CASE DIGEST

1. PEOPLE VS PERFECTO

2. MACARIOLA VS ASUNCION

FACTS:
When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B.
Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an
appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order dated
October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola.
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to
the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal
shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.
On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot
1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion.
Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and
interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein
Judge Asuncion was the president.
Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234
in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with acts unbecoming a judge alleging that
Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 pr. 5
of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce Sec 3 par H
ofRA 3019 Sec 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canons of Judicial Ethics.
On November 2, 1970 Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision
dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion,
After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Muoz
Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 29,1971 that
Judge Asuncion be exonerated.
ISSUE: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in
acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decide in a Civil Case Nio.
3010 and his engage ment in business by joining a private corporation during his
incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an act unbecoming of a judge?
HELD: No. The respondent Judge Asuncions actuation does not constitute of an act
unbecoming of a judge. But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business
activities.
SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to
operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving
the property. Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par H sec 3 of RA 3019
because the business of the corporation in which the respondent participated had obviously
no relation or connection with his judicial office. SC stated that respondent judge and his wife
deserve to the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its
incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.

3. De Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest
De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain
together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on
February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of
Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the
same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8,
1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their
positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982
(BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7,
1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have
qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them
and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of
Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years
had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term
of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for
being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.


Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was
validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.


Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov
on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly,
Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the
term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still
govern.

7. CASE DIGEST: Imbong v Ochoa, et
al. (G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934,
204957, 205003, 205138, 204988,
205043, 205478, 205491, 205720,
206355, 207111, 207172, 207563)
Click here for the full text of the Decision.
Read the RH Law (RA 10354) here.
Read the IRR of the RH Law here.
Read enforcement mechanisms of the RH Law with the unconstitutional provisions stricken out here.

*SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the State-sponsored
procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical health practitioners,
hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their
conscientious objections
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as a
condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine WON a supply
or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
* HELD:
A.
1. NO.
2. NO.
3.
a.) NO.
b.) YES.
c.) NO.
4. YES.
5. NO.
6. NO.
7. NO.
8. NO.
B. NO.
C. NO.
* RATIO:
1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they
agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of conception
according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also
support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of fertilization and
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent
the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The
RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also
those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH Law
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient
by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR
(Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.
2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases
gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the status quo
under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives
without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729:
the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine
that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective.
3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern
RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or
belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of
the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and
thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH
Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to immediately refer a
person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their
conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief
and conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the
Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated
by a religious group and health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if
they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate information and perform
RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and
inhibit) the freedom of religion. While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to
it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the effective implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates
the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers and their private
counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this
freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free exercise of
conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived
scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to achieve a legitimate
state objective. The Legislature has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health is
protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna
Carta of Women).
3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a
reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does not even mandate the type of family
planning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject
information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the
intervention of the State.
4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and
goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly,
Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a
family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the
right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the
institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. In
addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or
legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only
in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents
are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-
threatening procedures.
5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State
to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise
their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an
actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of
their children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to
that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than
supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in
developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the
religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several
terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a public health service provider. The private health care institution cited under Section 7
should be seen as synonymous to private health care service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of
medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and
modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH
information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as
to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is not a violation
of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which
states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and
children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In
addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14
is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health
education.
8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a
duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section
17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the
PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them
to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to
be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA
Act of 2009).
C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph (c) of Section 17
provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has
no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual
general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of
the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these services are not
mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely delineates the powers
that may be exercised by the regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the
State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare.



