Chance Necessity Mode of Production PDF

Chance, Necessity, and Mode of Production: A Marxist Critique of Cultural Evolutionism
Author(s): Dominique Legros

Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 79, No. 1 (Mar., 1977), pp. 26-41
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Chance, Necessity,
and Mode of Production:
A Marxist
Critique
of Cultural Evolutionism
DOMINIQUE
LEGROS
Johns
Hopkins University
Cultural evolutionism and historical materialism are two
fundamentally divergent
theories
of
evolution. The
nonrecognition by
cultural evolutionists
of
Marx's
distinction between "social
formation"
and "mode
of production"
has led them to
interpret
his thesis
of
the determination
of superstructures by
economic base as
"techno-economic
change begets
new levels
of general
evolution. " In
fact,
Marx's
actual thesis was aimed at
explaining
the
interrelationships
between
superstructures
and
economy
within a
previously
established mode
of production.
As a con-
sequence,
Marx's
analysis of
how a new mode is
"given"
has been
consistently
ignored.
Marx
poses
the
problem of
the
origins of capitalism,
not in terms
of
economic
determinism,
much less
technological fatalism,
but in terms
of
chance
and
necessity.
In this
paper,
I
attempt
to draw the theoretical
implications of
such
an
approach
in
respect
to
general
cultural evolution.
[Marxism
and cultural
evolutionism;
mode of
production;
economic determinism
criticized; capitalism,
rise
of;
cultural
evolution,
chance
in]
La
methode,
c'est
precisement
le choix des
faits.
-Henri Poincare
THERE HAS BEEN A TENDENCY to
identify
the cultural evolutionism of American
anthropologists
with Marxism. In
fact,
their work
developed quite independently
of Marxist
theory
and is often inconsistent with it. The
purpose
of this
paper
is to indicate the
ways
in
which Marxism
represents
a
radically
different
approach
from that of cultural evolutionism.
The
major points
that I shall make are the
following: (1)
the two theories differ
fundamentally
in how
they
define and relate the
concepts
of
"society"
and "mode of
production"; (2)
the Marxist thesis of the determination of
superstructures by
the economic
base,
or
infrastructure,
is aimed not at
explaining
the historical
origin
of these
superstructures,
but at
explaining
their
relationship
to the economic base within a
given
mode of
production,
a
synchronic phenomenon; (3)
when one examines Marx's formulation
of the
problem
of the
origins
of the
capitalist
mode of
production,
it becomes clear that he
does not
develop
this
question
in terms of economic
determination,
and still less as a matter
of
technological
fatalism. Marx's materialism is
historical,
not
economic,
and
gives
as much
emphasis
to chance as to
necessity.
SOCIETY AND MODE OF PRODUCTION: THE DIVERGENT THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORKS OF CULTURAL EVOLUTIONISM AND MARXISM
In order to contrast the theoretical framework of cultural evolutionism with that of
Marx,
I have chosen six
anthropologists who,
taken
together,
can be seen as a
representative
sample
of the
major
trends of cultural evolutionism. These are Leslie A.
White,
Julian H.
Steward, Robert L.
Carneiro, June
Helm, Marshall D. Sahlins, and Marvin Harris. The works
of White
(1959)
and Steward
(1955) reopened
the study of cultural evolution in
America,
26
Legros]
MARXISM AND CULTURAL EVOLUTIONISM 27
after 50
years
of
neglect.
Their
approaches differ,
however. Steward set forth and defended a
theory
of multilinear evolution
against
what he believed to be White's thesis of unilinear
evolution. Helm
(1969)
and Carneiro
(1960)
are mentioned as
representative
sources for
subsequent
formulations
drawing upon
the work of White and Steward. I refer to Sahlins for
his remarkable
paper,
"Evolution:
Specific
and General"
(1960a),
but it should be noted
that in his latest works
(1972, 1974, 1976),
Sahlins has
developed
new theoretical
orientations which constitute a
rupture
with cultural evolutionism.
Nevertheless, though
dated in
respect
to Sahlin's
present position,
this
paper represents
one of the best
syntheses
of cultural evolutionist
approaches.
At the end of this
paper, following
a brief
presentation
of the main
points
of Marx's
analysis
of the rise of
capitalism,
I criticize Harris'
interpretation
of Marx's work as a form of
cultural materialism
(1968:230-233)
similar to the framework of cultural evolutionism.
Harris'
interpretation
rests on the "Preface" to the
Critique of
Political
Economy
and sets
aside the results of Marx's main
work,
Das
Kapital.
This
procedure
is debatable. In
my
criticism,
I use Harris'
interpretation
to further illustrate the
divergences
between cultural
evolutionism and Marx's theses on evolution as formulated in
Capital.
It should be made
clear at the outset that
my purpose
is not to comment on the relative merits of the different
cultural
evolutionisms; rather,
it is to
attempt
to outline the
premises
basic to all.
Leslie A. White's
theory
of culture
(1959:6-7, passim)
identifies four
components:
the
ideological,
the
sociological,
the sentimental or
attitudinal,
and the
technological.
White
elaborates
(1959:19):
The fact that these four cultural
categories
are
interrelated,
that each is related to the
other
three,
does not mean that their
respective
roles in the culture
process
are
equal,
for
they
are not. The
technological
factor is the basic one;
all
otlirs
are
dependent upon
it.
Furthermore,
the
technological
factor
determines,
in a
general way
at
least,
the form and
content of the
social, philosophic,
and sentimental sectors
....
It is
fairly
obvious that the
social
organization
of a
people
is not
only dependent upon
their
technology
but is
determined to a
great extent,
if not
wholly, by it,
both in form and content.
In The Culture Process-an
early paper (1960)-Carneiro
differs from White in
according
equal priority
to
technology
and
economy,
but
otherwise,
he
approaches
the
problem
of
cultural evolution in a manner
structurally
identical to White's. He writes
(153-154):
The
technological
and economic
aspects
of culture
change
more
readily
and more
rapidly
than its social and
religious aspects. Inevitably
this
brings
about a
disconformity
between
the
two, which,
when it reaches a certain
magnitude,
results in
abrupt readjustive changes
in social and
religious
institutions.
Steward's
position
is somewhat elusive in
regard
to the causal
relationships
between
technology, economy,
social
organization, military patterns,
esthetic
features,
and
religious
institutions. On the one
hand,
the research
strategy
that he sets forth
(1955:39-42) clearly
accords a
determining
role to "the
interrelationship
of
exploitative
or
productive technology
and environment"
(1955:40).
We are invited to "ascertain the extent to which the behavior
patterns
entailed in
exploiting
the environment affect other
aspects
of culture"
(1955:41).
On the other
hand,
Steward is
unwilling
to take a stand and
say
what domains of culture are
likely
to be affected. Interrelated
features,
which form what he terms the cultural core
(1955: 37)
of a
society,
have to be identified for each case
study by empirical
observation.
