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CANICOSA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120318 December 5, 1997
FACTS:
RI CARDO "BOY" CANI COSA and SEVERI NO LAJARA wer e candi dat es f or mayor i n Cal amba, Laguna, dur i ng
t he 8 May 1995 el ect i ons. Af t er obt ai ni ng a maj or i t y of some 24, 000 vot es, Laj ar a was pr ocl ai med wi n n e r b y
t h e Mu n i c i p a l B o a r d o f C a n v a s s e r s . O n 1 5 Ma y 1 9 9 5 C a n i c o s a f i l e d wi t h t h e C o mmi s s i o n
o n Elections (COMELEC) a
Petition to Declare Failure of Election and to Declare Null and Void the Canvass and Proclamation
because of alleged widespread frauds and anomalies in casting and counting of votes, preparationof el ect i on r et ur ns, vi ol ence,
t hr eat s, i nt i mi dat i on, vot e buyi ng, unr egi st er ed vot er s vot i ng, and del ay i n t he delivery of election documents and
paraphernalia from the precincts to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer.Canicosa particularly averred that: (a) the names of the registered
voters did not appear in the list of voters int hei r pr eci nct s; ( b) mor e t han one- hal f of t he l egi t i mat e
r egi st er ed vot er s wer e not abl e t o vot e wi t h st r anger s v o t i n g i n t h e i r s t e a d ; ( c ) h e wa s c r e d i t e d wi t h
l e s s v o t e s t h a n h e a c t u a l l y r e c e i v e d ; ( d ) c o n t r o l d a t a o f t h e el ect i on r et ur ns was not f i l ed up i n
some pr eci nct s; ( e) bal l ot boxes br ought t o t he Of f i ce of t he Muni ci pal Treasurer were unsecured, i.e. , wi t hout
padl ocks nor sel f - l ocki ng met al seal s; and, ( f ) t her e was del ay i n
t hed e l i v e r y o f e l e c t i o n r e t u r n s . B u t t h e C O ME L E C e n b a n c
d i s m i s s e d t h e p e t i t i o n o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e allegations therein did not justify a declaration of failure of
election. Section 3, Article IX (C) Disposition of Cases

ISSUE
Whet her or not COMELEC di vi si on shoul d have f i rst heard t he pet i t i on bef ore deci di ng on i t e n b a n c o n a
motion for reconsideration?

HELD:
NO. Section 3, Article IX-C applies only when the COMELEC acts in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi - j udi ci al f unct i ons
and not when i t mer el y exer ci ses pur el y admi ni st r at i ve f unct i ons. Mor eover , i t i s expr essl y pr ovi ded i n Rul e
27, Sect i on 7 of t he COMELEC Rul es of Pr ocedur e t hat any par t y di ssat i sf i ed with the ruling of the board of canvassers
shall have a right to appeal to the COMELEC en banc.

Quest i ons as t o whet her el ect i ons have been hel d or whet her cer t ai n r et ur ns wer e f al si f i ed or manuf act ur edand
therefore should be excluded from the canvass do not involve the right to vote. Such questions are properlywithin the administrative
jurisdiction of COMELEC, hence, may be acted upon directly by the COMELEC enbanc without having to pass through any of its divisions
OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE: Section 6
Failure of Election

ISSUE
Whether or not the grounds cited by Canicosa can warrant the declaration of a failure of election?

HELD:
No. Section 6 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, reads: Sec. 6.
Failure of election I f , on account of force majeure, vi ol ence, t er r or i sm, f r aud, or ot her anal ogous causes the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the h o u r f i x e d b y l a w f o r t h e c l o s i n g
o f t h e v o t i n g , o r a f t e r t h e v o t i n g a n d d u r i n g t h e p r e p a r a t i o n a n d t h e





Penera vs. Comelec: Decriminalizing Premature Campaigning

Its fiesta time, its open season
- Comelec Commissioner Rene Sarmiento[1]

The case of Penera vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009) has effectively voided a section of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC) on premature campaigning.

The Supreme Court reinstated Rosalinda Penera as mayor of the municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte as it granted
her motion for reconsideration and set aside its earlier decision affirming her disqualification by the Comelec for premature
campaigning. Peneras disqualification stemmed from her alleged premature campaigning when she and her supporters had a
motorcade a day before the start of the authorized campaign period for the 2007 elections.

For one to commit a violation of premature campaigning under Section 80 of the OEC, the following elements must exist:
(1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity;
(2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate;
(3) the act is done outside the campaign period.[2]

Clearly, the second element requires the existence of a candidate. Under Section 79(a) of the OEC, a candidate is one who has
filed a certificate of candidacy to an elective public office. This is further qualified by Section 15 of R.A. 8436, which provides
that the person who filed a CoC shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed
his certificate of candidacy.

In other words, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before.
According to the Supreme Court, the law is clear as daylight any election offense that may be committed by a candidate
under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period.

I believe that Penera vs. Comelec has made partisan political activities, in whatever form, lawful before the start of the official
campaign period. Since the Supreme Court has declared that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done
during the campaign period, premature campaigning is effectively decriminalized.

