ORIGINAL ARTICLE

An Interbehavioral Investigation of Remembering Interactions

Mitch J. Fryling & Linda J. Hayes
Published online: 22 March 2014
#Association of Behavior Analysis International 2014
Abstract This study evaluated the influence of several factors
on the development and evolution of remembering interac-
tions from a thoroughly naturalistic, interbehavioral perspec-
tive. Specifically, the influence of non-compound and com-
pound substitute stimuli, setting factors, interbehavioral his-
tory, and evolution of stimulus function were evaluated. Large
differences between memorial interactions involving non-
compound and compound stimuli were found with respect to
both remembering and false remembering. Implications for
further conceptual and experimental investigations are
considered.
Keywords Interbehaviorism
.
Interbehavioral psychology
.
Memory
.
False memory
.
Remembering
.
Stimulus
substitution
Memory seems to be a critical area in the behavioral sciences.
Indeed, it is clear to psychologists and learning theorists from
a wide range of persuasions that our history influences our
day-to-day interactions. Of course, differences arise when
various workers go about explaining the process by which
this happens. For example, common cognitive theories sug-
gest that our memories are stored within cognitive structures
and later retrieved when memory occurs (e.g., Einstein and
McDaniel 2005; Hollingshead 1998; Roediger 1980),
whereas biological theories emphasize various areas of the
brain that are said to control memory behavior (e.g., Squire
1992). Hybrid cognitivebiological theories that embrace both
of the above assumptions have become common as well (see
Pear 2007). In other words, both dualismand reductionismare
common in psychological discussions of memory.
Alternatively, behavioral theories have suggested that memo-
ry is composed of behaviorenvironment interactions and is to
be studied as such (e.g., Palmer 1991). While much may be
said about the potential procedural similarities among the
various perspectives on memory, behavior analysts have long
favored a commitment to a natural science approach.
A range of studies in the area of memory has been con-
ducted by behavior analysts (e.g., Blough 1959; Branch 1977;
Marr 1983; Palmer 1991; Sargisson and White 2001, 2007;
Skinner 1950). Generally speaking, these workers have sug-
gested that memory is not a mental event but rather a behav-
ioral event (albeit a potentially private event; Palmer 1991).
Some of these researchers have attacked traditional ap-
proaches to memory in greater detail than others, indicating
that the existing theoretical work in memory is distracting and
unnecessary, as it focuses on hypothetical constructs rather
than behaviorenvironment functional relationships (Marr
1983). Indeed, the problems with common cognitive theories
seem to be glaring enough that non-behavioral psychologists
have also expressed concern (e.g., Watkins 1990).
We embrace an interbehavioral approach to memory (see
Blewitt 1983; Fryling and Hayes 2010; Kantor 1922).
However, the interbehavioral position remains relatively less
familiar to most behavior analysts when compared to other
philosophical positions such as radical behaviorism. It is likely
that this is at least partially due to the fact that interbehaviorism
has led to a relatively smaller amount of empirical investigation
relative to the more traditional Skinnerian perspective.
Moreover, there are a number of similarities and differences
between interbehaviorism and radical behaviorism, which
This study was completed in partial fulfillment of the first authors PhDin
behavior analysis at the University of Nevada, Reno.
M. J. Fryling
:
L. J. Hayes
University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, NV, USA
Present Address:
M. J. Fryling (*)
Division of Special Education & Counseling, California State
University, Los Angeles, 5151 State University Dr., Los Angeles,
CA 90032, USA
e-mail: mfrylin2@calstatela.edu
Psychol Rec (2014) 64:111
DOI 10.1007/s40732-014-0011-5
might make interbehaviorism seem more or less relevant to
behavior analysts (Morris 1982; Parrott 1983). For example,
interbehavioral psychology emphasizes integrated fields rather
than contingencies and stimulus functions rather than stimulus
objects. Although providing a comprehensive overview of the
interbehavioral position is far beyond the scope of this paper,
we will briefly comment on the pertinent details of it in the
following section (for more comprehensive reviews of
interbehaviorism and interbehavioral psychology, see Clayton
et al. (2005), Delprato and Smith (2009), Midgley and Morris
(2006)).