Aspects
of a
given
culture that are not found to be connected with "subsistence activities
and economic
arrangements"
are said to be "determined to a
greater
extent
by purely
historical factors," by
"random innovations or
by
diffusion" (1955:37; emphasis added).
Incidentally,
it should be noted that in the case of features which are found in the cultural
core, Steward
carefully
avoids
phrases
such as "determined by
economic
arrangements."
Apparently
in a
quandary,
he
only
claims that
they
are "related to," "connected with,"
or
"involved in the utilisation of environment" (1955:37).
28 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
[79,1977
Younger
scholars like Helm
(1969)
have
expressed
similar
positions,
but more
forthrightly.
Helm
distinguishes
between the
exploitative pattern,
the settlement
pattern,
and the
community pattern.
The
exploitative pattern
results from "cultural
definition
of
environmental resources and of the tools and
techniques
for the utilisation of those
resources"
(1969:151, emphasis added).
The "settlement
pattern comprises
the
society's
forms of human
occupations (for example,
nucleated versus
dispersed groups
in their
temporal, spatial,
and size
dimensions) existing through
seasonal or other
exploitative
cycles" (1969:151).
"The
relationships
and
arrangements,
based in cultural
convention,
among occupants
of locales are
community pattern" (1969:151).
For Helm
(1969:151-152);
We cannot
predict
a
simple progression
of
exploitative pattern-shaping
settlement
pattern
which in turn
shapes community pattern.
In the
long
run of human condition there
may
be flow in this
direction,
but in
any
short run there is
certainly interdependence
and
feedback.
Ideological
and social directives can and do affect settlement and
exploitation.
This brief
survey
makes it clear that Helm and Steward
together
are
opposed
to White and
Carneiro. The more recent trends of cultural evolutionism
represented
here
by
Carneiro and
Helm have not made the
controversy
between White and Steward
outdated-they merely
replicate
it. Helm's
primary concern,
like
Steward's,
is to indicate that
technology (or
economy)
does not determine
everything,
and
moreover,
that the central issue for a
theory
of cultural evolution is to ascertain for each concrete
society,
the
precise shaping-effect
of its
techno-ecological pattern.
On the
contrary, Carneiro,
like
White,
uses the
"shaping-effect"
thesis as a "law" which
explains
cultural evolution. In a
sense,
the
divergence
between these
two trends is
comparable
to the
gap
which would
separate
two schools of
ornithologists,
one
claiming
that loons
fly
south in the
fall,
and the other
rejecting
this formulation on the
grounds
that the scientific issue is to determine the
specific
locale where each loon
spends
the winter. That a
gap
of this nature can
easily
be filled is evident.
As Sahlins
(1960a)
has
pointed out,
the
misunderstanding
between Steward and White
stems from the fact that the
phenomenon
of cultural evolution
may
and must be
approached
from two
points
of view. Evolution
proceeds through
the differentiation of
specific societies,
and
through
this
process
there
emerge increasingly complex
levels of social
integration.
Thus,
on the one
hand,
it is
perfectly legitimate
to focus on the different
evolutionary
processes by
which societies
diverge.
In order to ascertain these various
developments,
one
clearly
must take into account more than the level of
technology.
On the other
hand, apart
from their initial
causes, improvements
in
harvesting energy (and consequently
in
technology)
become chief factors in
explaining
the different world
stages
of social
integration, regardless of
where and when
they appeared.
At this level the
subject
of
analysis
is the entire social
history
of the human
species,
and not this or that
particular
culture.
Consequently
we cannot
say
that there exists an actual theoretical
rupture
between the
two main trends of cultural evolutionism here
represented
on the one side
by
White and
Carneiro,
and on the other side
by
Steward and Helm. The thesis of the determination of
noneconomic levels
by
the techno-economical level
performs
a different heuristic function in
each case and thus
appears
under different formulations-but the thesis
itself
is
put
into
question by
neither. That it assumes a different theoretical role is
only
the
upshot
of a
displacement
in the focus of
research-displacement
which is made
necessary by
the
very
double nature of the
object
under
study-and
not an indication of the existence of two
theories in conflict.
While Sahlins'
argument
is essential in
showing
that the two main trends of cultural
evolutionism both lie within the same theoretical framework, it remains uncritical of cultural
evolutionism as such. As a matter of
fact, it
gives
to cultural evolutionism the
very
fundamentals it had been
lacking.
His
argument puts
an end to a false
controversy,
but in
this
early paper
Sahlins
accepted
the set of
underlying assumptions
shared
by
White and
Legros]
Steward. It is this
underlying layer
of common
categories
that I will contrast with the
somewhat different
premises
of Marx.
Cultural evolutionists
regard humanity, past
and
present,
as a series of distinct entities
termed cultures or societies. Each
society
is divided into ranked
components
or levels. What
is sometimes called mode of
production (Harris 1968:244;
Gabel
1967:2),
at other times
mode of
exploitation
or
exploitative pattern (Murdock 1969:129;
Helm
1969:151),
and
more
commonly
economic
structure,
techno-economic
base,
techno-economic conditions
(Harris 1968:231, 233, 240),
subsistence
pattern
or utilization of environment in
culturally
prescribed ways,
etc.
(Steward 1955:37-38, passim), technological component
or
technology
(L.
A. White
1959:18-28, passim),
is the set of
techniques, methods,
and
culturally
defined
environmental resources with which
society produces
the
goods
and services
necessary
to
fulfill its members' material and social needs. General levels of evolution are viewed in the
same terms as
particular societies;
these levels are defined
merely
as classes of
sociopolitical
entities or societies of a
given
order
(cf.
Sahlins
1960a:33).
The Marxist
approach
to social evolution is
radically
different. The
empirical
entities
defined
by
cultural evolutionists as
"societies," "cultures,"
or "cultural
systems"
are
conceptualized by
Marx as "social formations." What is involved here is more than a
change
of
vocabulary.
In contrast to cultural
evolutionism,
the Marxist
approach
does not
permit
the classification of "social formations" in terms of levels of
general
evolution.
The
complex corpus
of
techniques, customs, institutions, rules,
etc. is dissected so as to
inventory
the modes of
production'
that are
present
in the social formation. Here lies the
sharp divergence
from cultural evolutionism: what is at issue for Marx are the modes of
production
of a
society
and not its mode of
production.
The
premise
is that a
society may
combine several modes of
production.
In other
words,
within a
given society,
there
may
exist
(and
as a matter of fact do
exist)
not
simply
several
exploitative techniques (that
is
self-evident),
but several distinct modes of
production
with their
respective
economic
bases,
ideological superstructures,
and
juridical
and
political superstructures.2 Consequently
there
is little relation between what cultural evolutionists sometimes term the mode of
production
of a
society (the
sum of its
productive techniques)
and the Marxist
concept
of mode of
production.
For
Marx,
a mode of
production
is a distinct
production
structure in association
with its
superstructures (cf.
Althusser and Balibar
1970).
It
may
be found within several
social formations which are
quite
dissimilar to each other in other
respects.
