these
engineers repo rt , claims it is 1/100,000. An independent en-
gineer co nsu lt ing fo r NASA t h o u gh t 1 or 2 per 100 a rea-
sona ble est ima t e.)
The h ist o ry of t h e cert ifica t io n principles fo r these en-
gines is co nfu sing a nd difficu lt t o explain. Init ia lly t h e ru le
seems t o have been t h a t t wo sa mple engines mu st each
h a ve h a d twice t h e t ime o pera t ing wit h o u t fa ilu re, a s t h e
o pera t ing t ime of t h e engine to be cert ified (ru le of 2x). At
least t h a t is t h e FAA pra ct ice, and NASA seems t o have
a do pt ed it o rigina lly, expect ing t h e cert ified t ime to be 10
missions (hence 20 missio ns fo r each sa mple). Obvio u sly,
t h e best engines t o u se fo r co mpa riso n wo u ld be t hose of
greatest t ot al operating time (flight plus test), the so-called
fleet leaders. Bu t wh a t if a t h ird sample engine and several
o t h ers fa il in a short t ime? Su rely we will no t be safe be-
cau se two were u nu su a l in la st ing longer. The short t ime
migh t be more represent a t ive of t h e real possibilit ies, a nd
in t h e spirit of t h e sa fet y fa ct o r of 2, we shou ld o nly operat e
at half t h e t ime of t h e short -lived samples.
The slow sh ift t o wa rd a decreasing sa fet y fa ct o r can be
seen in ma ny examples. We t ake t h a t of t h e HPFTP t u rbine
blades. First of all t h e idea of t est ing an ent ire engine was
a ba ndo ned. Each engine h a s ha d ma ny impo rt a nt pa rt s
(su ch a s t h e t u rbo pu mps t h emselves) replaced a t frequ ent
int erva ls, so t h e ru le of 2x mu st be sh ift ed fro m engines t o
co mpo nent s. Thu s we accept an HPFTP fo r a given cert ifi-
cation t ime if t wo samples h a ve each ru n su ccessfu lly fo r
t wice t h a t t ime (a nd, of cou rse, a s a pra ct ica l ma t t er, no
longer insist ing t h a t t h is t ime be as lo ng as 10 missio ns).
Bu t wh a t is " su ccessfu lly" ? The FAA calls a t u rbine blade
crack a fa ilu re, in order t o really pro vide a sa fet y fa ct o r
grea t er t h a n 2 in practice. There is some t ime t h a t an en-
gine can ru n bet ween t h e t ime a crack origina lly st a rt s a nd
t h e t ime it h a s grown large enou gh t o fra ct u re. (The FAA
is co nt empla t ing new ru les t h a t t a ke t his ext ra sa fet y t ime
int o a cco u nt , bu t will accept t h em o nly if it is very ca refu lly
a na lyzed t h ro u gh kno wn models wi t h i n a kno wn ra nge o f
experience and wit h ma t eria ls t h o ro u gh ly t est ed. No ne of
t hese co ndit io ns applies t o t h e space sh u t t le ma in engines.)
Cra cks were fo u nd in ma ny second-st age HPFTP t u r-
bine bla des. In o ne case t h ree were fo u nd a ft er 1900 sec-
o nds, wh ile in a no t h er t h ey were no t fo u nd a ft er 4200
seconds, a lt h o u gh u su a lly t h ese longer ru ns showed cracks.
To fo llo w t his st o ry fu rt h er we mu st realize t h a t t h e st ress
depends a great deal on t he power level. The C hallenger
fligh t , as well as previo u s flights, was at a level called 104
percent of rated power du ring mo st of t h e t ime t h e engines
were o pera t ing. Ju dging fro m some ma t eria l da t a , it is su p-
posed t h a t at 104 percent of rat ed po wer, t h e t ime t o crack
is a bo u t twice t h a t at 109 percent , or fu ll power level (FPL).
Fu t u re flights were to be at 109 percent becau se of h ea vier
pa yloa ds, and ma ny t est s were ma de at t h is level. There-
fore, dividing t ime at 104 percent by 2, we o bt a in u nit s
called equ iva lent fu ll power level (EFPL). (Obvio u sly, some
u ncert a int y is int ro du ced by t h a t , bu t it h a s no t been st u d-
Appendi x F 231
ied.) The ea rliest cracks ment io ned above occu rred at 1375
seconds EFPL.