Interbehavioral Psychology
Interbehavioral psychologists conceptualize the psychological
event as an interrelated, multi-factored field. This event is
summarized by the following formula: PE = C(k, sf, rf, hi,
st, md), where C stands for the interdependence of all factors
in the field, k the unique organization of factors and situation
more generally, sf the stimulus function, rf the response func-
tion, hi the interbehavioral history, st the setting factors (or
interactional setting), and md the medium of contact
(Kantor 1958, p. 14). FromKantors perspective, each of these
factors is an equal participant in each and every psychological
event, whereby none can be viewed as being more indepen-
dent, dependent, or powerful than another (Smith 2006).
Although specific factors are isolated and manipulated for
the purposes of investigation, it is always the entire field that
is changed. Thus, when experimentation is pursued, it is
always interpreted within the context of the multi-factored
field.
A particularly interesting aspect of the conceptualization of
the psychological event is the notion of stimulus function.
Importantly, interbehaviorists make an explicit distinction
between stimulus objects and stimulus functions (see Kantor
1924, pp. 4748; Parrott 1983, 1986). The implications of this
distinction are profound and often misunderstood or
completely overlooked, even by behavior analysts (for a
discussion, see Parrott 1983, 1986). Awide range of complex
human behavior seems to occur in the absence of apparent
environmental support. We often see, hear, and feel with
respect to objects that are not physically present, for example.
When this happens, the stimulating action of some present
stimulus object is substituting for an absent one.
Conceptualizing these types of events in a naturalistic and
coherent manner is made possible by the distinction between
stimulus objects and functions. Moreover, this distinction is
especially central to the interbehavioral conceptualization of
memory. We explain this process in more detail below.
Association conditions occur when two or more factors
occur together in space and time (Kantor 1921). For example,
an association condition might be said to occur when a person
(A) and a song (B) occur together in space and time (e.g., you
listened to the song with your friend). Furthermore, this asso-
ciation may have occurred in a particular setting (C; e.g., the
beach), whereby the three factors all occurred together in
space and time. Importantly, association conditions are only
said to occur if an individual interacted with such conditions.
Given the above history, an individual might hear the song (B)
and see his or her friend (A) while at the beach (C) at a much
later date, even if the friend and song are not physically
present in the environment.
1
Similarly, upon seeing the friend
(A), the individual may hear the song (B) and see the beach
(C), even if both B and C are physically absent. When this
happens, present stimuli substitute for absent stimuli, such that
the absent stimuli are made psychologically present (Hayes
1992). This sort of process can become exceedingly complex
in naturalistic settings, particularly when various factors com-
bine in subtle ways, and when the role of the generalization of
substitute stimulus functions is fully appreciated. For exam-
ple, the individual may also feel the ocean breeze and warmth
of the sun as well, and all of these substitutional functions may
transfer to other stimuli by virtue of stimulus generalization
and always participate in unique multi-factored fields (this is
similar to stimulus equivalence and higher-order condition-
ing). Again, this process is fundamental to the interbehavioral
conceptualization of memory.
2
Remembering and Forgetting
Interbehaviorists have employed the process of association
conditions and subsequent outcome of stimulus substitution
to account for the important area of memory in behavior
science (e.g., Blewitt 1983; Fryling and Hayes 2010; Kantor
1921; Kantor and Smith 1975). These authors have distin-
guished between memorizing, reminiscing, and remembering
interactions. The interbehavioral analysis may seem related to
other perspectives on memory and related phenomena, but it
maintains an explicitly naturalistic and therefore distinct foun-
dation throughout.
Remembering interactions involve three phases common
to all memorial interactions: (a) initial association conditions,
(b) the passage of some time, and (c) the interaction with a
stimulus that substitutes for the initial environmental associa-
tion (Kantor 1921; Kantor and Smith 1975). Remembering
interactions are distinguished from reminiscing interactions
because the initial association conditions involve the descrip-
tion of an act to be completed in the future and a specific time
for that act to be completed. For example, initial association
conditions might involve Take your diabetes medication at 4
1
This analysis might also be used to explain events typically called
hallucinations.
2
It is important to note that while this process may seem similar to the
paired-associates learning literature (e.g., Bower 1961; Greeno 1964), this
only seems so at a very general, procedural level.
2 Psychol Rec (2014) 64:111
p.m. each day. Given this, the stimulus 4:00 p.m. on a watch
or cell phone might substitute for the initial association con-
dition, and the individual might take his or her medication.