In one
society,
it
may
be the structure of
production
in one economic
branch;
in another
society,
the
structure of two different branches. For this
reason,
Marx's
sequence
of
general
evolution
(slavery, feudalism, capitalism)
is of an
entirely
different nature from that of cultural
evolutionism
(band, tribe, chiefdom, state).
A series of
production
structures which are
general types ("Idealer
Durchschnitt" or
"Allgemeiner Typus")
abstracted as distinctive
parts
from more
complex
wholes termed social
formations,
can
hardly
be
equated
with the
cultural evolutionist
sequence
for which the entire structure of social formations is the basis
of classification and of definition of the levels of
general
evolution. A state cannot be a level
of
general
evolution in the Marxist
perspective;
it is a
superstructural apparatus,
a form of
sociopolitical integration
which
may
be
required by
different
types
of mode of
production.
Consequently,
as a form of
integration,
the state is to be found at different levels of
general
evolution
(the
modes of
production).
Balibar
(Althusser
and Balibar
1970:225)
is inaccurate when he
bluntly
states that
Marxism is a
"radically
anti-evolutionist"
theory
of the
history
of societies, but his remark
makes sense if we consider that evolutionism has been
equated
with the
theory
of evolution
of cultural evolutionists.
Perhaps,
is it more correct to
say,
as Althusser does
(1971:96),
that
cultural evolutionism is "the
poor
man's
hegelianism"! Though
Althusser is
unnecessarily
derogative,
he
might
have a
point.
Like
Hegel's,
the cultural evolutionist sequence
of
evolution ends with the
apotheosis
of the state. Thus, with cultural evolutionism, the Inca
[79,1977
state,
the Roman
empire,
the United
States,
the
People's Republic
of
China,
etc. are
lumped
into one
category
as variants of a
single
level of
general
evolution
(as
if there were no
differences
among
their
respective
dominant modes of
production).
Marx's
sequence
of evolution
(slavery, feudalism, capitalism)
is the
sequence
in which
these
types
of economic structure came into existence in Western
Europe. However,
at
any
given moment, any European
social formation was more
complex,
as a
whole,
than the
structure of its dominant
production
mode.
Certainly,
Marx uses
expressions
like
"capitalist
society"
or "feudal
society,"
but these are formulas
employed
to refer to societies in which
either the
capitalist
or the feudal mode of
production
is dominant.
Marx,
for
example,
chose
England
as the main source of data for his
analysis
of
capitalist
production,
but he never
equated England
as a social formation with the
capitalist
mode of
production.
While he stated
repeatedly
that the structure of
capitalist production requires
only
the existence of two classes
(bourgeoisie
and
proletariat),
he often referred us to other
types
of social classes that were
present
in
England
at the time of his
study
and were active
in the framework of
noncapitalist production organizations (landlords, independent
craftsmen,
and small
farmers).
Different
types
of
juridical superstructures corresponded
to
these different modes of
production.
Thus Marx noted for 19th
century England,
... occasionally
in rural districts a labourer is condemned to
imprisonment
for
desecrating
the
Sabbath, by working
in his front
garden.
The same labourer is
punished
for breach of contract if he remains
away
from his
metal, paper,
or
glass
works on the
Sunday,
even if it be from a
religious
whim
[Marx 1967:I, 264, n.1].
The coexistence of several modes of
production
within a
single
social formation is not a
phenomenon peculiar
to industrial societies.
Terray (1972: 136-138, passim)
has shown that
the traditional Gouro social formation
(Ivory Coast) represented
a combination and
articulation of two different modes of
production. Hunting,
but
net-hunting only
and not
trapping,
of
big game,
is
organized according
to mode of
production I. Agriculture, fishing,
gathering,
house
building, trapping
of
big game,
and
breeding
cattle are the economic
branches in which
production
is structured
according
to mode of
production
II. The
economic basis of mode I is
characterized, socially speaking, by
collective
ownership
of
means of
production
and
egalitarian sharing
of
products and, technically speaking, by
complex cooperative group
labor. Because of this structure of the economic base the
only
noticeable
superstructural
institutions that are
required
are a
hunting-party leadership
(technical exigency)
who is chosen
according
to merit
(the
result of the
egalitarian
social
aspect
of economic
base),
and a
village, loosely structured,
which is
brought together
into a
single
unit for
hunting purposes
and in time of warfare.
Simple cooperation
is the main
aspect (in
terms of
technology)
of the economic base of mode
II.
Socially speaking,
this
economic base is differentiated from that of mode I
by
the fact
that,
without
technological
necessity,
the
right
of
usage
of means of
production
is under the control of older men who
are related
through kinship
to the
producers (male
and female in this
case).
This
implies,
as a
necessary superstructural apparatus,
an
ideology
of social
differentiation
through age
and
sex. With the
lineage system, kinship
is
shaped
and structured in order to fit the
socioeconomic dimension of the economic basis and its technical
requirements (transfer
of
orphans
and individuals and
integration
of
captives
in order to correct the imbalance of
natural
reproduction
between
units).
Marcel Mauss
(1968),
in his
essay
on the
Eskimos, gives
further evidence that a
primitive
society may represent
a combination of several modes of
production.
His
conclusion, similar
to that of
Terray
in the case of the Gouro, is the result of a careful
analysis
of the
ethnographic
data and
certainly
not of an intention to illustrate a Marxist thesis. Mauss
demonstrated that the mode of
production
that is
prevalent during
the winter season and the
mode which dominates the summer activities correspond respectively
to two jural systems,
two codes of ethics, and two
types
of
religious
life
(1968:470).
He
goes
further than
any
Legros]
Marxist would
go
in
using expressions
such as "two successive and
alternating
civilizations"
(1968:470)
to characterize the two modes of
production
that can be found within a
single
Eskimo
society.
In contrast to the cultural evolutionists who
regard
societies as a
single
structure of
interrelated
levels, Marx,
and
approaches
like Mauss's in this
instance,
conceive of
society
as
composed of
several
primary
structures
of
interrelated levels:
i.e.,
the
combination/
articulation
of
several modes
of production.
It is essential to
point
out this difference in
order to
comprehend
the
precise
content of Marx's
theory
of determination
by
the
economic base.
DETERMINATION OF SUPERSTRUCTURES BY ECONOMIC BASE
Marx's thesis of the determination of the
superstructures by
the economic base is a
theory
of how certain elements of
production, ideology, law, political system, education,
etc.,
are
interrelated,
and constitute a
given
mode of
production. Necessarily,
in a
given
society
there are institutions which are
external,
or inconsistent with what is identified as
one of its modes of
production.
For
instance,
as in Marx's
example
mentioned
above,
in
19th
century England
it was
illegal
to work in
one's
own
garden (noncapitalist production)
on the
Sabbath,
while a
capitalist employer
had the
legal right
to
compel
his
employees
to
work on
Sunday.
Thus we can see that
desecrating
the Sabbath is not a
superstructural
element of the
capitalist
mode of
production. Yet,
it
belonged
to the
general corpus
of laws
of the British social formation of that
period.
