Sunteți pe pagina 1din 25

CIVIL PROCEDURE

COURSE OUTLINE
ATTY. CUSTODIO
1. Introduction

1.1. Applicability of rules to civil and criminal actions and
special proceedings

1.1.1. Civil Action one by which a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
prevention or redress of a wrong.
1.1.2. Criminal Action one by which the State
prosecutes a person for an act or omission
punishable by law.
1.1.3. Special Proceeding a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact.

1.2. Procedure and Practice

1.2.1. Practice is the method or means of conducting
litigation proceedings
1.2.2. Practice is the carrying on of actions according
to procedure by the rules of court

1.3. Courts and their Jurisdiction

LA NAVAL DRUG CORP V. CA
236 SCRA 78, AUG. 31, 1994
FACTS:
Respondent Yao is the present owner of a commercial
building a portion of which is leased to petitioner under a
contract of lease. The contract expired on April 30, 1989.
However, petitioner exercised its option to lease the same
building for another 5 years. But petitioner and respondent
Yao disagreed on the rental rate, and to resolve the
controversy Yao thru written notice to petitioner,
expressed his intention to submit their disagreement to
arbitration in accordance to par. 7 of their lease contract.

Both parties chose their respective arbitrators, but the
appointment of the third arbitrator was deferred by
petitioner. Thus, Respondent Yao prayed that after
summary hearing, to direct the arbitrators to proceed with
the arbitration, on the basis that the petitioner is delaying
the arbitration proceedings. Subsequently respondent Yao
file an amended petition for Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreement with Damages. The respondent court admitted
the amended petition despite petitioners opposition. The
court ordered the parties to submit their position papers
on the issue as to whether or not respondent Yaos claim
for damage may be litigated upon the summary
proceeding for enforcement of arbitration agreement.

Petitioner argued that the respondent court sits as a
special court exercising limited jurisdiction and is not
competent to act on respondent Yaos claim for damages,
which poses an issue litigable in an ordinary civil action.
While the appellate court has agreed with the petitioners
contention, it however, considered petitioner in estoppel
from questioning the competence of the court to
additionally hear and decide in the summary proceedings
private respondents claim for damages, it (petitioner)
having itself filed similarly its own counterclaim with the
court a quo.

RULING: The SC ruled the want of jurisdiction by the court
is indisputable, given the nature of the controversy. The
court a quo must refrain from taking up the claims of the
contending parties for damages which may be ventilated in
separate regular proceedings.

DOCTRINE:
When a court is called upon to exercise limited and
special jurisdiction, that court cannot stray to matters
outside the area of its declared authority or beyond
what has been expressly invested by law.

Lack of jurisdiction over the person. - Lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be
waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant
voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes
to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have
submitted himself to that jurisdiction.

Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed.
This defense may be interposed at any time, during
appeal or even after final judgment. Such is
understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred
by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties,
to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.

Jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Lack of
jurisdiction over the nature of the action is the
situation that arises when a court, which ordinarily
would have the authority and competence to take a
case, is rendered without it either because a special
law has limited the exercise of its normal jurisdiction
on a particular matter or because the type of action
has been reposed by law in certain other courts or
quasi-judicial agencies for determination. The rules
relating to the effects of want of jurisdiction over the
subject matter should apply with equal vigor to cases
where the court is similarly bereft of jurisdiction over
the nature of the action.

Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the nature of the action, the
invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It
is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or
disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction,
this matter being legislative in character.

ATWEL VS. CONCEPCION PROCESSIVE ASSO INC.
G.R. 169370, APRIL 14, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners were officers of CPA which collects rents from
the property bought in behalf of the association. While CPA
was in the process of registering as a stock corporation, its
other officers and members formed their own group and
registered themselves in the SEC as officers and members
of CPAI. Petitioners were not listed either as officers or
members of CPAI.

Subsequently, CPAI file a case in the SEC for mandatory
injunction. The case was transferred to the RTC which is a
special commercial court. In the complaint CPAI alleged
that it was the owner of the property and petitioners,
without authority were collecting rentals from the wet
market vendors.

The special commercial court ruled that the deed of sale
covering the property was in the name of CPA. Aggrieved,
petitioners went to the CA and contested the jurisdiction of
the special commercial court over the case. According to
them, they were not CPAI members, hence the case did
not involve an intra-corporate dispute between and
among members so as to warrant the special commercial
courts jurisdiction over it. CPAI, on the other hand argued
that petitioners were already in estoppel as they had
participated actively in the court proceedings.

The CA found that the special commercial court should not
have tried the case since there was no intra-corporate
dispute among the CPAI members or officers, it
nonetheless held that petitioners were already barred from
questioning the courts jurisdiction based on the doctrine
of estoppel.

RULING: Estoppel cannot apply because a courts
jurisdiction is conferred exclusively by law, not by the
parties agreement or by estoppel. For CPAI, no
exceptional circumstance appears in the case to warrant
divergence from the rule. Jurisdiction by estoppel is not
available here.



DOCTRINE:
The jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it
affects the very authority of the courts to take
cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings.

