Natural Law and Its Basis on Practical Reason 1

Natural Law and Its Basis on Natural Reason

How Do People Understand the Natural Law?
I have based this class on the book of Martin Rhonheimer on the Natural Law.
These are some ideas many people have about the natural law:
Natural Law is composed of moral norms derived from nature as such (what is
naturally given or presented).
These moral norms, that are independent of any opinion or concrete needs of the
individual, are imposed from the outside. All the person has to do is to apply these norms
to the concrete situation.
To find out if an action is moral or not, we have to look into the consequences of the
action and weigh the results to determine if the action is worth pursuing or not.
There are indeed certain naturalistic misunderstandings of the nature of natural law and the
foregoing ideas are examples of them. In this class, we will see that they are indeed
misunderstandings. We will also attempt to answer the following questions about the natural law:
What is meant when we say that human nature is the foundation of moral norms?
What are the methodological principles for an ethics that makes use of arguments that
follow natural law theory?
We will try to understand the answer of St. Thomas: the natural law is a law of the practical
reason. The theory of the natural law is a theory of the practical reason.
As we will see, this concept of the natural law has anthropological implications: a personal
anthropology is assumed.
A Reconstruction of the Theory of Natural Law is Necessary
In recent years, it has been believed that the philosophical basis for the theory of natural is
seriously defective. It has been labeled as physicalism, biologism or essentialism.
Physicalism
The leading objection to the theory of natural law is that it constitutes a physicalism or
naturalism. Objectors claim that through the theory we are attempting to derive ethical norms
from laws (especially biological laws) that are in accord with being. Now these laws belong to
the pre-moral sphere. This procedure in not correct for two reasons: 1) moral norms cannot be
drawn from pre-moral (ontic, physical or biological) laws or values; 2) an ought cannot be
derived from an is.
There does exist this school of natural law theory that can be described as physicalistic.
Natural Law and Its Basis on Practical Reason 2
The mistake of this school is the inability to understand the constitutive role played by
practical reason in the recognition of moral values. Natural law is understood as something that
belongs to the nature of things rather than as belonging to where it should belong: to practical
reason. This school does not see the role that practical reason has in constituting natural law
itself. This is the way St. Thomas conceived the natural law: the natural law is not something
simply discovered by reason. It is constituted by reason through an act of practical
understanding. Practical reason is the law-giver and not simply and executor or discoverer of
the law. Reason has the function of being the evaluator of human behavior. The task of reason
is to put things in order. Unless this is understood, it will not be possible to conceive the
natural law as an ordering of reason.
Frequently, many people who believe in the natural law theory think that the natural law
belongs to the natural order of things, something like the laws of nature. It is something that is
there in nature and that reason simply reads it off. In this way of looking at natural law, what
is prescribes what ought to be done. So the maxim goes: Become what you are! or Fulfill
your essence!
A Definition of Natural Law by Leo XIII and Vatican II
It would seem that the concept of natural law as something belonging to the order of reason was
already present in a pronouncement of Pope Leo XIII made in 1888 in his encyclical Libertas
Praestantissimum. The text reads as follows:
[The most fundamental of all laws is the lex naturalis] which has been written and
carved into the individual souls of all human beings, because it is itself the human reason
insofar as it commands the carrying out of right action and forbids wrongdoing. Now
this prescription of the human reason could not have the power of law, unless it were the
voice and interpreter of a higher reason, to which our mind and our freedom ought to be
subject It therefore follows that the law of nature is the very eternal law implanted in
those who have the use of reason, inclining them to a right action and goal and it is also
the eternal reason of God, the Creator and Governor of the whole universe (italics mine).
Leo XIII did not declare that the natural law is the objective order of nature that is known or
discovered subjectively by human reason. The text explicitly declared that the natural law is
itself human reason insofar as it commands the carrying out of right action and forbids wrong-
doing. The natural law is a prescription of reason which is the same thing as saying it is an
ordering of reason. The natural law has its basis in an act of practical reason. It is not the order
that is found in nature or natural things. The power of the law does not lie in nature but in the act
of reason that prescribes or commands. Because this act of practical reason is natural to man, it
constitutes a natural law. This text of Leo XIII does not endorse a physicalistic or naturalistic
conception of the natural law.