The
concept
of determination is used in order to define the "articulated
hierarchy"
("Gliederung")
of
the levels within a
given
mode
of production (Marx 1970:213;
in the
English
translation
"Gliederung"
is rendered
by "position").
As Marx
puts it,
the
problem
is
not to
explain
a social whole "in which all relations of
production
coexist
simultaneously
and
support
one another"
by
"the
single logical
formula of
movements,
of
sequence
of
time"
(Marx 1963:110-111).
Within a mode of
production
as a
system
of
levels,
Marx
accords a
determining power
to the economic base.
However,
this is
nothing
more than to
state that:
(1)
from mode to mode the economic bases
represent
different
systems
of
relations of
production; (2)
that
superstructural apparatus
are
required
in order to
replicate
through
time the
system
of relations of
production
of each economic
base; (3)
that the
nature of what has to be
replicated
for each base
(its specific system
of relations of
production)
determines what
type
of
is to be dominant in each
mode
(devices
to
prevent
the
development
of
inequalities
if an economic base is
egalitarian
or means to
protect inequalities
if what has to be
replicated
is a class
system).
In other
words, according
to its
nature,
the economic base determines the dominance of this or that
level for its own
replication process.
For
example,
a sector of
agriculture implemented by
free
peasants
and another sector
worked
by
slaves could coexist in a
single society.
The tools and
techniques
used
might
be
roughly
identical in both sectors. But it should be clear
that,
for
instance,
chattel
slavery
requires special apparatus
in order to endure as a
system
or economic base. For free
peasantry, kinship might
be the dominant
structuring apparatus,
while chattel
slavery
supposes
the existence of a
paramilitary
arm controlled
by
the
ruling
class.
This, however,
does not
necessarily prevent kinship
from also
being
one
structuring component
in the slave
organization
of
production.
Servile labor in native American cultures,
in Asia, or in some African societies, tends to be
readily
labeled as
slavery; perhaps
a name that
palliates
other deeds of
folly
and of shame!
Yet, in most cases, it is quite different from that which is
habitually implied by
the word
slavery-as divergent
as feudal servile
relationships
of
production
are from the chattel
slavery
of Athens or of the ante bellum United States
(for bondage
in Africa cf.
Meillassoux, 1975).
[79,1977
Those different forms of servile
labor,
subsumed under the
category
of
slavery, may
each
require
the dominance of
very
dissimilar
apparatus.
The
point
is
that,
servile or
not,
servile in this
way
and not in that
way, relationships
of
production
are
part
of the economic base and
thus,
that the base determines what
type
of
component
or
apparatus
is crucial to the
replication process
of the
system
of
production (cf.
Althusser
1969). According
to its
characteristics,
the economic base
entrusts,
if one
may say
so,
this or that
apparatus
with much
greater
confidence;
the
very
survival of the base
depends primarily upon
the existence of that dominant
component.
In Das
Kapital
Marx
gives
an
enlightening
note on his
position.
In the estimation of...
[a
German
paper
in America that
published
a review of Marx's
work Zur Kritik der Politischen
Oekonomie] my
view that each
special
mode of
production
and the social relations
corresponding
to
it,
in
short,
that the economic
structure of
society,
is the real basis on which the
juridical
and
political superstructure
is
raised,
and to which definite social forms of
thought correspond;
that the mode of
production
determines the character of the
social, political,
and intellectual life
generally,
all this is
very
true for our own
times,
in which material interests
preponderate,
but not
for the middle
ages,
in which
Catholicism,
nor for Athens and
Rome,
where
politics,
reigned supreme.
In the
first place
it strikes one as an odd
thing for anyone
to
suppose
that these well-worn
phrases
about the middle
ages
and the ancient world are unknown to
anyone
else. This
much, however,
is
clear,
that the middle
ages
could not live on
Catholicism,
nor the ancient world on
politics.
On the
contrary,
it is the mode in which
they gained
a livelihood that
explains why
here
politics,
and there
Catholicism, played
the
chief part [Marx 1967:I, 81, n.1, emphasis added].
In the same
footnote,
Marx adds that "it
requires
but a
slight acquaintance
with the
history
of the Roman
Republic,
for
example,
to be aware that its secret
history
is the
history
of its
landed
property."
Thus the
system
of relations of
production-in
this
case,
the
system
of
land
property-is readily
defined
by
Marx as an
integral aspect
of the economic base.
When an economic base rests on a relation of
exploitation,
it is
mandatory
to
arrange
for
apparatus that, ultimately,
will
permit society
to resort to
organized
violence in order to
enforce the
reproduction
of relations of
exploitation;
these are what Marxist tradition calls
state
apparatus (S.A.). However, violence,
with its
disrupting effects,
is
always
a last resort.
Parallel to state
apparatus
must exist what Althusser
(1971:142)
calls
ideological
state
apparatus (I.S.A.):
educational
I.S.A., religious I.S.A.,
communications I.S.A.
(T.V., radio,
press, etc.),
cultural I.S.A.
(leisure, sports, arts, etc.).
Each distinct I.S.A. functions
independently
of the others.
Meanwhile,
in their
respective autonomy,
and at their
respective
level and form of
intercession, they
all aim to "educate"
differentially
the diverse
types
of
agents required
for the relation of
exploitation (workers, foremen, engineers,
technicians,
theoreticians of labor
management, etc.,
in the case of
capitalism).
The main function of the
ideological
state
apparatus
is to
justify
the relations of
production,
however
"unjust"
or "unnatural"
they may
be.
They
"educate" in such a
way
that the outcome is the
production
of the
very types
of
agents who, depending
on each
other's
specialized knowledge,
must work
together
and thus
reproduce
the structure of the
economic basis. Yet it must be said that this whole
process
of differential education is not
without contradiction and
discrepancies.
In
contrast,
state
apparatus (government,
adminis-
tration, army, police, courts, prisons) operate
in more coherent manner.
By
inducement and
by
coercion
they
reinforce the
reproduction
of the economic structure when
ideological
apparatus
have failed in their "educational" mission.
The above-mentioned I.S.A.
are, as a whole, particular
to the
capitalist
mode of
production.
In the feudal system,
for
example, religion, education, and most of "literature"
and "theater," etc., were
integrated
into a
single ideological state apparatus,
the Church. The
other ideological
state
apparatus-the family (which played
a far more
important
role than
within
capitalism),
the estates general,
the
parliament,
the leagues,
the
system
of free
communes. the merchants' and bankers' ~uilds. and the iournevmen's association-were in
Legros]
their
functioning
more or less dominated
by
the Church I.S.A.
Hence, apparatus
such as
law,
courts, religion,
and educational
systems, may very
well
appear
undifferentiated in the
superstructures
of other modes of
production,
and in each
case,
it is
indispensible
to break
down the
superstructural
order into its
particular
concrete institutions.
In
fact,
Marx
may
have been the first social scientist to be aware of this
problem.
As he
explained
at
length (1970:205-214), categories
like
labor, law, production,
etc. are
fully
valid
only
within the most "modern" societies where
they express recognized
relations. The
fact that these
categories apply analytically
in societies in which
they
are not so
recognized
leaves the historian and
anthropologist
with the task of
explaining why they
are not to be
found as
recognized concepts
in these other societies.
HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF A MODE OF PRODUCTION: CHANCE AND NECESSITY
Marx's thesis of the determination of the
superstructures by
the economic base bears
only
on the internal
relationships
between the
components
of a mode
already constituted;
it
remains to be outlined how Marx conceives the historical formation of a mode of
production.
This can best be done
by examining
how he
analysed
the rise of the
capitalist
mode of
production.
In Das
Kapital
and the Grundrisse Marx criticizes classical
economy
which
presents
capitalism
as the result of
"savings"
made before
capitalism
ever existed.
According
to the
myth
of
bourgeois economy
some
groups
are said to have
accumulated, through
their
personal industry
and their
personal productivity, enough money
to be advanced in the form
of
wages
and means of
production.
Once this
process
was
started,
accumulation snowballed.
Marx
regarded
this
interpretation
as an a
posteriori justification.
As he insists
(1973:498-499, 506-510),
the
capitalist
mode of
production requires
two main conditions:
monetary capital and,
more
important,
the
possibility
of
hiring
workers for
wages and,
therefore,
the
availability
of labor to be
exploited
in this form. If merchants'
capital
had
been the
only
condition for the
development
of
capitalism,
Rome and
Byzantium
would
have become
capitalist (cf.
Marx
1973:506, passim). Capitalism
was the result of two
independent
historical
processes
that delivered
simultaneously
the two
requisites
of
capitalist
production
to Western
Europe
and that marked the "end" of its feudal
"period."
The
presence
of a number of "free" workers was
mainly
the result of
agrarian
transformations
from within the feudal mode of
production (cf.
Marx
1967:I, 717-733).
It
produced
a mass which was free in a double
sense, free from
relations
of clientship, bondage
and
servitude,
and
secondly
free of all
belongings
and
possessions.
..
; dependent
on the sale
of its labor
capacity
or on
begging, vagabondage
and
robbery
as its
only
source of income
[Marx 1973:507; emphasis added].
On the other
hand,
accumulated
money
was the
product
of activities external to the feudal
mode of
production (cf. Marx, 1967:I, 713-716, 742-744, 750-760, 765-774;
1967:III,
323-337, 593-613, 782-813).
One has to remember the Church's
opposition
to
usury
and the
fact that the Church was the dominant
ideological apparatus
within the feudal mode of
production. Usury,
merchants'
capital, developed
at the
fringe
of feudalism.
"Usury,
like
commerce, exploits
a
given
mode of
production.
It does not create
it,
but is related to it
outwardly" (Marx 1967:III, 609-610, emphasis added).
Merchants'
capital
found an
element, dispossessed peasants, given by
an external mode of
production (feudalism)
which
permitted
it to form the base of a new mode of
production.
As soon as, and wherever, merchants' capital
found this element, no matter how limited the
scale, at once and
wholly,
their combination constituted a
capitalist
mode of
production.
However, (and this is not
contradictory),
for two or three centuries, capitalism
did not
bring
any significant
innovation within the
technological
level.
Capitalists
left the
producers
to
work with the same tools
(cf.
Marx
1967:III, 332-337, 1973:508-509).
[79,1977
The
original
historical forms in which
capital appears
at first
sporadically
or
locally,
alongside
the old modes
[note
the
plural]
of
production,
while
exploding
them little
by
little
everywhere
is on one side
manufacture proper (not yet
the
factory).... (Marx
1973:510).
Even with
manufacture,
the
process
of labor remained skilled labor. Use-values were the
results of assembled serial
products,
but each serial
product
itself was the
product
of a
craftsman. It was
only
when machines were introduced
(19th century
industrial
revolution)
that the function of labor
power
was
displaced
and that individuals were in a
technological
sense
dispossessed
of the means of labor of
society (cf.
Althusser and Balibar
1970).
Independent
craftsmen's
production
could no
longer compete
with most industrial
products.
Producers,
as
individuals,
were then
separated
from socialized
production
in two
ways:
technically
and
socially (in
the
capitalist system
the
major
means of
production
of
society
is
the
property
of the
capitalist class).
This
implies that,
at the
beginning,
the subordination of
labor
power
to
capital
was
only
formal and had to be
directly
enforced
by
law and the state.
With his
wages,
the
dispossessed peasant
or craftsman still could have accumulated
enough
to
start
independent production. Necessary
tools were as
yet very simple,
and his
production
would still have been
socially
worthwhile.
Thus,
at the
very
dawn of
capitalism,
there was a need for a forceful intervention from
the
superstructural
level. The
capitalist
class at its
emergence
"needed" and used the
power
of the state to
"regulate" wages
and to
keep
the laborer himself in the "normal"
degree
of
dependency. Peasants,
who in the 15th
century
were
dragged
from their accustomed mode
of
life,
could not
instantly adapt
themselves to the
discipline
and rate of
exploitation
of
capitalist production. They
chose first to become
beggars
and
vagabonds.
". ..
[they]
were
drawn off this road
by gallows,
stocks and
whippings,
onto the narrow
path
to the labour
market.....
" (Marx 1973:507).
Hence,
at the end of the 15th
century
and
during
the whole of the 16th
century,
the
bloody legislation against vagabondage (Marx 1967:1, 264-277, 734-741)!
Under Edward
VI,
according
to a statute of
1547,
all
persons
had the
right
to take
away
the children of
vagabonds
and to
keep
them as
apprentices.
If
they
ran
away,
these children were to become
the slaves of their
masters,
who could
put
them in irons. The
parents'
fate was not
any
better. From the same
statutes,
it follows that if
any beggar
or
vagabond
refuses to
work,
he shall be condemned as a slave to the
person
who has denounced him
as an idler. The master shall feed his slave on bread and
water,
weak broth and such refuse
meat as he thinks fit. He has the
right
to force him to do
any work,
no matter how
disgusting,
with
whip
and chains. If the slave is absent a
fortnight,
he is condemned to
slavery
for life and is to be branded on forehead or back with the letter
S;
if he runs
away
thrice,
he is to be executed as a felon. The master can sell
him, bequeath him,
let him out
on hire as a
slave, just
as
any
other
personal
chattel or cattle. If the slaves
attempt
anything against
the
masters, they
are also to be executed. Justices of the
peace,
on
information,
are to hunt the rascals down.... Thus were the
agricultural people
first
forceably expropriated
from the
soil,
driven from their
homes,
turned into
vagabonds,
and then
whipped, branded,
tortured
by
law
grotesquely terrible,
into the
discipline
necessary
to the
wage system [Marx 1967:I, 735].
Yet this is
only
one extract of one statute. In
England,
as one
example,
this
legislation
was
perfected many
times under Elizabeth and James
I.
Some of these statutes remained
legally
binding
until the
beginning
of the 18th
century (cf.
Marx
1967:734-741, 264-277). Capital
and "free" workers were not
brought together by
a natural evolution.
They
were "united"
by legislative
means.
These methods depend in part on brute force, e.g., the colonial system. But they all
employ the power
of the State, the concentrated and organised force of
society, to
hasten, hot-house fashion, the process
of transformation of the feudal mode of
production into the
capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. Force is the midwife
of every society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power [Marx 1967:I,
751].
Legros]
This is not a
recapitulation
of
Diihring's
theses.
Engles (1972:176-203)
insisted that nei-
ther Marx nor himself were
treating
the role of violence in
history
as a matter of individual
will. To be
socially
effective collective violence must rest on an economic base. In
France,
the
capitalist
class had to resort to the means of the feudal state
through
the monarchical
apparatus.
As a result of its "alliance" with the
bourgeoisie,
from an initial status of
primus
inter
pares
in the Middle
Ages,
crowned
lineages acquired
the status of absolute
monarchy.
The
monarchy provided
the
bourgeoisie
with all the
it needed in
order to establish a new
way
of
producing.
The
monarchy
articulated the
expropriation
of
the
peasants by
the
nobility
to the needs of the
bourgeois
class
(for
the role of the
monarchy
in
England,
see Marx
1973:506-507).
This does not at all
imply
that
capitalism ineluctably
had to follow feudalism. There is no fate in
history, only
constraints.
This,
at
least,
is Marx's
conclusion of his case
study
of
capitalism (cf.
also his "Letters to Vera
Zassoulitch,
March
8,
1881,"
Marx and
Engels 1970:III, 152-161).
Marx conceived of the
appearance
of the
capitalist
mode of
producing
as a
find,
an historical
discovery.
The conditions
capitalism
required
were
given by
the
feudal
social
formation,
but the feudal mode of
production
alone
could not have led to
capitalism.
Once the
required
elements for the new structure were
found, they
were
put together by
force. "We make our
history ourselves, but,
in the first
place,
under
very
definite
assumptions
and conditions"
("Engels
to
Bloch, September 21,
1890,"
Marx and
Engels 1970:III, 487, emphasis added).
A new mode of
production
can be
organized
as soon as the social
preconditions
it
requires exist,
and then new
developments may
occur in the
technology
of
production
on
the basis of what the new social order renders feasible
(cf.
Marx
1967:I, 761-764).
It is not
Marx who is wedded to the thesis that
evolutionary changes
are
essentially responses
to
initial
changes
in the mode of
exploitation
or the subsistence
activities,
but cultural
evolutionists. Marvin Harris'
presentation (1968:217-249)
of Marx's work as a contribution
to cultural evolutionism is
quite revealing.
It is an unfortunate
paradox
because Harris is one
of the few American cultural
evolutionists,
if not the
only one,
who has
explicitly
defended
the relevance of Marx's
work,
and
this,
in a hostile
political
and cultural environment.
Harris
regards
as
confusing
the fact that in Marx's
analysis
"the transition to
capitalism
is
supposed
to occur as a result of the
organisation
of the craft and merchant
guilds,"
and "the
transformation of feudalism into
capitalism"
is not related to
changes
in the
technology
of
production (1968:232-233).
This leads
him, then,
to
express
a "disinterest in the
attempt
to
find out
precisely
what Marx and
Engels
intended
by
the
phrase
'mode of
production'
"
(1968:233). Consequently,
Harris recommends that for theoretical
purposes
Marx's
peculiar
analysis
of
capitalism
be set aside and that we focus on the "Preface" to the
Critique of
Political
Economy
which is not committed to the
explanation
of
any
sociocultural
type,
but
sets forth
general
Marxist
principles.
From this text he summarizes Marx's
position
as
follows:
The
major ingredients
in
... [Marx
and
Engels'
"law" of cultural
evolution]
in
retrospect
may
be seen as:
(1)
the trisection of sociocultural
systems
into techno-economic
base,
social
organization,
and
ideology; (2)
the
explanation
of
ideology
and social
organization
as
adaptive responses
to techno-economic
conditions; (3)
the formulation of a
functionalist model
providing
for interactive effects between all
parts
of the
system; (4)
the
provision
for
analysis
of both
system-maintaining
the
system-destroying variables;
and, (5)
the
pre-eminence
of culture over race
[Harris
1968:240
].
Though
this is a
secondary point,
it must be stated that Harris is not correct in
writing
that for Marx the transition to
capitalism
is
supposed
to occur as a result of the
organization
of craft and merchants'
guilds.
For
Marx,
Manufacture seized hold initially not of the so-called urban trades, but of the rural
secondary occupations, spinning and weaving, the two which least requires guild-level
skills, technical training. [Manufacture] takes up its first residence not in the cities, but
on the land, in villages lacking guilds, etc. The rural subsidiary occupations have the broad
[79,1977
basis
(characteristic)
of
manufactures,
while the urban trades demand
great progress
in
production
before
they
can be conducted in
factory style [Marx 1973:511].
A most crucial
problem
is Harris'
summary
of Marx's "law" of cultural evolution. This
"law"
provides
for
only
two
possible types
of
explanation
of
evolutionary processes: (1)
from
within,
transformation of a
system
into another as a result of the
system-destroying
variables; (2) adaptation
of
ideology
and social
organization
in
response
to techno-economic
changes.
The
system-destroying
variables
explanation
is the familiar
interpretation
of
evolutionary change according
to which the techno-economic base of culture
changes
more
rapidly
than its social
organization
and
ideology.
This
brings
about a
disconformity
between
the
two, leading
to a violent
collapse
of the whole
system
and to the constitution of a new
system by readjustive
functional
changes. Although
this is
only implicit
in Harris'
formula,
it
is made clear in his section on Marxist diachronic causal functionalism
(Harris
1968:235-236),
and is rendered evident
by
his distress at Marx's failure to relate the rise of
capitalism
to
changes
in the
technology
of
production (1968:232-233).
For
Marx, however,
we have seen that cultural evolution cannot be viewed in terms of a
self-transformation
of one mode of
production
into another one. The
internally
destructive
contradictions of a mode of
production
cannot transform the mode into another one.
They
can
only
lead to its
disintegration.
Marx is
very
clear on this
question,
in the
preparatory
texts to Das
Kapital
and in
Capital.
After a
description
of the
process
of the
dispossession
of
the
peasants during
the feudal
period,
he concludes:
These
are, now,
on one
side,
historic
presuppositions
needed before the worker can be
found as a free
worker,
as
objectless, purely subjective
labour
capacity confronting
the
objective
conditions of
production
as his
not-property,
as alien
property,
as value for
itself,
as
capital.
But the
question arises,
on the other
side,
which conditions are
required
so that he finds himself
up against
a
capital [Marx 1973:493]?
[On
the other hand Merchant's
capital]
is
incapable by
itself of
promoting
and
explaining
the transition from one mode of
production
to another
(Marx 1967:111, 327).