Citing Lozon v. NLRC, the Court came up with a clear
rule on when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when
it does not: The operation of estoppel on the question
of jurisdiction depends on whether the lower court
actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction,
but the case was tried and decided upon the theory
that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on
appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same
must exist as a matter of law and may not be
conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel.
However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the
case was heard and decided upon a given theory,
such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction,
the party who induces it to adopt such theory will not
be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent
position that the lower court had jurisdiction

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy case provided an exceptional
circumstance. To void the trial courts decision for lack
of jurisdiction was not only unfair but patently revolting
considering the question on jurisdiction was raised only
after 15yrs of tedious litigation and at a stage where
the case was already elevated to the Court of Appeals.

The rule remains that estoppel does not confer
jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the cause
of action or subject matter of the case.

It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party to the result
of a suit or proceeding in a court with no jurisdiction.
The decision of tribunal not vested with appropriate
jurisdiction is null and void.

1.4. How jurisdiction is obtained and exercised:
1.4.1. Over Persons
1.4.2. Over the subject matter
1.4.3. Over the res

1.5. Procedure and substantive law

2. General Provisions for Ordinary Civil Actions

2.1. Must be based on a cause of action

2.1.1. What is cause of action
2.1.2. No splitting of cause of action

CITY OF BACOLOD VS. SAN MIGUEL
29 SCRA 819, OCT. 30, 1969
FACTS: City Council of Bacolod passed an ordinance
imposing upon any person, firm or corporation engaged in
the manufacture of bottling of soft drinks within the
jurisdiction of the City of Bacolod a fee of 1/24 of a
centavo for every bottle plus a surcharge of 2% every
month, but in no case to exceed 24% for one whole year
upon such manufacturers or bottlers who will be
delinquent on any amount of fees due under the
ordinance.

City of Bacolod (appellee) sued San Miguel (appellant) for
collection of sum of money, alleging that San Miguel failed
to pay the additional bottling tax of P0.03 per case of soft
drinks. The RTC ruled in favor of City of Bacolod, the court
ordered San Miguel to pay the unpaid bottling taxes due
with legal interest.

After the decision has become final, appellee moved for
reconsideration, praying that the same be amended so as
to include the penalties and surcharges provided in the
ordinance. Said motion was denied, for the reason that the
decision is already final and may not be amended.

Failing in its attempt to collect the surcharges, appellee
filed a second action to collect said surcharges. Appellant
filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that: (1)
the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, and (2)
a party may not institute more than one suit for a single
cause of action.

The RTC denied said motion, thus appellant filed its
answer wherein it substantially reiterated, as affirmative
defenses the same grounds in his motion to dismiss. The
RTC ruled in favor of appellee and ordered San Miguel to
pay the surcharges provided in the ordinance.

RULING: The SC ruled in favor of appellants position and
held that appellee split up its cause of action when it filed
the first complaint seeking the recovery of only the bottling
taxes or charges plus legal interest, without mentioning in
any manner the surcharges.

DOCTRINE:
A party cannot split a single cause of action into parts
and sue on each part separately. The rule against
splitting a single cause of action is intended to prevent
litigation between the same parties in regard to the
same subject of controversy, to protect defendant from
unnecessary vexation and to avoid the cost and
expenses incident to numerous suits. (No man shall be
twice vexed for one and the same cause).

In the case at bar, the failure to pay the bottling
charges or taxes and the surcharge for delinquency in
the payment thereof constitutes but one single cause
of action which under the rule can be the subject of
only one complaint under the pain of either of them
being barred if not included in the same complaint with
the other.

Cause of action is a delict or wrong by which the
right of the plaintiff are violated by the defendant. Its
elements are:
1) A right existing in favor of the plaintiff
2) A corresponding obligation on the part of the
defendant to respect such right
3) An act or omission of the plaintiffs right which
defendant had the duty to respect.

A cause of action is basically an act or an omission or
several acts or omissions. A single act or omission can
be violative of various rights at the same time, as when
the act constitutes juridically a violation of several
separate and distinct legal obligation. On the other
hand, it can happen also that several acts or omission
may violate only one right, in which case, there would
be only one cause of action. Again the violation of a
single right may give rise to more than one relief. In a
single cause of action or violation of a right, the
plaintiff may be entitled to several reliefs. It is the filing
for separate complaints for these several reliefs that
constitute splitting up of the cause of action.

In the case at bar, the act of appellant in violation of
the right of appellee to be paid for the charges in full
under the ordinance was one single cause of action,
but the appellee became entitled, as a result of such
non-payment to 2 reliefs: (1) the recovery of the
balance of the basic charges; and (2) the payment of
the corresponding surcharges. The obligation to pay
the surcharges arose from the violation of appellant of
the same right of appellee from which the obligation to
pay the basic charges also arose. Since appellee filed
separate complaints for each of two reliefs related to
the same single cause of action, thereby splitting up
the said cause of action.

The effect of splitting up of a cause of action
whenever a plaintiff has filed more than one complaint
for the same violation of a right, the filing of the first
complaint on any of the reliefs born of said violation
constitutes a bar to any action on any pf the possible
reliefs arising from the same violation.

If first action is still pending, the defense to the
subsequent complaint would be litis pendentia. If it has
already finally terminated, the defense would be res
judicata.