Thus, any partisan political activity, provided they are lawful (i.e. not violative of any other law), done by a person who has
already filed his COC before the official campaign period, is legal.

The term partisan political activity is defined by the OEC[3] as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a
particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;

(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for
public office;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate;
or

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
Thus, because partisan political activities done before the campaign period are now lawful, the acts enumerated above are also
lawful.

The effect is that candidates could be punished only for unlawful acts or omissions committed during the campaign period.
Consequently, if candidates take campaign funds from a foreign government or bribe voters outside campaign period, they
cannot be prosecuted. A candidate can freely commit election offenses so long as he commits them before the start of the
campaign period.[4]

The ruling has in a sense extended the campaign period. Under the law, the campaign period for candidates running for
national posts starts three months before May 10, or election day. The campaign period for local posts is even shorter. But
because premature campaigning is now an impossible offense, one can campaign even before the start of this period.

The effect is that you have two periods wherein partisan political activities are legal: (1) from the filing of COCs to the start of
the official campaign period, wherein one is still not a candidate, and therefore cannot be liable for premature campaigning;
(2) the official campaign period where a candidate can now engage in actual campaigning.

This means that airing of infomercials, posting of tarpaulins and streamers, and even conducting gatherings of all sorts are
lawful.

Even saying vote for me should be considered lawful. After all, if you are still not a candidate, then directly or indirectly
soliciting votes, which does not promote any particular candidate, is perfectly legal.


Quinto vs. Comelec: Appointive Officials Not Deemed Resigned upon Filing Their COCs

This is a disaster waiting to happen.
- Justice Antonio T. Carpio[1]

The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in Quinto vs. Comelec[2] the second provision in the third paragraph of Section
13, Republic Act 9369,[3] Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC); and Section 4(a) of Comelec Resolution 8678.
Consequently, appointive public officials are no longer ipso facto resigned when they file their certificate of candidacy for an
elective post.

The Court found that the assailed provisions are violative of the equal protection clause. According to the court, in considering
persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their COCs, but not considering
as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact
alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does
not justify such differential treatment.

The ruling basically paves the way for justices, judges, election officials, military and police officers, members of the cabinet
and all appointed civil servants to continue exercising the functions of, and holding on to, their appointive office while
campaigning to get elected for an elective position.

The legal ramifications are of great significance. As Justice Carpio pointed out in his dissenting opinion, imagine if the
Provincial Commander of the AFP files his COC for governor on 1 December 2009 for the 10 May 2010 elections. If he is not
considered automatically resigned from office, he has until the start of the campaign period on 26 March 2010 to remain in his
post, in command of hundreds, if not thousands, of fully-armed personnel. The same is true for judges, cabinet secretaries, and
other heads of offices who have some kind of influence and control over certain personnel and government resources. There
are even reports that some Comelec officials themselves have filed their COCs for certain elective positions.

Next elections, it would then be possible that the Chief Justice, the Comelec Chairperson or the AFP Chief of Staff become a
candidate for President, Vice-President or Senator while serving the office to which they were appointed.

The decision does not seem to prevent the evil that the Constitution, in so many words, seeks to prevent. In fact, Article IX(B),
Section 2(4) of the Constitution expressly provides that No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.

Furthermore, if they lose, they just continue occupying their appointive posts. This is illogical because Section 6, Art. IX(B) of
the Constitution provides that No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed
to any office in the Government of any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of its subsidiaries.

What this author finds even more strange is that originally, both elective officials and appointive officials are generally deemed
resigned upon filing their COCs.[4] When the OEC was enacted in 1985, it substantially retained the rules on deemed
resignations for both elected and appointive officials.[5] However, the Republic Act No. 9006[6] expressly repealed, among
others, Section 67 of the OEC and rendered ineffective the provision relating to the automatic resignations of elected officials.

Curiously, RA 9006 is supposed to be An Act To Enhance The Holding Of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful And Credible
Elections Through Fair Election Practices. The law was all about the regulation of media or information in elections. But out of
nowhere, and without any reasonable connection to the subject law, RA 9006, in its repealing clause, repealed Section 67 of
the OEC. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has already declared that the repealing clause of RA 9006 is not a rider and
therefore constitutional in Farias vs. Comelec.[7] Personally, I still believe the repeal of Section 67 was a rider in the Fair
Election Act.

It must be pointed out that the major reason behind the decision is to give some sort of equality between elective and
appointive positions. The Court believed that prior to the decision, there was an obvious discrimination against appointive
officials. Thus, in a way, the Court in this case removed said discrimination and treated elective and appointive positions the
same.

Clearly, the effect of this decision is that public officials, whether elective or appointive, can keep their positions even when they
have filed their COCs. Both Section 66, on appointive officials, and Section 67, on elective officials, of the OEC are now
ineffective.

This author believes that if fairness and equality were the objectives, it would have been more logical to restore Section 67,
instead of deleting Section 66. This way, we go back to what the OEC originally contained.