Under Asian
forms, usury
can continue a
long time,
without
producing anything
more
than economic
decay
and
political corruption. Only
where and when the other
prerequisites of capitalist production
are
present
does
usury
become one
of
the means
assisting
in the establishment of a new mode of
production.... [Marx 1967:III, 597;
emphasis added].
The same
point
is made over and over
(cf.
Marx
1973:506-507, 1967:I, 713-716, 742-743,
1967:III, 325-327).
It is
perfectly
true that the "Preface" to the
Critique of
Political
Economy supports
Harris' formula. But this holds
only
if the rest of Marx's work is brushed aside-a fact of
which Harris is
aware,
and about which he is
fully explicit (Harris 1968:241).
His
procedure
is
debatable,
however. The
Critique of
Political
Economy
and its "Preface" were a mere
curtain-raiser to Marx's main
work,
Das
Kapital:
Kritik der Politischen
Oeconomie.
The
Critique of
Political
Economy, published
in
1859,
was
presented by
Marx as the first section
of the first book of a
larger study.
But this first section was
published
unfinished. At the
end,
Marx announced a third
chapter
that would conclude it
(1970:187,
n.
1).
The
project
was never achieved under this
planned
form.
Instead,
Marx wrote Das
Kapital
in which
Kritik der Politischen Oeconomie became a mere subtitle and was even deleted from the
French
translation, entirely
revised
by
him
(1872-75).
The Critique was
entirely
rewritten and most of its content embodied in Das Kapital in
the first
chapter.3
The famous 1859 "Preface",
where Marx had defined the "dialectic" of
the
"correspondence
and
non-correspondence"
between the
productive
forces and the
relations of
production,
had been
explicitly presented by
him as the results of his "critical
re-examination of
Hegel's Philosophy of Law"
(Marx 1970:20).
This
profoundly Hegelian-
evolutionist "Preface" did not
reappear
in
Capital, neither in form nor in
content, despite
Legros ]
the initial
importance
that Marx had attached to it in 1859. This reminder is
necessary
in
order to delineate where the "Preface" stands in Marx's work.
The trouble with Harris'
procedure
is not that he decided in favor of a text which is
Hegelian.
The
problem
is
simpler:
should the
glitter,
the
rapid formula,
and the bold strokes
of a 68-line text on evolution
prevail
over the results of an exhaustive
analysis
of data
(Das
Kapital
and its
preparatory manuscripts)?
CONCLUSION
Marx's
analysis
indicates that in the case of
capitalism,
the constitution of a new mode of
production-or
world
stage
of evolution-was the result of two unrelated
phenomena
(today's
Marxist historians would
say:
"of at least two unrelated
phenomena";
cf. Vidal
1956): monetary capital
and
expropriation
of
peasants.
Their
"synthesis,"
which was the
basis of the new
mode,
was achieved thanks to the most brutal violence. There was no
technological imperative.
It does indicate that there
may
be no
technological necessity
in
cultural evolution.
Technological
or
population growth may
have been as much the
upshot
of "innovation" in the social order as the result of unconscious or natural
processes (cf.
Cowgill 1975; Legros 1976).
For
instance,
in the
early
Middle
Ages
low
population,
low
production,
and low
consumption
were a vicious
cycle.
Not without
reason,
monks tended
to
postulate
a dense rural
population
as a
prime
mover
(cf. Lopez 1971:27, 30).
At the same
time,
Marx's
analysis provides
the
concepts
that render
possible
the
formulation of
why,
and in what
respect,
each
society
has to be treated as an irreducible
specificity (a "rediscovery"
of Boas' cultural
relativism;
relativism for which Boas
unfortunately provided
no
theory).
From the Marxist
point
of
view,
one can
explain,
for
example, why France, Germany,
and
England
are each
unique
social formations
despite
the
fact that all three are dominated
by
the
capitalist
mode of
production.
One identical mode
can be
present
and dominant in different social formations but in each case
may
be
respectively
articulated with other
modes,
or
may
be
placed
in a different
type
of
relationship
to them. In this
example
the three social formations must be considered with
their
particular
"zones of
influence," colonies, neocolonies,
and internal
"underdeveloped"
or "backward"
provinces.
As a
result,
a
given
mode of
production
can never
appear
in a
"pure"
form. In its concrete
actuality,
it is
always altered, adapted
to the
exigencies
or constraints of the social
environment where it functions. From
society
to
society
the same mode of
production-the
same from the
standpoint
of its basic
structure-may
show numerous variations in
appearance
which can be ascertained
solely by analysis
of the
empirically given
cir-
cumstances
(cf.
Marx
1967:III, 791-792). Hence,
it is essential to realize that the mode of
production is,
in
itself,
an abstract
object.
An
understanding
of
it,
as
such,
is nevertheless
necessary
in order to
analyze
its concrete effects in a
given
social formation.
To unravel the nodal structure of an
empirically
distinct
type
of
organization,
which
appears
under various altered
forms,
is to construct the
theory
of a
given
mode of
production.
For
example,
the
presence
of a
potlatch complex
in several societies
may
indicate the existence of one
particular
mode which crosscuts these societies. A contrasted
analysis
of the "variations in
appearance"
can be made in order to ascertain what is essential
and what is
secondary
to the
structure;
what is the
general type ("Idealer
Durchschnitt" or
"Allgemeiner Typus")
and what is local coloration. The same "variations in
appearance"
may
also be
analyzed
in terms of what causes them. Thus, they
can serve as
guides
in the
elucidation of what are the modes of
production which, in each
society, modify
in a
specific
form the mode of
production
under
study. (Of course, this does not deal with
every aspect
of Marx's
methodology.)
Our
knowledge
of the modes of
production
that marked human
history
is indeed small.
[79,1977
Marx
produced
the
theory
of the
capitalist
mode of
production,
but his
concept
of an
"Asiatic mode of
production"
seems to have been a scientific
faux pas (cf.
Godelier
1973;
Silverberg
and
Silverberg 1975).
Brunner's
papers
on the feudal mode of
production (1894)
and Bloch's two volumes
(1960)
still offer the best constructs for this mode.
Incidentally,
it is
interesting
to note that
technology
did not
play
a seminal role in the
rise of feudalism-no more than it did with
capitalism! Certainly,
historians have insisted
upon
the
importance
of the
"discovery"
of the
stirrup (cf. Lynn
White
1964);
but it is not a
disconformity
between this
technological
innovation and the old social order which
produced
an
abrupt
transformation of
part
of the
society
into a feudal structure. Put
simply,
for some
historians,
what led to this social innovation were
politico-military
decisions of
Martel, Carloman,
and
Pepin
to
put
the
stirrup
into use and to transform their armies into
armies of mounted
fighters.
As the
expenses
of
maintaining large
number of war-horses were
great,
"the ancient custom of
swearing allegiance
to a leader
(vassalage)
was fused with the
granting
of an estate
(benefice),
and the result was feudalism"
(Lynn
White
1964:5).