JALANDONI VS. MARTIR-GUANZON
102 PHIL 859, JAN. 21, 1958
FACTS: Spouses Jalandoni began a suit against Antonio
Guanzon for partition of lots and for recovery of damages
cause by defendants unwarranted refusal to recognize
plaintiffs right and partition said lots, as well as to account
for and deliver plaintiffs share in the crops. The lower
court held for plaintiff and ordered the partition of the land
but denied their claim for damages for failing to
substantiate their claim.

The decision became final because none of the parties
appealed therefrom. The plaintiff instituted another action
seeking recovery for damages. The court dismissed the
second complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

RULING: The lower court is correct in holding that the
recovery is now barred by previous judgment. These
damages are but the result of the original cause of action,
viz., the continuing refusal of defendants to recognize the
plaintiffs right to an interest in the property. To allow
them to recover by subsequent suit would be a violation of
the rule against multiplicity of suits and against the
splitting of causes of action since these damages spring
from the same cause of action that was pleaded in the
former case between the same parties.

DOCTRINE:
A final judgment on the merits is conclusive not only
on the questions actually contested and determined,
but upon all matters that might have been litigated and
decided in the former suit, i.e., all matters properly
belonging to the subject of the controversy and within
the scope of the issue.

2.1.3. Joinder and misjoinder of causes of action
2.1.4. Test of single cause of action

JOSEPH VS. BAUTISTA
170 SCRA 540, FEB. 23, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against
respondent Patrocino Perez, as owner of the cargo truck
based on a breach of contract of carriage and against
respondent Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as
owner and driver of the pick-up truck based on quasi-
delict.

Subsequently, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto
Cardeno, Antonio Sioson, and Jacinto Pagarigan, thru their
insurance, paid petitioners for injuries sustained. Thus,
petitioner executed a release of claim releasing from
liability the said persons. Thereafter, Villanueva, Cardeno
and their insurer, paid respondent Patrocinio Perez for
damages to his cargo truck. Consequently, respondents
Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a motion
to exonerate and exclude defendants/cross defendants
Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan on the case
alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already
paid damages to respondent Perez and respondent
Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid to
petitioner thru amicable settlement.

Respondent Perez filed an Opposition to Cross Defs.
Motion and counter motion to dismiss. The counter-motion
to dismiss was premised on the fact that the release of
claim executed in favor of the other respondents inured to
the benefit of respondent Perez, considering that all the
respondents are solidarily liable to petitioner. The
respondent judge dismissed the case.

RULING: The Court held that the trial court was correct in
holding that there was only one cause of action involved
although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner
against defendants were not necessarily identical since the
respondents were not identically circumstanced. However,
a recover of the petitioner under one remedy necessarily
bars recovery under the other.

DOCTRINE:
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or
wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant
in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. A
single act or omission can be violative of various rights
at the same time, as when the act constitutes
juridically a violation of several separate and distinct
legal obligations. However, where there is only one
delict, or wrong, there is but a single cause of action
regardless of the number of rights that may have been
violated belonging to one person.

The singleness of a cause of action lies in the
singleness of the delict or wrong violating the rights of
one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted
from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action
arises.

In the case at bar, the petitioner sustained a single
injury on his person that vested in him a single cause
of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action
against different respondents through the appropriate
remedies allowed by law.

The rationale for the proscription in our law against
double recovery for the same act or omission stems
from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.

2.2. Parties to civil actions

2.2.1. Who are parties in interest
2.2.2. Competency of parties
2.2.3. Indispensable and necessary parties
2.2.4. Joinder and misjoinder of parties
2.2.5. Death of party

2.2.5.1. Consequence of death of party

SARSABA VS. VDA DELA TORRE
594 SCRA 410, JULY 30, 2009
FACTS: A decision was rendered in NLRC which ordered
Gasing to pay monetary claim to Sereno, who was found
illegally dismissed. After the writ of execution was returned
unsatisfied, Labor Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution
directing the sheriff Lavarez to satisfy the judgment award.
Lavarez, with Sereno and his counsel Atty. Rogelio Sarsaba
levied a Fuso Truck which was at the time in the
possession of Gasing.

Meanwhile, respondent Fe Vda de Te (wife of the late
Pedro Te, who owned the truck) filed with the RTC a
complaint for recovery of motor vehicle, damages with
prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente lite against
petitioner, Sereno, Lavarez and the NLRC. Respondent
alleged that Lavarez erroneously assumed that Gaasing
owned the truck because he was, at the time of taking in
possession of the truck. Since neither she nor his husband
were parties to the labor case, she should not be made to
answer for the judgment award and be deprived of the
truck as a consequence of the levy in execution.

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants
and to discharge respondents atty-in-fact for lack of legal
personality to sue. It appears that respondent, Fe Vda de
Te died on April 12, 2005.

Respondent, through her lawyer, Atty. Carpentero filed an
opposition contending that the failure to serve summons
upon Sereno is not a ground for dismissing the complaint,
because the other defendants have already submitted their
responsive pleadings. Moreover, respondents death did
not render functus officio her right to sue since her
attorney-in-fact Faustino Castaneda, had long testified on
the complaint on March 13, 1998 for and on her behalf.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioner argues
that since Sereno died before summons was served on
him, the RTC should have dismissed the complaint against
all the defendants.

