Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL,
respondents
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from
looking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as
Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the
issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to
conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo
warranto against him was not filed on time.
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the
petition itself but of the payment of the filing fee, which the petitioner contends
was an indispensable requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00
only. This brings to mind the popular verse that for want of a horse the kingdom
was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was indeed filed beyond the
reglementary period, there is no question that this petition must be granted and
the challenge abated.
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio
City, on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the private
respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This
fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his
proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without the filing
fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was paid. This was done
beyond the reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of
a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer
on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission
within ten days after the proclamation of the result of the election.
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36,
Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the
payment of a filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00)
and the legal research fee as required by law.
And stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of
the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filling of the petition itself. He
cites many rulings of the Court to this effect, specifically Manchester v. Court of
Appeals.
1

For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of
time. In fact he says, it was flied ahead of time. His point is that when he filed his
"Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate Annulment of
Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the
COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC
Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected although it was offered. It was
only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as
solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19, serving him
notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid the filing fee on that date.
The private respondent argues further that during the period when the
COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the time for
filing an election protest or quo warranto proceeding was deemed suspended
under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2
At any rate, he says, Rule 36,
Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner, became
effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after publication of the said
Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof.
3
These rules
could not retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the
COMELEC.
In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did
not require it, the payment of filing fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996
and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on
January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private
respondent counters that the latter resolution was intended for the local
elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local
elections, which were supposed to be governed by the first-mentioned
resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on March 3, 1988, following
the lapse of seven days after its publication as required by RA No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became effective
on January 5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:
Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. The
rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission shall take effect on
the seventh day after their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least
(2) daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the
petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents
that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency
of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation
proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach
this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the payment of
the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record
that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect
only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the February 25, 1988
issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the
petition was filed.
The petitioner forgets Ta;ada v. Tuvera
4
when he argues that the resolutions
became effective "immediately upon approval" simply because it was so
provided therein. We held in that case that publication was still necessary
under the due process clause despite such effectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever
delay there may have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault
or neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case, we required the timely
payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the
case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,
5
however this Court, taking
into account the special circumstances of that case, declared:
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a
case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the
court may allow the payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In
the event of non-compliance therewith, the case shall be dismissed.
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. If the fees above prescribed
are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they
are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo
warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on time, the
petitioner would at the same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a
futile technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of
citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What is
worse is that it is regarded as an even less important consideration than the
reglementary period the petitioner insists upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the
petitioner is the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him.
However, as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and considering
the necessity for an early resolution of that more important question clearly and
urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it now in this
same action.
The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:
From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it
would appear that our sole function in this proceeding should be to
resolve the single issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the motion for new trial of the GSIS in question should indeed
be deemed pro forma. But going over the extended pleadings of both
parties, the Court is immediately impressed that substantial justice may not
be timely achieved, if we should decide this case upon such a technical
ground alone. We have carefully read all the allegations and arguments
of the parties, very ably and comprehensively expounded by evidently
knowledgeable and unusually competent counsel, and we feel we can
better serve the interests of justice by broadening the scope of our inquiry,
for as the record before us stands, we see that there is enough basis for us
to end the basic controversy between the parties here and now,
dispensing, however, with procedural steps which would not anyway
affect substantially the merits of their respective claims.
6

x x x
While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and
thereby allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more correct
procedure was for the respondent court to forward the case to the proper
court which was the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
Considering, however, the length of time that this case has been pending,
we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629)
and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states:
... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to
settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will
be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its
decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate Court and from
there to this Court. (p. 43)
Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988), we stated that:
... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those facts
dictate the rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's favor. There is therefore
no point in referring the case back to the Court of Appeals. The facts and
the legal propositions involved will not change, nor should the ultimate
judgment. Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends
of justice, it is time that the controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v.
Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co.
v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA
575; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105
Phil. 162).lwph1.t Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory
which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and
the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf.
Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked characteristic of our
judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so demand ... the
Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21
SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34
Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this Court act,
and act with finality.
7

x x x
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is
not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based
on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public
interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions
on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved
by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early
disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received all
the evidence of the parties.
8

This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where,
to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC
implicitly adopted as "its own" private respondent's repeated assertion
that petitioner is no longer a Filipino citizen. In so doing, has not
respondent COMELEC effectively disqualified itself, by reason of
prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto filed by private
respondent still pending before it?
9

This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the merits
of this case.
Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on
the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the
Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to be a
citizen of the Philippines.
10
The second was rendered by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the
petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines.
11

The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr.,
with Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and
Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without
prejudice to the issue of the respondent's citizenship being raised anew in a
proper case." Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while Commissioner
Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall have been made
with the Australian Embassy for official verification of the petitioner's alleged
naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-
Santiago and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. It is important to observe that in the proceeding
before the COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had
been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which was
eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an
Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien
with the CID upon his return to this country in 1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official
statement of the Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through its
Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of
that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. That statement
12
is
reproduced in full as follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a
certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and recognized as such by Letter of
Patent signed and sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on
23 November 1983, do hereby provide the following statement in response to
the subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition for
disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do
hereby certify that the statement is true and correct.
STATEMENT
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was
married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an
Australian citizen, he was not required to meet normal requirements for
the grant of citizenship and was granted Australian citizenship by Sydney
on 28 July 1976.
B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian
citizenship must take an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of
allegiance. The wording of the oath of affirmation is: "I ..., renouncing all
other allegiance ..." etc. This need not necessarily have any effect on his
former nationality as this would depend on the citizenship laws of his
former country.
C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in
Sydney on 27 June 1980 on the ground that the marriage had been
bigamous.
D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.
E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect of
Section 50 of Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the giving of
false or misleading information of a material nature in respect of an
application for Australian citizenship. If such a prosecution was successful,
he could be deprived of Australian citizenship under Section 21 of the Act.
F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of
Australian citizenship:
(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian citizenship
under Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship Act, or
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a formal
and voluntary act other than marriage, then he would automatically lose
as Australian citizenship under Section 17 of the Act.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THE
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT
MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.
(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to the
private respondent by the Department of Foreign Affairs reading as
follows:
13

Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you
that inquiry made with the Australian Government through the Embassy of
the Philippines in Canberra has elicited the following information:
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28 July
1976.
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to
either swear an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance
which carries a renunciation of "all other allegiance.
Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO
SEVERINO, JR. Assistant Secretary
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized
Australian reading as follows:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I will
be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I
will faithfully observe the laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an
Australian citizen.
14
And the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise
and declare that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty
Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors
according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the Laws of Australia
and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen.
15

The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence.
Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, which
he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before
the immigration authorities that he was an alien and registered as such under
Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985.
16
He later asked for the change
of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was
granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809.
17
He also categorically
declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements
voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the
barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner.
18

The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as
"mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as earlier
noted, not all the members joined in this finding. We reject this ruling as totally
baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not aware of the
consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted by counsel
when he performed these acts.
The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and
stresses Labo's political affiliation with the party in power then, but we need not
go into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of
the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does
not apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases.
19

Moreover, it does not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked only when the
petitioner filed his reply
20
to the private respondent's comment. Besides, one of
the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976
did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no
claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that
marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as
such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he
was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he
formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to
be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst
only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a
specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63,
which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are
applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that
under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia
was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was
bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here.
That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider
is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and
willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The
possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he
claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen
of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It
does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to
any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring
Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with
PD No. 725, providing that:
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship
may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying
with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of
Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking
the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall
thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. (Emphasis
supplied.)
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his
application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is
also the reason we must deny his present claim for recognition as a citizen of
the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on
January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a
qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage.
21
He was
therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42
of the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. An elective local official must be a citizen
of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day,
a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality,
city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein
for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy, and able to read and write English, Filipino, or any other
local language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality"
that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected
him by a "resonant and thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud
as all that, for his lead over the second-place was only about 2,100 votes. In
any event, the people of that locality could not have, even unanimously,
changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total
allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of
their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their
countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done
so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the
results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by
him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost
during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at
bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but
were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The
petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not
now qualified to serve as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed
the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The
simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections
22

decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was
proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as
a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In
effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by
eight members of the Court then
23
with three dissenting
24
and another two
reserving their vote.
25
One was on official leave.
26

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos,
27
Which represents
the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine
first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes
28
was supported by ten
members of the Court
29
without any dissent, although one reserved his vote,
30

another took no part
31
and two others were on leave.
32
There the Court held:
... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is a fundamental Idea in all republican forms of government
that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast
in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he
was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective
office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may
not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However,
in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief
that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status
as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other
nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so endowed, he must
not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that may
offer him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own country.
To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer
his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him.
33
But having done so,
he cannot expect to be welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his
adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an undesirable
alien.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered
after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade
makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he
solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of
the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of
Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the
Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and executory.
The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.,concurring:
As in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (G. R. No. 87193, June 23,
1989) and inspire of what would otherwise be insuperable procedural
obstacles, I am constrained to concur in the Court's decision so forcefully and
felicitously written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. I do so because I cannot see
how the Court can countenance a citizen of a foreign country or one who has
renounced Filipino citizenship sitting as the mayor of one of the most important
cities in the Philippines.
What was raised to the Court was only the issue of the COMELEC's jurisdiction to
inquire into the citizenship of the petitioner. Ordinarily, we would have limited
ourselves to sustaining the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and remanding the
case for further proceedings and the rendition of a decision. Under Section 7,
Article IXA of the Constitution, a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty day from receipt of a copy thereof. No decision on the petitioner's
citizenship has been rendered and no decision can, as yet, be elevated to us
for review. I, therefore, reiterate my statement in Frivaldo that my concurrence
is limited only to cases involving citizenship and disloyalty but not to any of the
many other grounds for disqualification cited in my concurring opinion.
Our decision to disqualify the petitioner is particularly distressing to me because
I am impressed by the singular achievements in the beautification of Baguio
City, in the peace and order situation, and in the resurgence of civic pride so
visible to anyone who has gone up to Baguio since Mr. Labo assumed the
mayorship. However, I see no other way this case can be resolved except by
adopting a pragmatic approach. It is beyond dispute that a non-citizen
cannot be the mayor of Baguio City. I join the rest of the Court.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.,concurring:
As in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (G. R. No. 87193, June 23,
1989) and inspire of what would otherwise be insuperable procedural
obstacles, I am constrained to concur in the Court's decision so forcefully and
felicitously written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. I do so because I cannot see
how the Court can countenance a citizen of a foreign country or one who has
renounced Filipino citizenship sitting as the mayor of one of the most important
cities in the Philippines.
What was raised to the Court was only the issue of the COMELEC's jurisdiction to
inquire into the citizenship of the petitioner. Ordinarily, we would have limited
ourselves to sustaining the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and remanding the
case for further proceedings and the rendition of a decision. Under Section 7,
Article IXA of the Constitution, a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty day from receipt of a copy thereof. No decision on the petitioner's
citizenship has been rendered and no decision can, as yet, be elevated to us
for review. I, therefore, reiterate my statement in Frivaldo that my concurrence
is limited only to cases involving citizenship and disloyalty but not to any of the
many other grounds for disqualification cited in my concurring opinion.
Our decision to disqualify the petitioner is particularly distressing to me because
I am impressed by the singular achievements in the beautification of Baguio
City, in the peace and order situation, and in the resurgence of civic pride so
visible to anyone who has gone up to Baguio since Mr. Labo assumed the
mayorship. However, I see no other way this case can be resolved except by
adopting a pragmatic approach. It is beyond dispute that a non-citizen
cannot be the mayor of Baguio City. I join the rest of the Court.































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner,
vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN,
DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO,
respondent.
Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.
Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner.
Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with
the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner.
1
After manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to
refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent
Commissioner thru counsel filed the return.
2
Counsel for the parties were heard
in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit marked
exhibits, and to file memoranda.
3
An internal resolution of 7 November 1988
referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988 resolution,
denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the pending
issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2)
validity of warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order
dated 24 November 1988.
4
On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny
with finality the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and further resolved to
deny the urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order dated 28 November
1988.
5

Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining
order on 5 December 1988.
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court
on 7 December 1988.
6
Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on
13 December 1988, the basis of which is a summary judgment of deportation
against Yu issued by the CID Board of Commissioners on 2 December 1988.
7

Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral argument on 8 December
1988.
In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention
8
was
filed by petitioner on 13 December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said
motion for release dated 14 December 1988 was filed on 15 December 1988
together with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO.
The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7
December 1988 is urgently sought by respondent Commissioner who was
ordered to cease and desist from immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending
the conclusion of hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. To finally
dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's motion for
clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5 December 1988,
9
urgent
motion for release from arbitrary detention dated 13 December 1988,
10
the
memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December
1988,
11
motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December 1988.
12

Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7
December 1988) dated 9 December 1988,
13
and the vigorous opposition to lift
restraining order dated 15 December 1988,
14
the Court resolved to give
petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice within which
to explain and prove why he should still be considered a citizen of the
Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport.
15

Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20
December 1988
16
followed by an earnest request for temporary release on 22
December 1988. Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating
her previous motion to lift temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply
thereto on 6 January 1989.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese
passport in 1971,
17
valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period
upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his
naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981,
petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N.
1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said
Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986.
18

While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his
naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith
and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,"
19
he declared his nationality
as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the
Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd.
20
filed in Hongkong sometime in April
1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an
express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through
naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano,
21
express
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly
and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship
upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen
22
resumed or reacquired his prior
status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport
23
and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had
become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of
Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of
Special Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the
issuance of said TRO have unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly
renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not only established
by the pleadings they are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this
point with the CID would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due
process was obviated when petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity
to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his
Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary
proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the
insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or
not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be
displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves
adverse to the petitioner his motion for clarification and other motions
mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from
detention is DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order
is GRANTED. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, C.J., dissenting
I dissent. The treatment given by the majority to the petition at bar does not
meet the traditional standards of fairness envisioned in the due process clause.
Petitioner herein is being effectively deprived of his Filipino citizenship through a
summary procedure and upon pieces of documentary evidence that, to my
mind, are not sufficiently substantial and probative for the purpose and
conclusion they were offered.
The observation of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his dissenting opinion that
"(c)onsidering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct
procedures according to law must be applied," is appropriate as it has been
held that "(i)f, however, in a deportation proceeding, the alleged alien claims
citizenship and supports the claim by substantial evidence, he is entitled to
have his status finally determined by a judicial, as distinguished from an
executive, tribunal" (3 Am Jur 2d 949 citing United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v.
Tod, 263 US 149, 68 Led 221, 44 S Ct 54; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 US 276, 66 Led
938, 42 S Ct 492). By this, it means a full blown trial under the more rigid rules of
evidence prescribed in court proceedings. And certainly, the review powers
being exercised by this Court in this case fall short of this requirement. Said
powers of review cannot be a substitute for the demands of due process,
particularly in the light of the well-recognized principle that this Court is not a
trier of facts.
As adverted to earlier, I find the evidence on record relied upon by the majority
to be inadequate to support the conclusion that petitioner has renounced his
Filipino citizenship, Renunciation must be shown by clear and express evidence
and not left to inference or implication.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting
I disagree with the summary procedure employed in this case to divest a
Filipino of his citizenship.
Judging from the records available to us, it appears that Mr. Willie Yu is far from
being the desirable kind of Filipino we would encourage to stay with us. But
precisely for this reason, I believe that a petition for denaturalization should
have been filed and prosecuted in the proper trial court instead of the shortcut
methods we are sustaining in the majority opinion. I must emphasize that the Bill
of Rights, its due process clause, and other restrictions on the untrammeled
exercise of government power find their fullest expression when invoked by
non-conforming, rebellious, or undesirable characters.
Considering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures
according to law must be applied. If Mr. Yu is no longer a Filipino, by all means
this Court should not stand in the way of the respondent Commissioner's efforts
to deport him. But where a person pleads with all his might that he has never
formally renounced his citizenship and that he might die if thrown out of the
country, he deserves at the very least a full trial where the reason behind his
actions may be explored and all the facts fully ascertained. The determination
that a person (not necessarily Mr. Yu) has ceased to be a Filipino is so
momentous and far-reaching that it should not be left to summary
proceedings.
I find it a dangerous precedent if administrative official on such informal
evidence as that presented in this case are allowed to rule that a Filipino has
"renounced" his citizenship and has, therefore, become stateless or a citizen of
another country (assuming that other country does not reject him because he
formally renounced citizenship therein when he became a Filipino) and to
immediately throw him out of the Philippines.
I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign passport is ipso facto
express renunciation of Filipino citizenship. A Filipino may get a foreign passport
for convenience, employment, or avoidance of discriminatory visa
requirements but he remains at heart a Filipino. Or he may do so because he
wants to give up his Philippine citizenship. Whatever the reason, it must be
ascertained in a court of law where a full trial is conducted instead of an
administrative determination of a most summary nature.
There are allegedly high government officials who have applied for and been
given alien certificates of registration by our Commission on Immigration and
Deportation or who have in the past, performed acts even more indicative of
"express renunciation" than the mere use of a passport or the signing of a
commercial document where a different citizenship has been typed or
entered. Are we ready now to authorize the respondent Commissioner to de-
Filipinization them? Can they be immediately deported for lack of lawful
documents to stay here as resident aliens? Can a summary administrative
determination override the voice of hundreds of thousands or even millions of
voters who put them in public office? It is likewise not the function of this Court
to be a trier of facts and to arrive at conclusions in the first instance in
citizenship cases.
The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the point. Like any other Filipino being
denaturalized or otherwise deprived of citizenship, he deserves his full day in
court. I . therefore, regretfully dissent on grounds of due process.
CRUZ, J., concurring
I concur in the result because I believe the petitioner has failed to overcome
the presumption that he has forfeited his status as a naturalized Filipino by his
obtention of a Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued by a state
only to its nationals. The petitioner has not shown that he comes under the
exception and was granted the Portuguese passport despite his Philippine
citizenship.
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly
renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view
rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing
citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full
awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the
"commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
CORTES, J., dissenting
I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of Filipino citizenship in
deportation proceedings does not ipso facto deprive the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) of jurisdiction over a case, its findings being
subject to judicial review.
However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that in this case the loss
of petitioner's Filipino citizenship has been established. The evidence on record,
consisting of the photocopy of a memorandum from the Portuguese Consular
Office that petitioner applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport in 1981
and that it expired in 1986 and photocopies of commercial papers manifesting
petitioner's nationality as Portuguese, without authentication by the
appropriate Philippine Consul, to my mind, do not constitute substantial
evidence that under the law petitioner has lost his Filipino citizenship by express
renunciation.
I find the CIDs evidence inadequate to create even a prima facie case of such
renunciation.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, C.J., dissenting
I dissent. The treatment given by the majority to the petition at bar does not
meet the traditional standards of fairness envisioned in the due process clause.
Petitioner herein is being effectively deprived of his Filipino citizenship through a
summary procedure and upon pieces of documentary evidence that, to my
mind, are not sufficiently substantial and probative for the purpose and
conclusion they were offered.
The observation of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his dissenting opinion that
"(c)onsidering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct
procedures according to law must be applied," is appropriate as it has been
held that "(i)f, however, in a deportation proceeding, the alleged alien claims
citizenship and supports the claim by substantial evidence, he is entitled to
have his status finally determined by a judicial, as distinguished from an
executive, tribunal" (3 Am Jur 2d 949 citing United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v.
Tod, 263 US 149, 68 Led 221, 44 S Ct 54; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 US 276, 66 Led
938, 42 S Ct 492). By this, it means a full blown trial under the more rigid rules of
evidence prescribed in court proceedings. And certainly, the review powers
being exercised by this Court in this case fall short of this requirement. Said
powers of review cannot be a substitute for the demands of due process,
particularly in the light of the well-recognized principle that this Court is not a
trier of facts.
As adverted to earlier, I find the evidence on record relied upon by the majority
to be inadequate to support the conclusion that petitioner has renounced his
Filipino citizenship, Renunciation must be shown by clear and express evidence
and not left to inference or implication.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting
I disagree with the summary procedure employed in this case to divest a
Filipino of his citizenship.
Judging from the records available to us, it appears that Mr. Willie Yu is far from
being the desirable kind of Filipino we would encourage to stay with us. But
precisely for this reason, I believe that a petition for denaturalization should
have been filed and prosecuted in the proper trial court instead of the shortcut
methods we are sustaining in the majority opinion. I must emphasize that the Bill
of Rights, its due process clause, and other restrictions on the untrammeled
exercise of government power find their fullest expression when invoked by
non-conforming, rebellious, or undesirable characters.
Considering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures
according to law must be applied. If Mr. Yu is no longer a Filipino, by all means
this Court should not stand in the way of the respondent Commissioner's efforts
to deport him. But where a person pleads with all his might that he has never
formally renounced his citizenship and that he might die if throw out of the
country, he deserves at the very least a full trial where the reason behind his
actions may be explored and all the facts fully ascertained. The determination
that a person (not necessarily Mr. Yu) has ceased to be a Filipino is so
momentous and far-reaching that it should not be left to summary
proceedings.
I find it a dangerous precedent if administrative official on such informal
evidence as that presented in this case are allowed to rule that a Filipino has
"renounced" his citizenship and has, therefore, become stateless or a citizen of
another country (assuming that other country does not reject him because he
formally renounced citizenship therein when he became a Filipino) and to
immediately throw him out of the Philippines.
I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign passport is ipso facto
express renunciation of Filipino citizenship. A Filipino may get a foreign passport
for convenience, employment, or avoidance of discriminatory visa
requirements but he remains at heart a Filipino. Or he may do so because he
wants to give up his Philippine citizenship. Whatever the reason, it must be
ascertained in a court of law where a full trial is conducted instead of an
administrative determination of a most summary nature.
There are allegedly high government officials who have applied for and been
given alien certificates of registration by our Commission on Immigration and
Deportation or who have in the past, performed acts even more indicative of
"express renunciation" than the mere use of a passport or the signing of a
commercial document where a different citizenship has been typed or
entered. Are we ready now to authorize the respondent Commissioner to de-
Filipinization them? Can they be immediately deported for lack of lawful
documents to stay here as resident aliens? Can a summary administrative
determination override the voice of hundreds of thousands or even millions of
voters who put them in public office? It is likewise not the function of this Court
to be a trier of facts and to arrive at conclusions in the first instance in
citizenship cases.
The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the point. Like any other Filipino being
denaturalized or otherwise deprived of citizenship, he deserves his full day in
court. I . therefore, regretfully dissent on grounds of due process.
CRUZ, J., concurring
I concur in the result because I believe the petitioner has failed to overcome
the presumption that he has forfeited his status as a naturalized Filipino by his
obtention of a Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued by a state
only to its nationals. The petitioner has not shown that he comes under the
exception and was granted the Portuguese passport despite his Philippine
citizenship.
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly
renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view
rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing
citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full
awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the
"commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
CORTES, J., dissenting
I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of Filipino citizenship in
deportation proceedings does not ipso facto deprive the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) of jurisdiction over a case, its findings being
subject to judicial review.
However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that in this case the loss
of petitioner's Filipino citizenship has been established. The evidence on record,
consisting of the photocopy of a memorandum from the Portuguese Consular
Office that petitioner applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport in 1981
and that it expired in 1986 and photocopies of commercial papers manifesting
petitioner's nationality as Portuguese, without authentication by the
appropriate Philippine Consul, to my mind, do not constitute substantial
evidence that under the law petitioner has lost his Filipino citizenship by express
renunciation.
I find the CIDs evidence inadequate to create even a prima facie case of such
renunciation.














Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should
be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon -
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes
in three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be
disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims
to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that
the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the
electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots;
and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted
directly to the position of governor, but who according to prevailing
jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of
Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections,
and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for
certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division,
1
promulgated on
December 19, 1995
2
and another Resolution of the Comelec en banc
promulgated February 23, 1996
3
denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections.
On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition
4

with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be
disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of
not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy
be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec
promulgated a Resolution
5
granting the petition with the following disposition
6
:
WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares
that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of
Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines.
Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is canceled.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until
after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted
for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en
banc
7
affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election
returns and a Certificate of Votes
8
dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the
following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of
Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition
9

praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order
10
dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition
"only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming
candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of
Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,
1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,
11
docketed as
SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of
Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in
the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after
"his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special
Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such,
when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released
and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there
was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . .
." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs.
Comelec,
12
the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position of
governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein
assailed Resolution
13
holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest
number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30,
1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold
the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore
RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the
proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby
ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered
the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R.
Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately
reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim
petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon
having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus,
qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His
Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this
resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof.
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution
14
promulgated on February
23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the
prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996
a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the status quo
prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the
following propositions"
15
:
First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and
substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction
with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction
in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;
Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was
a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be
elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;
Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is
the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify
him to hold the Office of Governor; and
Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports
the validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of
Sorsogon.
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first
two of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution
16
of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995,
disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the
May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the
Philippines";
2. Resolution
1
7 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11,
1995; and
3. Resolution
18
of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May
11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755.
However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different
ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is
reproduced hereinunder:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they
were not rendered "within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than
fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on
the petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the
election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said
Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and
123755 since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are
identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of
governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and
required them thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as
follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure
his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office
of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a
continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship
of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in
SPC No. 95-317 considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case,
an election protest or a quo warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in
light of existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in
promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from
assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not
rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold
legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 1991
19
expressly requires Philippine citizenship
as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial
governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other
local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice
mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age
on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court
20
as a non-citizen, it is
therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in
fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A.
7160).
Under Philippine law,
21
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No.
104654
22
and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his
citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so
"failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of
the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his
political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by
this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected
governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the
1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul
Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified
from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a
third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable
decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of
having successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring
citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor
General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he
lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his
cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took
his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June
30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been
proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial
Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and
unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and
since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious
defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that
"then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by
Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and
contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of
prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum dated
March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization
constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino
directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings
within your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of
Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."
23

This memorandum dated March 27, 1987
24
cannot by any stretch of legal
hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D.
No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones
25
and a repeal may be
express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then
President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on the copy furnished us by Lee
-- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed
or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even
mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule
of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied
repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously
demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist".
26

The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a
legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive
even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be
regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated
as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the
acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever
"judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other
words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first
Congress -- once created -- to deal with the matter. If she had intended to
repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the
matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance
in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the
exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to
the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential
Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit
unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common
sense as well.
Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the
repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was
"filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30,
1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits
thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the
Office of the President in Malacaang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is
confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was
reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started
processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the
FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be
said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee
on Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent,"
2
7
the Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996
that such allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who applied
and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to
this Court, through a Manifestation
28
filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality
in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The
mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to
conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the
requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with,
nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
725
29
itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and
regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to
promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien
covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant
is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous
citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen
who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his
naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was made
necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and
could not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and
the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his
country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General,
were granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the
existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any
contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued
before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President,
pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid,
nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas
the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must
exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is
filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654
30
which held that "both the Local
Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can
run and be elected to public office." Obviously, however, this was a mere
obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was
valid or not -- and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his
naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office
should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we
shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must
be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . .
. where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at
least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular
date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for
residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately
preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on
election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
public office,
31
and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other
than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation,
shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an
official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day
32
the
term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was
therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at
that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the
liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on
qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So
too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be
noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications"
of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such qualification
be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates
of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications -- unless otherwise
expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should thus be
possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the
time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30,
1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap &
Sons,
33
if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people
and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing
allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the
time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral
argument
34
to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed
at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as
a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also
specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter". And,
under the law
35
a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore,
Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if
he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the
requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed
prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter,
then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law
abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a
voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter
requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not
to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered
as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he
intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government
Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require
him to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of
this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement
is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he
seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not
disputed -- that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his
registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration . . . In
fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."
36

So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr.
Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987,
1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was
questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was
allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on
May 8, 1995."
3
7
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he
intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be
reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election
or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code
38
gives any voter, presumably including the defeated
candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a
candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on
how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from
failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within
ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such
time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the
Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m.,
June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having
taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he
should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered
the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such
oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at
such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the
repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application
on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,
39
"(l)aws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled
exceptions
40
to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or
REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,
41
curative statutes are those which undertake to cure
errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative
proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which
otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some
statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They
operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in
operation. Agpalo,
42
on the other hand, says that curative statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations . . . (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in
existing laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes
are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or
irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be
otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to
remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective
law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.

43

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also
provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its
preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women
(who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could
not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until
"after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and
who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision
allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine
citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply
to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect."
Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the right to re-acquire
Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist
prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy
and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their
Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship",
because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have
had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but
with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General
44
argues:
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96
SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14
SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the
existing naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married
Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of
their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by
naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing
the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship
by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the
aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are
considered essentially remedial and curative.
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is
unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute
retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or
amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a
consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof."
45
It is obvious to
the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events
and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence.
And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right
equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in
the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation
to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a
remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose
for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past
transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although
the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some
vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty."
46
This is all the more true of
P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right
of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D.
725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975,
while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and
applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo
became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725)
which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under
said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to
the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply
that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law
should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even
before the law came into being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of
former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is
to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to
have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the
repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to
take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing
in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of
the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to
anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his
repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any
contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some
constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo
deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there
were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent
prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and
the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of
applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who
may be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American
citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This
should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.

4
7
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act
upon and grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time
after the same were filed.
48
The fact that such interregna were relatively
insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result
of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct
prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has
the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection
with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the
interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not present
in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice
frustrated, should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust
or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of
the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions
about his possession of the nationality qualification -- whether at the date of
proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of
filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered
voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having
been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994,
his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American.
Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual
citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would
disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?"
49
We answer this
question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was
really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before
that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he
"had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship --
long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he
abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to
his Filipino citizenship."
50

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

51

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995.
Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before
the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it
is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.
52

The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution
53
of the Comelec Second
Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its
Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or
on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by this Honorable
Court.
54
Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June
30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying"
Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes
were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and
executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements
of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time
disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the
Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was
rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654
was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such
elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the words of the
respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution:
55

The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided
that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the
purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record
of any "final judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a
candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said
in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995),
directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not
a Filipino citizen "having been declared by the Supreme Court in its
Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines." This
declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in connection with
the 1992 elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot
govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the
modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration,
56
we held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again, as the occasion demands.
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the
petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that
may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election
protest or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed
on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's)
proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day reglementary period."
Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election
protest or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution
5
7 has given the Comelec
ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating
to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . .
officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in
the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say
that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and
decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317
obviously is one.
58
Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,
59
we ruled:
The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of
office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed,
we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies
may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning
candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187
SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs.
COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an
assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the
proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the
COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing
Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186
SCRA 484.)
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must
"be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as
Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no
question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the
following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,
60
"the fact remains that he
(Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,
61

Lee is "a second placer, . . . just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the
pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo
62
case, as follows:
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in
fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of
their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing
away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the
next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not
been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was
notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the
electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner
Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its
resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city
Payor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to
petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final
and subject to the final outcome of this case.
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling
appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation
as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both cases a
pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an
(omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several
others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the
electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged
disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in
other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in
spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it
is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro- claimed, since in losing
the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of
the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired
his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the
1995 elections, he -- not Lee -- should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's
proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the
Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec
(Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution
of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled
because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by
Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are
deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First
Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc
63
on February 23, 1996;
which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is
merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try
and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt
is strong. (emphasis supplied)
Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues
that President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed
as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it
decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because the
said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo
case;
64
viz., "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725,
Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends
that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the
Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous
judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or
mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured
whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the
purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his
disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous
rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to
question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of
candidacy on the ground of a false material representation therein as required
by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding
that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that
Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions
promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they
were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as prescribed by
Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the
Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A.
6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the
elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78
"is merely directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless
votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the
dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be
filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however
deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition.
And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period
mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the
Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed
beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the
unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive
effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo
case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly
involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there
is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his
qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening
repatriation has changed his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the
1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior
to his repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a
ground to lose American citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with
the duty of determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the
legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in international
law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens -- not who are
the citizens of other countries.
65
The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding
of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee
to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is
binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to
Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should be declared winner because
"Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was publicly known". First, there is
absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if
there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous
elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still
deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How
then can there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code
refers to the qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not
elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that
section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement
of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39,
par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to
"candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to
"candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so,
instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if
Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at
election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the
same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates for
governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's
repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides
that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what
the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood
thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is
deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word
"elective" in reference to Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as
regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest
non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier in this
Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first
to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But
that is NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and
applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and
perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or
liberal; the letter or the spirit, the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal
syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions;
harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying
election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than
to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice
rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute
unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's
conscience.
E P I L O G U E
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code
is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected.
We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not
having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and
Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus
valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of
the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative
intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up
his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he
abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his
application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having
given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the
vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of
governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since
his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a
voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well.
The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of
the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run
for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous
rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide
petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral
laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people,
66
for
in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the
popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal
niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
Consistently, we have held:
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations
omitted).
6
7
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense
and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly
stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure
the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a
reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to
resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority,
for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those
who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning
candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic
68
to constitutional and legal principles
that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of
the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his
cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his
repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship
at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have
disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time
of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a
disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real
essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role
of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the
Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and
sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in
the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought
American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this
stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and
dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and
sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly
voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every
time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization
bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer
determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-
backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal
technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his
native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and
love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of
justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all,
Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most
powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on
returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He
therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied
in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the
indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a
leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions
of the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and
academic. In any event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Melo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concurs in the result.
Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is
pro-people and pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will of
the people which is the be-all and the end-all of republicanism, it rests on a
foundation that will endure time and its tempest.
The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution.
For this reason, it appears as the first in our declaration of principles and state
policies. Thus, section 1 of Article II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he
Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them." The same principle
served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions.
1
It is one of the few
principles whose truth has been cherished by the Americans as self-evident.
Section 4, Article IV of the U.S. Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal
government to guarantee to every state a "republican form of government."
With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed republicanism as
the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino
framers.
2

Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is
more people-oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that
the prime duty of the Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section
1, Article XI also provides that ". . . public officers . . . must at all times be
accountable to the people . . ." Sections 15 and 1 of Article XIII define the role
and rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates that
"[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of
the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty."
And section 2 of Article XVII provides that "amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative . . ." All these provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to
the sovereignty of our people.
To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose
dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the
framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is
meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern.
3

