NICOLAS VALISNO vs.

FELIPE ADRIANO
G.R. No. L-37409

May 23, 1988

Plaintiff-appelantforHonorioValisnoGarcia I
Defendant-appellee for Felipe K Medina
Justice GRIO-AQUINO
FACTS:
Facts about the subject properties:
Valisno bought a parcel of land from defendants sister Honorata Adriano-Francisco
The land was inherited by Felipe Adriano and Honorata from their father Eladio Adriano
The land is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables
The land adjoins the land of Defendant Adriano on the bank of the Pampanga River
The land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canalabout 70m long,
traversing Adrianos land
Adrianos action which led to conflict:
He levelled a portion of the irrigation canal.
As a result, Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his
land
In December 1959, Valisnofiled a complaint in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications
In March 1960, The Bureau ordered Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation otherwise judicial
action shall be taken against him
Adriano instead of restoring, he asked for the reinvestigation of the case and was granted
Valisno was made to rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because he urgently
need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields
In October 1961, Bureaus Secretary made a final resolution dismissing the complaint filed in
December 1959. The ruling was:
Eladio Adriano, who was granted with water rights in 1923 ceased to enjoy in 1936 or 1937,
when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water right since then for more than 5
years extinguished the grant by operation of law
The water rights therefore did not form part of his hereditary estate
Valisno, as vendee of the landdid not acquire any water rights with the land purchased
In June 1960, Valisnofiled a complaint for damages in the CFI:
1. Valisno claimed the following damages:
P8,000 when he failed to plant his fields in 1960 for lack of irrigation water
P800 to reconstruct the canal on Adriano's land
2. Adrianos answer:
He admitted that levelled the irrigation canal on his land
Neither his late father nor his sister possessed water rights for the land which she
sold toValisno
He was the one who applied for water rights in 1956 and obtained it in 1958
Thus, he had a perfect right to level his land for his own use because he merely
allowed his sister to use his water rights when she still owned the adjacent land
3. CFIs decision:
Valisnohad no right to pass through the Adrianos land to draw water from the
Pampanga River
Sec 4 of the Irrigation Law provides that controversies between persons claiming a
right to water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public
Works

Valisnos arguments before the SC:

1. It was correct that the Secretary may legally decide who is entitled to water rights under the
Irrigation Act
2. But it was not correct that the Secretary has authority decide on the claim for damages
under Articles 642, 643, and 646 of the Civil Code
3. The law applicable to the case is the civil code and not the Irrigation Law
ISSUES:
1. Whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those of the Civil Code should apply to
this case
2. Whether an easement of waters in favor of the Valisno has been established
HELD:
1. On the applicable law
The applicable law is the Civil Code. It is because:
The Bureau of Works decision in March 1960, it indicated that the principal issue involved
falls under the subject of servitude of waters which are governed by Article 648 of the new
Civil Code and the suppletory laws mentioned - Irrigation law and the Spanish Law of Waters
2. On Valinos right of easement of water
Valino is entitled to water rights. It is because:
1. The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water
rights and improvements". By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, it sold, ceded,
conveyed and transferred all "rights, title, interest and participations over the parcel of
landand the water rights and such other improvements appertaining to the property subject
of the sale
2. Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a
water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the
water is supplied by a third person.
CONCLUSION: As an easement of waters in favor of the Valisno has been established, he is
entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference, such as the
Adrianos act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga
River

G.R. No. L-10619

February 28, 1958
LEOGARIO RONQUILLO, ET AL. Vs. JOSE ROCO, as Administrator of VICENTE, ROCO Y.
DOMINGUEZ ET AL.
Moises B. Cruz for appellants.
Vicente Roco, Jr. for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Involving as it does only a question of law, the present appeal from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, dated March 6, 1955, dismissing the amended and supplemental
complaint of plaintiffs on motion of defendants that it did not state a cause of action, was taken
directly to this Court.

The facts and the issue involved in the appeal are well and correctly stated in the appealed order, the
pertinent portion of which we are reproducing and making our own:
FACTS:

Plaintiffs have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way
which traversed the land of the defendants and their predecessors in interest, in going to
Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land and back, for more
than 20 years;

that the defendants and the tenants of Vicente Roco, the predecessors in interest of the
said defendants have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of road
right of way of said plaintiffs;

that on May 12, 1953, the defendants Jose Roco thru his co-defendants, Raymundo Martinez
and their men with malice aforethought and with a view to obstructing the plaintiffs'
private legal easement over the property of the late Vicente Roco, started constructing a
chapel in the middle of the said right of way construction actually impeded, obstructed
and disturbed the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of
way;

that on July 10, 1954 the new defendants Natividad Roco and Gregorio Miras, Jr. with the
approval of the defendant, Jose Roco and with the help of their men and laborers, by means of
force, intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with
barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passage way and their right of way in
question against their protests and opposition, thereby preventing them from going to or
coming from their homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the City of Naga.

A complaint was filed before the CFI of Camarines Sur. However, the trial court dismissed
the same holding that an easement of right of way though it may be apparent is,
nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired
through prescription, but only by virtue of a title.

Plaintiffs appealed directly to the SC.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION

Petitioner claims to have acquired the easement of right of way over the land of the
defendants and the latter's predecessors in interest, Vicente Roco, thru prescription by their
continuous and uninterrupted use of a narrow strip of land of the defendants as passage
way or road in going to Igualdad Street and the public market of Naga City, from their residential
land or houses, and return.

ISSUE: WON an easement of right of way can be acquired thru prescription.

SC RULING: NO.
Under old as well as the New Civil Code, easements may be continuous discontinuous (intermittent),
apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or less long intervals and which
depend upon acts of man (Articles 532 and 615 of the Old and New Civil Codes, respectively).
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or prescription, continuous nonapparent easements and discentinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue
of a title (Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old and New Civil Codes, respectively).

Under the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, particularly the articles thereof aforecited,
it would therefore appear that the easement of right of way may not be acquired through
prescription. Even Article 1959 of the Old Civil Code providing for prescription of ownership and
other real rights in real property, excludes therefrom the exception established by Article 539,
referring to discontinuous easements, such as, easement of right of way. (Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40
Phil., 857, 867).
In the case of Cuayong vs. Benedicto, 37 Phil., 781 where the point in issue was whether or not
vested rights in a right of way can be acquired through user from time immemorial, this Court said:
It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user from time immemorial had been acquired by
plaintiffs at the time the Civil Code took effect. Under that Code (Article 539) ino discontinuous
easement could be acquired by prescription in any event.
However, in the case of Municipality of Dumangas is Bishop of Jaro, 34 Phil., 545, this same Tribunal
held that the continued use by the public of a path over land adjoining the Catholic church in going to
and from said church through its side door, has given the church the right to such use by prescription,
and that because of said use by the public, an easement of right of way over said land has been
acquired by prescription, not only by the church, but also by the public, which without objection or
protest on the part of the owner of said land, had continually availed itself of the easement.
CONTRARY VIEW BY THE MINORITY: (basin mangutana si mam)
The minority of which the writer of this opinion is a part, believes that the easement of right of
way may now be acquired through prescription, at least since the introduction into this
jurisdiction of the special law on prescription through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190.
Said law, particularly, Section 41 thereof, makes no distinction as to the real rights which are subject
to prescription, and there would appear to be no valid reason, at least to the writer of this opinion,
why the continued use of a path or a road or right of way by the party, specially by the public, for ten
years or more, not by mere tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it, cannot
give said party a vested right to such right of way through prescription.
The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to constitute
adverse possession does not require the use thereof every day for the statutory period,
but simply the exercise of the right more or less frequently according to the nature of the
use. (17 Am. Jur. 972)
Even under the case of Cuaycong vs. Benedicto (supra), this Tribunal insinuated the rule that no
discontinuous easement, like an easement of right of way, may, under Article 539 of the Old Civil
Code, be acquired, might possibly have been changed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
relative to prescription.
. . . Assuming, without deciding, that this rule has been changed by the provisions of the present
Code of Civil Procedure relating to prescription, and that since its enactment discontinuous easement
of acquired by prescription, it is clear that this would not by avail plaintiffs. The Code of Civil
Procedure went into effect on October 1, 1901. The term of prescription for the acquisition of right in
real estate is fixed by the Code (section 41) at ten years. The evidence shows that in February, 1911,
before the expiration of the term of ten years since the time the Code of Civil Procedure took effect,
the defendants interrupted the use of the road by plaintiffs by constructing and maintaining a toll
gate on, it collecting toll from persons making use of it with carts and continued to do so until they
were enjoin by the granting of the preliminary injunction by the trial court in December 1912. . .
(Cuayong vs. Benedicto, 37 Phil., 781, 796).