RULING: The Court agreed with the RTC in ruling that the
failure to effect service of summons unto Patricio Sereno,
one of the defendants does not render the action
dismissible, considering that the 3 other defendants were
validly served with summons and the case with respect to
he answering of defendants may sill proceed
independently. Hence, only the case against Sereno will be
dismissed and the same may be filed as a claim against
the estate of Sereno.

As to the death of Fe Vda de Te, the Court agreed with the
RTC that the Attorney-in-fact had not lost personality to
prosecute the case. The proper remedy here is the
substitution of heirs and not the dismissal of this case.

DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of
summons by the sheriff, his deputy or other proper
court office, wither personally by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant or by substituted service. On
the other hand, summons is a writ by which the
defendant is notified of the action brought against him.
Service of such writ is the means by which the court
may acquire jurisdiction over his person.

The courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over ones
person is a defense which is personal to the person
claiming it. In the case at bar, it is now impossible for
Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death.
Neither can petitioner invoke such ground on behalf of
Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case
dismissed against all of the defendants. Failure to
serve the summons on Serenos person will not be a
cause for the dismissal of the complaint against the
other defendants, considering that they have been
served with copies of summons and complaints and
have long submitted their respective responsive
pleadings.

When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is
not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a
substitution of the deceased. Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court enumerates the actions that survive and
may be filed against the decedents representatives:
1) Actions to recover real or personal property or
an interest thereon
2) Actions to enforce liens thereon
3) Actions to recover damages for an injury to a
person or a property
In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court
of the death of his client and give the name and
address of the latters legal representative.

The rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of
jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. The rule
on substitution was crafted to protect every partys
right to due process. It was designed to ensure that
the deceased party would continue to be properly
represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly
appointed legal representative of his estate. Non-
compliance with the rules results in the denial of the
right of due process for the heirs, who though not duly
notified of the proceedings, would be substantially
affected by the decision rendered therein. Thus, it is
only when there is a denial of due process, as when
the deceased is not represented by any legal
representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial
proceedings and resulting judgment.

The failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to
inform the court of the death of his client, such that no
substitution is effected will not invalidate the
proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if the
action survives the death of such party. The trial
courts jurisdiction over the case subsists despite death
of the party.

The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the
right to due process of every party to the litigation who
may be affected by the intervening death. The
deceased litigants are themselves protected as they
continue to be properly represented in the suit through
the duly appointed legal representative of their estate.

GONZALES VS. PAGCOR
429 SCRA 533, MAY 27, 2004
FACTS: Ramon Gozales, as a citizen taxpayer and member
of the Philippine Bar, filed a petition as a class suit seeking
to restrain PAGCOR from continuing its operation and
prohibit it and its co-respondents from enforcing: (1) the
Grant of an Authority and Agreement for the Operations
of Sports Betting and Internet Gambling executed
between PAGCOR and SAGE; (2) the Grant of Authority to
Operate Computerized Bingo Games between PAGCOR and
BEST WORLD; and (3) the Agreement among PAGCOR,
BELLE and FILGAME to conduct jai-alai operations.

The parties were required to submit their respective
Memoranda. Only respondent PAGCOR and SAGE
submitted their Memoranda. Gonzales having failed to file
his Memorandum within the prescribed period, this Court
which was informed of the alleged demise of Gonzales.

Attys. Manuel B. Imbong and Jo Aurea M. Imbong filed a
motion for substitution. Respondents PAGCOR and SAGE
both argued that, movants Attys. Imbong and Imbong
may not be substituted for Gonzales as the former are
neither legal representatives nor heirs of the latter within
the purview of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

RULING: Gonzales necessarily asserted a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. Gonzales
alleged interest does not involve any claim to money or
property which he could have assigned to another or
transmitted to his heirs. Rather, he claimed to be
vindicating his rights as a citizen, taxpayer and member of
the bar. Being personal and non-transferable in nature,
any interest that he might have had in the outcome of this
case cannot be deemed to have survived his death.

DOCTRINE:
The criteria for determining whether an action survives
the death of a plaintiff or petitioner depends on the
nature of the action and the damage sued for. If the
causes of action which survives the wrong complained
of affects primarily and principally property or
property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
incidental, while in the causes of action which do not
survive the injury complained of is to the person the
property and rights of property affected being
incidental.

The movants argument that substitution should be
allowed since the citizens and taxpayers represented
by Gonzales in his class suit will be denied due process,
will not prosper. It is evident that the movants are not
asserting any right or interest transmitted to them by
the death of Gonzales, but are seeking to protect their
own individual interest as members of the classes
alleged to have been represented by Gonzales.

The proper procedure would have been for them to file
a Motion for Intervention as expressly provided for in
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and not a
Motion for Substitution. Ideally, such a Motion for
Intervention should be filed before the possibility of
abatement is raised by the death of the
named/representative party to the class suit; or where
such is not possible, within a reasonable time from the
death of the named or representative party.

2.2.5.2. What counsel should do on death of
party

2.3. Venue of actions

2.3.1. Real and personal actions

UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. VS. ROSEMOORE
MINING & DEVELOPMENT CORP
528 SCRA 123, MARCH 12, 2007
FACTS: Respondent Rosemoor applied for and was
granted by petitioner Westmont Bank a credit facility. To
secure the credit facility, a real estate mortgage
agreement was executed by Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual,
Rosemoors president, as mortgagors in favor of the Bank
as mortgagee. The agreement covered 2 properties, one in
Bulacan and the other in Nueva Ecija.