The binding power of this law does not come from reason itself or from the nature of things
(the natural order) but it comes from the eternal law, the law of God, which is imbedded in
human reason. Because of this, natural law is objective and its contents are not of the order of
nature but instead belong to the eternal law itself the law of God. This law is present to
human reason; human reason participates in it and it inclines man to the right action and goal.
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The practical reason that constitutes the natural law should not be understood as something
opposed to nature upon which reason must base itself in order to constitute the natural law. We
must remember that this human reason is itself part of human nature (an essential part of it) and
so it belongs also to nature.
We can appreciate this same concept of the natural law in this text of Vatican II:
In the depth of his conscience man discovers a law that he has not given to himself, but
which he must obey, and the voice of which sounds when it must in the ear of his heart,
urging him always to love and carry out what is good and to avoid what is bad: do this, avoid
that. For man has a law written in his heart by God, to obey which is his very dignity, and
according to which he will one day be judged. The conscience is the most secret center and
sanctum of a man, in which he is alone with God, whose voice resounds within him. By
conscience is revealed in a marvelous way that law which is fulfilled by the love of God and
neighbor (Gaudium et Spes, 16).
The text talks about mans conscience that discovers a law that is written in his heart. The
conscience is not the maker of the law but it simply discovers the law and applies it. But that
same law in found in the very same man written in his heart. It is not something coming to him
from the outside, but it is very much part of his being.
The fundamental question that we have to ask is: how is this moral ought constituted
originating from the insight of the individual person presenting to him a truth that demands to be
observed or followed?
The Essentialist Interpretation of the Natural Law
This interpretation of natural law puts it not in the order of reason but in the order of nature (the
order of how things are and by things we mean natural things as opposed to human reason
itself).
The correct interpretation of the natural law makes reason as the measure and rule for
morality. Reason not only applies the law (as when it is conscience); it itself is the measure.
This view holds that what something should be its perfection and fulfillment can be
derived from its nature. Every entity possesses an essence and the powers that flow from it. The
essence, because it is the foundation of the entitys operations, qualifies them as either good or
bad. If the entitys operations develop the entity then they are good. If they hinder its
development, then they are bad. Agere sequitur esse, as the Scholastic adage goes.
While this argument is indeed valid for natural things, it does not apply unconditionally to
the case of the human person. The human being is very much unlike other created beings. In his
behavior he is not subject to a single determinate thing. His actions are free. He may perform his
actions according to nature or not according to nature.
With this appeal of having recourse to human nature as the basis for judging the goodness
or evil of human actions, we arrive at a methodological dead end. The question is one of method:
how do I know human nature and its demands? How do I know what fulfills it or hinders its
Natural Law and Its Basis on Practical Reason 4
development? We know human nature through human behavior, which is qualified as moral. But
this qualification of moral cannot be derived from the essence of man.
The assumption is that the essence of man provides us with an idea of a goal that man should
tend to, and therefore, a measure of excellence and perfection. This is what Josef Pieper would
say: Become what you are! It is a nice thing to say but it is not so useful for purposes of
methodology and analysis. The question can be raised: How can I become what I am, when I
already am what I am? Of course, we understand Pieper to mean that man fulfills himself
through actions and man must act to become fully man. So the maxim presupposes two meanings
of the word man: the first is the specific nature of man and the second is man in the state of
being a perfect man.
And so we are saying that we can deduce what is good for man by looking at his essence as
specific nature. Then we also say that the essence that is really valid for deducing what is good
for man is the perfected essence only after a process of becoming perfect. So, the measure of the
good is not that which is, but the knowledge of what should be. From the individual persons
point of view, this poses a real practical problem: how do I know judging from my essence what
is it that will really perfect my essence?
And so, we have two natures in this issue: the raw essence and the perfected essence.
Though they are both found in human nature, the one cannot be deduced from the other.