Professor Tolentino in his Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 340, would
appear to be of the opinion that under, the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to
prescription, even discontinuous easements, like the easement right of way, may be acquired through
prescription:
. . . "It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by
prescription, provided it can be shown that the servitude was actual, open, public, continuous, under
a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants'."
BUT MAJORITY MUST PREVAIL.
However, the opinion of the majority must prevail, and it is held that under the present law,
particularly, the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, unless and until the same is changed
or clarified, the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
I would like to elaborate my reasons for concurring with the majority in declaring the easement of
right of way not acquirable by prescription.
The essence of this easement ("servidumbre de paso") lies in the power of the dominant owner to
cross or traverse the servient tenement without being prevented or disturbed by its owner. As a
servitude, it is a limitation on the servient owner's rights of ownership, because it restricts his right to
exclude others from his property. But such limitation exists only when the dominant owner actually
crosser, or passes over the servient estate; because when he does not, the servient owner's right of
exclusion is perfect and undisturbed. Since the dominant owner can not be continually and
uninterruptedly crossing the servient estate, but can do so only at intervals, the easement is
necessarily of an intermittent or discontinuous nature.
Because possession of a right consists in the enjoyment of that right (old Civil Code, Art. 430; Art.
423, new Civil Code) and to enjoy a right is to exercise it, it follows that the possession (enjoyment or
exercise) of a right of way is intermittent and discontinuous. From this premise, it is inevitable to
conclude, with Manresa and Sanchez Roman, that such easement can not be acquired by acquisitive
prescription (adverse possession) because the latter requires that the possession be continuous or
uninterrupted (old Civil Code, Art. 1941; new Civil Code, Art. 1118).
The Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) did not change the situation. Observe that its section 41, in
conferring prescriptive title upon "ten years adverse possession" qualifies it by the succeeding words
"uninterruptedly continued for ten years which is the same condition of continuity that is exacted by
the Civil Code.
SEC. 41.Title to Land by Prescription. Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming
to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years
by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced

or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title,
saving to the persons under disabilities the rights secured the next section. In order to constitute such
title by prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or
through whom he claims must have been actual, open, public, continous, under a claim of title
exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants. But failure to occupy or cultivate land
solely by reason of war shall not be deemed to constitute an interruption of possession of the
claimant, and his title by prescription shall he complete, if in other regrets perfect, notwithstanding
such failure to occupy or cultivate the land during the continuance of war.
The case of Municipality of Dumangas vs. Bishop of Jaro, 34 Phil. 541, does not, if properly analyzed,
constitute authority to hold that the easement of right of way is acquirable by prescription or adverse
possession. The Court there said:
The record shows that the church of the pueblo of Dumangas was constructed in or about the year
1987; that wall on the southeast side adjoins the building lot in question; and that since the
construction of the church there has been a side door in this wall through which the worshippers
attending divine service enter and leave, they having to pass over and cross the land in question. It is
therefore to be presumed that the use of said side door also carries with it the use by faithful
Catholics of the municipal land over which they have had to pass in order to gain access to said place
of worship, and, as this use of the land has been continuous, it is evident that the Church has
acquired a right to such use by prescription, in view of the time that has elapsed since the church was
built and dedicated to religious worship, during which period the municipality has not prohibited the
passage over the land by the persons who attend services customarily held in said church.
The record does not disclose the date when the Government ceded to the Church the land on which
the church building was afterwards erected, nor the date of the laying out of the adjacent square that
is claimed by the municipality and on which the side door of the church, which is used as an entrance
by the people who frequent this building, gives. There are good grounds for presuming that in
apportioning lands at the time of the establishment of the pueblo of Dumangas and in designating the
land adjacent to the church as a public square, this latter was impliedly encumbered with the
easement of a right of way to allow the public to enter and leave the church a case provided for by
article 567 of the Civil Code for the municipality has never erected any building or executed any
work which would have obstructed the passage and access to the side door of the church, and the
public has been enjoying the right of way over the land in question for an almost immemorable length
of time. Therefore an easement of right of way over said land has been acquired by prescription, not
only by the church, but also by the public which, without objection or protest, has continually availed
itself of the easement in question. (34 Phil., pp. 545-546).
It will be seen that the ratio decidendi of that case lies in the application of Article 567 of the old Civil
Code that provides as follows:
ART. 567. When an estate acquired by purchase, exchange, or partition is enclosed by other estates of
the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, the latter shall be obliged to grant a right of way without
indemnity, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.
Bearing in mind the provisions of the article quoted in relation to the wording of the decision in the
Dumangas case, it can be seen that what the court had in mind is that when the Spanish Crown
apportioned the land occupied by the Church of Dumangas, it impliedly burdened the neighboring
public square (which was also Crown property at the time) with an easement of right of way to allow
the public to enter and leave the church, because without such easement the grant in favor of
ecclesiastical authorities would be irrisory: what would be the use of constructing a church if no one
could enter it? Now, if there was an implied grant of the right of way by the Spanish Crown, it was

clearly unnecessary to justify the existence of the easement through prescriptive acquisition. Why
then does the decision repeatedly speak of prescription? Plainly, the word "prescription" was used in
the decision not in the sense of adverse possession for ten or thirty years, but in the sense of
"immemorial usage" that under the law anterior to the Civil Code of 1889, was one of the ways in
which the servitude of right of way could be acquired.1 This view is confirmed by the fact that
throughout the passages hereinabove quoted, the court's decision stresses that the people of
Dumangas have been passing over the public square to go to church since the town was founded and
the church was built, an "almost immemorable length of time." It would seem that the term
"priscription" used in said case was merely a loose expression that is apt to mislead unless the court's
reasoning is carefully analyzed.
Since 1889, however, the Civil Code repealed the prior legislation; and thereafter the right of way
could only be acquired by title and not by adverse possession (usucapio), saving those servitudes
already acquired before the Code came into effect (Decisions, Supreme Court of Spain 27 Oct. 1900,
1st February 1912; 11 May 1927, and 7 January 1920).
Paras, C.J. and Reyes A., J., concur.

EDUARDO TAEDOvs.HON. BERNAD, Presiding Judge of RTC, SPOUSES SIM and SPOUSES
CARDENAS
G.R. No. L-66520

August 30, 1988

Numeriano F. Capangpangan for petitioner.

Meinrado P. Parades for private respondents.
Justice PADILLA
FACTS:
Respondent Antonio Cardenas inherited from Lourdes Cardenastwo (2) contiguous parcels of land:
1. Lot 7501-A which consists of
An apartment building
small portion of the apartment also stands on Lot B
this lot was sold to herein Petitioner Taedo
2. Lot 7501-B which consists of
four-door apartmentof concrete and strong materials
one two-storey houseof strong materials
bodega and of strong materials
a septic tankforthe common use of the occupants of Lots A and B
this lot was mortgaged to Taedo on the same day Lot A was sold to the latter as a
security for the payment of a loan in the amount of P10,000.00
Agreement constituted on Lot-B:
Cardenas by way of written agreement promised to sell this lot to Taedo in case he would
decide to sell it because:
1. septic tank services Lot A
2. apartment building on Lot A has a part standing on Lot B
Cardenas action which led to a conflict:
He sold Lot B to Spouses Sim
When Taedo learned of the sale, he offered to redeem the property from the Spouses but
the latter refused
Romeo Sim instead:
1. blocked the sewage pipe connecting the apartment building on Lot 7501-A to the
septic tank on Lot B
2. asked Taedo to remove portion of the building which encroached on Lot B

 Eduardo Taedofiled an action for legal redemption and damages before the RTC against the
Spouses Sim and Cardenas
1. RTC dismissed the complaint:
Taedo's right to continue to use the septic tank, erected on Lot B, ceased upon the
subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners who do not have
the same interest
ISSUE:WhetherTaedo right to easement over the septic tank has been extinguished by the sale of Lot B
to the Spouses Sim
HELD: NO, because:
1. Article 631 of the Civil Code enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement.The
alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the grounds for
the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by
operation of law.

2. Article 624 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established
or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated,
as a title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the
time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided
in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed
before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a
thing owned in common by two or more persons.
3. No statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of
sale of Lot-A to Eduardo Taedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic
tank by the occupants of Lot A before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the
septic tank is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and PacitaSim the
new owners of the servient estate (Lot B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the
servitude.