Rosemoor defaulted in payment. In view of the default,
caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of both properties and
being the highest bidder, the bank caused the annotation
of the notarial certificate of sale of title in both properties.

Rosemoor filed 2 separate complaints against the bank,
one before the Mania RTC and the other before the
Malolos RTC.

In the Manila Case: Rosemoor filed a complaint for the
enforcement of the contract alleging that the bank moved
for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
venue had been improperly laid. The motion was denied.

In the Malolos Case: Rosemoor filed another action with
the Malolos RTC to annul the foreclosure sale, while the
case in Manila was pending. The bank filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that Rosemoor had engaged in
forum shopping, adverting the pending Manila case. The
bank further alleged that Dr. Pascual has no cause of
action since the properties registered in her name are
located in Nueva Ecija. Motion was denied. Malolos RTC
ruled in favor of Rosemoor.

The Bank challenges the Malolos RTCs jurisdiction over
the action to nullify the foreclosure sale of the Nueva Ecija
properties along with the Bulacan properties.

RULING:
On Forum Shopping: Respondend did not commit forum
shopping. There was no substantial identity of parties on
both cases being that several Bank officers in the manila
were not included in the Malolos case and Dr. Pascual was
not included as plaintif in the Manila case because hee
interest was not personal but merely in her capacity as
officer of Rosemoor. As regards the identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the right asserted in the
Manila case is to receive the proceeds of the loan, while
the right sought in the Malolos case is to restrain the
foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to secure a loan
that was not yet due. Moreover, the Malolos case is an
action to annul the foreclosure sale that is necessarily an
action affecting the title of the property sold. It is
therefore a real action which should be commenced and
tried in the province where the property or part thereof
lies. The Manila case, on the other hand, is a personal
action involving the enforcement of a contract between
Rosemoor, whose office is in QC, and the bank, whose
principal office is in Binondo, Manila. It was subsequent to
the filing of the Manila case that Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual
saw the need to secure a writ of injunction because the
consolidation of the titles to the mortgaged properties in
favor of the Bank was in the offing. But then, the action
can only be commenced where the properties, or portion
thereof, is located. Otherwise, the petition for injunction
would be dismissed for improper venue. Thus, Rosemoor
was warranted in filing the Malolos case and cannot be in
turn accused of forum shopping.

On Improper Venue: The venue of the action for the
nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly laid with the
Malolos RTC although two of the properties together with
the Bulacan properties are situated in Nueva Ecija. Since
there is only one proceeding sought to be nullified and
that is the extra-judicial mortgage foreclosure sale. And
there is only one initial transaction which served as the
basis of the foreclosure sale and that is the mortgage
contract.

DOCTRINE:
The essence of forum shopping is the filling of multiple
suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. The
elements of forum-shopping are:
1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties
represent the same interest in both actions.
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts
3. The identity with respect to the two preceeding
particulars in the two cases is such that any
judgment rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the other case.

Real action should be commenced and tried in the
province where the property or part thereof lies. On
the other hand, personal action may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

The venue of real actions affecting properties found in
different provinces is determined by the singularity or
plurality of the transactions involving said parcels of
land. Where the parcels are the object of one and the
same transaction, the venue is in the court of any of
the provinces wherein a parcel of land is situated.


2.3.2. Actions against non-residents
2.3.3. Agreement on venue

2.4. Commencement of actions

2.4.1. How and when deemed commenced

MAGASPI VS. RAMOLETE
115 SCRA 193, JULY 20, 1982
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land with
damages against private respondents. Upon filing and the
payment of P60.00 as docketing fees and P10 for sheriff
fees, the complaint was assigned.

Private respondent field a motion to compel plaintiffs to
pay the correct amount of docket fee. The plaintiff
opposed and claimed that the main action was the
recovery of a piece of land and on the basis of its assessed
value P60 was the correct docketing fee and damages are
still to be excluded.

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay additional docket fee
of P3,104. However, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to
amend the complaint to include the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines as defendant. Subsequently,
the judge admitted amended complaint although the
plaintiffs had not yet complied his order that they should
pay an additional docket fee.

The respondent filed a motion for the plaintiff to pay an
additional docket fee, otherwise the complaint will be
dismissed with prejudice.

The lower court ruled the original complaint, up to the
present, is not deemed registered or docketed. It follows
therefore, that there is likewise no amended complaint
deemed to have been admitted. The plaintiffs are given
the choice to pay the docket fee assessed or to forego this
proceeding.

RULING: The petitioner shall be assessed a docket fee on
the basis of the amended complaint.

The Court held that the case was docketed upon the
payment of P60 although said amount is insufficient the
Court held that since there is an honest difference of
opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee,
the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case and
the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular.

DOCTRINE:
A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in
court.

When a pleading is amended the original pleading is
deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform
any further function as a pleading. The case stands for
the trial on the amended pleading only. Thus, the
additional docket fee to be paid by petitioners should
be based on their amended complaint.

MANCHESTER DEV CORP VS. CA
149 SCRA 562, MAY 7, 1987
FACTS: The action in the present case is one for specific
performance and damages. The amount of the damages
sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of
the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78M as
damages suffered by plaintiff. The docket fee paid upon
the filing of the complaint in the amount of P410.