Moral goodness is really the fullness of the essence of man: it goes beyond nature and the
principles of essence. It cannot be derived from the principles of the essence of man. Moral
goodness is something added to the essence of man and is therefore accidental to him.
Moral goodness is derived from human actions that are born of mans powers, which in turn
are based on mans essence. While the essence of man is necessary for his actions to come into
being, the field of his actions is not necessary for his essence. Whether a man acts or not will not
make him lose his essential being as a man. The field of mans actions is the field of freedom.
Moral goodness is founded on mans essence, but it does not derive from his essence.
We know from experience that the knowledge of goodness and evil does not come from an
insight into what is essential in man. Much more is required. It requires a practical experience
and a further insight into what this experience means for me. Of course, this practical insight is
based on human nature; but it goes beyond what is simply human nature.
Erroneous Understanding of the Natural Law
A mistaken understanding of the Natural Law is to identify the natural law with the laws of
nature (the regularities and natural processes found in nature). This would be tantamount to
moralizing the natural order as such.
Would we regard any action that accords with the processes or laws of nature are morally
upright by that mere fact? For instance, we know that the law of nature would require that a man
eats to preserve his life. Would eating and eating be morally upright just because it follows the
law of nature? Or would an action that goes against natural processes or laws of nature be
considered morally depraved just because the action went against nature? For instance, would
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substituting a damaged heart for another one or cutting off ones appendix constitute a morally
illicit act just because these acts go against the natural dispositions?
One can see that going with or against nature does not determine the moral goodness or evil
of actions. But it is reason that knows there is some moral goodness or evil involved in the
actions. And reason knows the reasons why the actions are good or evil. The acts are good or evil
not because they go according to nature or against nature; but because they go against right
reason. And so, Thomas says: By the law of God, these things alone are prohibited, which are
against reason (Contra Gentiles, III, c. 125).
The moral order is not something that is derived from the order of nature. It is rather the
opposite: the moral order is derived from reasons interpretation of the natural order in the light
of the order of reason, which is the order of virtue (right reason). It is the work of practical
reason. And so, the natural order that reason presupposes is not yet the natural law. Aquinas
would say it pertains to the natural law but it is not yet itself the natural law. This law arises in
the order of reason when reason sees what the due good proper to the natural inclinations is so
that these inclinations achieve their ends in a truly human manner. Nevertheless the
presupposition of the natural law which is the natural order of things has to be there for the
natural law to exist.
Natural law is natural because it arises in man from principles that belong to human nature: it
is constituted by reason which is something natural to man. It belongs more to the order of
reason than the order of nature (although it is based on human nature). Nature is the
presupposition upon which reason builds the natural law. Nature provides the beginning, the seed
of virtue. Reason then constitutes the natural law looking and reflecting on the order of nature.
The natural law is called natural not because it is identified with the order of nature or because it
reflects physical regularities, but because it is a natural working of reason. This latter puts order
into the natural inclinations and prescribes a behavior that accords with human nature so that a
man can said to be acting according to right reason.
Practical Reason
The first question we must pose when we want to answer the question: What is morally good?
is not the question: What is man? but rather: How should we behave? What should I do to
be fulfilled? The answer to these last two questions can give us a hint to be able to answer the
question about the essence of man.
We are here dealing with questions that have to do with human actions that strive for a goal;
and that goal is what we call the good. Striving for a goal implies the existence of our knowing
power, reason, which intends the goal or the good. We come to know the existence of practical
reason: that kind or reason that verses over things that we must do or must not do. It is our very
same intellect that enables us to discern what is the good and what is not; and so to discern what
is suitable for achieving through action and what is not.
Moreover, after practical reason has discerned what is suitable or not, the same reason
becomes preceptive or imperative: it issues the command Good is to be done and pursued, and
evil is to be avoided.
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It is this reason that ensures that man acts in conformity with his nature and dignity. St.
Thomas stated, The good of each thing lies in this: that its operation is in accordance with its
form. The peculiar form of man is that he is a rational animal. Whence it is fitting that the
function of man is good, insofar as it is in accordance with right reason, for perversity of the
reason goes against the nature of reason (In I Ethic., lect. 2).