No w t h e cert ifica t io n ru le becomes "limit all second-
stage bla des to a ma ximu m of 1375 seconds EFPL." If one
o bject s t h a t t h e sa fet y fa ct o r of 2 is lo st , it is point ed o u t
t h a t t h e one t u rbine ran fo r 3800 seconds EFPL wit h o u t
cra cks, a nd half of t his is 1900 so we are being mo re conser-
va t ive. We h a ve fooled ou rselves in t h ree wa ys. First , we
h a ve o nly one sample, a nd it is no t t h e fleet leader: t h e
o t h er t wo samples of 3800 or more seconds EFPL ha d 17
cracked blades bet ween t h em. (There are 59 blades in t h e
engine.) Next , we h a ve a ba ndo ned t h e 2x ru le and su b-
st it u t ed equ a l t ime (1375). And finally, t h e 1375 is wh ere
a crack was discovered. We can say t h a t no crack ha d been
fo u nd below 1375, bu t t he last time we looked a nd saw no
cracks wa s 1100 seconds EFPL. We do no t kno w wh en t h e
crack fo rmed bet ween t h ese t imes. For example, cracks
ma y h a ve been fo rmed at 1150 seconds EFPL. (Appro xi-
ma t ely t wo -t h irds of t h e blade sets t est ed in excess of 1375
seconds EFPL h a d cracks. Some recent experiment s h a ve,
indeed, sh o wn cra cks as ea rly as 1150 seco nds.) It wa s
i mpo r t a nt t o keep t h e nu mber h igh , fo r t h e sh u t t l e ha d t o
fly it s engines very close t o t h eir limit by t h e t ime t h e fligh t
was over.
Fina lly, it is claimed t h a t t h e crit eria h a ve no t been
a ba ndo ned, a nd t h a t t h e syst em is sa fe, by giving u p t h e
FAA co nvent io n t h a t t here sh o u ld be no cra cks, and by
co nsidering o nly a co mplet ely fra ct u red bla de a fa ilu re.
W it h t his definit io n no engine h a s yet fa iled. The idea is
t h a t since t h ere is su ffi ci ent t ime fo r a crack t o grow t o
fra ct u re, we can ensu re t h a t all is sa fe by inspect ing all
bla des fo r cra cks. If cra cks a re fo u nd, replace t h e blades,
a nd if no ne are fo u nd, we h a ve eno u gh t ime fo r a sa fe
missio n. Th u s, it is claimed, t h e crack problem is no lo nger
a fligh t sa fet y pro blem, bu t merely a ma int ena nce problem.
This ma y in fa ct be t ru e. Bu t h o w well do we kno w t h a t
cra cks always gro w slo wly eno u gh so t h a t no fra ct u re can
occu r in a missio n? Three engines h a ve ru n fo r long t ime
periods wit h a few cracked bla des (a bo u t 3000 seconds
EFPL), wit h no blade a ct u a lly brea king o ff.
A fix fo r t h i s cra cking ma y h a ve been fo u nd. By cha ng-
ing t h e blade sh a pe, sh o t -peening t h e su rfa ce, a nd co vering
it wit h insu la t io n t o exclu de t h erma l shock, t h e new blades
h a ve no t cracked so fa r.
A simila r st o ry a ppea rs in t h e h ist o ry of cert ifica t io n of
t h e HPOTP, bu t we sha ll no t give t h e det a ils here.
In su mma ry, it is evident t h a t t h e fl i gh t rea diness re-
views a nd cert ifica t io n ru les show a det eriora t ion in rega rd
t o some of t h e pro blems of t h e space sh u t t l e ma in engines
t h a t is closely a na logou s t o t h e det erio ra t io n seen in t h e
ru les fo r t h e solid ro cket bo o st ers.
Avi oni c s
By " a vio nics" is mea nt t h e co mpu t er syst em on t h e
o rbit er a s well a s it s i npu t sensors a nd o u t pu t a ct u a t o rs. At
first we wi l l rest rict o u rselves t o t h e co mpu t ers pro per, a nd
no t be co ncerned wit h t h e relia bilit y o f t h e i npu t info rma -
t io n fro m t h e sensors of t empera t u re, pressu re, et cetera;
no r wi t h wh et h er t h e co mpu t er o u t pu t is fa i t h fu l l y fo llo wed
by t h e a ct u a t o rs o f ro cket firings, mech a nica l co nt ro ls, dis-
pla ys t o a st ro na u t s, et cet era .