When this under-assessment of the filing fee in this case
was brought to the attention of the Court, an investigation
was immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile, plaintiff
filed an amended complaint with leave of court for the
inclusion of a co-plaintiff and by eliminating any mention
of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint.
The Court issued an order for re-assessment of the docket
fee in the present case and other cases that were
investigated. The trial court directed plaintiff to rectify the
amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are
asking for. It was only then that the plaintiff specified the
amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the
reduced amount of P10M, but still no amount of damages
were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was
admitted.

** this case was compared with Magaspi case. (see facts
of magaspi case

RULING: The Court ruled that the docketing fee should eb
assessed by considering the amount of damages as
alleged in the original complaint. The trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only
P410 as docket fee. Neither can the amended complaint
thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal
purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly
filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order
admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null
and void. The CA is correct in ruling that the basis of
assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of
damages sought in the original complaint and not in the
amended complaint.

In the present case, there is a clear intent to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees when the counsel of
petitioner amended the complaint and sought to reduce
the amount of damages in the body of the complaint but
not in the prayer.

DOCTRINE:
All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also
in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in
the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall
not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleadings. THE RULING IN THE
MAGASPI CASE IN SO FAR AS IT IS INCONSISTENT
WITH THIS ANNOUNCEMENT IS OVERTURNED AND
REVERSED.

SUN INSURANCE VS. ASUNCION
170 SCRA 274, FEB 13, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Sun Insurance filed a complaint for the
consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance
policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity
against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. On the
other hand, private respondent filed a complaint for refund
of premiums. The complaint sought for actual,
compensatory, moral exemplary and liquidated damages,
although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the
amount of the damages sought said amount may be
inferred from the body of the complaint to be about P50M.

Only the amount of P210 was paid by private respondent
as docket fee which prompted the petitioners counsel to
raise this objection.

The petitioner filed an amended complaint wherein the
prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10M as
actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the
complaint, the amount of his pecuniary claim is
approximately P44M. Said complaint was admitted and the
private respondent was reassessed the additional docket
fee based on his prayer of not less than P10M in damages,
which he paid. Subsequently private respondent filed a
supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of
P20M, private respondent paid an additional docket fee.
After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent
court wherein private respondent was ordered to be
reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the
pendency of this petition, private respondent again paid an
additional docket fee. Nevertheless, petitioner contend that
the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering
the total amount of the claim.

RULING: The Court dismissed the petition. In the present
case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional
docket fees as required.

DOCTRINE:
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vest a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,
third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not
be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also
in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim
by the filing fee, but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by
the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
collect the additional fee.

HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO JR. VS. CA
G.R. NO. 116 121, JULY 18, 2011
FACTS: A passenger of a jeepney, Ruben Reinoso was
killed in a collision of a passenger jeepney and a truck. The
heirs of Reinoso filed a complaint for damages against the
owner of the jeepney and truck. RTC rendered its decision
in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the
RTC decision and dismissed the complaint on the ground
of non-payment of docket fees pursuant to the doctrine
laid down in Manchester. The CA further ruled that since
prescription had set in, petitioners could no longer pay the
required docket fees.

Petitioner argue that the ruling in Manchester should not
have been applied retroactively since it was filed prior to
the promulgation of the Manchester decision in 1987.
Petitioner further assert that at the time of the filing of the
complaint in 1979, they were not certain of the amount of
damages they were entitled to. They claim that the
jurisdiction of the trial court remains even if there was a
failure to pay the correct filing fee as long as the correct
amount would be paid subsequently. Finally, petitioners
stress that the alleged defect was never put in issue either
in the RTC or in the CA.

RULING: The Court finds merit in the petition. The Court
reinstated the RTC decision. The Clerk of Court of RTC
Manila or his duly authorized deputy is ordered to compute
the correct docket fees and to enforce the judgment lien
by collecting the additional fees from the petitioners.

DOCTRINE:
The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees
within the prescribed period is mandatory.

A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict
application of this rule was relaxed in the case of Sun
Insurance vs. Asuncion, wherein the Court decreed
that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied
by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time,
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

Where a party does not deliberately intend to defraud
the court in payment of docket fees, and manifest its
willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional
docket fees when required by the court, the liberal
doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance and not the strict
regulations in Manchester, will apply. The Court
allowed relaxation of the rule on non-payment of
docket fees in order to afford the parties the
opportunity to fully ventilate their case on the merits.

2.4.2. When does court acquire jurisdiction over a
case
2.4.3. Effect of underpayment of docket fees

2.4.3.1. Rule is payment may be allowed within
reasonable time but within reglementary
period
2.4.3.2. But in several case, both CA and SC
have caused the dismissal of cases for non-
payment of docket fees.

3. Procedure in Regional Trial Court

3.1. Applicable also to Municipal Trial Courts
3.2. Pleadings in general

3.2.1. Kinds of Pleadings
3.2.2. Formal requirements of pleadings

3.2.2.1. Parts of a pleading
3.2.2.2. Verification when required

3.2.2.2.1. Formal, not jurisdictional
KILUSAN-OLALIA VS. CA
528 SCRA 45, JULY 24, 2007
FACTS: On account of the May 1987 strike, Kimberly filed
a complaint to declare the strike illegal. As a counter-
complaint, KILUSAN-OLALIA, its officer and members
charged the company and its officers with unfair labor
practice. On June 3, 1987, Kimberly dismissed a number of
workers for knowingly participating in an illegal strike and
for committing illegal acts. The LA declared both parties in
pari delicto.