From this statement of Aquinas we can gather the basis for determining what is good for
man: it is not his essence or his substantial form. The measure to aid in determining the good is
right reason (practical reason). This is our reason that emits judgments about our actions, those
that we are doing, have done or about to do.
St. Thomas further asserts: It is clear, then, that the difference between good and evil,
considered with regard to an object, is a difference that essentially arises in relation to reason:
namely, whether the object matches it or not (S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 5). As we can see, Aquinas is
saying that to determine good or evil, we are not matching something in relation to mans
essence, but in relation to his reason. It is reason that constitutes an object to which reason itself
compares mans behavior. This object made by reason is what gives moral specification to his
actions.
Natural Law as the Work of Reason
For Aquinas every law is essentially something that belongs to reason (S. Th., I-II, q. 90, a. 1)
and is a work of reason (S. Th., q. 94, a. 1): Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man
is induced to act or is restrained from acting Now, the rule and measure of human acts is the
reason, which is the first principle of human acts.
In human actions, the first thing that occurs is the knowledge of the end and the intention to
achieve it. This implies an act of reason. It is human reason that gives the ordering that becomes
the principle of human actions. It has this law-giving function. From this we can see that the
natural law is an ordering of reason.
The natural law is not a power, a habit or a simple act of reason but something that is
constituted through an act of reason. It involves universal judgments that verse over human
actions. These judgments that the practical reason pronounces are also preceptive: they involve
commands or precepts. Reason perceives what is truly good for man and once it does, it issues
the command: Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided
Another quotation from Aquinas: The natural law is something constituted by reason, just as
the proposition is a work of reason (S. Th., I-II, q. 94, a.1).
The Constitution of the Natural Law through Natural Reason
Here is a text of St. Thomas on the role of reason in constituting the natural law: Just as in the
speculative reason, there are also in the practical reason primary, non-derivable and universally
known judgments. These are judgments whose terms are known to all. The terms for practical
judgments of this kind consist in each case of a good and a practical predicate, to be pursued or
to be avoided (S. Th., I-II, q.94, a. 2).
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The first principle of the practical reason: Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be
avoided might seem to be an empty formula. It seems to say nothing: it is too general or too
fundamental. And yet the first principle does not need to say anything: it is enough that it issues
a command: the good is to be done, evil is to be avoided. This principle is clear and present to all
other principles and judgments formulated by practical reason. As Aquinas says, it is the
foundation of all the other precepts of the natural law.
The Spontaneous Comprehension of Fundamental Human Values
Man has natural inclinations; by implication we understand these inclinations to be based on
human nature. They are not acquired tendencies and by nature they aim at goods that are proper
to each of them. The natural end of these tendencies do not yet belong to the ought that
belongs to the order of practical reason: the shift to the order of reason occurs when practical
reason comprehends these goods as practical goods, and so they are seekable and so it makes
them its own. This process takes place spontaneously and naturally.
The natural inclinations have a spontaneous dynamism that is quite independent of reason:
meaning that they can and do take place even if reason does not intervene. I am naturally
inclined to eat when I am hungry. Man is naturally attracted to woman. This does not mean that
these natural tendencies cannot be subject to reason. The goods of the natural tendencies on the
level of the natural are not yet goods of reason. Though St. Thomas calls them general rules
or measures for everything that man must do and of these things (actions) the natural reason is
the measure, even though the natural reason is not the measure of the things that are by nature
(S. Th., I-II, q. 91, a. 3 ad 2). The natural inclinations form the basis of the standard: they are not
yet the standards: they still do not have the power to govern actions. It is practical reason that is
the standard: reason puts order in ones natural inclinations.
The Order of Reason and the Order of Virtue
In practice, we have the experience that to act according to right reason is to act in a virtuous
manner. An act is considered virtuous not because it has naturally attained the end suited to it,
but rather because it has been ordered by right reason and has been subordinated to it.
This makes us understand that the order of virtue is the same as the order of right reason. St.
Thomas says that the good of man towards which moral virtue is directed consists in this: that
reason sufficiently recognize the truth and that the lower tendencies be ordered in accordance
with the rule of reason (De Virtutibus, a. 9).