Former Dean Vicente Sinco
4
states that an essential quality of sovereignty is
legal omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain essential qualities
inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This means
that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and absolute in relation to other legal
institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively its legal competence. Its
powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of what it should do at
any given time."
5
Citing Barker,
6
he adds that a more amplified definition of
sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal adjustment of all legal issues."
The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case of
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
7
where it held that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not
subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while
sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty
itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists
and acts."
In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as
distinguished from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains:
8

xxx xxx xxx
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for
the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern
themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and
renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries
who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf,
serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or
retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican
government is a responsible government whose officials hold and
discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to the
Constitution, "at all times be accountable to the people" they are sworn to
serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost needless to
state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the
people themselves.
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty
is indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the people together, all the
time.
9
For this reason, the Constitution and our laws provide when the entire
electorate or only some of them can elect those who make our laws and those
who execute our laws. Thus, the entire electorate votes for our senators but only
our district electorates vote for our congressmen, only our provincial electorates
vote for the members of our provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for
our city councilors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our councilors.
Also, the entire electorate votes for our President and Vice-President but only
our provincial electorates vote for our governors, only our city electorates vote
for our mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our mayors. By
defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the sovereignty
of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty
has been fragmented.
It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the
people of Sorsogon should be given the right to defy the law by allowing
Frivaldo to sit as their governor. Rather, the issue is: whether the will of the voters
of Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be given a decisive
value considering the uncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to
satisfy the qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and jurisprudence,
both here and abroad, on this legal issue cannot be denied. In the United
States,
10
there are two (2) principal schools of thought on the matter. One
espouses the view that a candidate must possess the qualifications for office at
the time of his election. The other ventures the view that the candidate should
satisfy the qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of the office. I am
unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this difficult
question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban adhered to the
second school of thought while Mr. Justice Davide dissents.
I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the
matter for this is vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion
can bring about ill effects to the State. Mr. Justice Davide's fear is based on the
assumption that Frivaldo continues to be disqualified and we cannot allow him
to sit as governor without transgressing the law. I do not concede this
assumption for as stressed above, courts have been sharply divided by this
mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see how we can derogate on
the sovereignty of the people by according more weight to the votes of the
people of Sorsogon.
Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion,
we cannot prosecute them "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty."
With due respect, the analogy is not appropriate. In his hypothetical case,
rebellion is concededly a crime, a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, an offense against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at bar, it
cannot be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon violated the law by
voting for Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldo's name was in the list of candidates
allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At that time too, Frivaldo was taking
all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even our jurisprudence has not
settled the issue when a candidate should possess the qualification of
citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I cannot
imagine how it will be disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the case
at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.
In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be
resolutory of the case at bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our
political history. For three (3) times, Frivaldo ran as governor of the province of
Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he was disqualified on the ground of citizenship.
The people of Sorsogon voted for him as their governor despite his
disqualification. The people never waffled in their support for Frivaldo. In 1988,
they gave him a winning margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave him a winning
spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo is
the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we
should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will
of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must
respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". .
. an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate
source of established authority."
11
The choice of the governed on who shall be
their governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of government.
In cases where the sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only be
legally right but also politically correct. We cannot fail by making the people
succeed.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by
my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself
unable to join him.
I
I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but not on the
ground that President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum
"effectively repealed" P.D. No. 725. In my view, the said memorandum only
suspended the implementation of the latter decree by divesting the Special
Committee on Naturalization of its authority to further act on grants of
citizenship under LOI No. 270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No.
1379; and "any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations."
A reading of the last paragraph of the memorandum can lead to no other
conclusion, thus:
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special
Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist
from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of
responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instruction No. 270 dated April 11,
1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975,
as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978,
relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other
related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations. (emphasis
supplied)
It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to
LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that
P.D. No. 725 is one such "related law" as it involves the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by repatriation and designates the Special Committee on
Naturalization created under LOI No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e., approve
or disapprove) applications under the said decree. The power of President
Aquino to suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27 March 1987
memorandum is beyond question considering that under Section 6, Article XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative power until the Congress
established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July 1987.
I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27
March 1987 was merely a declaration of "executive policy," and not an
exercise of legislative power. LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any
other related laws," such as P.D. No. 725, were issued by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers -- not executive power. These
laws relate to the acquisition (by naturalization) and reacquisition (by
repatriation) of Philippine citizenship, and in light of Sections 1(4) and 3, Article
IV of the 1987 Constitution (naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship shall be in accordance with law), it is indubitable that these subjects
are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the creation of the
Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the
power to accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly
legislative acts.
Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the reactivation
or revival of the Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by
Congress, since the President had long lost his authority to exercise "legislative
power." Considering that Congress has not seen it fit to do so, the President
cannot, in the exercise of executive power, lift the cease and desist order nor
reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the Committee
cannot validly accept Frivaldo's application for repatriation and approve it.
II
Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not "cure his
lack of citizenship." I depart from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the
citizenship requirement must be met, and that being the case, then it suffices
that citizenship be possessed upon commencement of the term of the office
involved; therefore, since Frivaldo "re-assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00
p.m. on 30 June 1995 and the term of office of Governor commenced at 12:00
noon of that day, he had, therefore, complied with the citizenship requirement.
In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective
local officials and not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are
not synonymous, as the ponencia seems to suggest. The first refers to the nature
of the office, which requires the process of voting by the electorate involved;
while the second refers to a victorious candidate for an elective office. The
section unquestionably refers to elective -- not elected -- local officials. It falls
under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled
Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a) thereof begins with the phrase
"An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of
candidates. It reads as follows:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent
component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years
of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the
sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on
election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15)
years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election
day (emphasis supplied)
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of
candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way
may the section be construed to mean that possession of qualifications
should be reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the
elected candidate.
For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when
the citizenship requirement must be possessed. I submit that the requirement
must be satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship must be possessed, not merely at
the commencement of the term, but at an earlier time, the latest being
election day itself. Section 39 is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant
this to be, as one basic qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A
REGISTERED VOTER IN THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . .
WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This simply means that he possesses all the
qualifications to exercise the right of suffrage. The fundamental qualification for
the exercise of this sovereign right is the possession of Philippine citizenship. No
less than the Constitution makes it the first qualification, as Section 1, Article V
thereof provides:
Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. . . . (emphasis supplied)
And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg.
881) expressly provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus:
Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines, not
otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over, who shall
have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality
wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election, may be a registered voter. (emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in
the 1988 and 1992 elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenship
-- he being a naturalized citizen of the United States of America -- he was
DISQUALIFIED to be elected as such and to serve the position (Frivaldo vs.
Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the Philippines vs. De
la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]). This disqualification inexorably nullified Frivaldo's
registration as a voter and declared it void ab initio. Our judgments therein
were self-executory and no further act, e.g., a COMELEC order to cancel his
registration as a voter or the physical destruction of his voter's certificate, was
necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a registered voter
for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing that
Frivaldo registered anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he did -- in
obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification -- this did not make him a
Filipino citizen, hence it was equally void ab initio. That he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the 1995 elections and was even allowed to vote therein were
of no moment. Neither act made him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the
judgments of this Court. On the contrary, said acts made a mockery of our
judgments. For the Court now to validate Frivaldo's registration as a voter
despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said judgments by
making their effectivity and enforceability dependent on a COMELEC order
cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the physical destruction of his
certificate of registration as a voter which, of course, was never our intention.
Moreover, to sanction Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be to sacrifice
substance in favor of form (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of
voters or voter's ID), and abet the COMELEC's incompetence in failing to
cancel Frivaldo's registration and allowing him to vote.
The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification
should be reckoned not from the date of the election nor the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, but from the date of proclamation, is that the only
available remedy to question the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a candidate is a
petition for quo warranto which, under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code, may be filed only within ten days from proclamation and not earlier.
I beg to differ.
Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a
candidate's ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code allows the filing of a petition to deny due course to or cancel the
certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation
contained therein, as required by Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn, requires
that the person filing the certificate of candidacy must state, inter alia, that he
is eligible for the office, which means that he has all the qualifications
(including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the
disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78 may be filed
at any time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The section reads in full as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA
760, 768 [1992]), where this Court held:
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain
candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period Section 78 of
the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him
completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification
of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days
from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under
Section 253 of the Code. Section 1, Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any
regional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo
warranto with the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The
petition may be filed within ten (10) days from the date the respondent is
proclaimed (Section 2).
Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of
a petition for disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided by the Constitution or by existing
laws, "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not
later than the date of proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide:
Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates
Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess
all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or
by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the
last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date
of proclamation.
While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification
on the ground of lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its invalidity is not
in issue here.
In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled
within the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
mandatory? The answer is provided in Loong.
We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in
the light of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition
to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
even beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, as
long as it is filed within a reasonable time from the discovery of the ineligibility.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions
to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in
Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25- day
period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action
to cancel a certificate of candidacy on account of any false representation
made therein. On the contrary, said Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section
78 of the Code.
We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case
which may be based on grounds other than that provided under Section 78
of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects
referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases filed under
Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is
mention made of the period within which these disqualification cases may
be filed. This is because there are provisions in the Code which supply the
periods within which a petition relating to disqualification of candidates must
be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253 on petitions
for quo warranto.
I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely
directory because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC to try
and decide petitions for disqualification even after elections. I submit that
Section 6 refers to disqualifications under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, the
proper court or the COMELEC are granted the authority to continue hearing
the case after the election, and during the pendency of the case, suspend the
proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the evidence against him is strong.
Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code provide:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be
a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed
removed upon declaration by competent authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he
again becomes disqualified.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate,
or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and
the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of
violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not
later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is
sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of
the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation
and assumption to office.
III
Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the
arguments in support of the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given
retroactive effect, as such goes against the spirit and letter of P.D. No. 725. The
spirit adheres to the principle that acquisition or re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship is not a right, but a mere privilege. Before the advent of P.D. No. 725,
only the following could apply for repatriation: (a) Army, Navy, or Air Corps
deserters; and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage
to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section 2[2], C.A. No. 63). P.D. NO.
725 expanded this to include Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship
by marriage to aliens even before the death of their alien husbands, or the
termination of their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost
their Philippine citizenship but subsequently desired to reacquire the latter.
Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that
repatriation takes effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, thus:
. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the
Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction
No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
AFTER WHICH THEY SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and capitalization supplied)
Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation
under the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the
committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is
approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the
applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If
the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the
filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided
otherwise.
This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement in the
first Frivaldo case that what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an act
"formally rejecting [the] adopted state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the
Philippines." That act meant nothing less than taking of the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines. If we now take this revision of doctrine to its
logical end, then it would also mean that if Frivaldo had chosen and
reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization or through Congressional
action, such would retroact to the filing of the petition for naturalization or the
bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a proposition which both the first
and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.
The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that
P.D. No. 725 can be given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial
nature.
Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may
P.D. No. 725 be characterized as a curative or remedial statute:
Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by
curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations.
The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to
be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or
made harmless, is something the legislature might have dispensed with by
a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.
Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in
existing laws, and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable a person
to carry into effect that which they have designed and intended, but has
failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory
disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which,
before the enactment of the statute, was invalid. (RUBEN E. AGPALO,
Statutory Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations omitted).
P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through
the marriage of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a foreign
country of natural-born Filipino citizens. It involves then the substantive, nay
primordial, right of citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it means, in
reality, the acquisition of "a new right," as the ponencia cannot but concede.
Therefore, it may not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect considering
that one who has lost Philippine citizenship does not have the right to reacquire
it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that citizenship, once lost, may
only be reacquired in the manner provided by law. Moreover, it has also been
observed that:
The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are
statutes relating to procedure and not substantive rights. (Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, Third ed. [1943], 5704 at 74, citations
omitted).
If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is curative or
remedial statute, it would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect
since it explicitly provides the date of its effectivity. Thus:
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy five.
Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, then nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself
unequivocally provides, it is only after taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines that the applicant is DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
IV
Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of
allegiance retroacted to the date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the
same could not be said insofar as it concerned the United States of America, of
which he was a citizen. For under the laws of the United States of America,
Frivaldo remained an American national until he renounced his citizenship and
allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995, when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of the Nationality Act
of 1940 of the United States of America provides that a person who is a national
of the United States of America, whether by birth or naturalization, loses his
nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other
formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S.
Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of the United States of
America, Third ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then that on election day and until
the hour of the commencement of the term for which he was elected - noon of
30 June 1995 as per Section 43 of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo
possessed dual citizenship, viz., (a) as an American citizen; and (b) as a Filipino
citizen through the adoption of the theory that the effects of his taking the oath
of allegiance were retrospective. Hence, he was disqualified to run for
Governor for yet another reason: possession of dual citizenship, in accordance
with Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code.
V
The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the
basis of his claim that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his
American citizenship - long before May 8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following
reasons: first, it is based on Frivaldo's unproven, self-serving allegation; second,
informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American
citizenship; and third, simply put, never did the status of a STATELESS person
attach to Frivaldo.
Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of
their nationality by their former government without having an opportunity to
acquire another; or de facto, which is the status of individuals possessed of a
nationality whose country does not give them protection outside their own
country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees
(JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments,
1995 ed., 290).
Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention
Regarding the Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled
and Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a stateless person is defined
as "a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the
operation of its law." However, it has not been shown that the United States of
America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its national at any time before he
took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 30 June 1995.
VI
Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that
"[t]he sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987
Constitution" and that the said Constitution is "more people-oriented," "borne
[as it is] out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution." I would even go further
by saying that this Constitution is pro-God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II,
Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section 1, Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article
XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18; Article XVI, Sections 5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII,
Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14; Article XIV, Sections 1, 4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section
11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article XII, Sections 1, 2(3); Article
XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II, Section 12), and pro-
family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).
Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty
beyond what I perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters. The
doctrine of people's sovereignty is founded on the principles of democracy
and republicanism and refers exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of
the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is quite clear on this, thus:
Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause
"We, the sovereign Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an attribute
of the Filipino people as one people, one body.
That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking
at it as the supreme authority of the people of any of the political subdivisions
to determine their own destiny; neither can we convert and treat every
fragment as the whole. In such a case, this Court would provide the formula for
the division and destruction of the State and render the Government
ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may consider the enforcement
of laws or the pursuit of a national policy by the executive branch of the
government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If these are
opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a certain province, or
even a municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, national policy, or
judgment must not be enforced, implemented, or executed in the said
province or municipality. More concretely, if, for instance, the vast majority of
the people of Batanes rise publicly and take up arms against the Government
for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the said Government or its
laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any
body of land, naval, or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or
the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives, then
those who did so -- and which are composed of the vast majority of the people
of Batanes -- a political subdivision -- cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty
of rebellion in violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code because of the
doctrine of peoples' sovereignty. Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of
sovereignty by investing upon the people of a mere political subdivision that
which the Constitution places in the entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to
the Nation.
So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply
because Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his closest rival,
Lee, i.e., a vast majority of the voters of Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign
will for the former, then this Court must yield to that will and must, therefore,
allow to be set aside, for Frivaldo, not just the laws on qualifications of
candidates and elective officials and naturalization and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding decisions of this Court
affecting him.
This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R.
No. 120295 and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.
Separate Opinions







Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 157004 July 4, 2003
SALLY A. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LEOVIC R. DIONEDA, respondents.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary
restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure seeking to set aside the February 11, 2003 En Banc Resolution
1

of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPC No. 01-124.
Sally A. Lee (petitioner) and Leovic R. Dioneda (private respondent) were
candidates for mayor of Sorsogon City, Sorsogon in the May 14, 2001 elections.
During the canvassing of the election returns, counsel for private respondent
objected to the inclusion of Election Return No. 41150266 for Precinct No. 28A2
in barangay Bucalbucalan, Sorsogon City on the grounds that 1) no entries
were made for the position of congressman, and 2) Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) watchers were utilized to fill up election returns.
2

In her opposition to private respondents objection, petitioner alleged that 1)
the omitted entry in the election return pertains to the position of congressman
which cannot be a subject of pre-proclamation controversy, 2) the utilization of
the watchers, who were under the direct supervision of the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI), was limited only to the filling up of the entries affecting the
party-list and justified by the severe lack of personnel to perform the task, and
3) the alleged defect does not affect the integrity of the election return.
3

On May 18, 2001, the Board of Canvassers (BOC), finding that the 1) questioned
election return was clear and regular on its face, 2) there was no pre-
proclamation for members of the House of Representatives and party list, and
3) the grounds relied upon by private respondent are all directed against the
proceedings of the BEI and not the BOC, ruled for the inclusion of the return.
4

Private respondent thereupon filed on the same day a notice of appeal of the
BOC ruling.
5

In the meantime, or on May 19, 2001, the BOC proclaimed the winning
candidates, including petitioner as city mayor.
6

Private respondent thus filed on May 23, 2001 before the COMELEC a petition,
7

docketed as SPC No. 01-124, assailing the ruling of the BOC and praying for the
exclusion of the questioned election return and the annulment of petitioners
proclamation.
Petitioner filed her answer
8
to the COMELEC petition, praying for its dismissal.
By Resolution
9
of January 10, 2003, the COMELEC Second Division granted the
petition of private respondent and accordingly excluded the questioned return
from the canvass and nullified the proclamation of petitioner. The dispositive
portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The order of
respondent Board dated May 18, 2001 including Election Return No.
41150266 from Precinct No. 28A2 of Bucalbucalan, Sorsogon City in the
May 14, 2001 Elections canvass of Sorsogon City is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. Said election return is hereby excluded from the May 14, 2001
Elections canvass of Sorsogon City. Further, the proclamation of private
respondent Sally Lee on May 19, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID
ab initio pursuant to Section 20 (i) of RA 7166.
A new City Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon City is hereby constituted to
be composed of the following COMELEC lawyers:
1. Atty. Nelia Aureus Chairperson
2. Atty. Allen Francis Abaya Vice-Chairperson
3. Atty. Emilio Santos Secretary
The new City Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon City is hereby directed to
prepare a new Statement of Votes for the position of mayor of Sorsogon
City excluding the election return from Precinct No. 28A2 of
Bucalbucalan, Sorsogon City and, based on said canvass in the new
Statement of Votes, proceed to proclaim the winning candidate for
mayor of Sorsogon City.
The original City Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon City is hereby directed
to transmit to the new Board all COMELEC forms and documents used in
the canvassing including the Boards copies of all election returns
canvassed in the May 14, 2001 Elections in Sorsogon City.
Finally, the Law Department is directed to conduct the necessary
investigation of the members of the BEI of Precinct No. 28A2 of
Bucalbucalan, Sorsogon City for the possible commission of election
offenses.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
10
of the COMELEC Second Division
January 10, 2003 Resolution was denied by the COMELEC En Banc, by
Resolution
11
of February 11, 2003 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission En Banc DENIES the
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Second
Division promulgated on January 10, 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED.
The New City Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon City constituted by said
Resolution is hereby ORDERED to convene immediately, prepare a new
Statement of Votes excluding the election returns from Precinct No.
28A[2], Bucalbucalan, Sorsogon City, and on the basis of the new
Statement of Votes, proclaim the winning candidate for mayor of
Sorsogon City.
The original City Board of Canvassers is directed to transmit to the new
City Board of Canvassers the COMELEC documents they used in their
canvass. In the event however that the old City Board of Canvassers, for
any reason, fail to deliver to the new City Board of Canvassers the
COMELEC documents used in the canvassing, specifically the old
statement of votes and the election return for Precinct No. 28A[2], prior to
date of canvass, the new Board is hereby authorized to use the COMELEC
copy of said documents.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition, alleging that:
I.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO GO BEYOND OR BEHIND
ELECTION RETURNS AND INVESTIGATE ELECTION IRREGULARITIES IN PRE-
PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY.
II.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED
THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS DESPITE THE CLEAR AND APPARENT LACK OF
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS TO SUPPORT THE SAME.
III.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED PROCEDURAL LAPSES IN THE
PROMULGATION OF THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS WHICH AFFECTS THE
FAIRNESS STANDARD.
12

On February 18, 2003, this Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order
13
enjoining the
COMELEC to observe the status quo prevailing before the filing of the petition
and refrain from implementing the assailed January 10, 2003 and February 11,
2003 Resolutions until further orders from this Court.
Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Section 243. Issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy.
The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-
proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceeding of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material
defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies
in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in
Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code;
(c )The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or
intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places
were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of
the aggrieved candidate or candidates. (Emphasis supplied)
On the first assigned error, petitioner argues that as the case at bar is a pre-
proclamation controversy, the COMELEC is "restricted to an examination of the
election returns and is without jurisdiction to go [beyond] or behind them and
investigate election irregularities,"
14
citing the case of Loong v. Commission on
Elections
15
which held:
x x x
We have recently reiterated the Dianalan and Dimaporo rulings in the
case of Alfonso v. Commission on Elections, promulgated in June, 1994.
The prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction, therefore, is that as long as the
returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face, the
Board of Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind them to verify the
allegations of irregularities in the casting or the counting of the votes.
Corollarily, technical examination of voting paraphernalia involving
analysis and comparison of voters signatures and thumbprints thereon is
prohibited in pre-proclamation cases which are mandated by law to be
expeditiously resolved without involving evidence aliunde and
examination of voluminous documents which take up much time and
cause delay in defeat of the public policy underlying the summary nature
of pre-proclamation controversies.
x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners argument is bereft of merit.
The doctrine cited by petitioner presupposes that the returns "appear to be
authentic and duly accomplished on their face." Where, as in the case at bar,
there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries
having been omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not
apply. The COMELEC is thus not powerless to determine if there is basis for the
exclusion of the questioned election return.
As to the second error raised by petitioner, she claims that contrary to the
findings of the COMELEC, there is no evidence on record that an LDP watcher
participated in the preparation of the questioned election return. She posits
that the omission of entries was not done with malice or bad faith nor meant to
subvert the true will of the people, and that the election return in question is
clear and regular on its face, duly authenticated by the signatures and
thumbmarks of the six watchers and all the members of the BEI. Finally, she
posits that an incomplete election return is not necessarily spurious,
manufactured or fraudulent to necessitate its exclusion.
16

While the BOC indeed found the questioned election return clear and regular
on its face, it is not conclusive on the COMELEC nor on this Court in light of what
transpired during the proceedings before the BOC in which the members of the
BEI were examined and gave the following explanations behind the omission of
entries for the position of congressman:
x x x
APP DIMAANO: Ito ba ang mga papeles o election return na inyong
ginawa sa presinto.
MS. LADUB: Opo.
APP DIMAANO: Opo. Ngayon, page one tungkol senators, okay. Sa party
list, meron kayong inilagay na resulta ng botohan. Punta tayo sa page
one noong local positions, tignan nyo po sa parte ng congressman kung
ano ang nakalagay. Kayo po una kayo po Ginang Jamisal.
MS. JAMISAL: Wala ho.
APP DIMAANO: Wala ho. Kayo po Gina Labayo.
MS. LABAYO: Wala ho.
APP DIMAANO: Wala ho. Kayo ho Ladub Ginang Ladub.
MS. LADUB. Wala ho.
APP DIMAANO. Okay, doon sa ibang position, governor, vice governor,
board member, city . . . anong masasabi ninyo?
MS. JAMISAL: Okay naman po.
APP DIMAANO: Meron lahat meron doon. Balik tayo doon sa position
noong congressman at saka representative.
APP DIMAANO: Maari bang sabihin ninyo sa amin kung bakit ito inamin
niyo at nakikita rito sa dokumentong ito sa election return na wala ni
anong marka, ni pangalan at saka itong mga ano yan . . . nararapat na
markings. Mauna ka Ginang Jamisal.
MS. JAMISAL: Siguro ho dahil siguro medyo ano na kami over fatigue na
inaantok na. yong nakita ko na mga naka-tally dito yon lang at saka
may mga bilang yon lang ang pinirimahan ko dahil yon lang . . . Hindi ko
na ho na ano yong sa taas may pangalan pa lang congressman hindi
naitala ni Gina yong pangalan ng kandidato sa congressman kayat
hindi ko na pinirmahan. So ang pinirmihan ko lang yong may mga tally.
Hindi ko na na ano ho na wala pala yong congressman. Hindi ko lang
nabasa ito na congressman. Kung siguro ho nakita ko lang na
congressman sasabihin ko ho . . . sasabihin ko kay Gina na ilagay ang ano
. . . ang kandidato sa congressman.
APP DIMAANO: Kayo Ginang Ladub, ano ang paliwanang niyo.
MS. LADUB: Masama ho ang pakiramdam ko.
APP DIMAANO: Ano ho ba ang isaktong papel niyo noong election doon
sa loob ng presinto. Taga ano ho kayo?
MSA. LADUB: Nagta-tally ho.
APP DIMAANO: Anong ibig sabihin ng tally.
MS. LADUB: Ako pa ang humahawak nitong sa senator sa pag tally ko po.
APP DIMAANO: Alin ang isaktong pinagtally-han niyo ho? Anong position?
MS. LADUB: Senator.
APP DIMAANO: At saka senator lang ho ba?
MS. LADUB: Opo.
APP DIMAANO: eh yong party list sinong . . .
MS. JAMISAL: Yong iba ho, sir na ano naming, yong watcher kasi hindi
pa naming kayang na ano . . . siguro naman sir walang problema . . .
ATTY. FORTES: Anong presinto yan?
WATCHER: 28A
ATTY. FORTES: 28A.
APP DIMAANO: Okay, dito tayo sa congressman sinong may in-charge
dito sino?
MS. JAMISAL: (Pointing to Ms. Labayo.)
APP DIMAANO: Gina Labayo. Kayo ho anong masasabi niyo rito. Dapat
ba ritong meron o wala.
MS. LABAYO: Meron ho.
APP DIMAANO: Dapat . . . meron daw. O ngayon, bakit wala?
MS. LABAYO: Nakalimutan ko ho. Humihingi po ako ng tawad sa inyo.
APP DIMAANO: Hindi, ipaliwanag mo lang kung bakit kayo nakalimot.
Hindi naman kami nag-ano niyon. Nag-uusig kami kasi yon din ang
sasabihin naming kung bakit.
MS. LABAYO: Sobrang pagod po, sir.
APP DIMAANO: Wala na bang ibang dahilan diyan. Wala ka na bang
ibang paliwanang maliban sa nakalimot kat napapagod ka na.
MS. LABAYO: (Silence.)
x x x
17
(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
As the above-quoted record of the proceedings before the BOC shows, Gina
Labayo, a member of the BEI, admitted that there were supposed to be entries
for the position of congressman but she forgot to record them as she was
extremely tired. Such convenient explanation, without more, does not,
however, appear satisfactory.
Moreover, in her Answer to the original petition filed with the COMELEC,
petitioner admitted that pollwatchers, who were not members of the BEI,
participated in the preparation of the election return. Thus she alleged:
x x x
More importantly, the transcript of the proceedings (Annex "A-3" page 9
and 15) will show and prove that what were prepared and made by the
pollwatchers were the entries in the TALLY BOARD and the votes cast in
the Election Return for Party List Representative;
x x x
18
(Emphasis and underscoring omitted; italics supplied)
As thus correctly ruled by the COMELEC Second Division:
Votes for an important position such as congressman do not simply vanish
into thin air. Those who are mandated by law to account for such votes, if
mistakenly omitted, are at least expected to give a fairly reasonable
account of why and how they have been omitted. Absent such
explanation, doubt arises as to the authenticity of the returns and the
manner of their preparation, specially in this case where a party watcher
was allowed to take part in the preparation of the election return.
x x x
19
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
As to the third error raised by petitioner, she argues that the January 10, 2003
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was promulgated without giving
her notice, and that were it not for her counsels "accidental" visit to the
COMELEC on January 13, 2003, said counsel would not have known that said
resolution was already promulgated and the 5-day period from the date of
promulgation to file a motion for reconsideration, as provided under the
following provision of Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, would
have lapsed:
20

Section 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed
within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-
forma, suspend the execution or implementation of the decision,
resolution, order and ruling.
And petitioner, noting that the ponente of the En Banc Resolution was not
therein indicated, raises the possibility that the ponente for the Second Division
Resolution and that of the En Banc Resolution were the same, thus violating
Section 1, Rule 4 of the COMELEC Rules
21
which reads:
Section 1. Disqualification or Inhibition of Members. (a) No Member shall
sit in any case in which he or his spouse or child is related to any party
within the sixth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, or in which he has
publicly expressed prejudgment as may be shown by convincing proof, or
in which the subject thereof is a decision promulgated by him while
previously serving as presiding judge of an inferior court, without the
written consent of all the parties, signed by them and entered in the
records of the case; Provided, that no Member shall be the "ponente" of
an en banc decision/resolution on a motion to reconsider a
decision/resolution written by him in a Division.
x x x (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)
In Lindo v. Commission on Elections,
22
this Court held that the 5-day period for
the filing of an appeal commences from the date of receipt of copy of the
decision. As correctly ruled by the COMELEC:
The petitioner misinterpreted the provision of Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1993
Comelec Rules of Procedure when she stated that "Unlike other cases, the
reglamentary period within which a party can have the decision or
resolution reviewed on motion for reconsideration runs from the date of
promulgation." When not promulgated in open hearing, a simple
procedural sense would dictate that the period to file a Motion for
Reconsideration must have to be tolled from the date of receipt of the
decision/resolution involved.
Further, the doctrine laid down in the case of Lindo v. Comelec (194 SCRA
25) would have supported the proposition that the additional requirement
imposed by the COMELEC Rules on advance notice of promulgation does
not form part of the process of promulgation and that the failure to serve
such notice in advance did not prejudice the rights of the parties and did
not vitiate the validity of the decision nor of the promulgation, as the
period for the unsatisfied party to move for reconsideration can be
exercised not from the date of promulgation, as misconstrued by
petitioner, but from her actual receipt of a copy of the resolution in
question.
23
(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
As to the non-indication of the ponente of the COMELEC En Banc Resolution,
petitioner merely proffers a possibility of violation of the COMELEC Rules. It is
presumed, however, that an official duty has been regularly performed.
24

The lack of merit of petitioners arguments notwithstanding, the COMELEC, in
ordering the exclusion of the questioned return, should have determined the
integrity of the ballot box, the ballot-contents of which were tallied and
reflected in the return, and if it was intact, it should have ordered its opening for
a recounting of the ballots if their integrity was similarly intact. So instructs
Section 234 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:
Section 234. Material defects in the election returns. If it should clearly
appear that some requisites in form or data had been omitted in the
election returns, the board of canvassers shall call for all members of the
board of election inspectors concerned by the most expeditious means,
for the same board to effect the correction.
Provided, That in case of the omission in the election returns of the name
of any candidate and/or his corresponding votes, the board of
canvassers shall require the board of election inspectors concerned to
complete the necessary data in the election returns and affix therein their
initials: Provided, further, That if the votes omitted in the returns cannot be
ascertained by other means except by recounting the ballots, the
Commission, after satisfying itself that the identity and integrity of the
ballot box have not been violated, shall order the board of election
inspectors to open the ballot box, and, also after satisfying itself that the
integrity of the ballots therein has been duly preserved, order the board of
election inspectors to count the votes for the candidate whose votes
have been omitted with notice thereof to all candidates for the position
involved and thereafter complete the returns. The right of a candidate to
avail of this provision shall not be lost or affected by the fact that an
election protest is subsequently filed by any of the candidates. (Emphasis
supplied)
And so does Section 235 of the same Code which provides:
Section 235. When election returns appear to be tampered with or
falsified. If the election returns submitted to the board of canvassers
appear to be tampered with, altered or falsified after they have left the
hands of the board of election inspectors under duress, force,
intimidation, or prepared by persons other than the members of the board
of election inspectors, the board of canvassers shall use other copies of
said election returns and if necessary, the copy inside the ballot box which
upon previous authority given by the Commission may be retrieved in
accordance with Section 220 hereof. If the other copies of the returns are
likewise tampered with, altered, falsified, not authentic, prepared under
duress, force, intimidation, or prepared by persons other than the board of
election inspectors, the board of canvassers or any candidate affected
shall bring the matter to the attention of the Commission. The Commission
shall then, after giving notice to all candidates concerned and after
satisfying itself that the integrity of the ballot box and, likewise after
satisfying itself that the integrity of the ballots therein has been duly
preserved shall order the board of election inspectors to recount the votes
of the candidates affected and prepare a new return which shall then be
used by the board of canvassers as basis of the canvass. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, this Court in Patoray v. Commission on Elections
25
held:
x x x
As to the election return for Precinct No. 20-A, we ruled that the COMELEC
erred in resorting to the Certificate of Votes in excluding the return in said
precinct. Since the return was incomplete for it lacked the data as to
provincial and congressional candidates, the applicable provision would
be Section 234 of the Omnibus Election Code which deals with material
defects in election returns. Thus, we ruled that the COMELEC should have
first determined the integrity of the ballot box, ordered the opening
thereof and recounted the ballots therein after satisfying itself that the
integrity of the ballots is intact. We then directed the COMELEC to issue
another Order in accordance with said Decision.
x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
If the integrity of the ballot box had been violated, then there would be no
need to open it. If not, and upon opening it there is evidence that the integrity
of the ballots had been violated, there would be no recounting thereof, and
the COMELEC would then seal the box and order its safekeeping. Thus Section
237 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 237. When integrity of ballots is violated. If upon the opening of the
ballot box as ordered by the Commission under Sections 234, 235 and 236,
hereof, it should appear that there are evidence or signs of replacement,
tampering or violation of the integrity of the ballots, the Commission shall
not recount the ballots but shall forthwith seal the ballot box and order its
safekeeping.
WHEREFORE, the COMELEC is, in accordance with the foregoing discussion,
hereby DIRECTED to determine within twenty days whether the integrity of the
ballot box, the ballot-contents of which were tallied and reflected in the
questioned return, is intact and, if in the affirmative and the integrity of the
ballots is likewise intact, to order the Sorsogon City Board of Election Inspectors
to recount the votes cast in Precinct No. 28A2 in Barangay Bucalbucalan,
Sorsogon City and prepare a new return to serve as basis of canvass by said
board; otherwise the ballot box should no longer be opened or the ballots
should no longer be recounted as the case may be, in which case an order for
the safekeeping of the ballot box should be issued. The Status Quo Ante Order
issued on February 18, 2003 is hereby DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.
Callejo, Sr., J., no part.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ,
respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of
the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House
of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."
1

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in
San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental
law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
2

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States
Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took
an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision
of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
x x x
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a
foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the
acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his
Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact
of alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory
with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the
Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or
acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance
incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service
to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who
is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign
country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or
(b), shall not be Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service
to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge
from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically
entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the full
enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with
his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.
3
He ran for and was elected
as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner
Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.1wphi1.nt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article
VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
4

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision
5
dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated
April 27, 2000.
6

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision
on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had
ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship
on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent
as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his
Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship
was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the
petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and
constitutionally restore his natural-born status.
7

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino
upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-
born Filipino since he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to
the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He
insists that Article citizens are those who are from birth with out having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as
natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in
Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of
being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
8

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds
of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at
the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof.
9

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect his Philippine citezenship."
10

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino
citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.
11
To be
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications
12

and none of the disqualification
13
provided by law to become a Filipino citizen.
The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two
(2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the
intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has
dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted
of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed
any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government
announced policies.
14

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same
in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63),
enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3)
by direct act of Congress.
15

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.
16
Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes
to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications
17
and
none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those
who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;
19
services in
the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
20
(3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time,
21
(4) marriage of a Filipino woman
to an alien;
22
and (5) political economic necessity.
23