On appeal, NLRC held that Kimberly was not guilty of
unfair labor practice, precluding the application of the in
pari delicto doctrine. KILUSAN-OLALIA instituted a Petition
for Certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed KILUSAN-
OLALIAs petition on procedural grounds: the verification
was signed only by petitioners president without any
board resolution or power of attorney authorizing anybody
to sign the same and the certificate on non-forum
shopping.

RULING: The Court found the disputed verification and
certification against forum shopping sufficient in form. In
the instant case, despite the fact that Ernesto Facundo,
the union president, was not shown to have been duly
authorized to sign the verification on behalf of the other
petioners, the CA should not have been too strict in the
application of the rule. Facundo, being the union president
was in position to verify the truthfulness and correctness
of the allegations in the petition.



DOCTRINE:
Verification is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite, as
it is mainly intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations therein made are done in good faith or are
true and correct and not mere speculation. The Court
may order the correction of the pleading, if not
verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that a strict
compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice may be served.

3.2.2.2.2. Verification by Counsel

IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC. VS. SEHWANI INC
575 SCRA 535, DEC. 24, 2008
FACTS: Respondent contend that the
Verification/Certification executed by Atty. Edmund Jason
Barranda of Villaraza and Angangco, which petitioner
attached to the present Petition is defective and should
result in the dismissal of the said petition. Respondent aver
that the Secretarys Certificate executed by Arnold M.
Wensinger stating that petitioner had authorized the
lawyers of Villaraza and Angangco to represent it in the
present petition and to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping, was not properly
notarized.

RULING: Atty. Barranda, as petitioners counsel, was in the
position to verify the truth and correctness of the
allegations of the present petition. Hence, the Verification
signed by Atty. Barranda substantially complies with the
formal requirements for such.

DOCTRINE:
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has
read the pleading and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records. The party itself need not sign the
verification. A partys representative, lawyer, or any
other person who personally knows the truth of the
facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.

The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an
assurance that the allegations of the petition has been
made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely
speculative. This requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of the pleadings, non-compliance
therewith does not necessarily render it fatally
defective. A verification is only a formal and not a
jurisdictional requirement. In the interest of substantial
justice, strict observance of procedural rules may be
dispensed with for compelling reasons.

3.2.2.3. Certification against forum-shopping in
initiatory pleading

3.2.2.3.1. Definition of forum-shopping

TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY
INC. ET. AL. VS. VALDEZ
G.R. NO. 150107, JAN 28, 2008
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE

3.2.2.3.2. Counsel cannot sign certification

DIGITAL MICROWAVE CORP VS. CA
G.R. NO. 128550, MARCH 16, 2000
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:


3.2.2.3.3. Co-owner or co-party may sign
in behalf of co-owners or co-parties

CAVILE VS. HEIRS OF CLARITA CAVILE
400 SCRA 255

3.2.2.4. Distinction between non-compliance of
verification and certification

SARI-SARI GROUP OF COMPANIES INC. VS. PIGLAS
KAMAO
561 SCRA 569
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:

MEDIAN CONTAINER CORP. VS. METROPOLITAN
BANK & TRUST CO.
561 SCRA 622
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:

3.2.3. Substantial requirements of pleadings

3.2.3.1. Sufficiency of allegations

3.2.3.1.1. Ultimate facts only

REMITERE VS. YULO
16 SCRA 251
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:

PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE VS. MANILA
BANKING CORP
559 SCRA 352
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:

3.2.3.1.2. Test of sufficiency of complaint

3.2.3.1.2.1. Can judgment be
rendered if admitted?
3.2.3.1.2.2. Always reckon against
grounds for dismissal
3.2.3.1.2.3. Is bill of particulars
applicable?

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS VS.
TRAZO
500 SCRA 242
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:

3.2.3.1.3. Test of sufficiency of responsive
pleading

3.2.3.1.3.1. Not susceptible to
summary judgment
3.2.3.1.3.2. Does not amount to
confession of judgment
3.2.3.1.3.3. MUST tender an issue
3.2.3.1.3.4. Must specifically deny
material allegations lest they be
deemed admitted
3.2.3.1.3.5. Defenses and objections
MUST be pleaded either in motion
to dismiss or answer, else waived

3.2.3.1.4. Alternative causes of action or
defenses may be pleaded even if
inconsistent with each other

3.2.3.1.4.1. Purpose of rule is to allow
for complete adjudication of any
controversy.

3.2.4. Counterclaims

3.2.4.1. Rule on permissive and compulsory
counterclaims
3.2.4.2. Test to determine the nature of
counterclaim

NAMARCO VS. FEDERATION OF UNITED NAMARCO
DISTRIBUTORS INC
49 SCRA 238
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:

METALS ENGINEERING VS. CA
203 SCRA 273
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:

BA FINANCE VS. CO
224 SCRA 163
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:

3.3. Effects of failure to plead

3.3.1. Order of default
3.3.1.1. By motion only, court cannot motu
proprio declare a party in default

3.3.2. Consequence of order of default

3.3.2.1. Judgment by default, extent thereof
limited by relief prayed for
3.3.2.2. Need for presentation of evidence

3.3.3. Rationale for order of default

3.4. Amended/Supplemental Pleadings

3.4.1. Amendment a matter of right before responsive
pleading filed

3.4.1.1. No limitation on extent of amendment,
even changing cause of action set out in
original pleading
3.4.1.2. Right to amend not affected by motion
to dismiss or motion for summary judgment
or even motion for judgment on the
pleadings which are not considered
responsive pleadings
3.4.1.3. Rule when some but not all defendants
filed responsive pleading

3.4.2. When issues joined, substantial amendments
discretionary and subject to the rule that the
cause of action is not substantially changed or the
theory altered

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. LZK HOLDINGS
& DEVELOPMENT CO.
456 SCRA 366
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:

YOUNG VS. SY
503 SCRA 151
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:

3.4.3. Amendment of the pleadings to conform to
evidence presented during trial is allowed:

3.4.3.1. When issues not raised by the pleadings
are tried with the consent of the parties
3.4.3.2. When, even if objected to, the court is
satisfied no prejudice will befall the objecting
party

3.4.4. Supplemental pleadings not a matter of right

LEOBRERA VS. CA
170 SCRA 711
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE

3.4.5. Effect of amended pleadings

3.4.5.1. Supersedes original pleadings
3.4.5.2. As a consequence, judicial admission
made in original pleadings need to be
offered in evidence

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. CA
196 SCRA 94
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:

3.5. Filing of responsive pleadings

3.5.1. What is responsive pleading

3.5.1.1. Answer Judicial admissions binding on
party

SANTOS VS. LUMBAO
519 SCRA 408
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:

3.5.1.2. Answer Judicial admission NOT
binding on party

GARDNER VS. CA
131 SCRA 585
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:

3.5.2. Bill of particulars, motion to dismiss interrupt
period to file responsive pleading
3.5.3. Compulsory counterclaim or cross claim should
be set up in responsive pleading. However, it may
be set up anytime thereafter (but before
judgment) if omitted through oversight,
inadvertence or excusable negligence
3.5.4. Reglementary period to file responsive pleading

3.5.4.1. Interrupted by bill of particulars and
motion to dismiss

3.6. Filing and service of pleadings and judicial papers

3.6.1. Service on counsel is mandatory unless
otherwise ordered by court

3.6.1.1. Improper service is ineffectual and does
not bind party
CABILI VS. BADELLES
6 SCRA 190
FACTS:

RULING:

DOCTRINE:

3.6.2. Service of pleadings and court papers (other
than judgments, final orders and resolution) may
be done by substituted service if personal service
and service by mail not successful
3.6.3. Service of judgment, final orders and
resolutions must be personal or by registered mail
only (or by publication where summons is served
by publication)

3.6.3.1. Service must be on counsel as service
on party not permitted
3.6.3.2. Where final order or judgment not
served on party or lawyer, said judgment
cannot become final or executory

3.7. Summons
3.7.1. Rules on service is strictly construed, hence:

3.7.1.1. For actions in personam

3.7.1.1.1. Against residents, service must
be personal first then substituted if
unsuccessful or publication if
whereabouts unknown or temporarily
outside the country
3.7.1.1.2. Against non-residents, only
personal service within the state can
confer jurisdiction over the defendant

3.7.1.2. For actions in rem or quasi in rem

3.7.1.2.1. Against residents, same as
above
3.7.1.2.2. Against non-residents, personal
service outside the country, with leave
of court, or publication with leave of
court

3.7.1.3. For actions against domestic juridical
persons, service only on those enumerated
in the statute is allowed
3.7.1.4. For actions against foreign juridical
entity, service must be on resident agent,
government regulator, or any officers,
agents within the country

VENTURAZA VS. CA
156 SCRA 305
FACTS:

RULINGS:

DOCTRINE:

SAMARTINO VS. RAON
383 SCRA 664
FACTS:

RULINGS:

DOCTRINE:

VALMONTE VS. CA
252 SCRA 92
FACTS:

RULINGS:

DOCTRINE:

ASIAVEST VS. CA
296 SCRA 529
FACTS:

RULINGS:

DOCTRINE:

PHILAM GEN VS. BREVA
442 SCRA 217
FACTS:

RULINGS:

DOCTRINE:

BPI VS. SANTIAGO
519 SCRA 389
FACTS:

RULINGS:

DOCTRINE:

3.8. Dismissal of action

3.8.1. Grounds

3.8.1.1. Lack of jurisdiction over person

AMIGO VS. CA
253 SCRA 382
FACTS:

RULINGS:

DOCTRINE:

3.8.1.2. Lack of jurisdiction over subject matter
3.8.1.3. Pendentia litis
3.8.1.4. Res judicata
3.8.1.5. No cause of action

3.8.2. Remedy in case of granting/denial of motion to
dismiss
3.8.2.1. Order denying motion to dismiss is
interlocutory, hence proper remedy is to
appeal after a decision has been rendered
3.8.2.2. Order granting motion to dismiss,
disposes of the case hence, appeal under
Rule 41 is appealable

S-ar putea să vă placă și