Given the above perspective, forgetting may occur for a
variety of reasons. First, there may be problems related to the
initial association conditions, whereby the conditions might
be relatively complicated or unclear. For example, when the
initial association conditions involve compound stimuli, re-
membering interactions may be compromised (e.g., every
time your pager goes off, take your medication, but only if
your blood pressure is above 120/80 and you havent eaten
sugar in the last hour). Likewise, setting factors might alter
the field in such a way that the extent to which remembering
interactions occur is impacted. In an example described by
Kantor and Smith (1975, p. 257), being very busy with an-
other task might alter the extent to which stimuli in the
environment function as substitutes. Third, interbehavioral
history may impact remembering interactions. For example,
if an individual has a history of engaging in remembering
interactions during relatively easy conditions rather than dif-
ficult conditions, his or her current remembering performance
may be altered. Related to the above, the evolution of stimulus
function might participate in remembering interactions. For
example, if initial association conditions involved compound
stimuli and an individual were exposed to components of the
compound stimulus in the absence of the whole (e.g., the
individuals pager goes off in a variety of circumstances),
the functioning of those individual components might change,
such that the overall remembering interaction is impacted.
This perspective might seem particularly close and relevant
to respondent phenomena, such as overshadowing (Pavlov
1960).
As we have mentioned, experimental work having a basis
in interbehavioral psychology is much needed. While little has
been done from an interbehavioral perspective, it is important
to note that various other perspectives and literatures in the
area of memory may be relevant (e.g., the paired-associates
memory literature). Moreover, given the importance of the
area of memory, alternative approaches to its conceptualiza-
tion and investigation seem warranted. The current investiga-
tion represents an attempt to conduct an interbehavioral inves-
tigation of remembering interactions. Specifically, it examines
the factors mentioned above, which may participate in both
remembering and forgetting. Related to remembering, the
current investigation also examines the extent to which indi-
viduals engage in remembering responses in the absence of
the targeted substitute stimulus (i.e., false remembering).
Given our above conceptualization of remembering, we
hypothesize that there may be differences between the extent
to which non-compound and compound stimuli operate as
substitute stimuli within remembering interactions. Further,
we hypothesize that the setting might alter remembering in-
teractions in various ways, such that substitute stimulus
functions may or may not be actualized in various setting
conditions. Finally, we hypothesize that the stimulus functions
of compound stimuli might be further compromised in condi-
tions where aspects of those stimuli are present in the absence
of the entire stimulus. In other words, the extent to which
stimuli are uniquely involved with the initial association con-
ditions might enhance their substitute stimulus functions with-
in remembering interactions.
Method
Participants and Setting
Participants were 32 undergraduate students taking psycholo-
gy courses at a large university. Participants were given two
research credits and $10 for their participation. Participants sat
at a computer station in experimental rooms approximately
3 m by 2 m, each separated from the others by a divider. The
computer had a 15-in. screen, with a standard mouse and
keyboard. A computer program written in Visual Basic
.NET 2005 ran the entire experiment and recorded all data.
The study was approved by the universitys Institutional
Review Board (IRB), and all participants consented prior to
participation. The experimenter waited in another room while
the participant was engaged with the computer.
Response Measurement
The primary dependent variable was remembering perfor-
mance during each 5-min interval of a game like Tetris

, as
measured by the number of times the participant typed the
remembering response with respect to appropriate non-
compound (1 shape) and compound (4 shapes) substitute
stimuli. Specifically, remembering responses were defined as
the individual typing a particular three-letter response in the
presence of the appropriate substitute stimuli within 5 s of that
stimulus appearing (e.g., typing FER). Figure 1 depicts the
non-compound and compound substitute stimuli employed
during the experiment. A secondary measure was the number
of false positives (or inaccurate memories) with respect to
non-compound and compound remembering responses. That
is, how often did the participant engage in the remembering
responses in the absence of the substitute stimulus as de-
scribed in the initial association conditions (instructions)?
Data were collected on both partial and full false positives.
Partial false positives involved the participants typing any part
of the remembering response, whereas full false positives
involved the participants typing the entire remembering re-
sponse. A final measure was the background puzzle perfor-
mance, which involved manipulating pieces of a puzzle sim-
ilar to Tetris

, measured as the number of rows of the puzzle

the participant completed. A completed row was one where
Psychol Rec (2014) 64:111 3
the participant placed all of the puzzle pieces together in such
a way that they filled a row, after which the row was removed.
Puzzle shapes were distinct fromthe shapes that composed the
substitute stimuli.