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply
consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine
and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,
24
we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and
2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not
even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was
to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to
register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or
where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.
25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
26
This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered
service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States,
acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides
or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain
a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.
27
It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost
his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen
since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As
correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen"
was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person
must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to
obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino
citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were
naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,
38
of Filipino mothers
who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those
"naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they
were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine
citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973
Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had
to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers
before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who
re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof
shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos
are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of
who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes
of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not
have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire
his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all
the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole
judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the House.
29
The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to
check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.
30
In the absence
thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and
annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that
of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for
certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision.
31
There is no
such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, and JJ., concur.
Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, no part.
Panganiban, concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr., on leave.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion.
Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, concur on this and the concurring opinion of J.
Panganiban
Ynares-Santiago, certify majority opinion of J. Kapunan.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ,
respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that the
House Electoral Tribunal did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Private
Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz remains a natural-born Filipino citizen and is
eligible to continue being a member of Congress. Let me just add a few points.
The Facts in Brief
It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San
Clemente, Tarlac, to Filipino parents. He was, therefore, a Filipino citizen,
pursuant to Section 1 (2),
1
Article IV of the Constitution. Furthermore, not having
done any act to acquire or perfect the Philippine citizenship he obtained from
birth, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, in accordance with Section 2
2
of the
same Article IV.
It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service to the
United States Marine Corps from November 1958 to October 1993. On June 5,
1990, he was naturalized as an American citizen, in connection with his US
military service. Consequently, under Section 1 (4)
3
of CA No. 63, he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned to
the Philippines and decided to regain his Filipino citizenship. Thus, on March 17,
1994, availing himself of the benefits of Republic Act (RA) No. 2630, entitled "An
Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost
Such by Rendering Service to, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Force of
the United States,"
4
Cruz took his oath of allegiance to the Republic and
registered the same with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan.
On the same day, he also executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship.
Main Issue
The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that, by reason of his
repatriation, Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz had reverted to his original status
as a natural-born citizen? I respectfully submit that the answer is "No." In fact, I
believe that the HRET was correct in its ruling.
1. Repatriation Is Recovery of Original Citizenship
First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of
RA 2630, a person "who ha[s] lost his citizenship" may "reacquire" it by " taking
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines." Former Senate
President Jovito R. Salonga, a noted authority on the subject, explains this
method more precisely in his treatise, Private International Law.
5
He defines
repatriation as "the recovery of the original nationality upon fulfillment of
certain condition."
6
Webster buttresses this definition by describing the ordinary
or common usage of repatriate, as "to restore or return to one's country of
origin, allegiance, or citizenship; x x x."
7
In relation to our subject matter,
repatriation, then, means restoration of citizenship. It is not a grant of a new
citizenship, but a recovery of one's former or original citizenship.
To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own again."
8
Ergo, since Cruz,
prior to his becoming a US citizen, was a natural-born Filipino citizen, he
"reacquired" the same status upon repatriation. To rule otherwise that Cruz
became a non-natural-born citizen would not be consistent whit the legal
and ordinary meaning of repatriation. It would be akin to naturalization, which
is the acquisition of a new citizenship. "New." Because it is not the same as the
with which he has previously been endowed.
In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor
of [its] claimant x x x."
9
Accordingly, the same should be construed in favor of
private respondent, who claims to be a natural-born citizen.
2. Not Being Naturalized, Respondent Is Natural Born
Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed
natural-born, because was not naturalized. Let me explain.
There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2)
naturalized citizens.
10
While CA 63 provides that citizenship may also be
acquired by direct act of the Legislature, I believe that those who do become
citizens through such procedure would properly fall under the second category
(naturalized).
11

Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid
procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they
possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by
law in order to become Filipino citizens. In contrast, as stated in the early case
Roa v. Collector of Customs,
12
a natural-born citizen is a citizen "who has
become such at the moment of his birth."
The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,
explains clearly who are considered natural-born Filipino citizens. He traces the
concept as first defined in Article III of the 1973 Constitution, which simply
provided as follows:
"Sec 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship."
Under the above definition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino
citizen may be considered "natural-born": (1) one must be a citizen of the
Philippines from birth, and (2) one does not have to do anything to acquire or
perfect one's Philippine citizenship.
13
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution,
excluded from the class of "natural-born citizens" were (1) those who were
naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who,
upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship.
14

The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born
citizens to include "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof," meaning those covered under class (2)
above. Consequently, only naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered
natural-born citizens. Premising therefrom, respondent being clearly and
concededly not naturalized is, therefore, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
15

With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them
separately, they naturally reacquire their original classification before the loss of
their Philippine citizenship. In the case of Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz, upon
his repatriation in1994, he reacquired his lost citizenship. In other words, he
regained his original status as a natural-born Filipino citizen, nothing less.
3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of HRET
Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion in holding
that Respondent Cruz is a natural-born Filipino citizen who is qualified to be a
member of Congress. I stress that the Court, in this certiorari proceeding before
us, is limited to determining whether the HRET committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed
Decision. The Court has no power to reverse or modify HRET's rulings, simply
because it differs in its perception of controversies. It cannot substitute its
discretion for that of HRET, an independent, constitutional body with its own
specific mandate.
The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of the
chambers of Congress "shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications their respective members."
16
In several
cases,
17
this Court has held that the power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals are original and exclusive, as if they remained in the legislature, a
coequal branch of government. Their judgment are beyond judicial
interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.
18
In the elegant words of Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez Jr.:
19

"The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct
perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It comes in
only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse
of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for
remedial action."
True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of repatriation. But,
as earlier explained, the legal and common definition of repatriation is the
reacquisition of the former citizenship. How then can the HRET be rebuked with
grave abuse of discretion? At best, I can concede that the legal definition is
not judicially settled or is even doubtful. But an interpretation made in good
faith and grounded o reason one way or the other cannot be the source of
grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The HRET did not
violate the Constitution or the law or any settled judicial doctrine. It was
definitely acting within its exclusive domain.
Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to be
the sole judge of the qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, one of which is citizenship. Absent any clear showing of a
manifest violation of the Constitution or the law or nay judicial decision, this
Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the HRET in the latter's
actions on matters over which full discretionary authority is lodged upon it by
our fundamental law.
20
Even assuming that we disagree with the conclusion of
public respondent, we cannot ipso facto attribute to it "grave abuse of
discretion." Verily, there is a line between perceived error and grave abuse.
21

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is
not enough. "It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law."
22

That the HRET, after careful deliberation and purposeful study, voted 7 to 2 to
issue its Decision upholding the qualifications of Congressman Cruz could not in
any wise be condemned as gravely abusive. Neither can I find any "patent or
gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or hostility" in such
exercise.
4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails
Fourth, the court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable
mandate of the people. It cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second
District of Pangasinan with fractured legalism. The people of the District have
clearly spoken. They overwhelmingly and unequivocally voted for private
respondent to represent them in the House of Representatives. The votes that
Cruz garnered (80, 119) in the last elections were much more than those of all
his opponents combined (66, 182).
23
In such instances, all possible doubts
should be resolved in favor of the winning candidate's eligibility; to rule
otherwise would be to defeat the will of the people.
24

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt,
political laws must be so constructed as to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
25
Public interest and the
sovereign will should, at all times, be the paramount considerations in election
controversies.
26
For it would be better to err in favor of the people's choice than
to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.
27

"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to
the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any
action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this
Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give
effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause
elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must
clearly demonstrative that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby
giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote."
28

5. Current Trend Towards Globalization
Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards
globalization.
29
Protectionist barriers dismantled. Whereas, in the past,
governments frowned upon the opening of their doors to aliens who wanted to
enjoy the same privileges as their citizens, the current era is adopting a more
liberal perspective. No longer are applicants for citizenship eyed with the
suspicion that they merely want to exploit local resources for themselves. They
are now being considered potential sources of developmental skills, know-how
and capital.1wphi1.nt
More so should our government open its doors to former Filipinos, like
Congressman Cruz, who want to rejoin the Filipino community as citizens again.
They are not "aliens" in the true sense of the law. They are actually Filipino by
blood, by origin and by culture, who want to reacquire their former citizenship.
It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for naturalization
in foreign countries, because of the great economic or social opportunities
there. Hence, we should welcome former Filipino citizens desirous of not simply
returning to the country or regaining Philippine citizenship, but of serving the
Filipino people as well. One of these admirable Filipino is private respondent
who, in only a year after being absent from the Philippines for about eight (8)
years, was already voted municipal mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. And
after serving as such for just one term, he was overwhelmingly chosen by the
people to be their representative in Congress.
I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial
interpretation of the law bar the sovereign will. Let not grave abuse be imputed
on the legitimate exercise of HRET's prerogatives.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ,
respondents.
DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M.
Kapunan. I am convinced that private respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is not
natural born citizen and, therefore, must be disqualified as a member of
Congress.
Who are natural-born citizens?
The laws on citizenship its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges and
immunities of citizens have given rise to some of the most disputations and
visceral issues resolved by this Court. The problem is taken up connection with
the sovereign right of voters to choose their representatives in Congress.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court of
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan because he does not
posses the constitutional requirement of being a natural-born citizen of this
country. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that he is qualified to be
elected to Congress considering that by repatriation, he re-acquired his status
as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960 to
Filipino parents, spouses Lamberto and Carmelita Cruz. On November 5, 1985,
he enlisted in the United States Armed Forces and served the United States
Marine Corps. While in the service for almost five years, he applied for
naturalization with the US District Court of Northern District of California and was
issued his Certificate of Naturalization No. 14556793 as an American citizen. On
October 27, 1993, he was honorably discharged from the US Marine Corps. He
then decided to return to the Philippines.
Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by persons who lost such citizenship by
rendering service to or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the
United States. On March 17, 1994, he took his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered with the Local Civil Registry
of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed an Affidavit of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. Thus, on April 11, 1994, the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation ordered the cancellation of his Alien Certificate
of Residence (ICR No. 286582) and issued him an Identification Certificate.
The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was affirmed by the Justice Department.
On January 18, 1995, the United States Embassy in Manila issued to him a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States.
In the local election of 1995, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.
He won and served as mayor for one term.
Thereafter, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for a seat in Congress, this
time declaring himself as a natural-born Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of
26,671 votes over candidate Antonio Bengson, III.
On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race in
the Second District of Pangasinan.
Bengson then filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of
Representative Electoral not being a natural-born Filipino citizen when he filed
his Certificate of Candidacy on March 15, 1998, is not qualified to run as a
member of the House of Representatives. That he should be a natural-born
citizen is a qualification mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution
which provides: "No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
After oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective
memoranda and supplemental memoranda, the HRET rendered a decision
holding that Cruz reacquired his natural-born citizenship upon his repatriation in
1994 and declaring him duly elected representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent
Teodoro C. Cruz is hereby DECLARED duly elected Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
"As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory, let notices and
copies thereof be sent to the President of the Philippines; the House of
Representatives, through the Speaker, and the Commission on Audit,
through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of the 1998 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Costs de oficio."
On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
Decision but the same was denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 00-48.
Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing the HRET Decision
on grounds that:
"1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had
ceased being such in view of the loss and renuciation of such citizenship
on his part.
"2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent
as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly
acquire his Philippine citizenship.
"3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship
was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess of despite the fact that such reacquisition
could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status."
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was
natural-born citizen of the Philippines at the time of the filing of his Certificate of
Candidacy for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution
1
provides:
"Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. xxx."
Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase "from
birth" contained in the above provisions.
Petitioner contends that the phrase "from birth" indicates that citizenship must
start at a definite point and must be continuous, constant and without
interruption. The Constitution does not extend the privilege of reacquiring a
natural-born citizen status to respondent, who at one time, became an alien.
His loss of citizenship carried with it the concomitant loss of all the benefits,
privileges and attributes of "natural-born" citizenship. When he reacquired his
citizenship in 1994, he had to comply with requirements for repatriation, thus
effectively taking him out of the constitutional definition of a natural-born
Filipino. For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to
the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since
he was born to Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of
being a natural-born citizen.
For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the
innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since he
was born to Filipino parents, he has been a natural-born Filipino from birth. His
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his
reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its
literal sense, but more in its legal connotation.
The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They were
born as Spanish subjects. In Roa vs. Collector of Customs,
2
the Supreme Court
traces the grant of natural-born status from the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of
Congress of July 1, 1902 and March 23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section
4 of the former with a proviso which reads:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide
by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of other Insular possessions of the United States and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who could become citizens of the
United State under the laws of the United State, if residing therein."
It was further held therein that under the said provision, "every person born the
11
th
of April, of parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who
continued to reside in this country are at the moment of their birth ipso facto
citizens of the Philippine Islands."
Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second
Philippine Commission, considered as our first colonial charter of fundamental
law, we were referred to as "people of the Islands," or "inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands," or "natives of the Islands" and not as citizens, much less
natural-born citizens. The first definition of "citizens of the Philippine Islands" in our
law is found in Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
3

Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose or
even non-existent qualification. As a requirement for the exercise of certain
rights and privileges, it became a more strict and difficult status to achieve with
the passing of the years.
Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be
acquired under either the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine.
4

This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones
Law of the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have limited "citizens of
the Philippine Islands" to resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April
11, 1899, their children born subsequent thereto, and later, those naturalized
according to law by the Philippine legislature. Only later was jus sanguinis firmly
applied and jus soli abandoned.
Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege
conferred by law directly to those who intended, and actually continued, to
belong to the Philippine Island. Even at the time of its conception in the
Philippines, such persons upon whom citizenship was conferred did not have to
do anything to acquire full citizenship.
5

Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at birth,
having been born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, he was automatically
restored to that status when he subsequently reacquired his citizenship after
losing it.
Public respondent HRET affirmed respondent's position when it pronounced that
the definition of natural-born citizen in Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution
refers to the classes of citizens enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article, to
wit:
"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Thus , respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there are only
two classes of citizens, i.e., natural-born and naturalized. Since respondent Cruz
is not a naturalized citizen, then he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution defines
natural-born citizens as " those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship."
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follow:
"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY
RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be rendering
service to, or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States,
acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall
contain a renunciation of any other citizenship."
respondent Cruz had perform certain acts before he could again become a
Filipino citizen. He had to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and register his oath with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarum,
Pangasinan. He had to renounce his American citizenship and had to execute
an affidavit of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation and constitution of a constitution is to give effect to the intention
of the framers and of the people who adopted it. Words appearing in
Constitution are used according to their plain, natural, and usual significance
and import and must be understood in the sense most obvious to the common
understanding of the people at the time of its adoption.
The provision on "natural-born citizens of the Philippines" is precise, clear and
definite. Indeed, neither HRET nor this Court can construe it other than what its
plain meaning conveys. It is not phrased in general language which may call
for construction of what the words imply.
In J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration,
6
this Court held:
"Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of Constitution begins with the
language of the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to
be given their ordinary meaning, except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential
for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible, should be understood in
the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers
and the people mean what they say."
The definition of a natural-born citizen in the Constitution must be applied to this
petition according to its natural sense.
Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the "reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
through any of these modes: (naturalization, repatriation and legislation under
Section 3, C.A. No. 63) results in the restoration of previous status, either as a
natural-born or a naturalized citizen" is a simplistic approach and tends to be
misleading.
If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the
citizen concerned can not be considered natural-born. Obviously, he has to
perform certain acts to become a citizen.
As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug
7
in the instant case,
concurred in by Justice A.R. Melo:
8

"Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original nationally upon
the fulfillment of certain conditions. While an applicant need not have to
undergo the tedious and time consuming process required by the Revised
Naturalization Law (CA 473, s amended), he, nevertheless, would still have
to make an express and unequivocal act of formally rejecting his
adopted state and reaffirming his total and exclusive allegiance and
loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be of
section 2, Article IV, of the 1987 Constitution, one should not have to
perform any act at all or go through any process, judicial or
administrative, to enable him to reacquire his citizenship. willoughby
opines that a natural-born citizen is one who is able to claim citizenship
without any prior declaration on his part of a desire to obtain such status.
Under this view, the term 'natural born' citizens could also cover those who
have been collectively deemed citizens by reason of the Treaty of Paris
and the Philippine Bill of 1902 and those who have been accorded by the
1935 Constitution to be Filipino citizens (those born in the Philippines of
alien parents who, before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution had been
elected to public office.)"
The two dissenting Justice correctly stated that the "stringent requirement of the
Constitution is so placed as to insure that only Filipino citizens with an absolute
and permanent degree of allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for
membership in Congress, the branch of the government directly involved and
given the dedicate task of legislation."
The dissenting opinion further states:
"The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen, first constitutionally defined in the
1973 Charter, later adopted by the 1987 Constitution, particularly in
Section 2, Article IV thereof, is meant to refer to those ' who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their citizenship,' and to those ' who elect Philippine citizenship.'
Time and again, the Supreme Court has declared that where the laws
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation there is only room for
application. The phrase 'from birth indicates that there is a starting point of
his citizenship and this citizenship should be continuous, constant and
without interruption."
Thus, respondent is not eligible for election to Congress as the Constitution
requires that a member of the House of Representative must be a "natural-born
citizen of the Philippines."
For sure, the framers of our Constitution intended to provide a more stringent
citizenship requirement for higher elective offices, including that of the office of
a Congressman. Otherwise, the Constitution should have simply provided that a
candidate for such position can be merely a citizen of the Philippines, as
required of local elective officers.
The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935 Constitution, the first charter framed
and ratified by the Filipino (even as the draft had to be approved by President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United States) guide and governs the
interpretation of Philippine citizenship and the more narrow and bounden
concept of being a natural-born citizen.
Under the 1935 costitution,
9
the requirement of natural-born citizenship was
applicable to the President and Vice Persident.
10
A person who had been a
citizen for only five (5) years could be elected to the National Assembly.
11
Only
in 1940,
12
when the first Constitution was amended did natural-born citizenship
become a requirement for Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives.
13
A Filipino naturalized for at least five (5) years could still be
appointed Justice of the Supreme court or a Judge of a lower court.
14

The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the
requirement of being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified
over the years.
Under the 1973 Constitution,
15
the President, members of the National
Assembly, Prime Minister, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of inferior
courts, the chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commission and the
majority of members of the cabinet must be natural-born citizens.
16
The 1987
Constitution added the Ombudsman and his deputies and the members of the
Commission on Human Rights to those who must be natural-born citizens.
17

The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical trend and
clear intendment of the Constitution. It shows a more liberal, if not a cavalier
approach to the meaning and import of natural born citizen and citizenship in
general.
It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a doctrine embodied in no
less that the constitution. Indeed, a deviation from the clear and constitutional
definition of a "natural born Filipino citizen" is a matter which can only be
accomplished through a constitutional amendment. Clearly respondent HRET
gravely abused its discretion.
Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship
has been restored. He can run for public office where natural-born citizenship is
not mandated. But he cannot be elected to high offices which the Constitution
has reserved only for natural-born Filipino citizens.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition.1wphi1.nt
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990
MATEO CAASI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990
ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.
Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective;
the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
private respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January
18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent
resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated
January 13, 1988 of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions
of Anecito Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595)
and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the disqualification of Merito C.
Miguel filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review
of the decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
14531 dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival
candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to
disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card
issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a
permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card
for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his
periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he
is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous
elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the
exception of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the
ground that:
The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not
sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the
Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent
has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as
shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. As
the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence
for candidates to elective local officials (sic) as provided for in Section 42
of the Local Government Code, there is no legal obstacle to his
candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No.
84508).
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a
foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card
holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has
not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)
In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito
Miguel, respondents," the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated
June 21, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C.
Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court which denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the
petition for quo warranto filed by Caasi. The Court of Appeals ordered the
regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo
warranto case. The Court of Appeals held:
... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning
the qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the
COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements
of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic)
and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the
petitioner, considering that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo
warranto cases under the Election Code are appealable to the
COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof
that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States, and (2) whether
respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or
immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to
change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or
an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25,
1971, EC).
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public
officials in the present administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are
holders of green cards in foreign countries, their effect on the holders' right to
hold elective public office in the Philippines is a question that excites much
interest in the outcome of this case.
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the
"Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230,
Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and
submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United
States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length
of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States
Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the
respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT
ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is
printed:
Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and
work in the United States." (Annex A pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No.
84508.)
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor
there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have there
permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's
or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S.
Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of
immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of
permanent residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes
give a broader meaning to the term "immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to
the U.S., the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the
protection given to him during the period of his residence therein.
Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain,
are in general entitled to the protection of the laws with regard to their
rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility.
In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to
remain are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to
their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal
responsibility. Thus resident alien friends are entitled to the benefit of the
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution that no
state shall deprive "any person" of life liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of the law,
and the protection of this amendment extends to the right to earn a
livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is
entitled to the protection of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the
federal constitution that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. (3 CJS 529-530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of
an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is
not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of
the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure"
as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881), which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.'
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting
himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local
elections, waive his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United
States?
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that
the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of
filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of
itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of
the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some
act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective
office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for
any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves
that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the
records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as
such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18,
1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for
that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at
least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the
qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42,
Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that
qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and
he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after
his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of
that municipality on January 18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent
residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has
laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public
office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The
law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our
country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is
that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such
entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye
on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under
the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as
permanent residents thereof.
Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent
residence in the United States, he never really intended to live there
permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to come
and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Court believe
that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this
time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the
Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party to
his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving him the best of both
worlds so to speak.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S.
and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof
that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the
Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his
application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver
of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S.
authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January
18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office,
hence, his election thereto was null and void.
WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in
SPC Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are
hereby set aside. The election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs against the said
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.






































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner,
vs.
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
x-----------------------------x
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO
KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are
deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,"
1
that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who
enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single
question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is
brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold
the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the
Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and
now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is
he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American
colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law
traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could
be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe,
his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a
petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-
born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan
Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted
a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley
and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married
Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004,
petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a
copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit
executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a
case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English
translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate
of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records
Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no
record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or
entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-
Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no
available information could be found in the files of the National Archives
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of
evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella
M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there
appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in
the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no
available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original
Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No.
20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a
copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported
marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a
certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900
until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit.
Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC
en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC
before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise
prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any
other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC
resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G.
R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs.
The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe,
Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634,
entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando
Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that,
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue
on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the
COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for
alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born
citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false"
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of
the Omnibus Election Code -
"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In
addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would
authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court per Rule 64
2
in an action for certiorari under Rule 65
3
of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution
also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that
judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law which power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly
elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary
view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully
informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to
occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634,
invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take
on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision
cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935
and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of
presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to
declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,
4
as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes
involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957,
to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent
Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the
Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines
and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the
parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have
implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless,
would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election
scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in
view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the
phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April
1992, would support this premise -
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President of the Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or
Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or
for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the
Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-
President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office.
5
In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a
post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an
election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical
background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle,
who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who
shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office.
6
Aristotle
saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which
he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in
number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.
7
The concept grew to include
one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like
autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to
deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant
obligations, on the other.
8
In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life
and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest
of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the
18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which
established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to
property, personal liberty and justice.
9
Its meaning expanded during the 19th
century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to
participate in the exercise of political power.
10
The 20th century saw the next
stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right
of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.
11
The idea of
citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so
developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in
keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the
internationalization of citizenship.
12

The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but
"subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."
13
In church records, the natives were
called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago.
Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but
their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all
of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the
Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.
14

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion,
promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended
to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among
experts;
15
however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to
Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,
16
the
Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of
children born in the Philippine Islands,
17
and finally, the Ley Extranjera de
Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the
Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.
18

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands
because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the
provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be
governed by special laws.
19

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18
December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who
were Spanish citizens. -
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside
of Spain,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy."
20

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the
state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony
in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted
principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while
resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no
effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and
the United States.
21
Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political
status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States
would be determined by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over
which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty
may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either
event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of
such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry
on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain
in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain
by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be
held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the
territory in which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress."
22

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be
Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they,
however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued
passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the
protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act
of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States
on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein,
who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety
eight."
23

Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11
th
day of April
1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2)
an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who
obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.
24

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11
April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in
the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential
writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also
known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and
England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that
period.
25
More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following
amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide
by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the
United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
26

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine
citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William
H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made
mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine
Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become
citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions
of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed
to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of
Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since
that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli
was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end
to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis
or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the
Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing
civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would
automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the
women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and
required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as
fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men,
the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new
Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under
the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship."
27

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during
the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring
citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis
28
had been in
vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs
29
(1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution
and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor
30
(1947), jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the
earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather
Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the
record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos,
Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954.
The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was
born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol
mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a
supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the
same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old,
unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old,
unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose
that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years
old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and
married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of
the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of
his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of
certainty from the documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ
is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo
Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties
during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3"
for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was
submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou
was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents
were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof,
particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the
marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie
Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11
September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner,
who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three
documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x x x x x x x
"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office
or is recorded in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ,
constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules
of Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries
made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the
preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a
breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such
statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have occurred.
31

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11
September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus
be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the
Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou
was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902
considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records
Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show
that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death
certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be
sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a
person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be
extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would
have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil
status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil
status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an
illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law
must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08
December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of
the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation
or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary.
Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the
lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had
in a record of birth, a will, or a public document.
32
Complementary to the new
code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof,
that -
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and
sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the
father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or
reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such
father could be identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be
signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the
same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.
33
In Mendoza
vs. Mella,
34
the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which
is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as
sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such
reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the
names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original,
let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For
all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who
furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in
any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document
wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made,
according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there
must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes
the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in
the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will
apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent
Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be
"some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,
35
this Court defined what
could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents,
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the
means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition
was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment
took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who
was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment
could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any
evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would
last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of
the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be
brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic
writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition,
simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would
include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or
other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and
Article 175 provide:
"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or
"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the
code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,
36
the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child
should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a
natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child
was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30,
1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment
or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the
traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate
relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the
child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal
affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or
illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in
general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship"
could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context
of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus
[been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate
the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of
a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the
protection of private interests."
37

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,
38
the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign
country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as
those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the
domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the
separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital
authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property,
legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it,
and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the
persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed
exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the
Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil
relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code,
39
such as on successional
rights and family relations.
40
In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would
be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights
as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights
under civil law
41
and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This
discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws,
which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the
family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children.
In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles
and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep
these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the
Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish
Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction,
however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not
unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship
status should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up
with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code
provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have
preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary
rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about
pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code
or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between
the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is
already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at
issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in
question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred,
and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of
Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be
accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal
relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children
(including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing
in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law
do hereby declare that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe,
more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's
Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
"x x x x x x x x x
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged
while they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was
also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children,
Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with
our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.),
Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months
between 1943-1944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4)
more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x x x x x x x
"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew,
Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate
child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish
or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of
the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up
filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,
42
this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt
the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility
and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of
a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other
from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are
analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique,
the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility
of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said
result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could
not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley,
Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita
Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and
respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of
marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at
best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent
himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage
certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a
Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year
later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an
illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so
followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing
his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,
43
citing Chiongbian vs.
de Leo
44
and Serra vs. Republic.
45