G.R. No. 80511 January 25, 1991

COSTABELLA CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, KATIPUNAN LUMBER CO., INC., AURORA BUSTOS LOPEZ, MANUEL S.
SATORRE, JR., JOSEFA C. REVILLES, FELIX TIUKINHOY, JR., PERFECTA L. CHUANGCO, and CESAR T.
ESPINA,respondents.
Roco, Bunag, Kapunan & Migallos for petitioner.
Albano, Garcia & Diaz Law Offices for Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc.
Zosa & Quijano Law Offices for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:p

The principal issue raised in this petition for review on certiorari of the decision
1986 of the Court of Appeals,

which modified the decision

dated May 30,

rendered by the Regional Trial

Court of Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, is whether or not the private respondents had acquired an
easement of right of way, in the form of a passageway, on the petitioner's property.

THE PARTIES

Petitioner is the owner of real estate properties designated as Lots Nos. 5122 and 5124 of the
Opon Cadastre, situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had
constructed a resort and hotel. Petitioner is the servient owner.

The private respondents, on the other hand, are the owners of adjoining properties more
particularly known as Lots Nos. 5123-A and 5123-C of the Opon Cadastre. PR are the
dominant owners.

FACTS:

Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the private
respondents, in going to and from their respective properties and the provincial road,
passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner's property.

In 1981, the petitioner closed the aforementioned passageway when it began the
construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened another route across its property
through which the private respondents, as in the past, were allowed to pass.

However, later, or sometime in August, 1982, when it undertook the construction of the
second phase of its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even
the alternative passageway and preventing the private respondents from traversing any
part of it.

As a direct consequence of these closures, an action for injunction with damages was
filed against the petitioner by the private respondents on September 2, 1982 before the then
CFI of Cebu.

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONTENTION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT

In their complaint, the private respondents assailed the petitioner's closure of the original
passageway which they (private respondents) claimed to be an "ancient road right of
way" that had been existing before World War II and since then had been used by them, the
community, and the general public, either as pedestrians or by means of vehicles, in going to
and coming from Lapu-Lapu City and other parts of the country. The private respondents

averred that by closing the alleged road right of way in question, the petitioner had
deprived them access to their properties and caused them damages.

In the same complaint, the private respondents likewise alleged that the petitioner had
constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latter's property without the necessary permit,
obstructing the passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris and
flotsam on the beach.

They also claimed that the debris and flotsam that had accumulated prevented them from
using their properties for the purpose for which they had acquired them. The complaint this
prayed for the trial court to order the re-opening of the original passageway across the
petitioner's property as well as the destruction of the dike.

PETITIONERS ANSWER

In its answer, the petitioner denied the existence of an ancient road through its property
and counter-averred, among others, that it and its predecessors-in-interest had permitted
the temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous use of, or passage through, its
property by the private respondents and others by mere tolerance and purely as
an act of neighborliness. It justified the walling in of its property in view of the
need to insure the safety and security of its hotel and beach resort, and for the
protection of the privacy and convenience of its hotel patrons and guests.

At any rate, the petitioner alleged, the private respondents were not entirely
dependent on the subject passageway as they (private respondents) had another
existing and adequate access to the public road through other properties.

With respect to the dike it allegedly constructed, the petitioner stated that what it built was a
breakwater on the foreshore land fronting its property and not a dike as claimed by the
private respondents. Moreover, contrary to the private respondents' accusation, the said
construction had benefitted the community especially the fishermen who used the same as
mooring for their boats during low tide. The quantity of flotsam and debris which had formed
on the private respondents' beach front on the other hand were but the natural and
unavoidable accumulations on beaches by the action of the tides and movement of the
waves of the sea.

The petitioner's answer then assailed the private respondents' complaint for its failure to
implead as defendants the owners of the other properties supposedly traversed by the
alleged ancient road right way, indispensable parties without whom no final adjudication of
the controversy could be rendered.

TRIAL COURTS RULING

After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision on March 15, 1984 finding that the private
respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway in controversy based on
its long existence and its continued use and enjoyment not only by the private
respondents, but also by the community at large. The petitioner in so closing the said
passageway, had accordingly violated the private respondents' vested right.

THE PARTIES APPEALED TO THE CA

Petitioner questioned the alleged "vested right" of the private respondents over the subject
passageway, and the private respondents assailed the dismissal of their complaint insofar as
their prayer for the demolition of the petitioner's "dike" is concerned.

CAS RULING: EASEMENT NOT BY PRECRIPTION BUT ONE THAT IS COMPULSORY.

The CA negated the trial courts finding that private respondent had acquired a vested right
over the passageway in question by virtue of prescription. It pointed out that an easement
of right of way is a discontinuous one which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code,
may only be acquired by virtue of a title and not by prescription.

The CA then ruled that the easement as one that is not dependent upon the claims of
the parties but a compulsory one that is legally demandable by the owner of the
dominant estate from the owner of the servient estate.

Thus the appellate court: (1) granted the private respondents the right to an easement of
way on the petitioner's property using the passageway in question, unless the
petitioner should provide another passageway equally accessible and convenient
as the one it closed; (2) remanded the case to the trial court for the determination of the
just and proper indemnity to be paid to the petitioner by the private respondents for the said
easement; and (3) set aside the trial court's award of actual damages and attorney's fees.

Petitioner motioned for partial reconsideration but the court denied the same and stated that:

While it is true that there is another outlet for the plaintiff to the main road, yet such outlet
is a new road constructed in 1979, while the road closed by defendant existed since over 30
years before. Legally, the old road could be closed; but since the existing outlet is
inconvenient to the plaintiff, equitably the plaintiff should be given a chance to pay
for a more convenient outlet through the land of the defendant at a point least prejudicial to
the latter. In any event, the plaintiff shall pay for all damages that defendant corporation may
sustain and the defendant regulates the manner of use of the right of way to protect defendant's
property and its customers. This is the gist of Our decision.

Hence this petition.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION BEFORE THE SC

Petitioner contends that the decision of the respondent appellate court is grossly erroneous
and not in accord with the provisions of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code on easements
and the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.

ISSUE:
1. WON private respondents have acquired an easement of right of way over petitioners
property by prescription.
2. WON

private respondents are entitled to a compulsory easement over petitioners

property as held by the respondent CA.

HELD:
1.

NOT ACQUIRED BY PRESCRIPTION. It is already well-established that an easement of right of

way, as is involved here, is discontinuous and as such can not be acquired by
prescription.

2.

NO COMPULSORY EASEMENT: Respondents CA is correct in holding that no easement had

been validly constituted over the petitioners property. Unfortunately, it failed to order the
reversal of the trial court's decision and the dismissal of the complaint. Instead, the
Appellate Court went on to commit a reversible error by considering the passageway in
issue as a compulsory easement which the private respondents, as owners of the
"dominant" estate, may demand from the petitioner the latter being the owner of the
"servient" estate.

It is provided under Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code that:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and
without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way
through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.

Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for
all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity
shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to

the servient estate.

In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the
estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate
without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage
caused by such encumbrance.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the
proprietor's own acts.

Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

Based on the foregoing, the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a
compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites,
to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not
due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to
the servient estate. Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.

In the case at bar, private respondents failed to establish the existence of the four
requisites mandated by law.

AS TO THE FIRST REQUISITE:

they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respective properties to
a public highway.

The CA found that there is a new road constructed leading to the main road however, it ruled
that this other outlet is inconvenient to the plaintiff.

On this score, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals lost sight of the fact that the
convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of
compulsory right of way.

21

To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal

right is "adequacy."

Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a
public highway, even if the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need
to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify the imposition of an
easement or right of way, "there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it."

AS TO THE SECOND REQUISITE:

the private respondents failed to indicate in their complaint or even to manifest during
the trial of the case that they were willing to indemnify fully the petitioner for the right of
way to be established over its property.

AS TO THE THIRD REQUISITE:

Neither have the private respondents been able to show that the isolation of their
property was not due to their personal or their predecessors-in-interest's own
acts.

AS TO THE FOURTH REQUISITE:

Finally, the private respondents failed to allege, much more introduce any evidence, that
the passageway they seek to be re-opened is at a point least prejudicial to the
petitioner. Considering that the petitioner operates a hotel and beach resort in its property,
it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security within its premises. Otherwise, the
convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would be compromised. That
indubitably will doom the petitioner's business. It is therefore of great importance that the
claimed light of way over the petitioner's property be located at a point least prejudicial to its
business.

Hence, the Private respondents' properties can not be said to be isolated, for which a compulsory
easement is demandable. Insofar therefore as the Appellate Court declared the case to be proper
as a controversy for a compulsory right of way, this Court is constrained to hold that it was in
error.

Servitudes of right of way are an ancient concept, which date back to the iter, actus, and via of
the Romans.

23

They are demanded by necessity, that is, to enable owners of isolated estates to

make full use of their properties, which lack of access to public roads has denied them.