Procedures
Design All participants were exposed to two-phase se-
quences, which were non-repeating, to evaluate the influence
of various factors on remembering interactions. Each phase
was designed to be 35 min in length, for a total of 70 min in
the experiment. There were four groups, with each having
eight participants. The order of the conditions for each group
is offset by a slash (e.g., the first condition/the second condi-
tion); Group 1 was slow/fast, Group 2 was fast/slow, Group 3
was slow/slow, and Group 4 was fast/fast.
Training All participants read the following instructions at the
beginning of the experiment:
This study should take approximately 90 min of your
time. You will receive two research credits and $10 for
your participation. You may stop participating in the
study at any time. Click OK to move on.
After clicking OK to move on, the participants read the
following:
This study involves you playing a game that has two
parts. The first part of the game requires you to place
shapes into a puzzle. You can move the pieces around by
using the arrow keys. You will get points for success-
fully completing rows. Click Next after you have read
this.
After participants clicked Next, they read the following:
You will now have the chance to practice the game, just
to be sure you knowhow to play it correctly. Again, you
use the arrow keys to move the pieces around.
UPRotate, LEFT/RIGHTMove Sideways,
DOWNMove down.
Click NEXT to start the practice trials.
Participants then completed two practice rows of the
puzzle. After successfully completing two practice
rows, participants then read the following:
Click NEXT to go on to the next part of the instructions.
After clicking NEXT, participants read the following on
the screen:
The second part of the game requires you to respond to
various shapes that will show up on the screen based on
the instructions below.
Whenever you see (heart shape), type FER within 5 s.
Whenever you see (star shape), type PLU within 5 s.
You begin typing the response by pressing the space bar.
Pressing the space bar will let you type in the text box.
You will get points for writing the correct word in the
text box at the correct time.
You will now have the chance to practice this part of the
game, just to be sure you know the correct response.
Click NEXT to begin the practice trials.
The participants then began practice trials with respect to
the non-compound stimuli (i.e., heart and star) until they
completed ten correct responses with respect to each of the
two stimuli. No points were given for correct responding
during this time. Upon making ten errors, the participants
were sent back to the relevant instructions again. Participants
could go back to the instructions twice, meaning that they had
a total of three opportunities to read the instructions and
demonstrate the remembering responses. If they failed to meet
the criteria, they were removed from the study. These partic-
ipants read the following:
Thank you for your participation. Please go get the
experimenter. Do not hit OK.
These participants received two research credits and $10
for their participation. Those that successfully complet-
ed the practice trials read the following:
Click NEXT to move on to the next part of the
instructions.
Non-compound S1
Non-compound S2
Compound S1
Compound S2
Fig. 1 Non-compound and
compound stimuli involved in the
experiment
4 Psychol Rec (2014) 64:111
After clicking Next, the participants read the following:
The last part of the instructions is also about the second
part of the game.
Whenever you see (compound stimulus 1:4 shapes),
type DES within 5 s.
Whenever you see (compound stimulus 2:4 shapes),
type OUL within 5 s.
These shapes do not have to appear in any particular
order or location on the screen. Whenever you see the
four shapes anywhere on the screen, hit the space bar
and type the word. Again, you will earn points for
correct responses.
You will now have the chance to practice this part of the
game, just to be sure you know the correct responses.
Click NEXT to begin the practice trials.
Participants then practiced until they had made ten correct
responses with respect to each of the two compound stimuli.
Again, upon making ten errors, participants went through the
relevant instructions again. As with the non-compound stim-
uli, participants had a total of three opportunities to go through
the relevant instructions and demonstrate the remembering
responses. If they failed to do so, they were removed from
the study. These participants read the following:
Thank you for your participation. Please go get the
experimenter. Do not hit OK.
These participants received two research credits and $10
for their participation.
After successfully completing the practice trials, partic-
ipants read the following:
You are now ready to start the game. Please try your
best.
Click START to begin the game.
Assessment After participants completed the initial require-
ments, they began playing the game, which involved the
measurement of remembering, false remembering, and back-
ground puzzle performances. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the four groups (slow/slow, slow/fast,
fast/fast, and fast/slow). The game started and continued for
a time period of 70 min. With the exception of training, the
puzzle (setting factor) was always on the bottom half of the
screen. The rows of the puzzle never stacked higher than the
bottom half of the screen, as the computer automatically
removed rows that reached that level (see Fig. 2 for a
screenshot of the game screen).