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G.
Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of
them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis
mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine
under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to
the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere
obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court
to look closely into these cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a
Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the
child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether
the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about
jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized
stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate
son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had
become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino
because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing
there about invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.
46
This is a more complicated case. The case was
about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan.
Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of
a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he
got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that
there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina
mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If
Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was
not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an
obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father,
were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was
illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter
dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs.
Vivo.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual
foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate
child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established
long ago by People vs. Cayat.
47
I would grant that the distinction
between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real
differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious
distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not
for another purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the
child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness
of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child
from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion
of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is
neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this
Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have
expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on
pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the
citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a
Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority
and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not
to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the
1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year
of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing
neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the
citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or
distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824
assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003
which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running
for the position of President in the 10
th
May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his
certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the
petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to
resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be
invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion
has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the
matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in
turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,
would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether
or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking
after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have
been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence
upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired,
would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ.
The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first
light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold
that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78,
in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has
utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding
the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC,
48
must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in
SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., see separate opinion, concurring.
Puno, J., on leave but was allowed to vote; see separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., on official leave; allowed to vote but did not send his vote on
the matter.
Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent of Justices Tinga and Morales; case should
have been remanded.
Ynares-Santiago, J., concurs and also with J. Punos separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
Corona, J., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice Morales.
Carpio-Morales, J., see dissenting opinion.
Callejo, Sr., J., please see concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Tinga, J., dissents per separate opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
DAVIDE, JR. C.J.:
The procedural and factual antecedents of these consolidated cases are as
follows:
On 9 January 2004, petitioner Victorino X. Fornier filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to disqualify private respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) and to deny due course to or cancel his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President in the forthcoming 10 May 2004
presidential elections. As a ground therefore, he averred that FPJ committed
falsity in a material representation in his certificate of candidacy in declaring
that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth and in fact he is not, since
he is the illegitimate son of Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan Poe, a
Spanish national. The case was docketed as COMELEC Case SPA No. 04-003
and assigned to the COMELECs First Division.
At the hearing before the First Division of the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier
offered FPJs record of birth to prove that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to
Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan Poe, who was then married to
Paulita Gomez. Upon the other hand, FPJ tried to establish that his father was a
Filipino citizen whose parents, although Spanish nationals, were Filipino citizens.
He adduced in evidence a copy of the marriage contract of Allan Poe and
Bessie Kelley, showing that they were married on 16 September 1940 in Manila.
In its Resolution of 23 January 2004, the First Division of the COMELEC dismissed
COMELEC Case SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. It declared that COMELECs
jurisdiction is limited to all matters relating to election, returns and qualifications
of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, but not those of national
officials like the President. It has, however, jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of
citizenship of national officials under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
on petitions to deny due course or cancel certificates of candidacy on the
ground that any material representation contained therein is false. It found that
the evidence adduced by petitioner Fornier is not substantial, and that FPJ did
not commit any falsehood in material representation when he stated in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
His motion for reconsideration filed before the COMELEC en banc having been
denied, petitioner Fornier filed a petition with this Court, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 161824.
Meanwhile, petitioners Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.
came to this Court via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 161434, to challenge the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC over the issue of the citizenship of FPJ. They assert that only this Court
has jurisdiction over the issue in light of the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article
VII of the Constitution, which provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
On 29 January 2004 petitioner Velez filed a similar petition, which was docketed
as G.R. No. 161634.
The core issues in these consolidated cases, as defined by the Court during the
oral argument, are as follows:
(1) Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to deny due
course to or cancel certificates of candidacy of Presidential candidates;
(2) Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petitions of (a)
Tecson, et al., (b) Velez, and (c) Fornier; and
(3) Whether respondent FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, whether he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
These consolidated petitions must be dismissed.
Both the petitions of Tecson and Velez invoke the jurisdiction of this Court as
provided for in the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution,
and raise the issue of the ineligibility of a candidate for President on the ground
that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The actions
contemplated in the said provision of the Constitution are post-election
remedies, namely, regular election contests and quo warranto. The petitioner
should have, instead, resorted to pre-election remedies, such as those
prescribed in Section 68 (Disqualifications), in relation to Section 72; Section 69
(Nuisance candidates); and Section 78 (Petition to deny course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy), in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code, which are implemented in Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. These pre-election remedies or actions do not, however, fall within
the original jurisdiction of this Court.
Under the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
COMELEC has the original jurisdiction to determine in an appropriate
proceeding whether a candidate for an elective office is eligible for the office
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy or is disqualified to be a
candidate or to continue such candidacy because of any of the recognized
grounds for disqualification. Its jurisdiction over COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 is,
therefore, beyond question.
Upon the other hand, this Court has jurisdiction over Forniers petition (G.R. No.
161824) under Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling
of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This Court can also take cognizance of the issue of whether the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the challenged resolution in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 by virtue of
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of nay branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
On the issue of whether private respondent FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen,
the following facts have been established by a weighty preponderance of
evidence either in the pleadings and the documents attached thereto or from
the admissions of the parties, through their counsels, during the oral arguments:
1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines.
2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.
3. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16 September 1940.
4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe, albeit a
Spanish subject, was not shown to have declared his allegiance to Spain
by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902.
From the foregoing it is clear that respondent FPJ was born before the marriage
of his parents. Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code then in force, he could either be
(a) a natural child if both his parents had no legal impediments to marry each
other; or (b) an illegitimate child if, indeed, Allan Poe was married to another
woman who was still alive at the time FPJ was born.
Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By
revolving his case around the illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded
paternity or filiation as a non-issue. For purposes of the citizenship of an
illegitimate child whose father is a Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof
of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow the citizenship of his
putative father, as advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, one of the amici curiae.
Since paternity or filiation is in fact admitted by petitioner Fornier, the COMELEC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen,
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
which reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
I agree with the amici curiae that this provision makes no distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate children of Filipino fathers. It is enough that filiation is
established or that the child is acknowledged or recognized by the father.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent from the majority opinion.
The Antecedent Proceedings
Petitioner Fornier filed before the Commission on Elections ("Comelec") a
"Petition for Disqualification of Presidential Candidate Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." on the ground that Fernando Poe, Jr. ("FPJ") is not a
natural-born Philippine citizen. The Comelec First Division dismissed the petition,
ruling that petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that FPJ committed
"any material misrepresentation when he stated in his Certificate of Candidacy
that he is a natural-born citizen." On motion for reconsideration, the Comelec
En Banc affirmed the ruling of the First Division. Petitioner Fornier now assails the
Comelec En Banc resolution under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
The Undisputed Facts
The undisputed facts are based on two documents and the admission of FPJ.
The first document is the Birth Certificate of FPJ, showing he was born on 20
August 1939. The Birth Certificate is an evidence of FPJ.[1] The second
document is the Marriage Certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, showing
that their marriage took place on 16 September 1940. The Marriage Certificate
is also an evidence of FPJ.[2] Moreover, FPJ admits that his mother Bessie Kelley
was an American citizen.[3]
Based on these two documents and admission, the undisputed facts are: (1)
FPJ was born out of wedlock and therefore illegitimate,[4] and (2) the mother
of FPJ was an American citizen.
The Issues
The issues raised in Forniers petition are:
(a) Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the petition to disqualify FPJ as
a candidate for President on the ground that FPJ is not a natural-born
Philippine citizen;
(b) Whether FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Jurisdiction
The Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially the qualifications of all
candidates. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec
has the power and function to "[E]nforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The initial determination of
who are qualified to file certificates of candidacies with the Comelec clearly
falls within this all-encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec. The
conduct of an election necessarily includes the initial determination of who are
qualified under existing laws to run for public office in an election. Otherwise,
the Comelecs certified list of candidates will be cluttered with unqualified
candidates making the conduct of elections unmanageable. For this reason,
the Comelec weeds out every presidential election dozens of candidates for
president who are deemed nuisance candidates by the Comelec.[5]
Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the Constitution also empowers the Comelec to
"[D]ecide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections x x x." The power to decide "all questions affecting elections"
necessarily includes the power to decide whether a candidate possesses the
qualifications required by law for election to public office. This broad
constitutional power and function vested in the Comelec is designed precisely
to avoid any situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without any
legal remedy. If one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like
Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the Comelec is certainly not
powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is
no need to wait until after the elections before such candidate may be
disqualified.
Under Rule 25 on "Disqualification of Candidates" of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, a voter may question before the Comelec the qualifications of any
candidate for public office. Thus, Rule 25 provides:
Section 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess
all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by
existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
Section 2. Who May File Petition for Disqualification. Any citizen of voting
age, or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political
parties may file with the Law Department of the Commission a petition to
disqualify a candidate on grounds provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The Comelec adopted its Rules of Procedure pursuant to its constitutional
power to promulgate its own rules of procedure[6] to expedite the disposition
of cases or controversies falling within its jurisdiction.
The Comelec has ruled upon the qualifications of candidates, even if the
Constitution provides that some other body shall be the "sole judge" of the
qualifications of the holders of the public offices involved. The Court has upheld
the jurisdiction of Comelec to issue such rulings,[7] even when the issue is the
citizenship of a candidate.[8] Thus, the Comelec has jurisdiction to determine
initially if FPJ meets the citizenship qualification to run for President.
However, the Comelec En Banc, in its scanty resolution, failed to state the
factual bases of its ruling. The Comelec En Banc also failed to rule conclusively
on the issue presented whether FPJ is a natural-born Philippine citizen. The
Comelec En Banc affirmed the First Division ruling that "[W]e feel we are not at
liberty to finally declare whether or not the respondent is a natural-born citizen."
In short, the Comelec En Banc allowed a candidate for President to run in the
coming elections without being convinced that the candidate is a natural-born
Philippine citizen. Clearly, the Comelec En Banc acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Under Section 1, Article VIII, as well as Section 5, Article VIII, of the
Constitution, the Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the issue in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65.
To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction to determine the qualification of a
candidate for President only after the elections would lead to an absurd
situation. The Court would have to wait for an alien to be elected on election
day before he could be disqualified to run for President. If the case is not
decided immediately after the election, an alien who wins the election may
even assume office as President before he is finally disqualified. Certainly, this is
not what the Constitution says when it provides that "[N]o person may be
elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."[9] The
clear and specific language of the Constitution prohibits the election of one
who is not a natural-born citizen. Thus, the issue of whether a candidate for
President is a natural-born Philippine citizen must be decided before the
election.
Governing Laws
Since FPJ was born on 20 August 1939, his citizenship at the time of his birth
depends on the Constitution and statutes in force at the time of his birth.[10]
FPJs citizenship at the time of his birth in 1939, applying the laws in force in
1939, determines whether he is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Natural-born Philippine citizens are "those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."[11] If a person has to perform an act, such as proving in
an administrative or judicial proceeding, that an event subsequent to his birth
transpired thus entitling him to Philippine citizenship, such person is not a natural
born citizen.[12]
The 1935 Constitution and the Spanish Civil Code, the laws in force in 1939, are
the governing laws that determine whether a person born in 1939 is a Philippine
citizen at the time of his birth in 1939. Any subsequent legislation cannot
change the citizenship at birth of a person born in 1939 because such
legislation would violate the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen as
one who is a Philippine citizen from birth. In short, one who is not a Philippine
citizen at birth in 1939 cannot be declared by subsequent legislation a natural-
born citizen.
General Principles
A legitimate child of a Filipino father follows the citizenship of the father. A child
born within wedlock is presumed to be the son of the father[13] and thus carries
the blood of the father. Under the doctrine of jus sanguinis, as provided for in
Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, by the fact of
legitimacy, automatically follows the citizenship of the Filipino father.
An illegitimate child, however, enjoys no presumption at birth of blood relation
to any father unless the father acknowledges the child at birth.[14] The law has
always required that "in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be
duly proved."[15] The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the
fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the blood
of the mother. Thus, unless the father acknowledges the illegitimate child at
birth, the illegitimate child can only acquire the citizenship of the only legally
known parent - the mother.
However, if the Filipino father is legally known because the filiation (blood
relation of illegitimate child to the father) of the child to the Filipino father is
established in accordance with law, the child follows the citizenship of the
Filipino father. This gives effect, without discrimination between legitimate and
illegitimate children, to the provision of the 1935 Constitution that "[T]hose
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines"[16] are Philippine citizens.
Nature of Citizenship
If the Filipino father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the child is a
natural-born Philippine citizen because no other act after his birth is required to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. The child possesses all the
qualifications to be a Philippine citizen at birth.
If the Filipino father acknowledges the child after birth, the child is a Philippine
citizen as of the time of the acknowledgment. In this case, the child does not
possess all the qualifications to be a Philippine citizen at birth because an act -
the acknowledgement of the Filipino father - is required for the child to acquire
or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Statutory provisions on retroactivity of
acknowledgment cannot be given effect because they would be contrary to
the constitutional definition of natural- born citizens as those who are Philippine
citizens at birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship.
If the illegitimacy of a child is established, there is no presumption that the child
has the blood of any man who is supposed to be the father. There is only a
conclusive presumption that the child has the blood of the mother. If an
illegitimate child claims to have the blood of a man who is supposed to be the
childs father, such blood relation must be established in accordance with
proof of filiation as required by law.
Where the illegitimate child of an alien mother claims to follow the citizenship of
the putative father, the burden is on the illegitimate child to establish a blood
relation to the putative Filipino father since there is no presumption that an
illegitimate child has the blood of the putative father. Even if the putative
father admits paternity after the birth of the illegitimate child, there must be an
administrative or judicial approval that such blood relation exists upon proof of
paternity as required by law.
Citizenship, being a matter of public and State interest, cannot be conferred
on an illegitimate child of an alien mother on the mere say so of the putative
Filipino father. The State has a right to examine the veracity of the claim of
paternity. Otherwise, the grant of Philippine citizenship to an illegitimate child of
an alien mother is left to the sole discretion of the putative Filipino father. For
example, a Philippine citizen of Chinese descent can simply claim that he has
several illegitimate children in China. The State cannot be required to grant
Philippine passports to these supposed illegitimate children born in China of
Chinese mothers just because the putative Filipino father acknowledges
paternity of these illegitimate children. There must be either an administrative or
judicial determination that the claim of the putative Filipino father is true.
The case of the illegitimate Vietnamese children, born in Vietnam of
Vietnamese mothers and allegedly of Filipino fathers, is illustrative. These
children grew up in Vietnam, many of them studying there until high school.
These children grew up knowing they were Vietnamese citizens. In 1975, a
Philippine Navy vessel brought them, together with their Vietnamese mothers,
to the Philippines as Saigon fell to the communists. The mothers of these
children became stateless when the Republic of (South) Vietnam ceased to
exist in 1975. The Department of Justice rendered Opinion No. 49 dated 3 May
1995 that being children of Filipino fathers, these Vietnamese children, even if
illegitimate, are Philippine citizens under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution and Section 1(2), Article III of the 1973 Constitution. This Opinion is
cited by FPJ as basis for his claim of being a natural-born Philippine citizen.[17]
However, this Opinion categorically stated that before the illegitimate
Vietnamese children may be considered Filipino citizens "it is necessary in every
case referred to that such paternity be established by sufficient and convincing
documentary evidence."[18]
In short, the illegitimate child must prove to the proper administrative or judicial
authority the paternity of the alleged Filipino father by "sufficient and
convincing documentary evidence." Clearly, an administrative or judicial act is
necessary to confer on the illegitimate Vietnamese children Philippine
citizenship. The mere claim of the illegitimate child of filiation to a Filipino father,
or the mere acknowledgment of the alleged Filipino father, does not
automatically confer Philippine citizenship on the child. The State must be
convinced of the veracity of such claim and approve the same. Since the
illegitimate Vietnamese children need to perform an act to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship, they are not natural-born Philippine citizens. They become
Philippine citizens only from the moment the proper administrative or judicial
authority approve and recognize their filiation to their alleged Filipino fathers.
The rationale behind requiring that only natural-born citizens may hold certain
high public offices[19] is to insure that the holders of these high public offices
grew up knowing they were at birth citizens of the Philippines. In their formative
years they knew they owed from birth their allegiance to the Philippines. In case
any other country claims their allegiance, they would be faithful and loyal to
the Philippines of which they were citizens from birth. This is particularly true to
the President who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.[20] The
President of the Philippines must owe, from birth, allegiance to the Philippines
and must have grown up knowing that he was a citizen of the Philippines at
birth. The constitutional definition of a natural-born Philippine citizen would lose
its meaning and efficacy if one who was at birth recognized by law as an alien
were declared forty years later[21] a natural-born Philippine citizen just
because his alleged Filipino father subsequently admitted his paternity.
Proof of Filiation
Article 131[22] of the Spanish Civil Code, the law in force in 1939, recognized
only the following as proof of filiation of a natural child:
a. acknowledgment in a record of birth;
b. acknowledgment in a will;
c. acknowledgment in some other public document.
To establish his Philippine citizenship at birth, FPJ must present either an
acknowledgement in a record of birth, or an acknowledgment in some other
public document executed at the time of his birth. An acknowledgment
executed after birth does not make one a citizen at birth but a citizen from the
time of such acknowledgment since the acknowledgment is an act done after
birth to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.
After the birth of one who is not a natural-born Philippine citizen, a subsequent
legislation liberalizing proof of filiation cannot apply to such person to make him
a natural-born citizen. A natural-born Philippine citizen is expressly defined in
the Constitution as one who is a citizen at birth. If a person is not a citizen at
birth, no subsequent legislation can retroactively declare him a citizen at birth
since it would violate the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen.
Burden of Proof
Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of
proving his Philippine citizenship. Any person who claims to be qualified to run
for President because he is, among others, a natural-born Philippine citizen, has
the burden of proving he is a natural-born citizen. Any doubt whether or not he
is natural-born citizen is resolved against him. The constitutional requirement of
a natural-born citizen, being an express qualification for election as President,
must be complied with strictly as defined in the Constitution. As the Court ruled
in Paa v. Chan: [23]
It is incumbent upon a person who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the
satisfaction of the Court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.
Since the undisputed facts show that FPJ is an illegitimate child, having been
born out of wedlock, the burden is on FPJ to prove his blood relation to his
alleged Filipino father. An illegitimate child enjoys no presumption of blood
relation to any father. Such blood relationship must be established in the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine citizenship of a person
because citizenship is not a private right or property, but a matter of public and
State interest. Even if petitioner Fornier admits that FPJ, although illegitimate, is
the son of Allan F. Poe, such admission cannot bind the State for the purpose of
conferring on FPJ the status of a natural-born Philippine citizen or even of a
naturalized citizen. Certainly, the Court will not recognize a person as a natural-
born Philippine citizen just because the private party litigants have admitted or
stipulated on such a status. In the present case, the Solicitor General, as
representative of the Government, is strongly disputing the status of FPJ as a
natural-born Philippine citizen.
Legitimation
Under Article 123[24] of the Spanish Civil Code, legitimation took effect as of
the date of marriage. There was no retroactivity of the effects of legitimation on
the rights of the legitimated child. Thus, a legitimated child acquired the rights
of a legitimate child only as of the date of marriage of the natural parents.
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married on 16 September 1940 while FPJ
was born more than one year earlier on 20 August 1939. Assuming that Allan F.
Poe was FPJs natural father, the effects of legitimation did not retroact to the
birth of FPJ on 20 August 1939.
Besides, legitimation vests only civil, not political rights, to the legitimated child.
As the Court held in Ching Leng:[25]
The framers of the Civil Code had no intention whatsoever to regulate therein
political questions. Hence, apart from reproducing the provisions of the
Constitution on citizenship, the Code contains no precept thereon except that
which refers all matters of "naturalization", as well as those related to the "loss
and reacquisition of citizenship" to "special laws." Consistently with this policy,
our Civil Code does not include therein any rule analogous to Articles 18 to 28
of the Civil Code of Spain, regulating citizenship. (Underscoring in the original)
Clearly, even assuming that the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
legitimated FPJ, such legitimation did not vest retroactively any civil or political
rights to FPJ.
Treaty of Paris of 1898 and Philippine Bill of 1902
FPJ admits that his grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was a Spanish citizen who came
to the Philippines from Spain.[26] To benefit from the mass naturalization under
the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902, FPJ must prove that
Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899.
Once it is established that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and resident of the
Philippines on 11 April 1899, then he is presumed to have acquired Philippine
citizenship under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902.[27]
Being an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899 is the
determinative fact to fall under the coverage of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and
the Philippine Bill of 1902.[28]
There is, however, no evidence on record that Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine
inhabitant and resident on 11 April 1899. The date of arrival of Lorenzo Pou in
the Philippines is not known. If he arrived in the Philippines after 11 April 1899,
then he could not benefit from the mass naturalization under the Treaty of Paris
of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902. There is also no evidence that Lorenzo
Pou was naturalized as a Philippine citizen after 11 April 1899. Thus, there can
be no presumption that Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine citizen.
There is also no evidence on record that Allan F. Poe, the son of Lorenzo Pou
and the alleged father of FPJ, was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Thus,
based on the evidence adduced there is no legal basis for claiming that Allan
F. Poe is a Philippine citizen. Nevertheless, there is no need to delve further into
this issue since the Court can decide this case without determining the
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou and Allan F. Poe. Whether or not Lorenzo Pou and
Allan F. Poe were Philippine citizens is not material in resolving whether FPJ is a
natural-born Philippine citizen.
Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Philippines signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 January
1990 and ratified the same on 21 August 1990. The Convention defines a child
to mean "every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under
the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier." Obviously, FPJ
cannot invoke the Convention since he is not a child as defined in the
Convention, and he was born half a century before the Convention came into
existence. FPJs citizenship at birth in 1939 could not in any way be affected by
the Convention which entered into force only on 2 September 1990.
The Convention has the status of a municipal law[29] and its ratification by the
Philippines could not have amended the express requirement in the
Constitution that only natural-born citizens of Philippines are qualified to be
President. While the Constitution apparently favors natural-born citizens over
those who are not, that is the explicit requirement of the Constitution which
neither the Executive Department nor the Legislature, in ratifying a treaty, could
amend. In short, the Convention cannot amend the definition in the
Constitution that natural-born citizens are "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship."
In any event, the Convention guarantees a child "the right to acquire a
nationality,"[30] and requires States Parties to "ensure the implementation" of
this right, "in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless."[31] Thus,
as far as nationality or citizenship is concerned, the Convention guarantees the
right of the child to acquire a nationality so that he may not be stateless. The
Convention does not guarantee a child a citizenship at birth, but merely "the
right to acquire a nationality" in accordance with municipal law. When FPJ was
born in 1939, he was apparently under United States law an American citizen at
birth.[32] After his birth FPJ also had the right to acquire Philippine citizenship by
proving his filiation to his alleged Filipino father in accordance with Philippine
law. At no point in time was FPJ in danger of being stateless. Clearly, FPJ
cannot invoke the Convention to claim he is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
The Doctrine in Ching Leng v. Galang
The prevailing doctrine today is that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and
an alien mother follows the citizenship of the alien mother as the only legally
known parent. The illegitimate child, even if acknowledged and legally
adopted by the Filipino father, cannot acquire the citizenship of the father. The
Court made this definitive doctrinal ruling in Ching Leng v. Galang,[33] which
involved the illegitimate minor children of a naturalized Filipino of Chinese
descent with a Chinese woman, Sy An. The illegitimate children were later on
jointly adopted by the naturalized Filipino and his legal wife, So Buan Ty.
The facts in Ching Leng as quoted by the Court from the trial courts decision
are as follows:
After the petitioner Ching Leng Alias Ching Ban Lee obtained judgment in this
Court dated May 2, 1950 granting his petition for naturalization, he together
with his wife So Buan Ty filed another petition also in this Court in Special Proc.
No. 1216 for the adoption of Ching Tiong Seng, Ching Liong Ding, Victoria
Ching Liong Yam, Sydney Ching and Ching Tiong An, all minors and admittedly
the illegitimate children of petitioner Ching Leng with one Sy An, a Chinese
citizen. Finding the petition for adoption proper, this Court granted the same in
a decision dated September 12, 1950, declaring the said minors free from all
legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to their mother
Sy An and to all legal intents and purposes the children of the adopter Ching
Leng alias Ching Ban Lee and So Buan Ty with all the legal rights and
obligations provided by law.
On September 29, 1955, Ching Leng took his oath of allegiance and became
therefore a full pledge (sic) Filipino citizen. Believing now that his adopted
illegitimate children became Filipino citizens by virtue of his naturalization,
petitioner Ching Leng addressed a communication to the respondent
Commissioner of Immigration requesting that the alien certificate of registration
of the said minors be cancelled. (Bold underscoring supplied)
In Ching Leng, the Court made a definitive ruling on the meaning of "minor
child or children" in Section 15 of the Naturalization Law,[34] as well as the
meaning of children "whose parents are citizens of the Philippines" under the
Constitution. The Court categorically ruled that these children refer to
legitimate children only, and not to illegitimate children. Thus, the Court held:
It is claimed that the phrases "minor children" and "minor child", used in these
provisions, include adopted children. The argument is predicated upon the
theory that an adopted child is, for all intents and purposes, a legitimate child.
Whenever, the word "children" or "child" is used in statutes, it is generally
understood, however, to refer to legitimate children, unless the context of the
law and its spirit indicate clearly the contrary. Thus, for instance, when the
Constitution provides that "those whose parents are citizens of the Philippines,
"and "those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines," who shall elect
Philippine citizenship "upon reaching the age of majority", are citizens of the
Philippines (Article IV, Section 1, subdivisions 3 and 4), our fundamental law
clearly refers to legitimate children (Chiong Bian vs. De Leon, 46 Off. Gaz., 3652-
3654; Serra v. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952).
Similarly, the children alluded to in said section 15 are those begotten in lawful
wedlock, when the adopter, at least is the father. In fact, illegitimate children
are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality, not
that of the illegitimate father (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332, 335-336; Santos
Co vs. Govt of the Philippines, 52 Phil. 543, 544; Serra v. Republic, supra; Gallofin
v. Ordoez, 70 Phil. 287; Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953). Although,
adoption gives "to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were
a legitimate child of the adopter", pursuant to said Article 341 of our Civil Code,
we have already seen that the rights therein alluded to are merely those
enumerated in Article 264, and do not include the acquisition of the nationality
of the adopter.
Moreover, as used in said section 15 of the Naturalization Law, the term
"children" could not possibly refer to those whose relation to the naturalized
person is one created by legal fiction, as, for instance, by adoption, for,
otherwise, the place and time of birth of the child would be immaterial. The
fact that the adopted persons involved in the case at bar are illegitimate
children of appellant Ching Leng does not affect substantially the legal
situation before us, for, by legal fiction, they are now being sought to be given
the status of legitimate children of said appellant, despite the circumstance
that the Civil Code of the Philippine does not permit their legitimation. (Bold
underscoring supplied)
Ching Leng, penned by Justice Roberto Concepcion in October 1958, was a
unanimous decision of the Court En Banc. Subsequent Court decisions,
including Paa v. Chan[35] and Morano et al. v. Vivo,[36] have cited the
doctrine laid down in Ching Leng that the provision in the 1935 Constitution
stating "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines" refers only to
legitimate children. When the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions were drafted, the
framers did not attempt to change the intent of this provision, even as they
were presumably aware of the Ching Leng doctrine.
Nevertheless, I believe that it is now time to abandon the Ching Leng doctrine.
The inexorable direction of the law, both international and domestic in the last
100 years, is to eliminate all forms of discrimination between legitimate and
illegitimate children. Where the Constitution does not distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate children, we should not also distinguish, especially
when private rights are not involved as in questions of citizenship. Abandoning
the Ching Leng doctrine upholds the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine is also in compliance with
our treaty obligation under the Covenant on the Rights of Children mandating
States Parties to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on the status of
children, save of course those distinctions prescribed in the Constitution itself
like the reservation of certain high public offices to natural-born citizens.
Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine does not mean, however, that an
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother automatically
becomes a Philippine citizen at birth. We have repeatedly ruled that an
illegitimate child does not enjoy any presumption of blood relation to the
alleged father until filiation or blood relation is proved as provided by law.[37]
Article 887 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "[I]n all cases of illegitimate
children, their filiation must be duly proved." The illegitimate child becomes a
Philippine citizen only from the time he establishes his blood relation to the
Filipino father. If the blood relation is established after the birth of the
illegitimate child, then the child is not a natural-born Philippine citizen since an
act is required after birth to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Conclusion
In conclusion, private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is not a natural-born
Philippine citizen since there is no showing that his alleged Filipino father Allan F.
Poe acknowledged him at birth. The Constitution defines a natural-born citizen
as a Philippine citizen "from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect" his Philippine citizenship. Private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. does
not meet this citizenship qualification.
Therefore, I vote to grant the petition of Victorino X. Fornier. However, I vote to
dismiss the petitions of Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. and Zoilo
Antonio Velez on the ground that their direct petitions invoking the jurisdiction
of the Court under Section 4, paragraph 7, Article VII of the Constitution are
premature, there being no election contest in this case.



























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170603 January 29, 2007
EDISON SO, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision
1
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80437 which reversed the Decision
2
of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 8, in Naturalization Case No. 02-
102984. Likewise assailed is the appellate courts Resolution denying the Motion
for Reconsideration of its Decision.
Antecedents
On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for
Naturalization
3
under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as
the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. He alleged the following in his
petition:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has
lived in No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he
derives an average annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and
lodging and other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write English,
Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth
Act (C.A.) No. 473, as amended, because he was born in the Philippines, and
studied in a school recognized by the Government where Philippine history,
government and culture are taught; he is a person of good moral character;
he believes in the principles underlying the Philippine constitution; he has
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living; he has mingled
socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people; he has all the
qualifications provided under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under
Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended; he is not opposed to organized
government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold
and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; he is not defending
or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of mens ideas; he is not a
polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy; he has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; he is not suffering from any
incurable contagious diseases or from mental alienation; the nation of which
he is a citizen is not at war with the Philippines; it is his intention in good faith to
become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty,
and particularly to China; and he will reside continuously in the Philippines from
the time of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission as citizen of
the Philippines. The petition was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 02-
102984.
Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit
4
of Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr.
and Mark B. Salcedo; and petitioners Certificate of Live Birth,
5
Alien Certificate
of Registration,
6
and Immigrant Certificate of Residence.
7

On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order
8
setting the petition for hearing at
8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned
were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted.
The entire petition and its annexes, including the order, were ordered published
once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered
that copies of the petition and notice be posted in public and conspicuous
places in the Manila City Hall Building.
9

Petitioner thus caused the publication of the above order, as well as the entire
petition and its annexes, in the Official Gazette on May 20, 2002
10
and May 27,
2002,
11
and in Today, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila,
on May 25, 2002 and June 1, 2002.
No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty.
Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal
consultant and adviser of the So familys business. He would usually attend
parties and other social functions hosted by petitioners family. He knew
petitioner to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed of good moral
character, including all the qualifications mandated by law. Atty. Adasa, Jr.
further testified that petitioner was gainfully employed and presently resides at
No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila; petitioner had been practicing
Philippine tradition and those embodied in the Constitution; petitioner had
been socially active, mingled with some of his neighbors and had conducted
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the
Philippines; and petitioner and his family observed Christmas and New Year
and some occasions such as fiestas. According to the witness, petitioner was
not disqualified under C.A. No. 473 to become a Filipino citizen: he is not
opposed to organized government or believes in the use of force; he is not a
polygamist and has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
neither is he suffering from any mental alienation or any incurable disease.
12

Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known
petitioner for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and
petitioner were classmates at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they
took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some school organizations and
mingled well with friends.
13
Salcedo further testified that he saw petitioner twice
a week, and during fiestas and special occasions when he would go to
petitioners house. He has known petitioner to have resided in Manila since
birth. Petitioner is intelligent, a person of good moral character, and believes in
the principles of the Philippine Constitution. Petitioner has a gainful occupation,
has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner and has all the
qualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of the
Philippines.
At the conclusion of his testimonial evidence, petitioner offered in evidence the
following documents: (1) Certificate of Live Birth;
14
(2) Alien Certificate of
Registration;
15
(3) Immigrant Certificate of Residence;
16
(4) Elementary Pupils
17

and High School Students
18
Permanent Record issued by Chang Kai Shek
College; (5) Transcript of Record issued by the University of Santo Tomas;
19
(6)
Certification of Part-Time Employment dated November 20, 2002;
20
(7) Income
Tax Returns and Certificate of Withholding Tax for the year 2001;
21
(8)
Certification from Metrobank that petitioner is a depositor;
22
(9) Clearances that
he has not been charged or convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude;
23
and (10) Medical Certificates and Psychiatric Evaluation issued by
the Philippine General Hospital.
24
The RTC admitted all these in evidence.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.
25
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
declaring that petitioner EDISON SO has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen and he is hereby admitted as
citizen of the Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon
as this decision becomes final, subject to payment of cost of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
26

The trial court ruled that the witnesses for petitioner had known him for the
period required by law, and they had affirmed that petitioner had all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
Thus, the court concluded that petitioner had satisfactorily supported his
petition with evidence.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), appealed the decision to the CA on the following grounds:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO
ADASA, JR. AND MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER WITNESSES.
II.
PETITIONER IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.
27

Respondent contended that based on the evidence on record, appellee
failed to prove that he possesses all the qualifications under Section 2 and
none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473. It insisted that his
two (2) character witnesses did not know him well enough to vouch for his
fitness to become a Filipino citizen; they merely made general statements
without giving specific details about his character and moral conduct.
28
The
witnesses did not even reside in the same place as petitioner.
29
Respondent
likewise argued that petitioner himself failed to prove that he is qualified to
become a Filipino citizen because he did not give any explanation or specific
answers to the questions propounded by his lawyer. He merely answered "yes"
or "no" or gave general statements in answer to his counsels questions. Thus,
petitioner was unable to prove that he had all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications required by law to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.
30

On the other hand, petitioner averred that he graduated cum laude from the
UST with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy. He is now on his
second year as a medical student at the UST Medicine and Surgery. He avers
that the requirements for naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended by LOI
270, in relation to Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and 1379, had been relaxed
after the Philippine government entered into diplomatic relations with the
Peoples Republic of China; the requirements were further relaxed when
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 was signed into law.
31
Petitioner pointed out that
the petition, with all its annexes, was published in the official gazette and a
newspaper of general circulation; notices were likewise sent to the National
Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Department of Foreign Affairs,
and the OSG. But none from these offices came forward to oppose the petition
before the lower court.
32
Petitioner insisted that he has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications to become Filipino. This was clearly established by
his witnesses.
In its Reply Brief, respondent alleged that R.A. No. 9139 applies to administrative
naturalization filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization. It insisted that
even in the absence of any opposition, a petition for naturalization may be
dismissed.
In its Decision
33
dated August 4, 2005, the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and
dismissed the petition for naturalization without prejudice.
34
According to the
CA, petitioners two (2) witnesses were not credible because they failed to
mention specific details of petitioners life or character to show how well they
knew him; they merely "parroted" the provisions of the Naturalization Act
without clearly explaining their applicability to petitioners case.
35
The appellate
court likewise ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of the
law that the applicant must not be less than 21 years of age on the day of the
hearing of the petition; during the first hearing on December 12, 2002, petitioner
was only twenty (20) years, nine (9) months, and twenty five (25) days old,
falling short of the requirement.
36
The CA stated, however, that it was not its
intention to forever close the door to any future application for naturalization
which petitioner would file, and that it believes that he would make a good
Filipino citizen in due time, a decided asset to this country.
37

Petitioners motion for reconsideration
38
was denied in a Resolution
39
dated
November 24, 2005; hence, the present petition grounded on the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA.
40

In support of his petition, petitioner reiterates the arguments he set forth in the
Brief filed before the CA.
In its Comment
41
on the petition, respondent countered that R.A. No. 9139
(which took effect on August 8, 2001 and where the applicants age
requirement was lowered to eighteen (18) years old), refers only to
administrative naturalization filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization;
it does not apply to judicial naturalization before the court, as in the present
case.
42
Respondent, through the OSG, avers that its failure to oppose the
petition before the court a quo does not preclude it from appealing the
decision of the RTC to the CA; it is even authorized to question an already final
decision by filing a petition for cancellation of citizenship.
43
Lastly, respondent
reiterates its argument that petitioners character witnesses are not qualified to
prove the formers qualifications.
In determining whether or not an applicant for naturalization is entitled to
become a Filipino citizen, it is necessary to resolve the following issues: (1)
whether or not R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for naturalization by judicial
act; and (2) whether or not the witnesses presented by petitioner are "credible"
in accordance with the jurisprudence and the definition and guidelines set
forth in C.A. No. 473.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political
body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.
44
Under
current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become
a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No.
9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c)
legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship to an alien.
45

Petitioners contention that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization
should possess are those provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in
C.A. No. 473 is barren of merit. The qualifications and disqualifications of an
applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 2
46
and 4
47
of
C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections 3
48
and 4
49
of R.A. No. 9139 provide
for the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by
administrative act.
Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make
the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and
more encouraging.
50
It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who,
by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession,
thus promoting "brain gain" for the Philippines.
51
These however, do not justify
petitioners contention that the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to
applications for naturalization by judicial act.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws the former
covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens
who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country
and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love
and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.
52
To
reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make
the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and
more encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus,
although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the
naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be
inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A.
No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another
mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native
born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to
apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications.
In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though
at the time of the filing of his petition, administrative naturalization under R.A.
No. 9139 was already available. Consequently, his application should be
governed by C.A. No. 473.
Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made
applicable even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law would be
broadened since it would then apply even to aliens who are not native born. It
must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to aliens who were born in the
Philippines and have been residing here.
Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is
contrary to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization
procedure in the country. One of the qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is
that the applicant was born in the Philippines and should have been residing
herein since birth. Thus, one who was born here but left the country, though
resided for more than ten (10) years from the filing of the application is also
disqualified. On the other hand, if we maintain the distinct qualifications under
each of the two laws, an alien who is not qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still
be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.
Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law
stands and the qualifications and disqualifications set forth therein are
maintained.
In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were
competent to vouch for his good moral character, and are themselves
possessed of good moral character. It must be stressed that character
witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the applicants
conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on specific facts and events
justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by law.
53

Petitioners witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific
acts; they did not elaborate on his traits. Their testimonies do not convince the
Court that they personally know petitioner well and are therefore in a position
to vouch for his qualifications. As correctly found by the CA, the witnesses
testimonies consisted mainly of general statements in answer to the leading
questions propounded by his counsel. What they conveniently did was to
enumerate the qualifications as set forth in the law without giving specific
details. The pertinent portion of Atty. Adasas testimony follows:
q Do you know the petitioner Edison So?
a Yes, Sir.
q Will you please tell us how did you come to know him?
a Well I came to know him[,] the petitioner[,] when I was the legal consultant
and adviser of their family business and I used to ah (sic) me[e]t him during my
visit to their place way back in 1991 to 1992.
q From that day of 1991 up to the present, is your relationship with the petitioner
more or less contin[u]ous?
a Yes, sir, because aside from the usual professional visit that I did to their family
some social function was sponsored normally and I am (sic) invited and I used
to attend.
q During the birthday party of the petitioner, did you usually attend petitioners
birthday?
a On several occasions I attend the birthday.
q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides at present?
a At present the petitioner resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila.
q Do you know for how long the petitioner resides in the Philippines?
a As far as I personally known (sic) Your Honor is that since birth.
q During all the times that you have know[n] the petitioner, what is your
impression of his conduct?
a Well ah (sic) I have personally known him to be obedient and hard working
individual and ah (sic) he has a good moral character and he has been ah
(sic) no adverse report concerning the character of the petitioner.
q In your opinion does the petitioner has the qualifications necessary to
become [a] citizen of the Philippines?
a Yes.
q Can you tell us why do you say so?
a I would say Your Honor that petitioner has posses (sic) all the qualifications
mandated by law and presently he is more than 21 years old and he has
resided in the Philippines particularly in the City of Manila contin[u]ously for
more than ten (10) years and that since his birth; and that he has good moral
character and I have observed that ah (sic) he has been practicing Philippine
traditions and ah (sic) those embodied in the Philippine constitution and he has
been socially active and meddle (sic) some of his neighbors and ah (sic) I am
sure he has desire to embrace and learn the customs and ideas and traditions
in the Philippine[s] and as I earlier mentioned that he conducted himself in
proper and approachable (sic) manner during his entire residence in our
country and he has a gainful occupation.
q Will you please tell us what are these customs which the petitioner
embraced?
a Well I have observed that ah (sic) together with his family they used to ah
observed (sic) the usual Filipino celebration during Christmas and new year and
some occasions such as fiestas.
q And do you know whether petitioner is not disqualified under
Commonwealth Act to become Filipino citizen of the Philippines (sic)?
a Ah there has been no incident or occasion which I learned that would
disqualify of coming (sic) the citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. I have
noticed that ah (sic) he is qualified under Commonwealth Act 473 as amended
because he is not opposed to ah (sic) organized government. His family and
himself does not believed (sic) in the use of force in the success of his ideas and
ah (sic) he is not a poligamist (sic) or believer in the practice of illegal and he
has not been convicted in any crime involving him in any crime (sic). and he is
not suffering from any mental alienation or any incurable contidious (sic)
disease. as provided for.
q Will you please tell us why you know all these stage?
a Because of ah (sic) the personal attachment with his family we have
continuously having ah (sic) the usual contact with his family.
54

