G.R. No.

107518 October 8, 1998

PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered
and duly proved.
1
Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss
must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount
thereof.
2
The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific facts that afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne.
3
A court cannot merely rely on
speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages
4
as well as
hearsay
5
or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect.
6
Such are the jurisprudential
precepts that the Court now applies in resolving the instant petition.
The records disclose that in the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia
XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was navigating the
waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it
collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation (LSC).
After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard
Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault. Based
on this finding by the Board and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner,
7
private
respondent sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the then Court
of First Instance of Caloocan City, paying thereto the docket fee of one thousand two hundred
fifty-two pesos (P1,252.00) and the legal research fee of two pesos (P2.00).
8
In particular,
private respondent prayed for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of
the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV, with interest at the
legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorney's fees. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case,
petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC
as it had already acquired ownership of thePetroparcel.
9

For its part, private respondent later sought the amendment of its complaint on the ground
that the original complaint failed to plead for the recovery of the lost value of the hull of M/V
Maria Efigenia XV.
10
Accordingly, in the amended complaint, private respondent averred
that M/V Maria Efigenia XV had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the
insurance payment of P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed.
The amended complaint also alleged that inflation resulting from the devaluation of the
Philippine peso had affected the replacement value of the hull of the vessel, its equipment and
its lost cargoes, such that there should be a reasonable determination thereof. Furthermore,
on account of the sinking of the vessel, private respondent supposedly incurred unrealized
profits and lost business opportunities that would thereafter be proven.
11

Subsequently, the complaint was further amended to include petitioner as a
defendant
12
which the lower court granted in its order of September 16,
1985.
13
After petitioner had filed its answer to the second amended complaint, on February 5,
1987, the lower court issued a pre-trial order
14
containing, among other things, a stipulations
of facts, to wit:
1. On 21 September 1977, while the fishing boat "M/V MARIA EFIGENIA" owned
by plaintiff was navigating in the vicinity of Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas,
on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila, said fishing boat was hit by the LSCO tanker
"Petroparcel" causing the former to sink.
2. The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted an investigation of this marine accident
and on 21 November 1978, the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard, the
Honorable Simeon N. Alejandro, rendered a decision finding the cause of the
accident to be the reckless and imprudent manner in which Edgardo Doruelo
navigated the LSCO "Petroparcel" and declared the latter vessel at fault.
3. On 2 April 1978, defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LUSTEVECO),
executed in favor of PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation a Deed of Transfer
involving several tankers, tugboats, barges and pumping stations, among which
was the LSCO Petroparcel.
4. On the same date on 2 April 1979 (sic), defendant PNOC STC again entered into
an Agreement of Transfer with co-defendant Lusteveco whereby all the business
properties and other assets appertaining to the tanker and bulk oil departments
including the motor tanker LSCO Petroparcel of defendant Lusteveco were sold to
PNOC STC.
5. The aforesaid agreement stipulates, among others, that PNOC-STC assumes,
without qualifications, all obligations arising from and by virtue of all rights it
obtained over the LSCO "Petroparcel".
6. On 6 July 1979, another agreement between defendant LUSTEVECO and PNOC-
STC was executed wherein Board of Marine Inquiry Case No. 332 (involving the
sea accident of 21 September 1977) was specifically identified and assumed by
the latter.
7. On 23 June 1979, the decision of Board of Marine Inquiry was affirmed by the
Ministry of National Defense, in its decision dismissing the appeal of Capt.
Edgardo Doruelo and Chief mate Anthony Estenzo of LSCO "Petroparcel".
8. LSCO "Petroparcel" is presently owned and operated by PNOC-STC and likewise
Capt. Edgardo Doruelo is still in their employ.
9. As a result of the sinking of M/V Maria Efigenia caused by the reckless and
imprudent manner in which LSCO Petroparcel was navigated by defendant
Doruelo, plaintiff suffered actual damages by the loss of its fishing nets, boat
equipments (sic) and cargoes, which went down with the ship when it sank the
replacement value of which should be left to the sound discretion of this
Honorable Court.
After trial, the lower court
15
rendered on November 18, 1989 its decision disposing of Civil
Case No. C-9457 as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport
Corporation, to pay the plaintiff:
a. The sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing
boat with interest from the date of the filing of the complaint at the
rate of 6% per annum;
b. The sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
c. The costs of suit.
The counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Likewise, the case against
defendant Edgardo Doruelo is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
In arriving at the above disposition, the lower court cited the evidence presented by private
respondent consisting of the testimony of its general manager and sole witness, Edilberto del
Rosario. Private respondent's witness testified that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was owned by
private respondent per Exhibit A, a certificate of ownership issued by the Philippine Coast
Guard showing that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was a wooden motor boat constructed in 1965
with 128.23 gross tonnage. According to him, at the time the vessel sank, it was then carrying
1,060 tubs (baeras) of assorted fish the value of which was never recovered. Also lost with
the vessel were two cummins engines (250 horsepower), radar, pathometer and compass. He
further added that with the loss of his flagship vessel in his fishing fleet of fourteen (14)
vessels, he was constrained to hire the services of counsel whom he paid P10,000 to handle
the case at the Board of Marine Inquiry and P50,000.00 for commencing suit for damages in
the lower court.
As to the award of P6,438,048.00 in actual damages, the lower court took into account the
following pieces of documentary evidence that private respondent proffered during trial:
(a) Exhibit A certified xerox copy of the certificate of ownership
of M/V Maria Efigenia XV;
(b) Exhibit B a document titled "Marine Protest" executed by
Delfin Villarosa, Jr. on September 22, 1977 stating that as a result of
the collision, the M/V Maria Efigenia XVsustained a hole at its left
side that caused it to sink with its cargo of 1,050 baerasvalued at
P170,000.00;
(c) Exhibit C a quotation for the construction of a 95-footer trawler
issued by Isidoro A. Magalong of I. A. Magalong Engineering and
Construction on January 26, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that
construction of such trawler would cost P2,250,000.00;
(d) Exhibit D pro forma invoice No. PSPI-05/87-NAV issued by E.D.
Daclan of Power Systems, Incorporated on January 20, 1987 to Del
Rosario showing that two (2) units of CUMMINS Marine Engine
model N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800 rpm. would cost P1,160,000.00;
(e) Exhibit E quotation of prices issued by Scan Marine Inc. on
January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that a unit of Furuno
Compact Daylight Radar, Model FR-604D, would cost P100,000.00
while a unit of Furuno Color Video Sounder, Model FCV-501 would
cost P45,000.00 so that the two units would cost P145,000.00;
(f) Exhibit F quotation of prices issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. on
January 21, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that two (2) rolls of nylon
rope (5" cir. X 300fl.) would cost P140,000.00; two (2) rolls of nylon
rope (3" cir. X 240fl.), P42,750.00; one (1) binocular (7 x 50),
P1,400.00, one (1) compass (6"), P4,000.00 and 50 pcs. of floats,
P9,000.00 or a total of P197,150.00;
(g) Exhibit G retainer agreement between Del Rosario and F.
Sumulong Associates Law Offices stipulating an acceptance fee of
P5,000.00, per appearance fee of P400.00, monthly retainer of
P500.00, contingent fee of 20% of the total amount recovered and
that attorney's fee to be awarded by the court should be given to Del
Rosario; and
(h) Exhibit H price quotation issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. dated
April 10, 1987 to Del Rosario showing the cost of poly nettings as: 50
rolls of 400/18 3kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P70,000.00; 50 rolls of
400/18 5kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P81,500.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 8kts.
100md x 100mtrs., P116,000.00, and 50 rolls of 400/18 10kts. 100md
x 100mtrs., P146,500 and baera (tub) at P65.00 per piece or a total
of P414,065.00.
The lower court held that the prevailing replacement value of P6,438,048.00 of the fishing
boat and all its equipment would regularly increase at 30% every year from the date the
quotations were given.
On the other hand, the lower court noted that petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro,
senior estimator at PNOC Dockyard & Engineering Corporation, as sole witness and it did not
bother at all to offer any documentary evidence to support its position. Lazaro testified that
the price quotations submitted by private respondent were "excessive" and that as an expert
witness, he used the quotations of his suppliers in making his estimates. However, he failed to
present such quotations of prices from his suppliers, saying that he could not produce a
breakdown of the costs of his estimates as it was "a sort of secret scheme." For this reason,
the lower court concluded:
Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the plaintiff relative to the
replacement value of the fishing boat and its equipments in the tune of
P6,438,048.00 which were lost due to the recklessness and imprudence of the
herein defendants were not rebutted by the latter with sufficient evidence. The
defendants through their sole witness Lorenzo Lazaro relied heavily on said
witness' bare claim that the amount afore-said is excessive or bloated, but they
did not bother at all to present any documentary evidence to substantiate such
claim. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of the
credible witness, but it must be credible in itself. (Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B. L. T. Bus
Co., Inc. L-26810, August 31, 1970).
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the lower court's decision
contending that: (1) the lower court erred in holding it liable for damages; that the lower court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by paying only P1,252.00 as docket fee; (2) assuming
that plaintiff was entitled to damages, the lower court erred in awarding an amount greater
than that prayed for in the second amended complaint; and (3) the lower court erred when it
failed to resolve the issues it had raised in its memorandum.
16
Petitioner likewise filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration expounding on whether the lower court acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case despite therein plaintiff's failure to pay the
prescribed docket fee.
17

On January 25, 1990, the lower court declined reconsideration for lack of merit.
18
Apparently
not having received the order denying its motion for reconsideration, petitioner still filed a
motion for leave to file a reply to private respondent's opposition to said motion.
19
Hence, on
February 12, 1990, the lower court denied said motion for leave to file a reply on the ground
that by the issuance of the order of January 25, 1990, said motion had become moot and
academic.
20

Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals which, however, affirmed the same in toto on October 14, 1992.
21
On petitioner's
assertion that the award of P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by competent and
admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del
Rosario as an expert witness because as the owner of the lost vessel, "it was well within his
knowledge and competency to identify and determine the equipment installed and the
cargoes loaded" on the vessel. Considering the documentary evidence presented as in the
nature of market reports or quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and price lists, the Court
of Appeals held, thus:
Consequently, until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence, the reception of these
documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound discretion
of the trial court. In fact, where the lower court is confronted with evidence which
appears to be of doubtful admissibility, the judge should declare in favor of
admissibility rather than of non-admissibility (The Collector of Palakadhari, 124
[1899], p. 13, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, Evidence, Volume VII, Part
I, 1990 Edition, p. 18). Trial courts are enjoined to observe the strict enforcement
of the rules of evidence which crystallized through constant use and practice and
are very useful and effective aids in the search for truth and for the effective
administration of justice. But in connection with evidence which may appear to be
of doubtful relevancy or incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be
liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them
unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court. If they are
thereafter found relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by completely
discarding or ignoring them. (Banaria vs. Banaria, et al., C.A. No. 4142, May 31,
1950; cited in Francisco, Supra). [Emphasis supplied].
Stressing that the alleged inadmissible documentary exhibits were never satisfactorily
rebutted by appellant's own sole witness in the person of Lorenzo Lazaro, the appellate court
found that petitioner ironically situated itself in an "inconsistent posture by the fact that its
own witness, admittedly an expert one, heavily relies on the very same pieces of evidence
(price quotations) appellant has so vigorously objected to as inadmissible evidence." Hence, it
concluded:
. . . The amount of P6,438,048.00 was duly established at the trial on the basis of
appellee's documentary exhibits (price quotations) which stood uncontroverted,
and which already included the amount by way of adjustment as prayed for in the
amended complaint. There was therefore no need for appellee to amend the
second amended complaint in so far as to the claim for damages is concerned to
conform with the evidence presented at the trial. The amount of P6,438,048.00
awarded is clearly within the relief prayed for in appellee's second amended
complaint.
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the respondent court held that following the ruling in Sun
Insurance Ltd. v. Asuncion,
22
the additional docket fee that may later on be declared as still
owing the court may be enforced as a lien on the judgment.
Hence, the instant recourse.
In assailing the Court of Appeals' decision, petitioner posits the view that the award of
P6,438,048 as actual damages should have been in light of these considerations, namely: (1)
the trial court did not base such award on the actual value of the vessel and its equipment at
the time of loss in 1977; (2) there was no evidence on extraordinary inflation that would
warrant an adjustment of the replacement cost of the lost vessel, equipment and cargo; (3)
the value of the lost cargo and the prices quoted in respondent's documentary evidence only
amount to P4,336,215.00; (4) private respondent's failure to adduce evidence to support its
claim for unrealized profit and business opportunities; and (5) private respondent's failure to
prove the extent and actual value of damages sustained as a result of the 1977 collision of the
vessels.
23

Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of
natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for
the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty.
24
In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts,
actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of.
25
There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of
what a person already possesses (dao emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a
benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).
26
Thus:
Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff is
entitled to their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of
money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially
similar goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of use during the period
before replacement. In other words, in the case of profit-earning chattels, what
has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at
the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that
regard must be had to existing and pending engagements, . . .
. . . . If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually
certain of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value in
respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate
the plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if the ship is valued without reference
to its actual future engagements and only in the light of its profit-earning
potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value thus assessed the
anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement which it was unable to fulfill.
What the court has to ascertain in each case is the "capitalised value of the vessel
as a profit-earning machine not in the abstract but in view of the actual
circumstances," without, of course, taking into account considerations which
were too remote at the time of the loss.
27
[Emphasis supplied].
As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory
damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of
certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.
28
The burden of
proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side.
He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as
a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.
29
In other words, damages
cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could
afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.
30

In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of private respondent's
general manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. Except for Exhibit B where the
value of the 1,050 baeras of fish were pegged at their September 1977 value when the
collision happened, the pieces of documentary evidence proffered by private respondent with
respect to items and equipment lost show similar items and equipment with corresponding
prices in early 1987 or approximately ten (10) years after the collision. Noticeably, petitioner
did not object to the exhibits in terms of the time index for valuation of the lost goods and
equipment. In objecting to the same pieces of evidence, petitioner commented that these
were not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del Rosario) did not have personal
knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither was he an expert on the subjects
thereof.
31
Clearly ignoring petitioner's objections to the exhibits, the lower court admitted
these pieces of evidence and gave them due weight to arrive at the award of P6,438,048.00 as
actual damages.
The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the course of Del Rosario's testimony. Private
respondent did not present any other witnesses especially those whose signatures appear in
the price quotations that became the bases of the award. We hold, however, that the price
quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have
been proffered along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have
testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned
owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price quotations. Section
36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only to those
facts that he knows of his personal knowledge.
For this reason, Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total amount
of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it was a
bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence. Moreover, because he was
the owner of private respondent corporation
32
whatever testimony he would give with regard
to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his
self-interest therein. We agree with the Court of Appeals that his testimony as to the
equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel should be given
credence
33
considering his familiarity thereto. However, we do not subscribe to the conclusion
that his valuation of such equipment, cargo and the vessel itself should be accepted as gospel
truth.
34
We must, therefore, examine the documentary evidence presented to support Del
Rosario's claim as regards the amount of losses.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence
considering that the persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses.
35
Any
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the
witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless
the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence
rule.
36
On this point, we believe that the exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions
provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130.
37

It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to "commercial lists and the
like" under Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. In this respect, the Court of
Appeals considered private respondent's exhibits as "commercial lists." It added, however,
that these exhibits should be admitted in evidence "until such time as the Supreme Court
categorically rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence" because "the
reception of these documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound
discretion of the trial court."
38
Reference to Section 45, Rule 130, however, would show that
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals on the matter was arbitrarily arrived at. This rule states:
Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest to
persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other
published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant
matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in
that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them there.
Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement
of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in
a list, register, periodical or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for
the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by
persons in the same occupation.
Based on the above requisites, it is our considered view that Exhibits B, C, D, E, F and H
39
are
not "commercial lists" for these do not belong to the category of "other published
compilations" under Section 45 aforequoted. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "(w)here
general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to
be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned."
40
The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued personally to Del
Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the
collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other
compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these "market reports or quotations"
within the purview of "commercial lists" as these are not "standard handbooks or periodicals,
containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the
occupation."
41
These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario. Thus, take
for example Exhibit D which reads:
January 20, 1987
PROFORMA INVOICE NO. PSPI-05/87-NAV
MARIA EFIGINIA FISHING CORPORATION
Navotas, Metro Manila
Attention: MR. EDDIE DEL ROSARIO
Gentlemen:
In accordance to your request, we are pleated to quote our Cummins Marine
Engine, to wit.
Two (2) units CUMMINS Marine Engine model N855-M,
195 bhp. at 1800 rpm., 6-cylinder in-line, 4-stroke cycle,
natural aspirated, 5 1/2 in. x 6 in. bore and stroke, 855
cu. In. displacement, keel-cooled, electric starting
coupled with Twin-Disc Marine gearbox model MG-509,
4.5:1 reduction ratio, includes oil cooler, companion
flange, manual and standard accessories as per attached
sheet.
Price FOB Manila P580,000.00/unit
Total FOB Manila P1,160,000.00
TERMS : CASH
DELIVERY : 60-90 days from date of order.
VALIDITY : Subject to our final confirmation.
WARRANTY : One (1) full year against factory defect.
Very truly yours,
POWER SYSTEMS, INC.
(Sgd.)
E. D. Daclan
To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible in evidence but these are, however, subject to
the general principles of evidence and to various rules relating to documentary
evidence.
42
Hence, in one case, it was held that a letter from an automobile dealer offering an
allowance for an automobile upon purchase of a new automobile after repairs had been
completed, was not a "price current" or "commercial list" within the statute which made such
items presumptive evidence of the value of the article specified therein. The letter was not
admissible in evidence as a "commercial list" even though the clerk of the dealer testified that
he had written the letter in due course of business upon instructions of the dealer.
43

But even on the theory that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the admissibility of those
letters or communications when it held that unless "plainly irrelevant, immaterial or
incompetent," evidence should better be admitted rather than rejected on "doubtful or
technical grounds,"
44
the same pieces of evidence, however, should not have been given
probative weight. This is a distinction we wish to point out. Admissibility of evidence refers to
the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to considered at all.
45
On the
other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves
an issue.
46
Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary
weight depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the
letter should be presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation the
opportunity to question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence,
failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. As earlier stated,
hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value. Thus:
The courts differ as to the weight to be given to hearsay evidence admitted
without objection. Some hold that when hearsay has been admitted without
objection, the same may be considered as any other properly admitted testimony.
Others maintain that it is entitled to no more consideration than if it had been
excluded.
The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is the latter one. Our Supreme Court held
that although the question of admissibility of evidence can not be raised for the
first time on appeal, yet if the evidence is hearsay it has no probative value and
should be disregarded whether objected to or not. "If no objection is made"
quoting Jones on Evidence "it (hearsay) becomes evidence by reason of the
want of such objection even though its admission does not confer upon it any
new attribute in point of weight. Its nature and quality remain the same, so far as
its intrinsic weakness and incompetency to satisfy the mind are concerned, and as
opposed to direct primary evidence, the latter always prevails.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent
evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rules of res inter
alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such
evidence any probative value. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated
with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no
probative value.
47

Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay
evidence.
48

Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it totally deprives
private respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel. This is because in Lufthansa
German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 49 the Court said:
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private
respondent is "entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated
in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered." [Emphasis supplied].
Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where property right has
been invaded.
50
Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication of nominal damages
shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between
the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns."
Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. Where these are
allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of
the existence of a technical injury.
51
However, the amount to be awarded as nominal damages
shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent
considering the concept and purpose of such damages.
52
The amount of nominal damages to
be awarded may also depend on certain special reasons extant in the case.
53

Applying now such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact that petitioner's
vessel Petroparcelwas at fault as well as private respondent's complaint claiming the amount
of P692,680.00 representing the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes that sunk with
the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In its amended complaint, private respondent alleged that the
vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00 but it had been paid insurance in the amount of
P200,000.00 and, therefore, it claimed only the amount of P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the receipt
of insurance payments should diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by private
respondent in his complaint considering that such payment is causally related to the loss for
which it claimed compensation. This Court believes that such allegations in the original and
amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a fair amount of nominal damages
inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action.
54
Private respondent should be bound by its allegations on the amount of its claims.
With respect to petitioner's contention that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the amended complaint increasing the amount of damages claimed to P600,000.00, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case when
private respondent paid the docket fee corresponding to its claim in its original complaint. Its
failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the
amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower court's
jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,
55
the unpaid
docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment even though private respondent
specified the amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its amended complaint.
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court on
the ground of insufficient docket fees in its answers to both the amended complaint and the
second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North
Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
56
participation in all stages of the case before the trial court,
that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner
by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer
to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985,
57
petitioner did not question the lower
court's jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989
58
when it filed its motion for
reconsideration of the lower court's decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower
court's lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction
by its own inaction.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 1992 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is
hereby MODIFIED insofar as it awarded actual damages to private respondent Maria Efigenia
Fishing Corporation in the amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor.
Considering the fact, however, that: (1) technically petitioner sustained injury but which,
unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, and (2) this case has dragged on for
almost two decades, we believe that an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00)
59
in favor of
private respondent as and for nominal damages is in order. No pronouncement as to costs.
















G.R. No. 190521 January 12, 2011
LETICIA TAN, MYRNA MEDINA, MARILOU SPOONER, ROSALINDA TAN, and MARY JANE TAN,
MARY LYN TAN, CELEDONIO TAN, JR., MARY JOY TAN, and MARK ALLAN TAN, represented
herein by their mother, LETICIA TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
OMC CARRIERS, INC. and BONIFACIO ARAMBALA, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration
1
filed by Leticia Tan, Myrna Medina, Marilou
Spooner, Rosalinda Tan, Mary Jane Tan, Mary Lyn Tan, Celedonio Tan, Jr., Mary Joy Tan, and
Mark Allan Tan (petitioners), all heirs of the late Celedonio Tan asking us to reverse and set
aside our Resolution of February 17, 2010.
2
We denied in this Resolution their petition for
review on certiorari for failing to show any reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals
(CA) decision of June 22, 2009
3
sufficient to warrant the exercise of our discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.
The CA decision, in turn, affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 96-186, finding the respondents OMC Carriers, Inc.
(OMC) and Bonifacio Arambala guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to the
petitioners.
THE FACTS
On September 27, 1996, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against
OMC and Bonifacio Arambala.
4
The complaint states that on November 24, 1995, at around
6:15 a.m., Arambala was driving a truck
5
with a trailer
6
owned by OMC, along Meralco Road,
Sucat, Muntinlupa City. When Arambala noticed that the truck had suddenly lost its brakes, he
told his companion to jump out. Soon thereafter, he also jumped out and abandoned the
truck. Driverless, the truck rammed into the house and tailoring shop owned by petitioner
Leticia Tan and her husband Celedonio Tan, instantly killing Celedonio who was standing at the
doorway of the house at the time.
7

The petitioners alleged that the collision occurred due to OMCs gross negligence in not
properly maintaining the truck, and to Arambalas recklessness when he abandoned the
moving truck. Thus, they claimed that the respondents should be held jointly and severally
liable for the actual damages that they suffered, which include the damage to their properties,
the funeral expenses they incurred for Celedonio Tans burial, as well as the loss of his earning
capacity. The petitioners also asked for moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
8

The respondents denied any liability for the collision, essentially claiming that the damage to
the petitioners was caused by a fortuitous event, since the truck skidded due to the slippery
condition of the road caused by spilled motor oil.
9

THE RTC DECISION
After trial, the RTC found OMC and Arambala jointly and severally liable to the petitioners for
damages.
10
Relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the RTC held that it was unusual for a
truck to suddenly lose its brakes; the fact that the truck rammed into the petitioners house
raised the presumption of negligence on the part of the respondents. These, the respondents
failed to refute.
11

The RTC did not agree with the respondents claim of a fortuitous event, pointing out that
even with oil on the road, Arambala did not slow down or take any precautionary measure to
prevent the truck from skidding off the road. The alleged oil on the road did not also explain
why the truck lost its brakes. Had OMC done a more rigid inspection of the truck before its
use, the defective brake could have been discovered. The RTC, thus, held OMC jointly and
severally liable with Arambala for the damage caused to the petitioners, based on the principle
of vicarious liability embodied in Article 2180
12
of the Civil Code.
13

The dispositive portion of the decision stated:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants ordering:
1. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P50,000.00
for the death of Celedonio Tan;
2. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P500,000.00
for the loss of earning capacity of Celedonio Tan, plus interest thereon from the date of
death of Celedonio Tan;
3. The defendants to pay the plaintiff Leticia Tan jointly and severally the amount
of P355,895.00 as actual damages;
4. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P500,000.00
as moral damages;
5. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P500,000.00
as exemplary damages; and
6. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and solidarily the amount of P500,000.00
as attorneys fees.
Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
14

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs findings on the issues of the respondents negligence and
liability for damages. However, the CA modified the damages awarded to the petitioners by
reducing the actual damages award from P355,895.00 to P72,295.00. The CA observed that
only the latter amount was duly supported by official receipts.
15

The CA also deleted the RTCs award for loss of earning capacity. The CA explained that the
petitioners failed to substantiate Celedonio Tans claimed earning capacity with reasonable
certainty; no documentary evidence was ever presented on this point. Instead, the RTC merely
relied on Leticia Tans testimony regarding Celedonio Tans income. The CA characterized this
testimony as self-serving.
16

The CA further reduced the exemplary damages from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00, and
deleted the award of attorneys fees because the RTC merely included the award in the
dispositive portion of the decision without discussing its legal basis.
17

THE PETITION
In the petition for review on certiorari before us,
18
the petitioners assert that the CA erred
when it modified the RTCs awarded damages. The petitioners submit the reasons outlined
below.
First, the CA erred when it reduced the RTCs award of actual damages from P355,895.00
to P72,295.00. The petitioners claim that they sought compensation for the damage done to
petitioner Leticia Tans house, tailoring shop, sewing machines, as well as other household
appliances. Since the damages primarily refer to the value of their destroyed property, and not
the cost of repairing or replacing them, the value cannot be evidenced by receipts.
Accordingly, the RTC correctly relied on petitioner Leticia Tans testimony and the
documentary evidence presented, consisting of pictures of the damaged property, to prove
their right to recover actual damages for the destroyed property.
Second, the petitioners are entitled to actual damages for the loss of Celedonio Tans earning
capacity. While they admit that they did not submit any documentary evidence to substantiate
this claim, the petitioners point out that Celedonio Tan was undisputably a self-employed
tailor who owned a small tailor shop; in his line of work, no documentary evidence is available.
Third, the petitioners maintain that they are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount
of P500,000.00 because the RTC and the CA consistently found that the collision was caused
by the respondents gross negligence. Moreover, the respondents acted with bad faith when
they fabricated the "oil slick on the road" story to avoid paying damages to the petitioners. As
observed by the CA, the Traffic Accident Investigation Report did not mention any motor oil on
the road at the time of the accident. SPO4 Armando Alambro, the Investigation Officer,
likewise testified that there was no oil on the road at the time of the accident. For the public
good and to serve as an example, the respondents should be made to pay P500,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Lastly, the petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees based on Article 2208 of the Civil Code
which provides, among others, that attorneys fees can be recovered when exemplary
damages are awarded, and when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
We initially denied the petition in our Resolution of February 17, 2010, for the petitioners
failure to show any reversible error in the CA decision sufficient to warrant the exercise of our
discretionary appellate jurisdiction. In our Resolution of August 11, 2010, we reinstated the
petition on the basis of the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
OUR RULING
Finding merit in the petitioners arguments, we partly grant the petition.
Procedural Issue
As both the RTC and the CA found that the respondents gross negligence led to the death of
Celedonio Tan, as well as to the destruction of the petitioners home and tailoring shop, we
see no reason to disturb this factual finding. We, thus, concentrate on the sole issue of what
damages the petitioners are entitled to.
We are generally precluded from resolving a Rule 45 petition that solely raises the issue of
damages, an essentially factual question, because Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
expressly states that
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from
a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.
In light, however of the RTCs and the CAs conflicting findings on the kind and amount of
damages suffered which must be compensated, we are compelled to consider the case as one
of the recognized exceptions.
19
We look into the parties presented evidence to resolve this
appeal.
Temperate damages in lieu of actual damages
We begin by discussing the petitioners claim for actual damages arising from the damage
inflicted on petitioner Leticia Tans house and tailoring shop, taking into account the sewing
machines and various household appliances affected. Our basic law tells us that to recover
damages there must be pleading and proof of actual damages suffered.
20
As we explained in
Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos:
21

Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award
of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can
be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.
22

The petitioners do not deny that they did not submit any receipt to support their claim for
actual damages to prove the monetary value of the damage caused to the house and tailoring
shop when the truck rammed into them. Thus, no actual damages for the destruction to
petitioner Leticia Tans house and tailoring shop can be awarded.
Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still has the
option of claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from the nature
of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the court is
convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss.
23
As defined in Article 2224
of the Civil Code:
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
In Canada v. All Commodities Marketing Corporation,
24
we disallowed the award of actual
damages arising from breach of contract, where the respondent merely alleged that it was
entitled to actual damages and failed to adduce proof to support its plea. In its place, we
awarded temperate damages, in recognition of the pecuniary loss suffered.
The photographs the petitioners presented as evidence show the extent of the damage done
to the house, the tailoring shop and the petitioners appliances and equipment.
25
Irrefutably,
this damage was directly attributable to Arambalas gross negligence in handling OMCs truck.
Unfortunately, these photographs are not enough to establish the amount of the loss with
certainty. From the attendant circumstances and given the property destroyed,
26
we find the
amount of P200,000.00 as a fair and sufficient award by way of temperate damages.
Temperate damages in lieu of loss of earning capacity
Similarly, the CA was correct in disallowing the award of actual damages for loss of earning
capacity. Damages for loss of earning capacity are awarded pursuant to Article 2206 of the
Civil Code, which states that:
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death[.]
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for loss of
earning capacity.
27
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work, no documentary evidence is
available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws.
28

According to the petitioners, prior to his death, Celedonio was a self-employed tailor who
earned approximatelyP156,000.00 a year, or P13,000.00 a month. At the time of his death in
1995, the prevailing daily minimum wage was P145.00,
29
or P3,770.00 per month, provided
the wage earner had only one rest day per week. Even if we take judicial notice of the fact that
a small tailoring shop normally does not issue receipts to its customers, and would probably
not have any documentary evidence of the income it earns, Celedonios alleged monthly
income ofP13,000.00 greatly exceeded the prevailing monthly minimum wage; thus, the
exception set forth above does not apply.
In the past, we awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning
capacity where earning capacity is plainly established but no evidence was presented to
support the allegation of the injured partys actual income.
In Pleno v. Court of Appeals,
30
we sustained the award of temperate damages in the amount
of P200,000.00 instead of actual damages for loss of earning capacity because the plaintiffs
income was not sufficiently proven.
We did the same in People v. Singh,
31
and People v. Almedilla,
32
granting temperate damages
in place of actual damages for the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence of
the deceaseds income.
Similarly, in Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad,
33
we deleted the award of damages for loss of
earning capacity for lack of evidentiary basis of the actual extent of the loss. Nevertheless,
because the income-earning capacity lost was clearly established, we awarded the
heirs P500,000.00 as temperate damages.
In the present case, the income-earning capacity of the deceased was never disputed.
Petitioners Mary Jane Tan, Mary Lyn Tan, Celedonio Tan, Jr., Mary Joy Tan and Mark Allan Tan
were all minors at the time the petition was filed on February 4, 2010,
34
and they all relied
mainly on the income earned by their father from his tailoring activities for their sustenance
and support. Under these facts and taking into account the unrebutted annual earnings of the
deceased, we hold that the petitioners are entitled to temperate damages in the amount
ofP300,000.00 [or roughly, the gross income for two (2) years] to compensate for damages for
loss of the earning capacity of the deceased.
Reduction of exemplary damages proper
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
35
In quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
36

Celedonio Tans death and the destruction of the petitioners home and tailoring shop were
unquestionably caused by the respondents gross negligence. The law allows the grant of
exemplary damages in cases such as this to serve as a warning to the pubic and as a deterrent
against the repetition of this kind of deleterious actions.
37
The grant, however, should be
tempered, as it is not intended to enrich one party or to impoverish another. From this
perspective, we find the CAs reduction of the exemplary damages awarded to the petitioners
from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00 to be proper.
Attorneys fees in order
In view of the award of exemplary damages, we find it also proper to award the petitioners
attorney's fees, in consonance with Article 2208(1) of the Civil Code.
38
We find the award of
attorneys fees, equivalent to 10% of the total amount adjudged the petitioners, to be just and
reasonable under the circumstances.
Interests due
Finally, we impose legal interest on the amounts awarded, in keeping with our ruling in
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
39
which held that:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or
quasi-delicts

is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under
Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable
damages.lavvphil
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may
have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal
interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the
court at the rate of 6% per annum.

No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so
reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run
only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification
of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for
the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Accordingly, legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amounts awarded starts to run
from May 14, 2003, when the trial court rendered judgment. From the time this judgment
becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum on the judgment
amount and the interest earned up to that date, until the judgment is wholly satisfied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The June 22, 2009
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 84733, which modified the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, in Civil Case No. 96-186, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, respondents OMC Carriers, Inc. and Bonifacio Arambala are
ordered to jointly and severally pay the petitioners the following:
(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Celedonio Tan;
(2) P72,295.00 as actual damages for funeral expenses;
(3) P200,000.00 as temperate damages for the damage done to petitioner Leticias
house, tailoring shop, household appliances and shop equipment;
(4) P300,000.00 as damages for the loss of Celedonio Tans earning capacity;
(5) P500,000.00 as moral damages;
(6) P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(7) 10% of the total amount as attorneys fees; and costs of suit.
In addition, the total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
May 14, 2003, and at the rate of 12% per annum, from the finality of this Resolution on the
balance and interest due, until fully paid.