CAYAT V. COMELEC G.R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007
FACTS:
Fr.Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May 2004 elections in Buguias Benguet.

Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat
misrepresents himself when he declared in his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is not because he is
serving probation after being convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness.

Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such, MR was denied because Cayat
failed to pay the filing fee and hence, it was declared final and executory.

Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed a petition for annulment of proclamation.
Comelec declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor.

Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of second placer.

ISSUE:
WON the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable.

HELD:
The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat became final and executory before the
elections and hence, there is only one candidate to speak of.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes
cast for him shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only candidate and the duly elected mayor.

The doctrine will apply in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the
decision on Cayats disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty
candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats disqualification became final only after the
elections.
Posted by Chrism at 6:07 PM
Labels: Public Corporation Digest


AGUJETAS V. CA. GR NO. 106560, 23 AUG 96TORRES, JR., J.:
Facts:Petitioners, Agujetas and Bijis, are former Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers for
the Province of Davao.
On January 21,1988 t he Pr ov i nc i al Boar d of Canv as s er s wher e petitioners occupy a position proclaimed the
winners for Gover nor , Vi ceGover nor and f or t he posi t i on of Provincial Board Members for Davao
Oriental in the January 18, 1988 election. A complaint was filed in COMELEC by Francisco Rabat (a losing
gubernatorial candidate) against petitioners for violation of the OEC and RA 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987).
After preliminary investigation Criminal Case no. 1886 was filed against petitioners for violation of the 2
nd
par.
of Sec. 231 i n r el at i on t o Sec. 262 of t he OEC whi ch alleges that petitioners willfully and unlawfully fail to
pr oc l ai m Er l i nda I r i go as el ec t ed Sangguni ang Panlalawigan Member candidate who obtained 31,129 votes,
the eighth highest number of votes cast in saidprovince but instead proclaimed candidate Pedro Pena who obtained only
30,699 votes.RTC f ound pet i t i oner s guilty
. Petitioners appealed in CA but CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Issue(s)W/N the failure to make a proclamation on the
basis of t he Cer t i f i cat e of Canvass or t he mer e er r oneous proclamations is punishable under Sec. 262 in relationto
Sec. 231 (2) of the Omnibus Election Code.Note: According to petitioners, the Omnibus ElectionCode does not punish
the preparation of an incorrect certificate of canvass, nor an erroneous proclamationmade by the Board; what it does punish
is that, havingthus prepared the corresponding certificate, the
boardf or some r eason f ai l s t o make t he cor r espondi ngproclamation on the basis thereof.RulingPetition DENIED.The
second paragraph of Section 231 of the OmnibusElection Code
reads:T h e r e s p e c t i v e b o a r d o f c a n v a s s e r s s h a l l p r e p a r e a certificate of canvass duly
signedand affixed with the imprint of thet humb of t he r i ght hand of eachmember, supported by a statementof the
votes and received by eachcandi dat e i n each pol l i ng pl aceand, on t he basi s t her eof , shal l proclaim as elected
the candidateswho obtained the highest number of votes cast in the province, city,municipality or barangay.
Failureto comply with this requirementshal l const i t ut e an el ect i onoffense.
To go by the explanation as proposed by the petitioner would be tantamount to tolerating and licensing
boardsof canvassers to "make an erroneous
proclamation"a n d s t i l l b e e x c u l p a t e d b y j u s t p u t t i n g u p t h e inexcusable defense that the "foul-up resulted
from theerroneous arrangement of the names of candidates" inone municipality or that "the basis of their
proclamationwas t he er r oneous r anki ng made by t he t abul at i oncommittee". That would be a neat apology for
allowingt he boar d t o be car el ess i n t hei r i mpor t ant t ask bysimply claiming that they cannot be held liable
becauset he y di d t hei r " dut y" of pr oc l ai mi ng t he wi nni ngcandidates
on the basis
of the certificate of canvass even "erroneous" certificates which they made

EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS vs. ROSITA C. CUMBA, ET AL.

Problem No. 1. Facts:In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba were candidates for the position of Mayor in
the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over the former.
Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte, which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City.
On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgement in
favor of the petitioner as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the court hereby declares the protestant as having won the mayoralty election
and as duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the local election held on May 11, 1992, the
protestant having obtained six (6) votes more than that of the protestee's votes.
Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the petitioner and the private respondent on 1 July 1994.
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC by filing her notice of appeal and paying the appellate docket fees.
On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.
On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which the private respondent opposed on 22 July 1994.
QUESTION: Under the circumstances, is the motion of execution pending appeal proper?
ANSWER: Since both the petitioner and the private respondent received copies of the decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed within five days
16
from 1 July 1994,
or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules
Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed
perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal,
17
or on 6 July 1994. On 4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July
1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of the case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was
divested of its jurisdiction over the case.
18
Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no
longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the motion was filed before the perfection of the appeal. G.R. No. 118861 April 27, 1995
EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS vs. ROSITA C. CUMBA, ET AL.