The co mpu t ing syst em is very elaborat e, h a ving over
250,000 lines of code. Amo ng ma ny o t h er t h ings it is re-
spo nsible fo r t h e a u t o ma t i c co nt ro l o f t h e sh u t t l e's ent ire
a scent i nt o o rbit , a nd fo r t h e descent u nt i l t h e sh u t t le is well
int o t h e a t mo sph ere (below Mach 1), once one bu t t o n is
pu sh ed deciding t h e la nding sit e desired. It wo u ld be possi-
ble t o ma ke t h e ent ire la nding a u t o ma t ic. (The la nding gear
lo wering signa l is expressly left o u t o f co mpu t er co nt ro l,
a nd mu st be pro vided by t h e pilo t , o st ensibly fo r sa fet y
Appendi x F 233
rea so ns.) D u ri ng o rbit a l fligh t t h e co mpu t ing syst em is
u sed in t h e co nt ro l of pa ylo a ds, in t h e displa y of info rma -
t io n t o t h e a st ro na u t s, a nd in t h e excha nge o f info rma t io n
wit h t h e gro u nd. It is evident t h a t t h e sa fet y o f fligh t re-
qu ires gu a ra nt eed a ccu ra cy of t h is ela bo ra t e syst em of
co mpu t er h a rdwa re a nd so ft wa re.
In brief, h a rdwa re relia bilit y is ensu red by h a ving fo u r
essent ia lly independent ident ica l co mpu t er syst ems.
Wh ere possible, each sensor also h a s mu lt iple co pies
u su a l l y fo u ra nd each copy feeds all fo u r of t h e co mpu t er
lines. If t h e inpu t s fro m t h e sensors disa gree, eit h er a cer-
t a in average or a ma jo rit y selection is u sed as t h e effect ive
i npu t , depending o n t h e circu mst a nces. Since each co m-
pu t er sees all copies of t he senso rs, t h e i npu t s are t h e same,
a nd beca u se t h e a lgo rit h ms u sed by each o f t h e fo u r com-
pu t ers are t h e same, t h e resu lt s in each co mpu t er sh o u ld be
ident ica l a t each st ep. From t ime t o t ime t h ey are com-
pa red, bu t beca u se t h ey mi gh t o pera t e a t sligh t ly different
speeds, a syst em o f st o pping a nd wa i t i ng a t specified t imes
is inst it u t ed befo re each co mpa riso n is ma de. If one of t h e
co mpu t ers disagrees o r is t oo la t e in h a vi ng it s a nswer
rea dy, t h e t h ree wh ich do agree are a ssu med t o be correct
a nd t h e erra nt co mpu t er is t a ken co mplet ely o u t o f t h e
syst em. If, no w, a no t h er co mpu t er fa ils, a s ju dged by t h e
a greement of t h e ot her t wo , it is t a ken o u t of t h e syst em,
a nd t h e rest of t h e flight is canceled: descent t o t h e la nding
sit e is i nst i t u t ed, cont rolled by t h e t wo remaining co mpu t -
ers. It is seen t h a t t his is a redu nda nt system since t h e
fa ilu re of o nly one co mpu t er does no t a ffect t h e missio n.
Finally, as an ext ra fea t u re of sa fet y, t h ere is a fift h indepen-
dent co mpu t er, wh o se memo ry is loaded wit h o nly t h e pro -
gra ms fo r a scent a nd descent , a nd wh ich is ca pa ble of con-
t ro lling t h e descent if t here is a fa ilu re of more t h a n t wo of
t h e co mpu t ers of t h e ma in line of fo u r.
There is no t eno u gh room in t h e memo ry of t h e ma in-
line co mpu t ers fo r all t h e pro gra ms of a scent , descent , and
pa ylo a d pro gra ms in flight , so t h e memo ry is loaded by t h e
a st ro na u t s a bo u t fo u r times fro m tapes.