G.R. No. 94590 July 29, 1992
CHINA AIRLINES LIMITED, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL J. OCAMPO, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
Private respondent Manuel J. Ocampo bought, through the Ultraman Travel Agency, a round-
trip ticket for Manila-San Francisco-Manila from petitioner China Airlines Limited ("CAL"). The
ticket purchased was a GV-10, or a Group Tour, ticket for which Ocampo paid a special
discounted (reduced) price of P6,063.00. A Group Tour ticket is issued to members of a group
of at least ten (10) passengers travelling for a minimum of fourteen (14) days and for a
maximum of thirty-five (35) days. It is a condition of a Group Tour ticket that the holder
thereof must stay in the place of destination (in this case, the United States), for at least
fourteen (14) but not exceeding thirty-five (35) days. The portion of the ticket covering the
return trip may be used only after expiration of fourteen (14) days counted from the date of
arrival at the place of destination; beyond the thirty-five (35) allowable days, the return trip
ticket is no longer valid.
The ticket purchased by respondent Ocampo bore the following schedule and status:
Date Time Status
Manila-Taipei 09 May 1030 RQ
Taipei-S.F. 09 May 1525 RQ
S.F.-Honolulu 24 May 2350 RQ
Honolulu-Tokyo 30 May 0405 RQ
Tokyo-Taipei 02 June 1545 RQ
Taipei-Manila 09 June 1120 RQ
1

It will be noted from the above schedule that respondent Ocampo's return flight from
San Francisco to Manila was scheduled for 24 May 1979, i.e., the 15th day after arrival in
San Francisco. Respondent Ocampo, however, wanted to leave for Manila earlier than
24 May 1979 because he had several business meetings scheduled to be held here prior
to 24 May 1979 and because of his desire to attend to his wife's and son's forthcoming
departure for Europe scheduled on 24 May 1979.
2

Notwithstanding the limitations on his discounted GV-10 ticket, therefore, respondent
Ocampo sought to make special arrangements, through Ultraman Travel Agency, with CAL
Manila for a change in schedule. The travel agency was, according to respondent Ocampo,
assured that the necessary adjustments would be made and that Mr. Ocampo could definitely
take the CAL flight from San Francisco on 18 May 1979. Not satisfied, respondent Ocampo sent
his private secretary to the office of CAL Manila to have the ticket changed. There, the
secretary was handed a typewritten note purporting to show a revised schedule for the
different sectors of the return trip from San Francisco to Manila with the corresponding flight
numbers. The revised schedule was as follows:
CI001 flight number
dep San Francisco 11:50 p.m. May 18
arr Honolulu 1:55 a.m. May 19
C1007 flight number
dep Honolulu 4:05 a.m. May 20
arr Taipei 10:25 a.m. May 21
C1811 flight number
dep Taipei 11:20 a.m. May 21
arr Manila 1:10 p.m. May 21
3

Respondent Ocampo was asked to reconfirm his return flight with CAL San Francisco which
would alter the ticket by attaching a sticker on it showing the adjusted flights and departure
dates. The revised schedule was also entered into respondent Ocampo's reservation card on
file in the office of CAL Manila.
Respondent Ocampo left Manila for San Francisco's on 9 May 1979 and arrived in San
Francisco also on the same day, San Francisco local time. Next day, he proceeded to CAL San
Francisco' office to confirm his revised return flight schedule. CAL San Francisco, however,
declined to confirm his return flight, since the date indicated on the ticket was not 18 May
1979 but rather 24 May 1979. Mr. Ocampo, however, apprised CAL San Francisco about the
special arrangement that he had requested from CAL Manila. CAL San Francisco contacted CAL
Manila by telex requesting verification of the revised schedule for respondent Ocampo. CAL
San Francisco, however, received a negative reply from CAL Manila.
Respondent Ocampo persisted in his efforts to book himself on the CAL San Francisco-
Honolulu flight on 18 May 1979. By telephone, he contacted his private secretary in Manila to
make the necessary inquiry and verification at CAL Manila. His secretary later telephoned back
to inform him that CAL Manila would forthwith send a communication to CAL San Francisco to
correct the situation. With that information, respondent Ocampo proceeded once more to CAL
San Francisco and left his telephone number and address where he could be contacted upon
receipt of confirmation from CAL Manila.
CAL San Francisco never sent any notice to private respondent. On the morning of 18 May
1979, respondent Ocampo went to CAL San Francisco's office to check again on the status of
his return flight; there he was apparently informed that CAL Manila had not responded.
Respondent Ocampo was accordingly constrained to take a Philippine Airlines flight which left
San Francisco on 20 May 1979, the earliest available return flight which respondent Ocampo
could secure after 18 May 1979.
4

Upon arrival in Manila, respondent Ocampo demanded an explanation from CAL Manila. He
was told candidly that a mistake had been committed by an employee of CAL Manila who had
sent a negative reply to CAL San Francisco's request for confirmation without first consulting
Ocampo's passenger reservation card. Another employee or representative of CAL Manila
offered private respondent compensation for actual expenses incurred by him due to his
inability to board the CAL 18 May 1979 flight from San Francisco. Private respondent asked
that the offer be reduced to writing; however, nothing in writing emanated from CAL Manila
and nothing further happened.
Private respondent then filed a complaint for damages before the then Court of First Instance
of Manila. He asked for P200,000.00 as moral damages, P200,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
On 23 May 1983, after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which read as follows:
In View of the Foregoing Considerations, the Court is of the opinion and so holds
that when the plaintiff tried to return to Manila from San Francisco, a date
different from the scheduled date of his departure from San Francisco as
contained in his plane ticket, the plaintiff is considered as a chance passenger and
could only board the defendant's plane, on his departure on May 18, 1979
depending upon the volume of passengers and plane load on May 18, 1979 and
defendant had not violated any provisions of the plane ticket issued to the
plaintiff which is the contract between plaintiff and the defendant; the complaint
is hereby dismissed for lack of cause of action. On principles of equity and justice,
defendant is hereby ordered to reimburse the plaintiff the sum of $601.00 or its
equivalent value in Philippine Currency at the rate then existing on May 18, 1979.
The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby dismissed as tin same had not been
fully established, without special pronouncement as to cost.
So ordered.
5

On appeal by private respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. The
Court of Appeals found petitioner CAL guilt of bad faith in not allowing respondent Ocampo to
board the 18 May 1979 CAL flight in San Francisco despite messages from CAL Manila
confirming the change in schedule and the availability of seats for the different sectors of the
flight from San Francisco to Manila. The Court of Appeals awarded, in addition to the US$601
that the trial court had ordered CAL to pay to private respondent, the sum of P200,000.00 as
moral damages, another P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees of
P50,000.00.
In the instant Petition for Review, petitioner CAL argues that:
1. The respondent Court erred when it concluded that the petitioner [was] liable
to the private respondent on the basis that he had a confirmed reservation
contrary to the express finding of the lower court.
2. The respondent Court erred when it concluded that the petitioner was guilty of
bad faith.
3. The respondent Court erred when it awarded damages not warranted by the
evidence and which are excessive.
6

We note that while the ticket, held by private respondent himself, showed on its face a 24
May 1979 departure from San Francisco to Honolulu and a "RQ" [Request] status, the evidence
of record showed that private respondent had indeed requested CAL Manila for an earlier
return flight, to which request CAL Manila eventually agreed. The record shows a stream of
telexes between the several offices of petitioner CAL involved in respondent's trip, disclosing
the following salient facts:
1. On 7 May 1979 at 2:54 p.m., Manila time, CAL Manila sent telexes to CAL Taipei and CAL San
Francisco informing the two (2) offices that respondent Ocampo had a sold seat for the sector
San Francisco-Honolulu on 18 May 1979, but that the status of the sector Honolulu-Taipei for
20 May 1979 and the sector Taipei-Manila for 21 May 1979, was only "wait listed."
2. On 7 May 1979 at 4:44 p.m., San Francisco time, CAL San Francisco sent a reply to CAL
Manila to confirm the San Francisco-Honolulu sector scheduled for 18 May 1979 as well as the
Honolulu-Taipei sector for 20 May 1979.
3. On 8 May 1979, at 10:10 a.m., Manila time, CAL Manila sent another telex to CAL Taipei,
urging the latter to do everything possible to confirm the Taipei-Manila sector of the flight
scheduled for 21 May 1979.
4. On 14 May 1979 at 8:06 a.m., Taipei time, CAL Taipei telexed CAL Manila confirming the
Taipei-Manila sector as earlier requested.
5. On 17 May 1979 at 1:10 P.m., San Francisco time, CAL San Francisco, which by then had
learned about the confirmed status of all segments of the flight San Francisco-Manila,
reiterated its request to CAL Manila for an early departure authority, i.e., as an exception to
the regular conditions of a GV-10 ticket, so that respondent Ocampo may be allowed to board
the 18 May 1979 flight leaving San Francisco for Honolulu.
6. On 17 May 1979 at 2:28 p.m., Manila time, CAL Manila instructed CAL San Francisco to
inform respondent Ocampo of the confirmed status of the different sectors of his return flight,
and to accept private respondent for carriage by reason of a prior arrangement made with CAL
Manila.
7. On 18 May 1979 at 9:32 a.m., Manila time, CAL Manila sent an urgent message to CAL San
Francisco substantially reiterating the instructions in CAL Manila's telex of 17 May 1979 sent at
2:28 p.m. For some reason not clear in the record, the last two (2) telexes received in CAL San
Francisco from CAL Manila apparently did not get to the attention of, and were not acted upon
by, the right person or persons in CAL San Francisco.
Because CAL Taipei had confirmed as early as 14 May 1979 the Taipei-Manila sector of Private
respondent's return trip, public respondent Court of Appeals considered CAL San Francisco's
refusal to board private respondent as an act of bad faith, and awarded private respondent
the large amounts he sought by way of moral and exemplary damages totalling P400,000.00.
We consider that private respondent was able to show that petitioner CAL had indeed
confirmed a seat for Mr. Ocampo on the 18 May 1979 flight from San Francisco-Honolulu (and
all the way to Manila). We agree, therefore, with the Court of Appeals that petitioner CAL had
breached its contract of carriage with private respondent by such failure or refusal to board
him on that flight.
We are not, however, persuaded that that breach of contractual obligation had been attended
by bad faith or malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. To the contrary, it appears
to the Court that petitioner CAL had exercised diligent efforts to effect the change of schedule
which it apparently had earlier stated to private respondent (prior to his departure from
Manila) it would carry out. There was clearly a concerted effort among the involved CAL
offices as shown by the flow of telexes from one to the others. If at the outset, petitioner CAL
simply did not intend to comply with its promise to private respondent that it would
accommodate his requested change of schedule, it would not have taken the trouble of
composing and transmitting all those telexes between its several offices.
CAL San Francisco was obviously aware of the limitations on a GV-10 CAL ticket and its
employee(s) who bad refused to accede summarily to respondent Ocampo's request for
confirmation of his revised schedule, cannot be held guilty of bad faith; the procedure adopted
of seeking verification from CAL Manila was one taken in the usual course of business and was
not in itself unreasonable or arbitrary.
7
There responsible officer(s) of CAL Manila admitted
that it had initially sent an erroneous message to CAL San Francisco concerning authorization
for early departure of private respondent from San Francisco. While the CAL Manila employee
who had sent a mistaken telex message was negligent, there was no evidence either of
deliberate malice or of gross negligence. The last two (2) telexes sent by CAL Manila to CAL San
Francisco on 17 May and 18 May 1979 were presumably received by CAL San Francisco in time
to have relayed to respondent Ocampo his acceptance as a passenger on the CAL flight out of
San Francisco scheduled for 18 May 1979. Again, however, we do not believe that respondent
Ocampo had convincingly shown that the employees of petitioner CAL were motivated by
personal malice or bad faith, or that there was patently negligence so gross as to amount to
bad faith. Bad faith under the law is not presumed; it must be established by clear and
convincing evidence. 8 Private respondent has not adduced that kind of evidence in the instant
case. There was no pretense that any of the employee of any of the CAL offices involved knew
respondent Ocampo from Adam.
Under Article 2201 of the Civil Code, the measure of recoverable damages for breach of
contract varies according to the circumstances attending that breach. Article 2201 provides:
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in
good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences
of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-
performance of the obligation. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 2220 is also pertinent:
Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due.
The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the law distinguishes a contractual breach effected in good faith from one
attended by bad faith. Where in breaching the contract, the defendant is not shown to
have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation and which the parties had
foreseen or could reasonably have foreseen; and in that case, such liability would not
include liability for moral and exemplary damages.
9
Under Article 2232 of the Civil Code,
in a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship, exemplary damages may be awarded
only if the defendant had acted in "a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner." We are unable to so characterize the behavior here
shown of the employees of CAL Manila and of CAL San Francisco. Thus, we believe and
so hold that the damages recoverable by respondent Ocampo are limited to the peso
value of the Philippine Airlines ticket it had purchased for his return flight from San
Francisco; and reasonable expenses occasioned to private respondent by reason of the
delay in his return San Francisco-Manila trip exercising the Court's discretion, we
believe that for such expenses, US$1,500.00 would be a reasonable amount
plus attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00, considering that respondent Ocampo
was ultimately compelled to litigate his claim against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 25 July 1990 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby ENTERED requiring petitioner to pay private respondent
Ocampo the Philippine Peso equivalent of US$2,101.00, at the rate of exchange prevailing at
the time of payment thereof, as reasonable compensatory damages, plus attorney's fees in the
amount of P15,000.00 and costs. Petitioner's counterclaim before the trial court is hereby
DISMISSED.

















G.R. No. L-12306 October 22, 1918
SIMONA MANZANARES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
RAFAEL MORETA, defendant-appellant.
Sanz & Luzuriaga for appellant.
Jose C. Zulueta for appellee.

TORRES, J.:
In the case which is brought for the recovery of the damages resulting from the death of the
child Salvador Bona, of from 8 to 9 years of age, who had been run over by an automobile
driven and managed by the defendant on the morning of March 5, 1916, a judgment was
rendered on August 3, 1916, whereby the said defendant was sentenced to pay the sum of
P1,000 as indemnity child, and to pay the costs. From this judgment, an appeal was taken by
the defendant after his motion for a new trial had been overruled, and the case is now before
this court by bill of exceptions.
The statement of facts is at once admitted, and we find no reason for disturbing the findings
made by the trail judge in his judgement appealed from, wherein the defendant was found
liable for the accident which occurred to the said child on Solana Street on the morning of said
day, and consequently, the defendant, as the one who had cause the accident, is bound to
indemnify the mother of the deceased child in the amount of P1,000, which was deemed by
the trial judge to be the value of the damages occasioned to the mother for the loss and death
of a member of her family.
To the reasons given by the trail judge as grounds for his decision, we deem pertinent to add
the following:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to
stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along
the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana street, it is to be
believed that, when he against stated to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue
its way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which
he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear
way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of
Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred, if the auto had been running at a slow
speed, aside form the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and
entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of
crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left; and if the accident
had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and
the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved
along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile
entered Solana Street form Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown
the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident
which caused the death of the child would not have occurred.
In view of the foregoing considerations as well as those contained in the judgment of the trial
court, which, we believe that he errors assigned by the appellant are thereby refuted and that
therefore the judgment appealed from, should be, as it hereby is, affirmed, with the costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
The facts are few and simple. A male child, 8 or 9 years of age, was killed through the
negligence of the defendant in driving his automobile. The mother of the dead boy is a widow,
a poor washerwoman. She brings action against the defendant to recover damages for her loss
in the amount of P5,000. Without there having been tendered any special proof of the amount
of damages suffered, the trial court found the defendant responsible and condemned him to
pay to plaintiff the sum of P1,000. The decision of this Court handed down by Justice Torres,
affirms the judgment of the Court of First Instance. If necessary, the decision of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana in the case of Burvant vs. Wolfe [1910], 126 La., 787), could be cited as
corroborative authority.
The principles of law which measure the pecuniary responsibility of the defendant, not
discussed in the main opinion, are more difficult. Since the time of Grotius and even before,
lawyers and publicists have speculated as to whether the loss of a human life should be
compensated in money, and if so, as to the amount which should be allowed.
At Common Law no civil action lies for damages caused by the death of a human being by the
wrongful or negligent act of another. The maxim is actio personalis moritur cum persona.
(Mobile Life Ins. Co. vs. Brame [1878], 95 U.S., 754; Baker vs. Bolton, 1 Campb., 493.) Two
different modes of reasoning have arrived at this result. The first and older theory was the
merger of the private right in the public wrong. (The E.B. Ward, Jr. [1883], 16 Fed., 255.) The
second and younger theory was that the death of a human being cannot be complained of as a
civil injury. under the latter doctrine, it has been repeatedly held that a civil action by a parent
for the death of a minor child cannot be maintained. (Kramer vs. San Francisco market Street
R. Co. [1864], 25 Cal., 434; Jackson vs. Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L. R. Co. [1894], 140 Ind., 241;
Wilson vs. Bumstead [1881], 12 Neb., 1; Sullivan vs. Union P. R. Co. 1880], 2 Fed., 447;
Osborn vs. Gillett [1873], L.R. 8 Exch., 88; Weems vs.Mathieson, 4 macq. H.L. Cas. 215; Gulf, C.
& S.F. ry. Co. vs. Beall [1897], 91 Tex., 310. See 41 L.R.A., 807, Note.)1awph!l.net
By the Civil Law, particularly as existing in Spain, France, Porto Rico, and Louisiana, the true
principle is somewhat beclouded. Thus, in Louisiana, a State favored by French and Spanish
antecedents, the exact question of whether an action for damages caused by the homicide of
a human being can be maintained, was presented by able counsel for the opinion of
distinguished jurists. and it was held in a decision, later expressly affirmed, that, under the Civil
Law, the action could not be maintained by the surviving wife or children. (Hubgh vs. new
Orlenas & Carrollton R.R. Co. [1851], 6 La. Ann., 495; Hermann vs. New Orleans & Carrollton
R.R. Co. [1856], 11 La Ann., 5; 24 Porthier Pandectes, p. 279; law 13; 7 Partida, title 15, law 3.)
The same question has arisen in Porto Rico. It has there been held that by the civil law in force
in Porto Rico a civil action lies for negligence resulting in death. (Borrero vs. cia. Anonyma dela
Luz Electrica de Ponce [1903], 1 Porto Rico Fed., 144; Diaz vs. San Juan Light & Transit co.
[1911], 17 Porto Rico, 64.) The right to sue for death from negligence of a defendant, by
persons entitled to support by the deceased has not been changed by the new civil Code of
Porto Rico. (Torres vs. Ponce Railway & Light Co. [1903], 1 Porto Rico Fed., 476.)
In Spain, from which both the Civil Law of Porto Rico and the Philippines were derived, it has
been decided that such an action could be maintained. (Decision of the supreme court of
Spain of December 14, 1894.) In France, the highest court has interpreted the Code Napoleon
as sanctioning actions by those damaged by the death of another against persons by whose
fault the death happened. (Chavoix vs. Enfants Duport [1853], 1 Journal du Palais 614;
Rollond's case, 19 Sirey, 269.)
That even in those jurisdictions in which the Common Law has force, the observance of the
principle has been resisted, is disclosed by the action of Hawaii in holding that there can be a
recovery for death by wrongful act. (The Schooner Robert Lewers Co. vs. Kekauoha [1902], 114
Fed., 849.) That the impropriety of the judge-made rule was early disclosed, is shown by the
numerous statutes, beginning with Lord Campbell's Act, which were enacted to cover the
deficiency by permitting of a right by the Civil Law, because of a statute, an action will now lie
for pecuniary and other damages caused by death. (McCubbin vs. Hastings [1875], 27 La. Ann.,
713.) And finally, that eminent authorities recognize liability in case of death by negligence is
disclosed by the mere mention of such names as Grotius, Puffendorf, and Domat,. For
instance, Grotius in his Rights of War and Peace said:
Exemplo haec sint. Homicida injustus, tenetur solvere impensas, si quae factae sunt in
medicos, et iis quos occisus alere exofficio solebat, puta parentibus, uxoribus liberis dare
tantum, quantum illa spes alimentorum, ratione habita aetatis occissi, valebat sicuti
Hercules legitur Iphiti a se occissi leberis mulctam pependissi, quo facilius expiaretur.
Michael Ephesius ad quintum Nocomachiorum Aristotillis; Alla kai o Phoenuthies elabe
tropon tine O gare e gune e oi paides, e oi suggenies tou phoneuthentos elabe tropon
tine ekeino dedotai. Sed et qui occisus est accipit aliquo modo. quae enim uxor ejus et
liberi et cognati accipiunt, ipse quodommodo accipit. Loquimur de homicida injusto, id
est, qui non habuit jus id faciendi unde mors sequitur. quare si quis jus haburit sed in
caritatem peccavirit ut qui furgere nolout, non tenebitur.
Vetae autem in libero homine aestimatio non fit, secus in servo qui vendi potuit. [11 La.
Ann., 5.]
The following may be for example: Any man slaying another, unjustly, is bound to
discharge the expenses, if any are contracted, for physicians, and to give to those whom
the slain was in duty accustomed to maintain-such as parents, wives, children-as much
as that hope of maintenance-regard being had to the age of the deceased-was worth:
thus, Hercules is said to have made reparation (paid a fine) to the Children of Iphitus,
slain by him, in order that expiation might more easily be made.
Michael, the Ephesian, says upon the 5th of the Nicomachii of Aristotle: "but also the
person slain receives, in some sort, for what the wife or children or relations of the
person slain receive is, in some sort given him." We are speaking of an unjust manslayer:
that is, one who had not the right of doing that from whence death follows.
Wherefore, if any one may have had the right, but has sinned against charity, as when
one (being assaulted) has been unwilling to flee, he shall not be bound. but of life, in
case of a free man, no valuation is made, otherwise, in case of a slave who can be sold.
Both because of the civil origin of the applicable law in the Philippines, because we re not
fettered b the harsh common law rule on the subject, because it is the modern and more
equitable principle, and because reason and natural justice are eloquent advocates, we hold
that an action for damages can be maintained in this jurisdiction for the death of a person by
wrongful act. It can be admitted, since objection has not been made, that the primary right of
action is in the parent.
The second phase of our inquiry, pertaining to the amount of compensation for the loss of a
human life, must now be settled.
"Damage" has been defined by Escriche as the detriment, injury, or loss which are occasioned
by reason of fault of another in the property or person." (Escriche, Diccionario Razonado de
Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, vol. 2, p. 597.) Of whatsoever nature the damage be, and from
whatsoever cause it may proceed, the person who has done the injury ought to repair it by an
indemnity proportionate to his fault and to the loss caused thereby. (Cushing, Domat's Civil
Law, p. 741.) Damnum (dao or a loss) must be shown to sustain an action for damages.
Philippine law as found in the well known article 1902 of the Civil Code, derived from Partida
VII, Title V, is to this effect. In order to give rise to the obligation imposed by this article of the
Civil Code, the coincidence of two distinct requisites is necessary, vis: (1) That there exist an
injury or damage not originating in acts or omissions of the prejudiced person demanding
indemnification therefore; (2) that said injury or damage be caused by the fault or negligence
of a person other than the sufferer. (12 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 604.)
Those seeking to recoup damages must ordinarily establish their pecuniary loss by satisfactory
proof. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, December 14, 1894; November 13 and 26,
1895; December 7, 1896; September 30, 1898, and December 16, 1903; Sanz vs. Lavin [1906],
6 Phil., 299; to Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario [1907], 8 Phil., 546; Diaz vs. San Juan Light and Transit
Co. [1911], 17 Porto Rico, 64.) The customary elements of damages must be shown. But in
certain cases, the law presumes a loss because of the impossibility of exact proof and
computation in respect to the amount of the loss sustained. In other words, the loss can be
proved either by evidence or by presumption. For instance, where the elation of husband and
wife or parent and child exist, provided the child is shown to be a minor, the law presumes a
pecuniary loss to the survivor from the fact of death, and it is not necessary to submit proof as
to such loss. (Chicago vs. Scholten [1874], 75 III., 468; Rockford, etc. R. col. vs. Delaney [1876];
Atrops vs. Costello [1894], 8 Wash., 149; Mason vs. Southern R. Co [1900], 58 S. C. 70;
McKechney vs. Redmond, 94 III. App., 470; Joliet vs. Weston, 22 III. Appl., 225;
Kelly vs. Twenty-third St. R. Co., 14 N.Y. St., 699; Dunhene vs. Ohio L. Ins. etc. co., 1 Disn., 257;
Diaz vs. San Juan Light & Transit Co. supra.)
In one of the cited cases, (City of Chicago vs. Hesing) on an action to recover damages resulting
to the parents, laboring people, by the death of their child four years old through negligence
on the part of the City of Chicago, the court said:
Only pecuniary damages can be recovered in such actions as this. Nothing can be given
as solace or for bereavement suffered. Under instructions declaring the true rule for
estimating the damages, the jury found for plaintiff, in the sum of $800, but one of the
errors assigned is, the amount found is excessive. As a matter of law, we cannot so
declare, and as a matter of fact, how can we know the amount is in excess of the
pecuniary damages sustained? When proof is made of the age an relationship of the
deceased to next of kin, the jury may estimate the pecuniary damages from the facts
proven, in connection with their own knowledge and experiences in relation to matters
of common observation. It is not indispensable there should be proof of actual services
of pecuniary value rendered to next of kind, nor that any witness should express an
opinion as to the value of services that may have been or might be rendered. Where the
deceased was a minor, and left a father who would have been entitle dot his services
had he lived, the law implies a pecuniary loss, for which compensation, under the
statute, may be given.
The discretion of a jury, where there is a jury, or of the trial court, where the court possesses
such faculty, in fixing the amount of damages, will not be interfered with by the appellate
court unless this discretion has been palpably abused. Since in the very nature of things the
value of a human life cannot be exactly estimated in money, and since the elements which go
to make up any value are personal to each case, much must depend on the good sense and
sound judgment of the jury or judge. The rule has been applied to the death of minor children
where there was nothing to show passion, prejudice, or ignorance on the part of the jury.
(See 13 Cyc., 375-377.)
The right of action for death and the presumption in favor of compensation begin admitted,
the difficulty of estimating in money the worth of a life should not keep a court from judicially
compensating the injured party as nearly as may be possible for the wrong. True, man is
incapable of measuring exactly in the delicate scales of justice the value of a human life. True,
the feelings of a mother on seeing her little son torn and mangled expiring dead could
never be assuaged with money. True, all the treasure in nature's vaults could not being to
compensate a parent for the loss of a beloved child. Nevertheless, within the bounds of
human powers, the negligent should make reparation for the loss.
Attempts at approximation in money for death have been made. Many American statutes
have arbitrarily limited the amounts that could e recovered to five thousand dollars or ten
thousand dollars. The federal Courst have intimated that these statutory limits should only be
taken as a guide to the permissible amount of damages. (Cheatham vs. Red River Line [1893],
56 Fed., 248; The Oceanic [1894], 61 Fed., 338; Farmers' L. & t. co. vs.Toledo A.A. & N.M. Ry.
co. [1895], 67 Fed. 73.) In Louisiana, $2,500 & $3,000, $4,000, and $6,000 were allowed in the
respective cases for the death of a child. In Porto Rico, $1,000 and $1,500 has been allowed for
such a loss. In the Philippines, the rule has been in criminal cases to allow as a matter of course
P1,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased.
The foregoing is believed to be a fair statement of the pertinent general principles. Before
closing, notice should be taken of the leading decisions of the supreme court of Spain and the
supreme court of Porto Rico. The first is the decision of the supreme court of Spain of
December 14, 1894.
Eulogio Santa Maria died in Madrid in 1891, in consequence of a fall from the wall of the
racket known as "Jai-alai," which he was climbing for the purpose of placing the customary
flags to announce the opening of the game. The facts were investigated through criminal
proceedings which were discontinued, and then the widow of the deceased, in her own behalf
and on behalf of her infant daughter, Teodora, instituted a civil action in the proper court,
alleging that "the cause of the fatal accident resided in the fault and omission of the owners of
the racket, because, as they knew and saw, neither the place for the raising of the flags nor the
road that had to be gone over to reach it were in a condition to insure safety;" that at his
death her husband had left two children, one named Anastasio, of 14 years, had by his first
marriage, and another named Teodora, of 3 years had by his second marriage with the
plaintiff; that the damages caused and for which the defendants should be held responsible
were of a twofold character that is, one having reference to affection and the other to the
loss of the modest pay which, capitalized at 5 per cent and added to the sum demandable for
the first mentioned consideration, amounted to 21,425 pesetas. The defendants alleged that
the death of the plaintiff's husband could not be ascribed to any fault, omission, or negligence
on their part, etc., and prayed that the complaint be dismissed. After hearing the case the
court rendered judgment condemning the defendants to pay the sum of 5,000 pesetas to the
heirs of the ceased as indemnification for the latter's death. An appeal from said judgment
having been taken by the plaintiff, the defendants joined in said appeal and the "Audiencia
territorial," in deciding the case, adjudged the defendants to pay the plaintiff in her own right
and as representative of her daughter, Teodora, 5,000 pesetas, as indemnification for the
death of her husband, affirming in these terms, the judgment appealed form, and reserving to
the other child of the deceased, who was not a party in this case, his right likewise to demand
indemnification. The defendants then took an appeal for annulment of judgment to the
supreme court, alleging that various laws had been violated and, among other particulars, that
the judgment did not state the amount at which the court valued the life of Santa Maria nor
was anything allowed the plaintiffs on the score of affection or for damages, nor was the
principle mentioned upon which the court had acted to fix the sum of 5,000pesetas.
The supreme court of Spain affirmed the judgment appealed from in its opinion of December
14, 1894, the grounds whereof are the following:
As to the ground the court had for concluding, in view of the evidence, that the death of
the unfortunate Eulogio Santa Maria was due to the omission on the part of the
appellants, owners, and managers of the racket (ball game) known as "Jai-Alai," of such
precautions as were called for to forestall the dangers attending the placing and
removal of the streamers, which the deceased had been doing with their knowledge and
consent, and for their benefit, we find that said court has correctly applied articles 1093,
1902, and 1903, and that it has not violated articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the Civil
Code, because, according to the first-mentioned article, obligations arising from acts or
omissions, in which faults or negligence, not punished by law, occur, are subject to the
provisions of said articles 1902 and 1903, and, according to the latter, indemnification
for the damage done lies whenever the act or omission has been the cause of the
damage and all the diligence of a good father of a family has not been observed, either
when the act or omission is personal with the party, or when it has reference to persons
for whom he should be responsible; and because the provisions of articles 1101, 1103,
and 1104 are of a general character and applicable to all kinds of obligations and do not
come in conflict with the special provisions of articles 1902 and 1903;
The indemnification corresponding to the damage caused by a guilty act or omission,
not constituting a crime, should be declared, as are all indemnifications, in every suit, in
accordance with the particular damage caused to the claimants, and as in the judgment
this has been done with respect to Juana Alonzo Celada and her daughter, the only
plaintiffs, by fixing the sum due them, said judgment does not violate article 1902 of the
code, and much less does it violate article 360 of the Law of Civil Procedure;
The amount of the indemnification adjudged is based on the evidence taken and on the
facts admitted by both parties in their pleadings at the trial, wherefore there has been
no violation of article 1214, though lack of proof, as alleged.
As has heretofore been intimated, the Civil Las in Porto Rico, derived from the same source as
that of the Philippines, can well be looked to for persuasive authority. Thus, as disclosed by the
facts in the decision coming from the pen of Justice Del Toro, one Diaz brought a suit against
the San Juan Light & Transit Co. to recover the sum of $6,000 as damages. The district court of
San Juan rendered judgment declaring that the facts and the law were in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant, and decreeing that the former should obtain from the latter the
sum of $3,000 as damages. The supreme court of Porto Rico said the issue was, that inasmuch
as plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence of the amount of damage sustained, judgment
should not be rendered in this form. After setting forth the decision of the supreme court of
Spain of December 14, 1894, hereinbefore described, and other authorities, the court said:
Applying the foregoing principles and those contained in section 1804 of the Revised
Civil Code to the specific case under consideration, we find that in the complaint it is
alleged that the complainant sustained damages which he estimates of $6,000, and that
the immediate and natural cause of said damages was the careless act of one of the
employees of the defendant, who was in its service and while in the discharge of his
duties.
The evidence taken does not show that the complainant failed to earn, as a result of the
injuries received, a stated sum of money, or that he had to pay the physician who
attended him another stated sum, etc.; but it does show that the complainant, a man of
51 years of age, who worked as a farmer and hawked about his products, supporting
himself and his family with his labor, while stepping out of one of the electric cars of the
defendant, at Stop 71/2 of the San Juan-Rio Piedras line, fell to the ground owing to the
carelessness and inattention of the motorman in starting the car before it was time; that
he received a severe blow which rendered him unconscious for some moments,
fractured his lower jaw, and caused abrasions on his legs and other parts of his body;
that he remained at the hospital, having his injuries nursed, for more or less one month,
and that, on being examined at the trial-that is, one year and five months after his fall-
he presented on the right side of his face, as a consequence of the fracture, a
contraction which means paralysis, and could speak, but hardly masticate, and only with
difficulty could open and close his mouth. It does not appear from the evidence that he
complainant has been disabled, but it does appear that at the time the evidence was
taken he was suffering from nervous illness, according to the opinion of Dr. Stahl, one of
the experts who testified at the trial.
Under these circumstances the judge, in accordance with the law and jurisprudence,
had to estimate for himself the damage caused and determine the amount of
indemnification which the defendant should pay the complainant. And is so doing the
curt did not commit the errors attributed to it by the appellant.
The question in the present case is not one of punitive or exemplary damages, but of
compensation for damages sustained. In order to allow such compensation it is not
necessary that the complainant should prove his loss in terms of dollars and cents, it
being sufficient, in cases of this nature to prove that the plaintiff, through the fault or
negligence of the defendant and not through his own fault and negligence, had
sustained a real damage, consisting of physical pains, loss of work, confinement in a
hospital, mental suffering, etc.
The indemnification in this case was fixed by the lower court of $2,000, and although it
could perhaps have been calculated at less, we do not find that it is immoderately
inadequate, and this being so we should not alter it. (Diaz vs. San Juan Light & Transit
co., supra.)
In another case, that of Gonzalez vs. The San Juan Light & Transit co. [1911], Porto Rico, 115)
recovery for damages was not permitted. In the latter case, it was said:
This is an appeal from the first section of the district court of San Juan seeking to reverse
a judgment therein rendered on December 1, 1909, in favor of the defendant. This suit
was initiated in the district court of San Juan through a complaint presented by Ramon
Gonzalez Soto, alleging therein that the defendant company, the San Juan Light and
Transit Co., had negligently caused the death of Juan Cordova Soto, son of the plaintiff,
in the ward of Santurce, between stops 21 and 22, on the trolley line of defendant,
about December 2, 1904, the father of the deceased not appearing also as a
complainant on account of his death having occurred after that of his son but previous
to the filing of the complaint.
We have stated said first ground alleged for reversal in the form in which it has been
expressed by counsel for the defendant; but possibly it might also have been set forth
more clearly as follows: "Even supposing that the plaintiff had shown that the death of
her son had been caused through the negligence of the defendant company, could
damages be awarded her without showing by proof their existence and the amount
thereof?"
Our Civil Code now in force, in section 1803, reads as follows:
A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another, when there is
fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
So that the claim of the plaintiff herein is sustained by this precept of the law which
establishes her right to be indemnified by the defendant for the damage caused her on
account of the death of her son, if said death was brought about by any act or omission
of said company, through its fault or negligence.
This is our substantive law in the matter of damages and it is in accordance with its
provisions, as interpreted by the ruling jurisprudence, that courts should decide
questions submitted to them for decision, and therefore the plaintiff is entitled, in cases
where there may exist fault or negligence on the part of the defendant company, to
recover from the defendant company the damages that may have been actually caused
to her, whatever they may be.
x x x x x x x x x
As may be seen, this jurisprudence (of Spain) is in accordance with the legal precept of
the code that only those damages actually caused may be awarded, and, therefore, to
enable the court to decide what damages have been caused, it is necessary to prove the
real existence of the damages and the corresponding facts from which the court can
deduce the amount thereof.
Of course, the plaintiff makes a claim only for herself for pecuniary loss sustained by her
on account of the death of her son, and the boy himself does not make any claim
because he did not live to do so; hence the mother would never have been entitled to
any other damages than those arising out of the loss of the services of her son, and
never to those damages which he himself might have been entitled to claim had he not
died, or arising from the injuries that he himself might have suffered on account of the
accident. The damages which would give the plaintiff in this case a right to recovery
against the defendant are only the loss of support, or contributions thereto, which the
son was accustomed to make to his mother from his earnings and of which she may
have been deprived by his death. But does the evidence introduced by the plaintiff
support her claim to recover such damages? We are of the opinion that it does not,
because she has not proven that her son was really earning the amount alleged in the
complaint, nor any other sum whatever, no alleged in the complaint, nor any other sum
whatever, nor alleged in the complaint, nor any other sum whatever, no how much
money he was earning by his work either in Arecibo or in San Juan during the days
immediately preceding his death or at any time. And we are of the opinion that this is a
necessary requisite, because, as the Civil Code declares that recovery may be had for
the damage caused, the damages accruing to the plaintiff must be shown so that the
trial judge may have data on which to base his decision.
In this action no evidence whatever has been produced in this respect. The only fact
proven in regard to this point is that Juan Cordova Soto was killed by a collision with the
trolley car; that he was earning something when he was previously in Arecibo. It is not
shown what occupation he had, nor how much money he earned while he was there
nor while he was in San Juan, nor is it shown that his mother derived any benefit from
his wages; and from this evidence the court cannot consider as proven he amount of the
damages, nor even their existence. It has not been show that the death of her son
caused any material or pecuniary damages to his mother, the plaintiff herein, nor the
amount thereof.
Therefore, an essential requisite for a judgment against the defendant company is
lacking, and even supposing that she had an action for damages through negligence of
the company in the death of the boy, we could not find a judgment against the
defendant company, for lack of evidence in regard to the existence of the pecuniary
damages sustained and facts from which to infer the amount thereof. Therefore, the
defendant's motion for a judgment in its favor on this first ground was properly
sustained.
As will be readily perceived, having dug out the applicable authorities, and having set them
before us, our task still is far from complete. On the one hand, the obvious conclusion would
be that, inasmuch as plaintiff has failed to prove her pecuniary loss, she cannot recover, or, for
the same reason, to return the case to the lower court for further evidence. This is the obvious
way. To one trained in the Common Law, and inculcated with all the doctrines of the American
law of damages, it is the logical way. Is it the just and natural way?
The first reply would be that the civil law authorities are, like the common law cases, against
recovery without proof of loss. If necessary, however, the three decisions just described, could
be differentiated from the present facts. The decision of the supreme court of Spain, it is to be
remembered, involved an action for the death of a man of mature years. The first decision of
the supreme court of Porto Rico recognizes the principle of presumptive recovery. The second
decision of the supreme court of recovery. The second decision of the supreme court of Porto
Rico concerned an action for the death of a son of sufficient age to have an earning capacity.
None of these is our case. Here present is the case of a young child, whose death is caused by
wrongful act, leaving a poor mother to be the loser.
To answer in a different way, let us make a comparison. The facts before us, and the facts
before the supreme court of Illinois in analogous cases, are substantially identical. We have
proof of the age of the deceased, proof of the name of the next of kin, and proof that the
mother is a laboring woman. Under both the Common Law and the Civil Law, plaintiff's
damage, broadly speaking, is for the loss of the services of the deceased, or for support by the
deceased. Plaintiff having shown that the deceased was her son and that he was 8 or 9 years
of age at the time of death, it was neither necessary nor possible to prove loss of services or
support, or to prove special damage as if the object of the loss had been a horse or other
animal. No doubt the damage could be greatly enhanced by showing the personal
characteristics of the deceased. Outside of this, however, the pecuniary loss may be estimated
from the facts at hand with reference to the general knowledge which all possess.
To force the plaintiff to prove her loss exactly would be to ask the impossible would be in
effect to return to the old common law rule which prohibits a recovery. Physical and gross
criteria, as the hewing of wood and carrying of water, are indeed no standards at all. Even if
the case was to be reopened, the plaintiff could with extreme difficulty present any better
evidence than that now before us. As we have the basis of satisfactory facts from which to
infer the amount of damage, as the law presumes a pecuniary loss because of the death, and
as the trial judge has made an intelligent computation, we should rest here, with knowledge
that, within the ken of human wisdom, justice has been done.
On a careful consideration of the entire field of the law on the subject of damages, we come to
the conclusion that the amount, in the nature of an indemnity allowed by the trial court, is
neither excessive nor immoderately inadequate, and should stand.
Judgment, therefore, should be affirmed.