5. Belgica v. Executive Secretary

* FACTS:
In the Philippines, the pork barrel (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly referred to as
lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (Congressional Pork Barrel). However, it has
also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The Congressional Pork Barrel can be traced from Act
3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the
Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund
(CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund under the Joseph
Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III
administrations.
The Presidential Pork Barrel questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential
Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD)
910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts
relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic
growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The
Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and
projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate
gross earnings of PAGCOR.
Over the years, pork funds have increased tremendously. In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as
former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums of government money went into the pockets of
legislators as kickbacks. In 2004, several citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004
General Appropriations Act for being unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. In July
2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that the government has
been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects. The investigation was spawned by
sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation JLN standing for Janet Lim
Napoles had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for ghost projects using no fewer than 20
dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA)
released the results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of legislators PDAF from 2007 to
2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration.
As for the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistle-blowers alleged that [a]t least P900 Million from royalties in
the operation of the Malampaya gas project intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy
[NGO].
* ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy
2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to judicial review
3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue
4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty
v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the
pork barrel system under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on
1.) separation of powers
2.) non-delegability of legislative power
3.) checks and balances
4.) accountability
5.) political dynasties
6.) local autonomy
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel
WON the phrases:
(a) and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President under Section 8 of PD 910
relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
(b) to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund,
are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power
* HELD AND RATIO:
A. Procedural Issues
No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided
by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must
be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.
1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety
of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the
Pork Barrel System. Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the
challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the
PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social
Fund are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits. The respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor
diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not
the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and
existing. Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had already abolished the PDAF render the issues
on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority
to nullify or annul its legal existence.
Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that the moot and academic
principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The
Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners
they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to the principles of separation
of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved: This is also
apparent from the nature of the interests involved the constitutionality of the very system within which
significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly
presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The
present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the systems flaws have never before been
magnified. To the Courts mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-
blowers, and the governments own recognition that reforms are needed to address the reported
abuses of the PDAF demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of
the matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners claims as not merely theorized, speculative or
hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the
constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. if only for the purpose of validating the existence of
an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to
be sufficient.
iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public: This is applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive
ruling on the systems constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative
to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious
resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided
on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the recognition that the
preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual
occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not
resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task
that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of
judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to
exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution).
3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have come before the Court
in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they dutifully contribute to the
coffers of the National Treasury. As taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity
of the existing Pork Barrel System under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be
utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules.
Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed
or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they
have raised may be classified as matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest. The CoA Chairpersons statement during the Oral Arguments that
the present controversy involves not [merely] a systems failure but a complete breakdown of controls
amplifies the seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the
illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement
of an invalid statute.
4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there
exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This required identity is not
attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article
and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the
entire Pork Barrel System. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural
technicality and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where
the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Philconsa was a limited response to
a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification
authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination
of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the
entire Pork Barrel System as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a
particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also
to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein
warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale
application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. Since the Court now
benefits from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA Report), it must partially abandon its previous
ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of
Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory.
Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases, stare decisis would not apply.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the
projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the
2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from
Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have
also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5 under the
2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various operational
aspects of budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and the
regulation and release of funds, in violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said authority
is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition
covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore
abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their
position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, the Court also declared that informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded
into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional
treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in
Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. The power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law a certain sum from the public
revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a
personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b)
a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred
the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds
based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the
GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would
not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto
consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is
forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b)
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding
source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes
that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
Presidents power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, limit[ed] state auditors from
obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said
Funds. Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a line by line budget or amount per proposed program,
activity or project, and per implementing agency.
4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested
with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they
themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section
14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: [A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. Allowing legislators to intervene in the
various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own
office.
However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual
legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which
must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and
the Executive department, through the formers post-enactment participation, may affect the process of
impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork
Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying
phrase as may be defined by law. In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not
been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed
intention of making equal the unequal (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division
is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of
the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis
gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be
relatively underdeveloped compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators
and Party-List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-President who do not represent any
locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with
the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to assist
the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction. Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose
functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should
not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making
authority except only when acting as a body.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as
it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase
gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in
effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the
general word or phrase is to be construed to include or be restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government states a singular and
general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general
phrase for such other purposes may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department
has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby
contradicting respondents own position that it is limited only to energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government.
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government, remains legally effective
and subsisting.
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund may be used to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and
[second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social
Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives
him carte blancheauthority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as
a priority. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure development
projects and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note,
the delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too broad of a classification since the said term
could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects must be stricken down as unconstitutional since similar to Section 8 of PD 910 - it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other
provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.