Man is a unity of body and soul. Being a body too, man has natural inclinations in his bodily
part that may be similar to the lower species of animal: nutrition, reproduction, sensation, etc.
But we must keep in mind that these inclinations are not merely animal; being part of man, by
nature they are already human. To regard them as animal tendencies would be to put a split or
dichotomy in man which is going to spell disaster for understanding human nature. Some people
think that these lower tendencies become human only when they are integrated into the sphere of
what is specifically human: the intellectual sphere. That this is quite clear, we can cite the case of
the tendency towards self-preservation (to preserve ones own life). Though we have this in
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common with all other living creatures, this tendency in man, in itself, is already a human
tendency.
These natural tendencies are already human to begin with. Nevertheless, in the practical and
operative sphere, these tendencies must still be ordered by reason according to their truly human
meaning and that ordering ought to be followed.
We must also avoid the opposite tendency: the naturalistic position, which claims that man is
a complex of natural inclinations that would already constitute norms in themselves without
further processing by reason and as such they would already constitute precepts of the natural
law.
All human tendencies occur in the unity of the human person who is a unity body and soul, a
unity of mind and emotions, a unity of reason and natural tendencies. Because of this unity, all
natural inclinations in man have a relationship of value to the entirety of man, including naturally
his reason. This value is not simply what the inclination tells us but it is discovered after relating
the natural inclinations relationship to what is specifically human, namely reason.
Moral Virtue is the Integration of the Natural Inclinations to the Ordering of Reason
The natural orientation of every human inclination towards its proper good must be brought
into the orientation of each inclination towards its specifically moral good. This good is the good
of reason. Only then will the human good really constitute moral virtue. Only then does the fully
human meaning of each one of these natural ends become clear in the context of the totality of
human person. Thus for example, in the case of man the natural tendency to preserves ones life
does not mean for him to simply preserve his life so as just to live or exist. That would be true
for plants or animals. A man wants to live for further aims and ends that he has because of his
reason. The meaning of his life and of preserving his life has a relationship to his reason. He
wants to live his life to the fullest.
Every natural inclination, though already a human good will reveal its specifically human
meaning only in the context of being ordered within the order of reason. This order, as
experience points out to us, is the same as the order of virtue. The order of reason reveals to us
the true character of the natural inclinations. Reason would not achieve this if it did not respect
the value of human inclinations as the conditions that constitute the human person and morality.
And so, Aquinas concludes: Virtue of the appetitive part (moral virtue) is nothing other a
certain disposition or form, stamped and pressed upon the appetitive power by reason (De
Virtutibus, a. 9).
Natural Inclinations are Seeds of the Virtues
Natural inclinations in natural things differ tremendously from natural inclinations in man. The
natural inclinations in natural things determine them to a specific way of acting: always the same
in the same circumstances and so we can recognize that a certain dam was made by a beaver.
But this is not the case with man: he has an appetitive power that is not determined to act in a
single manner. This appetitive power (the will) is governed by his reason. Reason is what gives
form and determination to the will. Moral virtue is a certain quality that resides in the will. It is a
Natural Law and Its Basis on Practical Reason 9
kind or nature, a second nature that tends to make the will act in a singular and specific way
and this way is the good of reason which is now the true human good. This good is multiple
and varied, just as the natural inclinations and their respective goods are.
Here the Stoic doctrine of the natural inclinations as seeds of the virtues (S.Th., I-II, q.94,
a.2) is confirmed by Aquinas but with a modification. Aquinas says that the natural inclinations
belong to the natural law because they also correspond to an impression of the eternal law in
man. Aquinas other definition of the natural law is it is mans participation in the eternal law of
God (S.Th., I-II, q.93). But it must be pointed out that the natural inclination in themselves are
not yet the natural law in the same way that we cannot consider the proper acts of the natural
tendencies as acts of virtue. We know that if the natural inclinations were not governed by
reason, they can lead to inhuman results.