G.R. No. L-25499 February 18, 1970
VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD A. QUINTOS, PRIMA A. QUINTOS, AND JULITA A.
QUINTOS,respondents.
Laurea and Pison for petitioner.
Bonifacio M. Abad, Jr. for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., seeks the review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The basic facts are set forth
in said decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote:
At about 1:30 in the morning of March 17, 1960, an Izuzu First Class passenger
bus owned and operated by the defendant, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan
and driven by Laureano Casim, left Lingayen, Pangasinan, for Manila. Among its
paying passengers was the deceased, Policronio Quintos, Jr. who sat on the first
seat, second row, right side of the bus. At about 4:55 o'clock a.m. when the
vehicle was nearing the northern approach of the Sadsaran Bridge on the national
highway in barrio Sto. Domingo, municipality of Minalin, Pampanga, it frontally hit
the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. As a result the end of a bamboo pole
placed on top of the hayload and tied to the cart to hold it in place, hit the right
side of the windshield of the bus. The protruding end of the bamboo pole, about 8
feet long from the rear of the bullcart, penetrated through the glass windshield
and landed on the face of Policronio Quintos, Jr. who, because of the impact, fell
from his seat and was sprawled on the floor. The pole landed on his left eye and
the bone of the left side of his face was fractured. He suffered other multiple
wounds and was rendered unconscious due, among other causes to severe
cerebral concussion. A La Mallorca passenger bus going in the opposite direction
towards San Fernando, Pampanga, reached the scene of the mishap and it was
stopped by Patrolman Felino Bacani of the municipal police force of Minalin who,
in the meantime, had gone to the scene to investigate. Patrolman Bacani placed
Policronio Quintos, Jr. and three other injured men who rode on the bullcart
aboard the La Mallorca bus and brought them to the provincial hospital of
Pampanga at San Fernando for medical assistance. Notwithstanding such
assistance, Policronio Quintos, Jr. died at 3:15 p.m. on the same day, March 17,
1960, due to traumatic shock due to cerebral injuries.
The private respondents, Trinidad, Prima and Julita, all surnamed Quintos, are the sisters and
only surviving heirs of Policronio Quintos Jr., who died single, leaving no descendants nor
ascendants. Said respondents herein brought this action against herein petitioner, Villa Rey
Transit, Inc., as owner and operator of said passenger bus, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-
Bulacan, for breach of the contract of carriage between said petitioner and the deceased
Policronio Quintos, Jr., to recover the aggregate sum of P63,750.00 as damages, including
attorney's fees. Said petitioner defendant in the court of first instance contended that
the mishap was due to a fortuitous event, but this pretense was rejected by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, both of which found that the accident and the death of Policronio had
been due to the negligence of the bus driver, for whom petitioner was liable under its contract
of carriage with the deceased. In the language of His Honor, the trial Judge:
The mishap was not the result of any unforeseeable fortuitous event or
emergency but was the direct result of the negligence of the driver of the
defendant. The defendant must, therefore, respond for damages resulting from
its breach of contract for carriage. As the complaint alleged a total damage of only
P63,750.00 although as elsewhere shown in this decision the damages for wake
and burial expenses, loss of income, death of the victim, and attorneys fee reach
the aggregate of P79,615.95, this Court finds it just that said damages be assessed
at total of only P63,750.00 as prayed for in plaintiffs' amended complaint.
The despositive part of the decision of the trial Court reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay to the
plaintiffs the amount of P63,750.00 as damages for breach of contract of carriage
resulting from the death of Policronio Quintos, Jr.
which, as above indicated, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the present petition
for review oncertiorari, filed by Villa Rey Transit, Inc.
The only issue raised in this appeal is the amount of damages recoverable by private
respondents herein. The determination of such amount depends, mainly upon two (2) factors,
namely: (1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed and (2)
the rate at which the losses sustained by said respondents should be fixed.
The first factor was based by the trial court the view of which was concurred in by the Court
of Appeals upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr., which was placed at 33-1/3
years he being over 29 years of age (or around 30 years for purposes of computation) at the
time of his demise by applying the formula (2/3 x [80-301 = life expectancy) adopted in the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the actuarial of Combined Experience Table of
Mortality. Upon the other hand, petitioner maintains that the lower courts had erred in
adopting said formula and in not acting in accordance with Alcantara v. Surro
1
in which the
damages were computed on a four (4) year basis, despite the fact that the victim therein was
39 years old, at the time of his death, and had a life expectancy of 28.90 years.
The case cited is not, however, controlling in the one at bar. In the Alcantara case, none of the
parties had questioned the propriety of the four-year basis adopted by the trial court in
making its award of damages. Both parties appealed, but only as regards the amount thereof.
The plaintiffs assailed the non-inclusion, in its computation, of the bonus that the corporation,
which was the victim's employer, had awarded to deserving officers and employees, based
upon the profits earned less than two (2) months before the accident that resulted in his
death. The defendants, in turn, objected to the sum awarded for the fourth year, which was
treble that of the previous years, based upon the increases given, in that fourth year,
to other employees of the same corporation. Neither this objection nor said claim for inclusion
of the bonus was sustained by this Court. Accordingly, the same had not thereby laid down
any rule on the length of time to be used in the computation of damages. On the contrary, it
declared:
The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased
person has therefore no fixed basis. Much is left to the discretion of the court
considering the moral and material damages involved, and so it has been said
that "(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human
life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical
calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the
beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor.' (25 C.J.S. 1241.) Other
factors that are usually considered are: (1) pecuniary loss to plaintiff or
beneficiary (25 C.J.S. 1243-1250) ; (2) loss of support (25 C.J.S., 1250-1251); (3)
loss of service (25 C.J.S. 1251-1254); (4) loss of society (25 C.J.S. 1254-1255); (5)
mental suffering of beneficiaries (25 C.J.S., 1258-1259) ; and (6) medical and
funeral expenses (26 C.J.S., 1254-1260)."
2

Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an important element in fixing the amount
recoverable by private respondents herein. Although it is not the sole element determinative
of said amount, no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in
the case at bar, of a purely arbitrary standard, such as a four-year rule. In short, the Court of
Appeals has not erred in basing the computation of petitioner's liability upon the life
expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr.
With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be computed, petitioner impugns the
decision appealed from upon the ground that the damages awarded therein will have to be
paid now, whereas most of those sought to be indemnified will be suffered years later. This
argument is basically true, and this is, perhaps, one of the reasons why the Alcantara case
points out the absence of a "fixed basis" for the ascertainment of the damages recoverable in
litigations like the one at bar. Just the same, the force of the said argument of petitioner
herein is offset by the fact that, although payment of the award in the case at bar will have to
take place upon the finality of the decision therein, the liability of petitioner herein had been
fixed at the rate only of P2,184.00 a year, which is the annual salary of Policronio Quintos, Jr.
at the time of his death, as a young "training assistant" in the Bacnotan Cement Industries, Inc.
In other words, unlike the Alcantara case, on which petitioner relies, the lower courts did not
consider, in the present case, Policronio's potentiality and capacity to increase his future
income. Indeed, upon the conclusion of his training period, he was supposed to have a better
job and be promoted from time to time, and, hence, to earn more, if not considering the
growing importance of trade, commerce and industry and the concomitant rise in the income
level of officers and employees
therein much more.
At this juncture, it should be noted, also, that We are mainly concerned with the
determination of the losses or damages sustained by the private respondents, as dependents
and intestate heirs of the deceased, and that said damages consist, not of the full amount of
his earnings, but of the support, they received or would have received from him had he not
died in consequence of the negligence of petitioner's agent. In fixing the amount of that
support, We must reckon with the "necessary expenses of his own living", which should be
deducted from his earnings. Thus, it has been consistently held that earning capacity, as an
element of damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning
capacity or his capacity to acquire money, "less the necessary expense for his own
living.
3
Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earning, but rather
the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received.
4
In other
words, only net earnings, not gross earning, are to be considered
5
that is, the total of the
earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income
6
and less living
and other incidental expenses.
7

All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to fix the deductible
living and other expenses of the deceased at the sum of P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a
month, and that, consequently, the loss sustained by his sisters may be roughly estimated at
P1,000.00 a year or P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his life expectancy. To this sum of
P33,333.33, the following should be added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 2206 of our Civil Code, as construed and applied
by this Court;
8
(b) P1,727.95, actually spent by private respondents for medical and burial
expenses; and (c) attorney's fee, which was fixed by the trial court, at P500.00, but which, in
view of the appeal taken by petitioner herein, first to the Court of Appeals and later to this
Supreme Court, should be increased to P2,500.00. In other words, the amount adjudged in the
decision appealed from should be reduced to the aggregate sum of P49,561.28, with interest
thereon, at the legal rate, from December 29, 1961, date of the promulgation of the decision
of the trial court.
Thus modified, said decision and that of the Court of Appeals are hereby affirmed, in all other
respects, with costs against petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc. It is so ordered.





















G.R. No. L-28512 February 28, 1973
PEDRO R. DAVILA and PRECIOSA C. TIRO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, defendant-appellant.
Dizon, De Guzman and Vitug and Pedro R. Davila for plaintiffs-appellants.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo, Belo and Ongsiako for defendant-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
In Civil Case No. 5728 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Pedro R. Davila and Preciosa C.
Tirol, plaintiffs, vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., defendant) judgment was rendered ordering the
defendant to pay the plaintiffs various sums of money, as follows:
(1) For the death of Pedro T. Davila, Jr. the amount of P6,000.00;
(2) For the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased at the rate of P12,000.00
per annum for five (5) years in the amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos. (P60,000.00);
(3) For moral damages in favor of the plaintiffs Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
(4) For exemplary damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
(5) For actual damages the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) broken
down to as follows: A rolex watch valued at P600.00; a pistol worth P300.00;
burial expenses P600.00; for the lot and the mausoleum P3,500.00;
(6) For Attorney's fees the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or a total
amount of One Hundred and One Thousand Pesos (P101,000.00)
To pay the costs of this proceedings.
Both parties appealed directly to this Court in view of the aggregate of the amounts awarded,
the judgment having been rendered before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 5440. In this appeal
the plaintiffs seek an increase in said amounts, and the defendant, complete exoneration
from, or at least mitigation of, liability.
The case arose from the tragic crash of a passenger plane of the defendant which took the
lives of all its crew and passengers. The plane, identified as PI-C133, was a DC-3 type of
aircraft, manufactured in 1942 and acquired by the defendant in 1948. It had flown almost
18,000 hours at the time of its ill-fated flight. Despite its age, however, it had been certified as
airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. On November 23, 1960, at 5:30 in the
afternoon, it took off from the Manduriao Airport, Iloilo, on its way to Manila, with 33 people
on board, including the plane's complement. It did not reach its destination, but crashed at
Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one hour and fifteen minutes after take-off. A massive search was
undertaken by the defendant and by other parties as soon as it was realized that the plane's
arrival in Manila was overdue. The plaintiffs, parents of Pedro T. Davila, Jr., who was one of
the passengers, had no definite news of what had happened to their son, getting what
information they could only from conflicting newspaper reports, until they received, on
December 19, 1960, a letter of condolence from the defendant's president Andres Soriano,
informing them that their son had died in the crash. And it was only on December 29 that his
body was recovered an taken back to Iloilo.
The issues before the trial court, and now before Us in this appeal, are whether or not the
defendant is liable for violation of its contract of carriage and if so, for how much. The
provisions of the Civil Code on this substantive question of liability are clear and explicit.
Article 1733 binds common carriers, "from the nature of their business and by reasons of
public policy, ... to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance ... for the safety of the
passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances of each case." Article 1755
establishes the standard of care required of a common carrier, which is, "to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." Article 1756 fixes the
burden of proof by providing that "in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." Lastly,
Article 1757 states that "the responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers ...
cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements
on tickets, or otherwise."
The route prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration for the flight of plane PI-C113 in
the afternoon of November 23, 1960 was Iloilo-Romblon-Manila, the latter stage,
denominated as airway "Amber I," being a straight lane from Romblon to Manila. The
prescribed elevation of the flight was 6,000 ft. The plane reported its position after take-off
and again when it was abeam the Roxas homer. However, it did not intercept airway "Amber I"
over Romblon as it was supposed to do, and the pilot did not give his position then although
Romblon was a compulsory checking point. The fact was that the plane had deviated from the
prescribed route by 32 miles to the west when it crashed at Mt. Baco. The reading of the
altimeter of the plane when its wreckage was found was 6,800 ft.
There is a suggestion that in the course of the flight between Romblon and Mindoro the
aircraft was drifted westward by the cross-winds then blowing in the region. The defendant,
however, has not given a definite explanation as to why, if such was the case, the pilot failed
to make the necessary correction in his flight to compensate for the drift. According to the
defendant's witness, Maj. Mijares, Chief of the Aviation Safety Division of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration and Chairman of the CAA Investigating Committee, there was a navigational
error, to which several factors contributed: "the weather observation at that time from the
Weather Bureau was not so good between Mt. Baco and Romblon and the wind aloft was
quite strong, which would be also one of the causes for the drifting of the aircraft; and the
other strong probability, I would say, would be the malfunction of the aircraft's navigational
instrument." He further explained that "a cross-wind can drift the plane if the pilot will not
make the necessary correction, if his navigational instrument is malfunctioning and the visual
reference outside the aircraft could not make the necessary corrections."
There is nothing in the testimony of Maj. Mijares to show just how strong the cross-winds
were in the region at the time, although in the investigation of the accident by the Senate
Committee on transportation there was testimony that the cross-winds had a velocity of either
20 to 25 knots or 25 to 35 knots an hour. Considering the relatively short distance from
Romblon to Mt. Baco and the brief span of time it would take to fly that distance, cross-winds
with the velocity stated could not have possibly deviated the plane by as much as 32 miles.
The defendant points out that the navigational instrument on board the plane consisted of
two (2) sets of automatic direction finders (ADF) which, when found after the crash, showed a
reading that the aircraft was heading north, which was the proper flight direction. This point,
however, is of no vital significance in this case since it does not explain why the aircraft was 32
miles off its prescribed route in the first place. It is suggested that the pilot did not notice the
drift of his plane because of poor visibility due to thick clouds, which prevented him from
making the corresponding correction on the basis of visual references to the terrain outside.
But according to Maj. Mijares himself the report from the Weather Bureau at the time showed
that visibility was 15 miles between Romblon and Mt. Baco and that the clouds from 2,700 to
7,000 ft. elevation were "scattered." And the profile of the probable weather cross-section
along airway "Amber I" during the flight (Exh. 33-A) shows that at 6,000 ft. the airlane was
clear and free of clouds. The suggestion therefore that the pilot was practically flying blind and
consequently failed to notice the drift of the aircraft is not justified by the evidence. Indeed
even the investigating team of the defendant under the chairmanship of Capt. Jaime Manzano
concluded in its report that "based on the limited evidences available, the board is of the
opinion that the probable cause was the inability of the pilot to intersect airway "Amber I"
over Romblon and to maintain track within its designated airway lane for reasons unknown."
What is undisputed therefore is that the pilot did not follow the route prescribed for his flight,
at least between Romblon and Manila. Since up to that point over Romblon, where he was
supposed to intersect airway "Amber I" the weather was clear, the most reasonable
conclusion is that his failure to do so was intentional, and that he probably wanted to fly on a
straight line to Manila. It was a violation of air-craft traffic rules to which, under the
circumstances, the accident may be directly attributable.
In any case, absent a satisfactory explanation on the part of the defendant as to how and why
the accident occurred, the presumption is that it was at fault, under Article 1756 of the Civil
Code.
The next question relates to the amount of damages that should be awarded to the plaintiffs,
parents of the deceased. The trial court fixed the indemnity for his death in the amount of
P6,000.00. Pursuant to current jurisprudence on the point it should be increased to
P12,000.00.
1

The deceased was employed as manager of a radio station
2
, from which he was earning
P8,400.00 a year, consisting of a monthly salary of P600.00 and allowance of P100.00. As a
lawyer and junior partner of his father in the law office, he had an annual income of P3,600.00.
From farming he was getting an average of P3,000.00. All in all therefore the deceased had
gross earnings of P15,000.00 a year.
According to Article 2206, paragraph (1), of the Civil Code, "the defendant shall be liable for
the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased and indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter." This Article, while referring to "damages for death caused by crime or quasi-delict," is
expressly made applicable by Article 1764 "to the death of a passenger caused by the breach
of contract by a common carrier."
The deceased, Pedro Davila, Jr., was single and 30 years of age when he died. At that age one's
normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years, according to the formula (2/3 x [80-30]) adopted by this
Court in the case of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
3
on the basis of the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality.
However, although the deceased was in relatively good health, his medical history shows that
he had complained of and been treated for such ailments as backaches, chest pains and
occasional feelings of tiredness. It is reasonable to make an allowance for these circumstances
and consider, for purposes of this case, a reduction of his life expectancy to 25 years.
In the same case of Villa Revenue Transit this Court stated:
"... earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is
necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, less the necessary
expense for his own living. Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire
earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have
received. In other words, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered, that is,
the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income
and less living and other incidental expenses."
Considering the fact that the deceased was getting his income from three (3) different sources,
namely from managing a radio station, from law practice and from farming, the expenses
incidental to the generation of such income were necessarily more than if he had only one
source. Together with his living expenses, a deduction of P600.00 a month, or P7,200.00 a
year, seems to Us reasonable, leaving a net yearly income of P7,800.00. This amount,
multiplied by 25 years, or P195,000.00 is the amount which should be awarded to the plaintiffs
in this particular respect.
Actual losses sustained consist of the following, as found by the trial court: "Rolex Watch
P600.00; pistol P300.00; Burial Expenses P600.00; and cost of cemetery lot and
mausoleum - P3,500.00."
Under Article 2206, in relation to Article 1764, of the Civil Code, the parents of the deceased
are entitled to moral damages for their mental anguish. The trial court awarded P10,000.00 in
this concept, and We find no justification to change the award, considering the long period of
uncertainty and suffering the plaintiffs underwent from November 23, when the plane crash
occurred, to December 19, when they received a letter from the defendant's president
confirming the death of their son, and again to the following December 29, when his body was
finally recovered and taken back to them.
With respect to the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, it is Our opinion that the
same should be eliminated. According to Article 2232 of the Civil Code, in contracts and quasi-
contracts the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. The failure of the defendant here to
exercise extraordinary diligence, as required by law, does not amount to anyone of the
circumstances contemplated in the said provision.
The trial court has awarded attorney's fees of P10,000.00. We do not find this award
groundless or the amount thereof unreasonable.
The total of the different items above enumerated is P232,000.00. The judgment of the court a
quo is therefore modified accordingly and the defendant is ordered to pay the said amount to
the plaintiffs, with legal interest thereon from the finality of this judgment. With costs against
the defendant.






G.R. No. 164266 July 23, 2008
NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR y DE LEON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Nover Bryan Salvador y De Leon, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision
1
dated February
26, 2004 which affirmed the Regional Trial Court
2
(RTC) Decision
3
dated October 26, 2001.
Likewise assailed is the appellate courts Resolution
4
dated July 6, 2004 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:
Spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga had three daughters, namely: Marianne, Mary Ann and
the victim Arlene. Mary Ann was married to the petitioner herein. The Zuiga family, including
Mary Ann and the petitioner were living together at 550 Coloong I, Valenzuela City. Their
residence had three bedrooms one for the Zuiga spouses; the other for Marianne and
Arlene; and the last for Mary Ann and the petitioner.
On September 20, 1997, the Zuiga spouses, together with Marianne, went to Bulacan to
attend the wake of Ernestos mother; while Mary Ann with her new born child, and Arlene,
stayed at their Valenzuela home. Petitioner, at that time, asked permission to attend a
birthday party.
5

At about 9:00 in the evening, petitioner, accompanied by Eduardo Palomares, returned home
to get some karaoke tapes to be used at the birthday party. They thereafter went back to the
party and stayed there until 12 midnight before heading back home.
At 4:30 in the morning, the following day, the Zuiga spouses and Marianne arrived home.
They opened the main door which was then locked. After preparing for sleep, Marianne
proceeded to the room which she was sharing with Arlene. There she saw Arlene, who
suffered stab wounds, already dead. After seeing Arlenes body, the Zuiga spouses rushed to
the room of Mary Ann and the petitioner. While Mary Ann proceeded to Arlenes room,
petitioner stayed at the sala and cried. He was later seen embracing Mary Ann and telling her
that he was innocent.
6

At around 5:00 in the morning, police investigators arrived. The police found no forcible entry
into the house; no valuables were missing; and no bloodstains in other parts of the house
except Arlenes room. They likewise discovered, on top of the kitchen table, petitioners
underwear (briefs), gray t-shirt and short pants.
7
They further found hair strands on Arlenes
bed. These pieces of evidence were brought to the laboratory for examination.
On September 21, 1997, Dr. Noel Minay (Dr. Minay), a medico-legal of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) conducted an autopsy of the deceased.
8
He found that Arlene suffered 21
stab wounds produced by a pointed instrument, one side of which was sharp like a balisong or
a kitchen knife. He further declared the possibility that Arlene struggled with the assailant
before she died.
9

The NBI Forensic Biologist also examined petitioners briefs, t-shirt and short pants, and found
that the briefs and shirt were positive of type "O" human blood, Arlenes blood type.
10
The NBI
Forensic Chemist, subsequently, conducted DNA Analysis on the following specimens:
1. One (1) dirty white Hanford brief[s];
2. One (1) light gray t-shirt with DKNY print infront;
3. Several strands of hair allegedly recovered in the bedroom of [the] victim;
4. Buccal swabs taken from the following:
a. ERNESTO ZUIGA (victims father)
b. MARGARITA ZUIGA (victims mother)
c. NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR (suspect)
11

The examination of specimen no. 1 yielded a negative result for the presence of human DNA;
while specimen nos. 2, 3, and 4 a-c, yielded positive results.
12

Petitioner was thus charged with Homicide in an Information dated April 8, 1998, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1997, in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any
justifiable cause and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault and stab one ARLENE ZUIGA, hitting on the different parts of her body,
which led to the death of said Arlene Zuiga.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
13

The aforementioned facts were established during the prosecutions presentation of evidence.
It was further testified to by the witnesses that petitioner owned a knife otherwise known as
balisong, which he usually brought every time he went out. Ill motive was shown by
petitioners previous act of peeping through the bathroom and Arlenes room on two
occasions while she was taking a bath and while she was inside the room with Marianne.
For his part, all that the petitioner could offer was bare denial of the accusations against him.
On October 26, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision finding the petitioner guilty of homicide.
The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR y DE
LEON guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as principal of the crime of homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, without any attending mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences
him to an indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The accused is further sentence (sic) to indemnify Spouses
Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of Arlene Zuiga and
another amount ofP50,000.00 as moral damages, both without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. The accused is further sentenced to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
14

The RTC considered the following circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish petitioners
guilt:
(1) The perpetrator did not use any force or destroy any portion of the house to get
inside the house. This implies that the perpetrator is an occupant of the house. The
accused was, during the time material to this case, residing with his in-laws. The
allegation of the accused that the main door of the house was open when he returned
to get the tape is difficult to believe. It is unthinkable that the remaining occupants of
the house, namely, Arlene and Mary Ann, who are both female, would not take the
necessary precaution for their own protection such as locking the door of the house. It is
as difficult to suppose that the perpetrator of the crime would go to the house where
his intended victim was sleeping without being sure that he could gain entry to the
house or have the necessary instruments to open the door.
(2) There were no personal belongings missing in the house. This shows that the person
who entered the room of the victim had no intention to steal. This fact can better be
appreciated if we consider the evidence that the accused was caught many times
peeping at Arlene during her lifetime; and that [bloodstains] were found not in the short
pants of the accused but in his Hanford brief and T-shirt.
(3) The absence of [bloodstains] or spots in any other part of the house except the room
of the victim. This indicates that the assailant must have cleaned the traces of blood
inside the house. The facility and time to clean the area is more available to an assailant
who was an occupant of the house or a member of the household.
(4) Prior to and up to the date of the commission of the crime on September 20 or 21,
1997[,] the accused was seen by his parents-in-law Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga and
her sister-in-law Marianne and his friend Dondy Hiponia in many occasions to have in
*his+ possession a balisong" or "beinte (sic) nueve." A "balisong" or "beinte (sic) nueve"
is the tagalong name for a knife with folding blade. There is no reason for the Court to
doubt the testimonies of said witnesses. Being close relatives and friend of the
accused[,] they have no motive to fabricate a story against the accused or to implicate
him to the commission of the crime charged. The claim of the accused that his father-in-
law Ernesto Zuiga is trying to implicate him [for] the killing of Arlene because his
father-in-law disapproved his marrying Mary Ann, and that he accompanied his mother-
in-law to the house of the mistress of his father-in-law is not supported by the facts of
the case. The accused was allowed to stay in the house of the Zuigas, an indication that
he was acceptable to the family. The alleged mistress of Ernesto was not shown to exist,
nor her supposed address revealed by the accused. The disappearance of said bladed
weapon and the denial by the accused that he ever owned the same are intriguing
because, according to expert testimony, the stab wounds sustained by the victim were
produced by a pointed instrument one side of which is sharp like a "balisong" or "beinte
(sic) nueve."
(5) The presence of human blood with type "O" in the t-shirt and brief of the accused,
the finding that the blood type of the victim belongs to groupd (sic) "O," and the
circumstance that the accused had suffered no scratches or wound from which to come
blood to stain his T-shirt and brief are revealing and could only lead to the conclusion
that the victim was the source of the blood found in the T-shirt and brief of the accused.
(6) The conclusion arrived at by Magsipoc that the DNA Profile of the [bloodstain] in the
light gray t-shirt and the DNA Profile on the hair strands could come from the accused
and the victim.
(7) The unusual behavior of the accused after the discovery of the dead body of Arlene
betrayed the accused. Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga testified that soon after the
discovery of the death of Arlene[,] they immediately went to the room of the accused
and his wife Mary Ann; that it took Margarita a hard time to awaken the accused; and
that upon being awakened, the accused did not get (sic) inside the room where Arlene
was and instead stayed and cried in the sala telling his wife that he was innocent even if
nobody yet at that time was pointing to him as the suspect. The actuation of the
accused then was that of a perpetrator of the crime with troubled conscience.
15