24

Under

Article 649 of the Civil Code, they are compulsory and hence, legally demandable, subject to
indemnity and the concurrence of the other conditions above-referred to.

As also earlier indicated, there must be a real necessity therefor, and not mere convenience for
the dominant estate. Hence, if there is an existing outlet, otherwise adequate, to the highway,
the "dominant" estate can not demand a right of way, although the same may not be
convenient. Of course, the question of when a particular passage may be said to be "adequate"
depends on the circumstances of each case. Manresa, however, says: "In truth, not only the
estate which absolutely does not possess it should be considered in this condition, but also that
which does not have one sufficiently safe or serviceable; an estate bordering a public road
through an inaccessible slope or precipice, is in fact isolated for all the effects of the easement
requested by its owner. On the other hand, an estate which for any reason has necessarily lost its
access to a public road during certain periods of the year is in the same condition. . . . There are
some who propound the query as to whether the fact that a river flows between the estate and
the public road should be considered as having the effect of isolating the estate. . . . If the river
may be crossed conveniently at all times without the least danger, it cannot be said that the
estate is isolated; in any other case, the answer is in the affirmative."

25

The isolation of the dominant estate is also dependent on the particular need of the dominant
owner, and the estate itself need not be totally landlocked. What is important to consider is
whether or not a right of way is necessary to fill a reasonable need therefor by the owner.

26

Thus, as Manresa had pointed out, if the passageway consists of an "inaccessible slope or
precipice,"

27

it is as if there is no passageway, that is, one that can sufficiently fulfill the

dominant owner's necessities, although by the existence of that passageway the property can
not be truly said that the property is isolated. So also, while an existing right of way may have
proved adequate at the start, the dominant owner's need may have changed since then, for
which Article 651 of the Code allows adjustments as to width.

28

But while a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the dominant estate is not at liberty
to impose one based on arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established
upon two criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial to the servient state; and (2) where the
distance to a public highway may be the shortest. According, however, to one commentator,
"least prejudice" prevails over "shortest distance."

29

Yet, each case must be weighed according

to its individual merits, and judged according to the sound discretion of the court. "The court,"
says Tolentino, "is not bound to establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be established

to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when there are constuctions or walls which can
be avoided by a roundabout way, or to secure the interest of the dominant owner, such as when
the shortest distance would place the way on a dangerous decline."

30

It is based on these settled principles that we have resolved this case.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 30, 1986, and the resolution dated October 27, 1987, of
the respondent Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE and the private respondents' complaint is hereby
DISMISSED. Costs against the private respondents.
TOMAS ENCARNACION vs. CA
G.R. No. 77628 March 11, 1991
Esteban M. Mendoza for petitioner.
Oscar Gozos for private respondents.
Chief Justice FERNAN
FACTS:
The subject Property are two (2) adjacent estates
Petitioner Encarnacion and Private Respondent Heirs of AnicetaMagsinoViuda de Sagun are
the owners
1. Servient Estate co-owned by the Heirs
Laurel-Talisay Highway
(North)
MamertoMagsino(East)

Felipe de Sagun (West)

Tomas Encarnacion (South)

2. Dominant Estate owned by Encarnacion
Eusebio de Sagun and MamertoMagsino
(North)
Pedro Matienzo (West)
FelinoMatienzo (East)
Taal Lake (South)
In other words, Servient estate stands between the dominant estate and the
national road:

Laurel-Talisay Highway
Servient Estate
Dominant Estate

MamertoMagsino
ROW

FelinoMatienzo

About the servient estate:

Prior to 1960, persons going to the national highway just crossed the servient estate at no
particular point
In 1960, the servient estate was enclosed with a concrete fence. A roadpath was constituted
measuring 25 meters long and about a meter wide to provide access to the highway:
meter width was taken from the servient estate

 meter width - was taken from another lot owned by MamertoMagsino

About the usage of the pathway as passage to the highway:
Petitioner benefited of it for his family and for his customers in his plant nursery business
When the business grew, it became more and more difficult for petitioner to haul the plants
and garden soil to and from the nursery and the highway with the use of pushcarts. But the
jeepneycould not pass through the roadpath
So, he asked the owners of the servient estate hat they sell to him one and 1 1/2 meters of
their property to be added to the existing pathway. But was refused.
Petitioner filed an action to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way
i.
RTC dismissed the complaint: Plaintiff at present has two outlets to the highway
i.
one, through the defendants' land on a 1 meter wide passageway, which is
bounded on both sides by concrete walls and
ii.
second, through the dried river bed 80 meters away. The plaintiff has an
adequate outlet to the highway through the dried river bed where his jeep
could pass
ii.
The RTC and CA cited was that the only reason why Encarnacion wanted a wider
easement through the De Sagun's estate was that it was more convenient for his
business and family needs
ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a widening of an already existing easement of right-of-way
HELD:YES, the Court finds that petitioner has sufficiently established his claim for an additional easement
of right of way:
1. While there is a dried river bed, , that access is grossly inadequate. Generally, the right of way may
be demanded:
a. when there is absolutely no access to a public highway
b. when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient
The river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from
the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four (4) to five (5)
meters up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods
With the inherent disadvantages of the river bed which make passage difficult, if not
impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all.
2. Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent
servient estates as a matter of law.
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way
shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may
accordingly be changed from time to time."
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and
without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way
through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all
the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall
consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the
servient estate.
In the case, petitioner has expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of
his land to compensate private respondents for their loss.

HEIRS V TUASON
EDWIN CASEvs.HEIRS OF TUASON Y SANTIBAEZ
G.R. No. L-5044 December 1, 1909
Hartigan and Rohde, and Roman Lacson for appellant.
Rosado, Sanz and Opisso for appellees.
Justice TORRES
FACTS:
The attorneys for Edwin Case applied for the registration of his property with the Court of Land
Registration under the provisions of Land Registration Act.
Felipe
1.
2.
3.

R. Caballero, counsel of heirs of Tuason, opposed on the Edwins application, alleging that:
His clients co-owned the property adjoining that of the petitioner on the southwest
Petitioner extended his southwest boundary line to a portion of the lot belonging to the heirs
The true dividing line between the property of the petitioner and that of the said heirs is the
walls
4. That said walls belong to the heirsand that petitioner improperly caused a portion of the
alterations on the buildings erected on his land, to rest on the wall owned by the heirs

The court granted the registration of the property described in the application filed by Edwin Case
but it excluded the wall claimed by
ISSUE: Whether a dividing wall owned by heirs is a party wall
HELD: NO
Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of party walls is presumed, unless there is a title
or exterior sign, or proof to the contrary, among others, in dividing walls adjoining buildings up to
the common point of elevation.
The legal presumption as to party walls is limited to the three cases dealt with in the said article of
the code, and is that of juristantum unless the contrary appear from the title of ownership of the
adjoining properties, that is to say, that the entire wall in controversy belongs to one of the property
owners, or where there is no exterior sign to destroy such presumption and support a presumption
against the party wall.
Three openings have been made in the wall, undoubtedly to allow the passage of air and light. Two
of them are beveled on the side toward the land of the objectors, and the third has recently been
beveled on the other. A rafter or lintel was found imbedded in the wall on the side of the property of
the opponents. These things constitute exterior signs and were recorded as the result of
personal inspection by the trial court in company with the experts of both parties. These signs
positively and conclusively prove that the said wall is not a party wall, but the exclusive property of
the defendant.

G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991

SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Balgos& Perez for petitioner.
Alfredo G. de Guzman for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:p

This is an appeal filed by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
The petitioner raises two questions: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals 1 erred in
reversing the trial court which had rendered summary judgment; and (2) whether or not
it erred in holding that an easement had been extinguished by merger.
We rule for the petitioner on both counts.
FACTS:

Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila, covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 157750 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of
the private respondent corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784.

The private respondent's title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of
sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way:

. . .a portion thereof measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS,

more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of
neighboring estates, this being duly annotated at the back of the covering transfer
Certificate of title per regulations of the Office of the City Engineer of Manila ...xxxx.

As a consequence, an annotation was entered in the private respondent's title.

The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of
neighboring estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and
contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the
private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered
use.

On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the
private respondent, to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the
easement.

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT:

PR TO OPEN THE GATES:The court a quo shortly issued ex parte an order directing the
private respondent to open the gates.

BUT LATER, LIFTED: Subsequently, the latter moved to have the order lifted, on the
grounds that: (1) the easement referred to has been extinguished by merger
in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the
property from its former owner; (2) the petitioner has another adequate
outlet; (3) the petitioner has not paid any indemnity therefor; and (4) the
petitioner has not shown that the right-of-way lies at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.