The natural law comes into existence when reason governs the movement of the natural
inclinations. It is an ordering of reason within the context of the natural inclinations. The natural
inclinations we are speaking of do not refer only to the inclinations of the physical or bodily part
of man but also to the inclinations of the rational part of man: his will. Even the natural
inclination of the will (to the good) has to be governed by reason (justice).
And so, moral virtue is the perfecting of the natural inclination through the ordering work of
reason so that it is conformed to right reason. The natural inclination is only a certain beginning
of moral virtue and the natural law.
The Constitution of Objects of the Precepts of Natural Law
We have said that reason constitutes the natural law. The object of the natural law is something
that is desirable that is understood and ordered by reason. The objective content of the natural
inclinations is expressed in a universal manner through the natural law. To be objective means
that the content of the natural inclinations are ordered, measured and integrated by the workings
of reason into the context of the whole person, into the purposive dynamics of human existence.
Natural law comprises elements of both nature and reason. There is not only the element
from nature, but there is also an ordering of reason that works on it, so that what began by nature
is carried out in accord with reason and thus in a human manner.
But we must note that reason itself is something natural to man. The good of reason
fundamentally is something we know naturally. Reason is naturally inclined to the end of
mans actions that are due to him as a person.
The natural inclinations of the person are many and varied. He is inclined to preserve his own
existence: to feed himself and take care of himself. He is inclined to unite to the opposite sex, an
inclination directed to the preservation of the human race. There are inclinations that are
exclusively human: to seek to know the truth, to live out the demands of justice.
These natural inclinations are recognized as such by reason. But reason goes further and it
recognizes the manner in which these inclinations ought to be integrated into the context of the
totality of human actions and existence so as to carry them out in a fully human manner.
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The Natural Law is the Law of Virtue
The natural law is not a universal norm under which particular cases must be subsumed: it is not
a law that I apply to the particular circumstances. Rather it is the preceptive (commanding)
ordering of practical reason. If we understand the natural law in this way, it will be the sole
foundation upon which human actions can be carried out in its specifically human character. As a
foundation it does not hinder nor pose a threat to the individuals freedom: it becomes the very
basis of the individuals freedom. It is the starting point of a vast array of possible human
behavior and concretizations on the part of the individual person.
Man is a being capable of steering himself towards what is true and good, through his natural
and practical reason. Reason is that principle that facilitates his acting freely and autonomously.
This freedom acquires its true and full meaning only when the person is virtuous. The virtuous
person is the existential incarnation of the natural: we can say that the natural law is operative or
lived out in the case of a virtuous person. Aquinas says that virtuous persons are a law unto
themselves (Ad Rom. II, lect. 3). In the same lesson, Aquinas asserts that in virtue consists the
highest degree of human dignity, because such a person is not led by others but by himself to
what is good. Moral virtue is measure and order in human behavior: this measure and order has
its origin in practical reason, which constitutes for the person the natural law. And so, the natural
law is the law of virtue.
Application of Aquinas Theory to a Case in Point: Contraception
We are here concerned with the case of the transmission of human life through the act that is
proper to marriage. In this case, reason has to deal with three dimensions of the act of marriage
considered from the point of view of the order of nature.
The first dimension we can point out is that the parents are the cause of the coming to be of
another human being, but they predispose the matter so to speak and they themselves realize it
is beyond their power to bring about an immortal soul. This dimension of this natural event
makes us realize the limited character of human power with respect to human life. It also
manifests the great dignity of human parenthood.
The second dimension of the act of marriage on the natural level is that it contributes to the
good of species: the preservation of the human race.
The third dimension of the act of marriage is concerned with the order of human love,
concretely of married love. This love has in turn two dimensions: fidelity towards ones spouse
and very much related to it is married chastity.
Paul VIs teaching about the immorality of contraception is based on this third dimension.
His critics have not understood his reasons for teaching the immorality of contraception claiming
that his proposition is based on biologism. We will try to understand why contraception
contradicts the natural law.
Starting Point: Concept of Responsible Parenthood
The human person is empowered to transmit human life in cooperation with God love: reason
tells us he must do this in a rational and responsible manner, suitable to his dignity as a person.