In the top half of the screen, individual puzzle pieces
(always shades of black and gray) fell at a slow pace or a fast
pace (setting factor), depending on the phase. Specifically,
pieces moved down the screen at the pace of eight movements
every 5 s in the slowcondition, and 20 movements every 5 s in
the fast condition. Importantly, pieces could be moved faster
by the participants by manipulating the arrow keys on the
computer. Therefore, slow pieces could be quickly ma-
nipulated and placed. In addition, various shapes that
included prearranged non-compound substitute stimuli,
compound substitute stimuli, and/or components of
compound substitute stimuli appeared in the top half
of the screen. There were always four to six colored
shapes visible on the screen. Every 5 s, two or more of
those stimuli changed (disappeared and appeared at var-
ious places), and thus 5 s was the amount of time the
participants had to engage in the appropriate remember-
ing response (i.e., FER, PLU, DES, or OUL). There
were point boxes on the left side of the screen that
displayed the accumulated points the participants had
earned. One of the boxes accumulated points for per-
formance on the puzzle (1 point contingent on complet-
ing one row), whereas the other accumulated points for
correct remembering responses (one point contingent on
one remembering response). There were no programmed
consequences for false remembering.
There were five trials for each of the two non-compound
stimuli and the two compound stimuli during each 5-min
interval. This means there were 20 total memory trials during
each 5-min period.
3
The exact timing and order of the presen-
tations of the compound/non-compound stimuli within each
5-min interval was not specifically programmed. The majority
of the trials (40) involved exposure to components of com-
pound stimuli, and not the targeted non-compound or com-
pound stimuli themselves (i.e., there were many trials where
there was no remembering response to make during each 5-
min period). The two non-compound stimuli (heart and star)
never appeared at the same time, and there was only one
correct response on any given trial or no correct response at
all.
Results
Overall Averages
For the main measure, overall remembering responses, the
mean number of non-compound remembering responses was
90.91 for each participant (SD41.05; range 0139), compared
to 41.78 for compound remembering responses (SD 35.27;
range 0118). Thus, more than twice as many non-compound
remembering responses were made than compound remem-
bering responses. When analyzed statistically, a two-tailed,
repeated-measures t test revealed a statistically significant
difference between non-compound and compound remember-
ing responses, T(31)=7.47, p<0.01.
3
Importantly, participants were not told this rule at any point during the
experiment.
Psychol Rec (2014) 64:111 5
False positive data were collected throughout the experi-
ment. While both partial and full false positive data were
taken, partial false positives occurred so infrequently as to
be not worth analyzing. When false positives occurred, they
involved the participant typing the entire response in the
absence of the initial substitute stimulus, rather than only part
of the response. On average, each participant engaged in 1.56
non-compound false positives (SD 2.58; range 012) and
63.75 compound false positives (SD 80.39; range 4380).
When the two types of false positives were compared statisti-
cally, a two-tailed, repeated-measures t test revealed a statisti-
cally significant and drastic difference between non-
compound and compound false positives, T(31) =4.474,
p<0.01. See Table 1 for a summary of this data.
Group Comparisons
Remembering When remembering responses are compared
between groups, the slow/fast group engaged in a mean of
106.25 (SD 59.6; range 25177); the fast/slow group, 106.88
(SD 73.6; range 27213); the slow/slow group, 175.5 (SD
62.29; range 88257); and the fast/fast group, 142.13 (SD
56.66; range 89236). Thus, the slow/slow group engaged in
the highest number of remembering responses overall, follow-
ed by the fast/fast group, with the slow/fast and fast/slow
groups being nearly identical in overall performance (see
Table 2).
When non-compound responses are examined sepa-
rately, the slow/fast group engaged in mean of 82.13
(SD 44.06; range 12130), the fast/slow group in a
mean of 67.63 (SD 55.78; range 0135), the slow/slow
group in a mean of 109.88 (SD 26.33; range 68139),
and the fast/fast group in a mean of 104 (SD 20.04;
range 78123). Again, slow/slow was the group with
the highest number of responses, followed by the
fast/fast group in a close second.