On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioners conviction.
16
Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE MOST CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION IS THE RESULT
OF THE DNA ANALYSIS CONDUCTED BY THE NBI FORENSIC CHEMIST.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN
IT RULED THAT BY MEANS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IT WAS PROVEN AND
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS THE ONE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF ARLENE ZUIGA.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
17

The petition lacks merit.
Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that
evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established
by inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct
testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the
community.
18

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if the following requisites are complied with:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
19

All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided that the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
20

In the present case, both the trial and appellate courts considered these pieces of evidence in
finding petitioners guilt: 1) the non-employment of force in entering the scene of the crime; 2)
no missing personal belongings; 3) the absence of bloodstains in other parts of the house
except Arlenes room; 4) petitioners ownership of a balisong, the same weapon used in
stabbing the victim; 5) the presence of type "O" human blood on petitioners T-shirt and
briefs; 6) the positive result of the DNA analysis using the bloodstains found in petitioners
shirt and briefs; and 7) petitioners unusual behavior after the discovery of the victims lifeless
body.
21

In his appeal before the CA and likewise in this present petition, petitioner questions the
sufficiency of each and every circumstance enumerated above. He specifically points out the
inconsistent findings of the NBI Forensic Chemist and those of the NBI Forensic Biologist.
22
As
to the circumstance that there was no forcible entry to the house, he insists that the main
door was not locked; and he, in fact, faults Arlene for not locking the door to her
bedroom.
23
Petitioner adds that the connection between the alleged "peeping incident" and
intent to kill was so remote; and thus insufficient to convict him.
24
He also persuades this
Court to give credence to his testimony that he owned a samurai (double-bladed knife) and
not a balisong (single-bladed) which thus negates his authorship of the crime, since it would be
contrary to the medico-legals findings that the weapon used was an instrument one side of
which was sharp.
25
Petitioner further asserts that the absence of scratches, wounds and
bruises on his body were more consistent with his innocence rather than his guilt, if we follow
the courts conclusion that Arlene had a chance to struggle with him prior to his
death.
26
Lastly, petitioner claims that if we were to believe the prosecutions version, it would
be hard to imagine that Mary Ann (petitioners wife), who was then in the other room, was
not awakened.
27

Prior to the fateful night when Arlenes lifeless body was discovered, several witnesses saw
petitioner in possession of a balisong. The NBI autopsy report, in turn, stated that the wounds
sustained by Arlene were inflicted with the use of a weapon only one side of which was sharp
(such as a balisong). After the discovery of the crime, the balisong was nowhere to be found.
Hence, the trial court was correct in its conclusion that the balisong previously seen in
petitioners possession was the very weapon used in stabbing the victim. While petitioner
admitted owning a different kind of weapon, he failed to produce it in court. As such, it
remained a self-serving allegation that cannot be considered to exonerate him from liability.
As to petitioners shirt and briefs, as correctly held by the trial court (and as affirmed by the
appellate court), they were found to be stained with type "O" blood (the victims blood type).
Instead of questioning the absence of proof that he was not of the same blood type as the
victim, petitioner should have presented evidence that he indeed has type "O" blood. The fact
remains that petitioner offered no explanation why his shirt and briefs contained bloodstains.
It is, therefore, correct to conclude that they were stained with the victims blood.
Moreover, the absence of scratches and bruises on petitioners body parts does not negate
the trial courts conclusion that the victim had the chance to struggle with the petitioner. This
is so because, at the time the petitioner attacked the victim between 1:00 and 4:00 in the
morning, she was most likely asleep and was only awakened by the petitioner; she was,
therefore, not in a position to offer strong resistance. This explains why such struggle
produced no bruises and scratches.
The presence of petitioners wife inside the house at that time does not likewise negate the
commission of the crime. Considering that his wife was a nursing mother who definitely had
sleepless nights, she could not be expected to be conscious of everything that happened
outside her room.
More importantly, intent to kill was duly established by the witnesses when they testified
relative to the "peeping incident." Although there was no evidence or allegation of sexual
advances, such incident manifested petitioners evil motive. It is a rule in criminal law that
motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or
statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds
or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be
inferred.
28
Motive and intent may be considered one and the same, in some instances, as in
the present case.
Lastly, the DNA analysis made by the NBI expert placed the petitioner at the scene of the
crime.1avvphi1 Such evidence was considered, together with the other circumstances
discussed earlier. The individual pieces of evidence may not be sufficient to point to the
accused as the author of the crime. However, when taken together, they are more than
enough to establish beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner committed the crime of
homicide. We would like to emphasize at this point that the peculiarity of circumstantial
evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one
particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which, when put together, reveals a
remarkable picture pointing towards the conclusion that the accused is the author of the
crime.
29

The prosecutions evidence, especially the testimonies of the witnesses who happen to be the
victims relatives, was not weakened by the fact of such relationship. The Court notes that
petitioner himself is a relative of the witnesses, albeit by affinity, being the husband of the
victims sister. It is unnatural for a relative, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to
accuse somebody else other than the real culprit. For her/him to do so is to let the guilty go
free.
30
Where there is nothing to indicate that witnesses were actuated by improper motives
on the witness stand, their positive declarations made under solemn oath deserve full faith
and credence.
31

We also reiterate the well-settled rule that this Court accords great weight and a high degree
of respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, as in the
present case. Here, the RTC was unequivocally upheld by the CA, which was clothed with the
power to review whether the trial courts conclusions were in accord with the facts and the
relevant laws.
32
The credibility given by the trial courts to prosecution witnesses is an
important aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on, because of the trial courts
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by counsels.
33

In view of the foregoing, petitioner was correctly convicted of homicide punishable by
reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty, absent any modifying circumstances, shall be taken from the full range
of prision mayor and the maximum of which shall be taken from the medium period of
reclusion temporal.
34
Specifically, the indeterminate penalty that should be imposed is within
the range of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum; to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Hence, a
modification of the penalty imposed by the trial court is in order. Instead of 8 years, 8 months
and 1 day, the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor;
35
while the maximum term shall be that imposed by the trial court.
An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review. It then becomes
the duty of this Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether or not included
in the assignment of errors.
36

We affirm the award of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delicto to the Zuiga spouses.
When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to such
amount as indemnity for death without need of any evidence or proof of damages.
37
The court
likewise correctly awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages because of their mental anguish and
moral suffering caused by Arlenes death.
The trial and appellate courts did not award actual damages, obviously because the victims
heirs failed to present proof of the expenses they incurred. However, it has been repeatedly
held by this Court that where the amount of actual damages cannot be determined because of
the absence of receipts to prove the same, temperate damages may be fixed at P25,000.00.
38

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated February 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26048 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Petitioner Nover Bryan Salvador y De Leon is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In addition to civil
indemnity and moral damages, petitioner is ordered to pay spouses Ernesto and Margarita
Zuiga the sum of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.





















G.R. No. 156302 April 7, 2009
THE HEIRS OF GEORGE Y. POE, Petitioners,
vs.
MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Review under Rule 45
1
of the Rules of Court assails the Decision
2
dated
26 June 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67297, which granted the Petition for
Certiorari of respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (MICI) and recalled and set aside
the Order
3
dated 6 September 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, of Antipolo
City, in Civil Case No. 93-2705. The RTC, in its recalled Order, denied the Notice of Appeal of
MICI and granted the Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution filed by petitioners Heirs
of George Y. Poe. The present Petition also challenges the Resolution
4
dated 29 November
2002 of the appellate court denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Records show that on 26 January 1996 at about 4:45 a.m., George Y. Poe (George) while
waiting for a ride to work in front of Capital Garments Corporation, Ortigas Avenue Extension,
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, was run over by a ten-wheeler Isuzu hauler truck with Plate
No. PMH-858 owned by Rhoda Santos (Rhoda), and then being driven by Willie Labrador
(Willie).
5
The said truck was insured with respondent MICI under Policy No. CV-293-007446-8.
To seek redress for Georges untimely death, his heirs and herein petitioners, namely, his
widow Emercelinda, and their children Flerida and Fernando, filed with the RTC a Complaint
for damages against Rhoda and respondent MICI, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-
2705.
6
Petitioners identified Rhoda and respondent MICI, as follows:
Defendant RHODA SANTOS is likewise of legal age, Filipino and a resident of Real Street,
Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila where she may be served with summons and other court
processes.
[Herein respondent] MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. (hereinafter "[MICI]" for brevity)
is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine law with address at Yuchengco
Bldg., 484 Q. Paredes Street, Binondo, Manila where it may be served with summons and
other processes of this Honorable Court;
Defendant Rhoda Santos, who is engaged in the business, among others, of selling gravel and
sand is the registered owner of one Isuzu Truck, with Plate No. PMH-858 and is the employer
of Willie Labrador the authorized driver of the aforesaid truck.
[Respondent MICI] on the other hand is the insurer of Rhoda Santos under a valid and existing
insurance policy duly issued by said [MICI], Policy No. CV-293-007446-8 over the subject
vehicle owned by Rhoda Santos, Truck-Hauler Isuzu 10 wheeler with plate no. PMH-858, serial
no. SRZ451-1928340 and motor no. 10PA1-403803. Under said insurance policy, [MICI] binds
itself, among others, to be liable for damages as well as any bodily injury to third persons
which may be caused by the operation of the insured vehicle.
7

And prayed that:
[J]udgment issue in favor of [herein petitioners] ordering [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI]
jointly and solidarily to pay the [petitioners] the following:
1. Actual damages in the total amount of THIRTY SIX THOUSAND (P36,000.00) PESOS for
funeral and burial expenses;
2. Actual damages in the amount of EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
EIGHTY FOUR (P805,984.00) PESOS as loss of earnings and financial support given by the
deceased by reason of his income and employment;
3. Moral damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS;
4. Exemplary damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS;
5. Attorneys fees in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS and litigation
expense in the amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P1,500.00) PESOS for each
court appearance;
6. The costs of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.
8

Rhoda and respondent MICI made the following admissions in their Joint Answer
9
:
That [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI] admit the allegations in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the
complaint;
That [Rhoda and respondent MICI] admit the allegations in paragraph 5 of the complaint that
the cargo truck is insured with [respondent] Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. [(MICI)]
however, the liability of the insured company attached only if there is a judicial
pronouncement that the insured and her driver are liable and moreover, the liability of the
insurance company is subject to the limitations set forth in the insurance policy.
10

Rhoda and respondent MICI denied liability for Georges death averring, among other
defenses, that: a) the accident was caused by the negligent act of the victim George, who
surreptitiously and unexpectedly crossed the road, catching the driver Willie by surprise, and
despite the latters effort to swerve the truck to the right, the said vehicle still came into
contact with the victim; b) the liability of respondent MICI, if any, would attach only upon a
judicial pronouncement that the insured Rhoda and her driver Willie are liable; c) the liability
of MICI should be based on the extent of the insurance coverage as embodied in Rhodas
policy; and d) Rhoda had always exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of her driver Willie.
After the termination of the pre-trial proceedings, trial on the merits ensued.
Petitioners introduced and offered evidence in support of their claims for damages against
MICI, and then rested their case. Thereafter, the hearings for the reception of the evidence of
Rhoda and respondent MICI were scheduled, but they failed to adduce their evidence despite
several postponements granted by the trial court. Thus, during the hearing on 9 June 1995, the
RTC, upon motion of petitioners counsel, issued an Order
11
declaring that Rhoda and
respondent MICI had waived their right to present evidence, and ordering the parties to
already submit their respective Memorandum within 15 days, after which, the case would be
deemed submitted for decision.1avvphi1.zw+
Rhoda and respondent MICI filed a Motion for Reconsideration
12
of the Order dated 9 June
1995, but it was denied by the RTC in another Order dated 11 August 1995.
13

Consequently, Rhoda and respondent MICI filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus,
14
Prohibition and Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, assailing the Orders dated 9 June 1995 and 11 August 1995 of
the RTC foreclosing their right to adduce evidence in support of their defense. The Petition
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 38948.
The Court of Appeals, through its Third Division, promulgated a Decision
15
on 29 April 1996,
denying due course to the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 38948. Rhoda and respondent MICI
elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Certiorari,
16
docketed as G.R. No.
126244. This Court likewise dismissed the Petition in G.R. No. 126244 in a Resolution dated 30
September 1996.
17
Entry of Judgment was made in G.R. No. 126244 on 8 November 1996.
18

On 28 February 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 93-2705, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Wherefore, [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI] are hereby ordered to pay jointly and
solidarily to the [herein petitioners] the following:
1. Moral damages amounting to P100,000.00;
2. Actual damages for loss of earning capacity amounting to P805,984.00;
3. P36,000.00 for funeral expenses;
4. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5. P50,000.00 for attorneys fees plus P1,500 per court appearance; and
6. Cost of suit.
19

Rhoda and respondent MICI received their copy of the foregoing RTC Decision on 14 March
2000.
20
On 22 March 2000, respondent MICI and Rhoda filed a Motion for Reconsideration
21
of
said Decision, averring therein that the RTC erred in ruling that the obligation of Rhoda and
respondent MICI to petitioners was solidary or joint and several; in computing Georges loss of
earning capacity not in accord with established jurisprudence; and in awarding moral damages
although it was not buttressed by evidence.
Resolving the Motion of respondent MICI and Rhoda, the RTC issued an Order
22
on 24 January
2001 modifying and amending its Decision dated 28 February 2000, and dismissing the case
against respondent MICI.
The RTC held that:
After a careful evaluation of the issues at hand, the contention of the [herein respondent
MICI] as far as the solidary liability of the insurance company with the other defendant
[Rhoda] is meritorious. However, the assailed Decision can be modified or amended to correct
the same honest inadvertence without necessarily reversing it and set aside to conform with
the evidence on hand.
The RTC also re-computed Georges loss of earning capacity, as follows:
The computation of actual damages for loss of earning capacity was determined by applying
the formula adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the actuarial of
Combined Experience Table of Mortality applied in x x x Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals (31 SCRA 521). Moral damages is awarded in accordance with Article 2206 of the New
Civil Code of the Philippines. While death indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is
automatically awarded in cases where the victim had died (People v. Sison, September 14,
1990 [189 SCRA 643]).
23

In the end, the RTC decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Decision of this Court dated 28
February 2000 is hereby amended or modified. Said Decision should read as follows:
"Wherefore, defendant Rhoda Santos is hereby ordered to pay to the [herein petitioners] the
following:
1. Moral damages amounting to P100,000.00;
2. Actual damages for loss of earning capacity amounting to P102,106.00;
3. P36,000.00 for funeral expenses;
4. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
5. P50,000.00 for attorneys fees plus P1,500.00 per court appearance;
6. Costs of the suit.
The case against Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. is hereby dismissed."
24

It was petitioners turn to file a Motion for Reconsideration
25
of the 24 January 2001 Order, to
which respondent MICI filed a "Vigorous Opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration."
26

On 15 June 2001, the RTC issued an Order reinstating its Decision dated 28 February 2000,
relevant portions of which state:
Finding the arguments raised by the [herein petitioners] in their Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of this Court dated January 24, 2001 to be more meritorious to [herein
respondents+ Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (sic) arguments in its vigorous opposition thereto,
said motion is hereby granted.
Accordingly, the Order under consideration is hereby reconsidered and set aside. The decision
of this Court dated February 28, 2000 is hereby reinstated.
Notify parties herein.
27

Respondent MICI received a copy of the 15 June 2001 Order of the RTC on 27 June 2001.
Aggrieved by the latest turn of events, respondent MICI filed on 9 July 2001 a Notice of
Appeal
28
of the 28 February 2000 Decision of the RTC, reinstated by the 15 June 2001
Resolution of the same court. Rhoda did not join respondent MICI in its Notice of Appeal.
29

Petitioners filed their Opposition
30
to the Notice of Appeal of respondent MICI, with a Motion
for the Issuance of Writ of Execution.
After considering the recent pleadings of the parties, the RTC, in its Order dated 6 September
2001, denied the Notice of Appeal of respondent MICI and granted petitioners Motion for the
Issuance of Writ of Execution. The RTC reasoned in its Order:
The records disclosed that on February 28, 2000 this Court rendered a Decision in favor of the
[herein petitioners] and against [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI]. The Decision was said to
have been received by MICI on March 14, 2000. Eight days after or on March 22, 2000, MICI
mailed its Motion for Reconsideration to this Court and granted the same in the Order dated
January 24, 2001. From this Order, [petitioners] filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
February 21, 2001 to which MICI filed a vigorous opposition. On June 15, 2001 this Court
granted *petitioners+ motion reinstating the Decision dated February 28, 2000. According to
MICI, the June 15, 2001 order was received by it on June 27, 2001. MICI filed a Notice of
Appeal on July 9, 2001 or twelve (12) days from receipt of said Order.
[Petitioners] contend that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time while [respondent] MICI
opposes, arguing otherwise. The latter interposed that the Order dated June 15, 2001 is in
reality a new Decision thereby giving it a fresh fifteen (15) days within which to file notice of
appeal.
*Respondent+ MICIs contention is not meritorious. The fifteen (15) day period within which to
file a notice of appeal should be reckoned from the date it received the Decision on March 14,
2000. So that when MICI mailed its Motion for Reconsideration on March 22, 2000, eight (8)
days had already lapsed, MICI has remaining seven (7) days to file a notice of appeal. However,
when it received the last Order of this Court it took [respondent] MICI twelve (12) days to file
the same. Needless to say, MICIs Notice of Appeal was filed out of time. The Court cannot
countenance the argument of MICI that a resolution to a motion for a final order or judgment
will have the effect of giving a fresh reglementary period. This would be contrary to what was
provided in the rules of procedure.
31

Accordingly, the RTC adjudged:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein respondent+ MICIs Notice of Appeal is hereby
Denied for having filed out of time making the Decision of this Court dated February 28, 2000
as final and executory. Accordingly, the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution filed by
[herein petitioners] is hereby Granted.
Notify parties herein.
32

Respondent MICI filed a Petition for Certiorari
33
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67297. The Petition assailed, for
having been rendered by the RTC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the following: (1) the Order dated 6 September 2001, denying the Notice of
Appeal of respondent MICI and granting petitioners Motion for the Issuance of Writ of
Execution; (2) the Decision dated 28 February 2000, holding Rhoda and respondent MICI
jointly and severally liable for Georges death; and (3) the Order dated 15 June 2001,
reinstating the Decision dated 28 February 2000.
The Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari of respondent MICI in a Decision dated
26 June 2000, ratiocinating thus:
Prescinding therefrom, we hold that the fifteen (15) day period to appeal must be reckoned
from the time the [herein respondent] Malayan received the order dated 15 June 2001
reversing in toto the order of 24 January 2000 and reinstating in full the Decision dated 28
February 2000. Thus, [respondent] Malayan had until 12 July 2001 within which to file its
notice of appeal. Therefore, when [respondent] Malayan filed its notice of appeal on 09 July
2001, it was well within the reglementary period and should have been given due course by
the public respondent court.
It was therefore, an excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent court when it
reckoned the *respondent+ Malayans period to appeal on the date it received on 14 March
2000 the formers decision dated 28 February 2000. As earlier expostulated, the said decision
was completely vacated insofar as the [respondent] Malayan is concerned when the public
respondent court in its order dated 24 January 2001 dismissed the case against the former.
Thus, to reckon the fifteen (15) days to appeal from the day the [respondent] Malayan
received the said decision on 14 March 2000, is the height of absurdity because there was
nothing for the [respondent] Malayan to appeal inasmuch as the public respondent court
vacated the said decision in favor of the former.
The aforesaid conclusion finds support in Sta. Romana vs. Lacson (104 SCRA 93), where the
court, relying on the case of Magdalena Estate, Inc. vs. Caluag, 11 SCRA 334, held that where
the court of origin made a thoroughly (sic) restudy of the original judgment and rendered the
amended and clarified judgment only after considering all the factual and legal issues, the
amended and clarified decision was an entirely new decision which superseded (sic). For all
intents and purposes, the court concluded the trial court rendered a new judgment from
which the time to appeal must be reckoned.
In the instant case, what is involved is not merely a substantial amendment or modification of
the original decision, but the total reversal thereof in the order dated 24 January 2000. Given
the rationale in the aforecited cases, it is only logical that the period of appeal be counted
from 27 June 2001, the date that [respondent] Malayan received the order dated 15 June 2001
reversing in toto the order of 24 January 2000 and reinstating the Decision dated 28 February
2000.
34
(Emphasis supplied.)
The fallo of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the petition for certiorari is partially
GRANTED. Accordingly, the public respondent courts order dated 06 September 2001 is
hereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE.
Public respondent court is hereby directed to approve the petitioner Malayans notice of
appeal and to refrain from executing the writ of execution granted on 06 September 2001.
35

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated 29
November 2002.
Understandably distraught, petitioners come before this Court in this Petition for Review,
which raise the following issues:
I.
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it
ruled that private respondent could file a Petition for Certiorari even though its Motion for
Reconsideration was still pending resolution with the lower court.
II.
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it
ruled that the private respondent had filed its Notice of Appeal with the trial court within the
reglementary period.
36

The Court first turns its attention to the primary issue for its resolution: whether the Notice of
Appeal filed by respondent MICI before the RTC was filed out of time.
The period for filing a Notice of Appeal is set by Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellants shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order. x x x.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed.
It is clear under the Rules that an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from.
37
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes
of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on
the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what
the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses
an action.
38

Propitious to petitioners is Neypes v. Court of Appeals,
39
which the Court promulgated on 14
September 2005, and wherein it laid down the fresh period rule:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution. (Emphases ours.)
The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant when a party opts to file a motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed
decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or
rectify any error of judgment.
40
With the advent of the fresh period rule, parties who availed
themselves of the remedy of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of
appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that motion.
41

The Court has accentuated that the fresh period rule is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3
of the Rules of Court which states that the appeal shall be taken "within fifteen (15) days from
notice of judgment or final order appealed from." The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed
in the sense which it ordinarily implies.
42
Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or
within 15 days from notice of the final order in the case.
Applying the fresh period rule, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals and holds that
respondent MICI seasonably filed its Notice of Appeal with the RTC on 9 July 2001, just 12 days
from 27 June 2001, when it received the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration of the 15
June 2001 Resolution reinstating the 28 February 2000 Decision of the RTC.
The fresh period rule may be applied to the case of respondent MICI, although the events
which transpired concerning its Notice of Appeal took place in June and July 2001, inasmuch as
rules of procedure may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. The Court notes that Neypes was promulgated on 14 September
2005, while the instant Petition was still pending before this Court.
Reference may be made to Republic v. Court of Appeals,
43
involving the retroactive application
of A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC which provided that the 60-day period within which to file a petition
for certiorari shall be reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration. In said case, the Court declared that rules of procedure "may be given
retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this
will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as
there is no vested rights in rules of procedure."
Hence, the fresh period rule laid down in Neypes was applied by the Court in resolving the
subsequent cases ofSumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc.,
44
Elbia v. Ceniza,
45
First Aqua Sugar
Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,
46
even though the antecedent facts giving rise to
said cases transpired before the promulgation of Neypes.
In De los Santos v. Vda de Mangubat,
47
particularly, the Court applied the fresh period rule,
elucidating that procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of
procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come
within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statutes. The fresh period rule is irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner
in which the appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or determined and, therefore,
can be made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity without danger of violating
anyone elses rights.
Since the Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent MICI filed its Notice
of Appeal with the RTC within the reglementary period, the appropriate action, under ordinary
circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the case to the RTC so that the RTC could
approve the Notice of Appeal of respondent MICI and respondent MICI could already file its
appeal with the Court of Appeals.
However, considering that the case at bar has been pending for almost sixteen years,
48
and the
records of the same are already before this Court, remand is no longer necessary.
Jurisprudence dictates that remand of a case to a lower court does not follow if, in the interest
of justice, the Supreme Court itself can resolve the dispute based on the records before it. As a
rule, remand is avoided in the following instances: (a) where the ends of justice would not be
subserved by a remand; or (b) where public interest demands an early disposition of the case;
or (c) where the trial court has already received all the evidence presented by both parties,
and the Supreme Court is in a position, based upon said evidence, to decide the case on its
merits.
49
In Lao v. People,
50
the Supreme Court, in consideration of the years that it had taken
for the controversy therein to reach it, concluded that remand of the case to a lower court was
no longer the more expeditious and practical route to follow, and it then decided the said case
based on the evidentiary record before it.
The consistent stand of the Court has always been that a case should be decided in its totality,
resolving all interlocking issues in order to render justice to all concerned and to end the
litigation once and for all. Verily, courts should always strive to settle the entire controversy in
a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seed of future litigation.
51
Where
the public interest so demands, the court will broaden its inquiry into a case and decide the
same on the merits rather than merely resolve the procedural question raised.
52
Such rule
obtains in this case.
The Court is convinced that the non-remanding of the case at bar is absolutely justified.
Petitioners have already suffered from the tragic loss of a loved one, and must not be made to
endure more pain and uncertainty brought about by the continued pendency of their claims
against those liable. The case has been dragging on for almost 16 years now without the
petitioners having been fully compensated for their loss. The Court cannot countenance such a
glaring indifference to petitioners cry for justice. To be sure, they deserve nothing less than
full compensation to give effect to their substantive rights.
53

The complete records of the present case have been elevated to this Court, and the pleadings
and evidence therein could fully support its factual adjudication. Indeed, after painstakingly
going over the records, the Court finds that the material and decisive facts are beyond dispute:
George was killed when he was hit by the truck driven by Willie, an employee of Rhoda; and
the truck is insured with respondent MICI. The only issue left for the Court to resolve is the
extent of the liability of Rhoda and respondent MICI for Georges death and the appropriate
amount of the damages to be awarded to petitioners.
The Court now turns to the issue of who is liable for damages for the death of George.
Respondent MICI does not deny that it is the insurer of the truck. Nevertheless, it asserts that
its liability is limited, and it should not be held solidarily liable with Rhoda for all the damages
awarded to petitioners.
A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the entire
obligation, and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation. In a joint obligation,
each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability and to each obligee belongs only a
part of the correlative rights. Well-entrenched is the rule that solidary obligation cannot lightly
be inferred. There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, when the
law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.
54

It is settled that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to third
persons, the liability of the insurer is direct and such third persons can directly sue the insurer.
The direct liability of the insurer under indemnity contracts against third party liability does
not mean, however, that the insurer can be held solidarily liable with the insured and/or the
other parties found at fault, since they are being held liable under different obligations. The
liability of the insured carrier or vehicle owner is based on tort, in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code;
55
while that of the insurer arises from contract, particularly, the
insurance policy. The third-party liability of the insurer is only up to the extent of the insurance
policy and that required by law; and it cannot be held solidarily liable for anything beyond that
amount.
56
Any award beyond the insurance coverage would already be the sole liability of the
insured and/or the other parties at fault.
57

In Vda. de Maglana v. Consolacion,
58
it was ruled that an insurer in an indemnity contract for
third-party liability is directly liable to the injured party up to the extent specified in the
agreement, but it cannot be held solidarily liable beyond that amount. According to
respondent MICI, its liability as insurer of Rhodas truck is limited. Following Vda. de Maglana,
petitioners would have had the option either (1) to claim the amount awarded to them from
respondent MICI, up to the extent of the insurance coverage, and the balance from Rhoda; or
(2) to enforce the entire judgment against Rhoda, subject to reimbursement from respondent
MICI to the extent of the insurance coverage. The Court, though, is precluded from applying its
ruling in Vda. de Maglana by the difference in one vital detail between the said case and the
one at bar. The insurer was able to sufficiently establish its limited liability in Vda. de Maglana,
while the same cannot be said for respondent MICI herein.
The Court highlights that in this case, the insurance policy between Rhoda and respondent
MICI, covering the truck involved in the accident which killed George, was never presented.
There is no means, therefore, for this Court to ascertain the supposed limited liability of
respondent MICI under said policy. Without the presentation of the insurance policy, the Court
cannot determine the existence of any limitation on the liability of respondent MICI under said
policy, and the extent or amount of such limitation.
It should be remembered that respondent MICI readily admits that it is the insurer of the truck
that hit and killed George, except that it insists that its liability under the insurance policy is
limited. As the party asserting its limited liability, respondent MICI then has the burden of
evidence to establish its claim. In civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to prove its claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law.
59
Regrettably, respondent MICI failed to discharge this burden.
60
The Court cannot rely on
mere allegations of limited liability sans proof.
The failure of respondent MICI to present the insurance policy which, understandably, is not
in petitioners possession, but in the custody and absolute control of respondent MICI as the
insurer and/or Rhoda as the insured gives rise to the presumption that its presentation is
prejudicial to the cause of respondent MICI.
61
When the evidence tends to prove a material
fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which,
from its very nature, must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact,
and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if
produced, would operate to his prejudice and support the case of his adversary.
62

Respondent MICI had all the opportunity to prove before the RTC that its liability under the
insurance policy it issued to Rhoda, was limited; yet, respondent MICI failed to do so. The
failure of respondent MICI to rebut that which would have naturally invited an immediate,
pervasive, and stiff opposition from it created an adverse inference that either the
controverting evidence to be presented by respondent MICI would only prejudice its case, or
that the uncontroverted evidence of petitioners indeed speaks of the truth. And such adverse
inference, recognized and adhered to by courts in judging the weight of evidence in all kinds of
proceedings, surely is not without basis its rationale and effect rest on sound, logical and
practical considerations, viz:
The presumption that a man will do that which tends to his obvious advantage, if he possesses
the means, supplies a most important test for judging of the comparative weight of evidence x
x x If, on the supposition that a charge or claim is unfounded, the party against whom it is
made has evidence within his reach by which he may repel that which is offered to his
prejudice, his omission to do so supplies a strong presumption that the charge or claim is well
founded; it would be contrary to every principle of reason, and to all experience of human
conduct, to form any other conclusion." (Starkie on Evidence, p. 846, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p.
544)
x x x x
The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own control, and refuses
to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable construction upon his
silence, and infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as claimed by the
opposing party." (Societe, etc., v. Allen, 90 Fed. Rep. 815, 817, 33 C.C.A. 282, per Taft, C.J.,
Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 561).
63

The inference still holds even if it be assumed, for argument's sake, that the solidary liability of
respondent MICI with Rhoda is improbable, for it has likewise been said that:
Weak evidence becomes strong by the neglect of the party against whom it is put in, in not
showing by means within the easy control of that party that the conclusion drawn from such
evidence is untrue. (Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Callaghan, 50 III. App. 676, 681, Moore on Facts,
Vol. I, p. 572).
64

Given the admission of respondent MICI that it is the insurer of the truck involved in the
accident that killed George, and in the utter absence of proof to establish both the existence
and the extent/amount of the alleged limited liability of respondent MICI as insurer, the Court
could only conclude that respondent MICI had agreed to fully indemnify third-party liabilities.
Consequently, there is no more difference in the amounts of damages which petitioners can
recover from Rhoda or respondent MICI; petitioners can recover the said amounts in full from
either of them, thus, making their liabilities solidary or joint and several.
The Court now comes to the issue of the amounts of the damages awarded.
In its Decision dated 22 February 2000, the RTC awarded petitioners moral and actual
damages, as well as funeral expenses and attorneys fees. Subsequently, in its Order dated 24
January 2001, the RTC reduced the amount of actual damages from P805,984.00
to P102,106.00, but additionally awarded death indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. Its
award of moral damages and funeral expenses as well as attorneys fees remained constant in
its 28 February 2000 decision and was carried over to its 24 January 2001 Order.
The Court shall now proceed to scrutinize said award of damages.
As regards the award of actual damages, Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that "[e]xcept
as provided by law or by stipulation one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved x x x."
The RTC awarded P36,000.00 for burial expenses. The award of P36,000.00 for burial expenses
is duly supported by receipts evidencing that petitioners did incur this expense. The
petitioners held a wake for two days at their residence and another two days at the Loyola
Memorial Park.
65
The amount covered the expenses by petitioners for the wake, funeral and
burial of George.
66

As to compensation for loss of earning capacity, the RTC initially awarded P805,984.00 in its 28
February 2000 Decision, which it later reduced to P102,106.00 on 24 January 2001.
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that in addition to the indemnity for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict, the "defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter, x x x." Compensation of
this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. Hence, it
is proper that compensation for loss of earning capacity should be awarded to the petitioners
in accordance with the formula established in decided cases for computing net earning
capacity, to wit:
The formula for the computation of unearned income is:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income -reasonable and
necessary living expenses).
Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the formula:
2 / 3 x [80 - age of deceased at the time of death]
67

Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, shall be computed by applying
the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality
or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality.
The second factor is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the
deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or
income and less living and other incidental expenses. The loss is not equivalent to the entire
earnings of the deceased, but only such portion that he would have used to support his
dependents or heirs. Hence, the Court deducts from his gross earnings the necessary expenses
supposed to be used by the deceased for his own needs. The Court explained in Villa Rey
Transit v. Court of Appeals
68
:
[The award of damages for loss of earning capacity is] concerned with the determination of
the losses or damages sustained by the private respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs
of the deceased, and that said damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings, but of
the support they received or would have received from him had he not died in consequence of
the negligence of petitioner's agent. In fixing the amount of that support, we must reckon with
the "necessary expenses of his own living," which should be deducted from his earnings. Thus,
it has been consistently held that earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate
for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire
money, "less necessary expense for his own living." Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable
is not the loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which
the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net earnings, and not gross earnings
are to be considered that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation
of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses."
Applying the aforestated jurisprudential guidelines in the computation of the amount of award
for damages set out in Villa Rey, the Court computes the award for the loss of Georges
earning capacity as follows:
Life expectancy = 2/3 x [80 - age of deceased at the time of death]
2/3 x [80 56]
2/3 x [24]
FORMULA NET EARNING CAPACITY (NEC)
If:
Age at time of death of George Poe = 58
69

Monthly Income at time of death = P6,946
70

Gross Annual Income (GAI) = [(6,946) (12)] = P83,352
Reasonable/Necessary Living Expenses (R/NLE) = 50%
71
of GAI = P41,676
NEC = [2/3 (80-58)] [83,352-41,676]
= [2/3 (22)] [41,676]
= [14.67] [41,676]
= P611,386.92
Therefore, Georges lost net earning capacity is equivalent to P611,386.92
The RTC awarded moral damages
72
in the amount of P100,000.00. With respect to moral
damages, the same are awarded under the following circumstances:
The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante. Moral damages are designed to compensate and alleviate in some
way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person.
Although incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted. The amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of
the offender.
In the instant case, petitioners testimonies reveal the intense suffering which they continue to
experience as a result of Georges death.
73
It is not difficult to comprehend that the sudden
and unexpected loss of a husband and father would cause mental anguish and serious anxiety
in the wife and children he left behind. Moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are
proper for Georges death.
74
1avvphi1.zw+
The RTC also awarded P50,000.00 as death indemnity which the Court shall not disturb. The
award of P50,000.00 as death indemnity is in accordance with current rulings of the Court.
75

Finally, the RTC awarded attorneys fees to petitioners. Petitioners are entitled to attorneys
fees. Under Article 2008 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may be granted when a party is
compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of
the other party.
76
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
77
the Court held
that an award of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees was reasonable. Hence, petitioners are entitled
to attorneys fees in that amount.
78

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. While the
Court AFFIRMS the Decision, dated 26 June 2002, and Resolution, dated 29 November 2002, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67297, granting the Petition for Certiorari of
respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., the Court, nonetheless, RESOLVES, in
consideration of the speedy administration of justice, and the peculiar circumstances of the
case, to give DUE COURSE to the present Petition and decide the same on its merits.
Rhoda Santos and respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay
jointly and severally the petitioners Heirs of George Y. Poe the following:
(1) Funeral expenses P36,000.00;
(2) Actual damages for loss of earning capacity P611,386.92;
(3) Moral damages amounting to P100,000.00;
(4) Death indemnity P50,000.00; and
(5) Attorneys fees P50,000.00 plus P1,500.00 per court appearance. No costs.




















