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Chapter One: Reason (pp. 25-48)
IGNORANCE (p. 25)
Avidy = a is negative prefix + verbal root vid to know, to perceive, to understand
Cognate with English word video
(better known as misknowledge)
Ignorance is the main problem facing all sentient beings.
It is a problem requiring a philosophical solution.
Principal source of suffering.
Humans are ignorant of the correct answers to two questions:
(1) What is the fundamental nature of reality?
(2) What is the true self?
The existence of diverse and often conflicting views generated the need to discriminate between good
and bad arguments.

ARGUMENT
Philosophical debate cannot proceed effectively unless the participants first agree on some fundamental
issues governing the activity of philosophizing.
The Nyaya school science of reasoning or just plain right school.
The Naiyayikas were principally interested in philosophical methodology and the theory of knowledge
(epistemology).
They developed a sophisticated method of rational argument that becomes basic framework for
interscholastic debate between all schools.
Five stage structure (IP p 362):
1. Premise to be established (a claim)
2. The reason for the premise
3. An example
4. Application of the example to the premise is explained
5. The inferred conclusion
Example of fire on the hill:
1. There is a fire on this hill (premise/claim/statement)
2. Because there is smoke (reason)
3. Since whatever has smoke has fire (example) INDUCTION
4. There is smoke on this hill, which is associated with fire (application)
5. Therefore, there is a fire on this hill (conclusion) INFERENCE
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Syllogism = a kind of logical argument in which a conclusion is inferred from two or more others (the
premises) of a specific form.
Compare the Nyaya syllogism with the classical form that we find in western philosophy:
1. All men are mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

1. Smoke is always a sign of fire
2. This hill has smoke
3. Therefore, this hill has fire
Whats the difference?
Both rely on inference
Aristotelian inference is an argument that moves from the universal (a general/blanket statement) to the
more particular on a purely formal basis. This is what we call deductive reasoning.
But Nyaya inference places much greater emphasis upon particularity, involving an argument that moves
from the more particular (statement based on observation) to another particular case via a universal
statement.
Deductive reasoning (top-down logic) contrasts with inductive reasoning (bottom-up logic) in the
following way: In deductive reasoning, a conclusion is reached from general statements, but in inductive
reasoning the conclusion is reached from specific examples.
1. All men are mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
The first premise states that all objects classified as "men" have the attribute "mortal".
Whats the relationship between the set of all men (small circle) and the set of all mortal creatures (big
circle)?



All men are necessarily mortal, but not all mortal things are necessarily man (i.e. a dog)
The second premise states that "Socrates" is classified as a "man" a member of the set "men".
The conclusion then states that "Socrates" must be "mortal" because the set of men is within the set
mortal creatures.

Now suppose the first general statement were not true. For example, suppose Spanish explorers
discovered a fountain of youth in the 17
th
c. What would the relationship between the set of all men and
mortal creatures be?
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Not all men are mortal (i.e. Ponce de Leon).
(This would also be the relationship between fire and smoke.)

So what has been said about the differences?
Some argue that it shows a more practical orientation in Indian logic.
Whereas Western logic the primary concern is with formal validity and deduction, the Indian model is
based upon its actual content or relevance of the world of lived-experience.
Western logic does not consider it its business to inquire whether the premises and the conclusion of an
argument are true. It is solely concerned with determining whether a given argument is valid.In sharp
contrast Indian logic is at once formal and material. Indian logicians reject the verbalist view of logicthe
view that logic is only concerned with thought-forms and symbols and not with content and referents
whereas the Indian view is based on the conviction that logic is an instrument for the discovery and
understanding of reality, and not a mere formal discipline wholly unrelated to the world, the Western
tradition, having sharply divided the formal from the empirical, is faced with the serious problem of
accounting for the fact of the application of logic in the study of the world
Puligandla (1997: 197-8)
Harrison says the Nyaya five-membered argument is weaker than Ar. three-membered one. This is
because it will always be vulnerable to the objection that the example is unreliable.

