AZNAR VS.

GARCIA
Nationality Principle Internal and Conflict Rule
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a period of
9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he
instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but
left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims
that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under
California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for
Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled
to anything under California law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the
successional rights of his heirs.
HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there
are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in
California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being
domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings the determination of the successional rights under Philippine
law only.

BELLIS VS. BELLIS
Nationality Principle
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he
divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas
properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were
not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been
deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the
illegitimate children.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas
Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.
*LEGITIME MEANING: That portion of a parent's estate of which he cannot disinherit his children,
without a legal cause.

HERMOSISISMA VS. CA
Torts and Damages - Breach of Promise to Marry Moral Damages
In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later she became an insurance
underwriter), and Francisco Hermosisima, 23 years old (apprentice ship pilot), fell in love with each
other. Since 1953, both had a refular intimate and sexual affair with each other. In 1954, Soledad got
pregnant. Francisco then promised to marry Soledad. In June 1954, Soledad gave birth to a baby girl. The
next month, Francisco got married but with a different woman named Romanita Perez.
Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the latter to recognize his daughter with
Soledad and for damages due to Franciscos breach of his promise to marry Soledad. The trial court
ruled in favor of Soledad. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and even
increased the award of damages. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages
because he seduced Soledad. He exploited the love of Soledad for him in order to satisfy his sexual
desires that being, the award of moral damages is proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry.
HELD: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court of Appeals based its
award of damages on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which says in part that Moral damages may be
recovered from (3) Seduction, xxx However, it must be noted that the Seduction being
contemplated in the said Civil Code provision is the same Seduction being contemplated in Article 337
and 338 of the Revised Penal Code. Such seduction is not present in this case.
Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal seduction) Soledad given
the circumstances of this case. Soledad was 10 years older than Francisco. Soledad had a better job
experience and a better job overall than Francisco who was a mere apprentice. Further still, it was
admitted by Soledad herself that she surrendered herself to Francisco and that she wanted to bind
by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
* Must take note that sexual contact before promise to marry is not subject to moral damages.
* When the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently delivers. Although she cannot recover moral
damages for the breach, nevertheless she can recover compensatory damages for medical and
hospitalization expenses as well as attorneys fees and of course monthly pension for the support of
the child.

WASSMER VS. VELEZ
Article 21 of the Civil Code Moral Damages Exemplary Damages - Breach of Promise to Marry
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it on
September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding
invitations, bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days
before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be
able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the
wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will
be returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually
judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of
Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous
events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the
award of exemplary and moral damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is
true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was
not a simple breach of promise to marry; because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the
wedding. Velezs unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. Wassmers cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides
in part any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral
damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary
damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise
to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner this warrants the imposition of
exemplary damages against him.