G.R. No. 97412 July 12, 1994
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.
Alojada & Garcia and Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza for petitoner.
Zapa Law Office for private respondent.

VITUG, J.:
The issues, albeit not completely novel, are: (a) whether or not a claim for damage sustained
on a shipment of goods can be a solidary, or joint and several, liability of the common carrier,
the arrastre operator and the customs broker; (b) whether the payment of legal interest on an
award for loss or damage is to be computed from the time the complaint is filed or from the
date the decision appealed from is rendered; and (c) whether the applicable rate of interest,
referred to above, is twelve percent (12%) or six percent (6%).
The findings of the court a quo, adopted by the Court of Appeals, on the antecedent and
undisputed facts that have led to the controversy are hereunder reproduced:
This is an action against defendants shipping company, arrastre operator and
broker-forwarder for damages sustained by a shipment while in defendants'
custody, filed by the insurer-subrogee who paid the consignee the value of such
losses/damages.
On December 4, 1981, two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from
Yokohama, Japan for delivery vessel "SS EASTERN COMET" owned by defendant
Eastern Shipping Lines under Bill of Lading
No. YMA-8 (Exh. B). The shipment was insured under plaintiff's Marine Insurance
Policy No. 81/01177 for P36,382,466.38.
Upon arrival of the shipment in Manila on December 12, 1981, it was discharged
unto the custody of defendant Metro Port Service, Inc. The latter excepted to one
drum, said to be in bad order, which damage was unknown to plaintiff.
On January 7, 1982 defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation received the
shipment from defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., one drum opened and without
seal (per "Request for Bad Order Survey." Exh. D).
On January 8 and 14, 1982, defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation made
deliveries of the shipment to the consignee's warehouse. The latter excepted to
one drum which contained spillages, while the rest of the contents was
adulterated/fake (per "Bad Order Waybill" No. 10649, Exh. E).
Plaintiff contended that due to the losses/damage sustained by said drum, the
consignee suffered losses totaling P19,032.95, due to the fault and negligence of
defendants. Claims were presented against defendants who failed and refused to
pay the same (Exhs. H, I, J, K, L).
As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff was compelled to pay the
consignee P19,032.95 under the aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it
became subrogated to all the rights of action of said consignee against
defendants (per "Form of Subrogation", "Release" and Philbanking check, Exhs.
M, N, and O). (pp. 85-86, Rollo.)
There were, to be sure, other factual issues that confronted both courts. Here, the appellate
court said:
Defendants filed their respective answers, traversing the material allegations of
the complaint contending that: As for defendant Eastern Shipping it alleged that
the shipment was discharged in good order from the vessel unto the custody of
Metro Port Service so that any damage/losses incurred after the shipment was
incurred after the shipment was turned over to the latter, is no longer its liability
(p. 17, Record); Metroport averred that although subject shipment was
discharged unto its custody, portion of the same was already in bad order (p. 11,
Record); Allied Brokerage alleged that plaintiff has no cause of action against it,
not having negligent or at fault for the shipment was already in damage and bad
order condition when received by it, but nonetheless, it still exercised extra
ordinary care and diligence in the handling/delivery of the cargo to consignee in
the same condition shipment was received by it.
From the evidence the court found the following:
The issues are:
1. Whether or not the shipment sustained losses/damages;
2. Whether or not these losses/damages were sustained while in the
custody of defendants (in whose respective custody, if
determinable);
3. Whether or not defendant(s) should be held liable for the
losses/damages (see plaintiff's pre-Trial Brief, Records, p. 34; Allied's
pre-Trial Brief, adopting plaintiff's Records, p. 38).
As to the first issue, there can be no doubt that the shipment
sustained losses/damages. The two drums were shipped in good
order and condition, as clearly shown by the Bill of Lading and
Commercial Invoice which do not indicate any damages drum that
was shipped (Exhs. B and C). But when on December 12, 1981 the
shipment was delivered to defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., it
excepted to one drum in bad order.
Correspondingly, as to the second issue, it follows that the
losses/damages were sustained while in the respective and/or
successive custody and possession of defendants carrier (Eastern),
arrastre operator (Metro Port) and broker (Allied Brokerage). This
becomes evident when the Marine Cargo Survey Report (Exh. G),
with its "Additional Survey Notes", are considered. In the latter
notes, it is stated that when the shipment was "landed on vessel" to
dock of Pier # 15, South Harbor, Manila on December 12, 1981, it was
observed that "one (1) fiber drum (was) in damaged condition,
covered by the vessel's Agent's Bad Order Tally Sheet No. 86427." The
report further states that when defendant Allied Brokerage withdrew
the shipment from defendant arrastre operator's custody on January
7, 1982, one drum was found opened without seal, cello bag partly
torn but contents intact. Net unrecovered spillages was
15 kgs. The report went on to state that when the drums reached the
consignee, one drum was found with adulterated/faked contents. It
is obvious, therefore, that these losses/damages occurred before the
shipment reached the consignee while under the successive
custodies of defendants. Under Art. 1737 of the New Civil Code, the
common carrier's duty to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance of goods remains in full force and effect even if the goods
are temporarily unloaded and stored in transit in the warehouse of
the carrier at the place of destination, until the consignee has been
advised and has had reasonable opportunity to remove or dispose of
the goods (Art. 1738, NCC). Defendant Eastern Shipping's own
exhibit, the "Turn-Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes" (Exhs. 3-
Eastern) states that on December 12, 1981 one drum was found
"open".
and thus held:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
A. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally:
1. The amount of P19,032.95, with the present legal interest of
12% per annum from October 1, 1982, the date of filing of this
complaints, until fully paid (the liability of defendant Eastern
Shipping, Inc. shall not exceed US$500 per case or the CIF value of
the loss, whichever is lesser, while the liability of defendant Metro
Port Service, Inc. shall be to the extent of the actual invoice value of
each package, crate box or container in no case to exceed P5,000.00
each, pursuant to Section 6.01 of the Management Contract);
2. P3,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
3. Costs.
B. Dismissing the counterclaims and crossclaim of
defendant/cross-claimant Allied Brokerage Corporation.
SO ORDERED. (p. 207, Record).
Dissatisfied, defendant's recourse to US.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
After a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record. We find that the conclusion
drawn therefrom is correct. As there is sufficient evidence that the shipment
sustained damage while in the successive possession of appellants, and therefore
they are liable to the appellee, as subrogee for the amount it paid to the
consignee. (pp. 87-89, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals thus affirmed in toto the judgment of the court
a quo.
In this petition, Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the common carrier, attributes error and grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court when
I. IT HELD PETITIONER CARRIER JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE
ARRASTRE OPERATOR AND CUSTOMS BROKER FOR THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AS GRANTED IN THE QUESTIONED DECISION;
II. IT HELD THAT THE GRANT OF INTEREST ON THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT SHOULD COMMENCE FROM THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT AT THE RATE OF TWELVE PERCENT PER ANNUM INSTEAD OF FROM
THE DATE OF THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ONLY AT THE RATE OF SIX
PERCENT PER ANNUM, PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CLAIM BEING INDISPUTABLY
UNLIQUIDATED.
The petition is, in part, granted.
In this decision, we have begun by saying that the questions raised by petitioner carrier are
not all that novel. Indeed, we do have a fairly good number of previous decisions this Court
can merely tack to.
The common carrier's duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts
from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of,
and received by, the carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a
reasonable time for their acceptance by, the person entitled to receive them (Arts. 1736-1738,
Civil Code; Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 646; Kui Bai vs. Dollar Steamship Lines, 52
Phil. 863). When the goods shipped either are lost or arrive in damaged condition, a
presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there need
not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable (Art. 1735, Civil Code; Philippine
National Railways vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87; Metro Port Service vs. Court of Appeals,
131 SCRA 365). There are, of course, exceptional cases when such presumption of fault is not
observed but these cases, enumerated in Article 1734
1
of the Civil Code, are exclusive, not one
of which can be applied to this case.
The question of charging both the carrier and the arrastre operator with the obligation of
properly delivering the goods to the consignee has, too, been passed upon by the Court.
In Fireman's Fund Insurance vs. Metro Port Services (182 SCRA 455), we have explained, in
holding the carrier and the arrastre operator liable in solidum,thus:
The legal relationship between the consignee and the arrastre operator is akin to
that of a depositor and warehouseman (Lua Kian v. Manila Railroad Co., 19 SCRA
5 [1967]. The relationship between the consignee and the common carrier is
similar to that of the consignee and the arrastre operator (Northern Motors, Inc.
v. Prince Line, et al., 107 Phil. 253 [1960]). Since it is the duty of the ARRASTRE to
take good care of the goods that are in its custody and to deliver them in good
condition to the consignee, such responsibility also devolves upon the CARRIER.
Both the ARRASTRE and the CARRIER are therefore charged with the obligation to
deliver the goods in good condition to the consignee.
We do not, of course, imply by the above pronouncement that the arrastre operator and the
customs broker are themselves always and necessarily liable solidarily with the carrier, or vice-
versa, nor that attendant facts in a given case may not vary the rule. The instant petition has
been brought solely by Eastern Shipping Lines, which, being the carrier and not having been
able to rebut the presumption of fault, is, in any event, to be held liable in this particular case.
A factual finding of both the court a quo and the appellate court, we take note, is that "there is
sufficient evidence that the shipment sustained damage while in the successive possession of
appellants" (the herein petitioner among them). Accordingly, the liability imposed on Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc., the sole petitioner in this case, is inevitable regardless of whether there
are others solidarily liable with it.
It is over the issue of legal interest adjudged by the appellate court that deserves more than
just a passing remark.
Let us first see a chronological recitation of the major rulings of this Court:
The early case of Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., vs. Manila Port
Service,
2
decided
3
on 15 May 1969, involved a suit for recovery of money arising out of short
deliveries and pilferage of goods. In this case, appellee Malayan Insurance (the plaintiff in the
lower court) averred in its complaint that the total amount of its claim for the value of the
undelivered goods amounted to P3,947.20. This demand, however, was neither established in
its totality nor definitely ascertained. In the stipulation of facts later entered into by the
parties, in lieu of proof, the amount of P1,447.51 was agreed upon. The trial court rendered
judgment ordering the appellants (defendants) Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad
Company to pay appellee Malayan Insurance the sum of P1,447.51 with legal interest thereon
from the date the complaint was filed on 28 December 1962 until full payment thereof. The
appellants then assailed, inter alia, the award of legal interest. In sustaining the appellants,
this Court ruled:
Interest upon an obligation which calls for the payment of money, absent a
stipulation, is the legal rate. Such interest normally is allowable from the date of
demand, judicial or extrajudicial. The trial court opted for judicial demand as the
starting point.
But then upon the provisions of Article 2213 of the Civil Code, interest "cannot be
recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty." And as was held by this Court in Rivera
vs. Perez,
4
L-6998, February 29, 1956, if the suit were for damages, "unliquidated
and not known until definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts
after proof (Montilla c. Corporacion de P.P. Agustinos, 25 Phil. 447; Lichauco
v. Guzman,
38 Phil. 302)," then, interest "should be from the date of the decision." (Emphasis
supplied)
The case of Reformina vs. Tomol,
5
rendered on 11 October 1985, was for "Recovery of
Damages for Injury to Person and Loss of Property." After trial, the lower court decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and third
party defendants and against the defendants and third party plaintiffs as follows:
Ordering defendants and third party plaintiffs Shell and Michael, Incorporated to
pay jointly and severally the following persons:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Plaintiffs Pacita F. Reformina and Francisco Reformina the sum of P131,084.00
which is the value of the boat F B Pacita III together with its accessories, fishing
gear and equipment minus P80,000.00 which is the value of the insurance
recovered and the amount of P10,000.00 a month as the estimated monthly loss
suffered by them as a result of the fire of May 6, 1969 up to the time they are
actually paid or already the total sum of P370,000.00 as of June 4, 1972 with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint until paid and to pay attorney's fees of
P5,000.00 with costs against defendants and third party plaintiffs. (Emphasis
supplied.)
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter modified the amount of damages awarded
but sustained the trial court in adjudging legal interest from the filing of the complaint
until fully paid. When the appellate court's decision became final, the case was
remanded to the lower court for execution, and this was when the trial court issued its
assailed resolution which applied the 6% interest per annum prescribed in Article 2209
of the Civil Code. In their petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners contended
that Central Bank Circular
No. 416, providing thus
By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act 2655, as amended,
Monetary Board in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed
that the rate of interest for the loan, or forbearance of any money, goods, or
credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as
to such rate of interest, shall be twelve (12%) percent per annum. This Circular
shall take effect immediately. (Emphasis found in the text)
should have, instead, been applied. This Court
6
ruled:
The judgments spoken of and referred to are judgments in litigations involving
loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. Any other kind of monetary
judgment which has nothing to do with, nor involving loans or forbearance of any
money, goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law for it is
not within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
Coming to the case at bar, the decision herein sought to be executed is one
rendered in an Action for Damages for injury to persons and loss of property and
does not involve any loan, much less forbearances of any money, goods or
credits. As correctly argued by the private respondents, the law applicable to the
said case is Article 2209 of the New Civil Code which reads
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of
money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages,
there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of
interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal
interest which is six percent per annum.
The above rule was reiterated in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., v. Cruz,
7
promulgated on 28
July 1986. The case was for damages occasioned by an injury to person and loss of property.
The trial court awarded private respondent Pedro Manabat actual and compensatory damages
in the amount of P72,500.00 with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until
fully paid. Relying on the Reformina v. Tomol case, this Court
8
modified the interest award
from 12% to 6% interest per annum but sustained the time computation thereof, i.e., from the
filing of the complaint until fully paid.
In Nakpil and Sons vs. Court of Appeals,
9
the trial court, in an action for the recovery of
damages arising from the collapse of a building, ordered,
inter alia, the "defendant United Construction Co., Inc. (one of the petitioners)
. . . to pay the plaintiff, . . . , the sum of P989,335.68 with interest at the legal rate from
November 29, 1968, the date of the filing of the complaint until full payment . . . ." Save from
the modification of the amount granted by the lower court, the Court of Appeals sustained the
trial court's decision. When taken to this Court for review, the case, on 03 October 1986, was
decided, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED and considering the
special and environmental circumstances of this case, we deem it reasonable to
render a decision imposing, as We do hereby impose, upon the defendant and the
third-party defendants (with the exception of Roman Ozaeta) a solidary (Art.
1723, Civil Code, Supra.
p. 10) indemnity in favor of the Philippine Bar Association of FIVE MILLION
(P5,000,000.00) Pesos to cover all damages (with the exception to attorney's fees)
occasioned by the loss of the building (including interest charges and lost rentals)
and an additional ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) Pesos as and for
attorney's fees, the total sum being payable upon the finality of this
decision. Upon failure to pay on such finality, twelve (12%) per cent interest per
annum shall be imposed upon aforementioned amounts from finality until paid.
Solidary costs against the defendant and third-party defendants (Except Roman
Ozaeta). (Emphasis supplied)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by United Construction, contending that "the
interest of twelve (12%) per cent per annum imposed on the total amount of the
monetary award was in contravention of law." The Court
10
ruled out the applicability of
the Reformina and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines cases and, in its resolution of 15 April
1988, it explained:
There should be no dispute that the imposition of 12% interest pursuant to
Central Bank Circular No. 416 . . . is applicable only in the following: (1) loans; (2)
forbearance of any money, goods or credit; and
(3) rate allowed in judgments (judgments spoken of refer to judgments involving
loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines
Inc. v. Cruz, 143 SCRA 160-161 [1986]; Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., 139 SCRA 260
[1985]). It is true that in the instant case, there is neither a loan or a forbearance,
but then no interest is actually imposed provided the sums referred to in the
judgment are paid upon the finality of the judgment. It is delay in the payment of
such final judgment, that will cause the imposition of the interest.
It will be noted that in the cases already adverted to, the rate of interest is
imposed on the total sum, from the filing of the complaint until paid; in other
words, as part of the judgment for damages. Clearly, they are not applicable to
the instant case. (Emphasis supplied.)
The subsequent case of American Express International, Inc., vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court
11
was a petition for review on certiorari from the decision, dated 27 February 1985, of
the then Intermediate Appellate Court reducing the amount of moral and exemplary damages
awarded by the trial court, to P240,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively, and its resolution,
dated 29 April 1985, restoring the amount of damages awarded by the trial court, i.e.,
P2,000,000.00 as moral damages and P400,000.00 as exemplary damages with interest
thereon at 12% per annum from notice of judgment, plus costs of suit. In a decision of 09
November 1988, this Court, while recognizing the right of the private respondent to recover
damages, held the award, however, for moral damages by the trial court, later sustained by
the IAC, to be inconceivably large. The Court
12
thus set aside the decision of the appellate
court and rendered a new one, "ordering the petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of
One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, with
six (6%) percent interest thereon computed from the finality of this decision until paid.
(Emphasis supplied)
Reformina came into fore again in the 21 February 1989 case of Florendo v. Ruiz
13
which arose
from a breach of employment contract. For having been illegally dismissed, the petitioner was
awarded by the trial court moral and exemplary damages without, however, providing any
legal interest thereon. When the decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the latter
held:
WHEREFORE, except as modified hereinabove the decision of the CFI of Negros
Oriental dated October 31, 1972 is affirmed in all respects, with the modification
that defendants-appellants, except defendant-appellant Merton Munn, are
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the amounts stated in the dispositive portion
of the decision, including the sum of P1,400.00 in concept of compensatory
damages, with interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the
complaint until fully paid(Emphasis supplied.)
The petition for review to this Court was denied. The records were thereupon
transmitted to the trial court, and an entry of judgment was made. The writ of execution
issued by the trial court directed that only compensatory damages should earn interest
at 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint. Ascribing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge, a petition for certiorari assailed the said order.
This Court said:
. . . , it is to be noted that the Court of Appeals ordered the payment of interest
"at the legal rate" from the time of the filing of the complaint. . . Said circular
[Central Bank Circular No. 416] does not apply to actions based on a breach of
employment contract like the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court reiterated that the 6% interest per annum on the damages should be
computed from the time the complaint was filed until the amount is fully paid.
Quite recently, the Court had another occasion to rule on the matter. National Power
Corporation vs. Angas,
14
decided on 08 May 1992, involved the expropriation of certain parcels
of land. After conducting a hearing on the complaints for eminent domain, the trial court
ordered the petitioner to pay the private respondents certain sums of money as just
compensation for their lands so expropriated "with legal interest thereon . . . until fully paid."
Again, in applying the 6% legal interest per annum under the Civil Code, the Court
15
declared:
. . . , (T)he transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money,
goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose,
the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest
adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal
interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the
properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for
the delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in
the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest
by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the
Civil Code shall apply.
Concededly, there have been seeming variances in the above holdings. The cases can perhaps
be classified into two groups according to the similarity of the issues involved and the
corresponding rulings rendered by the court. The "first group" would consist of the cases
of Reformina v. Tomol (1985), Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. Cruz(1986), Florendo
v. Ruiz (1989)
and National Power Corporation v. Angas (1992). In the "second group" would be Malayan
Insurance Company v.Manila Port Service (1969), Nakpil and Sons v. Court of
Appeals (1988), and American Express International v.Intermediate Appellate Court (1988).
In the "first group", the basic issue focuses on the application of either the 6% (under the Civil
Code) or 12% (under the Central Bank Circular) interest per annum. It is easily discernible in
these cases that there has been a consistent holding that the Central Bank Circular imposing
the 12% interest per annum applies only to loans or forbearance
16
of money, goods or credits,
as well as to judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, and
that the 6% interest under the Civil Code governs when the transaction involves the payment
of indemnities in the concept of damage arising from the breach or a delay in the performance
of obligations in general. Observe, too, that in these cases, a common time frame in the
computation of the 6% interest per annum has been applied, i.e., from the time the complaint
is filed until the adjudged amount is fully paid.
The "second group", did not alter the pronounced rule on the application of the 6% or 12%
interest per annum,
17
depending on whether or not the amount involved is a loan or
forbearance, on the one hand, or one of indemnity for damage, on the other hand. Unlike,
however, the "first group" which remained consistent in holding that the running of the legal
interest should be from the time of the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the "second
group" varied on the commencement of the running of the legal interest.
Malayan held that the amount awarded should bear legal interest from the date of the
decision of the court a quo,explaining that "if the suit were for damages, 'unliquidated and not
known until definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts after proof,' then,
interest 'should be from the date of the decision.'" American Express International
v. IAC, introduced a different time frame for reckoning the 6% interest by ordering it to be
"computed from the finality of (the) decision until paid." The Nakpil and Sons case ruled that
12% interest per annum should be imposed from the finality of the decision until the judgment
amount is paid.
The ostensible discord is not difficult to explain. The factual circumstances may have called for
different applications, guided by the rule that the courts are vested with discretion, depending
on the equities of each case, on the award of interest. Nonetheless, it may not be unwise, by
way of clarification and reconciliation, to suggest the following rules of thumb for future
guidance.
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or
quasi-delicts
18
is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages.
19
The provisions
under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of
recoverable damages.
20

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing.
21
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded.
22
In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be
12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under
and subject to the provisions of Article 1169
23
of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the
court
24
at the rate of 6% per annum.
25
No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty.
26
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date
the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory,
the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall
be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to
be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the legal interest to be paid is SIX PERCENT (6%) on the amount due
computed from the decision, dated
03 February 1988, of the court a quo. A TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX
PERCENT (6%), shall be imposed on such amount upon finality of this decision until the
payment thereof.


G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez, Gatmaitan for petitioners.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private-respondent.

NOCON, J.:
Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to accommodate them in TWA Flight 007
departing from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984 despite possession of confirmed
tickets, petitioners filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila, Branch 145. Advocating petitioner's position, the trial court categorically ruled
that respondent TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached its contract of carriage with petitioners
and that said breach was "characterized by bad faith." On appeal, however, the appellate
court found that while there was a breach of contract on respondent TWA's part, there was
neither fraud nor bad faith because under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil
Aeronautics Board of the United States of America it is allowed to overbook flights.
The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea,
purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines,
Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses
were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All
three tickets represented confirmed reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their
reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00
a.m., an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list
because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the
seats available on the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the
two other Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on
the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles,
including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked
lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets were given first
priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of
his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the
discounted tickets were denied boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he
discovered the he was holding his daughter's full-fare ticket.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be
accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in
another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred
Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach
of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145.
As aforesaid, the lower court ruled in favor of petitioners in its decision
1
dated January 9,
1989 the dispositive portion of which states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiffs the following amounts:
(1) US $918.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the
price of the tickets bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines,
to enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New York City;
(2) US $159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing the
price of Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P8,934.50,
Philippine Currency, representing the price of Liana Zalamea's ticket for TWA
Flight 007,
(4) Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00), Philippine Currency, as
moral damages for all the plaintiffs'
(5) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for
attorney's fees; and
(6) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
2

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are recoverable in a
damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad
faith. Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted
practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal
Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on
respondent TransWorld Airlines.
Moreover, while respondent TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that the flight was
overbooked and that even a person with a confirmed reservation may be denied
accommodation on an overbooked flight, nevertheless it ruled that such omission or
negligence cannot under the circumstances be considered to be so gross as to amount to bad
faith.
Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the wait-list along with
forty-eight (48) other passengers where full-fare first class tickets were given priority over
discounted tickets.
The dispositive portion of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
3
dated October 25,
1991 states as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision under review is hereby
MODIFIED in that the award of moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs is
eliminated, and the defendant-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the
following amounts:
(1) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the
price of Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(2) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the
price of Cesar Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
(4) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
4

Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for review
on certiorari and alleged the following errors committed by the respondent Court of Appeals,
to wit:
I.
. . . IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF
RESPONDENT TWA BECAUSE IT HAS A RIGHT TO OVERBOOK FLIGHTS.
II.
. . . IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
III.
. . . IN NOT ORDERING THE REFUND OF LIANA ZALAMEA'S TWA TICKET AND
PAYMENT FOR THE AMERICAN AIRLINES
TICKETS.
5

That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow
petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be
disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
6
Written law may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The
certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
7

Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service
agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the
Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication
of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to
the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the
law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by
the defendant airline.
8
Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable
law in this case would be Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the
passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of
Appeals,
9
where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last
minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a
particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every
right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier
opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately
overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of
them would show up for the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a
confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages.
Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,
10
where private respondent was not
allowed to board the plane because her seat had already been given to another passenger
even before the allowable period for passengers to check in had lapsed despite the fact that
she had a confirmed ticket and she had arrived on time, this Court held that petitioner airline
acted in bad faith in violating private respondent's rights under their contract of carriage and is
therefore liable for the injuries she has sustained as a result.
In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of contract of carriage
amounts to bad faith. In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,
11
where a would-be passenger had the necessary ticket, baggage claim and clearance
from immigration all clearly and unmistakably showing that she was, in fact, included in the
passenger manifest of said flight, and yet was denied accommodation in said flight, this Court
did not hesitate to affirm the lower court's finding awarding her damages.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. So ruled this Court in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
12
This
is so, for a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty a duty to
provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to self-
interest or enrichment. Thus, it was also held that the switch of planes from Lockheed 1011 to
a smaller Boeing 707 because there were only 138 confirmed economy class passengers who
could very well be accommodated in the smaller planes, thereby sacrificing the comfort of its
first class passengers for the sake of economy, amounts to bad faith. Such inattention and lack
of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration entitles
the passenger to an award of moral damages.
13

Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith
in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if
they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have
incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its
passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or
would have the choice to ride with another airline.
Respondent TWA contends that Exhibit I, the detached flight coupon upon which were written
the name of the passenger and the points of origin and destination, contained such a notice.
An examination of Exhibit I does not bear this out. At any rate, said exhibit was not offered for
the purpose of showing the existence of a notice of overbooking but to show that Exhibit I was
used for flight 007 in first class of June 11, 1984 from New York to Los Angeles.
Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy
of giving less priority to discounted tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the same
time, and held confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them was allowed to board the plane ten
minutes before departure time because the full-fare ticket he was holding was given priority
over discounted tickets. The other two petitioners were left behind.
It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of
boarding priorities are reasonable policies, which when implemented do not amount to bad
faith. But the issue raised in this case is not the reasonableness of said policies but whether or
not said policies were incorporated or deemed written on petitioners' contracts of carriage.
Respondent TWA failed to show that there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it present
any argument of substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked
condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers.
It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru
its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats without
any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could easily have
done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last minute
amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of
petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners' rights
makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent
TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary
damages, as well.
Petitioners also assail the respondent court's decision not to require the refund of Liana
Zalamea's ticket because the ticket was used by her father. On this score, we uphold the
respondent court. Petitioners had not shown with certainty that the act of respondent TWA in
allowing Mr. Zalamea to use the ticket of her daughter was due to inadvertence or deliberate
act. Petitioners had also failed to establish that they did not accede to said agreement. The
logical conclusion, therefore, is that both petitioners and respondent TWA agreed, albeit
impliedly, to the course of action taken.
The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the American Airlines
tickets purchased and used by petitioners Suthira and Liana. The evidence shows that
petitioners Suthira and Liana were constrained to take the American Airlines flight to Los
Angeles not because they "opted not to use their TWA tickets on another TWA flight" but
because respondent TWA could not accommodate them either on the next TWA flight which
was also fully booked.
14
The purchase of the American Airlines tickets by petitioners Suthira
and Liana was the consequence of respondent TWA's unjustifiable breach of its contracts of
carriage with petitioners. In accordance with Article 2201, New Civil Code, respondent TWA
should, therefore, be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of its obligation. In the previously cited case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of
Appeals,
15
this Court explicitly held that a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost
of the tickets he had to buy for a flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being
refunded for the cost of the unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual
cost of their flight from New York to Los Angeles. On this score, we differ from the trial court's
ruling which ordered not only the reimbursement of the American Airlines tickets but also the
refund of the unused TWA tickets. To require both prestations would have enabled petitioners
to fly from New York to Los Angeles without any fare being paid.
The award to petitioners of attorney's fees is also justified under Article 2208(2) of the Civil
Code which allows recovery when the defendant's act or omission has compelled plaintiff to
litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest. However, the award for moral damages
and exemplary damages by the trial court is excessive in the light of the fact that only Suthira
and Liana Zalamea were actually "bumped off." An award of P50,000.00 moral damages and
another P50,000.00 exemplary damages would suffice under the circumstances obtaining in
the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby MODIFIED to the extent of adjudging respondent TransWorld Airlines to pay
damages to petitioners in the following amounts, to wit:
(1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the
tickets bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to
Los Angeles from New York City;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(5) Costs of suit.