DEBATE (p. 29)
Naiyayikas developed a framework within which philosophical debates could proceed between parties
holding opposing views.
IP p. 377-79 Nyaya Sutra (3
rd
c. CE)* of Gotama with commentary by Vatsyayana
Such rules helped provide a platform for exchange between different darsanas.
Three types of debate:
(1) Discussion (vada)
a. Arriving at the truth through rational discussion.

(2) Disputation (jalpa)
a. Merely winning is the goal

(3) Destructive criticism (vitanda)
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a. Wrangling, isnt really debate at all. One merely tries to force their view on the other without
attempting to understand it.
Which is best?
Vada requires two participantsproponent (attacker) who holds an initial position and a respondent
(defender) who responds.
The progress of debate can be broken down into the following five steps (see EP pp. 30-31)
1. Attacker states thesis (i.e. All men are mortal)
2. Defender can reject it outright if he thinks it is erroneous, but if he accepts it then he asks the
attacker to provide a reason.
3. Attacker offers a proof outlining the reasons why the thesis should be accepted (i.e. Consider
SocratesHe is a man, and all men are mortaltherefore Socrates is mortal).
4. Defender asks if the proof contains the logical relations required of a sound inference (Nyaya list
of fallacious reasoning). (i.e. Is there a logical pervasion between being a human and being
mortal).

Attacker removes thornsnegates any faulty logical relations they may have occurred (i.e. not all men
are mortal).

KNOWLEDGE
What counts as knowledge?
Participants of debate have to agree on what counts.
Nyayikas claimed that genuine knowledge has to be produced by a reliable source.
Thus identifying reliable sources is important.
Pramana source of knowledge right cognition valid cognition etc.
Nyaya accepted four (IP p. 359) = perception (best), inference, comparison (analogy), and verbal
testimony.
Carvaka rejected both inference and testimony (see chart EP p. 34)

INFERENCE
We use this all the time. It is the smoke on the hill thing.
But is it accurate?
Jayarasi (7
th
c. CE) of the Carvaka school believed it was not.
He says that citing an example (i.e. oven) can never be sufficient for establishing general claims that
would be true about all times and in all cases.
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(For instance we can talk about dry ice as an exception.)
Jayarasi argued that inductive arguments (arguments based on experience) can never guarantee the
truth of their conclusion.
Jayarasi attacks inference by criticizing induction.
Why does he want to attack inference? Because his school believes that the only thing that exists is what
can be directly perceivedthis includes past and present (see causation below).
The Western philosopher David Hume (18
th
c. CE) called this the problem of induction.
Now, most scientific knowledge is based on induction.
So one possible response to this problem is that the practice inductive reasoning must be legitimate
because it is so remarkably successfulinduction works because it has been successful in the past.
The problem with this defense is that it is circular. You are using induction to prove induction.
However, Jayarasi says that this defense is wrong because it relies on induction. It involves a circular
argument. We would have to appeal to a generalization based on our past experience of apparently
successful induction.
See inductive argument in EP p. 36 (bottom)
See Jayarasis statement on IP p. 231

CAUSATION p. 37
Another strategy to defend inference is to provide a causal account of how and why inferential reasoning
leads to a particular conclusion.
In other words, inference works because it tracks the causal relationship between two things, i.e. fire
(cause) and smoke (effect/result).
Inference allows us to draw a conclusion based on an unseen cause, but an observed effect.
i.e. Elephant footprint in the sand => there was an elephant on the beach. (see EP box top of p. 38)
Carvaka said success of such reasoning is happy accident.
Read IP pp 233-234


Jayarasi has two arguments:
#1 refute inference based on the effect (IP 239)
#2 the impossibility of understanding the relation of cause and effect (IP 242-46)

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Argument #1
In order for something (i.e. footprint) to be an effect we must directly perceive it ceasing to exist, but we
can never directly perceive anything ceasing to exist because if it has ceased to exist we could not
perceive it at all.
To appreciate this it is important to remember that nothing exists outside of direct perception for the
Carvaka.
Jayarasi argues that there are no effects.
His argument assumes that effects begin and end at some point in time.
If a footprint is identified as an effect we must directly perceive it ceasing to exist.
But we can never directly perceive anything ceasing to exist because if it has ceased to exist we could
not perceive it at all.
i.e. the absence of something is different from proving its non-existence.
IP pp. 239