Regarding compound remembering, a mean of 24.13 (SD
22.25; range 056) responses were made in the slow/fast
Fig. 2 Example of the
experimental preparation
Table 1 Overall group performance
Non-compound Compound
M SD Range M SD Range
Remembering 90.91 41.05 0139 41.78 35.27 0118
False positives 1.56 2.58 012 63.75 80.39 4380
Table 2 Between group performance
Remembering M SD Range
Slow/fast 106.25 59.6 25177
Fast/slow 106.88 73.6 27213
Slow/slow 175.5 62.29 88257
Fast/fast 142.13 56.66 89236
6 Psychol Rec (2014) 64:111
group, a mean of 39.25 (SD 29.14; range 1686) in the
fast/slow group, a mean of 65.63 (SD 38.66; range 5
118) in the slow/slow group, and a mean of 38.13 (SD
40.53; range 7115) in the fast/fast group. While the
slow/slow group is again the top performer, there are
some interesting changes. The group with the second
highest number of responses is the fast/slow group,
followed closely by the fast/fast group. The slow/fast
group was the lowest performing group with respect to
compound remembering responses.
When the mean remembering performance for each group
is graphed over each 5-min interval, group differences are
more clearly observed during the second half of the experi-
ment (see Fig. 3). Importantly, such differences must be
interpreted with caution, as they may be mere continuations
of trends fromthe first phase of the experiment, or possibly the
result of decreased group variability.
False Positives
When comparing overall false positives between groups, in-
dividuals in the slow/fast group engaged in an overall mean of
80.13 false positives (SD 127.96; range 5392); the fast/slow
group, 43.88 (SD 25.05, range 1382); the slow/slow group,
89.75 (SD 98.29, range 5281); and the fast/fast group, 47.5
(SD 37.98, range 8120) (see Table 3).
Participants in the slow/fast group engaged in a mean of
2.13 (SD 4.12; range 012) non-compound false positives
relative to a mean of 78 (SD 124.07; range 4380) compound
false positives. In the fast/slow group, participants engaged in
a mean of 0.25 (SD 0.46; range 01) non-compound false
positives compared to 43.63 (SD 25.01; range 1281) com-
pound false positives. In the slow/slow group, a mean of 2.25
(SD 2.76; range 08) non-compound false positives occurred,
with compound false positives at 87.5 (SD 97.42; range 4
279). Last, individuals in the fast/fast group engaged in a
mean of 1.63 (SD 1.3; range 04) non-compound false posi-
tives and 45.88 (SD 37.54; range 7118) compound false
positives. Thus, there were rather large and clear differences
between non-compound and compound false positive remem-
bering responses for all groups.
Interestingly, the groups that started out in a slow setting
factor engaged in particularly high rates of false positives
when compared to the groups that started out with a fast
setting factor, generally speaking. On average, there were
nearly twice as many false positives made by those who
started in slow conditions. When mean false positives are
graphed over time for each group, we again see that those
groups that started off with an slow setting factor generally
engaged in more false positives throughout the experiment
when compared to the other groups (see Fig. 4). Also, it is
important to note that all false positives are on a decreasing
trend.
Rows Completed
Table 4 displays the mean number of rows completed for each
group. As may be expected, the slow/slow group had the
highest mean number of rows completed (M 284.5; SD
118.95; range 99485). This was followed by the fast/slow
group (M 246.88; SD 65.17; range 123327), the slow/fast
group (M 150.75; SD 102.95; range 37342), and finally, the
fast/fast group (M107; SD106.63; range 7268). Again, these
means may be expected, as the group with two slow phases
had the highest mean number of rows, followed by the two
groups that had one slow condition, and finally, the group that
had no slow setting conditions.
Figure 5 displays the mean number of rows completed
during each 5-min interval for each group. The fast/fast group
engaged in relatively low rates of game performance
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
M
e
a
n

R
e
m
e
m
b
e
r
i
n
g
Five Minute Intervals
Remembering
Slow/Fast
Fast/Slow
Slow/Slow
Fast/Fast
Fig. 3 The mean number of
remembering responses during
each 5-min interval for each of the
four groups
Psychol Rec (2014) 64:111 7
throughout the experiment. The other three groups were over-
lapping during the first phase of the experiment, and the four
groups were organized into two distinct clusters during the
second phase of the experiment. Specifically, the slow/slow
and fast/slow groups completed many more rows of the game
when compared to the slow/fast and fast/fast groups. Thus, the
slow setting factor was correlated with a higher number of
rows completed when compared to the fast setting factor,
particularly in the second phase of the experiment.