It can thus be inferred that Atty. Adasa is close to petitioners family, but not
specifically to petitioner. Atty. Adasas statements refer to his observations on
the familys practices and not to petitioner in particular. Nothing in his testimony
suggests that he was close to petitioner and knew him well enough to vouch
for his qualifications.
Salcedo, on the other hand, testified thus:
q Now do you know the petitioner in this case Edison So?
a Yes, Sir.
q Are you personally acquainted with him?
a Yes, Sir.
q How long have you known the petitioner?
a I have known him for about ten (10) years, Sir.
q Will you please inform the Honorable court under what circumstances did
you come to know the petitioner?
a I met him in a birthday party in 1991, Sir.
q And from 1991 up to the present is your relationship with the petitioner more
or less contin[u]ous?
a Yes, Sir.
q How often did you see the petitioner?
a I see him twice a week, Sir.
q And during this time that you met the petitioner, what did you usually do?
a We play some games, Sir. We play Patentero (sic).
q Do you go to church together?
a Yes, Sir.
q During fiestas in your place, did the petitioner go?
a Yes, Sir.
q How about during fiestas in the place where the petitioner reside[s], did you
also go during fiestas?
a Yes, Sir.
q During occasion in the house of the petitioner, are you invited?
a Yes, Sir.
q How many time[s] did you go to his (sic) residence of the petitioner?
a Twice a week, sir.
q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides?
a The petitioner resides at 528 Lavezares Street, Tondo, Manila, Sir.
q For how long does the petitioner reside in that address?
a Since birth, Sir.
q During all the times that you have known the petitioner, will you please tell us
your impression of his conduct?
a He is a person of good moral, sir, and he believed in the principles of the
Philippines (sic) Constitution.
q Will you please cite one or two of these principles underlined the principles
(sic) of the Philippines (sic) Constitution?
a Ah the Philippines is a Republican of the (sic) state, sovereignty preside (sic)
over the people and the government authority emanate from within; and the
other one is the civilian government is not supreme over the military.
q Now in your opinion does the petitioner have all the qualifications necessary
to become a citizen of the Philippines?
a Yes, Sir.
q What are these qualifications?
a He is at least 21 years old, he is a person of good moral and has been residing
in the Philippines since birth.
q What else?
a He must be a Filipino and ah must practice the traditions and customs, Sir.
q Do you know whether the petitioner conducted himself in a proper and
appraochable (sic) manner during the period of his residence in the
Philippines?
a Yes, Sir.
q Do you know if the petitioner has a gainful occupation?
a Yes, Sir.
q What is the occupation of the petitioner?
a Ah (sic) he is the secretary in a wood factory in Commonwealth, Sir.
q And aside from being the secretary, what else did the petitioner do?
a He help (sic) in the factory cargo, Sir.
q Is the petitioner still a student?
a Yes, Sir.
q Where is he studying?
a In UST, Sir.
q Is he your classmate?
a Yes, Sir.
q What was his course?
a Pharmacy, Sir.
q So when you said he was the secretary he only works as part time secretary?
a Yes, Sir.
q You said the petitioner meddle (sic) socially with the Filipinos?
a Yes, Sir.
q Will you please name at least one of those Filipinos the petitioner meddle (sic)
with?
a Samuel Falmera, Sir, Marlon Kahocom, Sir.
q Who else?
a Elmer Ramos, Sir.
q Who else?
a Sharmaine Santos, Sir.
q You said the petitioner is of good moral character?
a Yes, Sir.
q Why do you know that?
a As a classmate I can see him I go with him and ah (sic) I can see that he has
ah better approached (sic) with other people and I can see that he mixed very
well with friends.
q So during school days you see him everyday?
a Yes, Sir.
q When there are no classes during the vacation you see the petitioner twice a
week?
a Yes, Sir.
q Does the petitioner (sic), do you think the petitioner is not disqualified to
become the citizen of the Republic of the Philippines?
a Yes, Sir, he is not disqualified, Sir.
q Why do you say that he is not disqualified?
a Because he abide [by] any law in the government, sir, ah (sic) he is not
polygamus and he is not convicted of any crime, Sir.
q Do you know ever the petitioner oppose to any organized government?
a No, Sir.
q Do you know whether he believe[s] in the use of force in any such ideas?
a No, Sir.
q Do you know if the petitioner is a believer in the practice of polygamy?
a No, Sir.
q Do you know whether the petitioner suffer[s] from mental alienation or
incurable disease illnesses?
a No, Sir.
q Why do you know?
a I know him personally, sir, I have been with him as my classmate, sir and ah
(sic) he is a very intelligent person, Sir.
q Is the petitioner a member also of any organization or association in your
school?
a Yes, Sir.
q What organization?
a He is a member of Wishten and a member of starget, Sir.
q What does starget means?
a Starget is an organization of Chinese community in UST, Sir.
q How about the other one which you mentioned?
a Ah (sic) these are twisting, sir he represents the ah the (sic) school
intercollegiate, Sir.
55

Again, Salcedo did not give specific details on petitioners qualifications.
In sum, petitioners witnesses clearly did not personally know him well enough;
their testimonies do not satisfactorily establish that petitioner has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only
his own good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her
witnesses, who must be credible persons.
56
Within the purview of the
naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual who has not
been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has
no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or
testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the declaration made
but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a good
standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he
is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its
face value, as a good warranty of the applicants worthiness.
57

The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner are
persons of good standing in the community; that they are honest and upright,
or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. The most that was established was
the educational attainment of the witnesses; however, this cannot be equated
with their credibility. In fine, petitioner focused on presenting evidence tending
to build his own good moral character and neglected to establish the
credibility and good moral character of his witnesses.
58

We do not agree with petitioners argument that respondent is precluded from
questioning the RTC decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A
naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the
decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of
naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the
applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and
jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization
upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the
certificate.
59
If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with
more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary
period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.
Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of naturalization law. For this reason, we affirm the decision of the
CA denying the petition for naturalization without prejudice.
It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges
that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege
that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and
upon strict compliance with the law.
60

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:



CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Asscociate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR.,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR.,
respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a
decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue
before us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern
Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the
second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit
and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the
second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised
on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private
respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989.
This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the
petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete.
The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated
that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is
original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162).
The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175)
Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice
Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral
Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25
SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the
power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action
taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be
reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full,
clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of
this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same."
(pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our
constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court
stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save
only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon
a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without
or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing
Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the
Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse."
(at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that
the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except,
in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of
power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture
into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial
of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less
than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded
jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and
agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted
within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of
its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective
power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to
decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to
look into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral
Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are,
in the exercise of their functions independent organs independent of
Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the
Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for
the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to
remain where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution,
the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided
political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the
Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less
independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The
degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many
legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test
remains the same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of
due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the
power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather,
Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence
in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of
hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence
from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in
1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he
was able to establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his
easy assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang,
he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into
Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino,
Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according
to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who
was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided
to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in
Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch
was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private
respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of
where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar
an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a
Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring
the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan
may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor
of nine years was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as
the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in
Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed
another one in place of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other
than that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search
for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and
college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a
fire gutted their second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family
constructed still another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two
doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and
passed the CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked
for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an
examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in
Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the
unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother,
as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of
the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the
article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he
grew up and spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of
Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the
management of their family business decided to be of greater service to his
province and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987,
he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern
Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their
representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are
combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who,
having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which
discriminates against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only
to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973
Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship
by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was
done before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and
Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the
interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of
the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons who have elected Philippine
Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right
Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas'
well written book, he said that the decision was designed merely to
accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on
natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that the Reverend
Father Bernas is going against this intention by supporting the
amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in
my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his
election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a
natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will
leave it to the body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes
me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before January
17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of
the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable
situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935
Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-
born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers
would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not
natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the
provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation
resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be
hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment
thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter
would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279
[1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective
operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of
the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly,
103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any
constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the
prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not
mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are organic
living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation
where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically
granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so
elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of
Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were
both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to
depend on the fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made
up of essentially the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to
remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born
before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either
before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The
enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which
then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at
the time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development Bank of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at
the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the
respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution
accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January
17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship
when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is
obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born
citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine
(9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973
and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a
sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a
citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen
since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that
the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52;
emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He
has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected
to have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re
Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no
alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a
Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a
small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government
agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and
getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has
always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to
show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to
indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not his
natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr.
Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court
will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him
represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have
considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those
who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to
elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less
binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office
where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for
public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an
alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is
no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-
one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have
resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected
citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his
father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a
minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already
elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis
supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized
citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father
of his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go
after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral
approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto
v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong
Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of due process. Jose
Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair
opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words
of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his
demise and obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now
lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong
Chuan. Our function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse
of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his
natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his
father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not
the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and
up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong
could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced
Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced
with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which
he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed
manifest grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship
has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by
the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by
that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared
and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional
Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a
difference could only be characterized as error. There would be no basis to call
the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a
natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their
children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered
Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were
born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any
town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This
domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed
lost until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of
Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar
around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him
by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee
on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it
even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong
Te set-up his business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the
meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned
to the Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said
country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had
his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he
had become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile
in a town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an
inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has
actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's
Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to
educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section
4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private
respondent was a natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to
prove it were not in compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners
allege that the private respondent failed to present the original of the
documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the
proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall
under the exceptions to the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the
Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971
Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971
Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the
U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the
effect that there is no governmental agency which is the official custodian of
the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988,
pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN,
February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the
Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party
to testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as
aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the
inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of
sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent
search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil.
817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were
adequately established, the contents of the questioned documents can be
proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary
evidence cited in the Committee Report, the former member of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness
in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent, categorically
stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of
the election protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN,
February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the
Constitutional Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the plenary
session which deliberated on the report on the election protest against
Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present. Among
them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners
could have presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's
having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they
demur to the contents of the documents presented by the private respondent.
They merely relied on the procedural objections respecting the admissibility of
the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil
Ong to be a member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the
Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a
member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies
over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full
presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even
assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts
as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line
between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution.
The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not
only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of
residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to
remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of
the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district,
for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the
election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by
law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the
1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the
word "residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v.
Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent
residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile
of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi
(Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his
parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose
Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to
the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently
established that after the fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was
constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a
sixteen-door apartment was built by their family, two doors of which were
reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property
in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is
misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private
respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private
respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof
(as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his
parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in
Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893
[1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to
establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the
municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis
supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run
for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution
only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and
residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the
candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see
Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where
one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil.
294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of
finishing his studies and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to
abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical
journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus
revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone
an interracial evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing
influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other
nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a
person, for there is none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part
Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of
course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some
Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private
respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a
special privilege which one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the
basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who
qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization
laws only the very affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to
suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt
process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to
overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire
citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more
positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to
be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach
to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong,
Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no
part.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul the
decision * of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which
declared private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, and the resolution
of the tribunal dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners' motions for
reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare private
respondent Ong not qualified to be a Member of the House of Representatives
and to declare him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the highest number
of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly elected representative of
the second legislative district of Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03,
petitioner Balanquit prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong and
Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not qualified for membership in the House
of Representatives and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected
representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private respondent Jose
Ong Chuan, Jr. were among the candidates for the position of Representative
or Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar during the 11 May
1987 congressional elections. Private respondent was proclaimed duly-elected
on 18 May 1987 with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes over
petitioner Co who obtained the next highest number of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests against
private respondent with the tribunal, docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15
respectively. Both protests raised almost the same issues and were thus
considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, in
contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the same Constitution, for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the congressional
elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held that
respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and was a
legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior to the
May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore, declared qualified to
continue in office as Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of the
Philippines, representing the second legislative district of Northern Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in the
tribunal are the following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses
Ong Chuan also known as Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His place
of birth is Laoang which is now one of the municipalities comprising the
province of Northern Samar (Republic Act No. 6132 approved on August
24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived in
Manila on December 16, 1915. (Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter, he
took up residence in Laoang, Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was
celebrated according to the rites and practices of the Roman Catholic
Church in the Municipality of Laoang (Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a
natural-born Filipino citizen, both her parents at the time of her birth being
Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E & I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine
citizenship, filed his petition for naturalization with the Court of First
Instance of Samar, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a
decision approving the application of Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization
and declaring said petitioner a Filipino citizen "with all the rights and
privileges and duties, liabilities and obligations inherent to Filipino citizens.
(Exh. E)
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:
(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and
executory;
(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate
of Naturalization in favor of the applicant Ong Chuan who prefers to
take his oath and register his name as Jose Ong Chuan. Petitioner
may take his oath as Filipino citizen under Ms new christian name,
Jose Ong Chuan. (Exh. F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines as prescribed by Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
was issued the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization. (Exh. G)
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee and
a son born on July 25, 1937 at Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose Ong
Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was elected delegate from Northern Samar to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that he had attended
grade school in Laoang. Thereafter, he went to Manila where he finished
his secondary as well as his college education. While later employed in
Manila, protestee however went home to Laoang whenever he had the
opportunity to do so, which invariably would be as frequent as twice to
four times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of
Laoang, he registered as a voter therein and correspondingly voted in
said municipality in the 1984 and 1986 elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during the general registration of all voters in
the country, Protestee re-registered as a voter in Precinct No. 4 of
Barangay Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's affidavit, Protestee
indicated that he is a resident of Laoang since birth. (Exh. 7)
1

Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision having been
denied, petitioners filed the present petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's jurisdiction
to review the decision of the House Electoral Tribunal, considering the
constitutional provision vesting upon said tribunal the power and authority to
act as the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives.
2

On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present controversy, I believe
that, contrary to the respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction
and competence to review the questioned decision of the tribunal and to
decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the
House of Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero vs. Bocar,
3

construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provided that ". . .
The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly,"
that:
The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of
such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in
any event, "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of
the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." (Barry vs. US
ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, this Court is duty-bound to determine whether or not, in an actual
controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived
irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election or a disputed
appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great legal
force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal should be final
and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional directive, made the sole judge of
contests relating to such matters. The present controversy, however, involves no
less than a determination of whether the qualifications for membership in the
House of Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have been met.
Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss in the performance of its duties,
as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives,
solely because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such
a case, the tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this
Court of its power of judicial review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for
the office of Member of the House of Representatives, are here controverted
by petitioners who, at the same time, claim that they are entitled to the office
illegally held by private respondent. From this additional direction, where one
asserts an earnestly perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by another,
there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for this Court to consider and
decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal,
asserts supremacy over it in contravention of the time-honored principle of
constitutional separation of powers. The Court in this instance simply performs a
function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of interpreting, in a
justiciable controversy, the pertinent provisions of the Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct
constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the
interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in
situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that
stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (the
Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36).
4

Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to
determine whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold so important
and high a public office which is specifically reserved by the Constitution only
to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my considered
opinion that the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its questioned decision
and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution
5
requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must
be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino)
citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-quoted
constitutional provisions. The first sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the
basic definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private respondent fall
within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
because he did not have "to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship." It bears to repeat that on 15 May 1957, while still a
minor of 9 years he already became a Filipino citizen by declaration of
law. Since his mother was a natural-born citizen at the time of her
marriage, protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine citizenship at the
moment of his birth and, consequently the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15
of CA 473 that he was a Filipino citizen retroacted to the moment of his
birth without his having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such
Philippine citizenship.
6

I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such kaleidoscopic
ratiocination. The records show that private respondent was born on 19 June
1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a
natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In other words, at birth,
private respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen)
because his father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen).
Under the 1935 Constitution which was enforced at the time of private
respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of
the Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were
citizens of the Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens.
7

Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen,
in relation to the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese
citizenship of his father at the time of his birth, although from birth, private
respondent had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his
mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor
children of a naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the Philippines prior
to the naturalization of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens,
8
this
does not alter the fact that private respondent was not born to a Filipino father,
and the operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not confer upon him the status
of a natural-born citizen merely because he did not have to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be considered a
natural-born citizen by virtue of the operation of CA 473, petitioners however
contend that the naturalization of private respondent's father was invalid and
void from the beginning, and, therefore, private respondent is not even a
Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct
proceeding for nullity of naturalization as a Filipino citizen is permissible, and,
therefore, a collateral attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in an
electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the challenge
against Ong Chuan's naturalization must emanate from the Government and
must be made in a proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for de-
naturalization directed against the proper party, who in such case is Ong
Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded the
character of impregnability under the principle of res judicata.
9
Section 18 of
CA 473 provides that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon
motion made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or his
representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee,
10
this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of
citizenship. He may accept the offer and become a citizen upon
compliance with the prescribed conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is
of favor, not of right. He can only become a citizen upon and after a strict
compliance with the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high privilege
is bound, therefore, to conform to the terms upon which alone the right
he seeks can be conferred. It is his province, and he is bound, to see that
the jurisdictional facts upon which the grant is predicated actually exist
and if they do not he takes nothing by this paper grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons, no
other person is entitled to such privilege, nor to a certificate purporting to
grant it, and any such certificate issued to a person not so entitled to
receive it must be treated as a mere nullity, which confers no legal rights
as against the government, from which it has been obtained without
warrant of law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as
delicate and exacting nature, affecting public interest of the highest order,
and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by
law therefor."
11

Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the petitioners
that the naturalization of private respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the
Court should make a ruling on the validity of said naturalization proceedings.
This course of action becomes all the more inevitable and justified in the
present case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding
a public
office.
12

It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of private
respondent is derived from his father. If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from
the beginning, then there is nothing from which private respondent can derive
his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a spring cannot rise higher than its
source. And to allow private respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino
citizenship by virtue of a void naturalization of his father, would constitute or at
least sanction a continuing offense against the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan, took the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Philippine Government, as
prescribed by Section 12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI
issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate
of Naturalization and for the applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite oath
of allegiance of one who has previously obtained a decision favorable to his
application for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper and illegal
to authorize the taking of said oath upon the issuance of said order and before
the expiration of the reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said
order.
13

In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic,
14
this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of
order granting citizenship is irregular and makes the proceedings so taken
null and void. (Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of
Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization of Jose
Ong Chuan (private respondent's father) was null and void. It follows that the
private respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void naturalization
of his father and thus he cannot himself be considered a Filipino citizen, more
so, a natural-born Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of court to
issue the certificate of naturalization to Ong Chuan and for the latter to take
the oath of allegiance was final and not appealable, the resulting
naturalization of Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic
naturalization of private respondent, then a minor, as a Filipino citizen on 15
May 1957, but not his acquisition or perfection of the status of a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent
acquired the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen by reason of the
undisputed fact that his mother was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn
leads us to an examination of the second sentence in Article IV, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a manner of speaking, in relation to Section
1, paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the status of a natural-born Filipino
citizen to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. The right or privilege of election is available, however, only to those
born to Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution, and before the 1973
Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of its
jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion as to exceed its jurisdiction in
"distorting" the conferment by the 1987 Constitution of the status of "natural-
born" Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship all in its strained
effort, according to petitioners, to support private respondent's qualification to
be a Member of the House of Representatives.
15

Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3) of Article
IV of the 1987 Constitution contemplates that only the legitimate children of
Filipino mothers with alien father, born before 17 January 1973 and who would
reach the age of majority (and thus elect Philippine citizenship) after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born
Filipino citizen.
16

The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional provisions'
interpretation, found reason to refer to the interpellations made during the 1986
Constitutional Commission. It said:
That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the
1987 Constitution was (sic) intended by its (sic) framers to be endowed,
without distinction, to all Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935
Constitution is more than persuasively established by the extensive
interpellations and debate on the issue as borne by the official records of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
17

Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine citizenship was
made irrelevant to the case at bar, since private respondent, contrary to the
conclusion of the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship, as
provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the controversy regarding
the meaning of the constitutional provisions in question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations petitions and
opinions expressed in the 1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in
ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even nebulous
constitutional provisions. Thus
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.
18

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 2,
Article IV in relation to Section 1(3) of the same Article, appear to negate the
contention of petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers before 17
January 1973 and who would elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of
the 1987 Constitution, are to be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner Treas
specifically asked Commissioner Bernas regarding the provisions in question,
thus:
MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political
Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided
to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as
provided in Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, by adding that
persons who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be considered natural-born. Am I right, Mr.
Presiding Officer?
FR BERNAS: Yes.
MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills addition to
Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution would be contrary to the spirit of
that section?
FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter
really. But whether it is contrary to the spirit is something that has
been debated before and is being debated even now. We will
recall that during the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the status of
natural-born citizenship of one of the delegates, Mr. Ang, was
challenged precisely because he was a citizen by election. Finally,
the 1971 Constitutional Convention considered him a natural-born
citizen, one of the requirements to be a Member of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. The reason behind that decision was that
a person under his circumstances already had the inchoate right to
be a citizen by the fact that the mother was a Filipino. And as a
matter of fact, the 1971 Constitutional Convention formalized that
recognition by adopting paragraph 2 of Section 1 of the 1971
Constitution. So, the entire purpose of this proviso is simply to perhaps
remedy whatever injustice there may be so that these people born
before January 17, 1973 who are not naturalized and people who
are not natural born but who are in the same situation as we are
considered natural-born citizens. So, the intention of the Committee
in proposing this is to equalize their status.
19

When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens, Commissioner
Bernas replied to Commissioner Azcuna thus:
MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this refer
only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it
under the 1935 Constitution?
FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine
citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution, whether
the election was done before or after 17 January 1973.
20

And during the period of amendments. Commissioner Rodrigo explained the
purpose of what now appear as Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an
inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973, when we were under
the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers
were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers
but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and, if they do elect, they become
Filipino citizens, yet, but not natural-born Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino mothers
and those born of Filipino fathers. So that from January 17, 1973 when the
1973 Constitution took effect, those born of Filipino mothers but of alien
fathers are natural-born Filipino citizens. Also, those who are born of
Filipino fathers and alien mothers are natural-born Filipino citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a Filipino
mother and that born of a Filipino father, why do we not give a chance to
a child born before January 17, 1973, if and when he elects Philippine
citizenship, to be in the same status as one born of a Filipino father
namely, natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a mother vis-
a-vis the child. I would like to state also that we showed equalize the
status of a child born of a Filipino mother the day before January 17, 1973
and a child born also of a Filipino mother on January 17 or 24 hours later.
A child born of a Filipino mother but an alien father one day before
January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects Philippine citizenship, but
he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the other child who
luckily was born 24 hours later maybe because of parto laborioso is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
21

It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in
defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize the position of Filipino
fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino
citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the 1973
Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino
mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to
Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect Philippine citizenship
upon their reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born
Filipino citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of the age of
majority, may be made before or after 17 January 1973. This interpretation
appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of the
Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's individual interests,
22

and to foster equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17 January 1973)
to a Filipino mother (with an alien spouse) and should have elected Philippine
citizenship on 19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of majority), or soon
thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen under the
1987 Constitution, the vital question is: did private respondent really elect
Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that private respondent did
not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to the ruling of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had
exercised the right of suffrage when he came of age, the same
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs.
Mallare) [sic] The acts of the petitioner in registering as a voter,
participating in elections and campaigning for certain candidates were
held by the Supreme Court as sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship. Accordingly, even without complying with the
formal requisites for election, the petitioner's Filipino citizenship was
judicially upheld.
23

I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently erroneous and
clearly untenable, as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled
doctrine in this jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be made
in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625. Sections 1 and 2
24
of the Act
mandate that the option to elect Philippine citizenship must be effected
expressly not impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare
25
which held that Esteban
Mallare's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied
election of Philippine citizenship, is not applicable to the case at bar. The
respondent tribunal failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of
majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625 was approved and,
more importantly, eleven (11) years before the 1935 Constitution (which
granted the right of election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to
that effect considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth
Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was required to
exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper
party by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution.
26

Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he was
an illegitimate (natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus followed her
citizenship. I therefore agree with the petitioners' submission that, in citing the
Mallare case, the respondent tribunal had engaged in an obiter dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the
Revised Naturalization Law, providing for private respondent's acquisition of
Filipino citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father, the law itself had
already elected Philippine citizenship for him. For, assuming arguendo that the
naturalization of private respondent's father was valid, and that there was no
further need for private respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he had
automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet, this did not mean that the
operation of the Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of
Philippine citizenship as contemplated by the Constitution. Besides, election of
Philippine citizenship derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching
the age of majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a
reasonable time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he cannot be
deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am constrained to
state that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in
contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is disqualified or ineligible to
be a Member of the House of Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of required
residence, inasmuch as the Constitution requires that a Member of the House
of Representatives must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident
for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the petitioners can
replace private respondent as the Representative of the second legislative
district of Northern Samar in the House of Representatives.
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may take the
place of private respondent in the House of Representatives representing the
second district of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon L. Labo, Jr.
vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal,
27

is controlling. There we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto
petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City for the
simple reason that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for
mayor of that City.
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in
effect, a quo warranto proceeding even if it is labelled an election protest.
28
It
is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily to
install the protestant in his place.
29

The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are
cast for an ineligible candidate in an election does not entitle the candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a
case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity.
30

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and
it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried
unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676).
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate who
lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the
candidate who won is found ineligible for the office to which he was
elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes (23 Phil. 238)
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the
office because of fraud or irregularities in the election is quite
different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold
such an office. . . . If it be found that the successful candidate
(according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an
illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the
former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not,
strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots. . . .
31

The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as a
natural-born Filipino citizen, in relation to the present case.
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L. Ong, both of
them having the same father and mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention
32
to the effect that Emil L. Ong was a natural-born Filipino citizen,
alleged before the House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is himself a
natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially impressive, is, as will
now be shown, flawed and not supported by the evidence. Not even the
majority decision of the electoral tribunal adopted the same as the basis of its
decision in favor of private respondent. The tribunal, in reference to this
submission, said:
Be that as it may and in the light of the Tribunal's disposition of protestee's
citizenship based on an entirely different set of circumstances, apart from
the indisputable fact that the matters attempted to be brought in issue in
connection therewith are too far removed in point of time and relevance
from the decisive events relied upon by the Tribunal, we view these two
issues as being already inconsequential.
33

The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to predicate its decision on the
alleged citizenship by naturalization of private respondent's father (Ong
Chuan) and on the alleged election of Philippine citizenship by private
respondent.
Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Electoral protests, numbers EP-07 and EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing
and Gualberto D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his citizenship
qualification. The Committee on Election Protests Credentials of the 1971
Contitution Convention heard the protests and submitted to the Convention a
report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion of which stated:
It appearing that protestee's grandfather was himself a Filipino citizen
under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898, thus conferring upon protestee's own father, Ong
Chuan, Philippine citizenship at birth, the conclusion is inescapable that
protestee himself is a natural-born citizen, and is therefore qualified to
hold the office of delegate to the Constitutional Convention.
34

On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, the election protests filed against Emil L. Ong were dismissed,
following the report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials.
35

It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong is, to say the least, inconclusive to the
case at bar, because
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention decision in the Emil L. Ong case
involved the 1935 Constitution; the present case, on the other hand
involves the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no specific definition of a "natural-born
citizen" of the Philippines; the 1987 Constitution contains a precise and
specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2, Art.
IV thereof and private respondent does not qualify under such definition
in the 1987 Constitution;
c) the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L.
Ong was a decision of a political body, not a court of law. And, even if
we have to take such a decision as a decision of a quasi-judicial body
(i.e., a political body exercising quasi-judicial functions), said decision in
the Emil L. Ong case can not have the category or character of res
judicata in the present judicial controversy, because between the two (2)
cases, there is no identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while the
other involves private respondent) and, more importantly, there is no
identity of causes of action because the first involves the 1935 Constitution
while the second involves the 1987 Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on procedural rules and
logic, the evidence submitted before the electoral tribunal and, therefore, also
before this Court, does not support the allegations made by Emil L. Ong before
the 1971 Constitutional Convention and inferentially adopted by private
respondent in the present controversy. This leads us to an interesting inquiry and
finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L. Ong was a "natural-
born citizen" of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the
"fact" and this appears crucial and central to its decision that Emil L. Ong's
grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and, therefore, his descendants like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private
respondent) became natural-born Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional Convention
said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899 and was therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 as well as their children born subsequent
thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands."
(Section 4, Philippine Bill of
1902).
36

The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is
whether or not Ong Te private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was
"an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside therein and was a
Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he met these requirements of the Philippine
Bill of 1902, then, Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a Filipino
citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the House
Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z ,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of
entries in the "Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show that Ong
Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar where he is claimed to have been a
resident. Petitioners (protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence
before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibit V, a certification of the Chief of the
Archives Division, Records and Management and Archives Office, stating that
the name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro Central de Chinos" for the
province of Samar for 1895. These exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly
argue, tend to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April
1899 and, therefore, could not continue residing in Samar, Philippines after 11
April 1899, contrary to private respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs
or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR
COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE, except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the majority decision of the
House Electoral Tribunal skirted any reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino
citizenship of Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902. It is equally not surprising
that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and father or private respondent, did not
even attempt to claim Filipino citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino
citizenship under the Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead applied for Philippine
citizenship through naturalization.
Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the House Electoral
Tribunal should no longer have reviewed the factual question or issue of Ong
Te's citizenship in the light of the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a Filipino citizen under the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The tribunal had to look into the question because the
finding that Ong Te had become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of
1902 was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as held in Lee vs.
Commissioners of
Immigration:
37

. . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding Court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC,
et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8 May 1984. In connection with said resolution, it is
contended by private respondent that the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in the Emil L. Ong case was elevated to this Court on a question
involving Emil L. Ong's disqualification to run for membership in the Batasang
Pambansa and that, according to private respondent, this Court allowed the
use of the Committee Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it would help to look
into the circumstances of the case brought before this Court in relation to the
Court's action or disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were both
candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May 1984 election. Valle filed
a petition for disqualification with the Commission on Election on 29 March 1984
docketed as SPC No. 84-69 contending that Ong is not a natural-born citizen.
Ong filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the judgment of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention on his status as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines bars the petitioner from raising the Identical issue before the
COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94) The motion was denied by the
COMELEC, thus, prompting Emil L. Ong to file with this Court a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any further
hearing on the disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong
(SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and considering that at the hearing this morning, it
was brought out that the 1971 Constitutional Convention, at its session of
November 28, 1972, after considering the Report of its Committee on
Election Protests and Credentials, found that the protest questioning the
citizenship of the protestee (the petitioner herein) was groundless and
dismissed Election Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed against said
petitioner (p. 237, Rollo), the authenticity of the Minutes of said session as
well as of the said Committee's Report having been duly admitted in
evidence without objection and bears out, for now, without need for a full
hearing, that petitioner is a natural-born citizen, the Court Resolved to
ISSUE, effective immediately, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining
respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the
disqualification case entitled Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-
69) scheduled at 3:00 o'clock this afternoon, or any other day, except to
dismiss the same. This is without prejudice to any appropriate action that
private respondent may wish to take after the elections. (emphasis
supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 67201 was rendered
without the benefit of a hearing on the merits either by the Court or by the
COMELEC and merely on the basis of a Committee's Report to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is quite significant) did
not foreclose any appropriate action that Del Valle (therein petitioner) may
wish to take after the elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen
under the 1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or further proceeding in
regard to the same question and that, consequently, there is no vested right of
Emil L. Ong to such recognition. How much more when the Constitution
involved is not the 1935 Constitution but the 1987 Constitution whose provisions
were never considered in all such proceedings because the 1987 Constitution
was still inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private respondent) who
unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes for the elective position
of Representative (Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the
second district of Northern Samar, would have had to cease in office by virtue
of this Court's decision, if the full membership of the Court had participated in
this case, with the result that the legislative district would cease to have, in the
interim, a representative in the House of Representatives. But the fundamental
consideration in cases of this nature is the Constitution and only the
Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that when the electorate in the
second legislative district of Northern Samar cast the majority of their votes for
private respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully eligible and
qualified for the office because he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That
erroneous assumption and belief can not prevail over, but must yield to the
majesty of the Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the Constitution mandates that
members of the House of Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of
the Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court says, "Filipino citizens
will do." This is bad enough. What is worse is, the same voting majority, in effect,
says, "even aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private respondent Jose L. Ong Chua,
Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore
NOT QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of
the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a question of fact, and
as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves facts to the tribunal that determined them.
I am quite agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,
as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the membership in the House, as
follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
1

is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its judgment
because it thinks it knows better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections,
2
it was held that this Court
can not review the errors of the Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge"
of all election contests) in the sense of reviewing facts and unearthing
mistakes and that this Court's jurisdiction is to see simply whether or not it is
guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has
conferred expanded powers on the Court,
3
but as the Charter states, our
authority is "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government."
4
It is not to review facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical exercise of power
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of due process of
law.
5

I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a matter of opinion with
which men may differ, but certainly, it is quite another thing to say that the
respondent Tribunal has gravely abused its discretion because the majority has
begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the Court to remedy all
imagined wrongs committed by the Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the Tribunal, Jose Ong is a
Filipino citizen and consequently, is possessed of the qualifications to be a
member of the House. As the sole judge, precisely, of this question, the Court
can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in question stands exactly
on indefensible grounds. It is to be noted that Jose Ong had relied on the
Report dated September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
Committee
6
on Election Protests and Credentials, in which the Committees
upheld the citizenship, and sustained the qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil
Ong, Jose Ong's full blood brother. According to the Report, Ong Te the Ongs'
grandfather, was already a Filipino citizen having complied with the
requirements on Filipinization by existing laws for which his successors need not
have elected Filipino citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx
There is merit in protestee's claim. There can hardly be any doubt that
Ong Te protestees's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899, and was therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, as well as their children born
subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands" (Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902). Excepted from the
operation of this rule were Spanish subjects who shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. But under the Treaty of Paris, only
Spanish subjects who were natives of Peninsular Spain had the privilege of
preserving their Spanish nationality.
7

xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted, protestee's grandfather established residence in the
Philippines in 1895, as shown by the Registro Central de Chinos. He was
also issued a certificate of registration. He established a business here, and
later acquired real property. Although he went back to China for brief
visits, he invariably came back. He even brought his eldest son, Ong
Chuan, to live in the Philippines when the latter was only 10 years old. And
Ong Chuan was admitted into the country because, as duly noted on his
landing certificate, his father, Ong Te had been duly enrolled under CR
16009-36755 i.e., as a permanent resident. Indeed, even when Ong Te
went back to China in the 1920's for another visit, he left his son, Ong
Chuan, who was then still a minor, in the Philippines obviously because
he had long considered the Philippines his home. The domicile he
established in 1895 is presumed to have continued up to, and beyond,
April 11, 1899, for, as already adverted to, a domicile once acquired is not
lost until a new one is gained. The only conclusion then can thus be drawn
is that Ong Te was duly domiciled in the Philippines as of April 11, 1899,
within the meaning of par. 4, Art. 17, of the Civil Code of 1889 and was,
consequently, a Spanish subject, he qualified as a Filipino citizen under
the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
8

It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, subsequently sought
naturalization in the belief that he was, all along, a Chinese citizen, but as the
Report held:
Protestants, however, make capital of the fact that both Ong Te and his
son, Ong Chuan (protestee's father), appear to have been registered as
Chinese citizens even long after the turn of the century. Worse, Ong
Chuan himself believed the was alien, to the extent of having to seek
admission as a Pilipino citizen through naturalization proceedings. The
point, to our mind, is neither crucial nor substantial. Ong's status as a
citizen is a matter of law, rather than of personal belief. It is what the law
provides, and not what one thinks his status to be, which determines
whether one is a citizen of a particular state or not. Mere mistake or
misapprehension as to one's citizenship, it has been held, is not a sufficient
cause or reason for forfeiture of Philippine citizenship; it does not even
constitute estoppel (Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too, estoppel
applies only to questions of fact and not of law (Tanada v. Cuenco, L-
10520, Feb. 28, 1957).
9

It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously approved by the Committee,
and on November 28, 1972, approved without any objection by the
Convention in plenary session.
10