Argument #2
Jayarasi also says that the relationship between cause and effect is unintelligible.
A cause is only a cause once it has caused an effect
We can never have knowledge of a cause which is unqualified by the effect.
J. says we are not justified in accepting the conclusions of inferential arguments on the basis of a posted
causal relationship.
IP pp. 242-46

Hume argued that a distinction must be drawn between logical necessity and the apparent necessity
of causality.
An example of logical necessity is 2 + 2 = 4 (THIS IS TRUE IN ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS)
Apparent necessity of causality is the following: because a certain fruit that has provided me with
nourishment up until the present, it will always nourish me. (THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY TRUE IN ALL
POSSIBLE WORLDS.)
What Hume is expressing here is skepticism about causation.

SCEPTICISM p. 39
In addition to the Carvaka thinkers like Jayarasi, Buddhists were also skeptical of Nyaya philosophy.
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Consider Nagarjuna (2
nd
c. CE) associated with Madhyamaka school (middle way)
The Nyaya believe that knowing something is there (i.e. an elephant of the beach) by means of a reliable
source of knowledge (i.e. perception) entails that the elephant on the beach exists independently of the
fact that anyone knew it was there. (i.e. tree in forest)
Today we call this nave or direct realism = objects in the world exist independently of our minds.
Nagarjuna argues that appearances are illusoryappearance-reality distinction
Nyaya says the reliability of perception (and the other sources of knowledge they accept) is self-evident.
Nagarjuna says we still manage to doubt perception. Moreover, we know perceptions can be mistaken
(i.e. stick in water).
The problem is that we never have access to the purported object independently of the way that they
appear to us, we can never be in a position to compare the actual objects with our perceptions of them.
Nagarjuna proposed that we should refrain from claiming to know anything. Because he regarded each
of the sources of knowledge accepted by the Nyaya as unreliable, he was also convinced that the
framework of debate they advocated was pointless.
If I were to put forward any thesis [in debate] whatsoever, then by that I would have made a logical
error.
The problem of skepticism challenges our claim to know anything.
(Much more on Nagarjuna to come )

PERSPECTIVE
Jainism emerged around the same time as Buddhism (~500 BCE, axial age).
Mahavira (599-527 BCE)
Jainism attempts to reconcile the debate between rival darsanas with their theory of anekanta (reality is
many-sided).
They assert that people adopt different perspectives that allow them to see selective aspects of reality.
The adage of the blind philosophers and the elephant
Modern example might be CC TVmultiple cameras (i.e. views) each capturing some select aspect of
reality. Each is partially true.
Our assertions about reality are therefore only true in a certain respect.
Or, all views are true to a certain respect.

LOGIC
Consider a piece of cloth that is colored blue and grey.
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The Jains developed a theory of language to explain how we might say that the cloth is both blue and
not blue without contradicting ourselves.
Consider another example
Tomorrow I am going to the airport.
If I said this right now you would understand this to mean that tomorrow (i.e. the day after today) I will be
traveling to the airport.
But say you found that statement written on a piece of paper, you would have no idea when tomorrow
actually is?
Linguistically there is no difference between the twoone spoken and one written.
There is, however, an implicit difference.
Jains hold that all of our assertions have hidden parameters like this and that, because they are not
made clear, the way we normally use language is vague.
They attempt to explain this through the seven modes of assertion (EP p. 44)
i.e. somehow the object is blue
Somehow ranges over the parameters of substance, time, place, and state.
The object may be blue with respect to this time, place, and statebut not to another.
See top of EP p. 46 for elaboration of example
The Jainas claim that complete knowledge of an object is available through applying the theory of
the seven modes, whereas only partial knowledge is available through adopting a particular
perspective.