Natural Law and Its Basis on Practical Reason 11
In this matter, he cannot be exclusively led by instinct or drives. His parenthood must be
responsible. In this field of human acts, what provides the measure and rule? It is obvious
that instincts and drives do not provide this measure and rule: it is reason that fulfills this task.
The act of transmitting human life is not simply an act of procreative power but rather it is a
human act that is the result of a persons using his reason and his freedom. And so, responsible
parenthood means using the power to transmit human life within the framework of the order
given by right reason. The order of reason as regards this power specifies two virtues: that of
justice and that of chastity.
The Problem: the Joining of the Unitive and Procreative Meanings of the Marital Act
Critics of Paul VI assert that he bases his teaching on the immorality of contraception on the idea
of preserving the biological integrity of the marital act and the biological integrity of the natural
cycles of human fertility: an argument that is naturalistic or biologistic. But this is not what Paul
VI said. The quotation is as follows:
That teaching, often set forth by the Magisterium, is founded upon the inseparable
connection, willed by God and unable to be broken by man on his own initiative, between
the two meanings of the conjugal act: the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning.
Indeed, by its intimate structure, the conjugal act, while most closely uniting husband and
wife, capacitates them for the generation of new lives, according to the laws inscribed in
the very being of man and of woman. By safeguarding both these essential aspects, the
unitive and procreative, the conjugal act preserves in its fullness the sense of true mutual
love and its ordination towards mans most high calling to parenthood (Humanae Vitae,
12).
Paul VI was not talking about preserving the biological integrity of the conjugal act but
rather of its integrity as a human and personal act. He was not talking about the openness of the
act itself to human life but rather of the openness of the wills of the spouses towards their duty of
parenthood.
The conjugal act has these two equally important aspects: loving unity and procreation. Both
aspects are destroyed by contraception. And so, the point of contention is not the natural integrity
of the conjugal act but the integrity of human love itself: an integrity that is discerned in the
order of reason, which is the order of virtue.
The teaching of Paul VI has been misunderstood time and again. People think that the Pope
was just suggesting a different method of controlling births and that he was saying the natural
method is the moral one. This vision of the Pope teaching betrays a biologistic and naturalistic
view of the conjugal act, which as we have said ought to be viewed in the context of the entire
human person and as a personal act.
We are not trying to say that artificial interventions into the natural process of the human
body (artificial contraceptives) are immoral. If that were so, artificial teeth and limbs would not
be possible. Nor are we saying that a conjugal act that does not end in conception is morally bad.
And neither are we saying that there is a moral distinction between infertility caused by artificial
Natural Law and Its Basis on Practical Reason 12
means and that caused by natural events. What we are considering here is the relationship of the
human will towards fertility or infertility.
We are not here considering a difference of method: artificial or natural. We are facing two
divergent cases: one where the person voluntarily practices abstinence and exerts effort to master
his instincts and urges because he wants to practice responsible parenthood; and the case where
he does not practice abstinence and avoids the consequence of the fruitfulness of the conjugal act
by using an artificial contraceptive.
In the first case, there is the voluntary governance of the sexual drive, the prevalence of the
reason and the will, the practice of the virtue of chastity.
In the second case, there is the foregoing of the practice of abstinence and the prevalence of
reason over the instincts, which are allowed to go ahead because the undesirable consequences
have been eliminated anyway and everything is safe. In this second case, reason has ceased to
govern the instincts involved in the action and with the consequence that the action is rendered
outside the purview of reason and in this sense it is inhuman. Herein lays the disorder
involved in the use of contraceptives: a disorder which we cannot just write off as minor or a
glitch because of its tremendous effects on individual persons and on society in general.
What is at stake here is the virtue of chastity, concretely of marital chastity. This involves the
voluntary governing of the sexual drive by reason and will so that the sexual drives are
successfully integrated by the person into the context of his personal life contributing to harmony
among his powers and a deepening of his married life and love. Only in this way can married life
be truly human. What is crucial here is the role of the will: does it rule the instincts or is this
regulating role dispensed with?