I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in
all candor, I speak from experience, because when the Convention approved
the Report in question, I was one of its vice-presidents and the presiding officer.
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this Court (on a
question involving Emil Ong's qualification to sit as member of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa)
11
in which this Court allowed the use of the Committee
Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit that the question of
the Ong's citizenship is a settled matter. Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of the Convention as well as
G.R. No. 67201 of this Court, involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit,
however, that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or not we will overturn
the unanimous ruling of 267 delegates, indeed, also of this Court.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul the
decision * of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which
declared private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, and the resolution
of the tribunal dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners' motions for
reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare private
respondent Ong not qualified to be a Member of the House of Representatives
and to declare him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the highest number
of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly elected representative of
the second legislative district of Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03,
petitioner Balanquit prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong and
Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not qualified for membership in the House
of Representatives and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected
representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private respondent Jose
Ong Chuan, Jr. were among the candidates for the position of Representative
or Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar during the 11 May
1987 congressional elections. Private respondent was proclaimed duly-elected
on 18 May 1987 with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes over
petitioner Co who obtained the next highest number of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests against
private respondent with the tribunal, docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15
respectively. Both protests raised almost the same issues and were thus
considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, in
contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the same Constitution, for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the congressional
elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held that
respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and was a
legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior to the
May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore, declared qualified to
continue in office as Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of the
Philippines, representing the second legislative district of Northern Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in the
tribunal are the following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses
Ong Chuan also known as Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His place
of birth is Laoang which is now one of the municipalities comprising the
province of Northern Samar (Republic Act No. 6132 approved on August
24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived in
Manila on December 16, 1915. (Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter, he
took up residence in Laoang, Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was
celebrated according to the rites and practices of the Roman Catholic
Church in the Municipality of Laoang (Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a
natural-born Filipino citizen, both her parents at the time of her birth being
Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E & I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine
citizenship, filed his petition for naturalization with the Court of First
Instance of Samar, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a
decision approving the application of Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization
and declaring said petitioner a Filipino citizen "with all the rights and
privileges and duties, liabilities and obligations inherent to Filipino citizens.
(Exh. E)
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:
(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and
executory;
(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate
of Naturalization in favor of the applicant Ong Chuan who prefers to
take his oath and register his name as Jose Ong Chuan. Petitioner
may take his oath as Filipino citizen under Ms new christian name,
Jose Ong Chuan. (Exh. F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines as prescribed by Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
was issued the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization. (Exh. G)
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee and
a son born on July 25, 1937 at Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose Ong
Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was elected delegate from Northern Samar to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that he had attended
grade school in Laoang. Thereafter, he went to Manila where he finished
his secondary as well as his college education. While later employed in
Manila, protestee however went home to Laoang whenever he had the
opportunity to do so, which invariably would be as frequent as twice to
four times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of
Laoang, he registered as a voter therein and correspondingly voted in
said municipality in the 1984 and 1986 elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during the general registration of all voters in
the country, Protestee re-registered as a voter in Precinct No. 4 of
Barangay Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's affidavit, Protestee
indicated that he is a resident of Laoang since birth. (Exh. 7)
1

Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision having been
denied, petitioners filed the present petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's jurisdiction
to review the decision of the House Electoral Tribunal, considering the
constitutional provision vesting upon said tribunal the power and authority to
act as the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives.
2

On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present controversy, I believe
that, contrary to the respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction
and competence to review the questioned decision of the tribunal and to
decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the
House of Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero vs. Bocar,
3

construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provided that ". . .
The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly,"
that:
The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of
such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in
any event, "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of
the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." (Barry vs. US
ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, this Court is duty-bound to determine whether or not, in an actual
controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived
irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election or a disputed
appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great legal
force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal should be final
and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional directive, made the sole judge of
contests relating to such matters. The present controversy, however, involves no
less than a determination of whether the qualifications for membership in the
House of Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have been met.
Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss in the performance of its duties,
as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives,
solely because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such
a case, the tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this
Court of its power of judicial review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for
the office of Member of the House of Representatives, are here controverted
by petitioners who, at the same time, claim that they are entitled to the office
illegally held by private respondent. From this additional direction, where one
asserts an earnestly perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by another,
there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for this Court to consider and
decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal,
asserts supremacy over it in contravention of the time-honored principle of
constitutional separation of powers. The Court in this instance simply performs a
function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of interpreting, in a
justiciable controversy, the pertinent provisions of the Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct
constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the
interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in
situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that
stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (the
Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36).
4

Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to
determine whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold so important
and high a public office which is specifically reserved by the Constitution only
to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my considered
opinion that the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its questioned decision
and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution
5
requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must
be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino)
citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-quoted
constitutional provisions. The first sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the
basic definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private respondent fall
within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
because he did not have "to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship." It bears to repeat that on 15 May 1957, while still a
minor of 9 years he already became a Filipino citizen by declaration of
law. Since his mother was a natural-born citizen at the time of her
marriage, protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine citizenship at the
moment of his birth and, consequently the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15
of CA 473 that he was a Filipino citizen retroacted to the moment of his
birth without his having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such
Philippine citizenship.
6

I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such kaleidoscopic
ratiocination. The records show that private respondent was born on 19 June
1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a
natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In other words, at birth,
private respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen)
because his father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen).
Under the 1935 Constitution which was enforced at the time of private
respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of
the Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were
citizens of the Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens.
7

Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen,
in relation to the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese
citizenship of his father at the time of his birth, although from birth, private
respondent had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his
mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor
children of a naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the Philippines prior
to the naturalization of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens,
8
this
does not alter the fact that private respondent was not born to a Filipino father,
and the operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not confer upon him the status
of a natural-born citizen merely because he did not have to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be considered a
natural-born citizen by virtue of the operation of CA 473, petitioners however
contend that the naturalization of private respondent's father was invalid and
void from the beginning, and, therefore, private respondent is not even a
Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct
proceeding for nullity of naturalization as a Filipino citizen is permissible, and,
therefore, a collateral attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in an
electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the challenge
against Ong Chuan's naturalization must emanate from the Government and
must be made in a proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for de-
naturalization directed against the proper party, who in such case is Ong
Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded the
character of impregnability under the principle of res judicata.
9
Section 18 of
CA 473 provides that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon
motion made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or his
representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee,
10
this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of
citizenship. He may accept the offer and become a citizen upon
compliance with the prescribed conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is
of favor, not of right. He can only become a citizen upon and after a strict
compliance with the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high privilege
is bound, therefore, to conform to the terms upon which alone the right
he seeks can be conferred. It is his province, and he is bound, to see that
the jurisdictional facts upon which the grant is predicated actually exist
and if they do not he takes nothing by this paper grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons, no
other person is entitled to such privilege, nor to a certificate purporting to
grant it, and any such certificate issued to a person not so entitled to
receive it must be treated as a mere nullity, which confers no legal rights
as against the government, from which it has been obtained without
warrant of law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as
delicate and exacting nature, affecting public interest of the highest order,
and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by
law therefor."
11

Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the petitioners
that the naturalization of private respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the
Court should make a ruling on the validity of said naturalization proceedings.
This course of action becomes all the more inevitable and justified in the
present case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding
a public
office.
12

It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of private
respondent is derived from his father. If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from
the beginning, then there is nothing from which private respondent can derive
his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a spring cannot rise higher than its
source. And to allow private respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino
citizenship by virtue of a void naturalization of his father, would constitute or at
least sanction a continuing offense against the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan, took the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Philippine Government, as
prescribed by Section 12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI
issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate
of Naturalization and for the applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite oath
of allegiance of one who has previously obtained a decision favorable to his
application for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper and illegal
to authorize the taking of said oath upon the issuance of said order and before
the expiration of the reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said
order.
13

In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic,
14
this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of
order granting citizenship is irregular and makes the proceedings so taken
null and void. (Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of
Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization of Jose
Ong Chuan (private respondent's father) was null and void. It follows that the
private respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void naturalization
of his father and thus he cannot himself be considered a Filipino citizen, more
so, a natural-born Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of court to
issue the certificate of naturalization to Ong Chuan and for the latter to take
the oath of allegiance was final and not appealable, the resulting
naturalization of Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic
naturalization of private respondent, then a minor, as a Filipino citizen on 15
May 1957, but not his acquisition or perfection of the status of a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent
acquired the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen by reason of the
undisputed fact that his mother was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn
leads us to an examination of the second sentence in Article IV, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a manner of speaking, in relation to Section
1, paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the status of a natural-born Filipino
citizen to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. The right or privilege of election is available, however, only to those
born to Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution, and before the 1973
Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of its
jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion as to exceed its jurisdiction in
"distorting" the conferment by the 1987 Constitution of the status of "natural-
born" Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship all in its strained
effort, according to petitioners, to support private respondent's qualification to
be a Member of the House of Representatives.
15

Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3) of Article
IV of the 1987 Constitution contemplates that only the legitimate children of
Filipino mothers with alien father, born before 17 January 1973 and who would
reach the age of majority (and thus elect Philippine citizenship) after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born
Filipino citizen.
16

The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional provisions'
interpretation, found reason to refer to the interpellations made during the 1986
Constitutional Commission. It said:
That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the
1987 Constitution was (sic) intended by its (sic) framers to be endowed,
without distinction, to all Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935
Constitution is more than persuasively established by the extensive
interpellations and debate on the issue as borne by the official records of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
17

Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine citizenship was
made irrelevant to the case at bar, since private respondent, contrary to the
conclusion of the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship, as
provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the controversy regarding
the meaning of the constitutional provisions in question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations petitions and
opinions expressed in the 1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in
ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even nebulous
constitutional provisions. Thus
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.
18

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 2,
Article IV in relation to Section 1(3) of the same Article, appear to negate the
contention of petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers before 17
January 1973 and who would elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of
the 1987 Constitution, are to be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner Treas
specifically asked Commissioner Bernas regarding the provisions in question,
thus:
MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political
Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided
to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as
provided in Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, by adding that
persons who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be considered natural-born. Am I right, Mr.
Presiding Officer?
FR BERNAS: Yes.
MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills addition to
Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution would be contrary to the spirit of
that section?
FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter
really. But whether it is contrary to the spirit is something that has
been debated before and is being debated even now. We will
recall that during the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the status of
natural-born citizenship of one of the delegates, Mr. Ang, was
challenged precisely because he was a citizen by election. Finally,
the 1971 Constitutional Convention considered him a natural-born
citizen, one of the requirements to be a Member of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. The reason behind that decision was that
a person under his circumstances already had the inchoate right to
be a citizen by the fact that the mother was a Filipino. And as a
matter of fact, the 1971 Constitutional Convention formalized that
recognition by adopting paragraph 2 of Section 1 of the 1971
Constitution. So, the entire purpose of this proviso is simply to perhaps
remedy whatever injustice there may be so that these people born
before January 17, 1973 who are not naturalized and people who
are not natural born but who are in the same situation as we are
considered natural-born citizens. So, the intention of the Committee
in proposing this is to equalize their status.
19

When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens, Commissioner
Bernas replied to Commissioner Azcuna thus:
MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this refer
only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it
under the 1935 Constitution?
FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine
citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution, whether
the election was done before or after 17 January 1973.
20

And during the period of amendments. Commissioner Rodrigo explained the
purpose of what now appear as Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an
inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973, when we were under
the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers
were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers
but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and, if they do elect, they become
Filipino citizens, yet, but not natural-born Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino mothers
and those born of Filipino fathers. So that from January 17, 1973 when the
1973 Constitution took effect, those born of Filipino mothers but of alien
fathers are natural-born Filipino citizens. Also, those who are born of
Filipino fathers and alien mothers are natural-born Filipino citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a Filipino
mother and that born of a Filipino father, why do we not give a chance to
a child born before January 17, 1973, if and when he elects Philippine
citizenship, to be in the same status as one born of a Filipino father
namely, natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a mother vis-
a-vis the child. I would like to state also that we showed equalize the
status of a child born of a Filipino mother the day before January 17, 1973
and a child born also of a Filipino mother on January 17 or 24 hours later.
A child born of a Filipino mother but an alien father one day before
January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects Philippine citizenship, but
he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the other child who
luckily was born 24 hours later maybe because of parto laborioso is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
21

It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in
defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize the position of Filipino
fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino
citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the 1973
Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino
mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to
Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect Philippine citizenship
upon their reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born
Filipino citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of the age of
majority, may be made before or after 17 January 1973. This interpretation
appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of the
Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's individual interests,
22

and to foster equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17 January 1973)
to a Filipino mother (with an alien spouse) and should have elected Philippine
citizenship on 19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of majority), or soon
thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen under the
1987 Constitution, the vital question is: did private respondent really elect
Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that private respondent did
not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to the ruling of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had
exercised the right of suffrage when he came of age, the same
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs.
Mallare) [sic] The acts of the petitioner in registering as a voter,
participating in elections and campaigning for certain candidates were
held by the Supreme Court as sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship. Accordingly, even without complying with the
formal requisites for election, the petitioner's Filipino citizenship was
judicially upheld.
23

I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently erroneous and
clearly untenable, as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled
doctrine in this jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be made
in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625. Sections 1 and 2
24
of the Act
mandate that the option to elect Philippine citizenship must be effected
expressly not impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare
25
which held that Esteban
Mallare's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied
election of Philippine citizenship, is not applicable to the case at bar. The
respondent tribunal failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of
majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625 was approved and,
more importantly, eleven (11) years before the 1935 Constitution (which
granted the right of election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to
that effect considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth
Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was required to
exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper
party by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution.
26

Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he was
an illegitimate (natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus followed her
citizenship. I therefore agree with the petitioners' submission that, in citing the
Mallare case, the respondent tribunal had engaged in an obiter dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the
Revised Naturalization Law, providing for private respondent's acquisition of
Filipino citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father, the law itself had
already elected Philippine citizenship for him. For, assuming arguendo that the
naturalization of private respondent's father was valid, and that there was no
further need for private respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he had
automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet, this did not mean that the
operation of the Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of
Philippine citizenship as contemplated by the Constitution. Besides, election of
Philippine citizenship derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching
the age of majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a
reasonable time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he cannot be
deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am constrained to
state that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in
contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is disqualified or ineligible to
be a Member of the House of Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of required
residence, inasmuch as the Constitution requires that a Member of the House
of Representatives must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident
for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the petitioners can
replace private respondent as the Representative of the second legislative
district of Northern Samar in the House of Representatives.
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may take the
place of private respondent in the House of Representatives representing the
second district of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon L. Labo, Jr.
vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal,
27

is controlling. There we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto
petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City for the
simple reason that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for
mayor of that City.
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in
effect, a quo warranto proceeding even if it is labelled an election protest.
28
It
is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily to
install the protestant in his place.
29

The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are
cast for an ineligible candidate in an election does not entitle the candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a
case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity.
30

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and
it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried
unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676).
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate who
lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the
candidate who won is found ineligible for the office to which he was
elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes (23 Phil. 238)
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the
office because of fraud or irregularities in the election is quite
different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold
such an office. . . . If it be found that the successful candidate
(according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an
illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the
former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not,
strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots. . . . 31
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L. Ong, both of
them having the same father and mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention 32 to the















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990
JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEA, respondents.
Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for the
disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea as candidate for
Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his
certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP
Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its
incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a
Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a
Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American
and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March
27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").
The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial
Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of
private respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main
petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board
to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the
following exhibits tending to show that private respondent is an American
citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of
Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B");
Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent
dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated
November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated
January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen,
alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and
son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has
been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of
the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter
in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to
proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of
votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for
disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof
that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Hence, the present petition.
The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a
registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy
was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election
of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city
officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission
within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on
November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of
said private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for
disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of
time.
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be
treated as a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as
it is unquestionably premature, considering that private respondent was
proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's
citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to which he has been
proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of
the case, as the COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and,
therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of
Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing
evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct
proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the
modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship;
and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent
Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned
hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the
United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private
respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance
and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent
is an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken
and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws."
(p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and
who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the
laws of the United States does not concern Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private
respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove
that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated,
however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June
21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989)
are not applicable to the case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1983 per certification from the United States District Court,
Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P.
Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United
States but claimed that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to
protect himself from the persecution of the Marcos government. The Court,
however, found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out
that there were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as
Frivaldo who did not find it necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an
Australian citizen and that he was naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976,
per certification from the Australian Government through its Consul in the
Philippines. This was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a
number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen
of Australia.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore,
disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of
Baguio City, respectively, the Court considered the fact that by their own
admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to a
foreign state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the
oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid
and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the
electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter
and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a
Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that
because Osmea obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American
citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he,
Osmea should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine
citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow).
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a person
who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a
brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother
named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two
universities, namely University X and University Y, presents a Certification that he
is a student of University X, this does not necessarily mean that he is not still a
student of University Y. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of
Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss
of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or
"implied".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV,
Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987
Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the concept of dual
citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that
under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance
shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of
the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I concur. I also join in the concurring opinion of Justice Sarmiento.
Cortes, J., concur in the result.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American
citizenship, only that he did not necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The
important question, however, inheres in how he obtained American citizenship.
I find that there is a dearth of facts here.
For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has
lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No. 63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193,
June 21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If he,
however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli it is by force
of circumstances rather than choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship,
if he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.
In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a
citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time. a citizen of the
United States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship
by any of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that
he had obtained an alien certificate of registration, standing alone, does not
amount to "express renunciation."
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.
While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a
choice will have to be made by the individual concerned at some point in time
in his life, involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.
That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24,
and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien Certificates of Registration. Registration as
an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a citizen.
If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so register because of
the "uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he could have, under the new
dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and
abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.
The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article
IV, Section 5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate conviction
shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for one to
consider giving up the legal convenience of dual citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.
It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect
affirming that he is not a citizen. The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually
exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really matters in
the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the local state or
he is not; and the question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not
those of any other state.
One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by
"express renunciation" thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23,1989, there was such renunciation when the
petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which he
renounced all allegiance to all other states. In the case of Labo v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner not only took a
similar oath after his naturalization in Australia but also executed other
documents in which he stated that he was not a Filipino.
The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his
disavowal of Philippine citizenship. "Express renunciation" is a separate mode of
losing Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on "naturalization
in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.
When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage,
he cannot say he still loves her despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that
he has left her for another woman to whom he has totally and solemnly
transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he protests he married a
second time simply for material convenience and that his heart still belongs to
the wife he has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful
character.
By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after
renouncing it because of its meager resources, or for other ulterior and equally
base reasons, is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated
state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble this attitude may
appear to others, it is to me nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that
we should not condone, let alone extol.
Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is
involved here as the private respondent claims to be a citizen both of the
Philippines and of the United States. The question I think we must answer is: Was
there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private
respondent when he knowingly and voluntarily registered as an alien with the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?
In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January
24, 1989, I made the following observations in a separate opinion:
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly
renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view
rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing
citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full
awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the
"commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the
Philippine government to register him as an alien. Gov. Osmea did.
It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and
using an American passport, these acts could not have by themselves alone
constituted a repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is that
he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did was
register with the Philippine government as an alien within its own territory,
presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it exercises over its
nationals. This was a voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not
required to register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free
will. By this decision, he categorically asked the Republic of the Philippines to
treat him as an American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land
that was willing to consider him its own.
C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of
Philippine citizenship be made in connection with the naturalization of the
erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation may be made
independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words
are prescribed by the statute for the express renunciation of Philippine
citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and the
preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine
citizenship is lost.
The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never
be allowed where Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be
deserved to be retained. The Philippines for all her modest resources compared
to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding total
love and loyalty from her children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual
national is shared with another state; what is worse is where he formally rejects
the Philippines, and in its own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to
the other state.
I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmea to improve the
province of Cebu, and also, I should add, of the commendable record of Gov.
Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the administration of their respective jurisdictions.
But that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public
office any person who, although supported by the electorate, is not a Filipino
citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot ignore.
Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent.
I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner
Osmea enjoyed at one time dual citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and U.S.
citizenships. He was born in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an American
(U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21
November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the Philippine immigration authorities was, in
my view, an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. As held in Board of
Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano
1
express renunciation means a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication.
Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder-
like the private respondent of age, and with full legal capacity to act,
voluntarily and under oath applies with the Philippine Government for
registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is
concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit manifestation of desire to
be considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities
issued to private respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated
21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re- enter the Philippines No. 122018
dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration Certificate of Clearance
No. D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh E)
2

All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to
the private respondent at his request are predicated on the proposition that
private respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be
mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar, private
respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City Native Born Certificate of
Residence No. 115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration
records). This document, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again
predicated on the proposition that private respondent is a duly-registered align
(American) residing in the Philippines.
Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry
Permit executed and signed by private respondent on 3 January 1980, again
under oath, and verified from the records at the CID wherein private
respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of this
document cannot be underestimated For, if private respondent believed that
he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said Application for Re-
entry Permit, since it is the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his country
(the Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent executed said
sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of which is attached hereto as
Annex B, is again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he
was, as he continuous to be, a resident alien (American) in the Philippines.
It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already
registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration under the Alien
Registration Act of 1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said Act provides:
SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the
approval of this Act, apply for registration, in the case of those residing in
the City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those
residing in other localities at the office of the city or municipal treasurers,
or at any other office designated by the President. ... .
3
(Emphasis
supplied)
Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January 1988,
private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27
and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in the
Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the year 1958, when he was 24 years old
and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under oath
as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly,
distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that he was an alien (and,
therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and under its laws.
At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification
should be made. In his Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated
by his counsel that he (private respondent) was born in 1934 hence, our
mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an alien in 1958, he
was 24 years old and in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45 years
old. However, private respondent's immigration records disclose that he was
born in 1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is the correct
year of birth of private respondent (and that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as
stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous), then in 1958, when he first registered
as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an
alien, he was 41 years old.
Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as
an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he
was almost 21 years old the age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under
the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14 years or over has to
register in person (and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:
The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of
age, shall have the duty of registering such alien: Provided, That
whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines
he shall, within fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for registration.
(Sec. 1, par. 2)
I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder
on whether to remain a Filipino citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14,
and private respondent (although a bit late) made the notice in 1958 (at age
20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.
If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had
been made or filed by private respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine
Government), there could perhaps be some room for contention that vis-a- vis
the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced his
Philippine citizenship. But said acts of express renunciation were filed with the
Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines. In turn the Philippine
Government, through the immigration authorities, accepted and acted on
private respondent's aforesaid representations, and registered and
documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.
The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual
citizenship, because this condition or status assumes as a necessary
complement thereof dual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different
countries. As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong
vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as determinative of
Philippine citizenship, for the following reason, among others:
... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must
not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and
prevented. But the application of the principle jus soli to persons born in
this country of alien parentage would encourage dual allegiance which
in the long run would be detrimental to both countries of which such
persons might claim to be citizens.
4

This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now provides
Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law. (Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having
the "best of two (2) words" maybe the result of birth or other factors
accidentally brought about, the "dual citizen" has to make a choice at one
time or another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to
having two (2) legal spouses, when as a matter of principle and sound public
policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly desirable.
Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:
Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon.
It inevitably results in questionable loyalties and leads to international
conflicts. Dual nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a
badge of convenience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the
singleness of commitment which is the hallmark of citizenship and
allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his own nationality,
and this choice should be honored by all countries. However, he should
not be entitled to claim more than one nationality.
5
(Emphasis supplied)
Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the
Philippine Government which, like many other countries, considers dual
allegiance as against national or public interest to register him at least twice
(and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro tanto
was a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The choice must be respected
as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning, distinguished and
respected person who must be presumed to have known the full import of his
acts.
Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is
inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its recent decision in G.R. No. 86565
(Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.) I see no valid
justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Philippine law while holding
private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact, in
a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a
citizen of Australia" (p. 7, Decision). And is exactly what private respondent did.
In a number of sworn statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the
United States.
To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private
respondent, despite such sworn statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court
says, "never mind those sworn statements, you are still a Filipino." Sauce for the
goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander. The doctrinal basis of the
Court's decisions should be built on the merits, not on distinctions that really
make no difference.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private
respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own acts of express renunciation of such
citizenship.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R. No,
83882, January 24, 1989) and Ramon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R.
86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I cannot participate in this
case because one of the principal counsel is my relative by affinity, within the
fourth civil degree.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American
citizenship, offly that he did not necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The
important question, however, inheres in how he obtained American citizenship.
I find that there is a dearth of facts here.
For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has
lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No. 63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193,
June 21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If he,
however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli it is by force
of circumstances rather than choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship,
if he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.
In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a
citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time. a citizen of the
United States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship
by any of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that
he had obtained an alien certificate of registration, standing alone, does not
amount to "express renunciation."
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.
While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a
choice will have to be made by the individual concerned at some point in time
in his life, involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.
That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24,
and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien Certificates of Registration. Registration as
an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a citizen.
If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so register because of
the "uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he could have, under the new
dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and
abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.
The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article
IV, Section 5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate conviction
shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for one to
consider giving up the legal convenience of dual citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.
It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect
affirming that he is not a citizen. The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually
exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really matters in
the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the local state or
he is not; and the question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not
those of any other state.
One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by
"express renunciation" thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23,1989, there was such renunciation when the
petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which he
renounced all allegiance to all other states. In the case of Labo v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner not only took a
similar oath after his naturalization in Australia but also executed other
documents in which he stated that he was not a Filipino.
The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his
disavowal of Philippine citizenship. "Express renunciation" is a separate mode of
losing Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on "naturalization
in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.
When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage,
he cannot say he still loves her despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that
he has left her for another woman to whom he has totally and solemnly
transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he protests he married a
second time simply for material convenience and that his heart still belongs to
the wife he has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful
character.
By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after
renouncing it because of its meager resources, or for other ulterior and equally
base reasons, is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated
state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble this attitude may
appear to others, it is to me nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that
we should not condone, let alone extol.
Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is
involved here as the private respondent claims to be a citizen both of the
Philippines and of the United States. The question I think we must answer is: Was
there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private
respondent when he knowingly and voluntarily registered as an alien with the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?
In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January
24, 1989, I made the following observations in a separate opinion:
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly
renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view
rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing
citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full
awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the
"commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the
Philippine government to register him as an alien. Gov. Osmea did.
It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and
using an American passport, these acts could not have by themselves alone
constituted a repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is that
he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did was
register with the Philippine government as an alien within its own territory,
presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it exercises over its
nationals. This was a voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not
required to register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free
will. By this decision, he categorically asked the Republic of the Philippines to
treat him as an American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land
that was willing to consider him its own.
C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of
Philippine citizenship be made in connection with the naturalization of the
erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation may be made
independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words
are prescribed by the statute for the express renunciation of Philippine
citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and the
preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine
citizenship is lost.
The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never
be allowed where Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be
deserved to be retained. The Philippines for all her modest resources compared
to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding total
love and loyalty from her children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual
national is shared with another state; what is worse is where he formally rejects
the Philippines, and in its own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to
the other state.
I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmea to improve the
province of Cebu, and also, I should add, of the commendable record of Gov.
Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the administration of their respective jurisdictions.
But that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public
office any person who, although supported by the electorate, is not a Filipino
citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot ignore.
Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent.
I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner
Osmea enjoyed at one time dual citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and U.S.
citizenships. He was born in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an American
(U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21
November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the Philippine immigration authorities was, in
my view, an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. As held in Board of
Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano
1
express renunciation means a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication.
Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder-
like the private respondent of age, and with full legal capacity to act,
voluntarily and under oath applies with the Philippine Government for
registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is
concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit manifestation of desire to
be considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities
issued to private respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated
21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re- enter the Philippines No. 122018
dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration Certificate of Clearance
No. D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh E)
2

All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to
the private respondent at his request are predicated on the proposition that
private respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be
mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar, private
respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City Native Born Certificate of
Residence No. 115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration
records). This document, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again
predicated on the proposition that private respondent is a duly-registered alien
(American) residing in the Philippines.
Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry
Permit executed and signed by private respondent on 3 January 1980, again
under oath, and verified from the records at the CID wherein private
respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of this
document cannot be underestimated. For, if private respondent believed that
he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said Application for Re-
entry Permit, since it is the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his country
(the Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent executed said
sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of which is attached hereto as
Annex B, is again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he
was, as he continuous to be, a resident alien (American) in the Philippines.
It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already
registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration under the Alien
Registration Act of 1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said Act provides:
SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the
approval of this Act, apply for registration, in the case of those residing in
the City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those
residing in other localities at the office of the city or municipal treasurers,
or at any other office designated by the President. ... .
3
(Emphasis
supplied)
Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January 1988,
private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27
and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in the
Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the year 1958, when he was 24 years old
and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under oath
as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly,
distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that he was an alien (and,
therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and under its laws.
At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification
should be made. In his Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated
by his counsel that he (private respondent) was born in 1934-hence, our
mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an alien in 1958, he
was 24 years old and in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45 years
old. However, private respondent's immigration records disclose that he was
born in 1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is the correct
year of birth of private respondent (and that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as
stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous), then in 1958, when he first registered
as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an
alien, he was 41 years old.
Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as
an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he
was almost 21 years old the age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under
the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14 years or over has to
register in person (and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:
The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of
age, shall have the duty of registering such alien: Provided, That
whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines
he shall, within fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for registration.
(Sec. 1, par. 2)
I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder
on whether to remain a Filipino citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14,
and private respondent (although a bit late) made the notice in 1958 (at age
20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.
If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had
been made or filed by private respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine
Government), there could perhaps be some room for contention that vis-a- vis
the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced his
Philippine citizenship. But said acts of express renunciation were filed with the
Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines. In turn the Philippine
Government, through the immigration authorities, accepted and acted on
private respondent's aforesaid representations, and registered and
documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.
The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual
citizenship, because this condition or status assumes as a necessary
complement thereof dual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different
countries. As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong
vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as determinative of
Philippine citizenship, for the following reason, among others:
... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must
not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and
prevented. But the application of the principle jus soli to persons born in
this country of alien parentage would encourage dual allegiance which
in the long run would be detrimental to both countries of which such
persons might claim to be citizens.
4

This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now provides-
Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law. (Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having
the "best of two (2) words" maybe the result of birth or other factors
accidentally brought about, the "dual citizen" has to make a choice at one
time or another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to
having two (2) legal spouses, when as a matter of principle and sound public
policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly desirable.
Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:
Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon.
It inevitably results in questionable loyalties and leads to international
conflicts. Dual nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a
badge of convenience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the
singleness of commitment which is the hallmark of citizenship and
allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his own nationality,
and this choice should be honored by all countries. However, he should
not be entitled to claim more than one nationality.
5
(Emphasis supplied)
Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the
Philippine Government which, like many other countries, considers dual
allegiance as against national or public interest to register him at least twice
(and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro tanto
was a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The choice must be respected
as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning, distinguished and
respected person who must be presumed to have known the full import of his
acts.
Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is
inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its recent decision in G.R. No. 86565
(Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.), I see no valid
justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Philippine law while holding
private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact, in
a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a
citizen of Australia" (p. 7, Decision). And is exactly what private respondent did.
In a number of sworn statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the
United States.
To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private
respondent, despite such sworn statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court
says, "never mind those sworn statements, you are still a Filipino." Sauce for the
goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander The doctrinal basis of the
Court's decisions should be built on the merits, not on distinctions that really
make no difference.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private
respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own acts of express renunciation of such
citizenship.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:
My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R. No,
83882, January 24, 1989) and Ramon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R.
86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I cannot participate in this
case because one of the principal counsel is my relative by affinity, within the
fourth civil degree.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American
citizenship, offly that he did not necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The
important question, however, inheres in how he obtained American citizenship.
I find that there is a dearth of facts here.
For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has
lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No. 63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193,
June 21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If he,
however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli it is by force
of circumstances rather than choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship,
if he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.
In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a
citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time. a citizen of the
United States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship
by any of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that
he had obtained an alien certificate of registration, standing alone, does not
amount to "express renunciation."
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.
While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a
choice will have to be made by the individual concerned at some point in time
in his life, involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.
That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24,
and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien Certificates of Registration. Registration as
an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a citizen.
If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so register because of
the "uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he could have, under the new
dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and
abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.
The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article
IV, Section 5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate conviction
shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for one to
consider giving up the legal convenience of dual citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.
It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect
affirming that he is not a citizen. The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually
exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really matters in
the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the local state or
he is not; and the question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not
those of any other state.
One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by
"express renunciation" thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23,1989, there was such renunciation when the
petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which he
renounced all allegiance to all other states. In the case of Labo v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner not only took a
similar oath after his naturalization in Australia but also executed other
documents in which he stated that he was not a Filipino.
The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his
disavowal of Philippine citizenship. "Express renunciation" is a separate mode of
losing Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on "naturalization
in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.
When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage,
he cannot say he still loves her despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that
he has left her for another woman to whom he has totally and solemnly
transferred his troth It does him no credit when he protests he married a second
time simply for material convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife
he has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful character.
By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after
renouncing it because of its meager resources, or for other ulterior and equally
base reasons, is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated
state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble this attitude may
appear to others, it is to me nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that
we should not condone, let alone extol.
Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is
involved here as the private respondent claims to be a citizen both of the
Philippines and of the United States. The question I think we must answer is: Was
there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private
respondent when he knowingly and voluntarily registered as an alien with the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?
In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January
24, 1989, I made the following observations in a separate opinion:
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly
renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view
rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing
citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full
awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the
"commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the
Philippine government to register him as an alien. Gov. Osmea did.
It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and
using an American passport, these acts could not have by themselves alone
constituted a repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is that
he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did was
register with the Philippine government as an alien within its own territory,
presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it exercises over its
nationals. This was a voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not
required to register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free
will. By this decision, he categorically asked the Republic of the Philippines to
treat him as an American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land
that was willing to consider him its own.
C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of
Philippine citizenship be made in connection with the naturalization of the
erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation may be made
independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words
are prescribed by the statute for the express renunciation of Philippine
citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and the
preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine
citizenship is lost.
The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never
be allowed where Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be
deserved to be retained. The Philippines for all her modest resources compared
to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding total
love and loyalty from her children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual
national is shared with another state; what is worse is where he formally rejects
the Philippines, and in its own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to
the other state.
I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmea to improve the
province of Cebu, and also, I should add, of the commendable record of Gov.
Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the administration of their respective jurisdictions.
But that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public
office any person who, although supported by the electorate, is not a Filipino
citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot ignore.
Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent.
I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner
Osmea enjoyed at one time dual citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and U.S.
citizenships. He was born in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an American
(U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21
November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the Philippine immigration authorities was, in
my view, an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. As held in Board of
Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano
1
express renunciation means a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication.
Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder-
like the private respondent of age, and with full legal capacity to act,
voluntarily and under oath applies with the Philippine Government for
registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is
concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit manifestation of desire to
be considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities
issued to private respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated
21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re- enter the Philippines No. 122018
dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration Certificate of Clearance
No. D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh E)
2

All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to
the private respondent at his request are predicated on the proposition that
private respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be
mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar, private
respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City Native Born Certificate of
Residence No. 115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration
records). This document, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again
predicated on the proposition that private respondent is a duly-registered align
(American) residing in the Philippines.
Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry
Permit executed and signed by private respondent on 3 January 1980, again
under oath, and verified from the records at the CID wherein private
respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of this
document cannot be underestimated For, if private respondent believed that
he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said Application for Re-
entry Permit, since it is the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his country
(the Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent executed said
sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of which is attached hereto as
Annex B, is again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he
was, as he continuous to be, a resident alien (American) in the Philippines.
It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already
registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration under the Alien
Registration Act of 1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said Act provides:
SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the
approval of this Act, apply for registration, in the case of those residing in
the City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those
residing in other localities at the office of the city or municipal treasurers,
or at any other office designated by the President. ... .
3
(Emphasis
supplied)
Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January 1988,
private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27
and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in the
Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the year 1958, when he was 24 years old
and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under oath
as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly,
distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that he was an alien (and,
therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and under its laws.
At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification
should be made. In his Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated
by his counsel that he (private respondent) was born in 1934-hence, our
mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an alien in 1958, he
was 24 years old and in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45 years
old. However, private respondent's immigration records disclose that he was
born in 1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is the correct
year of birth of private respondent (and that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as
stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous), then in 1958, when he first registered
as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an
alien, he was 41 years old.
Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as
an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he
was almost 21 years old the age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under
the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14 years or over has to
register in person (and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:
The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of
age, shall have the duty of registering such alien: Provided, That
whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines
he shall, within fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for registration.
(Sec. 1, par. 2)
I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder
on whether to remain a Filipino citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14,
and private respondent (although a bit late) made the notice in 1958 (at age
20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.
If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had
been made or filed by private respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine
Government), there could perhaps be some room for contention that vis-a- vis
the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced his
Philippine citizenship. But said acts of express renunciation were filed with the
Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines. In turn the Philippine
Government, through the immigration authorities, accepted and acted on
private respondent's aforesaid representations, and registered and
documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.
The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual
citizenship, because this condition or status assumes as a necessary
complement thereof dual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different
countries. As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong
vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as determinative of
Philippine citizenship, for the following reason, among others:
... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must
not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and
prevented. But the application of the principle jus soli to persons born in
this country of alien parentage would encourage dual allegiance which
in the long run would be detrimental to both countries of which such
persons might claim to be citizens.
4

This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now provides-
Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law. (Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having
the "best of two (2) words" maybe the result of birth or other factors
accidentally brought about, the "dual citizen" has to make a choice at one
time or another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to
having two (2) legal spouses, when as a matter of principle and sound public
policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly desirable.
Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:
Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon.
It inevitably results in questionable loyalties and leads to international
conflicts. Dual nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a
badge of convenience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the
singleness of commitment which is the hallmark of citizenship and
allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his own nationality,
and this choice should be honored by all countries. However, he should
not be entitled to claim more than one nationality.
5
(Emphasis supplied)
Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the
Philippine Government which, like many other countries, considers dual
allegiance as against national or public interest to register him at least twice
(and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro tanto
was a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The choice must be respected
as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning, distinguished and
respected person who must be presumed to have known the full import of his
acts.
Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is
inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its recent decision in G.R. No. 86565
(Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al., I see no valid
justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Ph. Philippine law while holding
private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact,,
in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a
citizen of Australia"(p. 7, Decision). And is exactly what private respondent did.
In a number of sworn statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the
United States.
To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private
respondent, despite such sworn statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court
says, "never mind those sworn statements, you are still a Filipino." Sauce for the
goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gender The doctrinal basis of the
Court's decisions should be built on the merits, not on distinctions that really
make no difference.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private
respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own acts of express renunciation of such
citizenship.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:
My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R. No,
83882, January 24, 1989) and Ramon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R.
86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I cannot participate in this
case because one of the principal counsel is my relative by affinity, within the
fourth civil degree.