Discussion
We hypothesized that there may be differences between the
way in which non-compound and compound stimuli operate
as substitutes in remembering interactions. Moreover, we
were interested in the extent to which setting factors and
history/evolution of stimulus function differentially participat-
ed in fields with non-compound and compound substitute
stimuli. Indeed, this experiment demonstrated some signifi-
cant differences between responses to non-compound and
compound stimuli, specifically with respect to the way in
which they operated as substitute stimuli in remembering
interactions. Non-compound stimuli operated as substitutes
much more often than compound stimuli, and this difference
was found to be statistically significant. In addition to large
differences with respect to remembering performance, there
were also substantial differences with respect to non-
compound and compound stimuli when considering the num-
ber of false positives (i.e., remembering in the absence of the
substitute stimulus developed during the initial association
conditions). Specifically, the majority of false positives in-
volved responses that were associated with compound stimuli
during the initial association conditions (e.g., typing DES at
the wrong time). The differences between compound and non-
compound false positives were also found to be statistically
significant. Therefore, compound stimuli were indeed associ-
ated with distinct response patterns relative to non-compound
stimuli.
The above-mentioned differences underscore an interesting
additional aspect of compound stimuli, namely, that they
involve more false positives, or more memories in the absence
of the initial stimulus compound. In the natural environment,
association conditions always involve compound stimuli and,
thus, substitutional interactions become extraordinarily com-
plex. Some factors present at one time may be present at other
times, and other factors not and, thus, aspects of the factors
participating in psychological fields do so in unique ways,
involving complicated integrations of substitutional functions.
Thus, one might speculate that responding occurs in the
absence of stimulation (e.g., Skinner 1974), not only because
of the confusion between stimulus objects and stimulus func-
tions but also because of the complex nature of substitutional
processes.
Although this investigation was analogue in nature, there
are a number of practical implications. Most obviously, if one
wishes to develop and sustain remembering interactions over
a period of time, our results suggest that involving a stimulus
that remains uniquely related to the remembering interaction
would be central toward accomplishing this. In lay terms, if
remembering interactions need to develop and persist, a
uniquely involved reminder may be required. In other
words, as components of compound stimuli are often present
at various times in the absence of the entire stimulus, com-
pound stimuli are relatively less specifically associated with
the remembering interaction when compared to non-
compound stimuli. This feature of compound stimuli relates
to our initial hypothesis regarding the evolution of stimulus
function, whereby histories that involve partial presentations
Table 3 Between group performance
False positives M SD Range
Slow/fast 80.13 127.96 5392
Fast/slow 43.88 25.05 1382
Slow/slow 89.75 98.29 5281
Fast/fast 47.5 37.98 8120
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
M
e
a
n

F
a
l
s
e

P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
s
Five Minute Intervals
False Positives
Fast/Slo
Slow/Slo
Slow/Fast
Fast/Fast
Fig. 4 Mean number of false
positives made by each group
during each 5-min interval
8 Psychol Rec (2014) 64:111
of compound stimuli seemto impact the overall functioning of
compound stimuli at later times. When reminders (e.g., fluo-
rescent notes) are used for a variety of things, their functioning
as substitutes may be compromised. Not only did more re-
membering happen with respect to non-compound substitutes
but also much less inaccurate remembering occurred with
respect to non-compound stimuli. Thus, when errors may be
especially problematic (e.g., medication regimens), special
attention may need to be given to the development of effective
substitute stimuli to serve as reminders. Of course, future
work needs to examine these implications more closely and
also the extent to which they correspond to the adherence
literature.
Related to the above, it is important to mention that the
shapes of the non-compound stimuli (heart and star) might be
considered somewhat more salient or unique relative to the
shapes of the compound stimuli. Thus, it is possible that the
uniqueness of the shapes of the non-compound stimuli may
have contributed to the distinct response patterns observed.
This is only a possibility, however, and one that future re-
searchers might consider more systematically.
We also hypothesized that the setting condition (the puzzle)
would participate in remembering interactions. Indeed, group
differences with respect to false positives were also rather
interesting. When looking at mean group differences, what
stands out is that those groups starting out with a slow condi-
tion engaged in nearly twice as many false positives than did
the groups starting out with a fast condition. Thus, when the
setting was slower, many more false positives seemed to
occur. However, it is again important to note that all false
positive data were on a decreasing trend. Moreover, individual
groups were very small (N=8), with substantial variability
among the participants, and it is therefore difficult to draw
conclusions regarding any of these possibilities. Future re-
search should examine these more specifically and might
consider the interbehavioral perspective to aide in interpreta-
tion (see Kantor 1924: Kantor and Smith 1975, pp. 3538).