G.R. No. 127569 July 30, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SENEN PRADES, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
Before the Court for automatic review is the August 13, 1996 judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Iriga City, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. IR-3666, finding accused-appellant Senen
Prades guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The
judgment likewise ordered appellant to pay private complainant P50,000.00 by way of moral
damages, as well as the costs.
1

The information in Criminal Case No. IR-3666 alleges:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 1994, at about 12:00 o'clock midnight, at
San Vicente Ogbon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a handgun, by means of
force and intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said Emmie R. Rosales
against the latter's will, and that the accused perpetrated the offense charged at
the dwelling of herein complainant and with the use of a firearm in threatening
complainant, to the latter's damage and prejudice in such amount as may be
proven in court.
2

With the assistance of counsel de oficio, appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
3
The defense waived the pre-trial
4
and the case proceeded to trial in due
course.
The private complainant and the physician who conducted a medical examination on her were
presented in the trial court to establih the case for the People. After the physician had testified
as the first witness, appellant absconded. The records of the case reveal that appellant
escaped from his escort guard while he was being transported from a hearing at the Regional
Trial Court of Iriga City to the Tinangis Penal Farm in Pili, Camarines Sur on March 29,
1995
5
Trial accordingly continued in absentia.
Private complainant Emmie R. Rosales was seventeen years old when the dastardly outrage
befell her on March 24, 1994. She testified that she and her younger sister, Melissa, were
asleep in a room in their house and were then the only persons at home because their
grandfather, who lived with them, was in the hospital at that time.
6

At around midnight, complainant suddenly awoke as she felt a heavy weight pressing down
upon her. She thereupon realized that a man, clad only in his underwear, lay on top of her. She
was about to shout when he poked a gun at her neck and warned her not to create any noise
or he would kill her.
7

Although the house lights were off, moonlight streamed through the sawali door of the room,
enabling complainant to see the intruder.
8
She recognized him as appellant Senen Prades, her
barrio mate. It appears that he had gained entry into the house through a passageway in the
kitchen.
9

Appellant attempted to remove complainant's pants and underwear even as he continued to
jab the gun at her neck. Complainant resisted him and struggled for twenty to thirty minutes
until she was overcome by his strength.
10
He knelt on her knees and succeeded in removing
her clothing.
11
He then spread her legs apart, forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina,
12
and
bodily pinned her down. He fondled her breasts and private parts and made push and pull
movements with his genital organ for about two minutes.
13
Complainant was resultantly in
pain as she felt blood ooze out of her vagina.
14
She continued to struggle against appellant but
to no avail.
After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled away from complainant and once again nudged her
with the gun. He warned her not to tell anyone about the event or he would kill her and her
family.
15
Appellant left complainant stunned and in tears. She did not inform anyone about
the incident.
Several days later, complainant received two letters from appellant.
16
She saw appellant hand
the first letter to her grandmother who later gave it to her.
17
The other letter was given by
appellant to complainant through the latter's sister.
18
Aggrieved by all these circumstances,
complainant decided to disclose to her grandfather the sexual assault that transpired on
March 24.
Complainant and her grandfather forthwith reported the matter to the Barangay Captain who
advised them to proceed to the police headquarters of Nabua, Camarines Sur.
19
After filing a
report with the police, complainant underwent physical examination at a rural health center in
Sto. Domingo.
20
She then instituted a complaint for rape against appellant.
Pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabua, Camarines
Sur,
21
appellant was arrested and detained at the municipal jail of Nabua. He filed a motion
for bail but the same was denied by the lower court.
22
Trial commenced in Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court on December 14, 1994.
Dr. Stephen A. Beltran,
23
the Rural Health Physician of Nabua, Camarines Sur, testified that he
conducted a physical examination on complainant on April 8, 1994 and found indications of
sexual intercourse.
24
The medical certificate issued by said physician revealed the following:
FINDINGS: VAGINAL EXAMINATION
(+) Hymenal laceration scar at
6:00 o'clock
(-) Gross blood
(-) (S)eminal fluid
IMPRESSION: VAGINAL PENETRATION, COMPLETE.
25

As earlier noted, appellant escaped from confinement before the prosecution had completed
the presentation of its evidence. A general warrant of arrest was issued for his apprehension
and it was ordered that he be included in the list of wanted criminals.
26
Appellant, however,
has not been recaptured up to now.
Fearing for her life and for the safety of her family members, complainant left her home in San
Vicente, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and moved to Naga City.
27
All she hoped for was to begin a
new life, away from the stigma created by the crime on her name and her family, and away
from the dread of possibly being killed by appellant who was at large and, perhaps, lurking in
the shadows.
After the presentation of its evidence, the prosecution rested its case. Because appellant had
taken flight, he was deemed to have waived his right to adduce evidence hence counsel for
the defense was unable to introduce evidence to dispute the charge.
28

In its decision dated August 13, 1996, the court a quo found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling, and
imposed upon him the penalty of death. The lower court issued another warrant of arrest for
the capture of appellant.
29
It has not been served to date as he remains at large, a fugitive
from justice. Because appellant was condemned to suffer the principal penalty of death, his
conviction is now before the Court on automatic review.
As its lone assignment of error, the defense alleges that the court below erred in finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It is contended that the
testimony of complainant on the identity of appellant as the author of the crime is doubtful
not only because there was insufficient lighting in the room of complainant, where the alleged
act of rape took place, but also because complainant had never been face to face with
appellant prior to the incident.
30

The Court has exhaustively reviewed and objectively analyzed the records of this case,
especially so because a capital offense is involved, and sees no cogent reason to depart from
the findings and conclusions of the court below. We consequently affirm the conviction of
appellant.
The contention that the identity of appellant has not been established deserves exiguous
consideration because it is undisputed that appellant was known to the victim long before the
assault. They lived in the same barrio
31
and the wife of appellant was the goddaughter of
complainant's grandmother.
32
Appellant also used to periodically pass by the house of
complainant.
33

The defense adverts to the fact that on the night of the occurrence, there were no lights in the
room where the rape took place. It is further claimed that it was impossible for moonlight to
penetrate the sawali door and enable complainant to identify her assailant because the spaces
in the sawali were "as small as the diameter of a mungo bean . . . (a)nd these small spaces are
set wide apart between the slats."
34

This contention must fail. The evidence shows that the crime scene was not in total darkness.
As already stated, complainant was able to identify appellant because the room was lit by
moonlight that filtered through the sparse, woven bamboo slats of the sawali door. The
amount of light emitted by the moon is relative. While there are evenings of pitch darkness,
there are moonlit nights when the brightness of the moon is sufficient to enable one to see
distinct details of objects.
In addition to this consideration, the house of complainant was a typical provincial home made
of bamboo,
35
usually consisting of bamboo stilts, interwoven slats of bamboo forming walls
of sawali, and similar materials. Such constructional pattern naturally allowed light to
penetrate into the house and this fact reasonably induces the conclusion that complainant was
truthful in claiming that there was sufficient illumination in the room which permitted her to
identify her aggressor.
Furthermore, complainant had an extended and adequate look at the features of appellant
during the assault, with ample opportunity to recognize him. As this Court has repeatedly held,
a man and a woman cannot be physically closer to each other than during the sexual
act.
36
Not surprisingly, therefore, complainant readily and positively identified appellant in
court during the trial as the man who raped her on March 24, 1994.
Doctrinally, the credibility of a rape victim is augmented when, as in the instant case, she has
no motive to testify against the accused or where there is absolutely no evidence which even
remotely suggests that she could have been actuated by such motive.
37
We are thus
convincingly assured that the lower court prudently fulfilled its obligation as a factual assessor
and a legal adjudicator. We accordingly give due respect to the evaluation of the trial court on
the credibility of the complaining witness.
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by, inter alia, force or intimidation.
The degree of the force or intimidation required is relative. It need not be overpowering or
irresistible because all that is necessary is that it is sufficient to consummate the purpose
which appellant had in mind.
38

It is indubitable that complainant put up a struggle when appellant forced himself upon her.
She was inevitably subdued by his strength and she ultimately succumbed to his venery. Even
assuming arguendo that complainant did not repel the physical aggression of appellant, this
does not preclude a finding that she was raped. It is well settled that physical resistance need
not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter
submits herself, against her will, to the rapist's advances because of fear for her life and
personal safety.
39

In the case now before us, although complainant had a companion who was asleep in the
room when she was attacked by appellant, she could not have dared risk her life by screaming
for help because appellant pressed a handgun at her neck and threatened to kill her and her
family if she would resist him or report the incident. The evidence establishes that the sexual
intercourse between appellant and complainant was consummated through force and
intimidation and ineluctably constituted the crime of rape. The fact that it was committed in a
room where there was another occupant does not rule out the crime.
40

In addition, and virtually foreclosing further chicanery by appellant, it is conceded that after
the rape, he sent complainant two letters in which he implored her forgiveness and offered to
leave his wife so that he could be with her. In fine, appellant sealed his own fate by admitting
his crime under the seal of a virtual confession in fact, if not in law.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be settled
through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
41
For this rule to apply, it is not necessary that a
complaint be first filed by the victim because all that is required is that after committing the
crime, appellant or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is
proved.
42

Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong and a plea
for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise.
43
The letters of
appellant containing an appeal for condonation of his acts cannot but be construed as an
implied admission of his guilt.
The Court is persuaded that appellant sent complainant the letters introduced in evidence by
the prosecution and that said letters contained an admission of his guilt, thus confirming his
culpability. If appellant did not forcibly rape complainant on the night of March 24, 1994,
complainant may possibly have accepted appellant's offer to live with her. At the very least,
she would not have revealed her misfortune so as not to expose the despoliation of her virtue.
That complainant chose to divulge the incident and subject herself to the disgrace of public
scrutiny and scandal buttresses the charge that she had been criminally ravished by appellant.
Further, because no evidence was presented by the defense to discredit this affirmation of
guilt derived from the contents of the letters, the authenticity of said letters is no longer open
to question. The letters thus bolster and corroborate complainant's testimony on the identity
and guilty of appellant.
44

Another factor supporting appellant's conviction is his flight. By escaping from confinement
during trial and failing to turn himself in despite his subsequent conviction by the trial court,
and despite the standing warrant of arrest, appellant has become a fugitive from justice.
Flight is the evasion of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to
avoid arrest, detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings.
45
It is
considered an indication of guilt.
46
A "fugitive from justice," on the other hand, is one who
flees after conviction to avoid punishment, as well as one who, after being charged, flees to
avoid prosecution.
47
By his flight and thereafter becoming a fugitive, appellant waived his
right to adduce evidence and consequently denied himself the opportunity to dispute the
charge against him.
It is a fundamental rule that criminal cases rise and fall on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness or, as in this case, the absence of evidence of the
defense. We emphasize that the flight of appellant, by itself, does not sustain his conviction
because the law requires therefor no less than the proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
the case before us, however, complainant's testimony and positive identification of appellant
were sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of the physician who examined her, the
medico-legal report, and the letters of appellant in which he acknowledged his guilt and
sought complainant's mercy. These considerations convince the Court that appellant was the
perpetrator of the crime. His flight and status as a fugitive from the law merely dispel any
remaining shred of doubt on his guilt.
Incidentally, to obviate any question as to the propriety of the course of action we have taken
in this case, that is, of subjecting the judgment of conviction of the trial court to automatic
appellate review despite the fact that appellant was partially tried and convicted by said
court in absentia, and is and has been a fugitive from justice since then and up to the present,
we draw upon our ruling in People vs. Esparas, et al.
48
which declared:
. . . On August 20, 1996, we issued an extended resolution upholding the power of
this Court to review all death penalty cases regardless of the escape of the
accused from confinement prior to the judgment of the trial court, thus:
We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing
jurisprudence mandating our review of all death penalty cases,
regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the
court. . . . . Ours is not only the power but the duty to review all
death penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate this power which is
bestowed by the Constitution. . . . .
On the question as to whether or not the Court can validly promulgate this judgment in the
case at bar, the answer is in the affirmative. As graphically elucidated in Florendo vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.:
49

The last paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120 * is a new provision introduced by the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides for the promulgation of
judgment in absentia (Gupit Jr., Rules of Criminal Procedure 362-363 [1986]). The
amendment was intended to obviate the situation in the past where the judicial
process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the
promulgation of judgment. In explaining the amendment, Justice Florenz D.
Regalado commented:
Without this amendatory provision, the ends of public justice would
be set at naught and, where the civil liability ex-delicto was instituted
with the criminal action, the offended party could not enforce either
the primary liability of the accused or any subsidiary liability, where
proper and involved in the case, as no judgment could be
promulgated. Since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions only
require prior arraignment as an indispensable requisite and the trial
may thereafter proceed in the absence of the accused, the judgment
in this case being merely the procedural culmination of the trial, the
promulgation thereof can justifiably be made in absentia in the
manner set out in this section (II Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium 369, [6th ed., 1989]).
If, for any reason, it should be claimed that the provision under discussion is intended to be
the procedure in the trial courts, the simple rejoinder is that there is no reason why, on
considerations of its rationale and procedural expediency, the same should not apply to the
same factual situation in the appellate courts. In the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals,
the judgment is promulgated by merely filing the signed copy thereof with the Clerk of Court
who causes true copies of the same to be served upon the parties,
50
hence the appearance of
the accused is not even required there as his presence is necessary only in the promulgation of
the judgments of trial courts.
51
Thereafter, when the judgment of the appellate court
becomes executory, the records of the case together with a certified copy of the appellate
court judgment are returned to the court a quo for execution of the judgment.
52
On this issue,
however, one member of this Court has submitted a separate opinion.
At this juncture, we also note that when the rape was committed the governing law was
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4111 and
7659,
53
under which the use of a deadly weapon in committing the felony of rape was, as it
still is, punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
Reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties and Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
provides the rules for their application, one of which, pertinent to this case, is that when in the
commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater
penalty shall be applied.
Two aggravating circumstances were alleged in the information, namely, nocturnity and
dwelling. We agree with the court below that nocturnity cannot be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance in this case because although the crime was committed late that
night, the evidence does not positively establish that nighttime facilitated the commission of
the crime, or that it was especially sought by the offender to ensure its commission, or that
the offender took advantage thereof for impunity. It cannot, therefore, be considered herein
under either the so-called objective or subjective tests for determining the existence of this
circumstance.
It is clear, however, that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is attendant in the
commission of the crime. Article 14(5) of the Revised Penal Code provides that this
circumstance aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the
offended party, if the latter has not given provocation. In the instant case, the aforesaid
circumstance of dwelling was definitely present in the commission of the crime of rape with
the use of a deadly weapon. From all the foregoing considerations, the presence of this
aggravating circumstance mandates that the supreme penalty of death be imposed.
The lower court, however, erred in classifying the award of P50,000.00 to the offended party
as being in the character of moral damages. Jurisprudence has elucidated that the award
authorized by the criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, in the
amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual
damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law
54
For that matter,
the civil liability ex delicto provided by the Revised Penal Code, that is, restitution, reparation
and indemnification,
55
all correspond to actual or compensatory damages in the Civil
Code,
56
since the other damages provided therein are moral, nominal, temperate or
moderate, liquidated, and exemplary or corrective damages
57
which have altogether different
concepts and fundaments.
We reiterate here that said civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape; it
is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on
different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound
discretion.
58
Evidently, therefore, the lower court actually intended the award of P50,000.00
as indemnification to be paid to the victim.
On this score, we have to take note of a new policy adopted by the Court. The recent judicial
prescription is that the indemnification for the victim shall be in the increased amount of
P75,000.00 if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory
laws.
59
Applying the foregoing policy, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the offended party
in the case at bar is and should be P75,000.00.
One other cognate development in the case law on rape is applicable to the present
disposition. The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under
consideration, moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal
proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of
the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice. Indeed the conventional requirement
ofallegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed with
in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate
pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made.
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages
60
are too obvious to
still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes
and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by
necessary implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go through the
superfluity of still being proved through a testimonial charade.
The People having established the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt, his conviction
and the penalty imposed by the court a quo is correct and must consequently be affirmed.
Withal, four Members of this Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659 insofar
as it prescribes the death penalty is unconstitutional; but they nevertheless submit to the
ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be
imposed in this case.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of lriga City, Branch 36, in Criminal Case
No. IR-3666 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Senen
Prades is ordered to indemnify the offended party. Emmie R. Rosales, in the amount of
P75,000.00 as compensatory damages, and to pay the additional amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages, with costs in all instances.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic
Act No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded
to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.



Separate Opinions

Appellant Senen Prades absconded before the prosecution finished presenting its evidence in
the trial court. But trial proceeded and judgment was rendered in his absence.
In People v. Esparas,* the accused after her arraignment escaped from jail. Like the present
appellant, she was tried in absentia, found guilty as charged and sentenced to the death
penalty. Before requiring appellant to file an appeal brief, this Court was confronted with the
issue of "whether or not it will proceed to authomatically review her death sentence."
Affirmative votes were cast by six (6) justices; namely, JJ. Davide Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Kapunan, Hermosisima, and J. Puno who wrote that existing jurisprudence mandates a review
of all death penalty cases regardless of the escape of the accused from confinement. Two (2)
other justices, JJ. Vitug and Panganiban, joined only in the result, explaining that while the
Court should not dismiss an appeal from a decision imposing the death penalty due to the
escape of the accused, it cannot at the same time render judgment on him until after he is
rearrested and thus becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. Six (6) other justices
CJ. Narvasa and JJ. Padilla, Regalado, Melo, Mendoza and Torres dissented, with J. Padilla
stressing in his written dissent that when an appellant escapes from confinement or jumps bail
or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal, the dismissal of such appeal is
authorized under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.
While an escapee mocks the law and puts himself outside the protection of the judiciary, and
while his appeal should not be automatically dismissed merely for that reason, still I believe
that the Supreme Court should not deliberate on the appeal of the accused, much less render
judgment thereon, until after he or she is rearrested or voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction
of the Court.
In the present case, I therefore vote that the Court should not deliberate nor render judgment
on the appeal until after the appellant is within the Court's jurisdiction.

# Separate Opinions

Appellant Senen Prades absconded before the prosecution finished presenting its evidence in
the trial court. But trial proceeded and judgment was rendered in his absence.
In People v. Esparas,* the accused after her arraignment escaped from jail. Like the present
appellant, she was tried in absentia, found guilty as charged and sentenced to the death
penalty. Before requiring appellant to file an appeal brief, this Court was confronted with the
issue of "whether or not it will proceed to authomatically review her death sentence."
Affirmative votes were cast by six (6) justices; namely, JJ. Davide Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Kapunan, Hermosisima, and J. Puno who wrote that existing jurisprudence mandates a review
of all death penalty cases regardless of the escape of the accused from confinement. Two (2)
other justices, JJ. Vitug and Panganiban, joined only in the result, explaining that while the
Court should not dismiss an appeal from a decision imposing the death penalty due to the
escape of the accused, it cannot at the same time render judgment on him until after he is
rearrested and thus becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. Six (6) other justices
CJ. Narvasa and JJ. Padilla, Regalado, Melo, Mendoza and Torres dissented, with J. Padilla
stressing in his written dissent that when an appellant escapes from confinement or jumps bail
or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal, the dismissal of such appeal is
authorized under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.
While an escapee mocks the law and puts himself outside the protection of the judiciary, and
while his appeal should not be automatically dismissed merely for that reason, still I believe
that the Supreme Court should not deliberate on the appeal of the accused, much less render
judgment thereon, until after he or she is rearrested or voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction
of the Court.
In the present case, I therefore vote that the Court should not deliberate nor render judgment
on the appeal until after the appellant is within the Court's jurisdiction.






G.R. No. 88561 April 20, 1990
DR. HERMAN ARMOVIT, DORA ARMOVIT and JACQUELINE ARMOVIT, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioners.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.

GANGAYCO, J.:
This is a case which involves a Filipino physician and his family residing in the United States
who came home to the Philippines on a Christmas visit. They were bumped off at the Manila
International Airport on their return flight to the U.S. because of an erroneous entry in their
plane tickets relating to their time of departure.
In October 1981, the petitioners decided to spend their Christmas holidays with relatives and
friends in the Philippines, so they purchased from private respondent, (Northwest Airlines,
Inc.) three (3) round trip airline tickets from the U.S. to Manila and back, plus three (3) tickets
for the rest of the children, though not involved in the suit. Each ticket of the petitioners which
was in the handwriting of private respondent's tickets sales agent contains the following entry
on the Manila to Tokyo portion of the return flight:
from Manila to Tokyo, NW flight 002, date 17 January, time 10:30 A.M. Status,
OK.
1

On their return trip from Manila to the U.S. scheduled on January 17, 1982, petitioner arrived
at the check-in counter of private respondent at the Manila International Airport at 9:15 in the
morning, which is a good one (1) hour and fifteen (15) minutes ahead of the 10:30 A.M.
scheduled flight time recited in their tickets. Petitioners were rudely informed that they
cannot be accommodated inasmuch as Flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 a.m. was already taking
off and the 10:30 A.M. flight time entered in their plane tickets was erroneous.
Previous to the said date of departure petitioners re-confirmed their reservations through
their representative Ernesto Madriaga who personally presented the three (3) tickets at the
private respondent's Roxas Boulevard office.
2
The departure time in the three (3) tickets of
petitioners was not changed when re-confirmed. The names of petitioners appeared in the
passenger manifest and confirmed as Passenger Nos. 306, 307, and 308, Flight 002.
3

Herein petitioner Dr. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that because of the bump-off he
will not be able to keep his appointments with his patients in the U.S. Petitioners suffered
anguish, wounded feelings, and serious anxiety day and night of January 17th until the
morning of January 18th when they were finally informed that seats will be available for them
on the flight that day.
Because of the refusal of the private respondent to heed the repeated demands of the
petitioners for compensatory damages arising from the aforesaid breach of their air-transport
contracts,
4
petitioners were compelled to file an action for damages in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered on July 2, 1985, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs actual, moral, exemplary and
nominal damages, plus attorney's fees, as follows:
a) Actual damages in favor of Dr. Herman Armovit in the sum of
P1,300.00, with interest at the legal rate from January 17, 1982;
b) Moral damages of P500,000.00, exemplary damages of
P500,000.00, and nominal damages of P100,000.00 in favor of Dr.
Herman Armovit;
c) Moral damages of P300,000.00, exemplary damages of
P300,000.00, and nominal damages of P50,000.00 in favor of Mrs.
Dora Armovit;
d) Moral damages of P300,000.00, exemplary damages of
P300,000.00, and nominal damages of P50,000.00 in favor of Miss
Jacqueline Armovit; and
e) Attorney's fees of 5% of the total awards under the above
paragraphs.
plus costs of suit.
5

Not satisfied therewith, private respondent interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
wherein in due course a decision was rendered on June 20, 1989, the relevant portion and
dispositive part of which read as follows:
Plaintiffs-appellees had complied with the "72-hour reconfirmation rule." They
had obtained reconfirmation from defendant-appellant of the time and date of
their flight, as indicated in their tickets. The trial court said so and We find nothing
significance to warrant a disturbance of such finding.
On the allowance of damages, the trial court has discretion to grant and fix the
amounts to be paid the prevailing party. In this case, there was gross negligence
on the part of defendant-appellant in reconfirming the time and date of
departure of Flight No. 002 as indicated in the three (3) tickets (Exhibits A, A-1
and A-2). And, as admitted by defendant-appellant, plaintiffs-appellees had
arrived at the airport at 9:15 A.M. or one (1) hour before departure time of 10:30
A.M.
Appellees' actual damages in the amount of P1,300.00 is maintained for being
unrebutted by the Appellant.
However, We modify the allowance of the other awards made by the trial court.
The moral damages of P900,000.00 awarded to Appellees must be eliminated
considering the following:
1. That the appellees did not take the witness stand to testify on their "social
humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety" and the breach of contract was not
malicious or fraudulent. (Art. 2220, Civil Code). It has been held that:
Nor was there error in the appealed decision in denying moral damages, not only
on account of the plaintiffs failure to take the witness stand and testify to her
social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., as the decision holds, but
primarily because a breach of contract like that of defendant not being malicious
or fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral damages under Article 2220
of the Civil Code (Ventilla vs. Centeno, L-14333, 28 Jan. 1961; Fores vs. Miranda, L-
12163; 4 March 1959 Francisco vs. GSIS, 7 SCRA 577).
2. Furthermore, moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in
the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer (San Andres vs. Court of
Appeals, 116 SCRA 85). In a later case, the Supreme Court held that moral
damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of
the defendant (R & B Surety vs. IAC, 129 SCRA 745) citing Grand Union
Supermarket, Inc. vs. Espino, Jr. 94 SCRA 966).
However, there is no question that appellant acted with negligence in not
informing appellees about the change of hour of departure. To provide an
example or correction for the public good, therefore, the award of exemplary
damages is proper (Art. 2229 & 2231 Civil Code; Lopez v. Pan American World
Airways, 16 SCRA 431; Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport, 148 SCRA 440).
Nonetheless, the awards granted by the trial court are far too exhorbitant and
excessive compared to the actual loss of P1,300.00. The authority of the Court of
Appeals to modify or change the amounts of awards has been upheld in a long
line of decisions. We reduce the award of exemplary damages from P500,000.00
to P100,000.00 in favor of Dr. Herman Armovit, from P500,000.00 to P50,000.00
in favor of Mrs. Dora Armovit; and from P300,000.00 to P20,000.00 in favor of
Miss Jacqueline Armovit. (Gellada vs. Warner Barnes, 57 O.G. (4) 7347, Sadie vs.
Bachrach, 57 O.G. (4) 636, Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport, supra). The award
of nominal damages has to be eliminated since we are already awarding actual
loss. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory damages
(Vda. de Medina, et al. v. Cresencia, et al., 99 Phil. 506).
The award of 5% of the total damages as attorney's fees is reasonable.
3. WHEREFORE, with the above modifications, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
6

A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by the petitioners was denied in a resolution dated
May 29, 1989.
7

Both petitioners and private respondent elevated the matter to this Court for review
by certiorari.
The petition of private respondent was docketed as G.R. No. 86776. It was denied in a
resolution of this Court dated July 10, 1989, and the motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied in a resolution dated September 6, 1989. On October 12, 1989 this Court ordered the
entry of judgment in this case and for the records to be remanded to the court of origin for
prompt execution of the judgment.
In the herein petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner they claim that the questioned
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals should be struck down as an unlawful, unjust
and reasonless departure from the decisions of this Court as far as the award for moral
damages and the drastic reduction of the exemplary damages are concerned.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The appellate court observed that private respondent was guilty of gross negligence not only
in the issuance of the tickets by the erroneous entry of the date of departure and without
changing or correcting the error when the said three (3) tickets were presented for re-
confirmation. Nevertheless it deleted the award of moral damages on the ground that
petitioners did not take the witness stand to testify on "their social humiliation, wounded
feelings and anxiety, and that the breach of contract was not malicious or fraudulent."
8

We disagree.
In Air France vs. Carrascoso,
9
Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways,
10
and Zulueta vs. Pan
American World Airways,
11
this Court awarded damages for the gross negligence of the airline
which amounted to malice and bad faith and which tainted the breach of air transportation
contract.
Thus in Air France, this Court observed:
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air carrier
sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites
people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action
for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have the right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that
any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger
gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
12

The gross negligence committed by private respondent in the issuance of the tickets with
entries as to the time of the flight, the failure to correct such erroneous entries and the
manner by which petitioners were rudely informed that they were bumped off are
clear indicia of such malice and bad faith and establish that private respondent committed a
breach of contract which entitles petitioners to moral damages.
The appellate court observed that the petitioners failed to take the witness stand and testify
on the matter. It overlooked however, that the failure of the petitioner to appear in court to
testify was explained by them. The assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August 21,
1983 following the year they were bumped off caused a turmoil in the country. This turmoil
spilled over to the year 1984 when they were scheduled to testify. However, the violent
demonstrations in the country were sensationalized in the U.S. media so petitioners were
advised to refrain from returning to the Philippines at the time.
Nevertheless, Atty. Raymund Armovit, brother of petitioner Dr. Armovit, took the witness
stand as he was with the petitioners from the time they checked in up to the time of their
ultimate departure. He was a witness when the check-in officer rudely informed the
petitioners that their flight had already taken off, while petitioner Dr. Armovit remonstrated
that their tickets reflected their flight time to be 10:30 A.M.; that in anger and frustration, Dr.
Armovit told the said check-in-officer that he had to be accommodated that morning so that
he could attend to all his appointments in the U.S.; that petitioner Jacqueline Armovit also
complained about not being able to report for work at the expiration of her leave of absence;
that while petitioner had to accept private respondent's offer for hotel accommodations at the
Philippine Village Hotel so that they could follow up and wait for their flight out of Manila the
following day, petitioners did not use their meal coupons supplied because of the limitations
thereon so they had to spend for lunch, dinner, and breakfast in the sum of P1,300.00 while
waiting to be flown out of Manila; that Dr. Armovit had to forego the professional fees for the
medical appointments he missed due to his inability to take the January 17 flight; that the
petitioners were finally able to fly out of Manila on January 18, 1982, but were assured of this
flight only on the very morning of that day, so that they experienced anxiety until they were
assured seats for that flight.
13

No doubt Atty. Raymund Armovit's testimony adequately and sufficiently established the
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation that petitioners suffered upon having
been bumped off. However, considering the circumstances of this case whereby the private
respondent attended to the plight of the petitioners, taking care of their accommodations
while waiting and boarding them in the flight back to the U.S. the following day, the Court
finds that the petitioners are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 each.
By the same token to provide an example for the public good, an award of exemplary damages
is also proper.
14
The award of the appellate court is adequate.
Nevertheless, the deletion of the nominal damages by the appellate court is well-taken since
there is an award of actual damages. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual or
compensatory damages.
15

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned judgment of the Court of Appeals is
hereby modified such that private respondent shall pay the following:
(a) actual damages in favor of Dr. Armovit in the sum of P1,300.00 with interest at
the legal rate from January 17, 1982;
(b) moral damages at P100,000.00 and exemplary damages and P100,000.00 in
favor of Dr. Armovit;
(c) moral damages of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 in favor
of Mrs. Dora Armovit;
(d) moral damages of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 in favor of Miss Jacqueline Armovit; and
(e) attorney's fees at 5% of the total awards under the above paragraphs, plus the
cost of suit.
G.R. No. L-22425 August 31, 1965
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NICOLAS L. CUENCA and COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL SIXTH DIVISION), respondents.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner.
Bengzon, Villegas and Zarraga for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an action for damages for alleged breach of contract. After appropriate proceedings the
Court of First Instance of Manila, in which the case was originally filed, rendered judgment
sentencing defendant Northwest Airlines, Inc. hereinafter referred to as petitioner to pay
to plaintiff Cuenca hereinafter referred to as respondent the sum of P20,000 as moral
damages, together with the sum of P5,000 as exemplary damages, with legal interest thereon
from the date of the filing of complaint," December 12, 1959, "until fully paid, plus the further
sum of P2,000 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation." On appeal taken by petitioner,
said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except as to the P5,000.00 exemplary
damages, which was eliminated, and the P20,000.00 award for moral damages, which was
converted into nominal damages. The case is now before us on petition for review
by certiorari filed by petitioner, upon the ground that the lower court has erred: (1) in holding
that the Warsaw Convention of October 12, 1929, relative to transportation by air is not in
force in the Philippines; (2) in not holding that respondent has no cause of action; and (3) in
awarding P20,000 as nominal damages.
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the first assignment of error because the same is the
basis of the second assignment of error, and the latter is devoid of merit, even if we assumed
the former to be well-taken. Indeed the second assignment of error is predicated upon Articles
17, 18 and 19 of said Convention, reading:
ART. 17. The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the
accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
ART. 18. (1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage, or any goods, if the
occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place during the transportation
by air.
(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the preceding paragraph shall
comprise the period during which the baggage or goods are in charge of the carrier,
whether in an airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing outside an
airport, in any place whatsoever.
(3) The period of the transportation by air shall not extend to any transportation by
land, by sea, or by river performed outside an airport. If, however, such transportation
takes place in the performance of a contract for transportation by air, for the purpose of
loading, delivery, or transhipment, any damage is presumed, subject to proof to the
contrary, to have been the result of an event which took place during the transportation
by air.
ART. 19. The carrier shall be liable for damage occasioned by delay in the transportation
by air of passengers, baggage, or goods.
Petitioner argues that pursuant to those provisions, an air "carrier is liable only" in the event
of death of a passenger or injury suffered by him, or of destruction or loss of, or damage to
any checked baggage or any goods, or of delay in the transportation by air of passengers,
baggage or goods. This pretense is not borne out by the language of said Articles. The same
merely declare the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated cases, if the conditions
therein specified are present. Neither said provisions nor others in the aforementioned
Convention regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier. Under
petitioner's theory, an air carrier would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event
of its absolute refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which is absurd.
The third assignment of error is based upon Medina vs. Cresencia (52 Off. Gaz. 4606),
and Quijano vs. Philippine Air Lines (CA-G.R. No. 21804-R). Neither case is, however, in point,
aside from the fact that the latter is not controlling upon us. In the first case, this Court
eliminated a P10,000 award for nominal damages, because the aggrieved party had already
been awarded P6,000 as compensatory damages, P30,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as
exemplary damages, and "nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages." In
the case at bar, the Court of Appeals has adjudicated no such compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages to respondent herein.
Moreover, there are special reasons why the P20,000.00 award in favor of respondent herein
is justified, even if said award were characterized as nominal damages. When his contract of
carriage was violated by the petitioner, respondent held the office of Commissioner of Public
Highways of the Republic of the Philippines. Having boarded petitioner's plane in Manila with a
first class ticket to Tokyo, he was, upon arrival at Okinawa, transferred to the tourist class
compartment. Although he revealed that he was traveling in his official capacity as official
delegate of the Republic to a conference in Tokyo, an agent of petitioner rudely compelled him
in the presence of other passengers to move, over his objection, to the tourist class, under
threat of otherwise leaving him in Okinawa. In order to reach the conference on time,
respondent had no choice but to obey.
It is true that said ticket was marked "W/L," but respondent's attention was not called thereto.
Much less was he advised that "W/L" meant "wait listed." Upon the other hand, having paid
the first class fare in full and having been given first class accommodation as he took
petitioner's plane in Manila, respondent was entitled to believe that this was a confirmation of
his first class reservation and that he would keep the same until his ultimate destination,
Tokyo. Then, too, petitioner has not tried to explain or even alleged that the person to whom
respondent's first class seat was given had a better right thereto. In other words, since the
offense had been committed with full knowledge of the fact that respondent was an official
representative of the Republic of the Philippines, the sum of P20,000 awarded as damages
may well be considered as merely nominal. At any rate, considering that petitioner's agent had
acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner, said award may also be considered as one
for exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
It is so ordered.