Becau se of t h e eno rmo u s effo rt requ ired t o replace t h e
so ft wa re fo r su ch a n elaborat e syst em a nd t o check o u t a
new syst em, no change in t h e h a rdwa re has been ma de
since t h e sh u t t l e t ra nspo rt a t io n syst em began a bo u t fift een
years ago. The a ct u a l h a rdwa re is o bso let efo r exa mple,
t h e memo ries are of t h e old ferrit e-co re t ype. It is becom-
ing mo re di ffi cu l t t o find ma nu fa ct u rers t o su pply su ch
o ld-fa sh io ned co mpu t ers t h a t are relia ble a nd o f h igh
enou gh qu a l i t y. Mo dern co mpu t ers are mu ch mo re reli-
able, a nd t h ey ru n mu ch fa st er. This simplifies circu it s a nd
a llo ws mo re t o be done. To da y's co mpu t ers wo u ld no t
requ ire so mu ch lo a ding fro m t a pes, fo r t h eir memo ries a re
mu ch larger.
The so ft wa re is checked very ca refu lly in a bo t t o m-u p
fa sh i o n. First , each new line of code is checked; t h en sec-
t io ns o f code (mo du les) wi t h special fu nct i o ns are verified.
The scope is increased st ep by st ep u nt il t h e new ch a nges
are inco rpo ra t ed i nt o a co mplet e syst em a nd ch ecked. This
co mplet e o u t pu t is considered t h e fina l pro du ct , newly
released. Bu t wo rking co mplet ely i ndependent l y is a
verifica t io n gro u p t h a t t a kes a n a dversa ry a t t i t u de t o t h e
so ft wa re develo pment gro u p a nd t est s t h e so ft wa re a s if it
were a cu st o mer of t h e delivered pro du ct . There is a ddi-
t io na l verifica t io n in u sing t h e new pro gra ms in simu la t o rs,
et cetera. An error du ring t h is st a ge o f verifica t io n t est ing
is co nsidered very serio u s, a nd it s origin is st u died very
ca refu lly t o a vo id su ch mist a kes in t h e fu t u re. Su ch inex-
perienced errors have been fo u nd o nly a bo u t six t imes in
all t h e pro gra mming a nd pro gra m ch a nging (fo r new o r
alt ered pa ylo a ds) t h a t has been done. The principle fo l-
lowed is: all t h is verifica t io n is no t an a spect of pro gra m
sa fet y; it is a t est of t h a t sa fet y in a no nca t a st ro ph ic verifica -
t io n. Flight sa fet y is t o be ju dged solely on h o w well t h e
pro gra ms do in t h e verified t est s. A fa ilu re h ere genera t es
co nsidera ble concern.
Appendi x F 235
To su mma rize, t h en, t h e co mpu t er so ft wa re checking
syst em is of h igh est qu a lit y. There appears to be no process
of gra du a lly fo o ling oneself wh ile degra ding st a nda rds, t h e
process so ch a ra ct erist ic of t h e solid rocket boost er and
space sh u t t le ma in engine sa fet y syst ems. To be su re, t here
h a ve been recent su ggest io ns by ma na gement t o cu rt ail
su ch elaborat e a nd expensive t est s as being u nnecessa ry at
t h is la t e da t e in sh u t t le h ist o ry. Su ch su ggest ions mu st be
resist ed, fo r t hey do no t a pprecia t e t h e mu t u a l su bt le in-
flu ences and sou rces of error generat ed by even small pro-
gra m changes in one pa rt of a pro gra m on a no t h er. There
are perpet u a l requ est s fo r pro gra m changes as new pa y-
loads a nd new dema nds a nd mo difica t io ns are su ggest ed by
t h e u sers. Ch a nges are expensive beca u se t h ey requ ire ex-
t ensive t est ing. The proper wa y t o save mo ney is t o cu rt a il
t h e nu mber of requ est ed ch a nges, no t t h e qu a lit y of t est ing
fo r each.
One migh t add t h a t t h e ela bo ra t e syst em could be very
mu ch impro ved by mo dern h a rdwa re a nd pro gra mming
t ech niqu es. Any o u t side co mpet it io n wo u ld h a ve all t h e
a dva nt a ges o f st a rt ing over. Wh et h er mo dern h a rdwa re is
a good idea fo r NASA shou ld be ca refu lly considered now.