The private respondent's opposition notwithstanding, the trial court issued a

"temporary writ of preliminary injunction to continue up to the final termination
of the case upon its merits upon the posting of a P5,000.00 bond by the plaintiff. 4
(the petitioner herein).

Thereafter, the respondent corporation answered and reiterated its above defenses.

On April 15, 1986, the petitioner moved for summary judgment which the trial
court granted.

On January 19, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment against the private
respondent.

The private respondent appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.

CAS RULING
EASEMENT IS ALREADY EXTINGUISHED BY MERGER.
In reversing the trial court which had, as earlier mentioned, rendered summary
judgment, the respondent Court of Appeals held that the summary judgment was
improper and that the lower court erroneously ignored the defense set up by the private
respondent that the easement in question had been extinguished. According to the
Appellate Court, an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does
not impair the private respondent's title, and that since the private
respondent had acquired title to the property, "merger" brought about an
extinguishment of the easement. Hence this petition.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION
The petitioner submits that the respondent Court of Appeals erred, because the very
deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the previous owner
of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that in any event, the
intent of the parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding
the sale.
ISSUE:
1. WON an easement exists.
2. WON it was extinguished by merger when private respondent acquired title over the
lot.
HELD:
1. There is no question that an easement, as described in the deed of sale
executed between the private respondent and the seller, had been constituted
on the private respondent's property, and has been in fact annotated at the
back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784.

Private respondents act of erecting steel gates across the alley was in
defiance of these conditions and a violation of the deed of sale, and, of course,
the servitude of way.
It is hardly the point, as the Court of Appeals held, that the private respondent is the
owner of the portion on which the right-of-way had been established and that an
easement can not impair ownership. The petitioner is not claiming the easement or any
part of the property as its own, but rather, it is seeking to have the private respondent
respect the easement already existing thereon. The petitioner is moreover agreed that
the private respondent has ownership, but that nonetheless, it has failed to observe the
limitation or encumbrance imposed on the same
It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the
petitioner's contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a mere
right-of-way, it can not be separated from the tenement and maintainan
independent existence. Thus:
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or
passively belong.
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part.
Although they are possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere
accessories, they can not, however, be alienated from the tenement, or
mortgaged separately.
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable
from the main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as
an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of
the servient estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire
ownership over the property including the disputed alley as a result of the
conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up
obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a
servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
2. The Court is furthermore of the opinion that no genuine merger took place
as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation.
According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant
and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can
be seen, requires full ownership of both estates.
One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a
personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular
tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code:

Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or
of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. 16
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement"
to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate,
17 in this case, the public at large.
Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant
owner relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement
of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public if
that is possible no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a
personal easement.
In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a valid defense,
indeed, a sham one, because as we said, merger is not possible, and secondly,
the sale unequivocally preserved the existing easement. In other words, the
answer does not, in reality, tender any genuine issue on a material fact and
can not militate against the petitioner's clear cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE
and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. The petitioner and its
counsel are hereby required to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be punished for
contempt of court, and also administratively dealt with in the case of counsel, for forum
shopping.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
SEVERINA and FLORA CHOCO vs. ISIDRO SANTAMARIA
G.R. No. 6076

December 29, 1911

Manuel Torres, for plaintiffs.

LeodegarioAzarraga, for defendant.
Justice MAPA
FACTS:
About the parties and subject property
Defendant is in possession of a land and has erected a house thereon flush with the
boundary line of the adjacent property. Plaintiffs are the owners of the land on both sides of
the defendant's house
Defendant in the building of his house has made several openings and windows in the walls
of the house on both sides overlooking then over the property of the plaintiff

 Although a written protest has been made by the plaintiffs and an amicable adjustment has
been suggested, the two parties failed to reach a compromise, hence, no adjustment was
made on the windows. Apparently, the windows of the defendants building miserably failed the
requisites provided by law:
either the windows under the ceiling did not comply with
30cm2requirement, or the windows only had wire screening when what is required by law is an iron
grate embedded in the wall and a wire screen.

Description:

1. The rear wall windows were 50 x 80 cm. The right wall windows were 25 x 35 cm in the
2ndstorey , and 25 x 25 cm in the 1st storey
2. The other windows were 35 x 67 cm, and 75 x 90, all of which covered by wire screening
only.

The law provides in Article 581 of the Civil Code (article 669, New Civil Code), the owner of a
wall which is not a party wall, adjoining anothers estate, amy make in it windows or openings to
admit light at the height of the ceiling joists or immediately under the ceiling, 30cm 2, with an
iron grate embedded in the wall and a wire screen.

 In the instant case, the windows are in a wall not a party wall adjoining the Choco estate and the
windows are more or less than 30cm2and have a wire screen but there does not appear to be the
iron grate embedded in the wall.

The Chocos filed a case to close all the windows of defendants building. The court ruled in their
favor but did not order the permanent closing of window 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 because only window 7
was not under the ceiling, and window 1 in the balcony of the back part of defendants building.

Hence,this appeal. The lower court said that window 1 in the balcony overlooks Calle Padre Rada
and that though the Chocos lot can be seen from thiswindow, it is not contiguous to their property.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not window 1 should be closed.

2. Whether or not windows 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 should be permanently closed.

HELD:

1. Yes. If it is in front of the Chocos lot, it is unquestionable that it directly overlooks the same; but
even though it did not only a side or oblique view of the lot could be obtained from it, it could not
be kept open, since between it and the Chocos property, there does not intervene the distance
required by law- that of 2m in the 1st case, and 60 cm in the 2nd case.

In reality, there is no distance at all between the said window and the Chocos lot because as the
Supreme Court has said, the window is perpendicular to the boundary line of the said lot;
therefore, its opening is a manifest violation of Art. 582 of the Civil Code (Article 670, New Civil
Code) which states that:Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings projecting
over the estate of the neighbor, cannot be made if there is not a distance of at least 2m between
the wall in which they are built and said estate.Neither can side nor oblique views be opened over
said property unless there is a distance of 60cm.Hence, the defendant is ordered to close finally
and forever window 1.

2. No. They cannot be permanently closed because only window 7 is not immediately under the ceiling
(techos). By techo is understood that a part of a construction which covers the rooms under it and
certainly formsone of the essential parts of every story. A story is composed of earth, pavement
and ceiling, the latter, that is, the ceiling, being part of the story that is visible to the observer
situated below in the room covered by it. Consequently, every storey has a ceiling, and not, as
the Chocos maintain, the upper one alone. If windows 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 comply with requirements
of the law under Article 581 (Article 669, New Civil Code) they can be reopened.

DE JESUS V HOWMART

G.R. No. 95252 September 5, 1997

LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC., ATENEO DE MANILA

UNIVERSITY, ROMULO VILLA, LORENZO TIMBOL, EMDEN
ENCARNACION, VICENTE CASIO, JR., DOMINGO REYES, PEDRO C.
MERCADO, MARIO AQUINO, RAFAEL GOSECO, PORFIRIO CABALU, JR.,
and ANTONIO ADRIANO, in their behalf and in behalf of the
residents of LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS, INC., PHASES I AND II,
respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
MANGYAN ROAD is a 15-meter wide thoroughfare in Quezon City abutting
Katipunan Avenue on the west, traversing the edges of La Vista Subdivision
on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll (now
Miriam) College on the south. Mangyan Road serves as the boundary
between LA VISTA on one side and ATENEO and MARYKNOLL on the other. It
bends towards the east and ends at the gate of Loyola Grand Villas
Subdivision. The road has been the subject of an endless dispute, the
disagreements always stemming from this unresolved issue: Is there an
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road?
In resolving this controversy, the Court would wish to write finis to this
seemingly interminable debate which has dragged on for more than twenty
years.
BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
LA VISTA sold to Phil Building Corp. (PBC) a parcel of its land. They agreed to
maintain a 15 meter-wide road along the boundary. Thus, each of their
property is burdened with 1/2 of the 15 m easement. PBC sold his land to
ADMU who later sold it to Maryknoll who developed it into Loyola Villas. La
vista prohibited the residents of Loyola from using the road because ADMU
allegedly failed to comply with the conditions set forth over the use of the
road.
FACTS:
The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was originally part of
a vast tract of land owned by the Tuasons in Quezon City and
Marikina.