G.R. No. 85161 September 9, 1991
COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION and ENRIQUE SY, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR VENTANILLA ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, respondents.
Esteban C. Manuel for petitioners.
Augusta Gatmaytan for OVEC.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p
Petitioners seek a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 09504 "Enrique Sy and Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Oscar Ventanilla
Enterprises Corporation" affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan
City, Branch XXV, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the complaint of the plaintiff Enrique F. Sy is dismissed, and on the
counterclaim of the defendant O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Declaring as lawful, the cancellation and termination of the Lease Agreement
(Exh. A) and the defendant's re-entry and repossession of the Avenue, Broadway
and Capitol theaters under lease on February 11, 1980;
2. Declaring as lawful, the forfeiture clause under paragraph 12 of the Id Lease
Agreement, and confirming the forfeiture of the plaintiffs remaining cash deposit
of P290,000.00 in favor of the defendant thereunder, as of February 11, 1980;
3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P289,534.78,
representing arrears in rentals, unremitted amounts for amusement tax
delinquency and accrued interest thereon, with further interest on said amounts
at the rate of 12% per annum (per lease agreement) from December 1, 1980 until
the same is fully paid;
4. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the amount of P100,000.00,
representing the P10,000.00 portion of the monthly lease rental which were not
deducted from the cash deposit of the plaintiff from February to November, 1980,
after the forfeiture of the said cash deposit on February 11, 1980, with interest
thereon at the rate of 12% per annum on each of the said monthly amounts of
P10,000.00 from the time the same became due until it is paid;
5. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant through the injunction bond, the
sum of P100,000.00, representing the P10,000.00 monthly increase in rentals
which the defendant failed to realize from February to November 1980 result
from the injunction, with legal interest thereon from the finality of this decision
until fully paid;
6. Ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendant the sum equivalent to ten per
centum (10%) of the above-mentioned amounts of P289,534.78, P100,000.00 and
P100,000.00, as and for attorney's fees; and
7. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs. (pp. 94-95, Rollo)
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent Oscar Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation (OVEC), as lessor, and the petitioner
Enrique F. Sy, as lessee, entered into a lease agreement over the Avenue, Broadway and
Capitol Theaters and the land on which they are situated in Cabanatuan City, including their
air-conditioning systems, projectors and accessories needed for showing the films or motion
pictures. The term of the lease was for six (6) years commencing from June 13, 1977 and
ending June 12,1983. After more than two (2) years of operation of the Avenue, Broadway and
Capitol Theaters, the lessor OVEC made demands for the repossession of the said leased
properties in view of the Sy's arrears in monthly rentals and non-payment of amusement
taxes. On August 8,1979, OVEC and Sy had a conference and by reason of Sy's request for
reconsideration of OVECs demand for repossession of the three (3) theaters, the former was
allowed to continue operating the leased premises upon his conformity to certain conditions
imposed by the latter in a supplemental agreement dated August 13, 1979.
In pursuance of their latter agreement, Sy's arrears in rental in the amount of P125,455.76 (as
of July 31, 1979) was reduced to P71,028.91 as of December 31, 1979. However, the accrued
amusement tax liability of the three (3) theaters to the City Government of Cabanatuan City
had accumulated to P84,000.00 despite the fact that Sy had been deducting the amount of
P4,000.00 from his monthly rental with the obligation to remit the said deductions to the city
government. Hence, letters of demand dated January 7, 1980 and February 3, 1980 were sent
to Sy demanding payment of the arrears in rentals and amusement tax delinquency. The latter
demand was with warning that OVEC will re-enter and repossess the Avenue, Broadway and
Capital Theaters on February 11, 1980 in pursuance of the pertinent provisions of their lease
contract of June 11, 1977 and their supplemental letter-agreement of August 13, 1979. But
notwithstanding the said demands and warnings SY failed to pay the above-mentioned
amounts in full Consequently, OVEC padlocked the gates of the three theaters under lease and
took possession thereof in the morning of February 11, 1980 by posting its men around the
premises of the Id movie houses and preventing the lessee's employees from entering the
same.
Sy, through his counsel, filed the present action for reformation of the lease agreement,
damages and injunction late in the afternoon of the same day. And by virtue of a restraining
order dated February 12, 1980 followed by an order directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction issued in said case, Sy regained possession and operation of the
Avenue, Broadway and Capital theaters.
As first cause of action, Sy alleged that the amount of deposit P600,000.00 as agreed upon,
P300,000.00 of which was to be paid on June 13, 1977 and the balance on December 13, 1977
was too big; and that OVEC had assured him that said forfeiture will not come to pass. By
way of second cause of action, Sy sought to recover from OVEC the sums of P100,000.00 which
Sy allegedly spent in making "major repairs" on Broadway Theater and the application of
which to Sy's due rentals; (2) P48,000.00 covering the cost of electrical current allegedly used
by OVEC in its alleged "illegal connection" to Capitol Theater and (3) P31,000.00 also for the
cost of electrical current allegedly used by OVEC for its alleged "illegal connection" to
Broadway Theater and for damages suffered by Sy as a result of such connection. Under the
third cause of action, it is alleged in the complaint that on February 11, 1980, OVEC had the
three theaters padlocked with the use of force, and that as a result, Sy suffered damages at
the rate of P5,000.00 a day, in view of his failure to go thru the contracts he had entered into
with movie and booking companies for the showing of movies at ABC. As fourth cause of
action, Sy prayed for the issuance of a restraining order/preliminary injunction to enjoin OVEC
and all persons employed by it from entering and taking possession of the three theaters,
conditioned upon Sy's filing of a P500,000.00 bond supplied by Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation (CBISCO).
OVEC on the other hand, alleged in its answer by way of counterclaims, that by reason of Sy's
violation of the terms of the subject lease agreement, OVEC became authorized to enter and
possess the three theaters in question and to terminate said agreement and the balance of the
deposits given by Sy to OVEC had thus become forfeited; that OVEC would be losing
P50,000.00 for every month that the possession and operation of said three theaters remain
with Sy and that OVEC incurred P500,000.00 for attorney's service.
The trial court arrived at the conclusions that Sy is not entitled to the reformation of the lease
agreement; that the repossession of the leased premises by OVEC after the cancellation and
termination of the lease was in accordance with the stipulation of the parties in the said
agreement and the law applicable thereto and that the consequent forfeiture of Sy's cash
deposit in favor of OVEC was clearly agreed upon by them in the lease agreement. The trial
court further concluded that Sy was not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction issued in
his favor after the commencement of the action and that the injunction bond filed by Sy is
liable for whatever damages OVEC may have suffered by reason of the injunction.
On the counterclaim of OVEC the trial court found that the said lessor was deprived of the
possession and enjoyment of the leased premises and also suffered damages as a result of the
filing of the case by Sy and his violation of the terms and conditions of the lease agreement.
Hence, it held that OVEC is entitled to recover the said damages in addition to the arrears in
rentals and amusement tax delinquency of Sy and the accrued interest thereon. From the
evidence presented, it found that as of the end of November, 1980, when OVEC finally
regained the possession of the three (3) theaters under lease, Sy's unpaid rentals and
amusement tax liability amounted to P289,534.78. In addition, it held that Sy was under
obligation to pay P10,000.00 every month from February to November, 1980 or the total
amount of P100,000.00 with interest on each amount of P10,000.00 from the time the same
became due. This P10,000.00 portion of the monthly lease rental was supposed to come from
the remaining cash deposit of Sy but with the consequent forfeiture of the remaining cash
deposit of P290,000.00, there was no more cash deposit from which said amount could be
deducted. Further, it adjudged Sy to pay attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the amounts
above-mentioned.
Finally, the trial court held Sy through the injunction bond liable to pay the sum of P10,000.00
every month from February to November, 1980. The amount represents the supposed
increase in rental from P50,000.00 to P60,000.00 in view of the offer of one RTG Productions,
Inc. to lease the three theaters involved for P60,000.00 a month.
From this decision of the trial court, Sy and (CBISCO) appealed the decision in toto while OVEC
appealed insofar as the decision failed to hold the injunction bond liable for an damages
awarded by the trial court.
The respondent Court of Appeals found no ambiguity in the provisions of the lease agreement.
It held that the provisions are fair and reasonable and therefore, should be respected and
enforced as the law between the parties. It held that the cancellation or termination of the
agreement prior to its expiration period is justified as it was brought about by Sy's own default
in his compliance with the terms of the agreement and not "motivated by fraud or greed." It
also affirmed the award to OVEC of the amount of P100,000.00 chargeable against the
injunction bond posted by CBISCO which was soundly and amply justified by the trial court.
The respondent Court likewise found no merit in OVECS appeal and held that the trial court
did not err in not charging and holding the injunction bond posted by Sy liable for all the
awards as the undertaking of CBISCO under the bond referred only to damages which OVEC
may suffer as a result of the injunction.
From this decision, CBISCO and Sy filed this instant petition on the following grounds:
A
PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO UNJUSTLY ENRICH OR BE
BENEFITTED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PETITIONERS.
B
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS CO D SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT SETTING OFF THE P100,000.00 SUPPOSED
DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE INJUNCTION AGAINST THE P290,000.00
REMAINING CASH DEPOSIT OF PETITIONER ENRIQUE SY.
C
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF
LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS COUNTER-CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE NECESSARY DOCKET
FEE. (p. 10, Rollo)
We find no merit in petitioners' argument that the forfeiture clause stipulated in the lease
agreement would unjustly enrich the respondent OVEC at the expense of Sy and CBISCO
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. A provision which calls for
the forfeiture of the remaining deposit still in the possession of the lessor, without prejudice
to any other obligation still owing, in the event of the termination or cancellation of the
agreement by reason of the lessee's violation of any of the terms and conditions of the
agreement is a penal clause that may be validly entered into. A penal clause is an accessory
obligation which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of insuring the
performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special presentation (generally consisting in
the payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or
inadequately fulfilled. (Eduardo P. Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law, Vol. IV, First
Edition, pp. 199-200) As a general rule, in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall
substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance.
This is specifically provided for in Article 1226, par. 1, New Civil Code. In such case, proof of
actual damages suffered by the creditor is not necessary in order that the penalty may be
demanded (Article 1228, New Civil Code). However, there are exceptions to the rule that the
penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of
non-compliance with the principal obligation. They are first, when there is a stipulation to the
contrary; second, when the obligor is sued for refusal to pay the agreed penalty; and third,
when the obligor is guilty of fraud (Article 1226, par. 1, New Civil Code). It is evident that in all
said cases, the purpose of the penalty is to punish the obligor. Therefore, the obligee can
recover from the obligor not only the penalty but also the damages resulting from the non-
fulfillment or defective performance of the principal obligation.
In the case at bar, inasmuch as the forfeiture clause provides that the deposit shall be deemed
forfeited, without prejudice to any other obligation still owing by the lessee to the lessor, the
penalty cannot substitute for the P100,000.00 supposed damage resulting from the issuance
of the injunction against the P290,000.00 remaining cash deposit. This supposed damage
suffered by OVEC was the alleged P10,000.00 a month increase in rental from P50,000.00 to
P60,000,00), which OVEC failed to realize for ten months from February to November, 1980 in
the total sum of P100,000.00. This opportunity cost which was duly proven before the trial
court, was correctly made chargeable by the said court against the injunction bond posted by
CBISCO. The undertaking assumed by CBISCO under subject injunction refers to "all such
damages as such party may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally
decide that the Plaintiff was/were not entitled thereto." (Rollo, p. 101) Thus, the respondent
Court correctly sustained the trial court in holding that the bond shall and may answer only for
damages which OVEC may suffer as a result of the injunction. The arrears in rental, the
unmeritted amounts of the amusement tax delinquency, the amount of P100,000.00
(P10,000.00 portions of each monthly rental which were not deducted from plaintiffs cash
deposit from February to November, 1980 after the forfeiture of said cash deposit on February
11, 1980) and attorney's fees which were all charged against Sy were correctly considered by
the respondent Court as damages which OVEC sustained not as a result of the injunction.
There is likewise no merit to the claim of petitioners that respondent Court committed serious
error of law and grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondent's counterclaim
for failure to pay the necessary docket fee, which is an issue raised for the first time in this
petition. Petitioners rely on the rule in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562 to the effect that all the proceedings held
in connection with a case where the correct docket fees are not paid should be peremptorily
be considered null and void because, for all legal purposes, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the case. It should be remembered however, that in Davao Light and Power
Co., Inc. v. Dinopol, G.R. 75195, August 19, 1988, 164 SCRA 748, this Court took note of the fact
that the assailed order of the trial court was issued prior to the resolution in the Manchester
case and held that its strict application to the case at bar would therefore be unduly harsh.
Thus, We allowed the amendment of the complaint by specifying the amount of damages
within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from notice and the re-assessment of the filing
fees. Then, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, G.R. 79937-38, February 3, 1989, 170
SCRA 274, We held that where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglemen tary period.
Nevertheless, OVEC's counterclaims are compulsory so no docket fees are required as the
following circumstances are present: (a) they arise out of or are necessarily connected with
the transaction or occurrence that is subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (b) they do
not require for their adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim (see Javier v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 75379, March 31, 1989, 171 SCRA 605). Whether the
respective claims asserted by the parties arise out of the same contract or transaction within
the limitation on counterclaims imposed by the statutes depends on a consideration of all the
facts brought forth by the parties and on a determination of whether there is some legal or
equitable relationship between the ground of recovery alleged in the counterclaim and the
matters alleged as the cause of action by the plaintiff (80 C.J.S. 48). As the counterclaims of
OVEC arise from or are necessarily connected with the facts alleged in the complaint for
reformation of instrument of Sy, it is clear that said counterclaims are compulsory.
ACCORDINGLY, finding no merit in the grounds relied upon by petitioners in their petition, the
same is hereby DENIED and the decision dated June 15, 1988 and the resolution dated
September 21, 1988, both of the respondent Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.



















G.R. No. 116279 January 29, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO CRISTOBAL, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice
and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to
which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is
always an intrinsically evil act,
1
an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the
victim but the society itself.
The pain rape causes becomes more excruciating when the victim carries the life of an unborn
within her womb. That tender and innocent life, born of love and its parents' participation in
the mystery of life, is thereby placed in undue danger. Such was the case of Cherry Tamayo, a
married woman. She was twenty-eight years old, with one child and another on the way, when
tragedy struck. She was sexually assaulted on 31 March 1986. Fortunately, the life in her
womb survived.
She accused Rogelio Cristobal of rape in a sworn complaint
2
filed with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Maddela, Quirino, on 8 April 1986.
Having found sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime charged has
been committed and the accused was probably guilty thereof, the court ruled that the accused
should be held for trial.
3
Accordingly, it issued a warrant for his arrest
4
and fixed his bail bond
at P17,000.00.
5
The accused was arrested but was later released on bail.
6
Thereafter, the
court increased the amount of bail to P30,000.00 and, consequently, ordered the rearrest of
the accused.
7
Unfortunately, by this time, he was nowhere to be found.
On 26 August 1986, the MTC ordered the case to be "sent to the files without prejudice to its
subsequent prosecution as soon as the defendant is apprehended."
8
Almost a year after, or
specifically on 24 August 1987, the said court ordered the records of the case to be forwarded
to the Provincial Fiscal for proper disposition.
9

On 15 September 1987, the Provincial Fiscal of Quirino filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cabarroguis, Quirino, an information
10
charging accused Rogelio Cristobal with the crime of
rape committed as follows:
That between the hours of 12:00 to 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 31, 1986 in
Barangay San Dionisio I, Municipality of Maddela, Province of Quirino, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of
force, threat and intimidation and with lewd design, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with one CHERRY A. TAMAYO against the will of the latter.
That the aggravating circumstance of the accused having committed the crime in
uninhabited place attended the commission of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 604 and assigned to Branch 32 of the said court.
A warrant of arrest was issued on 18 October 1987. Because it was returned unserved,
an alias warrant of arrest was issued on 1 February 1988, which was also returned unserved.
The trial court then ordered the archival of the case and the arrest of the accused.
11

It was only on 27 July 1993 when accused Rogelio Cristobal was arrested and detained at the
provincial jail.
12
On 21 October 1993, the Provincial Prosecutor filed a Manifestation for the
revival of the case,
13
which the court favorably acted upon.
14

Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the offended party, Cherry Tamayo, and the physician who
conducted a medical examination on her, Dr. Mercedita S. Erni-Reta. The defense presented
the accused Rogelio Cristobal and his employer, Wilfredo Manzano, who is married to the
accused's cousin, Emilia Manzano. Being merely corroborative to the testimonies of the first
two defense witnesses that at the time of the alleged commission of the crime the accused
was hired by the Manzano spouses to plow their field,
15
the testimony of Mrs. Emilia Manzano
was admitted by the prosecution to expedite the disposition of the case.
16

The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
In the morning of 31 March 1986, Cherry Tamayo, a resident of Barangay San Dionisio I,
Maddela, Quirino, went to the nearby Bilala Creek to wash her family's clothes. She was alone.
At around midday, between the hours of 12:00 and 1:00 and after accomplishing her task, she
decided to take a bath in the creek. She was about to start when somebody held her neck
from behind and thereafter forcibly laid her down the ground. Only then did she recognize her
attacker, the accused Rogelio Cristobal. Cherry managed to stand up and run away, but
Rogelio caught up with her and delivered two fistblows to her stomach. Not content with this,
Rogelio, while viciously holding her hair, pressed down Cherry's face into the water. Rogelio
then took her three meters away from the creek and forcibly laid her down on the ground.
Because of her weakened and pregnant state, Cherry could not struggle any further. Rogelio
removed her clothes and panties. He then went on top of her, inserted his private organ into
hers, and succeeded in satisfying his lust on her.
17
Afterwhich, he slapped and threatened
Cherry with death if she would talk.
18

The threat went unheeded as Cherry, upon reaching her home, immediately told her husband
of what had happened to her. Her husband accompanied her to the police station of Maddela,
Quirino, to report the incident and then to Dr. Mercedita Erni-Reta for medical examination.
19

Dr. Erni-Reta found that Cherry's vaginal canal had a laceration at the erythematous border at
2:00 and chemoses at 3:00 at the vaginal os.
20
On the witness stand, Dr. Erni-Reta confirmed
these findings.
21
She added that, upon internal examination, she found seminal fluid in the
vaginal canal which must have been there for no longer than twenty-four hours.
22

The defense, on the other hand, established the following to refute the version of the
prosecution:
On 31 March 1986, Rogelio Cristobal was plowing the land of the spouses Wilfredo and Emilia
Manzano located in Salay, San Agustin, Isabela. He started plowing at 7:00 a.m. and went with
Wilfredo to the latter's home for lunch at around 11:00 a.m.. Emilia was with them for lunch.
The three of them talked until 2:00 p.m.. He went home thereafter, attended to his children,
and then brought out his carabao to graze in Talaytay, Dagubog Grande, which is about 200
meters away from his house.
23
Then he went to the house of Melchor Cristobal. While he was
at Melchor's house, a policeman by the name of Jimmy Benedicto arrested him for the crime
of rape and brought him to Councilor Benjamin Dumlao. He was subsequently taken to the
166th PC Detachment in San Dionisio, Maddela, Quirino, where he was interrogated and
where he spent the night. In the morning, he was brought to the municipal court to face the
charges filed against him.
24

In its decision
25
dated 28 March 1994, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the complainant, Cherry Tamayo, in the amount of P30,000.00.
The trial court found clear and convincing the categorical testimony of Cherry Tamayo of
having been accosted from behind, knocked to the ground, boxed, submerged in water, taken
three meters from the creek, and raped.
26
In view of her positive identification of the accused,
it disregarded the defense of alibi set up by the latter, which it found to be a weak one. It ruled
that for the defense of alibi to prosper the accused must show physical impossibility to be at
the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. The accused was within three kilometers
only from Bilala Creek where the rape was committed. Such distance is near enough to cover
by walking in a matter of thirty minutes.
27
It was not, therefore, physically impossible for him
to be at the crime scene at the time the crime was committed.
In this appeal, the accused contends that the trial court erred in (1) convicting him on the basis
of the private complainant's inconsistent testimony, and (2) not giving due weight to his
defense of alibi.
28

The Appellee disagrees with him and prays that the assailed decision be affirmed with
modification of the award for moral damages, which should be increased from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00.
29

Central to the accused's assigned errors is the issue of the credibility of the complainant. It has
long been settled that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
30
It has been aptly said:
In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation Of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe
them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between
fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That
line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the
reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth
or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden
pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright
tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or
looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort
or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in remembered pain,
or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis
of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.
31

This rule admits of exceptions, such as when the evaluation was reached arbitrarily, when the
trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which could affect the result of the case.
32
None of these exceptions exists in
this case.
It is also settled that when a woman Says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that she has been raped, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility
the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
33

Moreover, the accused was unable to prove any ill motive on the part of the complainant. In
fact, in his answer to the court's questions, he categorically stated that there was no grudge
between him and the complainant.
34
Where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason
or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or
falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the said testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
35

Additionally, no married woman in her right mind, like Cherry Tamayo, would subject herself
to public scrutiny and humiliation in order to perpetuate a falsehood. Neither would she take
the risk of being alienated from her husband and her family. If Cherry Tamayo then resolved to
face the ordeal and relate in public what many similarly situated would have kept secret, she
did so simply to obtain justice.
To cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant, the accused cites an inconsistency in the
testimony of the complainant. He points out that at first, the complainant said that her panties
were removed by the accused while she was already lying down, but later she said that it was
before she was laid down on the ground that the accused stripped her of her panties. The
accused failed to elevate this inconsistency to the level of a major one sufficient to strip the
complainant of credibility. Being too trivial, such inconsistency does not rock the pedestal
upon which the complainant's credibility rests. In fact, it enhances her credibility, as it
manifests spontaneity and lack of scheming.
36

As to the second assigned error, the accused submits that although as a general rule alibi is a
weak defense, it gained strength in this case in the light of the aforementioned inconsistency
in the complainant's testimony. We are not persuaded. Since, as discussed above, such
inconsistency does not pierce the complainant's credibility, the, second assigned error has
therefore no leg to stand on.
The alibi of the accused thus maintains its weak and impotent state. For the defense of alibi to
prosper, it must establish the physical impossibility for the accused to be present at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission.
37
The accused's testimony placing himself
somewhere else was corroborated by the testimony of Wilfredo and Emilia Manzano. But he
failed to establish physical impossibility because the alibi places him within only three
kilometers from where the crime was committed, a manageable distance to travel in a few
minutes.
For sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has shown moral corruption,
perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The
imposition then of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from committing
similar acts or for correction for the public good
38
is warranted.
39
We hereby fix it at
P25,000.00.
Pursuant to the current policy of this Court, the moral damages awarded by the trial court
should be increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the decision of Branch 32 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, in Criminal Case No. 604 convicting the accused ROGELIO
CRISTOBAL of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED, subject to the foregoing modifications. As
modified, the award of moral damages is increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00, and the
accused is further ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Costs
against the accused.





















G.R. No. L-31931 August 31, 1988
FORTUNATO DE LEON & JUANA F. GONZALES-DE LEON, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Sixth Division composed of Justices Concepcion, Serrano &
San Diego) DR. CORNELIO S. TANTOCO and JUAN BRIONES represented by Administratrix
MAGDALENA BERNARDO, respondents-appellees.
Fortunato de Leon, Celso B. Jamora and Guillermo B. Ilagan for petitioners-appellants.
Jose B. Puerto for respondent-appellee Juan Briones.
Diogracias T. Reyes & Associates and Jose M. Luison for respondent-appellee Cornelio S.
Tantoco.

PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision * of the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) in
C.A., G.R. No. 40201-R promulgated on February 21, 1970 affirming the judgment ** of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, with modification of the amount of moral and exemplary
damages from P100,000.00 to P60,000.00 and the amount of attorney's fees from P10,000.00
to P5,000.00 the dispositive portion of which appellate court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified as above indicated
respecting the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
The rest are hereby affirmed with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. (pp. 6-7,
Decision of the Court of Appeals; pp. 61-62, Rollo)
The facts of the case as drawn by respondent court from the evidence on record are quoted as
follows:
The third-party defendants spouses Juan Briones and Magdalena Bernardo were
the former registered owners of the fishpond situated at San Roque, Paombong,
Bulcacan, which was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 28296 (Exhibit 2).
This fishpond was the subject of a deed of mortgage executed by the spouses
Briones on January 22, 1954, in favor of Hermogenes Tantoco involving the
consideration of P20,000.00 (Exh. 2), which amount was later assigned by the
mortgagee to his father herein defendant and thirdparty plaintiff Dr. Cornelio S.
Tantoco (Exh. 10). Apart from this first mortgage, the spouses Briones likewise
executed a deed of second mortgage for P68,824.00 with 10% interest per annum
in favor of Cornelio S. Tantoco dated May 26, 1959 (Exh. 1). Both mortgages were
duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan and duly
annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 28296 (Exh. 2) of the
Briones. While these two mortgages were still subsisting the Briones spouses sold
the fishpond, which is the subject matter of said two mortgages, to plaintiff
spouses Fortunato de Leon and Juana F. Gonzales de Leon in the amount of
P120,000.00 (Exh. 5). Of the amount of P120,000.00, the Briones spouses actually
received only the amount of P31,000.00 on June 2, 1959, as the amount of
P89,000.00 was withheld by the plaintiff de Leon who assumed to answer the
mortgage indebtedness of the Briones to the Tantocos (Exhs. 3, 3-a, 3-a-1 to 3-b).
After the sale plaintiffs de Leon satisfied the mortgage loan of P20,000.00
including 10% interest per annum to Hermogenes Tantoco who then accordingly
executed a deed of discharge of mortgage (Exhs. Z & Z-1), but the mortgage in
favor of Cornelio S. Tantoco in the amount of P68,824 was not satisfied. On
February 5, 1962 plaintiffs made payment of P29,382.50 to the defendant
Cornelio Tantocos." (Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 23).
In his letter to private respondent Cornelio Tantoco dated February 5, 1962, petitioner
Fortunato de Leon made it clear that he was tendering the sum of P29,382.50, represented by
PNB Cashier's Check No. 119874 in full discharge of the legitimate obligation of his clients, the
spouses Juan Briones and Magdalena Bernardo. He requested acknowledgment of the receipt
of his letter and the execution of the necessary document (Exhibits, p. 103). Through counsel
private respondent, trying to set the records straight for petitioners, made the clarification
that the principal obligation of the Briones as of May 25, 1959 was P68,824.00 and on January
26, 1962 when a letter of demand was sent to them their total obligation including the agreed
interest amounted to P88,888.98. Hence the above mentioned PNB check will be held in
abeyance pending remittance of the total obligation after which the necessary document will
be executed (Exhibits, p. 105).
On April 5, 1962 Juan Briones executed an affidavit denying ever having hired petitioner
Fortunato de Leon as counsel nor having authorized petitioner to pay any obligation of his to
private respondent for as a matter of fact all obligations he had with private respondent had
been assumed by petitioner in a document executed by petitioner himself in his own
handwriting (Exhibits, p. 108).
On May 8, 1962 the spouses Fortunato de Leon and Juana F. de Leon, petitioners herein, filed
a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan against defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco,
respondent herein, Civil Case No. 2554, for discharge of mortgage (Record on Appeal, p. 4). On
May 31, 1962 defendant filed his answer with counterclaim and third party complaint against
the Briones spouses with petition for leave to file third party complaint (Record on Appeal, p.
7). He alleged by way of special and affirmative defenses, among others, that the true and real
amount of obligation of the Briones spouses is the sum of P68,824.00, Philippine currency,
with 10% interest secured by a second mortgage in favor of defendant, executed and signed
by the Briones spouses on May 26,1959, which deed of second mortgage was duly registered
in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos, Bulacan on May 27, 1959 and properly
annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 28296 issued in the names of Juan
Briones and Magdalena Bernardo; that the amount of P29,382.50 sent by plaintiff as alleged
counsel of the spouses Juan Briones and Magdalena Bernardo was accepted by the said
defendant as part payment or partial extinguishment of the mortgage loan of P68,824.00 with
10% interest thereon per annum from May 22, 1959, and plaintiffs have been informed of the
tenor of said acceptance and application thereof as partial payment of the mortgage
obligation in question; and, that defendant did not accede to the demand of the plaintiff to
have the mortgage lien on the property in question cancelled or discharged because the full
amount of the mortgage debt of P68,824.00 plus the 10% interest thereon from May 22, 1959
has not yet been fully paid either by the plaintiffs or by the spouses Juan Briones and
Magdalena Bernardo. Defendant prayed under the counterclaim that plaintiffs be ordered to
pay defendant the following amounts:
(1) P62,245.04 plus lO% interest thereon per annum from May 22, 1962 until the
full amount thereon has been paid in the event that the assumption of obligation
(Annex "2") is found by the Court to be true, valid and binding between the
parties thereto;
(2) P100,000.00 for moral damages with 6% interest thereon from the date of the
filing of the counterclaim until full payment thereof;
(3) P10,000.00 for exemplary damages with 6% interest thereon from the date of
the filing of the counterclaim until full payment thereof; and
(4) P5,000.00 for attorney's fee with 6% interest thereon from the date of the
filing of the counterclaim until full payment thereof."
On June 8, 1962 plaintiffs filed an answer to defendants' counterclaim, by way of counterclaim
to the counterclaim and praying for judgment (Record on Appeal, p. 24) as follows:
A. Dismissing defendants' counterclaim with costs against them;
B. Sentencing defendants to pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of P200,00o.oo by
way of moral damages with legal interest thereon from date hereof;
C. Sentencing defendants to pay not less than P20,000.00 to Plaintiffs by way of
exemplary damages with legal interest from date hereof;
D. Sentencing defendants to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 by way of
actual damages;
E. Declaring the lien on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25079 of plaintiffs duly
discharged;
F. Ordering defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco to execute the covering Release and
Discharge of Mortgage;
G. Ordering defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco to return his mortgagee's copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25079 to the Register of Deeds of Bulacan;
H. Sentencing defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco to pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of
P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees;
I. Plaintiffs further pray for such additional relief just and proper in the premises.
On June 22, 1962, long before defendant's third party complaint was admitted, the Briones
spouses filed an answer to the third-party complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 32) which was
stricken out by order of the trial court dated September 3, 1962 (Record on Appeal, p. 35) on
petition of plaintiffs dated July 18, 1962 (Record on Appeal, p. 33). Third-party defendants filed
their second answer to third-party complaint on October 6, 1962, virtually confessing
judgment in behalf of third-party plaintiff (Record on Appeal, p. 35). They alleged by way of
special and affirmative defense that plaintiff Fortunato de Leon at the time of the sale knew of
the obligations of herein third-party defendants to third-party plaintiff and as a matter of fact
said plaintiff assumed said obligations.
On July 29,1963 Magdalena Bernardo Vda. de Briones was substituted third-party defendant
as administratrix of the estate of Juan Briones who died in the course of the proceedings, upon
petition of defendant Tantoco (Record on Appeal, p. 64).
On September 16, 1963 plaintiffs filed a petition for leave to intervene in defendant's third-
party complaint, with their answer in intervention, which was granted by the Court on October
14, 1963 (Record on Appeal, p. 64).
On May 16, 1967 the trial court rendered its decision on the case (Record on Appeal, p. 74) the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering: the dismissal of the
complaint; payment by its plaintiffs to the defendant Third-party plaintiff by way
of counterclaim the sum of P64,921.00 wth interest thereon at 10% per annum
from February 5, 1962 until fully paid; payment by plaintiff to defendant the sum
of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and the further sum of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; payment of costs of plaintiff.
On appeal respondent Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification
respecting the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. Petitioner
spouses filed on March 7, 1970 their motion for reconsideration of the decision of respondent
court which motion was denied on April 20, 1970. On April 23, 1979 petitioners filed their
motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration.
On July 5, 1970, barely two days before the expiration date of the period of appeal with their
motion still unacted upon, petitioners filed with this Court their motion for extension of time
to file petition for certiorari by way of appeal (Rollo, p. 1) which motion was granted in the
Resolution of May 8, 1970 (Rollo, p. 2). The motion to file a second motion for reconsideration
was denied by respondent Court on May 15, 1970 (Rollo, p. 53).
The instant petition for certiorari by way of appeal with preliminary injunction was filed with
this Court on May 20, 1970 (Rollo, P. 7).
In the resolution of June 8, 1970 the petition was given due course solely on the issue of the
propriety of the award made by the respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco in "the amount of P60,000
in the concept of moral and exemplary damages" (Rollo, p. 75).
On June 20, 1970 petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court dated
June 8, 1979 (Rollo, p. 82), to include other issues.
On the same date private respondent Corn elio Tantoco moved for the issuance of partial
entry of final judgment with respect to the portion of the decision appealed from which is not
the subject of the instant appeal by certiorari (Rollo, p. 102).
On June 25, 1970 the Court resolved to require respondents to comment on the
aforementioned motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 101). Said comment was filed on July 8,
1970 (Rollo, p. 109).
On July 8, 1970 petitioner spouses filed a consolidated opposition to private respondent
Tantoco motion for partial entry of final judgment and reply to his manifestation-motion
(Rollo, p. 121) and on July 9, 1970 filed a reply to respondent Tantoco's motion to dismiss
appeal (Rollo, p. 128).
On July 20, 1970 the Court resolved among others to deny: (1) respondent Tantoco's motion
to dismiss appeal; (2) petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Court's resolution of June
8, 1970; and (3) respondent Tantoco's motion for partial entry of judgment insofar as the
portion of the decision appealed from which is not the subject of the instant appeal by
certiorari is concerned, without prejudice to respondent's presenting the same motion to
respondent Court of Appeals for consideration and action at the proper time (Rollo, p. 133).
Respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco filed with this Court on July 21, 1970 reply to consolidated
opposition and rejoinder to reply to respondent Tantoco's motion to dismiss appeal (Rollo, p.
134).
Brief for petitioners was filed on August 5, 1970 (Rollo, p. 159); brief for respondents was filed
on October 28, 1970 (Rollo, p. 187).
On November 14,1970 petitioners filed an "Urgent Petition ex-parte For Issuance of
Restraining Order and To Declare Respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco Guilty of Contempt of
Court" stating that respondent Tantoco filed with the Court of Appeals on August 14, 1970 the
same motion for partial entry of judgment which was filed with this Court and denied in the
resolution of July 20, 1970 but which was granted by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of
October 31, 1970 over petitioners-appellants' objection (Rollo, p. 192). On November 18, 1970
respondents were required to comment thereon (Rollo, p. 197) and the required comment
was filed by private respondent on November 26, 1970 (Rollo, p. 200).
On December 2, 1970 a partial remanding of the records of this case to the Court of Appeals
was made in compliance with Section 11 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court (Rollo, P. 220).
The Reply brief of the petitioners was filed on December 3, 1970 (Rollo, p. 210). On the same
date petitioners-appellants' "Urgent Petition for Issuance of Restraining Order and To Declare
Respondent Cornelio's Tantoco Guilty of Contempt of Court" was denied. (Rollo, p. 212).
On February 12, 1971 petitioners spouses again filed a petition for issuance of a restraining
order (Rollo, p. 227) and private respondent was required to comment thereon (Rollo, p. 233).
Said comment was filed on February 23, 1971 (Rollo, p. 236).
On February 24, 1971 petitioner spouses filed an urgent manifestation informing the Court of
the urgency of the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction because the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan had presumably granted respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco's
motion for partial execution of judgment in an order dated February 11, 1971 which
petitioners had not yet received, notwithstanding petitioners' urgent motion to postpone
hearing of same scheduled for February 15, 1971 because of the pendency of petitioner's
motion before this Court for issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunctions
filed on February 11, 1971 (Rollo, p. 241). In the resolution of February 26, 1971 private
respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco was required to comment thereon (Rollo, p. 248) and said
comment was filed by respondent on March 6, 1971 (Rollo, p. 251). In the resolution of March
10, 1971 petitioners' petition for issuance of a restraining order was denied (Rollo, p. 265).
Petitioners assign the following errors (Brief for Petitioners, p. 1):
I.
The respondent Court erred in awarding in favor of respondent Cornelio S.
Tantoco moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P60,000.00 in the
absence of supporting evidence and reasons notwithstanding that no actual and
compensatory damages have been allegedly proved and awarded in respondent's
favor.
II.
The respondent Court erred in awarding P5,000.00 attorney's fees in favor of
respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco and in sentencing petitioners de Leons to pay
same; instead of awarding the latter (Petitioners) reasonable attorney's fees as
prayed for in their complaint.
III.
The respondent Court erred in sentencing herein petitioners de Leons to pay
respondent Tantoco P60,000.00 moral and exemplary damages and P5,000.00
attorney's fees when there exist no contractual or juridical relations whatsoever
between them.
IV.
That the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of February 21, 1970 and its
adverse Resolutions of April 20, 1970 and of May 15, 1970 are all nullities.
In accordance with the Resolution of the Court dated June 8, 1970 (Rollo, p. 75) the sole issue
that has to be resolved by the Court is the question of whether or not the award of P60,000.00
in the concept of moral and exemplary damages is proper.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 625
[1984]; Bagumbayan Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 132 SCRA 441 [1984]; Guita
v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 576 [1985]); (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148
SCRA 440 [1987]). On the other hand, jurisprudence sets certain conditions when exemplary
damages may be awarded, to wit: (1) They may be imposed by way of example or correction
only in addition, among others, to compensatory damages and cannot be recovered as a
matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages
that may be awarded to the claimant; (2) the claimant must first establish his right to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages; and (3) the wrongful act must be
accompanied by bad faith, and the award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolant manner (Octot v. Ybaez, III SCRA 79
[1982]); Sweet Lines, Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 121 SCRA 769 [19831); Dee Hua Liong Electrical
Equipment Corporation v. Reyes, 145 SCRA 713 [1985]); Tan Kapoc v. Masa, 134 SCRA 231
[1985]). It may be awarded for breach of contract or quasicontract as when a telegraph
company personnel transmitted the wrong telegram (Radio Communication of the Philippines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 359 [1981].
Respondent Court found malice in petitioners'refusal to satisfy respondent Tantocos lawful
claim and in their subsequent filing of the present case against respondent, and took into
consideration the worries and mental anxiety of respondent as a result thereof. In the words
of respondent court:
The evidence shows that plaintiff-appellants'refusal to satisfy appellee's lawful
claims clearly amounted to malice on their part when they filed the present case
resulting as it were in worries and mental anxiety of the defendant Tantoco who
was dragged to court to litigate this case for almost 10 years up to now. He was
even branded as a money lender, and accused forgery and of entering into
collusion with the end in view of extracting extra amount ... from the herein
plaintiff. All these tried to picture defendant Cornelio Tantoco with alleged
dishonesty who respecting the legitimate obligation of the Briones to defendant
Cornelio Tantoco, thereby blemishing his honor, integrity and reputation as a
prominent doctor and a businessman. With all these extant circumstances which
served as a guidepost for us in determining the reasonable amount of damages
sustained by the defendant-appellee, this Court hereby fixes the amount of
P60,000.00 representing moral and exemplary damages and the further sum of
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, which plaintiffs-appellants should pay the
defendant-appellee. (Rollo, p. 61)
As a lawyer in the practice of law since his admission to the Bar in 1929, who has held several
important positions in the government (TSN, April 22, 1965, p. 127) petitioner Fortunato de
Leon could not have missed the import of the annotation at the back of TCT No. 28296
regarding the second mortgage for the sum of sixty eight thousand eight hundred twenty-four
pesos (P68,824.00) of the property he was buying, in favor of respondent Cornelio Tantoco,
entry No. 54835 in the registry of deeds of Bulacan (Exhibits, p. 93). The same annotation was
transferred to TCT No. T-25079 in the name of petitioner after the sale of the property was
effected and entered in the registry of deeds of Bulacan on June 3, 1959 (Exhibits, p. 102).
Furthermore, petitioners cannot deny having assumed the mortgage debts of the Briones
spouses amounting to P89,000.00 in favor of the Tantocos. The "Patunay" (Exhibits 3-a)
executed by the Briones spouses on June 3, 1959 gives the information that their property,
and fishpond, was sold by them to the spouses Fortunato de Leon and Juana F. Gonzales for
the amount of one hundred twenty thousand pesos (Pl20,000.00), payment made to them, as
follows:
Pinanagutan
na aming
pagkakautang
kay