Meta-Systemic and Conceptual Considerations
The interbehavioral position might seem close to a more
traditional behavior analytic competing stimuli analysis
(e.g., Fisher et al. 2004); however, such traditional analyses
seem antithetical to several core tenets of interbehavioral
psychology. Specifically, it is not the operant contingency that
is central to our conceptualization of remembering but the
multi-factored interactional field. Therefore, factors never
compete with one another; they always participate in an
integrated whole. In other words, from the perspective of
interbehavioral psychology, we are not likely to find ourselves
talking about contingencies, let alone competing contingen-
cies. Moreover, we never observed such competition, and
therefore, this inference does not seem to be derived from
interbehavioral thinking (also see Hayes et al. 1997).
The interbehavioral perspective described herein may also
be utilized to integrate various other perspectives on memory.
For example, one very popular memory procedure, paired-
associates learning (see Pear 2007, pp. 8485), involves indi-
viduals memorizing pairs of stimuli (often two nonsense
words) and later presenting one of the stimuli and having the
individual state the missing element. This type of research is
largely conducted by cognitive psychologists, who embrace
explicitly dualistic philosophical assumptions, or perhaps
more commonly today, hybrids of dualistic and reductionistic
premises (e.g., the software-hardware metaphor). However,
the interbehavioral perspective provides an alternative,
Table 4 Between group performance
Rows completed M SD Range
Slow/fast 150.75 102.95 37342
Fast/slow 246.88 65.17 123327
Slow/slow 284.5 118.95 99485
Fast/fast 107 106.63 7268
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
M
e
a
n

N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

R
o
w
s
Five Minute Intervals
Rows Completed
Slow/Slow
Fast/Fast
Fast/Slow
Slow/Fast
Fig. 5 Mean number of rows
completed for each of the four
groups during each 5-min interval
Psychol Rec (2014) 64:111 9
naturalistic way of interpreting this area of research.
Specifically, the construction of stimulus substitution has
much to offer interpretive work in this area. Given the cen-
trality of stimulus substitution toward understanding psycho-
logical events of the memorial type, future system building
work should be conducted with the aim to integrate other
perspectives within an interbehavioral framework.
Although we hypothesized that the setting factor might
impact remembering performance, the conceptualization of
the setting factor presented some interpretive difficulty in the
present experiment. Indeed, it is difficult to examine the way
in which the setting factor participated in the interactional
field. Interbehaviorists have long cautioned about the difficul-
ty of distinguishing between settings and stimuli (Kantor
1924, pp. 5556; Smith 2006). Kantor (1924, p. 56) indicated
that setting factors have their primary influence on other
stimuli, rather than on their own coordinated reaction systems
(i.e., setting factors shouldnt involve their own type of
responding but rather influence other stimuli). Thus, while
we attempted to measure the way in which the participants
interacted with the puzzle, this may have little to do with
setting factors for remembering interactions. Specifically, it
is possible that the speed of the pieces falling functioned as a
setting factor for rows completed, not for remembering.
Future studies should attempt to construct a setting factor
that the participant is required to interact with, one that is
specifically interrelated with the psychological stimulus, rath-
er than one that composes a somewhat incompatible response.
For example, participants could complete the experiment in a
room with other people talking, or with specific background
colors that make the substitute stimuli more or less salient
(having these setting factors present for some participants or
conditions and not for others). This type of setting factor
manipulation would guarantee that all participants contacted
the setting factor, and also focuses on the way in which it alters
responding with respect to the psychological stimulus of
interest. This would allow researchers to draw more conclu-
sions regarding the extent to which setting factors participate
in remembering interactions. In addition, as a number of
factors were manipulated in the present experiment, future
researchers may wish to conduct more detailed analyses fo-
cusing on a specific factor with a smaller number of partici-
pants, whereas others may wish to include more participants
to better understand potential group differences.
This experiment was an attempt to demonstrate the value of
the interbehavioral position toward understanding complex
behavior of the memorial type. We discovered a number of
interesting issues in doing so, particularly with respect to the
differential manner in which non-compound and compound
stimuli operate as substitutes in remembering interactions.
The interbehavioral position is explicitly contextual in its field
orientation and thus opens the door to a number of avenues for
future research. Indeed, one of the primary values of the
interbehavioral position is that its constructs tend to be rela-
tively less restrictive (e.g., compared to reinforcement contin-
gencies) and, thus, workers operating from this perspective
might be more likely to capture aspects of remembering
interactions that are not typically targeted by other workers.
It is our hope that this study can stimulate further research
from an interbehavioral perspective.
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