 On 1 July 1949 the Tuasons sold to Philippine Building Corporation a

portion of their landholdings amounting to 1,330,556 square meters by
virtue of a Deed of Sale with Mortgage.
Paragraph three (3) of the deed provides that ". . . the boundary
line between the property herein sold and the adjoining
property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15)
meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the
property herein sold to the VENDEE and the other half from
the portion adjoining belonging to the VENDORS."
On 7 December 1951 the Philippine Building Corporation, which was
then acting for and in behalf of Ateneo de Manila University (ATENEO)
in buying the properties from the Tuasons, sold, assigned and
formally transferred in a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Mortgage, with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land to
ATENEO which assumed the mortgage.
On their part, the Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining
the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into a
residential village known as La Vista Subdivision. Thus the
boundary between LA VISTA and the portion sold to Philippine
Building Corporation was the 15-meter wide roadway known as the
Mangyan Road.
On 6 June 1952 ATENEO sold to MARYKNOLL the western portion of
the land adjacent to Mangyan Road.
On 30 January 1976 ATENEO informed LA VISTA of the former's
intention to develop some 16 hectares of its property along
Mangyan Road into a subdivision. In response, LA VISTA President
Manuel J. Gonzales clarified certain aspects with regard to the use of
Mangyan Road. Thus
. . . The Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide, one-half of
which is taken from your property and the other half from the La
Vista Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-of-way on
your 71/2 m. portion was created in our favor and likewise
an easement of right-of-way was created on our 7 1/2
portion of the road in your favor (paragraph 3 of the Deed of

Sale between the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation

and Ateneo de Manila dated 1 July 1949 . . . .
On 28 April 1976 LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales, in a letter to
ATENEO President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S. J., offered to buy under specified
conditions the property ATENEO was intending to develop. One of
the conditions stipulated by the LA VISTA President was that "[i]t is the
essence of the offer that the mutuaI right of way (the existing
mangyan road) between the Ateneo de Manila University and La
Vista Homeowners' Association will be extinguished."
The offer of LA VISTA to buy was not accepted by ATENEO. Instead, on
10 May 1976 ATENEO offered to sell the property to the public
subject to the condition that the right to use the 15-meter roadway will
be transferred to the vendee who will negotiate with the legally involved
parties regarding the use of such right as well as the development costs
for improving the access road.
LA VISTA became one of the bidders. However it lost to Solid
Homes, Inc., in the bidding. Thus on 29 October 1976 ATENEO executed
a Deed of Sale in favor of Solid Homes, Inc., over parcels of land covering
a total area of 124,424 square meters subject, among others, to the
condition that
7. The VENDOR hereby passes unto the VENDEE, its assigns and
successors-in-interest the privileges of such right of way which the
VENDOR acquired, and still has, by virtue of the Deeds mentioned
in the immediately preceeding paragraph hereof; provided, that
the VENDOR shall nonetheless continue to enjoy said right
of way privileges with the VENDEE, which right of way in favor
of the VENDOR shall be annotated on the pertinent road lot titles.
However it is hereby agreed that the implementation of such right
of way shall be for the VENDEE's sole responsibility and liability,
and likewise any development of such right of way shall be for the
full account of the VENDEE. In the future, if needed, the VENDOR is
therefore free to make use of the aforesaid right of way, and/or
Mangyan Road access, but in such a case the VENDOR shall
contribute a pro-rata share in the maintenance of the area.

 Subsequently, Solid Homes, Inc., developed a subdivision now

known as Loyola Grand Villas and together they now claim to
have an easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road through
which they could have access to Katipunan Avenue.
LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales however informed Solid
Homes, Inc., that LA VISTA could not recognize the right-of-way
over Mangyan Road because, first, Philippine Building
Corporation and its assignee ATENEO never complied with their
obligation of providing the Tuasons with a right-of-way on their
7.5-meter portion of the road and, second, since the property
was purchased for commercial purposes, Solid Homes, Inc., was
no longer entitled to the right-of-way as Mangyan Road was
established exclusively for ATENEO in whose favor the right-ofway was originally constituted.
LA VISTA, after instructing its security guards to prohibit agents and
assignees of Solid Homes, Inc., from traversing Mangyan Road,
then constructed one-meter high cylindrical concrete posts
chained together at the middle of and along the entire length of
Mangyan Road thus preventing the residents of LOYOLA from
passing through.
Solid Homes, Inc., complained to LA VISTA but the concrete posts were
not removed. To gain access to LOYOLA through Mangyan Road an
opening through the adobe wall of ATENEO was made and some
six (6) cylindrical concrete posts of LA VISTA were destroyed. LA
VISTA then stationed security guards in the area to prevent entry to
LOYOLA through Mangyan Road.
On 17 December 1976, to avert violence, Solid Homes, Inc.,
instituted the instant case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-22450,
before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal and prayed that LA
VISTA been joined from preventing and obstructing the use and passage
of LOYOLA residents through Mangyan Road.
LA VISTA in turn filed a third-party complaint against ATENEO.
On 20 November 1987 the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
rendered a decision on the merits 2 in Civil Case No. Q-22450 affirming
and recognizing the easement of right-of-way along Mangyan

Road in favor of Solid Homes, Inc., and ordering LA VISTA to pay

damages
LA VISTA appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 19929.
RULING OF THE CA
On 22 May 1990, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals 6 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 19929 affirmed in toto the Decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. Q-22450.
Hence this petition.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION
LA VISTA argues that respondent appellate court erred in holding that an
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road exists.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioner is entitled to a legal or compulsory
easement of a right-of-way which should be distinguished from a
voluntary easement.
HELD:
A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law
for public use or for private interest.
By express provisions of Arts. 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the
owner of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory right-of-way
only after he has established the existence of four (4) requisites,
namely, (a) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after payment of the proper
indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and,
(d) the right-of-way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
A voluntary easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will or
agreement of the parties.
From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the
parties and their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to

establish an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their

mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient estates.
This is quite evident when: (a) the Tuasons and the Philippine Building
Corporation in 1949 stipulated in par. 3 of their Deed of Sale with Mortgage
that the "boundary line between the property herein sold and the adjoining
property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half
of which shall be taken from the property herein sold to the VENDEE and the
other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the vendors;" (b) the
Tuasons in 1951 expressly agreed and consented to the assignment of the
land to, and the assumption of all the rights and obligations by ATENEO,
including the obligation to contribute seven and one-half meters of the
property sold to form part of the 15-meter wide roadway; (c) the Tuasons in
1958 filed a complaint against MARYKNOLL and ATENEO for breach of
contract and the enforcement of the reciprocal easement on Mangyan Road,
and demanded that MARYKNOLL set back its wall to restore Mangyan Road
to its original width of 15 meters, after MARYKNOLL constructed a wall in the
middle of the 15-meter wide roadway; (d) LA VISTA President Manuel J.
Gonzales admitted and clarified in 1976, in a letter to ATENEO President Fr.
Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that "Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide, one-half
of which is taken from your property and the other half from the La Vista
Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m. portion
was created in our favor and likewise an easement of right-of-way was
created on our 7 1/2 m. portion of the road in your favor;" (e) LA VISTA, in its
offer to buy the hillside portion of the ATENEO property in 1976,
acknowledged the existence of the contractual right-of-way as it manifested
that the mutual right-of-way between the Ateneo de Manila University and
La Vista Homeowners' Association would be extinguished if it bought the
adjacent ATENEO property and would thus become the owner of both the
dominant and servient estates; and, (f) LA VISTA President Luis G. Quimson,
in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, received by this Court on 26 March
1997, acknowledged that "one-half of the whole length of (Mangyan Road)
belongs to La Vista Assn., Inc. The other half is owned by Miriam (Maryknoll)
and the Ateneo in equal portions;"
These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned
had indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way over
Mangyan Road and, like any other contract, the same could be

extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the

owner of the dominant estate.
One's attention should rather be focused on the contractual stipulations in
the deed of sale between the Tuason Family and the Philippine Building
Corporation which were incorporated in the deed of assignment with
assumption of mortgage by the Philippine Building Corporation in favor of
Ateneo as well as in the deed of sale dated October 24, 1976 when the
property was ultimately transferred by Ateneo to plaintiff-appellee.
Like any other contractual stipulation, the same cannot be
extinguished except by voluntary rescission of the contract
establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the
dominant lots, more so when the easement was implicitly recognized by
the letters of the La Vista President to Ateneo dated February 11 and April
28, 1976 (page 22, Decision; 19 Ruling Case Law 745).
The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the
voluntary agreement between Ateneo and Solid Homes, Inc., is thus
legally demandable (Articles 619 and 625, New Civil Code) with the
corresponding duty on the servient estate not to obstruct the same so much
so that
When the owner of the servient tenement performs acts or constructs works
impairing the use of the servitude, the owner of the dominant tenement
may ask for the destruction of such works and the restoration of the things
to their condition before the impairment was committed, with indemnity for
damages suffered (3 Sanchez Roman 609). An injunction may also be
obtained in order to restrain the owner of the servient tenement from
obstructing or impairing in any manner the lawful use of the servitude
(Resolme v. Lazo, 27 Phil. 416; 417; 418)." (Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, by Tolentino, Volume 2,
1963 edition, page 320) 21
Resultantly, when the court says that an easement exists, it is not
creating one. For, even an injunction cannot be used to create one as
there is no such thing as a judicial easement. As in the instant case, the
court merely declares the existence of an easement created by the
parties.