Congress of the Philippines
Twelfth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun held in Metro Manila on Monday, the twenty-eighth day of July, two
thousand three.

Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-
acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to
the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the
laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of
the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-
acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed
citizenship of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003"
and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That
they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took
that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in
the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned
officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held
unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby
shall remain valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general
circulation.


Approved,
FRANKLIN DRILON
President of the Senate
JOSE DE VENECIA JR.
Speaker of the House of
Representatives
This Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2130 and House Bill No. 4720
was finally passed by the the House of Representatives and Senate on August
25, 2003 and August 26, 2003, respectively.
OSCAR G. YABES
Secretary of Senate
ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
House of Represenatives
Approved: August 29, 2003
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines































Congress of the Philippines
Eleventh Congress
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9139 June 08, 2001
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FOR
CERTAIN ALIENS BY ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall control and regulate the
admission and integration of aliens into its territory and body politic including
the grant of citizenship to aliens. Towards this end, aliens born and residing in
the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative
proceedings subject to certain requirements dictated by national security and
interest.
Section 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of the succeeding section,
any person desiring to avail of the benefits of this Act must meet the following
qualifications:
(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since
birth;
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time
of filing of his/her petition;
(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the
underlying principles of the Constitution, and must have conducted
himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire
period of residence in the Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted
government as well as with the community in which he/she is living;
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary
education in any public school or private educational institution dully
recognized by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where
Philippine history, government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of
the school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or
nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor children of school age,
he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools;
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful
occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support
and if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family:
Provided, however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college
degree holders but are unable to practice their profession because they are
disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the
dialects of the Philippines; and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino
people.
Section 4. Disqualifications, - The following are not qualified to be naturalized as
Filipino citizens under this Act:
(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association
of group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence,
personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn
and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of
such war; and
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the
right to be naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Section 5. Petition for Citizenship. - (1) Any person desiring to acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall file with the Special Committee on Naturalization
created under Section 6 hereof, a petition of five (5) copies legibly typed and
signed, thumbmarked and verified by him/her, with the latter's passport-sized
photograph attached to each copy of the petition, and setting forth the
following:
(a) The petitioner's name and surname, and any other name he/she has used
or by which he/she is known;
(b) The petitioner's present and former places of residence;
(c) The petitioner's place and date of birth, the names and citizenship of his/her
parents and their residences;
(d) The petitioner's trade, business, profession or occupation, and if married,
also that of his/her spouse;
(e) Whether the petitioner is single or married or his/her marriage is annulled. If
married, petitioner shall state the date and place of his/her marriage, and the
name, date of birth, birthplace, citizenship and residence of his/her spouse;
and if his marriage is annulled, the date of decree of annulment of marriage
and the court which granted the same;
(f) If the petitioner has children, the name, date and birthplace and residences
of his/her children ;
(g) A declaration that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications under this Act;
(h) A declaration that the petitioner shall never be a public charge; and
(i) A declaration that it is the petitioner's true and honest intention to acquire
Philippine citizenship and to renounce absolutely and forever any prince,
potentate, State or sovereign, and particularly the country of which the
applicant is a citizen or subject.
(2) The application shall be accompanied by:
(a) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's birth certificate;
(b) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's alien certificate of
registration and native born certificate of residence;
(c) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's marriage certified,
if married, or the death certificate of his spouse, if widowed, or the court
decree annulling his marriage, if such was the fact;
(d) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of birth certificates, alien
certificate of registration or native born certificate of residence if any, of
petitioner's minor children, wherever applicable;
(e) Affidavit of financial capacity by the petitioner, and sworn statements on
the good moral character of the petitioner by at least two (2) Filipino citizens of
good reputation in his/her place of residence stating that they have personally
known the petitioner for at least a period of ten (10) years and that said
petitioner has in their own opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a
citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions
of this Act;
(f) A medical certificate that petitioner is not a user of prohibited drugs or
otherwise a drug dependent and that he/she is not afflicted with acquired
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS);
(g) School diploma and transcript of records of the petitioner in the schools he
attended in the Philippines. Should the petitioner have minor children, a
certification that his children are enrolled in a school where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught and are part of the curriculum; and
(h) If gainfully employed, the income tax return for the past three (3) years.
Section 6. Special Committee on Naturalization. - There shall be constituted a
Special Committee on Naturalization herein referred to as the "Committee",
with the Solicitor General as chairman, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, or his
representative, and the National Security Adviser, as members, with the power
to approve, deny or reject applications for naturalization as provided in this
Act.
The Committee shall meet, as often as practicable, to consider applications for
naturalization. For this purpose, the chairman and members shall receive an
honorarium of Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) and One thousand five hundred
pesos (P1,500.00), respectively, per meeting attended.
Section 7. Powers/Functions of the Special Committee on Naturalization. - An
alien who believes that he has all the qualifications, and none of the
disqualifications, may file an application for naturalization with the secretariat
of the Special Committee on Naturalization, and a processing fee of Forty
thousand pesos (P40,000.00). Thereafter, the petition shall be stamped to
indicate the date of filing and a corresponding docket number. Within fifteen
(15) days from the receipt of the petition, the Committee shall determine
whether the petition is complete in substance and in form. If such petition is
complete, the Committee shall immediately publish pertinent portions of the
petition indicating the name, qualifications and other personal circumstances
of the applicant, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation, and have copies of the petition posted in any public or
conspicuous area. The Committee shall immediately furnish the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Bureau of Immigration (BI), the civil registrar of the
petitioner's place of residence and tile National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
copies of the petition and its supporting documents. These agencies shall have
copies of the petition posted in any public or conspicuous area in their
buildings, offices and premises, and shall, within thirty (30) days from the receipt
of the petition, submit to the Committee a report stating whether or not
petitioner has any derogatory record on file or any such relevant and material
information which might be adverse to petitioner's application for citizenship.
If the petition is found by the Committee to be wanting in substance and form,
the petition shall be dismissed without prejudice.
Section 8. Approval or Disapproval of the Petition. - Within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the report of the agencies which were furnished a copy of the
petition or the date of the last publication of the petition, whichever comes in
later, the Committee shall consider and review all relevant and material
information it has received pertaining to the petition, and may, for the purpose
call the petitioner for interview to ascertain his/her identity, the authenticity of
the petition and its annexes, and to determine the truthfulness of the
statements and declarations made in the petition and its annexes.
If the Committee shall have received any information adverse to the petition,
the Committee shall allow the petitioner to answer, explain or refute the
information.
Thereafter, if the Committee believes, in view of the facts before it, that the
petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required for
Philippine citizenship under this Act, it shall approve the petition and
henceforth, notify the petitioner of the fact of such approval. Otherwise, the
Committee shall disapprove the same.
Section 9. Decree of Naturalization and Naturalization Processing Fee. -Within
thirty (30) days from the receipt of the notice of the approval of his/her petition,
the applicant shall pay to the Committee a naturalization fee of One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) payable as follows: Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) upon the approval of the petition and Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) upon the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, forthwith, a certificate of naturalization shall be issued. Within sixty
(60) days from the issuance of the certificate, the petitioner shall take an oath
of allegiance in the proper forum upon proof of payment of the required
naturalization processing fee and certificate of naturalization. Should the
applicant fail to take the abovementioned oath of allegiance within said
period of time, the approval of the petition shall be deemed abandoned.
Section 10. Duty of the Bureau of Immigration. - Within five (5) days after the
applicant has taken his oath of allegiance as required in the preceding
section, the BI shall forward a copy of the petitioner's oath to the proper local
civil registrar. Thereafter, the BI shall cancel the alien certificates of registration
of the applicant.
Section 11. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children. - After the approval of the
petition for administrative naturalization in cancellation of applicant's alien
certificate of registration, applicant's alien lawful wife and minor children may
file a petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of registration with the
Committee subject to the payment of the filing fee of Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) and naturalization fee of Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00)
payable as follows: Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon the approval of
the petition and Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon the taking of the
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 12. Status of Alien Husband and Minor Children. - If the applicant is a
married woman, the approval of her petition for administrative naturalization
will not benefit her alien husband but her minor children may file a petition for
cancellation of their alien certificates of registration with the BI subject to the
requirements of existing laws.
Section 13. Cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization. - The Special
Committee may cancel certificates of naturalization issued under this Act in the
following cases:
(a) If it finds that the naturalized person or his duly authorized representative
made any false statement or misrepresentation or committed any violation of
law, rules and regulations in connection with the petition for naturalization, or if
he otherwise obtains Philippine citizenship fraudulently or illegally, the
certificate of naturalization shall be cancelled;
(b) If the naturalized person or his wife, or any or his minor children who acquire
Filipino citizenship by virtue of his naturalization shall, within five (5) years next
following the grant of Philippine citizenship, establish permanent residence in a
foreign country, that individual's certificate of naturalization or acquired
citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked: Provided, That the fact of such
person's remaining for more than one (1) year in his country of origin, or two (2)
years in any foreign country, shall be considered prima facie evidence of intent
to permanently reside therein;
(c) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with acquired citizenship allows
himself or herself to be used as a dummy in violation of any constitutional or
legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship as a condition for the exercise,
use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege, the certificate of
naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked; and
(d) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with acquired citizenship
commits any act inimical to national security, the certificate of naturalization or
acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked.
In case the naturalized person holds any hereditary title, or belong to any order
of nobility, he shall make an express renunciation of his title or membership in
this order of nobility before the Special Committee or its duly authorized
representative, and such renunciation shall be included in the records of his
application for citizenship.
Section 14. Penalties. - Any person who shall fraudulently make, falsify, forge,
change, alter, or cause or aid any person to do the same, or who shall
purposely aid and assist in falsely making, forging, falsifying, changing or
altering a naturalization certificate issued under this proceeding for the purpose
of making use thereof, or in order that the same may be used by another
person or persons, and any person who shall purposely aid and assist another in
obtaining a naturalization certificate in violation of this Act, shall be punished
by a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,OOO.OO) and
by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, and in the case that the
person convicted is a naturalized citizen, his certificate of naturalization shall, if
not earlier cancelled by the Special Committee, be ordered cancelled.
Section 15. Any person who failed to register his/her birth with the concerned
city or municipal civil registrar may, within two (2) years from the effectivity of
this Act, file a petition for the acquisition of the Philippine citizenship: Provided,
That the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under this Act and subject to the requirements of existing laws.
Section 16. Special Disposition of the Filing Fee. - An amount equivalent to
twenty five percent (25%) of the filing fee to be paid by the applicants pursuant
to Section 7 hereof shall accrue to the University of the Philippines Law Center
and another twenty-five percent (25%) shall be allotted for the publication of
the Journal of the House of Representatives. Said amount shall be treated as
receipts automatically appropriated.
Section 17. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Special Committee on
Naturalization is hereby authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be needed for the proper implementation of the provisions of this Act.
Section 18. Repealing Clause. -All provisions of existing laws, orders, decrees,
rules and regulations contrary to or inconsistent with this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 19. Separability CIause. - If any part, section or provision of this Act is
declared invalid or unconstitutional, the part, section or provision not affected
thereby shall continue to be in force and effect.
Section 20. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
(Sgd)
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
(Sgd)
ELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker of the House of Representatives
(Sgd)
LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate
(Sgd)
ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
House of Representatives

Approved: June 08, 2001
(Sgd)
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines





Repu blic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 533 September 12, 1974
IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE, respondent,
R E S O L U T I O N
FERNANDEZ, J .:p
On complaint of then Acting Immigration Commissioner, Martiniano P. Vivo, this Court
ordered the investigation of the matter of citizenship of Florencio Mallare, who was admitted to
the Philippine Bar on March 5, 1962, for the purpose of determining whether his name should
be stricken from the roll of persons authorized to practice law in the Philippines.
After an investigation conducted by this Court's Legal Officer Investigator, a decision was
rendered by this Court on April 29, 1968, holding that by preponderance of evidence, it
appeared that respondent Mallare's father, Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and
his mother admittedly being a Chinese, respondent is likewise a Chinese national. Consequently
respondent Florencio Mallare was declared excluded from the practice of law; his admission to
the bar was revoked, and he was ordered to return to this Court, the lawyer's diploma previously
issued to him.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, which was denied by the Court in its
resolution of January 10, 1969. On February 4, 1969, respondent petitioned the Court for the
reopening of the case and for new trial on the ground, inter alia, of newly discovered evidence,
the introduction of which could alter the decision previously promulgated. The evidence
proposed to be presented consisted of (1) an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate
Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that Estaben Mallare
(respondent's father) is the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino; and (2) testimonies of certain
persons who had a known Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime.
By resolution of July 31, 1969, this Court ruled:
Considering that the respondent, as a duly admitted member of the bar, should be
given ample opportunity to establish the true facts about his citizenship and that no
effort should be spared to ascertain the truth before strippling him of the privilege
granted to him by this Court since 1962, and denying him the practice of his
chosen profession which he has honorably discharged as far as the records show:
The Court Resolved to set aside the decision of April 29, 1968 and to grant the re-
opening and new trial prayed for, which shall take place before the Court's
Investigating Officer on the days specified by him upon notice to respondent
Mallare, the Commissioner of Immigration and the Solicitor General, wherein said
parties may adduce all proper additional evidence that they may desire to present.
The proofs taken at the original investigation shall not be retaken, but considered
as part of the evidence in the new trial. Thereafter, the Court Investigator shall
submit his report on this Tribunal. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the parties submitted their respective additional evidences before the Court's
investigator.
Respondent's petition to set aside the decision of this Court of April 29, 1968, as well as the
resolution of January 10, 1969, is premised upon three basic arguments, to wit: (a) Respondent's
father, Esteban Mallare, being the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino, was a Filipino citizen;
(b) Esteben Mallare, the son of a Filipino mother, by his own overt acts, had chosen Philippine
citizenship; and (c) respondent, a legitimate son of Esteban Mallare, is a Filipino citizen.
The determinative issue in this controversy, therefore, revolves around the citizenship of
respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, for if Esteban were a Filipino as respondent claims, the
latter axiomatically would also be a Filipino and the objection against his inclusion in the Roll
of Attorneys in the Philippines would lose legal basis.
After a painstaking study of the original and additional evidences herein presented, the Court
finds sufficient grounds to warrant a definite setting aside of Our decision of April 29, 1968,
and a definitive declaration that respondent Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore
with qualification and right to continue the practice of law in the Philippines.
To support his contention that respondent Florencio Mallare is not a Filipino, the Commissioner
of Immigration presented:
Exhibits "A" and "B", Opinions Nos. 90 and 166 of the Secretary of Justice dated March 31,
1955 and July 10, 1959, respectively, to the effect that respondent and his brothers and sisters
had failed to establish their claim to Philippine citizenship;
Exhibit "C", the death certificate of Esteban Mallare dated June 7, 1945, wherein he was
reported to be of Chinese nationality;
Exhibits "D", "E", "F" and "G", the birth certificates of respondent, his brothers and sisters,
dated October 23, 1929, November 8, 1932, October 26, 1939, and February 10, 1943,
respectively, stating that their father was a Chinese citizen, born in Amoy, China, and wherein
respondent was reported to be a Chinese, born in Macalelon, Quezon;
Exhibits "H" to "M" the records of Civil Case No. 329-G and Special Proceeding No. 3925,
both of the Court of First Instance of Quezon; and
Exhibit "N", respondent's alien certificate of registration, dated August 25, 1950.
Upon the other hand, respondent submitted
Exhibit "1", the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon in Civil Case No. 329-G,
dated November 18, 1959, upholding the validity of a contract of sale, the vendees therein
(including respondent) being citizens of the Philippines;
Exhibit "2", an order by the Acting Commissioner of Immigration, canceling respondent's alien
certificate of registration on the strength of the court's decision in Civil Case No. 329-G; Exhibit
"3", identification certificate No. 11712 issued by the Bureau of Immigration, declaring
respondent "as a citizen of the Philippines by birth being the legitimate son of Esteban Mallare,
a Filipino citizen as 'per order of this office dated 8 June 1960 CEBNO 4223-R'";
Exhibit "4", final order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, dated November 28, 1960, in
Special Proceedings No. 3925, ordering the Municipal Treasurer of Macalelon, Quezon, to
correct the entry in the Registry of Birth book of the municipality by changing respondent's
nationality from "Chinese" to "Filipino";
Exhibit "5", respondent's affidavit dated October 7, 1961 showing him to be a registered voter
of Macalelon, Quezon;
Exhibit "6", respondent's passport issued on March 5, 1962, showing that he is a citizen of the
Philippines;
Exhibit "7", opinion of the Solicitor General, dated July 25, 1962, recognizing respondent
Florencio Mallare as a Filipino citizen;
Exhibit "L", landing certificate of Te Na (respondent's mother), dated July 7, 1926, wherein she
was certified as "wife of P.I. citizen";
Exhibit "K-9", certification by the municipal treasurer of Macalelon, Quezon that Esteban
Mallare was registered in the Registry List of Voters on April 14, 1928; and
The entry in the baptismal registry of the Immaculate Concepcion Church at Macalelon,
Quezon, purporting to show that Esteban Mallare was the natural child of Ana Mallare, a
Filipina.
Respondent also presented the following residents of Macalelon, Quezon:
(a) Damiana Cabangon, 80 years old who declared that she was with her mother, the "hilot"
who attended to Ana Mallare during her delivery, when Esteban Mallare was born;
1
that she
was present when Esteban was baptized;
2
that Ana Mallare had lived continuously in
Macalelon and was reputed to be unmarried;
3
that she had never met (seen) Esteban's father, a
certain Mr. Dy.
4

(b) Rafael Catarroja 77 years old and former mayor of Macalelon who declared that he knew
Esteban Mallare even as a child;
5
that Esteban was then living with his mother, Ana Mallare, a
Tagala, who was cohabiting with a Chinese;
6
that Esteban started voting in 1934, and became
one of his (the witness') campaign leaders when he ran for the mayor ship in 1934.
7

(c) Salomon Gimenez, 75 years old and former mayor of Macalelon, who declared having
known Esteban Mallare; that in the elections of l925, when Esteban campaigned for a rival
candidate against him, he (the witness) wanted to seek for Esteban's disqualification; that he
sought the counsel of Judge Gaudencio Eleazar (a relative of the witness), who advised him that
a disqualification move would not prosper because Esteban's mother was not married to
Esteban's Chinese father;
8
that as of 1940, when witness was municipal mayor, there were only
about 3,000 residents in Macalelon.
9

(d) Joaquin Enobal, 69 years old, who declared that he was a classmate and playmate of Esteban
Mallare, whose house was only about five houses away from theirs; 10 that he had not seen the
husband of Ana Mallare;
11
that Ana was a Tagalog who had lived in Macalelon.
12

In Our decision of April 29, 1968, respondent's claim that he is a Filipino was denied for lack of
evidence proving the Philippine citizenship of his father, Esteban Mallare. It was ruled that Ana
Mallare (Esteban's mother) can not be considered a Filipino, there being no proof that she was
"an inhabitant of the Philippines continuing to reside therein who was a Spanish subject on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine"; that the landing certificate issued by
the Bureau of Immigration which referred to respondent's mother, Te Na, as "wife of Dy
Esteban, P.I. citizen", was based upon an ex parte determination of the evidence presented by
therein applicant and consequently carries little evidentiary weight as to the citizenship of her
said husband; and that the affidavit of Esteban Mallare, executed on February 20, 1939, to the
effect that he had chosen to follow the citizenship of his Filipino mother was not only self-
serving, but also it can not be considered a re-affirmation of the alleged election of citizenship
since no previous election of such citizenship has been proved to exist.
With the additional evidence submitted by respondent pursuant to the authority granted by this
Court, the aforementioned void in the proof of respondent's citizenship has been duly filled.
The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and
residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration that Ana
Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was
reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and
illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare. Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth,
race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive. Unlike that of
matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from persons who are not
members of the family the reason for the distinction is the public interest that is taken in the
question of the existence of marital relations.
13

The principle could not have been more true than in a Philippine rural community where
relationships not in conformity with established contentions become the subject of criticisms
and public cynosure. Thus, the public reputation in Macalelon that Esteban was Ana's natural
child, testified to by the witness, would constitute proof of the illegitimacy of the former.
Besides, if Estaban were really born out of legal union, it is highly improbable that he would be
keeping the surname "Mallare" after his mother, instead of adopting that of his father. And it
would be straining the imagination to perceive that this situation was purposedly sought by
Esteban's parents to suit some ulterior motives. In 1903, we can not concede that alien
inhabitants of his country were that sophisticated or legally-oriented.
The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog
(and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as being mere conclusions devoid of
evidentiary value. The declarations were not only based on the reputation in the community
regarding her race or race-ancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but they must have certain
factual basis. For it must be realized that in this Philippine society, every region possesses
certain characteristics all its own. Thus, a Tagalog would normally detect if a person hails from
the same region even from the way the latter speaks. Considering that the witnesses testified
having known, and lived with, Ana Mallare in Macalelon, their declaration that she is a Tagalog
should receive a high degree of credibility.
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no
other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine
citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-
4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act
taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully entitled.
14

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien, Esteban's
exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of
April 14, 1928 (Exh. "K-9"), and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old),
Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate. These
acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship.
15
Indeed, it would be unfair
to expect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect considering that prior to the enactment
of Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was required to exercise
the option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party by Section 1, subsection 4,
Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.
It is true that in the death certificate of Esteban Mallare (Exh. "C"), he was referred to as a
Chinese national, and in the birth certificates of respondent and his brothers and sister (Exhs.
"D", "E", "F" and "G"), they were declared to be of Chinese nationality. Respondent likewise
appeared to have applied for alien registration on August 25, 1950 (Exh. "N"). While said
documents are public and the entries therein are, consequently, presumed to be correct, such
presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing
their inaccuracy.
Artemio Mallare, Esteban's eldest son and who supposedly supplied the data appearing in
Exhibit "C", denied having any hand in the funeral arrangements and the preparation of the said
death certification of his father. He declared that he was merely 16 years old when his father
met his death in an accident in 1945, and he came to know of it only when he was brought to
the funeral parlor on the following day.
16
The entries in the birth certificates (Exhs. "D", "E",
and "G"), on the other hand, appeared to have been prepared upon information given by the
nurse or midwife who attended to respondent's mother during her deliveries and who would
have no knowledge of the actual fact of the place of birth and the citizenship of Esteban, the
father; and in the case of respondent Florencio Mallare, the informant was neither his father or
mother; it was Maria Arana a "hilot". In the case of the birth certificate of Esperanza Mallare
(Exh. "F"), the informant appeared to be Esteban Mallare himself. It is noted, however, that no
proof has been presented to show that it was Esteban Mallare who personally gave the
information that the child's and parents' nationality is Chinese. And any error on his part can not
affect respondent Florencio Mallare. With respect to the registration of respondent as a citizen
of China in 1950 (Exh. "N"), it was explained that this was secured by respondent's mother, on
the belief that upon the death of her husband, Esteban Mallare, she and her children reverted to
Chinese citizenship. At any rate, even assuming that said documents were prepared with actual
knowledge and consent by respondent or by his parents, on the erroneous belief that Esteban
was a non-Filipino, such acts would not cause the loss or forfeiture of Philippine citizenship
17

which Esteban acquired from his Filipino mother.
Complainant places much emphasis on the convicting testimonies of the expert witnesses on the
entry in the baptismal registry of the Immaculate Concepcion church. The discrepancy in the
testimonies of said witnesses, however, loses significance in the face of the finding, based on
other evidence that Esteban Mallare is the natural child of Ana Mallare, born to her in 1903 at
Macalelon, Quezon.
Upon the foregoing considerations, and on the basis of the original and additional evidence
herein adduced the decision of this Court dated April 29, 1968, is hereby definitely set aside,
and the complaint in this case is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz
Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.


































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 533 April 29, 1968
IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J .:
The respondent, Florencio Mallare, was admitted to the practice of law on 5 March 1962. In his
verified petition to take the bar examinations in 1961, he alleged that he is a citizen of the
Philippines and that "his father is Esteban Mallare and his mother is Te Na, both Filipino
citizens". (Personal Record, No. 17450, Bar Division)
On 16 July 1962, the then Acting Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano P. Vivo denounced
the respondent to this Court as a Chinaman masquerading as a Filipino citizen and requested
that the matter be investigated thoroughly and if the respondent fails to show that he has legally
become a Filipino, steps be taken for striking his name from the roll of persons authorized to
practice law. Acting upon the request, this Court, on 9 August 1962, referred the matter to its
Legal Officer-Investigator for investigation and report. An investigation was thus held wherein
the relator or complainant and the respondent appeared and adduced their respective evidence.
The position of the respondent-lawyer is that he is a Filipino citizen based on the supposed
citizenship of his father, Esteban Mallare, alleged to be a Filipino citizen by choice, because he
was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother, Ana Mallare and that the
respondent's mother, Te Na, a Chinese, followed the citizenship of her husband upon their
marriage.
The respondent's second theory is that, having been declared a Filipino citizen in a final
judgment in 1960 by the Court of First Instance of Quezon province, in its Civil Case No. 329-
G (entitled, Vitaliano Itable vs. Artemio, Florencio, Paciencia, Esperanza and Raymundo
Mallare) and his birth record, wherein he was originally registered as a Chinese, has likewise
been ordered corrected to Filipino, by final judgment in Special Proceeding No. 3925 of the
same court,
1
his Filipino citizenship is conclusive, res judicata and binding to the government
and to the world.
Complainant Vivo disputed, on the facts, the respondent's first theory, and, on the second
theory, claimed that the aforestated Civil Case No. 329-G (Itable vs. Mallare) was a simulated
action calculated to obtain a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship and, after having
obtained the said declaration, the respondent, together with his brothers and sisters, utilized the
declaration to change their birth and alien registration the better to hide their true nationality,
which is Chinese.
The respondent denies the charge of simulating an action; and by way of defense, points out
that Civil Case No. 329-G and Special Proceeding No. 3925 are not subject to collateral attack
and, since his birth record and alien registration (and that of his brothers and sisters) have been
corrected and cancelled, respectively, the question of their citizenship is now moot and
academic.
On respondent's first claim to citizenship by blood, the earliest datum that can be stated about
the respondent's supposed ancestry is that in 1902,
2
ex-municipal president Rafael Catarroja,
then eight (8) years old, met for the first time Ana Mallare, the supposed paternal grandmother
of the respondent, in Macalelon, Quezon. He had not seen her deliver or give birth to the baby
boy, Esteban Mallare, father of the respondent, but met the supposed Filipina mother and
Esteban Mallare years later when the boy was already eight (8) years old. (Annex "8," pp. 10-
12, t.s.n., Sept. 24, 1959, Civil Case No. 329-G, CFI of Quezon Province). There is no evidence
that Ana Mallare was an "inhabitant of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who
was a Spanish subject on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine", as
required by the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and she cannot, therefore, be considered a
Filipina. That witness Catarroja, the respondent, and the latter's brothers and sisters, stated that
Ana Mallare was a Filipina, as well as their testimonies in the civil case that she had not
married her Chinese husband and that she is the true mother of Esteban Mallare, are more of
opinion or conjecture than fact, utterly insufficient to overcome the presumption that persons
living together as husband and wife are married to each other (Rule 131, par. bb). "Every
intendment of law and fact", says Article 220 of our Civil Code "leans toward the validity of
marriage and the legitimacy of children."
The respondent relies on three documents as indicative of the alleged Philippine citizenship of
his father, Esteban Mallare. On 7 July 1926, Te Na, respondent's Chinese mother, was described
in a landing certificate of residence issued to her, as "wife of P.I. citizen" and as wife of Dy
Esteban, P.I. citizen". (Annex "16", being Exh. "3" in Civil Case No. 329-G). On 20 February
1939, Esteban Dy Mallare executed an affidavit stating therein that when he reached the age of
majority he had "definitely elected to be a Filipino citizen following the citizenship of my
mother." (Annex "4" being Exh. "1" in Civil Case No. 329-G) And, in 1928, Esteban Mallare
was a registered voter in Macalelon, Quezon. (Annex "7", being Exh. "2" in Civil Case No.
329-G).
A landing certificate of residence issued under Section 7, Act 702 by the Collector of Customs
is based upon an administrative ex parte determination of the evidence presented and the facts
as stated by the applicant and, therefore, carries little evidentiary weight as to the citizenship of
the applicant's husband. In the instant case, the truth of Te Na's declarations when she applied
for the landing certificate could have been inquired into had she been presented as a witness in
these proceedings, but this was not done.
The affidavit of Esteban Mallare, besides being self-serving, is not a substitute for a duly
recorded election of Philippine citizenship, assuming that the affiant was qualified to so elect.
When Esteban executed it, he was already thirty-six (36) years old and he executed it for the
purpose, stated in the last paragraph, of making a change in a miscellaneous lease application
wherein he had previously stated that he is a citizen of China. Nor can it be regarded as a re-
affirmation of an alleged election of citizenship, since no such previous election was proven to
have existed.
Esteban Mallare's registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining
exclusively to Filipino citizens but this does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this
jurisdiction, is determinable by his blood ( jus sanguinis).
Against these pretensions of Philippine citizenship, all the five (5) known children of the
spouses Esteban Mallare and Te Na Artemio, Esperanza, Florencio, Paciencia and Raymundo,
were registered at birth as children of a Chinese father and a Chinese mother and with the added
detail that their parents were born in China.
The birth certificate of Esperanza Mallare (Exh. "F") who was born on 25 October 1939, is
particularly significant in this regard, because it bears the father's own signature. If Esteban
Mallare was indeed a Filipino by choice, as stated by him in his aforementioned affidavit
(Annex 4), then he should have so stated in this birth certificate of his daughter, instead, he
admits, against his own interest, that he is a Chinese. Esteban Mallare's own death certificate
(Exh. "C"), over the signature of his son, Artemio Mallare, shows against Artemio's own
interest that Esteban was a Chinese, born in Fookiang, China; that he died on 5 June 1945, at
the age of 42 and is buried at the Chinese cemetery, having resided in the Philippines for 28
years (Exh. "C"), i.e., only since 1917.
The affidavit of Artemio denying that the signature in the aforesaid death certificate is his, is
inadmissible and, therefore, should be rejected, as it was offered in evidence for the first time
after trial was closed, as an annex to the respondent's memorandum with the investigator. The
affiant was not examined thereon, and the affidavit is self-serving besides.
The entire family, consisting of the father, mother and their four (4) children (Raymundo was
not yet born) were registered as aliens in 1942 in the then Division of Alien Statistics, pursuant
to the proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines and Executive Order No. 25 of the then Executive Commission. (See letter of Jan.
18, 1963 from the Bureau of Immigration to the Legal Officer-Investigator, see also pp. 171 and
180-181, Vol. I, No. 4, Official Gazette, published during Japanese occupation.) .
In addition, the respondent himself was again registered as an alien in 1950, his application
thereto bearing his thumbprints and stating therein that he is a Chinese; that he belongs to the
yellow race and that he had used these other names: "Tan Jua Gae", "Enciong" and "Jua Gac"
(Exh. "N"). He had been a teacher in the Candon Chinese School (t.s.n., p. 17, Oct. 3, 1962).
His explanation that it was his mother who registered him as an alien is flimsy; and, as stated
hereinbefore, he did not present his mother as a witness.
The evidence is thus clearly preponderant, if not overwhelming that the respondent's father,
Esteban Mallare or "Mallari", also known as "Esteban Dy", "Esteban Dy Mallare" and "Esteban
Tan", was and remained a Chinese until he died; consequently, the respondent's mother,
admittedly a Chinese, retained her original citizenship and their offspring, respondent, Florencio
Mallare, together with his brothers and sisters, are likewise Chinese nationals, through and
through.
We now turn to respondent's second defense of res judicata. There are certain marks of
simulation that attended Civil Case No. 329-G, and indicating that it was brought to circumvent
a previous unfavorable opinion of the Secretary of Justice denying cancellation of Mallare's
alien registration (Op. No. 90, Ser. of 1955, dated March 31, 1955). The said civil case was
instituted by the vendor (Vitaliano Itable) of a certain parcel of land to rescind the sale and
recover the land sold from the vendees, who are the herein respondent and his brothers and
sisters, on the ground that the said vendees are Chinese. The vendor-plaintiff practically
abandoned the case; the vendees-defendants submitted evidence purporting to show their
Filipino citizenship, and plaintiff neither cross examined nor presented rebuttal proof. After
trial, the court, declaring the vendees as natural-born Filipino citizens, decided for the validity
of the sale of the parcel of land.
On the basis of the foregoing declaration by the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province, the
respondent and his brothers and sisters filed Special Proceeding No. 3925, in the same court,
but in a different branch, for the "correction" of their birth records. The local fiscal, representing
the Solicitor General, appeared but did not oppose the petition; wherefore, after hearing, the
court granted the petition. Based on the same judicial declaration, the then Commissioner of
Immigration De la Rosa (not the complainant) cancelled on June 8, 1960, the alien registration
of the herein respondent and that of his brothers and sisters, and issued to them identification
certificates recognizing them as Filipino citizens. Then Solicitor General Alafriz took the same
position.
Civil Case No. 329-G and Special Proceeding No. 3925 are not modes of acquiring Philippine
citizenship; neither is the Chinese citizenship of the respondent converted to Filipino because
certain government agencies recognized him as such. He remains, by jus sanguinis, a Chinese
until he is naturalized.
It is noted that the declaration that the respondent and his brothers and sisters are Filipino
citizens is stated in the dispositive portion of the decision in Civil Case No. 329-G, which was
an action in personam. The pronouncement was not within the court's competence, because the
declaration of the citizenship of these defendants was not the relief that was sought. At the time,
the pronouncement was beyond judicial power, there being no law authorizing the institution of
a judicial preceding to declare the citizenship of an individual (Danilo Channie Tan v. Republic,
L-14159, April 18, 1960; Paralaran v. Republic, L-15047, Jan. 30, 1962; Tan Yu Chin v.
Republic, L-15775, April 29, 1961; Tan v. Republic, L-16108, October 31, 1961; Santiago vs.
Commissioner, L-14653, Jan. 31, 1963; Comissioner vs. Domingo, L-21274, July 31, 1963; Lao
Yap Diok, et al. v. Republic, L-19107-09, Sept. 30, 1964).
In the basic case Channie Tan vs. Republic, ante, this Court ruled as follows:1wph1.t
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable
controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of said right, and a remedy granted or sanctioned by law, for said
breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a
controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status.
Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action
or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is
married, or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as a
necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. At
times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization, by judicial
decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial
proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. (Tan vs. Republic, G.R.
No. L-14159, April 18, 1960, reiterated in G.R. No. L-15775, April 29, 1961).
The said judicial declaration
3
was merely an incident to the adjudication of the rights of the
parties to the controversy over land ownership. Their citizenship was not the thing adjudicated
in the judgment and the declaration that they are Filipinos was but a necessary premise for the
court to arrive at a conclusion that the sale of the realty was valid as between the parties. Not
being the thing directly adjudicated, their declared citizenship is not res judicata, and cannot
become conclusive.
The appearance of the fiscal, representing the Solicitor General, in Special Proceeding No. 3925
does not bind the state to the order of "correction" of the birth records because the proceeding
was not instituted as in rem and, under no law had the state given its consent to be party thereto.
For this reason, the fiscal's appearance was an unauthorized one.
It is noteworthy that in neither case relied upon by the respondent does it appear that his claim
for citizenship was given adequate publication so as to apprise all concerned and give them
opportunity to contest it or supply the corresponding public office any derogatory data that
might exist against the alleged citizenship. Hence, neither decision constitutes res judicata on
the issue of respondent's alleged Filipino nationality.
And certainly, the Supreme Court, acting pursuant to its inherent and constitutional authority,
may not be precluded from inquiring into the citizenship of persons admitted to the practice of
law, independently of any other court's findings in the cases or proceedings brought or instituted
therein.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the respondent Florencio Mallare is hereby declared
excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the Philippine bar is revoked and he is
hereby ordered to return immediately to this Court the lawyer's diploma previously issued to
him.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished, when it becomes final, to the Secretary of Justice, for
such action as may be deemed warranted; and let another copy be sent to the Local Civil
Registrar of Macalelon, Quezon, for purposes of record in the corresponding civil registry of
births. So ordered.
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
1wph1.t Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondents.
MENDOZA, J .:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V.
Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275
1