Finally, ret u rning t o t h e sensors a nd a ct u a t o rs o f t h e
avionics syst em, we find t h a t t h e a t t it u de t o wa rd syst em
fa ilu re a nd relia bilit y is no t nea rly as good as fo r t h e com-
pu t er syst em. For example, a di ffi cu l t y was fo u nd wit h cer-
t a in t empera t u re sensors somet imes fa iling. Y et eight een
mo nt h s la t er t h e same sensors were still being u sed, still
somet imes fa iling, u nt il a la u nch ha d t o be scru bbed be-
cau se t wo of t h em fa iled at t h e same t ime. Even on a su c-
ceeding flight t his u nrelia ble sensor was u sed a ga in. And
rea ct io n co nt ro l syst ems, t h e ro cket jet s u sed fo r reo rient -
ing and co nt ro l in flight , st ill are so mewh a t u nrelia ble.
There is co nsidera ble redu nda ncy, bu t also a lo ng h ist o ry
of fa ilu res, none of wh ich has yet been ext ensive enou gh to
seriou sly a ffect a flight . The a ct io n of t he jet s is checked by
sensors: if a jet fails t o fire, t h e co mpu t ers choose a no t h er
jet t o fire. Bu t t h ey are not designed t o fa il, and t h e prob-
lem shou ld be solved.
C onc lusi ons
If a rea so na ble la u nch schedu le is to be ma int a ined,
engineering o ft en ca nno t be done fa st enou gh t o keep u p
wit h t h e expect at ions o f t h e o rigina lly co nserva t ive cert ifi-
cation criteria designed t o gu a ra nt ee a very sa fe vehicle. In
su ch sit u a t io ns, sa fet y crit eria are alt ered su bt lya nd wi t h
o ft en a ppa rent ly logical a rgu ment sso t h a t fligh t s can st ill
be cert ified in time. The sh u t t l e t h erefo re flies in a rela-
t ively u nsa fe co ndit io n, wit h a chance of fa ilu re on t h e
order of a percent. (It is difficu lt to be more accurate.)
Officia l ma na gement , o n t h e o t h er h a nd, claims t o be-
lieve t h e pro ba bilit y of fa ilu re is a t h o u sa nd t imes less. One
reason fo r t h is ma y be a n a t t empt t o a ssu re t h e go vernment
of NASA's perfect io n a nd su ccess in order t o ensu re t h e
su pply of fu nds. The o t h er ma y be t h a t t h ey sincerely be-
lieve it t o be t ru e, demo nst ra t i ng a n a lmo st incredible la ck
o f co mmu nica t io n bet ween t h e ma na gers a nd t h eir wo rk-
ing engineers.
In a ny event , t h is has ha d very u nfo rt u na t e conse-
qu ences, t h e mo st seriou s of wh ich is t o encou rage ordi-
na ry cit izens t o fly in su ch a da ngero u s ma ch inea s if it
had attained the safety of an ordinary airliner. The as-
t ro na u t s, like t est pilo t s, shou ld kno w t h eir risks, a nd we
h o no r t h em fo r t h eir cou rage. Who can do u bt t h a t McAu -
liffe* wa s equ a lly a person of great cou rage, wh o was closer
t o a n a wa reness o f t h e t ru e risks t h a n NASA ma na gement
wo u ld have u s believe?
Let u s ma ke reco mmenda t io ns t o ensu re t h a t NASA
'No t e fo r fo reign rea ders: Ch rist a McAu l i ffe, a schoolt eacher, was t o h a ve been
t h e first o rdina ry cit izen in spacea symbo l o f t h e na t i o n's co mmi t ment t o edu ca -
t io n, a nd o f t h e sh u t t l e's sa fet y.
Appendi x F
237
o fficia ls deal in a world of rea lit y, u nderst a nding technolog-
ical weaknesses and imperfect io ns well enou gh to be ac-
tively trying to eliminate them. They mu st live in a world
of reality in compa ring the costs and u t ilit y of t h e sh u t t le
t o other met h o ds of ent ering space. And t h ey mu st be
realistic in ma king co nt ra ct s and in est ima t ing t h e costs a nd
difficu lt ies of each pro ject . Only rea list ic flight schedu les
shou ld be proposedschedu les t h a t h a ve a rea sona ble
chance of being met . If in t h is way t h e government wou ld
no t su ppo rt NASA, t hen so be it. NASA owes it to t h e
cit izens fro m wh o m it asks su ppo rt t o be fra nk, h o nest , and
info rma t ive, so t h a t these cit izens can ma ke the wisest deci-
sions fo r t h e u se of t heir limited resou rces.
For a su ccessfu l t ech no lo gy, rea lit y mu st t ake prece-
dence over pu blic rela t io ns, fo r Na t u re ca nno t be fooled.

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