The argument of petitioner LA VISTA that there are other routes to

LOYOLA from Mangyan Road is likewise meritless, to say the least.
The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only
legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the
case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as
an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a
property right, which survives the termination of the necessity.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 22 May
1990 and its Resolution dated 6 September 1990, which affirmed the
Decision of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, dated 20 November 1987, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
SIMEON FLORO vs. ORLANDO A. LLENADO (Deceased), substituted by his wife WENIFREDA T.
LLENADO and the COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 75723, June 2, 1995
Justice ROMEO

FACTS:
Private respondent Llenado owns a subdivision that is yet to have a road connecting to the McArthur
Highway and for the mean time was granted permission by petitioner Floro to use portion of the latters
property, also a subdivision, as access road. Later, Floro blocked the said road denying Llenado access to
the highway thru the formers property. It was however, established by evidence that upon purchase by
the Llenados of the subdivision, there was an existing plan to convert part of the Ipapo property adjoining
the Llenado Homes Subdivision into a road and such plan subsists even to the date of complain for
easement of right of way against the petitioner.
Conflicting Claims of the Parties
Floro contends that:
1. The verbal permission to pass through the Floro Park Subdivision in going to and from the
MacArthur Highway. was for the month of March only, without compensation and as a
neighborly gesture only
2. The Llenados are not entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way over the property of
Floro
Llenado contends that
1. The verbal permission to pass through the Floro Park Subdivision in going to and from the
MacArthur Highway was in relation to the easement of right of way granted in their favor
2. They are entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way over the property of Floro
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a voluntary easement established for the Llenados
2. Whether or not the Llenados are entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way
HELD:
1. As to the establishment of voluntary easement

The court ruled in the negative. The use of Floros property as roads by the Llenados during the
month of March was by mere tolerance of Floro pending the negotiation of the terms and conditions
of the right of way. No contract was validly entered into by reason of the failure of the parties to
agree on its terms and conditions. Thus, private respondents Llenados cannot claim entitlement to
a right of way through the Floro Park Subdivision on the basis of a voluntary easement.
2. As to the entitlement of Llenado to a compulsory easement of right of way
The court ruled in the negative. There being an existing right of way over the Ipapo property, the
first requirement for a grant of a compulsory easement of right of way - that the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway has not been
met.

G.R. No. 114170

January 15, 1999

PROSPERITY CREDIT RESOURCES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC., respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
petitioner, a mortgage creditor foreclosed private respondents 7 lots.
Private respondent redeemed 3 of the said lots but agreed to provide
petitioner a right of way. Now petitioner made excavations along the said
road lot for the installation water pipes. Private respondent argues that
the excavation of the road lot was not included in their agreement.
FACTS:
On August 3, 1984, private respondent Metropolitan Fabrics, Inc.
obtained a loan from petitioner Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. As
security, the former mortgaged to the latter 7 parcels of land
located at 685 Tandang Sora Ave., Bo. Banlat, Quezon City.
The said lots comprise a commercial compound with Tandang Sora
Ave. As the nearest public road.
By October 27, 1987, private respondent's loan amounted to P10.5
million. Because of default, the mortgage was foreclosed and sold to
petitioner as the highest bidder and purchaser of the 7 lots.

 Later, private respondent offered to redeem the 3 lots covered by

TCT Nos. 317705, 317706, and 317707.
These lots are all located on the southern and middle portions of
the compound. As the reacquisition of these three lots by private
respondent would leave the remaining four lots on the
northwestern side without access to Tandang Sora Avenue,
petitioner acceded to private respondent's request on the
condition that petitioner be given a right of way on the existing
private road which forms part of the area to be redeemed by
private respondent.
The parties' agreement was embodied in a Memorandum of Undertaking,
dated September 18, 1987.
PETITIONERS COMPLAINT
On November 7, 1991, petitioner filed an injunctive suit in the RTC of
Quezon City (Branch 95) alleging that, in violation of the terms of the
MOU, private respondent refused to allow petitioner to make
excavations on one side of the access road for the installation of
water pipes; that it banned entry of petitioner's trucks and those
of its tenants between 11:30 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. and 10:00 P.M. to 7:00
A.M.; and that it subjected the vehicles to unnecessary searches. P
Petitioner sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction requiring private respondent "to allow [petitioner] to proceed
with the MWSS installation project over the road lot in question, to allow
[petitioner's] and [its] tenants' delivery trucks and other vehicles access
to the same at any time and without undergoing unnecessary searches,
and to otherwise recognize [petitioner's] right of way over the said lot."
Petitioner prayed that, after trial, the writ be made final.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ANSWER
On December 21, 1991, private respondent filed an answer with
counterclaim, alleging that petitioner's right to undertake
excavations on the access road was not provided for in the MOU.
As counterclaim, private respondent alleged that it was petitioner which
caused damage to private respondent's tenants by undertaking,
without its consent, construction works on the access road which

raised its level to about a meter and caused serious flooding of

the nearby buildings whenever it rained; and that, as a result, its
tenants demanded compensation for damage to their merchandise and
equipment occasioned by the flooding. Private respondent prayed for
P2.1 million as counterclaim.
TRIAL COURTS RULING
The the trial court granted, on February 14, 1992, petitioner's
prayer for a preliminary writ, conditioned upon the filing by petitioner of
a bond in the amount of P500,000.00.
Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals to annul the aforesaid orders, dated February 14, 1992
and March 2, 1992, of the trial court.
CAS RULING
On November 26, 1994, the appellate court granted the petition and
set aside the questioned orders after finding that the trial court
had acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing them.
After denial of its MR, petitioner filed the present petition for review on
certiorari. Petitioner claims that the MOU allowed it to use the road lot for
ingress and egress of whatever kind of passage.
ISSUE: WON the right of way granted by private respondent to petitioner
includes the right to make excavations on the said road lot.
HELD:
There is no question as to the meaning of the terms "ingress"
and "egress.'' They give petitioner the right to use the private
road as a means of entry into and exit from its property on the
northwestern side of the compound. The question concerns the
meaning of the phrase "for whatever kind of passage."
The word "passage" does not, however, "clearly and
unmistakably" convey a meaning that includes a right to install
water pipes on the access road. The ordinary meaning of the
word, as defined in Webster's Dictionary, is that it is "the act or
action of passing: movement or transference from one place or

point to another." It means, according to Black's Law Dictionary, the

"act of passing; transit; transition."
To achieve a meaning such as that which petitioner proposes requires the
consideration of evidence showing the parties' intention in using the
word which can only be done during trial on the merits. Until such time,
petitioner cannot claim to have a "clear and unmistakable" right
justifying the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in
this case. Thus, the trial court should have observed caution and denied
petitioner's application for the preliminary writ.
The recourse petitioner proposes must await the presentation of the
parties' evidence during trial and the determination of their intention
must be made by the trial court, not by this Court. Petitioner cannot
circumvent the process by asking this Court to determine the facts
surrounding the execution of their agreement. Indeed, for us to
undertake such inquiry would be to expand the scope of the present
review and intrude into the domain of the trial court. Petitioner will have
ample opportunity to substantiate its allegations on this point during the
trial of the case. Rule 130 11, which petitioner invokes, is actually a rule
for interpretation of documentary evidence formally offered at the trial. It
does not apply to preliminary proceedings concerning the issuance of
ancillary remedies.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 26,
1993, and its resolution, dated February 28, 1994, are hereby
AFFIRMED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Buena, J., took no part.
ANASTACIA QUIMEN vs. CA and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS
G.R. No. 112331. May 29, 1996
Justice BELLOSILLO
FACTS:
Yolanda purchased a lot from her aunt Anastacia. The lot has no direct access to the municipal road in that
it was situated behind two lots that of Anastacia and the other of Yolandas parents - from said road. The
purchase was made with the agreement that she shall be provided with a right of passage over the lot of
her aunt who owns one of the front lots and the one who sold her the back lot. The latter, however, refused

when Yolanda tendered payment. In an action filed in court praying for easement, the lower court favored
Yolanda but on appeal, was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Conflicting Claims of the Parties:
Yolanda contends that
1. she is entitled to a right of way;
2. that a passage starting from the lot of her parents detouring to avoid their sari-sari store
to pass through the lot of Anastacia and cutting down an avocado tree is proper in that it
is least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Anastacia contends that
1. her lot is not the servient estate in that it does not adjoin the lot of Yolanda;
2. when Yolanda purchased the lot the easement of right of way she (Anastacia) provided
her (petitioner) was ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of ownership of the
dominant and the servient estates in one person
3. granting that her lot is a servient estate, the proposed passage is not proper in that the
least prejudicial passage is a straight line even if it means destroying part of the sari-sari
store of Yolandas parents
ISSUES:
1. whether or not Yolanda is entitled to right of way
2. whether or not the lot of Anastacia is servient estate
3. whether or not the purchase of the lot by Yolands extinguishes the easement previously provided by
Anastacia as a result of merger
4. whether or not the proposal of Yolanda as to the route or passage is proper and least prejudicial to
the servient estates
HELD:
1. As to entitlement to a right of way
Yolanda is entitled to a right of way. A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by
covenant
or granted by law to a person or class of persons to pass over anothers property when his tenement
is surrounded by realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The
owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he
indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property.
The conditions sine qua non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the
dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of
the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate.
A cursory examination of the complaint of respondent Yolanda for a right of way readily shows that.
2. As to the lot of Anastacia being a servient estate
The court ruled in the affirmative. The evidence clearly shows that the property of private
respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other persons including that of petitioner. These facts
are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the trial court itself
declared that "[t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda
QuimenOliveros were totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an imperative
need for an easement of right of way to the public highway.
3. As to the extinguishment of the easement of right of way by merger
The court ruled in the negative. As determined in the previous item, the lot of Yolanda is the
dominant estate while that of Anastacia and even the lot of Yolandas parents are servient estates.
There could possibly be no merger in that there is a dominant estate and servient estates.

4. As to the propriety of Yolandas proposed route

The proposal is proper. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the easement of right
of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of
shortest distance. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as
when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand,
the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass
through. In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not
concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it
will not be the shortest.

[G. R. No. 114348. September 20, 2000]

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DICK

MANGLAPUS, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Manglapus bought a patented land. Under the patent, the lot is burdened with a right of way in
favor of the government for not more than 20 m width for use as railroads, aqueducts, etc. NIA
constructed a canal over a portion of his land. The canal was 11 m wide. Manglapus then filed a
complaint against NIA for damages and just compensation.

On June 28, 1963, a certain Vicente Manglapus was issued a free patent over 3 hectares of
land and obtained an OCT over the said lot in his name under the condition that the same
shall be subject to all conditions and public easements and servitudes, among others.

Subsequently, Vicente Mangplapus sold the lot to herein respondent Dick Manglapus by way
of absolute sale. And the land was registered in the latters name under a TCT.

Sometime in 1982, NIA entered into a contract to construct canals, which included a portion
of Manglapus land and made diggings and fillings thereon. The canals were 11 meters wide.

On March 14, 1991. Manglapus filed with the RTC of CDO a complaint for damages against
NIA alleging that the diggings and fillings destroyed the agricultural use of h is land and that
no reasonable compensation was paid for its taking.

The trial court ruled in favor of Manglapus. The CA affirmed the ruling in toto. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: WON NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a portion of his
property for use as easement of a right of way.

Stated otherwise, WON the taking of the portion used to construct canals were the States
exercise of eminent domain thus entitling respondent payment of just compensation.

HELD: NO.

The TCT and the OCT covering the subject lot contained a reservation granting the
government a right of way over the land covered therein.

Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either by law or by
the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements."

In the present case, we find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in
favor of the government. The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent
Manglapus by free patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private
property, in which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for
public use as an easement of a right of way.

Neither can Manglapus argue that he was a transferee or buyer in good faith. Under the
Torrens system, for one to be a buyer in good faith and for value, the vendee must see the
transfer certificate of title and rely upon the same. Here, the annotation on the transfer
certificate of title imposed on Manglapus the duty to refer to the conditions annotated on the
back of the original certificate of title. This, he did not do. The law cannot protect him.
Manglapus is a transferee with notice of the liens annotated in the title.

One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system is charged with notice of
burdens and claims that are annotated on the title.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSES the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 38835.
IN LIEU THEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in Civil Case No. 4266, and DISMISSES the complaint.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.
ALCANTARA, etalvs.CORNELIO B. RETA, JR
Justice PARDO
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint with RTC against Retafor the exercise of the right of first refusal
Respective Claims of parties:
Alcantaras arguments:
1. They were tenants/lessees of the land covered by TCT No. T-72594owned by Reta
2. The land has been converted by Reta into a commercial center and Reta is
threatening to eject them from the land
3. They have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in accordance with Section
3(g) of P.D. No. 1517 since they are legitimate tenants or lessees thereof
4. Amicable settlement between Reta and Ricardo Roble was void for beingviolative

 Retas arguments:
1. The land is beyond the ambit of P.D. No. 1517 since it has not been proclaimed as an
Urban Land Reform Zone
2. The applicable law is B.P.Blg. 25 for failure of the plaintiffs to pay the rentals for the
use of the land
3. amicable settlement between him and Ricardo Roble was translated to the latter and
fully explained in his own dialect
4. Respondent Reta allowed petitioner Ricardo Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees
for P186 from where he gathered tuba and to construct his house on the land
because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba
RTC& CA decision:It dismissed the complaint and ordered Alcantarato pay Reta of the rentals
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners have the right of first refusal
2. Whether the grant of Reta to Roble to construct a house would constitute a personal easement
HELD:
1. NO.
The area involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone(ULRZ). To qualify
and avail oneself of the rights and privileges, the requisites are:
a. a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more
b. must have built his home on the land by contract
c. has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years
Obviously, those who do not fall within the said category cannot be considered "legitimate
tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal. Although Reta admitted that
he had verbal agreements with Petitioners. This notwithstanding, they are still not the
legitimate tenants contemplated under the law who can exercise the right of refusal.
2. YES
Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct his house on the land because it would facilitate
his gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614
of the Civil Code.

Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community,
or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.

BRYAN VILLANUEVA vs. HON. VELASCO, Presiding Judge, JULIO SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY
LORILLA
G.R. No. 130845, November 27, 2000
Justice QUISUMBING
FACTS:
About

the subject property and the parties

Pacific Banking Corporation acquired the lot from Spouses Gabrielat a public auction
The bank sold the lot to Petitioner Villanueva
The land has a small house on its southeastern portion
The land occupied 1 meter of the 2-meter wide easement of right of way
The right of way was granted by the Spouses to the Espinolasin a Contract of Easement
Espinolas are predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Sebastian and Lorilla

The Contract of Easement of Right of Way provides that:

The purpose is for the Espinolas to have an access to and from their house to TandangSora
Ave. which is the nearest public road

shall be binding between the parties and upon their heirs, successors, assigns, without
prejudice in cases of sale of subject property that will warrant the circumstances

A case was filed by the private respondents against Gabriel Spouses to enforcement the easement
But the petitioner did not know of such easement, neither, the pending case at the time he
bought the land from the bank
RTC ordered the Gabriels to provide the right of way and to demolish the small house
encroaching on the easement
Petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of Demolition.
His allegation was that the writ of demolition could not apply to his property since he was
not a party to the civil case
Before CA for petition for certiorari His propositions were:
1. Contract of easement executed by the Gabriels in favor of the Espinolas could not be
enforced against him
2. He is not bound by the contract of easement because the same was not annotated in the
title and that a notice of lispendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was not
recorded with the Register of Deeds
3. He was not a party to Civil Case
ISSUE:Whether the easement on the property binds petitioner
HELD: YES
1. On the Petitioners argument that the contract of easement could not be enforced
against him
The easement in the instant petition is both:
1) An easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and
As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided
for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code.
The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are:
i.
the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet
to a public highway;
ii.
proper indemnity has been paid;
iii.
the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
iv.
the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
v.
to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
2) An easement by necessity or a legal easement.
A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest,
and becomes a continuing property right.
Therefore, the small house occupying 1 meter of the 2-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of
private respondents cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of
private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of
the easement. Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the
easement in view of the needs of private respondents estate.
2. On the Petitioners argument that existence of the easement of right of way was not
annotated in his title
It is in the nature of legal easement that the servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to
provide the dominant estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from and egress to the
public highway

3. On the Petitioners argument that he was not a party to Civil Case

A decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to said case and those who are their
successor in interest by title after said case has been commenced or filed in court.
In this case, title in the name of petitioner was entered in the Register of Deedsafter he bought the
property from the bank which had acquired it from the Gabriels. For, although not a party to the
suit, he is a successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action in court.
Hence, the decision in Civil Case binds petitioner. (Rule 39, Sec. 47, of the Rules of Court)