Some people claim there is no difference between a conjugal act that is performed during the
infertile period of the woman (though it may be performed in the context of the practice of
periodic continence during the fertile period) and the act that is performed with the use of
artificial contraceptives. The premises and the conclusions are the same: the act is performed and
there is no conception. Married couples themselves will tell you the difference: the former is
performed as the result of the decision and mastery of the will and the mutual agreement of the
spouses. In this way, the human character of the act is preserved as well as the respect and love
for the spouse. Even if the conjugal act is performed during infertile periods, the act preserves its
openness to life and its full truth of married love.
One might object and say, How can a conjugal act known to be infertile from the outset be
open to life? The openness to life we are talking about here is not the biological openness to
life. Indeed, from the biological point of view the act performed during the infertile period is not
open to life in the sense that no new life will ensue. The openness to life we are referring to
has to do with the choice of the will to regulate the sexual instinct so as exercise parenthood
responsibly. It is openness to and recognition of the truth about the conjugal act being the vehicle
for the transmission of human life. In the context of a married life that has objectively accepted
the children God has willed for the couple, a qualified decision to space the next birth for the
time being or permanently making use of periodic abstinence during the fertile periods and
Natural Law and Its Basis on Practical Reason 13
recourse to the infertile periods are acts of reason putting order into ones instincts and so, are
also acts of responsible parenthood.
The objection can also be given: but isnt it that the couple that decides to use contraceptives
are also exercising self-control over their actions and are using reason to govern their
actions, deciding to use means discovered by reason and ingenuity to render the act of
marriage unfruitful because there are serious reason for doing so.
It is certain that couples who use contraceptives apply a certain kind of self-control over
their bodies, much in the same way that any person who uses medication exercises also some
control over his body. But this sort of control is not a moral virtue. The objection rests on the
supposition that the human sexual drive is a purely biological function, deprived of any personal
dimension capable of being the subject of virtue. The human sexual drive has a personal meaning
and a very personal way of being carried out. This personal manner of engaging the sexual
powers is a moral virtue and it is called chastity.
We must note that the human sexual powers are human not only at the moment when the
person engages them in a truly personal manner or in a manner that befits human dignity. This
will imply that the human sexual drives are not human to begin with or when they are not
engaged in a truly human way. This way of looking at things would introduce a dichotomy in
man: that he is a body and a spirit and to think that his body is animal and not human until it is
informed by the human spirit. A person is a unity of body and spirit; and all his powers even
the vegetative powers are all human from the very outset.
The self-control we are talking about here is not just any sort of self-control, but it is a moral
virtue. It is well-known that criminals and morally depraved persons do exercise a great deal of
self-control to carry out their vicious activities. Virtue is the sort of self-control that puts order
into ones natural inclinations so that the person obtains true and fundamental human goods.
Contraception, although it is a form of self-control is not a moral virtue. It is an act of
manipulating the marital act to render it unfruitful. It is meant to shut out the fruitfulness of the
marital act leaving out any sort of mastery over the sexual drive itself. The two aspects of the
same act the loving union and the fruitfulness are separated by a choice of the will. The
union, which from a personal point of view is the subject of fruitfulness, is voluntarily deprived
of this dimension. From the personal point of view the act is denatured: it is manipulated and is
deprived of its true nature.
What is disorderly in the act of contraception is not so much the denaturing of an act but
what it means for the persons who do it. Even couples themselves will admit as much: you dont
need to practice self-mastery if you use contraceptives. There you have the lack of virtue and
therefore a moral evil.
And so, we have seen that the natural law theory of Aquinas is one based on practical reason.
It is this reason that makes us understand the order of moral virtue. It bases itself on an
anthropology that is personal and so, rightfully strives to safeguard the dignity of the human
person.
Natural Law and Its Basis on Practical Reason 14
References
Grisez, G. The Way of the Lord Jesus. I. Christian Moral Principles. Chicago, 1983.
Lehu, L. La Raison: Rgle de la moralit daprs Saint Thomas. Paris, 1930.
Rhonheimer, Martin. Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of Moral Autonomy,
New York: Fordham University Press, 2000.
Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae.