Case Digest for Caltex vs Palomar 18 SCRA 247

BY IAMFREAKGEEK ON JUNE 16, 2013

G.R. No. L-19650
Caltex Philippines, Inc., petitioner-appellee
Vs.
Enrico Palomar, in his capacity as The Postmaster General, respondent-appellant
Click Here for the Full Text of the case
FACTS:
In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a promotional
scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. The contest was entitled Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest, which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters as
hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specific period.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing
the contest but also for the transmission of communications, representations were made by
Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. This was
formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the Post master General, dated October 31, 1960, in which
Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position
that the contest does not violate the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law.
Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltexs request stating
that the contest scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-lottery Provision and ultimately,
declined Clatexs request for clearance.
Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration involved in part
of the contestant, the contest was not commendable as a lottery. However, the Postmaster
General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or even it does not involve
any consideration it still falls as Gift Enterprise, which was equally banned by the Postal Law.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief?
2. Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within the coverage of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law?
HELD:

I.
By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court which deals with the
applicability to invoke declaratory relief which states: Declaratory relief is available to person
whose rights are affected by a statute, to determine any question of construction or validity
arising under the statute and for a declaration of rights thereunder.
In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain
conditions:
1. There must be a justiciable controversy.
2.

The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.

3. The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy.
4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
With the appellees bent to hold the contest and the appellants threat to issue a fraud order if
carried out, the contenders are confronted by an ominous shadow of imminent and inevitable
litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a declaration. And, contrary to the
insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the
appellees desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others which admittedly
does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable
controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is
actually contested.
Construction
-

Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors

of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not
without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a
corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its
proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales
promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held
that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county
prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan.
II.
Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?

Lottery
-

Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance

e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as various forms of
gambling.
Three Essential Elements:
1. Consideration
2.

Prize

3. 3. Chance
No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it appears to
be more of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is any requirements that any fee be
paid, any merchandise be bought, any services be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given
for the privilege to participate. Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station,
request for the entry form which is available on demand and accomplish and submit the same for
the drawing of the winner. Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible
consideration which would brand it as a lottery.
Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no
consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but it does
condemn as criminal scheme in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or
indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in the way of
increased patronage be considered as a consideration and thus violates the Postal Law?
No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the
sponsors of the contest. The true test lies on whether or not the participant pays a valuable
consideration for the chance of winning and not whether or not those conducting the enterprise
receiver something of value for the distribution of the prize.
Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?
Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there appears to be a
consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is common applied to a
sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement to
purchase the product, the purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.

And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case at bar since there is
not sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser.
The contest is open to all qualified contestant irrespective of whether or not they buy the
appellees products.
The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that every case must
be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision. It is only
logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is
consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.
In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of the Postal Law, gift
enterprise and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they
involve the element of consideration. Finding non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee
may not be denied the use of the mails for the purpose thereof.

When is Executive construction not given weight?

1. Phil. Apparel Workers Union v. NLRC
There was no grant of said increases yet, despite the contrary opinion expressed in the letter of
the Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted that the letter was based on a wrong premise or
representation on the part of the company. The construction or explanation of Labor
Undersecretary is not only wrong as it was purely based on a misapprehension of facts, but also
unlawful because it goes beyond the scope of the law. The Supreme Court set aside the decision
of the commission, and ordered the company to pay, in addition to the increased allowance
provided for in PD 1123.

Belgica Vs. Ochoa

G.R. No. 208566 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork
Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress.
It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority
Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard
projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft
projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million
for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request
for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya
Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is
derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013,
six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the
pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their prok barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing
projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission
on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the
purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which
the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel
system, whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators

themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in
the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or
the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend
where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get
the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does
grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the prepossess of referendum and initiative
are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot
delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which
his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power.
The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it)
collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it
state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in
the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined
because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to
which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA
again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the
house of representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate
a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local
government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the
PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya
and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as
well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the
appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energyrelated ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to
further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may
direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be
allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution.
The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can
be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Maglasang vs. People [G.R. No. 90083, October 4, 1990]

Facts: Khalyxto Maglasang was convicted in the court in San Carlos, Negros
Occidental. His counsel, Atty. Castellano, filed for a petition for certiorari
through registered mail. Due to non-compliance with the requirements, the
court dismissed the petition and a motion for reconsideration. Atty. Castellano then sent
a complaint to the Office of the President where he accused the five justices of the 2nd
division, with biases and ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments.
He accused the court of sabotaging the Aquino administration for being Marcos
appointees, and robbing the Filipino people genuine justice and democracy. He also
said that the SC is doing this to protect the judge who was impleaded in the petition and
for money reasons. He alleges further that the court is too expensive to be reached by
ordinary men. The court is also inconsiderate and overly strict and meticulous. When
asked to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt, Castellano said that the
complaint was constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and
very strict practices of the justices concerned. He also said that the justices have no
jurisdiction over his act and that they should just answer the complaint. The SC found
him guilty of contempt and improper conduct and ordered to pay P1, 000 or
imprisonment of 15 days, and to suffer six months suspension.
Issue: Whether or not the Atty. Castellanos acts constitute a violation of the provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held: Yes. The court found his comments scurrilous and contumacious. He went
beyond the bounds of constructive criticism. What he said are not relevant to the cause
of his client. They cast aspersion on the Courts integrity as a neutral and final arbiter of
all justiciable controversies before it.
The explanation of Castellano in his negligence in the filing of the petition for certiorari
did not render his negligence excusable. It is clear that the case was lost not by the
alleged injustices Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the members of the Court, but his
inexcusable negligence and incompetence.
As an officer of the court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and
integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Also, with the complaint he filed, the
most basic tenet of the system of government
separation of power - has been lost. He should know that not even the President of the

Philippines can pass judgment on any of the Courts acts.

FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668) Case Digest
Facts:
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now
in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel
documents and enjoin the implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is
without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so within the limits
prescribed by law. Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue:
Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?
Ruling:
The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their
welfare and advance national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace. The president
is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with dayto-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when
no
foreign
foe
appears
on
the
horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the
country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify
the
violence
directed
against
the
state
and
instigate
more
chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions
against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become
serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines.
The petition is DISMISSED.
LUIS LOKIN JR. VS. COMELEC
Forum shopping; no forum shopping where petitions have different causes of action and seek
different reliefs. Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment. Thus, forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse

decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition in the Supreme Court, a party files another petition in
the Court of Appeals, because he thereby deliberately splits appeals in the hope that even as
one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar
remedy) would still be open; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a writ of preliminary
injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court. What is truly important to
consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused to the courts
and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and administrative agencies to rule on
the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same
issue. The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act
constitutes forum shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the
courts and as abusing their processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the
administration of justice. Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same
incident does not necessarily constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions
filed involve the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances. The actions
must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Elsewise stated, forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the
second nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing CIBACs
entitlement to an additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down the
provision in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance all
proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases. He has
insisted that the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to proclaim him due to his being CIBACs
second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no authority to exercise discretion and to suspend
or defer the proclamation of winning party-list organizations with pending disputes. On the other
hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14, 2007 resolution
of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and
the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and to
challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELECs basis for allowing
CIBACs withdrawal of Lokins nomination.
Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the
action for mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved
the same parties, because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they

sought were different. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis K. Lokin vs.
Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 179431-32/G.R. No. 180443. June 22, 2010
Case # 6
Tongonan Holdings and Dev't Corp. (THDC) V. Atty. Francisco Escao, Jr. September 2011
G.R. No. 190994
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by
Tongonan Holdings and Development Corporation (THDC) assailing, on questions of law, the
August 12, 2009 Decision[1] of the 19th Division of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City (CA), in CAG.R. SP No. 03935, entitled Atty. Francisco Escao, Jr. v. Hon. Apolinario Buaya, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Ormoc City and Tongonan Holdings &
Development Corporation, represented by its president, Mr. Antonio Diano, and its December 10,
2009 Resolution denying the motion for the reconsideration thereof.
The Facts
This controversy between petitioner THDC and its erstwhile counsel, respondent Atty. Francisco
Escao, Jr. (Atty. Escao) arose from a case for eminent domain entitled Philippine National Oil
Company v. Sps. Dominador and Minerva Samson. THDC was named as Defendant-Intervenor
in the said case, as it had purchased the subject parcels of land from the defendant spouses
(Spouses Samson) and was represented by Atty. Escao of the Escao Montehermoso Oliver
and Trias Law Office from February 24, 1997 to June 30, 1999. After the dissolution of the law
firm, Atty. Escao continued to represent THDC from July 1, 1999 until his services was
terminated by THDC in April 2005.
Eventually, in the RTC Order[3] dated November 27, 2000, THDC was awarded just
compensation in the amount of 33,242,700.00 with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the date of the filing of the complaint on June 10, 1996.
Atty. Escao sought the entry of his attorneys liens on the basis of the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) dated February 24, 1997, contracted between him and THDC, stipulating the
30% professional or attorneys fees.
The RTC, in its Order[4] dated June 13, 2001, declared the claim of 30% attorneys fees on the
judgment as unconscionable. The amount of attorneys fees was then fixed at 15% of the
judgment award in the name of the partners. On appeal, this reduction of attorneys fees was
affirmed by the CA in its Decision[5].
Upon dismissal of PNOCs appeal in the main case in the CA, Atty. Escao, representing THDC,
moved for the execution of the RTC decision. The RTC then ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution in its Order[6].
Subsequently, Atty. Escao filed an Urgent Manifestation with Motion[7] alleging that THDC had
lost its juridical personality as a corporation due to the revocation of its certificate of registration.
He prayed that the enforcement of the said writ of execution be held in abeyance until the
termination of the NBIs investigation relative to the allegations that the RTC Decision of
November 27, 2000 and the dismissal of the appeal were secured through fraud. THDC later

furnished the RTC with a copy of a certification from the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) that the corporation had not been dissolved.
As a result, THDC terminated the services of Atty. Escao on the ground of loss of confidence,
which was approved by the RTC.
a
Afterward, Atty. Escao filed a Motion to Enter Into the Records Attorneys Lien[8]
a
for additional attorneys fees of 15% for his professional services. In all, he was demanding a total
of 63.7% of the judgment awards.
The RTC, in its September 26, 2005 Order,[9] denied the motion and approved only the 15%
Attorneys Lien on the money judgment in favor of Atty. Escao and his former partners. It held
that Atty. Escao was not entitled to an additional compensation on the ground that when he took
over the case from their law firm there was no separate contract for his legal services.
RULING:
the petition is GRANTED. The August 12, 2009 Decision and the December 10, 2009 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the RTC is ordered to
allow the immediate release to the petitioner the total amount due in Civil Case No. 3392-0 not
subject to existing liens.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on October 6, 2010 is ordered LIFTED.
Basis:
Atty. Escao is not entitled to the escrow of the entire proceeds of the case. Neither is he entitled
to the escrow of additional claim for attorneys fees of 15% for his personal services after the
dissolution of their law firm and 33.7% in favor of his consultant, Atty. Lino Dumas and Partners.
Atty. Escao has already collected his fees through his former law firm and is now enjoying the
fruits of his labor, the uncertainty of the release of his clients award notwithstanding. He,
therefore, has no more right to prevent the release of the judgment award in favor of THDC.
In fine, the THDC, being the rightful claimant, is entitled to the proceeds of the judgment not
subject to existing liens. To uphold the escrow of the full judgment award would ultimately result in
patent injustice and prejudice to THDC, which, to this date, has yet to be compensated for the
taking of its property.
This Court is not only a court of law, but also a court of justice
In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta A.M. No. 98-5-01SC, November 9, 1998
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March
30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City
and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be
expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision

prohibits the

Presidentfrom

making

any appointments two

months

immediately

before

thenext presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continuedvacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public

safety.

Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban onappointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII
of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view
of

Secs.

(1)

and

of

Art.

VIII

Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution two months immediately
before the next presidentialelections and up to the end of his term the President is neither
required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of
Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time
frames

provided

therein

unless

This prohibition onappointments comes

prohibited
into

effect

by

Sec.
once

15

of

every

Art.
6

VII.
years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the
ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling
of vacanciesin the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case
of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban
LANDMARK CASE:
G.R. No. 191149, March 17,2010 618 SCRA 639
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
Facts:
Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta respectively commenced G.R. No.
191002 and G.R. No. 191149 as special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus, praying that
the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent President the list of at least three nominees for
the position of the next Chief Justice.
All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the incumbent
President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. That question is
undoubtedly impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation, because the appointment
of the Chief Justice is any Presidents most important appointment.

Peralta states in his petition in G.R. No. 191149 that mandamus can compel the JBC to
immediately transmit to the President, within a reasonable time, its nomination list for the position
of chief justice upon the mandatory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in compliance
with its mandated duty under the Constitution in the event that the Court resolves that the
President can appoint a Chief Justice even during the election ban under Section 15, Article VII of
the Constitution.
Petitioners De Castro (G.R. No. 191002), Soriano (G.R. No. 191032) and Peralta (G.R. No.
191149) all assert their right as citizens filing their petitions on behalf of the public who are directly
affected by the issue of the appointment of the next Chief Justice.
Issue:

Do the petitioners have legal standing to file a petition?

Does the JBC have the discretion to withhold the submission of the short list
to President?
Does the Supreme Court bound to Always follow the Principle of Stare Decisis?

Conclusion:

The court dismissed the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in GR no. 191002 and
GR no.191149.The motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being
thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of
March 17, 2010. Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the
purpose of clarification and emphasis.

Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and
accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela (A.M.
No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998, In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional
Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabananatuan City,
respectively.)

The contention has no basis.

Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere,
i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means
that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority,
controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the
same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a
court of competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly
those of appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to
higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law
laid down.

No, On February 26, 2010, the OSG also submitted its comment, essentially stating that the
incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement
by May 17, 2010.A writ of mandamus can issue to compel the JBC to submit the list of
nominees to the President, considering that its duty to prepare the list of at least three
nominees is unqualified, and the submission of the list is a ministerial act that the JBC is
mandated to perform under the Constitution; as such, the JBC, the nature of whose
principal function is executive, is not vested with the power to resolve who has the
authority to appoint the next Chief Justice and, therefore, has no discretion to
withhold the list from the President.

Not all the time, The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next
Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section
4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that in their deliberations on the mandatory period for
the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, the framers neither mentioned nor referred
to the ban against midnight appointments, or its effects on such period, or vice versa;
that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments,
they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the
prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII
(Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme
Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from
political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of
the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court
Justice.

The OSG posits that although Valenzuela involved the appointment of RTC Judges,
the situation now refers to the appointment of the next Chief Justice to which the
prohibition does not apply; that, at any rate, Valenzuela even recognized that there
might be the imperative need for an appointment during the period of the ban, like when
the membership of the Supreme Court should be so reduced that it will have no quorum,
or should the voting on a particular important question requiring expeditious resolution be
divided; and that Valenzuela also recognized that the filling of vacancies in the Judiciary
is undoubtedly in the public interest, most especially if there is any compelling reason to
justify the making of the appointments during the period of the prohibition.

Lastly, the OSG urges that there are now undeniably compelling reasons for the
incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice, to wit: (a) a deluge of cases
involving sensitive political issues is quite expected;(b) the Court acts as the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), which, sitting en banc, is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President and
Vice President and, as such, has the power to correct manifest errors on the
statement of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC); (c) if history has
shown that during ordinary times the Chief Justice was appointed immediately
upon the occurrence of the vacancy, from the time of the effectivity of the
Constitution, there is now even more reason to appoint the next Chief Justice
immediately upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno; and (d) should the next
Chief Justice come from among the incumbent Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, thereby causing a vacancy, it also becomes incumbent upon the JBC to
start the selection process for the filling up of the vacancy in accordance with the
constitutional mandate.

DE CASTRO VS. JBC Leave a comment

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President
from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010
and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days
from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers
intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII
(Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers
also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to
appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes

and its insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a
Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course,
whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of
Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short
list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within
90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or
in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the
power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It
is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and
Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was
their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would
have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.

PCA VS. ENRIQUEZ

235 SCRA 506 Political Law Veto Power Part of the Legislative Process
Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel Countrywide Development Fund
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president
involving the General Appropriations Act of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel.
The Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development
fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items
as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA of 1994,
neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Taada and Romulo
sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the respondents in G.R.
No. 113766. In this petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special
provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the
President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the
National Housing Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that
the CDF is constitutional. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and
granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs
Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994
commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more
properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al averred that the president cannot validly
veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is
sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in fact the Sc found that such
provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as
a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the President vetoed special
provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds

allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as
unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy
it avoided double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual
obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC
ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the
subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand,
it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items
in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so
long as they are appropriate in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the
Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall
effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment
deemed necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an
administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts
must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being inappropriate
provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by
direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI
of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials
enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per
reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the payment of separation
benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special
Provision to the item on the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to
P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the
president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing
laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed
under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive
public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless
specifically authorized by law. I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall
maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation
standardization. Taada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the
CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were
placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted
the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to
law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of
appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated
as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional

The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local
districts know more about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government
or the president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better
position to recommend as to where funds should be allocated.
Statcon no.9
philippine constitutional association vs Enriquez
This case is actually a consolidation of four cases.regarding the GAA of 1994.
Issues- in the first case there was an issue over the country wide development fund (now known
as PDAF) . That the country wide fund system may have let members of congress exceed their
powers by allowing them to identify projects when it should be the executive implementing the
law.There was also an issue about the special provision allowing members of congress to realign
their budgets or in other words spend the money for other purposes than appropriated by law.
Another issue raised by one of the complainants is that there was a higher priority set for debt
servicing. There were 2 conditions attached with the president vetoing the 1st.
The veto made by the president on certain conditions for AFP expenditures which needed to have
congressional approval was also an issue
The conditions imposed on appropriations for the DPWH projects.
held:The petitions were dismissed except for the veto on the provision of debt service. Also as to
the veto of certain AFP and DPWH expenditure.
Comment- This case allows for the practice of the pork barrel system. It allowed for the
realignment of congressman's budgets subject to the approval of the house speaker or senate
pres.
One of the concerns raise against debt servicing was the constitutional provision of giving priority
to educational expenses. It appears this provision is not self executing.
In a previous case cited by the court gonzales vs carague it was ruled that the president cannot
veto attached provisions/ conditions in an appropriation bill. Neither can the augmentation power
provided in the constitution be exercise without an enabling legislation.
i believe this case was made reading to see what is stare decisis such as gonzaleas was quoted.
IT also serve as a standing case that allowed pork barrel until Beligca vs Ochoa.

LAMP VS. SEC OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its Chairman and
counsel, CEFERINO PADUA, Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR ANGELES,
GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA
BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO
ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ ARZAGAMENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO
REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY
GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA, Board of Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN.

AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR.

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and
the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in representation of the Members of
the Congress
G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012
FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004
(GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded
together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the
country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or
direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects.
It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs
and projects to be funded out of PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in
receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in
effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does
not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional
sanction,8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not
be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.
ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in
this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is
unconstitutional and illegal.
HELD:
I.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an
alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there
indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.
LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds
have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public
interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the
consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

II.
The Court rules in the negative.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the
presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the
law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the
Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court
must sustain legislation because to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an
affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which
approved it.
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that,
indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend
them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioners request for rejection of a law
which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
PORK BARREL:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and
programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress
is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and
determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the
priorities set by the Executive.33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute
appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of
Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a
direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional
boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
_______________
NOTES:
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Pork barrel system is unconstitutional - SC

Unconstitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. G.R. No. 208566/G.R. No. 208493/G.R. No. 209251. November 11, 2013
Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, et al. Vs. Hon. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr, et al./Social Justice Society (SJS) President Samson S. Alcantara Vs. Hon. Franklin M.
Drilon, etc., et al./Pedrito M. Nepomuceno, etc. Vs. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino
III, et al.

Concurring Opinion - C.J. Sereno, J. Carpio, J. Leonen.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion - J. Brion.
"x x x.
The Issues Before the Court Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the
following are the main issues for the Courts resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to
judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Courts Decision dated
August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R.
No. 164987, entitled Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Management115 (LAMP) bar the relitigation of the issue of constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions
on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
Whether or not the phrases (a) and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged
or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to
the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been
stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as
prompted by the present cases.
x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations
discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby
declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
(a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article;
(b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous
PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators
whether individually or collectively organized into committees to intervene, assume or
participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not
limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund

release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight;

(c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous
PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which conferred personal,
lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine;
(d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(e) the phrases (1) and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President
under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Courts temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be
PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the
year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya
Funds under the phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social
Fund under the phrase to finance the priority infrastructure development projects pursuant to
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which
are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs)
but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby
ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be
disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while
the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to
be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby
DENIES petitioners prayer seeking that
the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to
provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports
related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases.
Petitioners access to official documents already available and of public record which are related
to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodians
reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without
prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to
pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners' prayer to order the inclusion of
the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a
matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of
government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the
government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute
all government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the
irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel
System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SO ORDERED.

The System of Checks and Balances in the Philippines

Wednesday, May 05, 2010
Aris Enconado
1

You may also visit this entry: Checks and Balances in the Philippines.

The separation of powers, as essential feature of a constitutional government, was classically

expounded by Montesquieu in a much celebrated chapter of the Espirit de lois. In his discussion of
the English Constitution, he drew a sharp and logical distinction between the legislative, the
executive and the judicial powers and insisted that they should be handled by separate and distinct
bodies.

The principle of the separation of powers has been adopted in the Philippines in order to avoid
arbitrary rule and abuse of authority. The so called checks and balances among the three major
departments of the government - executive, legislative and the judiciary are no more than means
of control by each and upon each of the departments. It is the duty of the departments to exercise
moderation in their dealings with one another and their treatment of the public interest.This
principle was instituted in the Philippine constitution for the purpose of impeding each branch from
trespassing and seizing the power vested to others. Moreover, the provisions of the constitution in
establishing limitations on the exercise of government authority also provide means of moderation.
The principle of the separation of powers does not necessarily mean that absolute exclusivity with
respect to such powers as properly belongs to each branch. In a democratic system this maybe
shared by two or more of the other branches.

In this system, the judiciary, in terms of political and financial strength, is the weakest of the
three co equalbranches of the government. The judicial department having neither the

power neither of the purse nor of the sword is considered as the weakest of the three main
departments of government. On the contrary, however, it is tasked with the burden of refeering
endless political disputes and conflicts among the more contentiousbranches the legislative and
the executive. The Supreme Court also possesses the power to decide cases and controversies.
The Supreme Court cannot and will not allow itself to be made as instrument of politics, nor be a
privy to any attempt at the perpetration of injustice.

Even though the Supreme Court is considered as the weakest among the three departments, the
1987 Constitution strengthens it by providing for a broadened power of political review over political
questions, granting fiscal autonomy and reducing the role requirement for a declaration of
unconstitutionality to the concurrence of a simple majority of the members who actually took part in
the deliberation on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean. A compelling rationalization
of prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the off-cited case of Chicot county
Drainage District v. Baxter States Bank. The Chicot Doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to
take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact
negating acceptance of a principle of absolute invalidity.

Since the power of the Supreme Court to declare acts of both the executive and
the legislative branches of the government as null and void is bestowed directly in the Philippines
constitution, it can be inferred, therefore, that the supreme court is superior over the other two
departments. To some extent, this is quite true. However, the power of the judiciary to declare the
validity or constitutionality of the acts of the executive and the legislative does not necessarily
reflect the superiority of the judicial department. Instead, it indicates the supremacy of the
constitution over a statute, treaty or presidential act which violates the constitution. TheSupreme
Court commonly nullifies the acts of legislatures and executives that conflict with the state
constitution. Since the constitution is the supreme law of the land, the courts, in deciding cases,
must be able to make final, fair and binding interpretations of the law.

Judicial Independence Law & Legal Definition

Judicial independence is the idea of keeping the judiciary away from the other branches of
government. The main objective behind granting judicial independence is to avoid the

improper influence on the court from the other branches of government, or from private or
partisan interests. It is alo referred as independence of the judiciary. Judicial independence
is not for the protection of judges, although it is often thought of in that context today. The
principle of judicial independence is designed to protect the system of justice and the rule of
law, and thus maintain public trust and confidence in the courts. With judicial independence,
the winners are everyone.[ Segars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit Selection Comm'n, 387 S.C.
109 (S.C. 2010)].
Judicial independence can be ensured by granting life tenure or long tenure for judges. Life
tenure or long tenure ideally frees the judges to decide cases and make rulings according to
the rule of law and judicial discretion, even if those decisions are politically unpopular or
opposed by powerful interests.