In
order to endow their
cavalry,
Martel and his immediate successors
simply
distributed vast
tracts of land
forcefully
seized from the Church. In
truth,
the rise of feudalism has been far
more
complex
than what one
may
summarize in a few lines. But once
again,
we should
note,
violence came from authorities in
power making history
themselves under
very
definite
conditions. Without these
political decisions,
the
stirrup
would be classed for what it is: a
minor
"discovery"
which renders horseback
riding
more stable
by giving
lateral
support
in
addition to the front and back
support
offered
by pommel
and cantle. While the
stirrup
has
been discovered or rediscovered
by
other
peoples,
feudalism has been
essentially
a
European
find.
In addition to
capitalism
and
feudalism,
our
knowledge
includes
only partial
elements of
theory: Terray (1972), Rey (1971, 1973),
Meillassoux
(1964),
and Sahlins
(1960b)
on a
lineage mode;
Mauss
(1968)
on two unnamed modes
among
the
Eskimos;
Sahlins
(1972)
on
one domestic mode of
production,
etc.
Many
economic
types
of
organization
have been
empirically
discerned
by anthropologists,
but our work
by
and
large
has remained at the
stage
of
monographic description
and classification. None of the societies of which we know
can be
regarded
as
primitive
in the sense of
being
the
primeval type
of human
society.
Rather, they
are
products
of
long processes
of transformations and we
may anticipate
that
vestiges
of
past "stages"
"stain" their
respective
cores.
Thus,
to
provide
the abstract construct of each
type
of
organization
that has been
discerned
may prove
to be as
complicated
an endeavor as Marx's
analysis
of
capitalism.
No
doubt some of our
present categories
will reveal themselves as
having
been mere
mirages,
as
Fried
(1975) suggested
for the so-called tribal mode of
production.
A critical examination of
our
vague empirical categories (foraging economy,
redistributive
system, tribe, etc.)
is a
necessary step
toward
defining
the different
preindustrial
modes of
production.
General
evolution can be elucidated
only
if the
fundamental requisites
of each mode of
production
have been
ascertained;
for to find the
"origins"
of a mode of
production
X is to discover or
to reconstruct the historical occurrences in which the
requisites
of X
appeared together
at
the same time.
The
concept
of mode of
production,
in the theoretical framework in which Marx uses
it,
constitutes a
discriminating
criterion for a science of
history.
It allows us to construct an
evolutionary sequence
in terms of a succession of modes of
production,
but renders
purposeless
the classification of societies in terms of
general
evolution. With Marxism, what
is at stake is not a classification of societies, but an
understanding
of the
specificity
of each
actual concrete
society
as a
unique synthesis
of heterogeneous modes of
production.
In one
social formation, certain modes would
necessarily
have to be classified into one level of
evolution and others into another. This constitutes a reversal of cultural evolutionism.
Marxism certainly offers fewer definitive answers than cultural evolutionism does. It is. in
Legros ]
fact,
closer to the modern
conception
of
biological
evolution in which the
concept
of chance
has become as crucial as the
concept
of
necessity (cf.
Monod
1971).
I use the word "chance"
deliberately
for its
connotation, although
its
ideological weight
is
certainly
not sufficient to counterbalance the mechanist
interpretation
to which Marx's
work has been
subjected. Yet,
as
Piaget pointed
out
(1971:30-31)
in relation to Monod's
work,
chance as such is not
explanatory. Using Waddington's
models and those for which
Monod received his Nobel
prize, Piaget
indicates how Monod could have elaborated further
on the content and the
signification
of chance in
biological
evolution.
My point
is that with
Marxism,
we are far from
having
means of this nature to substantiate what is "chance" in
history. Nonetheless,
one of the interests of Marx's work as
compared
to the theoretical
framework of cultural
evolutionism,
is that it
provides
the
concepts
that allow one to
delineate and to set forward the
very problem
of an historical chance.
NOTES
Acknowledgments.
This is a revised version of a
paper presented
in the
symposium,
"The
Mode of Production: Method and
Theory,"
at the 141st Annual
Meeting
of
the
American
Association for the Advancement of
Science,
New
York,
26-31
January,
1975.
I wish to
express my gratitude
to those who have
encouraged me,
criticised
me,
and
advised me in the course of this work: David F.
Aberle,
David
Feingold,
Marvin
Harris,
Edmund R.
Leach,
Michael D.
Lieber, Margaret MacKenzie,
Judith R.
Shapiro,
James
Silverberg,
Paul M.
Sweezy,
and Eric R. Wolf. Also
my
thanks
go
to
Cheryl
Leif and
Betsy
Traube,
who were more than
patient
in
convincing
me that
my "English"
was
merely
awful
rather than
idiosyncratic.
Marvin Harris'
strong
criticisms stimulated me to formulate
my
disagreements
more
clearly
in those areas where our
positions diverge.
For
example,
his
objections
to
my
use of a
category
such as chance
(which
can or could have been
interpreted
as a
"bourgeois"
historical
relativism) prompted
me to
clarify
the actual issues involved in
the last
paragraph
of the
present
version of the
paper.
Readers familiar with Marxist
epistemology
will
recognize my
indebtedness to the
pioneering
work of Louis Althusser and his students.
1
In this
paper my
intention is
only
to delineate the
place
and function of the
concept
of
mode of
production
in Marx's
theory
of
society
and evolution. I do not
attempt
at all to
offer a formal definition of the
concept.
This definition can be found in Althusser and
Balibar
(1970); Terray (1972)
and
Rey (1971) give examples
of how this
concept may
be
used in the context of
noncapitalist production
structures.
2To premise that different modes
may
coexist in one
society together
with their
respective superstructures
entails neither that it must
always
be
so,
nor that at one
given
time a social formation
might
not be made of
only
elements of several modes of
production.
At times of
transition,
some modes
may
remain more or less intact while others
may
be
represented solely by
one or a few of their
components.
Modes of
production
often exist
only
in altered forms. This
being
so a cross-societal
comparative
work is almost
always
deemed
necessary
in order to
produce
the abstract
concept
of a
given
mode. In one
society,
the
ideological component
of the mode
may
have been conserved and in another it
may
survive
only
in the form of its economic features
(for
further details
cf. Legros
and
Copans
1976).
3Later,
in
1873,
in the Afterword to the second edition of
Capital,
Marx admitted that
this
chapter
was not
entirely clear, recognizing
that he had
"coquetted
with the modes of
expression peculiar
to
[Hegel]."
His intention had been to have
"openly
avowed
[himself]
the
pupil
of that
mighty
thinker" who was treated as a "dead
dog" by
"cultured
Germany"
at the
period
Marx was
writing (Marx 1967:I, 12, 19-20).
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Submitted 22 July 1975
Revision submitted 17 December 1975
Accepted 9 July 1976
Final revisions received 8 October 1976

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Chance, Necessity, and Mode of Production: A Marxist Critique of Cultural Evolutionism

Author(s): Dominique Legros

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