Contemporary

Disaster
Management:
Lessons Learned
from Fukushima
(So Far)
Akira Nakamura is professor emeritus
and director of the Research Center for
Crisis and Contingency Management at
Meiji University in Tokyo. He was both
vice president and dean of the graduate
school of the university until 2008. He
is the incumbent president of the Asian
Association for Public Administration and
vice president of the International Institute
of Administrative Sciences.
E-mail: nakamura@isc.meiji.ac.jp
Masao Kikuchi is an associate professor
of public policy and management in the
School of Business Administration at Meiji
University in Tokyo. Previously, he was a re-
search fellow at the Institute of Administra-
tive Management and a research associate
at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade
and Industry.
E-mail: kms@kisc.meiji.ac.jp
Triple Disasters and the Fukushima Nuclear Fiasco in Japan 893
Akira Nakamura
Masao Kikuchi
Meiji University
Japan is the only country to suer twice from the
terrible consequences of atomic bombs. Hiroshima and
Nagasaki are renowned internationally for experiencing
the rst twin devastating nuclear attacks in history.
Unfortunately, Japan has witnessed several other serious
nuclear-related disasters in recent years. Te much-
publicized Fukushima disaster in 2011 is one of them.
How could such a serious accident occur in a modern,
highly sensitive, nuclear-conscious country? Te answer
to that central question is complex, involving not only
political and administrative issues but also technical
and human dimensions. In retrospect, both government
o cials and private industry were far too lax with
the operation and development of nuclear policies and
facilities. Te Fukushima debacle was the result of a lack
of rigorous management and control of nuclear issues by
both public authorities and private industry.
M
any Japanese have claimed that Japan is the
only country to be exposed twice to atomic
bombs. True to this assertion, two cities,
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are internationally recog-
nized as having experienced the rst nuclear attacks
in history. Consequently, each year, on August 6 and
9, the anniversaries of those bombings, people from
around the globe ock to these cities and publicly
pledge to have No more Hiroshima and No more
Nagasaki. Tese calls are impressive antinuclear gath-
erings, reported live on television for the rest of the
country every summer.
However, Japan has experienced
several of its own serious nuclear-
related disasters. In 1978, the
currently troubled Fukushima
reactor malfunctioned and
leaked radioactive substances.
For about seven hours, one reac-
tor triggered a chain reaction in
which nuclear rods reached a
condition of criticality (TEPCO
2007, 11828). In 1989, at
the same Fukushima plant, the
water cooling system broke down, spewing nuclear
particles into the atmosphere (Nuclear Safety Com-
mission of Japan 1992). Tis mishap was designated
a Level 2 event according to international accident
criteria. In 1999, a semipublic nuclear reprocessing
corporation, JCO, precipitated a major accident when
plant workers accidentally spilled highly enriched
nuclear fuel, killing two employees and exposing more
than 600 plant workers to serious levels of radiation
(Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan 2000).
Tis list, regrettably, could be more extensive; however,
until recently, such accidents were not public knowl-
edge, for various reasons. As this and other incidents
demonstrate, both government o cials and private
companies involved in the operation and develop-
ment of nuclear energy seem to be too lax in dealing
with nuclear issues and facilities. Te current ongoing
Fukushima disaster appears to be a result of this lack
of rigorous management and control of nuclear issues
on the part of both public authorities and private
industry. Tus, at present, if conditions continue in
the northern part of the country, the region called
Fukushima may well become the third name to be
remembered as the site of a nuclear tragedy in Japan.
How could a serious accident such as the Fukushima
asco occur in a modern, nuclear-conscious coun-
try? Te answer to this central question is complex,
involving not only political and administrative issues
but also technical and human
dimensions. Against this back-
ground, and even as the crisis
continues, this short paper tries
to outline the probable reasons
for the Fukushima disaster from
a number of dierent perspec-
tives.
A word of caution is in order at
this point, however: Tis paper
is not intended to be country
specic, but rather thematic and
What We Know, and What We Have Not Yet Learned: Triple
Disasters and the Fukushima Nuclear Fiasco in Japan
How could a serious accident
such as the Fukushima asco
occur in a modern, nuclear-
conscious country? Te answer
to this central question is
complex, involving not only
political and administrative
issues but also technical and
human dimensions.
894 Public Administration Review November | December 2011
wrong, the nuclear plants would be able to absorb any potential
hazards. Teir condence in Japans nuclear reactors often was
reected in their media releases. Various publications and television
commercials frequently tried to convince the public that Japanese
nuclear reactors were safe and secure. In fact, for a long time, the
electric rms have encouraged the public to convert their house-
holds entirely to electricity in lieu of using natural gas. According to
the advertisements, the companies would extend big discounts on
monthly bills to these families.
However, to the shock and distress of government o cials and
private rms, the earthquake and subsequent tsunami that hit the
northern part of Japan on March 11, 2011, knocked down the nu-
clear power plants owned and operated by the Tokyo Electric Power
Company (TEPCO) in Fukushima. Consequently, four nuclear ves-
sels in the Fukushima plant remain in serious trouble as of this writ-
ing, and there is little hope of any recovery from this accident very
soon. Indeed, current estimates suggest that a complete recovery of
the vessels could take several months, if not years. Tis is because
the tsunami cut o all electricity to the facility, so that it is unable to
cool down the nuclear pellets. Tis resulted in the meltdown of nu-
clear fuel rods in three of the vessels, producing radioactive particles
that spread into the air and sea.
Before the accident, TEPCO had emphasized that, in both design
and operation, its nuclear generators were absolutely fail safe. Te
rm claimed that the facility was completely earthquake resistant;
in its assessment, the reactors would be able to withstand a major
tremoreven more severe than the one that hit the city of Kobe in
1995 (TEPCO 2011). Te rm also stressed that the vessels would
be able to bear high tides and any tsunami as strong as the one that
engulfed the area in 1960 following a major earthquake in Chile.
Te 6-meter-high tsunami that originated in Chile that year killed
142 Japanese living in the same region that was overwhelmed by
the mammoth wave in 2011 (Geographical Survey Institute 1961,
1100; U.S. Geological Survey 2005, 116).
In order to prove its claim, TEPCO recounted how it had installed
at least ve layers of protective devices in the nuclear reactor. Te
company demonstrated that the nuclear pellets were shielded
securely by a heavy metal container, and the container was further
protected by a meter-thick metal wall. TEPCO further noted that
relevant to cases in other democracies. However, the recent debacle
in Japan has disclosed a number of administrative and political
practices that are indigenous to Japanese culture and tradition. For
this reason, the paper may appear culturally bound and often idi-
osyncratic in argument; nonetheless, the authors attempt as much
as possible to provide a paper that is germane to the experience of
other countries with various types of nuclear equipment.
Environmental Flux and Technical Problems
Humanity already is keenly aware that radioactive substances are
lethally dangerous, and that the utmost caution is called for in deal-
ing with these dangerous compounds. As this paper will examine,
given the potentially fatal risks of developing nuclear energy, it is
ordinarily the case that a country creates a regulatory regime staed
by specialists to manage and control radioactive power genera-
tors. Te state also prepares stringent administrative frameworks to
place atomic energy generators under public scrutiny. Japan is no
exception (refer to table 1). Te government has created a variety
of monitoring agencies and put safeguards in place to ensure the
safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants (Japan Atomic
Energy Relations Organization 1996, 1637).
Nevertheless, a nuclear disaster struck the country in March 2011,
when a ferocious tsunami overtook several reactors in the Fuku-
shima Daiichi (Number One) nuclear power plant. Initially, the
general view was that the nuclear debacle had been a direct con-
sequence of the tsunami, and that the accident could not possibly
have been avoided. However, over time, a dierent perception has
emerged, and public opinion steadily has changed. Increasingly, the
public and the media believe that instead of being caused by the
tsunami alone, the Fukushima nuclear disaster was the direct result
of errors made by both the central government and the operating
rm, including human mistakes, poor designs, environmental ux,
and regulatory aws (Japan Times, May 16, 2011).
One of the most serious perceptions held by a number of concerned
citizens is that the Japanese government and industry were overcon-
dent about the safety and security of the nuclear reactors. Both
parties long had indicated that accidents such as those at Tree Mile
Island or Chernobyl never could take place in Japan. In their evalu-
ation, the Japanese reactors had been built to perfection. Govern-
ment and industry alike pointed out that, even if anything did go
Table 1 Chronology of Nuclear Energy Administration in Japan
1951 Japan signs the San Francisco Peace Treaty
1953 U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower delivers his Atoms for Peace speech before the United Nations General Assembly
1954 The Japanese government allocates the rst expenditures for nuclear energy development
December 1955 The Japanese government enacts the Basic Law of Atomic Energy Development and forms the Nuclear Committee and the Nuclear Bureau
within the prime ministers ofce
May 1956 The Japanese government transfers the Nuclear Bureau to the Science and Technology Agency
September 1959 The Japanese government establishes the Nuclear Power Generation Division within the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
July 1966 The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute initiates the rst commercial nuclear power plant at Tokai
March 1971 The Tokyo Electric Power Company begins operation of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant
January 1976 The Japanese government establishes the Nuclear Safety Bureau within the Science and Technology Agency
July 1977 The Japanese government establishes a Nuclear Power Generation Safety Division within the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
October 1978 The Japanese government reorganizes the Nuclear Committee as the Nuclear Safety Commission
November 1978 The rst critical accident occurs at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Generation Plant
September 1999 JCO discloses that the accident was a Level 4 event on the International Nuclear Event Scale
January 2001 The Japanese government moves the Nuclear Safety Commission to the Cabinet Ofce
January 2001 The Japanese government establishes the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency as a special agency under the Agency for Natural Resources and
Energy within the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
Sources: Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization (1996); Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (2010).
Triple Disasters and the Fukushima Nuclear Fiasco in Japan 895
electricity to the coolant system of the reactor. Lamentably, this
independent building directly faced the sea; the earthquake revealed
that the building was too fragile to withstand the enormous power
of the tsunami. Perhaps imagined as an inconceivable occurrence
by the original designers, the structure was knocked down, and all
electricity to the coolant system was shut o (Asahi Shimbun, April 6,
2011).
Tis mishap was followed by another serious accident. A day later,
accumulated hydrogen gas in the containment buildings exploded,
ripping the roof completely o the containment facility and, even-
tually, causing the nuclear rods to melt down. In fact, a day after
the breakdown of the plant, a press secretary in the governments
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency publicly stated that the explo-
sion had induced a critical meltdown in the nuclear vessels. Tis
secretary subsequently was reprimanded and was rumored to have
been transferred to another section. Ever since, he has disappeared
from the public eye. Te government held that his comment was
premature and misleading; instead, the cabinet secretary indicated
that no meltdown had occurred, and no leaks of lethal gas had been
detected. It was not until two months later that both the govern-
ment and the company nally corrected their previous assessment
and admitted that the meltdown had occurred right after the tsu-
nami attack (Japan Times, May 13, 2011).
Tese incidents had serious and negative consequences for the gov-
ernment in terms of public trust. Certainly, the destruction of the
nuclear vessels caused pandemonium and introduced confusion into
the decision-making process of government. Many Japanese can
understand this eect; at the same time, however, they feel that they
have been completely misled by both the government and TEPCO.
Te dissemination of accurate information to the public is funda-
mental in crisis management, but at a critical juncture, the Japanese
government did not seem to follow this basic rule. Te lack of
accountability and transparency has contributed to a decline in public
trust in both government and industry on the nuclear safety of the
country. Tis is an important lesson that the current and ongoing
tragedy can teach future leaders of the country (Cvetkocvich et al.
2002, 35967; Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort 2001, 527; Asahi
Shimbun, April 10, 2011).
Nuclear Power Village and Expanding Atomic Plants
In addition to the technical issues, several policy-making problems
have contributed to the current debacle. By its very nature, a com-
plex issue such as nuclear power, which can have a major impact on
the population, creates a public policy challenge. Because the issue
is scientic and esoteric, general policy and specic critical decisions
tend to be established by a closely knit network, limited to a few
professionals and technocrats. Consequently, the resulting nuclear
policy often adopts an exclusive, self-regulatory outlook in which
those who formulate the policies and programs are themselves
responsible for their implementation, regulation, and supervision.
In fact, this situation actually occurred in Japan: a closely knit club-
style group, dubbed the Nuclear Power Village, developed nuclear
policy. Tis village is a policy-making unit comprising government
o cials, scientists, andsignicantlyTEPCO sta members.
Te TEPCO members tend to have substantial power, even as they
frequently eschew opinions that are inimical to the growth of the
nuclear energy industry. Tis lack of impartiality, augmented by
this huge box construction was double-covered by an additional
vessel with several safety ventilators, asserting that these vents would
discharge ignitable gases should the pellet cooling system fail to
function. Finally, TEPCO stated that the entire nuclear genera-
tor was enveloped by a robust containment building. Te power
rm thus insisted that its nuclear plants were completely free of
any functional failure and operational accident (Yamaguchi 2006,
110). As a matter of fact, TEPCO continually stressed the safety of
its power plants in Japan in dierent modes and methods; however,
after the accident, the company deleted these announcements on
the Internet and elsewhere.
Tese precautionary measures, however, fell short of convincing
some concerned residents and scientists. In fact, ten years earlier,
some physicists already had expressed criticism and doubts, writing
articles pointing out that a major earthquake could cause serious
damage to the nuclear reactors (Ishibashi 1997, 72024). Eventu-
ally, these scientists joined with anxious citizens; together, they
sued Chubu Electric Power in an attempt to prevent the rm from
operating a plant in Shizuoka Prefecture, which is located on an
earthquake-prone fault. Although the legal conict received much
media attention, these antinuclear activists soon were dismayed; the
district court handed down a verdict in October 2007 that favored
the position of Chubu Electric Power. Te judgment found that
the company had prepared su cient safety and protective measures
against potential radioactive accidents. Te verdict was tantamount
to the industry receiving a positive signal to start operation of
the reactors. As a matter of fact, Japans Supreme Court never has
handed down a ruling against any power company. In retrospect,
this decision was pivotal in the development of Japans nuclear
energy program (Japanese Society for the Study of Nuclear Energy
2008). Both the national government and the electric power opera-
tors were encouraged to expand the construction of nuclear power
plants throughout the country.
In a marked contrast to Japans district court decision, Charles Per-
row (1984, 3261), emeritus professor of sociology at Yale Univer-
sity, makes several interesting observations about potential accidents
of atomic power generators. Key to his argument is the idea of
coupling. According to his theory, a nuclear reactor is made up of
a substantial number of sensitive parts, some of which are closely
interconnected; in fact, they are inextricably linked, and Perrow
contends that if this were not the case, the whole system would not
be able to function. Terefore, the malfunction of one part aects
the entire system, resulting in a major failure. Consequently, in a
complex system such as a nuclear generator, Perrow believes that
there can be no such thing as a fail-safe guarantee.
Unfortunately for the Japanese, the Fukushima disaster clearly sup-
ports Perrows hypothesis. Each component in the Fukushima plant
may have been semiperfectly designed and built: dierent units
would have been totally dependent on others in order to guarantee
the smooth operation of the power generators. However, as the
accident began to unfold, a serious design error was discovered in
the plant layouta aw that, as it turned out, was disastrous to
the security of the nuclear vessels. In an atomic generator, nuclear
pellets constantly must be kept cooled to a low temperature. For
this purpose, the Fukushima plant was provided with a separate
building adjacent to the containment structure in order to circulate
896 Public Administration Review November | December 2011
while the village has garnered approximately 13,000 million yen
(US$162 million) from central government grants over the last
three decades.
Residents in these areas usually are content with the government
program. Some of them have been able to sell their properties to
a power facility for a substantial prot; the people also enjoy such
public facilities as luxurious swimming pools and athletic gymna-
siums, in addition to centers for the elderly, all built by the local
government with the money made available by the central subsidies.
Higashi Dori, a small village located in the northernmost part of
the main island, oers an example. Te current village population
is 3,700 residents, of which 983 are 14 years of age and under. Tis
village already has opened extravagant modern elementary and jun-
ior high schools, even before construction of the reactor is initiated
(Asahi Shimbun, May 28, 2011).
Rural regions with nuclear power reactors risk becoming one-
industry towns, dependent on nancial handouts from government
and industry and thus subservient to the will of the electricity sup-
ply companies. Often, they face a dilemma: local taxes on the power
plant gradually depreciate as the equipment ages, while the cost of
running the community facilities increases. Te chief executive of
Futaba Town addressed this problem by pushing it into the future,
soliciting the construction of additional plants from the government
and the industry. As this example shows, the original acquisition of
nuclear power plants can create a vicious circlein order to sustain
local nances, rural communities resort to asking for the construc-
tion of additional dangerous facilities. Unfortunately, the residents
of Futaba, living adjacent to the Fukushima plant, had to be evacu-
ated and have been forced to live away from their homes. Tis is the
high price they are paying for having ten reactors in their town.
Several political and administrative problems also have contributed
to the present nuclear calamity in Japan. One major concern has
been a lack of oversight: the government appears to have been too
lax in its control of the electric power industry monopoly. Some
foreign observers may wonder why this is the case. Te practice
stems from administrative traditions that are unique to Japans po-
litical environment. In what might be considered a agrant conict
of interest in other democracies, in Japan, there are cases in which
retired government bureaucrats in the nuclear regulatory agencies
become employed by the electric power companies right after they
leave o ce. In order to avoid public scrutiny and restrictive regula-
tion, these o cials initially take a consultant post in an enterprise
for a few years; eventually, they move upward to become one of the
leading executives in the rm. Similarly, it was
a long-standing custom that the conservative
Liberal Democratic Party, which was in power
until 2009, received political contributions
from these power rms. Ostensibly, at least,
the power rms no longer provide direct and
open monetary contributions to the party.
However, these electric companies have nu-
merous subsidiaries, and these subcontractors
frequently formed voter mobilizing machines
for conservative candidates. In many parts of
the country, prospective candidates for national
legislative o ces often sought endorsements
the rise of a closed system of making nuclear policy, is one of the
root causes of the current debacle in Fukushima (Johnson 1982;
Okimoto 1989; Schaede 1995, 293317).
Japan has nine power companies that control the electricity sup-
ply market; they are monopoly corporations that historically have
been well protected by the central government. As of 2010, nuclear
energy accounted for 30 percent of the total power consumption in
the country. Tese nine rms operate a total of 54 nuclear reactors,
some of which are more than 40 years old and others that have dis-
closed serious defects. In fact, the problematic Fukushima Daiichi
plant began operation in 1971. As previously indicated, there have
been several fatal accidents at this plant, although TEPCO kept
some of them secret, failing to report the incidents to the regula-
tory agencies. Nonetheless, the recent expos indicates that the rm
applied for an extension of the use of the old Fukushima reactors
for another 40 years. Te application still was pending when the
disaster occurred (Japan Times, April 7, 2011).
Concerned Japanese long have contended that both the central
administration and the Liberal Democratic Party were too lenient
in managing the electric power rms. As we shall examine later, data
exist that suggest an ethically suspicious rapport between the gov-
ernment and this industry. In fact, rather than enforcing stringent
controls, the government has helped these utility enterprises facili-
tate the construction of nuclear power plants in dierent parts of
the country. Te government has plans to increase nuclear power to
more than 50 percent of Japans total energy consumption by 2030
(METI 2010, 111). To achieve this objective, the central authority
hopes to construct nine reactors by 2020 and an additional ve by
2030. As part of these programs, the government has enacted three
dierent laws, beginning in 1974, all intended to extend handsome
subsidies to local governments willing to make spare land available
for the power companies and nuclear reactors.
According to the model, any area in which a nuclear power plant
is proposed receives a total of 44,900 million yen (approximately
US$561 million) over ten years before the facility is completed.
Once the reactor begins to function, the area gets an additional
1.215 billion yen (US$1.5 trillion) over a 45-year period. To execute
the program, more than 95 percent of the national nances for the
countrys energy source development have been earmarked for the
erection of atomic power plants. Only in the last few months has
the government begun to discuss the development of other en-
ergy sources. Te money previously earmarked for nuclear energy
expansion also would be utilized to appease rural towns and villages
(Agency for Natural Resources and Energy
2009, 4; Kamata 2011).
Many rural regions with declining popula-
tions and industries nd these public hand-
outs alluring, and they actively have sought
to benet from them. In some rural areas, a
major portion of the local government budget
comes from national grants. For example, the
nancial revenue of Futaba Machi, a small
rural town that houses the Fukushima nuclear
power plant, is made up of more than 26.4
percent from dierent taxes paid by TEPCO,
Several political and
administrative problems
contributed to the present
nuclear calamity in Japan. One
major concern has been a lack
of oversight: the government
appears to have been too lax in
its control of the electric power
industry monopoly.
Triple Disasters and the Fukushima Nuclear Fiasco in Japan 897
Critical Infrastructure Protection and Fragmented Policy
Making
In addition to yielding in its relationships with the electric power
companies, the Japanese government has an ine cient, complex,
and extremely fragmented regulatory framework for dealing with
nuclear issues. Unlike the United States and other leading states,
Japan has failed to develop a centralized system of critical infrastruc-
ture protection. In the eld of crisis management, infrastructure
pertains to facilities such as nuclear power plants, major airports, gov-
ernment o ces, and so on. It suggests that the government must do
its utmost to keep the operation of these indispensable establishments
safe in the interest of national security. After 9/11, the United States
created the Department of Homeland Security as the sole agency
responsible for the protection of the countrys critical infrastructure.
Te European Union has taken similar steps designed to protect
critical infrastructure from terrorism (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security 2011).
In Japan, however, the governments approach to maintaining the
safety of nuclear plants has been extremely fragmented. One of the
most absurd aspects of this situation is the fact that the agencies that
regulate and promote the nuclear industry are under the same gov-
ernment umbrella: the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
Te Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency polices the operation of
nuclear plants, while the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy
is responsible for expanding the number of nuclear reactors in
Japan. Tis arrangement is probably inconceivable in other coun-
tries: under this format, not many people would be convinced that
the central government is serious about controlling and managing
the nuclear industry.
Adding to the di culties, Japans nuclear regulatory system is made
more complicated by the administrative milieu. Japans Nuclear
Safety Commission is supposed to perform a function similar to
that of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the United States.
Teoretically, it is an independent agency that is directly account-
able to the chief executive and a liated with the prime minis-
ters o ce, a rigorous government watchdog over nuclear issues.
However, there appear to be several critical aws. Te chair of the
committee is a professor of nuclear physics from the University of
Tokyo who has been well known for many years as a protector of the
nuclear industry. He holds a university chair endowed by TEPCO
and has been rumored to have received
substantial research grants from the industry.
When the Fukushima asco occurred, the
chair of the committee was nowhere to be
seen: in the rst critical few weeks, he did not
initiate press conferences or hold any media
interviews (Research Group of Aging Nuclear
Plants 2011, 1749).
Tis lack of leadership and fragmentation of
the regulatory system have created at least two
major problems. Te tsunami that damaged the
Fukushima radioactive vessels demonstrated
that the government has an excessive number
of decision-making centers. Tese include the
prime minister, the chief cabinet secretary, the
minister of economy, industry and trade, the
and campaign support from the power rms. Otherwise, it would
have been hard for them to win the election, especially in the rural
region. For this reason, the Liberal Democratic Party was very atten-
tive to the political interests of the major power companies. It is lit-
tle wonder, then, that government regulation was rather lax toward
the private power companies (Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 2011).
In fact, the recent disaster has helped divulge several unsavory
aspects of Japanese politics (Dauvergne 1993, 57691; Samuels
1987). Cozy relationships between the national government and
the monopoly power companies have surfaced. According to media
information, over the last 50 years, more than 68 high-ranking
o cials in the central government have taken executive positions in
one of the nine major power companies after retiring from public
service. As of 2011, thirteen former high-ranking bureaucrats were
members of the boards of directors in the power companies.
Tis postretirement job transfer, known as the Descent from
Heaven, is notorious (Colignon and Usui 2003; Schaede 1995,
293317). One member of the board of directors of TEPCO is a
former bureaucrat of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
As late as January 2011, the director general of the Natural Resourc-
es and Energy Agency became a senior consultant to TEPCO four
months after he left the government position. Under public pressure
in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster, he resigned from his post
(Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 2011).
Te close rapport between public o cials and industry also may
account for the lack of stringent regulation and supervision of the
power companies in the past. TEPCOs reactors suered a number
of troubles over the years prior to the current catastrophe. Te com-
pany concealed these accidents, often submitting false reports to the
government about safety incidents in one of their plants for a long
period of time. According to the Japan Times, the company tendered
another falsied inspection paper to the regulatory agency on March
1, 2011, ten days before the tsunami struck northern Japan. Tese
past incidents demonstrate a lack of governmental integrity and
rmness with respect to the leading power industries (Japan Times,
March 20, 2011).
Adding credence to the theory of a cozy governmentindustry
relationship is the fact that when the Fukushima disaster rst was
exposed, TEPCO sta members, rather than
representatives from the government regula-
tory agencies, held the rst press interviews
and provided information about the crisis.
Naturally, the o cial company line played
down the extent of the calamity, and initial
reports avoided using the term meltdown.
It was not until much later that the rm
publicly admitted that the meltdown of
radioactive rods had occurred just a few hours
after the tsunami knocked out the Fukushima
plant. During this time, the central govern-
ment, including the chief cabinet secretary,
only echoed information issued by the power
company. Te regulatory agencies failed to
collect independent data relative to the break-
down of the reactors in Fukushima.
[A] lack of leadership and
fragmentation of the regulatory
system have created at least two
major problems. Te tsunami
that damaged the Fukushima
radioactive vessels demonstrated
that the [Japanese] government
has an excessive number of
decision-making centers. Tis
absence of central leadership
produced the second problem:
blame avoidance.
898 Public Administration Review November | December 2011
systems that gave us life, we may all nd ourselves in the kind
of trouble visited upon Hiroshima in 1945. Te rst nuclear
powered electricity was generated in Idaho in 1951. Now
there are 442 plants worldwide, again with fallible humans
supposedly in total control. If our technology, no matter how
innovative, does not work in harmony with the systems that
gave us life, we may all nd ourselves in the kind of trouble
visited upon Japan in 2011. (Myers 2011)
No matter how carefully we prepare, an unprecedented tsunami,
earthquake, or other disaster may occur. While government and
industry must stand ready to avoid the worst-case scenario, they also
must be prepared to meet any hazards head on. Fortitude and deter-
mination are demanded of those who are in leadership positions at a
time of national crisis.
Te second lesson that the Japanese experience teaches us is that
crisis management has an important public policy dimension. From
this perspective, many people feel that the Japanese government has
been too hasty in developing and expanding the number of nuclear
plants, without su ciently considering the detriments and disadvan-
tages. As previously indicated, 95 percent of the budget for national
energy development has been directed toward the growth of nuclear
energy, with the intent to provide more than 50 percent of the
countrys energy consumption by 2030. To facilitate this objective,
the national government has dispensed subsidies and grants to several
rural regions, many of which now are nding that their initial deci-
sion to accept the funds was a mistake. In order to maintain facilities
built with government largesse, they must invite further construction
of even more reactors; otherwise, local taxes decline as a result of
equipment depreciation. Eventually, this cycle will cause local com-
munities to suer nancial collapse, unable to make ends meet.
Te bottom line of this and other problems related to the nuclear
issues has been the development of a closely knit policy-making sys-
tem at the center. Te policy domain of nuclear energy development
has witnessed the rise of self-regulatory policy management. Only a
limited few have been involved in the discussion of nuclear energy
development. Tey have tended to avoid the growth of antinuclear
public sentiments and movements. In this regard, the dominant
power rms have been quite successful in capturing both party
members and public o cials. Tis captured government would
seem to be responsible for the ongoing debacle in Fukushima.
In addition, the current problem indicates
that Japan needs a solid concept of critical
infrastructure protection. Te country should
mobilize whatever resources it controls to pro-
tect and ensure the safe and secure operation
of facilities essential for national survival. In
order to carry out this mission, the countrys
decision-making process requires a substan-
tial renovation, particularly in the culture
of complexity. As noted, in Japan, the basic
format for making critical decisions has been
fragmented, without central authority. Te
national government seems to have no focal
point for generating command power. Japans
tradition of collective and consensual decision
director of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, TEPCO, and so
on. Te incumbent government cabinet in Japan seems to lack forti-
tude and determination: the chief executive failed to coordinate and
create a unied message. In fact, at the critical moment, it appeared
as if TEPCO was at the center of critical decision making. Eventu-
ally, the prime minister started to screen all decisions in his o ce.
Nonetheless, centralization around the prime minister overwhelmed
his personal capacity, which led to further delays in delivering critical
decisions from the center (Asahi Shimbun, April 10, 2011).
Tis absence of central leadership produced the second problem:
blame avoidance (Hood 2011). When the fallout at the Fukushima
plant was disclosed, the government had to issue a number of evacu-
ation instructions to the residents. Te government instructions
fell into three categories. Te rst was a no entry zone, covering
the area within 20 kilometers of the power plant. Being close to
the nuclear plant, the region potentially is contaminated; therefore,
nobody is allowed within that zone, and violators are subject to
penalties. Te second, labeled the evacuation zone, comprises areas
located between 20 and 30 kilometers from the accident site. Avoid-
ing this district is not legally binding; the government encourages
residents to leave the area but does not require them to do so. In
fact, some have stayed in this zone, while others have followed the
government instructions. Te third tier is called the stand ready
zone. Although it is outside the 30-kilometer connes, the area has
a possibility of nuclear particle fallout. Should this happen, residents
would be required to leave the district.
Tree zones having been designated, the central question still
remains: who enforces these area classications? Because there seems
to be no central command post to implement decisions and issue
instructions, the central government has left the responsibility in the
hands of local chief executives, again fragmenting decision making
in the center. Tere is an additional, politically practical reason:
evacuation orders would be highly unpopular. Many residents
would protest to the government because they would hate leaving
their home towns. Politically shrewd, the incumbent Democratic
Party of Japan has tried to avoid being the target of public blame.
Instead, in the name of decentralization, the central government has
delegated the di cult decision of evacuations, with the potential to
arouse public anger, to local governments (METI 2011).
Concluding Remarks
Te recent nuclear asco in Japan provides a number of critical
lessons for other countries. First, we should
remind ourselves that nuclear reactors are le-
thal equipment. Tere is no fail safe. In this
regard, Winslow Myers makes an interesting
observation:
In the larger picture, we have gone in
60 years from one nation with nuclear
weapons to nine nations. Tat means nine
complex command and control systems
with fallible human beings managing
them, with all the potential for mistakes,
misinterpretations, or accidents. If our
technology, no matter how innovative,
does not work in harmony with the larger
Japans tradition of collective and
consensual decision making is
not practical in a crisis situation;
in an emergency, the leadership
of the country must demonstrate
fortitude and determination.
In fact, from a sociopolitical
perspective, the absence of
strong leadership might be more
critical for the country than the
actual disaster .
Triple Disasters and the Fukushima Nuclear Fiasco in Japan 899
making is not practical in a crisis situation: in an emergency, the
leadership of the country must demonstrate fortitude and deter-
mination. In this regard, the national leader may face a lonesome
and frightful job. At this time, unfortunately, decisive leadership is
missing in Japans political landscape. In fact, from a sociopolitical
perspective, the absence of strong leadership might be more critical
for the country than the actual disaster that occurred on March 11,
2011. Tis is one of the major questions that the earthquake has
brought to the fore.
Finally, the recent asco has highlighted the critical transformation
of politico-administrative relationships. For many years, a group
of leading bureaucrats dominated Japans decision-making process.
Te Liberal Democratic Party often rubber stamped bureaucratic
policy decisions. Te incoming Democratic Party has worked hard
to change this traditional pattern of running the country. For this
reason, the Democratic Party of Japan has been steadfast in imple-
menting policies and programs without consulting public o cials.
In the recent debacle, however, it appears that the partys attempt
to entrench political leadership has backred. Unfortunately, these
party members lack administrative experience and expertise in deal-
ing with such delicate issues as nuclear power plants. Consequently,
the incumbent government has been making erroneous decisions,
often ill timed. Tis has created confusion and chaos in the central
nerve of government. Politico-administrative relationships call for a
new innovation and amendment in Japans current nuclear disaster.
Otherwise, the entire political system of the country will suer a
meltdown.
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