G.
Hermogenes
Tantoco
hanggang
Mayo 1959
P
89,000.00
Cash na
tinanggap
namin PBC
Check No.
57040
11,000.00
Pagare No. 1
Junio 1, 1959
10,000.00
Pagare No. 2
Junio 1, 1959
10,000.00
Kabuuan P
120,000.00
At the bottom of the "Patunay" in the handwriting of petitioner Fortunato de Leon is a
statement signed by him (Exh. 3b) signifying that he was assuming the spouses'debt of
P89,000.00 to respondent Tantoco, in the following words:
Ang pagkautang na P89,000.00 sa mga Tantoco ay aking inaasumihan. (Exhibits, p.
97).
Petitioner retained P89,000.00 out of the P120,000.00, representing the mortgage loan of the
Briones spouses to the Tantocos, including interest. Immediately after the sale of the fishpond
was effected and registered with the registry of deeds of Bulacan petitioner paid the
P20,000.00 loan of the Briones spouses to Hermogenes Tantoco including 10% interest on the
loan, covered by a first mortgage on the property. Accordingly, Hermogenes Tantoco executed
a deed of discharge from the mortgage. Out of the P68,000.00 mortgage loan of the Briones
spouses from respondent Cornelio Tantoco, petitioner, however made only a payment of
P29,382.50 but would want respondent to execute the necessary discharge document. The
documents speak for themselves. They are mute but plain and visible evidence of the
deliberate intent of petitioner to defraud respondent of the amount withheld from the Briones
spouses to cover the amount of the mortgage loan in favor of respondent.
The filing of the case against respondent being unfounded and maliciously prosecuted
satisfactorily proves the existence of the factual basis for moral damages and the causal
relation to petitioners' acts (Hawpia v. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 535 [1967]; Ventura v.
Bernabe, 38 SCRA 587 [1971]; Enervida v. de la Torre, 55 SCRA 340 [1974]; Tan Kapoe v. Masa,
134 SCRA 231 [1985]). Private respondent has a good name to protect. He is a surgeon by
profession, had been Chief of the Bulacan Provincial Hospital since 1946 until he put up a
hospital of his own, the Rosary General Hospital.He is a member of the Knights of Columbus, a
Cursillista, a member of the Lions, a fellow of the Philippine College of Surgeons in good
standing from 1946 up to the present, a member of the Philippine Medical Association and of
the Bulacan Medical Association. He has been humiliated, embarrassed, maligned and has
been charged in bad faith as a money lender in petitioner's complaint accusing him of
defrauding the Briones spouses (TSN, pp. 227-250).
The entitlement to moral damages having been established the award of exemplary damages
is proper (Bert Osmea & Associates v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 395 [1983]; Tan Kapoe v.
Masa, 134 SCRA 231 [1985]).
While the award of moral and exemplary damages in an aggregate amount may not be the
usual way of awarding said damages there is no question of respondent's entitlement to moral
and exemplary damage (Tan Kapoe v. Masa, supra). The amount should be reduced, however,
for being excessive compared to the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party
(Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440 [1987]). Moral damages though
incapable of pecuniary estimations, are in the category of an award designed to compensate
the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty of the wrongdoer (San
Andres v. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 85 [1982] cited in Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport
System, Inc. supra).
Time and again the Court has ruled that "moral damages are emphatically not intended to
enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable the
injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendants' culpable action" (Grand Union
Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., 94 SCRA 966 [1979]); R & B Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 736 [1984]; Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System,
Inc.,supra).
In the case of Miranda Ribaya v. Bautista (95 SCRA 672 [1980]), this Court considered 25% of
the principal amount as reasonable. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found on February
21, 1970 that the outstanding balance of the disputed loan was P64,921.69. Twenty five
percent thereof is P16,230.00 but considering the depreciation of the Philippine peso today, it
is believed that the award of moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is
reasonable.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but the
aggregate award of moral and exemplary damages is reduced to P25,000.00.




















G.R. No. 171271 August 31, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in an amended
Information
1
that reads:
That on or about the 12th of February, 2001, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with
intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y
Sua on the different parts of her body with the use of a deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon
said Evelyn Kho y Sua stab wounds, which directly caused her death; that the act was
committed inside the dwelling of Evelyn Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the
respect due to the offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are as follows:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998. The latter
worked as the managing partner of the Lawyers Advocate Circle, a law firm operated as a sole
proprietorship, and located at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31 Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Juan, M.M.
Accused was initially paid P6,000.00 a month as wages, aside from boarding, food, overtime
and extra pay, which he received when he did extra driving and other work for Atty. Sua-Khos
family.
On February 12, 2001, at around 6:00 oclock in the evening, the accused drove Atty. Sua Kho
to her condominium unit at 1702 Platinum 2000, Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Jun M.M. After
handing his employers bag to Marissa Hiso, the housemaid, accused proceeded to the kitchen
where he drank a glass of water. Also in the condominium unit were Atty. Sua-Khos three year
old daughter Issa and her nanny, Nelie Maglasang. After talking and playing with her daughter
for a few minutes, Atty. Sua-Kho emerged from the bedroom to talk with the accused. Shortly
thereafter, Marrisa heard her employer screaming, and she saw the accused stabbing her with
their kitchen knife. She tried to stop the accused, shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the latter
continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. Meanwhile, Nelie also heard her employers screams, and
locked herself with Issa in the masters bathroom. When she peeped-out from her hiding
place, she saw Marissa, whom she signaled to go downstairs for help. The latter did so, and
sought help from the security guard. Nellie, meanwhile called Atty. Sua-Khos father,
Marcelino Sua, and husband, Daniel Kho, on the bedroom phone.
When Marcelino Sua arrived, he saw Marissa and a security guard in front of the condominium
unit. When they entered, they saw the bloodied and unmoving body of Atty. Sua-Kho sprawled
on the floor. Marcelino then brought his daughter to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital,
where doctors tried to revive her, but failed. The accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victims
car. He was arrested soon afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on his way to his home
province.
Upon examination of the victims body, Dr. Edgardo Rodriguez Vida found that she suffered
eighteen (18) stab wounds and three (3) incise wounds aside from other minor injuries. The
stab wounds on her chest were considered fatal as they affected both lungs, the main blood
vessel of the heart and the heart itself. There were four stab wounds on the heart, one on the
right lung and four on the left lung. According to the doctor, the wounds could have been
caused by a sharp single-bladed object and that the incise wounds found on the left forearm,
right wrist and left leg could have been inflicted while Atty. Sua-Kho tried to parry the blows.
Marian Aquino, legal secretary of the Lawyers Advocate Circle, where the victim worked,
related that prior to the killing of Atty. Sua-Kho, the accused had confided to her about his
grudges against the victim, such as being given spoiled food, that his meals were being
measured, that he worked long hours of the day and served many bosses. On February 11,
2001, accused spent the day at her boarding house where he told her he could no longer take
the way Atty. Sua-Kho treated him. Later he said "nadedemonyo na ako" and that he would
finish Atty. Sua-Kho. He would hit her at the back, very deep, and he would make sure that she
would die. Then he would go to the province, his territory, where he could not be followed.
Atty. Joel Baguio, an associate at the Lawyers Advocate Circle, also testified that before the
killing, the accused told him of his grudges against Atty. Sua-Kho, like his being scolded for
being late, and being called a thief, a killer, and ex-convict and other bad names. On February
12, 2001, the accused also told him not to get too close, as he might get involved in what was
going to happen.
The accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of self-defense. Atty. Sua-Kho, he testified,
didnt want her husband to know that she had been taking trips with a company guest, a
certain Phillip Robinson, to Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls in Tanay. She warned the accused
that something bad would happen to him if her husband would learn about it. In the evening
of February 12, 2001, Atty. Sua-Kho urged accused to go to her fathers house, because her
husband Daniel Kho would be arriving. As she and the accused argued about Phillip Robinson,
the former got a knife and stabbed him with it, catching him on the wrist. Accused managed to
wrest control of the knife, and with it, stabbed Atty. Sua-Kho three or four times. After he
stabbed her he was shocked and left the place using the victims car. He fled to Mindoro
where he allegedly surrendered to the police.
2

On March 26, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused, Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to
suffer the severe penalty of death by lethal injection with all the accessory penalties provided
by law and to pay the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused, he is ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victim actual,
moral, nominal, exemplary and temperate damages in the respective sums of P298,202.25,
P50,000.00, P200,000.00, P200,000.00 and P50,000.00. He is also ordered to pay the victims
heirs P50,000.00 for the loss of the victims life, all with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6
percent per annum from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
3

The case was elevated to this Court because the penalty imposed was death. However,
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,
4
the case was transferred and referred to the Court
of Appeals.
5

On October 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS, in that, the accused-appellant, having been found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder, is hereby sentenced to Death. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
victim the following:
(1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P298,202.25 as actual damages; and
(4) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
The awards of temperate and nominal damages are hereby DELETED.
Since the imposition of the death penalty in this case was affirmed, this Decision and the
complete records of this case are hereby ordered TRANSMITTED to the Supreme Court on
automatic review, immediately upon the promulgation of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
6

The Court of Appeals disregarded appellants claim of self defense for lack of evidence and for
being incredible considering the number and location of wounds sustained by the victim and
his flight from the crime scene. It also noted that treachery did not attend the commission of
the crime as there were no particulars as to how the killing began or executed.
However, the appellate court found that evident premeditation was adequately established
which qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated abuse of superior strength as an
aggravating circumstance.
As regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the rank, sex and age of the
victim, the Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were included as amendments to
the information after the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same
should not be allowed because it will prejudice the rights of the appellant.
In a Resolution dated March 7, 2006, we required both parties to file supplemental briefs. The
Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it will no longer be filing a supplemental brief.
On the other hand, appellant insisted on his theory of self defense and prayed for his acquittal.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that appellants claim of
self-defense is self-serving hence should not be given credence. In Cabuslay v. People,
7
we
ruled that:
One who invokes self defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly, the burden of
proof shifts to the accused who must then prove the justifying circumstance. He must show by
clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative
or a stranger. With clear and convincing evidence, all the following elements of self defense
must be established: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person claiming self defense.
Appellants version of the stabbing incident does not inspire belief. His testimony that it was
Atty. Sua-Kho who attacked him is uncorroborated and improbable. Appellants alleged use of
reasonable means to repel the aggression is also untenable considering the nature and
number of wounds inflicted on the victim which demonstrate a determined effort to kill the
victim and not just defend oneself.
8
We note that the victim suffered 18 stab wounds which
were all directed to her chest, heart and lungs. She also had incised wounds which were
inflicted while she was parrying the blows coming from the appellant. In fact, appellant
testified that Atty. Sua-Kho was running away from him but he still pursued her and inflicted
the fatal wounds:
Q: According to you, Atty. launched at you and you covered and cut on your left hand and that
was the time you got the knife and what happened after that?
A: What I remember is that she went inside.
Q: So, she run (sic) away from you, is that what you are saying?
A: When I was hit and I was able to stab her, she ran towards the room.
Q: So she was trying to avoid [you] after she stabbed you the first time?
A: I do not know, what I know is that when I stabbed her, she went inside the room.
Q: What part of the body did you hit her the first time?
A: At the abdominal area, sir.
Q: After that initial wound, Atty. Kho run (sic) towards the room, is that correct?
A: What I remember, she run (sic), sir.
9

Moreover, appellants act of fleeing from the crime scene instead of reporting the incident to
the police authorities is contrary to his proclaimed innocence but highly indicative of guilt and
negate his claim of self defense.
10

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
present. Treachery under paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as
the deliberate employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against
persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise. For treachery to be present,
two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution which would ensure
the safety of the offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim
no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the means, method and manner of the execution
were deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender.
11
Treachery cannot be presumed;
it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself.
12

In the instant case, there is no proof on how the attack was commenced. Where no particulars
are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted
in the death of the victim began and developed, it can in no way be established from mere
suppositions that the killing was perpetrated by treachery.
13

We find however that evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength
attended the killing.
Like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be
established by clear and positive evidence;
14
that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
15
The
essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and
reflections upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient
to arrive at a calm judgment. To be considered, the following elements must be proven: (1)
the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating
that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision
and the execution, to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
16

Prosecution witnesses Marian Aquino and Atty. Joel Baguio testified as to appellants state of
mind and predisposition to avenge the alleged maltreatment by the victim. Both witnesses
testified on appellants ill-plans against his employer the day prior to the crime. Absent
evidence showing any reason or motive for the witnesses to falsely testify against the
appellant, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and their testimonies
should be accorded full faith and credit. Thus, the lower courts correctly concluded that
evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime.
Appellant likewise took advantage of his superior strength to perpetuate the criminal act. He
killed Atty. Sua-Kho by overpowering her and driving the murder weapon into her body several
times, despite her attempts to parry the blows. He could not have executed the dastardly act
without employing physical superiority over the victim. InPeople v. Espina,
17
we have ruled
that an attack by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman
constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in
the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.
We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the amendments in the
information regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the
respect due to rank, age or sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
18
provides that an
amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided
leave of court is obtained and such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned.
19

In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag,
20
we had the occasion to distinguish between substantial and
formal amendments:
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the
following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which
relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction;
(2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that
charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has
or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of
the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such
amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the
accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the
other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of
substance.
21

Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a
substantial, amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging another
offense different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original
information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the
event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of
appellant.
22
Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the
offended party on account of rank, age or sex.
23
Without any objection by the defense, the
defect is deemed waived.
24

There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could have killed her
elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we appreciate the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling. However, it was not convincingly shown that appellant
deliberately intended to offend or disregard the respect due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. Sua-
Kho. The motive for the murder was his grudge against the victim and not because she was a
lawyer and his employer. Neither did appellant took into consideration the age of Atty. Sua-
Kho and the fact that she is a woman when he killed her.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
25
as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
26
prescribes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Considering the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation and the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, and
taking advantage of superior strength without any mitigating circumstance, the proper
imposable penalty would have been death.
27

However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty on June 24, 2006
28
, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion
perpetua, thus:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic
Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the
Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand
Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all
other laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1)
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3)
moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (6)
interest, in proper cases.
29

We affirm the monetary awards granted by the Court of Appeals but modify the amount of
actual damages and exemplary damages.
The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without
need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Hence, based on recent jurisprudence,
the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 for the heirs Atty. Sua-Kho is in order.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an
injury or loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice and are aimed at
repairing the wrong done.
30
To be recoverable, actual and compensatory damages must be
duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty.
31
In the present case, the award of actual
damages of P298,210.25
32
is correct, considering that the said amount has been duly proven.
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in view
of the violent death of the victim and the resultant grief of her family.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code specifically states that exemplary damages may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, as in this case.
Moreover, as an example and deterrent to future similar transgressions, the Court finds that
an award of P25,000.00 for exemplary damages is proper.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01366,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga
isfound GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt ofMURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by evident premeditation and
with the attendant aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and
dwelling, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been
death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without possibility of parole. The appellant is ORDERED to pay
the heirs of Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P298,210.25
as actual damages; 50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; all
with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from this date until fully paid.

















G.R. No. 175924 March 14, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
On October 28, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 140, in Makati City pronounced
Erland Sabadlab y Bayquel guilty of forcible abduction with rape committed against AAA,
1
a 16-
year old domestic helper, and penalized him with reclusion perpetua.
2
On April 26, 2006, the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction and the penalty, but modified the civil
damages.
3
Hence, Sabadlab appeals.
Antecedents
Both the RTC and the CA agreed on the factual antecedents.
AAA was then walking at around noon of March 12, 2002 on Dapitan Street in Makati City,
proceeding towards MA Montessori to fetch her employers son who was studying there.
Suddenly, a man (later identified as Sabadlab) grabbed her by the shoulder and ordered her to
go with him. She recognized him to be the man who had persistently greeted her every time
she had bought pandesal at 5 oclock am near her employers house in the past two weeks.
Alarmed, she refused to do his bidding, but Sabadlab poked a gun at her throat. Two other
men whom she did not recognize joined Sabadlab at that point. They forced her into the
backseat of a parked car, and one of Sabadlabs cohorts blindfolded her with a handkerchief.
The car moved forward, and stopped after twenty minutes of travel. Still blindfolded, she was
brought out of the car. Sabadlab said that he would remove her clothes. Sabadlab then
undressed her, leaving only the blindfold on her. One of them tied her hands behind her back.
Sabadlab began kissing her body from the neck downwards. Although blindfolded, she knew
that it was Sabadlab because his cohorts were calling out his name as he was kissing her body.
Then they made her lie flat on the ground with her hands still tied behind her back. Sabadlab
raped her in that position. The others took their turns in raping her after Sabadlab. To prevent
her from shouting for help, Sabadlab stuffed her mouth with crumpled newspapers. The three
ravished her again and again, that she could not remember the number of times they did so.
At around 3:00 oclock pm, Sabadlab and his cohorts returned a blindfolded AAA by car back to
Dapitan Street, but let her go only after sternly warning that they would surely kill her if she
told anyone about the rapes. Once they left, she proceeded to MA Montessori to fetch her
ward. She waited there until 5:30 pm.
Upon her arrival at the house, AAAs employer noticed the kiss marks on her neck. AAA at first
lied about the kiss marks, but she ultimately disclosed the rapes because her irritated
employer slapped and boxed her on the stomach to force her to disclose.
On March 13, 2002, her employer brought AAA to the Makati Police Station to report the
rapes. AAA underwent medico-legal examination later that day at the PNP Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame Quezon City. The results of the medico-legal examination were embodied in
Medico-Legal Report No. M-797-02 issued by medico-legal officer Dr. Mary Ann P. Gajardo, viz:
PHYSICAL INJURIES:
1. Ecchymosis, right mandibular region, measuring 2.5 x 2.5 cm, 8 cms from the
anterior midline.
2. Ecchymosis, neck, measuring 3 x 2.5 cms, 6 cms right of the anterior midline.
3. Ecchymosis, neck, measuring 3 x 2.5 cms, 4.5 cms left of the anterior midline.
4. Ecchymosis, nape, measuring 3.5 x 2.5 cms, 4 cms right of the posterior
midline.
5. Ecchymosis, nape, measuring 4.5 x 3 cms, 4 cms left of the posterior midline.
6. Ecchymosis, right breast, measuring 4 x 3.5 cms. 10 cms from the anterior
midline.
7. Ecchymosis, sternal region, measuring 9 x 3 cms, bissecting the anterior
midline.
8. Ecchymosis, left breast, measuring 3.5 x 2.5 cms, 9 cms from the anterior
midline.
9. Ecchymosis, left breast, measuring 3.5 x 3 cms, 11 cms from the anterior
midline.
10. Abrasion, left scapular region, measuring 3.5 x 0.5 cms. 14 cms from the
posterior midline
GENITAL:
PUBIC HAIR: Moderate
LABIA MAJORA: Full, convex and slightly gaping.
LABIA MINORA: Pinkish brown slightly hypertrophied labia minora in between.
HYMEN: Presence of shallow fresh lacerations at 7 oclock position and deep fresh
lacerations at 6 and 9 oclock position. Congested.
POSTERIOIR FOURCHETTE: Abraded/Congested
EXTERNAL VAGINAL ORIFICE: Offers strong resistance upon introduction of the
examiners index finger.
VAGINAL CANAL: Narrow with prominent rugosities.
CERVIX: Soft and close
PERIURETHRAL AND VAGINAL SMEARS: Negative for spermatozoa and negative for gram
(-) diploxocci.
CONCLUSION: Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity. Barring unforeseen
complications, it is estimated that the above injuries will heal within 3-5 days.
4

Afterwards, AAA and the policemen went to the vicinity where she had usually bought
pandesal to look for the suspects. She spotted Sabadlab in one of the nearby restaurants and
pointed to him. The policemen apprehended Sabadlab and brought him to the station, where
he gave his name as Erland Sabadlab y Bayquel. That was her first time to know the name of
Sabadlab.
These antecedents impelled the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati to immediately charge
Sabadlab and two John Does with forcible abduction with rape via the information dated
March 13, 2002, alleging:
That on or about the 12th day of March of 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with two
(2) John Does whose names and whereabouts are still unknown, with lewd designs and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and carry away AAA, 16 years of age, against her will from Dapitan St.,
Barangay Guadalupe, Makati City and brought her to an undisclosed place, where accused by
means of force, violence and intimidation had carnal knowledge of complainant against her
will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
5

In his defense, Sabadlab denied the charge and asserted alibi, claiming that on March 12,
2002, he was at Billiard M where he worked as a spotter; that he stayed there until noon,
leaving the place only to have lunch; and that he returned to Billiard M at 12:30 pm and stayed
there until he was arrested at 7:00 pm of March 12, 2002. Frederick Dionisio and Nathaniel
Salvacion corroborated Sabadlabs alibi.
As stated, the RTC convicted Sabadlab for forcible abduction with rape as charged based on
AAAs positive identification of him as one of the rapists, observing that her physical injuries
and fresh hymenal lacerations were consistent with her account of the rapes, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT as principal of the crime of forcible abduction with rape charged in this case, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs.
On the civil aspect, the accused is ordered to pay AAA the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00)
as MORAL DAMAGES.
SO ORDERED.
6

On appeal in the CA, Sabadlab assigned the following errors,
7
to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE HIGHLY
INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Nonetheless, the CA sustained his conviction and the penalty of reclusion perpetua, holding
that the supposed inconsistencies referred to trivial matters or innocent lapses that did not
affect the credibility of AAA as a witness but were instead badges of veracity or manifestations
of truthfulness of the material points of her testimony. The CA thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the RTC
dated October 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
1. The award of moral damages is REDUCED to P50,000.00;
2. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED;
3. Appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Pursuant to Section 13 (C), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may
appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.
SO ORDERED.
8

Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration on August 2, 2006, Sabadlab is now before
the Court to seek the final review.
In addition to the arguments and submissions made in his appellants brief in the CA, Sabadlab
indicates in his supplemental brief
9
that AAAs version was ambiguous and implausible, and
conflicted with human experience as borne by the following, namely: (a) the State did not
present any torn apparel; (b) no bodily injuries were shown to prove that AAA had resisted the
sexual intercourse; (c) AAA did not cry for help; and (d) AAA did not escape despite several
opportunities to do so. He contends, moreover, that the States evidence established only
simple seduction.
10

Ruling
We affirm the conviction.
First of all, Sabadlab continues to assail the credibility of AAAs recollections. We understand
why he does so, because the credibility of the victims testimony is a primordial consideration
in rape.
11
Yet, because both the RTC and the CA unanimously regarded AAA as a credible and
spontaneous witness, he has now to present clear and persuasive reasons to convince us to
reverse both lower courts determination of credibility and to resolve the appeal his way.
Our review reveals, however, that Sabadlab has not tendered any clear and persuasive reasons
that may warrant the reversal or modification of the findings of both lower courts on the
credibility of AAA and his criminal liability. The supposed inconsistencies dwelled on minor
details or collateral matters that the CA precisely held to be badges of veracity and
manifestations of truthfulness due to their tendency of demonstrating that the testimony had
not been rehearsed or concocted. It is also basic that inconsistencies bearing on minor details
or collateral matters should not adversely affect the substance of the witness declaration,
veracity, or weight of testimony.
12
The only inconsistencies that might have discredited the
victims credible testimony were those that affected or related to the elements of the crime.
Alas, that was not true herein.
The supposed inconsistencies were inconsequential to the issue of guilt. For one, the matter of
who of the three rapists had blindfolded and undressed AAA was trifling, because her
confusion did not alter the fact that she had been really blindfolded and rendered naked. Nor
did the failure to produce any torn apparel of AAA disprove the crime charged, it being
without dispute that the tearing of the victims apparel was not necessary in the commission
of the crime charged. In fact, she did not even state that her clothes had been torn when
Sabadlab had forcibly undressed her. Verily, details and matters that did not detract from the
commission of the crime did not diminish her credibility.
We hardly need to remind that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and
of weighing their credibility is best left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand impressions
he derives while the witnesses testify before him.
13
The demeanor on the witness chair of
persons sworn to tell the truth in judicial proceedings is a significant element of judicial
adjudication because it can draw the line between fact and fancy. Their forthright answers or
hesitant pauses, their quivering voices or angry tones, their flustered looks or sincere gazes,
their modest blushes or guilty blanches - all these can reveal if the witnesses are telling the
truth or lying in their teeth.
14
As the final appellate reviewer in this case, then, we bow to the
age-old norm to accord the utmost respect to the findings and conclusions on the credibility of
witnesses reached by the trial judge on account of his unmatched opportunity to observe the
witnesses and on account of his personal access to the various indicia available but not
reflected in the record.
15

Secondly, AAAs recollection of the principal occurrence and her positive identification of the
rapists, particularly Sabadlab, were firm. It is reassuring, too, that her trustworthiness in
identifying Sabadlab as one of the rapists rested on her recognition of him as the man who had
frequently flirted with her at the store where she had usually bought pandesal for her
employers table. As such, the identification of him as one of the rapists became impervious to
doubt.
Thirdly, AAAs failure to shout for help and her failure to escape were not factors that should
diminish credibility due to their being plausibly explained, the first by the fact that her mouth
had been stuffed by Sabadlab with crumpled newspaper, preventing her from making any
outcry, and the second by the fact that the culprits had blindfolded her and had also tied her
hands behind her back.
And, lastly, Sabadlabs allegation that AAA did not sustain any bodily injuries was actually
contrary to the medical certification showing her several physical injuries and the penetration
of her female organ.
16
This should debunk without difficulty his submission that she did not
offer any resistance to the sexual assaults she suffered. Her resistance to Sabadlabs order for
her to go with him was immediately stifled by his poking of the gun at her throat and by
appearance of his two cohorts.1wphi1 At any rate, it is notable that among the amendments
of the law on rape introduced under Republic Act No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Act of 1997) is
Section 266-D, which adverts to the degree of resistance that the victim may put up against
the rapist, viz:
Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of
rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to
render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the
prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A.
We next deal with the characterization of the crime as forcible abduction with rape. The
principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan Street and
in bringing her to another place was to rape and ravish her. This objective became evident
from the successive acts of Sabadlab immediately after she had alighted from the car in
completely undressing her as to expose her whole body (except the eyes due to the blindfold),
in kissing her body from the neck down, and in having carnal knowledge of her (in that order).
Although forcible abduction was seemingly committed,
17
we cannot hold him guilty of the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape when the objective of the abduction was to
commit the rape. Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.
18

The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly prescribed. Article 266-A and Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,
19
respectively define and
punish simple rape as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished byreclusion perpetua.
xxx
Although the CA deleted the RTCs award of exemplary damages because of the "absence of
aggravating circumstance (sic),"
20
we reinstate the award in view of the attendance of the
aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime. The Civil
Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in a criminal case as part of the civil
liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."
21
The
Civil Code allows such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."
22
Present
here was the need for exemplarity. Thus, the CA should have recognized the entitlement to
exemplary damages of AAA on account of the attendance of use of a deadly weapon. It was of
no moment that the use of a deadly weapon was not specifically alleged in the information. As
fittingly explained in People v. Catubig:
23

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has
a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to
the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary
or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern,
the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party
who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due
the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance
is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil,
liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, the Court grants the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to
the civil indemnity ofP50,000.00 and the moral damages of P50,000.00 the CA awarded to
AAA. Sabadlab is further liable for interest of 6% per annum on all the civil damages.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 26, 2006, with
the MODIFICATION that ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL is: (a) DECLARED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of SIMPLE RAPE as defined under Article 266-A and as penalized with
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353; and (b) ORDERED TO PAY to the victim P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest
of 6% per annum on each of the amounts reckoned from the finality of this decision.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.