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not
a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,
2
the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELEC's Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of
Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati
City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the
respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of
Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that
he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen
because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was
born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is
considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his
registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is born
a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the
position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office
he seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship
are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios
Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
3
The motion remained
pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the
COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.
4
Petitioner's
motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed
the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice
mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
5
The pertinent portions of the
resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the
age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American
passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the
Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of
registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship,
as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance
to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City,
garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes
over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand
eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine
hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty
four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws,
it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in
complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled
before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA
727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondent's certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a
candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998,
elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers,
upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent
Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati
City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of
August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC
en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of
Makati City. Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of
majority when he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered
himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of
the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division
adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be
declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold
the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano
whether petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an
original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's
motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore,
cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person
allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an
action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to
intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or
when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for
intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's
rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in
litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-
mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati
City if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory
judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came
out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation
at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent
from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,
6
reiterated in
several cases,
7
only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and
the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared
the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File
Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's
purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective
local position" under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the
disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the
action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered
the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which
provides:
Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after
election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for
certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present
petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but also
with the substantive issues respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the
ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses
dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of
Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for
any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated
in the Charter of the City of Makati.
8

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with
him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
"command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold
local elective office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
9
For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow
the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their father's' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any
act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained
its necessity as follows:
10

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening
than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps,
never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of
birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance
of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the
triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket,
as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact chat the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in
Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the
People's Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for
overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and
Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because
of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in
that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of
allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,
may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also
took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday,
including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of
guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion
who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,
China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is
of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we
have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which
will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP
AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus:
11

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual
citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double
sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought
would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to
citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the
Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that
citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State
when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the
concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the
fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was made in 1975, a good
number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10;
and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign
government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary
of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine
and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double
allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate
what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future
legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the
security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of
double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a
proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate
double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship,
it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out:
"[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is
considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control."
12

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has
not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following
discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
13

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41,
page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective
local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose
mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born
citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen,
upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the
country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the
moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his
citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country
of origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen?
No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office
would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino
citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not
require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of
the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is
opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he
should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen,
and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested
upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that
will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall
under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty"
14
of which at the
time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen
of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,
15
it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounce, his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares
that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition
imposed by law is satisfied and compiled with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization
Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The
latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read
into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative
department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has
thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all
means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will
and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September
4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis,
while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he
was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en
banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private
respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he is
solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not
sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made
when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been
made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
the United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether
by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over
foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Afroyim v. Rusk
16
as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign
relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following
statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED")
NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN
LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND
DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE
FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL
ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS
OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION
OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN
ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC it was held:
17

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would
the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which
under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running
for any elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is
cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took
said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In
his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned
his American citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was
stateless in the interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship
but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995.
Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is
basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent
any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in
private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be
effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of
majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority
age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no
merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v.
COMELEC
18
applies mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate staring he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of
Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied."
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he
is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago,
19
we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., are on leave.
Pardo, J., took no part.






Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:p
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or
not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was
held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section
17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under
the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by
the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to
be as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature." (id., at
p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice
Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and
complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission,
(Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be
the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction
shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is
full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that
would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants
of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the
judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this
Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident
use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of
the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors
of independent branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial
of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to
speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to
determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article
VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental
branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred
or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to
decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it
thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not
powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions
independent organs independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to
HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of
powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign
authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886
[1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation
may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the
two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET
because of its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions
any less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how
many legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the
same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the
part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the
Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in
the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang,
Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then
Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to
establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the
community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed
Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed,
Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter,
got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a
hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in
Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal
status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of
April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years
was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records
to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local
populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was
burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place
of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and
home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their
second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this
time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He
found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in
the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was
challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the
unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally
and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it
was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent
his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang,
Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family
business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when
the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of
Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in
Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the
two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of
Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates
against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to
those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue
of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or
after January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228;
Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and
Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the
interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973
Constitution by adding that persons who have elected Philippine Citizenship under
the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well
written book, he said that the decision was designed merely to accommodate
former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on natural-born has no
retroactive effect. Now it seems that the Reverend Father Bernas is going against
this intention by supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my
thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of
Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born
Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it
to the body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as
unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot
be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation.
Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of
Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born
of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino
citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective
from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It
must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the
literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter,
especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court
of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress
the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail
over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any
constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions
therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas
having their essence in their form but are organic living institutions, the
significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a
Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-
born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers
with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born
citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting
accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly
situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental
anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who
elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was
meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render
those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative
provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342
[1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be
a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural
born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age
is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in
1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn
statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In
1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise
of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established
his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves
and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father
applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has
worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the
examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and
has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he
does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no
acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern
Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member
of this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent
them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to
elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos,
serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running
for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his
status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about
Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would
not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a
Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It
observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a
naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to
him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had
already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis
supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because
of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship
after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not
be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a
direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and
void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to
rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To
quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his
demise and obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend
himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our
function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise
of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother,
not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to
determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that
time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not
have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in
favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was
no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave
abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the
Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was
declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang
Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error.
There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born
citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent
thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects,
viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of
Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the
Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
(Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895.
Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a
resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went
beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and
acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-
paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the
Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no
moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines
and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town
under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for
an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a
domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other logical
conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of
section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was
a natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were
not in compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private
respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and
of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to
the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee
Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on
November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty.
Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given
before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency which is the official
custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp.
30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6,
1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant
Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such
execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by
Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law
does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown
that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v.
Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established,
the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection
of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the
Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo,
when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent,
categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the
election protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional
Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the
report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of
delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The
petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having
been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of
the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural
objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a
member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of
the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at
length on the controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only
after a full presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even
assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed
with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term
"residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-
vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of
domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, and
a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering
that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos
living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence"
which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence
of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to
be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi
(Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed
at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said
domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after
the fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door
apartment was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence.
(TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar,
he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents.
Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of
succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these
were still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme
Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required
that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough
that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative.
(Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress
would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the
candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required
by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run.
(see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his
studies and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in
Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that
he always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial
evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese,
Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to
our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there
is none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part
Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the
private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege
which one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too
harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its
richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the
very affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a
lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats
and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were
able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more
positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino.
A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is
essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul the decision * of respondent
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) dated 6
November 1989 which declared private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, and the resolution of the tribunal
dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners' motions for reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong
not qualified to be a Member of the House of Representatives and to declare him (petitioner Co)
who allegedly obtained the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly
elected representative of the second legislative district of Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-
03, petitioner Balanquit prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong and Co (petitioner
in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not qualified for membership in the House of Representatives and to
proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr.
were among the candidates for the position of Representative or Congressman for the second
district of Northern Samar during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private respondent
was proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May 1987 with a plurality of some sixteen thousand
(16,000) votes over petitioner Co who obtained the next highest number of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests against private respondent
with the tribunal, docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15 respectively. Both protests raised
almost the same issues and were thus considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in
relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, in
contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the same Constitution, for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the congressional elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held that respondent Jose L.
Ong is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and was a legal resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar for the required period prior to the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore,
declared qualified to continue in office as Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of
the Philippines, representing the second legislative district of Northern Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in the tribunal are the
following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses Ong Chuan
also known as Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His place of birth is Laoang
which is now one of the municipalities comprising the province of Northern Samar
(Republic Act No. 6132 approved on August 24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended
to the 1987 Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived in Manila on
December 16, 1915. (Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter, he took up residence in
Laoang, Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was celebrated
according to the rites and practices of the Roman Catholic Church in the
Municipality of Laoang (Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a natural-
born Filipino citizen, both her parents at the time of her birth being Filipino
citizens. (Exhibits E & I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine
citizenship, filed his petition for naturalization with the Court of First Instance of
Samar, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law.
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision
approving the application of Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization and declaring said
petitioner a Filipino citizen "with all the rights and privileges and duties, liabilities
and obligations inherent to Filipino citizens. (Exh. E)
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:
(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and
executory;
(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate
of Naturalization in favor of the applicant Ong Chuan who prefers to
take his oath and register his name as Jose Ong Chuan. Petitioner may
take his oath as Filipino citizen under Ms new christian name, Jose
Ong Chuan. (Exh. F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines as prescribed
by Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, was issued the corresponding
Certificate of Naturalization. (Exh. G)
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee and a son
born on July 25, 1937 at Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan and
Agrifina E. Lao, was elected delegate from Northern Samar to the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that he had attended grade
school in Laoang. Thereafter, he went to Manila where he finished his secondary
as well as his college education. While later employed in Manila, protestee
however went home to Laoang whenever he had the opportunity to do so, which
invariably would be as frequent as twice to four times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of Laoang, he
registered as a voter therein and correspondingly voted in said municipality in the
1984 and 1986 elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during the general registration of all voters in the
country, Protestee re-registered as a voter in Precinct No. 4 of Barangay
Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's affidavit, Protestee indicated that he is a
resident of Laoang since birth. (Exh. 7)
1

Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision having been denied,
petitioners filed the present petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's jurisdiction to review the
decision of the House Electoral Tribunal, considering the constitutional provision vesting upon
said tribunal the power and authority to act as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
2

On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present controversy, I believe that, contrary
to the respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence to review the
questioned decision of the tribunal and to decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. But as
early as 1938, it was held in Morrero vs. Bocar,
3
construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution which provided that ". . . The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, "upon a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute
a denial of due process of law." (Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73
Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
this Court is duty-bound to determine whether or not, in an actual controversy, there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived irregularities in the
conduct of a congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may
be contended with great legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal
should be final and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional directive, made the sole judge of
contests relating to such matters. The present controversy, however, involves no less than a
determination of whether the qualifications for membership in the House of Representatives, as
prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss
in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not
a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives,
solely because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the
tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for the office of
Member of the House of Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners who, at the same
time, claim that they are entitled to the office illegally held by private respondent. From this
additional direction, where one asserts an earnestly perceived right that in turn is vigorously
resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for this Court to consider
and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, asserts supremacy
over it in contravention of the time-honored principle of constitutional separation of powers.
The Court in this instance simply performs a function entrusted and assigned to it by the
Constitution of interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional
(and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three
branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the
State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of
governmental power (the Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p.
36).
4

Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to determine whether or
not private respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a public office which is
specifically reserved by the Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my considered opinion that the
respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in rendering its questioned decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently
stated.
The Constitution
5
requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years
of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section I
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-quoted constitutional
provisions. The first sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the basic definition of a natural-
born Filipino citizen. Does private respondent fall within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines under the
first sentence of Sec. 2 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution because he did not
have "to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." It bears
to repeat that on 15 May 1957, while still a minor of 9 years he already became a
Filipino citizen by declaration of law. Since his mother was a natural-born citizen
at the time of her marriage, protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine citizenship
at the moment of his birth and, consequently the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of
CA 473 that he was a Filipino citizen retroacted to the moment of his birth without
his having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such Philippine citizenship.
6

I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The
records show that private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan,
a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern
Samar. In other words, at birth, private respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born
Filipino citizen) because his father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized Filipino
citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was enforced at the time of private respondent's
birth on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were
considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino
citizens.
7

Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in relation to
the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, having been
born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth,
although from birth, private respondent had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the
citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor children of a
naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the Philippines prior to the naturalization of the
parent automatically become Filipino citizens,
8
this does not alter the fact that private
respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not
confer upon him the status of a natural-born citizen merely because he did not have to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be considered a natural-born citizen
by virtue of the operation of CA 473, petitioners however contend that the naturalization of
private respondent's father was invalid and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private
respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct proceeding for nullity of
naturalization as a Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a collateral attack on Ong
Chuan's naturalization is barred in an electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong
Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the challenge against Ong Chuan's
naturalization must emanate from the Government and must be made in a proper/appropriate
and direct proceeding for de-naturalization directed against the proper party, who in such case is
Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded the character of
impregnability under the principle of res judicata.
9
Section 18 of CA 473 provides that a
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon motion made in the proper proceeding by the
Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee,
10
this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of citizenship. He
may accept the offer and become a citizen upon compliance with the prescribed
conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of right. He can only
become a citizen upon and after a strict compliance with the acts of Congress. An
applicant for this high privilege is bound, therefore, to conform to the terms upon
which alone the right he seeks can be conferred. It is his province, and he is bound,
to see that the jurisdictional facts upon which the grant is predicated actually exist
and if they do not he takes nothing by this paper grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons, no other
person is entitled to such privilege, nor to a certificate purporting to grant it, and
any such certificate issued to a person not so entitled to receive it must be treated
as a mere nullity, which confers no legal rights as against the government, from
which it has been obtained without warrant of law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as delicate and
exacting nature, affecting public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only
under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor."
11

Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the petitioners that the
naturalization of private respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the Court should make a
ruling on the validity of said naturalization proceedings. This course of action becomes all the
more inevitable and justified in the present case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a
foreigner is holding a public
office.
12

It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of private respondent is derived
from his father. If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from the beginning, then there is
nothing from which private respondent can derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a
spring cannot rise higher than its source. And to allow private respondent to avail of the
privileges of Filipino citizenship by virtue of a void naturalization of his father, would
constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense against the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan, took the oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and the Philippine Government, as prescribed by Section 12 of CA 473 on
the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the
corresponding Certificate of Naturalization and for the applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite oath of allegiance of
one who has previously obtained a decision favorable to his application for naturalization, is
appealable. It is, therefore, improper and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the
issuance of said order and before the expiration of the reglementary period to perfect any appeal
from said order.
13

In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic,
14
this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of order
granting citizenship is irregular and makes the proceedings so taken null and void.
(Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs. Republic
of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan
(private respondent's father) was null and void. It follows that the private respondent did not
acquire any legal rights from the void naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be
considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-born Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of court to issue the
certificate of naturalization to Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the oath of allegiance was
final and not appealable, the resulting naturalization of Ong Chuan effected, as previously
stated, an automatic naturalization of private respondent, then a minor, as a Filipino citizen on
15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or perfection of the status of a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent acquired the status of a
natural-born Filipino citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that his mother was a natural-born
Filipino citizen. This in turn leads us to an examination of the second sentence in Article IV,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a manner of speaking, in relation to Section 1,
paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen to those who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The right or privilege of election
is available, however, only to those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution, and
before the 1973 Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely
abused its discretion as to exceed its jurisdiction in "distorting" the conferment by the 1987
Constitution of the status of "natural-born" Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine
citizenship all in its strained effort, according to petitioners, to support private respondent's
qualification to be a Member of the House of Representatives.
15

Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution contemplates that only the legitimate children of Filipino mothers with alien father,
born before 17 January 1973 and who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect
Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution are entitled to the status of
natural-born Filipino citizen.
16

The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional provisions' interpretation,
found reason to refer to the interpellations made during the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It
said:
That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution was (sic) intended by its (sic) framers to be endowed, without
distinction, to all Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935 Constitution is more
than persuasively established by the extensive interpellations and debate on the
issue as borne by the official records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
17

Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine citizenship was made irrelevant
to the case at bar, since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of the respondent
tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship, as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to
settle the controversy regarding the meaning of the constitutional provisions in question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations petitions and opinions
expressed in the 1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in ascertaining the
meaning of somewhat elusive and even nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of
the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by
the explanation offered by the framers.
18

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 2, Article IV in
relation to Section 1(3) of the same Article, appear to negate the contention of petitioners that
only those born to Filipino mothers before 17 January 1973 and who would elect Philippine
citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are to be considered natural-born
Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner Treas specifically asked
Commissioner Bernas regarding the provisions in question, thus:
MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and
Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the
interpretation of who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as provided in Section 4 of
the 1973 Constitution, by adding that persons who have elected Philippine
citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be considered natural-born. Am I
right, Mr. Presiding Officer?
FR BERNAS: Yes.
MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills addition to Section 4 of
the 1973 Constitution would be contrary to the spirit of that section?
FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter really. But
whether it is contrary to the spirit is something that has been debated before and is
being debated even now. We will recall that during the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, the status of natural-born citizenship of one of the delegates, Mr. Ang,
was challenged precisely because he was a citizen by election. Finally, the 1971
Constitutional Convention considered him a natural-born citizen, one of the
requirements to be a Member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The reason
behind that decision was that a person under his circumstances already had the
inchoate right to be a citizen by the fact that the mother was a Filipino. And as a
matter of fact, the 1971 Constitutional Convention formalized that recognition by
adopting paragraph 2 of Section 1 of the 1971 Constitution. So, the entire purpose
of this proviso is simply to perhaps remedy whatever injustice there may be so that
these people born before January 17, 1973 who are not naturalized and people who
are not natural born but who are in the same situation as we are considered natural-
born citizens. So, the intention of the Committee in proposing this is to equalize
their status.
19

When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens, Commissioner Bernas replied to
Commissioner Azcuna thus:
MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this refer only to
those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1935 Constitution?
FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by
virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution, whether the election was done
before or after 17 January 1973.
20

And during the period of amendments. Commissioner Rodrigo explained the purpose of what
now appear as Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution,
thus:
MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an inequitable situation.
Between 1935 and 1973, when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of
Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of
Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and, if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens, yet, but
not natural-born Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino mothers and
those born of Filipino fathers. So that from January 17, 1973 when the 1973
Constitution took effect, those born of Filipino mothers but of alien fathers are
natural-born Filipino citizens. Also, those who are born of Filipino fathers and
alien mothers are natural-born Filipino citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a Filipino mother
and that born of a Filipino father, why do we not give a chance to a child born
before January 17, 1973, if and when he elects Philippine citizenship, to be in the
same status as one born of a Filipino father namely, natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a mother vis-a-vis the
child. I would like to state also that we showed equalize the status of a child born
of a Filipino mother the day before January 17, 1973 and a child born also of a
Filipino mother on January 17 or 24 hours later. A child born of a Filipino mother
but an alien father one day before January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects
Philippine citizenship, but he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the
other child who luckily was born 24 hours later maybe because of parto
laborioso is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
21

It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-
born Filipino citizen was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to
their children becoming natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973,
effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers (with alien spouse) or
Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to
Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect Philippine citizenship upon their
reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The election,
which is related to the attainment of the age of majority, may be made before or after 17
January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of
the Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's individual interests,
22
and to foster
equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17 January 1973) to a Filipino
mother (with an alien spouse) and should have elected Philippine citizenship on 19 June 1969
(when he attained the age of majority), or soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a
natural-born Filipino citizen under the 1987 Constitution, the vital question is: did private
respondent really elect Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that private respondent
did not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to the ruling of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had exercised the
right of suffrage when he came of age, the same constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare) [sic] The acts of the
petitioner in registering as a voter, participating in elections and campaigning for
certain candidates were held by the Supreme Court as sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship. Accordingly, even without complying with
the formal requisites for election, the petitioner's Filipino citizenship was judicially
upheld.
23

I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently erroneous and clearly untenable,
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that
election of Philippine citizenship must be made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
Sections 1 and 2
24
of the Act mandate that the option to elect Philippine citizenship must be
effected expressly not impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare
25
which held that Esteban Mallare's
exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied election of
Philippine citizenship, is not applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal failed to
consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years
before CA 625 was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years before the 1935
Constitution (which granted the right of election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect
considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7,
1941, no particular proceeding was required to exercise the option to elect
Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party by Section 1, subsection 4,
Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.
26

Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he was an
illegitimate (natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus followed her citizenship. I
therefore agree with the petitioners' submission that, in citing the Mallare case, the
respondent tribunal had engaged in an obiter dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the Revised
Naturalization Law, providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino citizenship by
reason of the naturalization of his father, the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship
for him. For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private respondent's father was valid,
and that there was no further need for private respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he
had automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the
Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of Philippine citizenship as
contemplated by the Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship derived from one's
Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable time thereafter as
required by CA 625. Consequently, he cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am constrained to state that private
respondent is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is
disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the House of Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of required residence, inasmuch
as the Constitution requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be both a
natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident for at least one (1) year in the district in which he
shall be elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the petitioners can replace private
respondent as the Representative of the second legislative district of Northern Samar in the
House of Representatives.
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may take the place of private
respondent in the House of Representatives representing the second district of Northern Samar.
The ruling of this Court in Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal,
27
is controlling. There we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who
filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City
for the simple reason that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the
election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for mayor of that City.
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in effect, a quo
warranto proceeding even if it is labelled an election protest.
28
It is a proceeding to unseat the
ineligible person from office but not necessarily to install the protestant in his place.
29

The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an
ineligible candidate in an election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. In such a case, the electors have failed to make a choice
and the election is a nullity.
30

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in
the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676).
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate who lost in an
election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is
found ineligible for the office to which he was elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v.
Paredes (23 Phil. 238)
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because
of fraud or irregularities in the election is quite different from that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. . . . If it be found that the
successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in
an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must
retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a
contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible to any
other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots. . . .
31

The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as a natural-born
Filipino citizen, in relation to the present case.
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L. Ong, both of them having
the same father and mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
32
to the effect
that Emil L. Ong was a natural-born Filipino citizen, alleged before the House Electoral
Tribunal that, by analogy, he is himself a natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while
initially impressive, is, as will now be shown, flawed and not supported by the evidence. Not
even the majority decision of the electoral tribunal adopted the same as the basis of its decision
in favor of private respondent. The tribunal, in reference to this submission, said:
Be that as it may and in the light of the Tribunal's disposition of protestee's
citizenship based on an entirely different set of circumstances, apart from the
indisputable fact that the matters attempted to be brought in issue in connection
therewith are too far removed in point of time and relevance from the decisive
events relied upon by the Tribunal, we view these two issues as being already
inconsequential.
33

The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to predicate its decision on the alleged
citizenship by naturalization of private respondent's father (Ong Chuan) and on the
alleged election of Philippine citizenship by private respondent.
Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Electoral protests,
numbers EP-07 and EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing and Gualberto D. Luto against
Emil L. Ong, contesting his citizenship qualification. The Committee on Election Protests
Credentials of the 1971 Contitution Convention heard the protests and submitted to the
Convention a report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion of which stated:
It appearing that protestee's grandfather was himself a Filipino citizen under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty of Paris of December 10,
1898, thus conferring upon protestee's own father, Ong Chuan, Philippine
citizenship at birth, the conclusion is inescapable that protestee himself is a natural-
born citizen, and is therefore qualified to hold the office of delegate to the
Constitutional Convention.
34

On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the
election protests filed against Emil L. Ong were dismissed, following the report of the
Committee on Election Protests and Credentials.
35

It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case
of Emil L. Ong is, to say the least, inconclusive to the case at bar, because
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention decision in the Emil L. Ong case involved
the 1935 Constitution; the present case, on the other hand involves the 1987
Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no specific definition of a "natural-born citizen"
of the Philippines; the 1987 Constitution contains a precise and specific definition
of a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2, Art. IV thereof and private
respondent does not qualify under such definition in the 1987 Constitution;
c) the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong
was a decision of a political body, not a court of law. And, even if we have to take
such a decision as a decision of a quasi-judicial body (i.e., a political body
exercising quasi-judicial functions), said decision in the Emil L. Ong case can not
have the category or character of res judicata in the present judicial controversy,
because between the two (2) cases, there is no identity of parties (one involves
Emil L. Ong, while the other involves private respondent) and, more importantly,
there is no identity of causes of action because the first involves the 1935
Constitution while the second involves the 1987 Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on procedural rules and logic, the evidence
submitted before the electoral tribunal and, therefore, also before this Court, does not support
the allegations made by Emil L. Ong before the 1971 Constitutional Convention and
inferentially adopted by private respondent in the present controversy. This leads us to an
interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L. Ong was a "natural-born citizen" of
the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the "fact" and this appears crucial
and central to its decision that Emil L. Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and, therefore, his descendants like Emil L. Ong (and
therefore, also private respondent) became natural-born Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional
Convention said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines
on April 11, 1899 and was therefore one of the many who became ipso facto
citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said
law expressly declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who continued
to reside therein and who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 as well as their
children born subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands." (Section 4, Philippine Bill of
1902).
36

The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is whether or not
Ong Te private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was "an inhabitant of the
Philippines who continued to reside therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he
met these requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then, Ong Te was a Filipino citizen;
otherwise, he was not a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal
exhibits W, X, Y, Z ,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the "Registro de
Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of
Samar where he is claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners (protestants) also submitted and
offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibit V, a certification of the Chief of
the Archives Division, Records and Management and Archives Office, stating that the name of
Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro Central de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895.
These exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend to prove that Ong Te was
NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue residing in
Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to private respondent's pretense. In the face of
these proofs or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR
COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE, except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the majority decision of the House Electoral
Tribunal skirted any reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of Ong Te under the
Philippine Bill of 1902. It is equally not surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and
father or private respondent, did not even attempt to claim Filipino citizenship by reason of Ong
Te's alleged Filipino citizenship under the Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead applied for
Philippine citizenship through naturalization.
Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the House Electoral Tribunal should no
longer have reviewed the factual question or issue of Ong Te's citizenship in the light of the
resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a
Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902. The tribunal had to look into the question
because the finding that Ong Te had become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902
was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as held in Lee vs. Commissioners of
Immigration:
37

. . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial
or administrative case, whatever the corresponding Court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 67201, 8 May 1984. In connection with said resolution, it is contended by private
respondent that the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case
was elevated to this Court on a question involving Emil L. Ong's disqualification to run for
membership in the Batasang Pambansa and that, according to private respondent, this Court
allowed the use of the Committee Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it would help to look into the
circumstances of the case brought before this Court in relation to the Court's action or
disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were both candidates for the Batasang
Pambansa in the 14 May 1984 election. Valle filed a petition for disqualification with the
Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed as SPC No. 84-69 contending that Ong is
not a natural-born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
judgment of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on his status as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines bars the petitioner from raising the Identical issue before the COMELEC. (G.R. No.
67201, Rollo, p. 94) The motion was denied by the COMELEC, thus, prompting Emil L. Ong to
file with this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the disqualification case
entitled "Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R.
Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, and considering that at the hearing this morning, it was brought out that
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, at its session of November 28, 1972, after
considering the Report of its Committee on Election Protests and Credentials,
found that the protest questioning the citizenship of the protestee (the petitioner
herein) was groundless and dismissed Election Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed
against said petitioner (p. 237, Rollo), the authenticity of the Minutes of said
session as well as of the said Committee's Report having been duly admitted in
evidence without objection and bears out, for now, without need for a full hearing,
that petitioner is a natural-born citizen, the Court Resolved to ISSUE, effective
immediately, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondent COMELEC
from holding any further hearing on the disqualification case entitled Edilberto Del
Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at 3:00 o'clock this afternoon, or
any other day, except to dismiss the same. This is without prejudice to any
appropriate action that private respondent may wish to take after the elections.
(emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 67201 was rendered without the
benefit of a hearing on the merits either by the Court or by the COMELEC and merely on the
basis of a Committee's Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and
this is quite significant) did not foreclose any appropriate action that Del Valle (therein
petitioner) may wish to take after the elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution did
not foreclose a future or further proceeding in regard to the same question and that,
consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L. Ong to such recognition. How much more
when the Constitution involved is not the 1935 Constitution but the 1987 Constitution whose
provisions were never considered in all such proceedings because the 1987 Constitution was
still inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private respondent) who unquestionably obtained the
highest number of votes for the elective position of Representative (Congressman) to the House
of Representatives for the second district of Northern Samar, would have had to cease in office
by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full membership of the Court had participated in this
case, with the result that the legislative district would cease to have, in the interim, a
representative in the House of Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in cases of
this nature is the Constitution and only the Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that
when the electorate in the second legislative district of Northern Samar cast the majority of their
votes for private respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully eligible and qualified
for the office because he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and
belief can not prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the Constitution mandates that members of the
House of Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the Philippines". The voting
majority of the present Court says, "Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is
worse is, the same voting majority, in effect, says, "even aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as he
clearly is, NOT a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore NOT QUALIFIED to be
a Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.
SARMIENTO, J ., concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a question of fact, and as a rule, the
Supreme Court leaves facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite agreed that the
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to
the membership in the House, as follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
1

is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its judgment because it thinks it
knows better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections,
2
it was held that this Court can not review
the errors of the Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all election contests) in
the sense of reviewing facts and unearthing mistakes and that this Court's jurisdiction is to
see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. It is true that the new
Constitution has conferred expanded powers on the Court,
3
but as the Charter states, our
authority is "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
4
It is not to review facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical exercise of power amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of due process of law.
5

I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a matter of opinion with which men may
differ, but certainly, it is quite another thing to say that the respondent Tribunal has gravely
abused its discretion because the majority has begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty
of the Court to remedy all imagined wrongs committed by the Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the Tribunal, Jose Ong is a Filipino citizen
and consequently, is possessed of the qualifications to be a member of the House. As the sole
judge, precisely, of this question, the Court can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in question stands exactly on indefensible
grounds. It is to be noted that Jose Ong had relied on the Report dated September 4, 1972 of the
1971 Constitutional Convention Committee
6
on Election Protests and Credentials, in which the
Committees upheld the citizenship, and sustained the qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil
Ong, Jose Ong's full blood brother. According to the Report, Ong Te the Ongs' grandfather, was
already a Filipino citizen having complied with the requirements on Filipinization by existing
laws for which his successors need not have elected Filipino citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx
There is merit in protestee's claim. There can hardly be any doubt that Ong Te
protestees's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on April
11, 1899, and was therefore one of the many who became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly
declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who continued to reside
therein and who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, as well as their children
born subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands" (Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902). Excepted from the operation of this rule
were Spanish subjects who shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. But
under the Treaty of Paris, only Spanish subjects who were natives of Peninsular
Spain had the privilege of preserving their Spanish nationality.
7

xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted, protestee's grandfather established residence in the Philippines in
1895, as shown by the Registro Central de Chinos. He was also issued a certificate
of registration. He established a business here, and later acquired real property.
Although he went back to China for brief visits, he invariably came back. He even
brought his eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in the Philippines when the latter was
only 10 years old. And Ong Chuan was admitted into the country because, as duly
noted on his landing certificate, his father, Ong Te had been duly enrolled under
CR 16009-36755 i.e., as a permanent resident. Indeed, even when Ong Te went
back to China in the 1920's for another visit, he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was
then still a minor, in the Philippines obviously because he had long considered
the Philippines his home. The domicile he established in 1895 is presumed to have
continued up to, and beyond, April 11, 1899, for, as already adverted to, a domicile
once acquired is not lost until a new one is gained. The only conclusion then can
thus be drawn is that Ong Te was duly domiciled in the Philippines as of April 11,
1899, within the meaning of par. 4, Art. 17, of the Civil Code of 1889 and was,
consequently, a Spanish subject, he qualified as a Filipino citizen under the
provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
8

It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, subsequently sought naturalization in the
belief that he was, all along, a Chinese citizen, but as the Report held:
Protestants, however, make capital of the fact that both Ong Te and his son, Ong
Chuan (protestee's father), appear to have been registered as Chinese citizens even
long after the turn of the century. Worse, Ong Chuan himself believed the was
alien, to the extent of having to seek admission as a Pilipino citizen through
naturalization proceedings. The point, to our mind, is neither crucial nor
substantial. Ong's status as a citizen is a matter of law, rather than of personal
belief. It is what the law provides, and not what one thinks his status to be, which
determines whether one is a citizen of a particular state or not. Mere mistake or
misapprehension as to one's citizenship, it has been held, is not a sufficient cause
or reason for forfeiture of Philippine citizenship; it does not even constitute
estoppel (Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too, estoppel applies only to
questions of fact and not of law (Tanada v. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957).
9

It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously approved by the Committee, and on
November 28, 1972, approved without any objection by the Convention in plenary session.
10

I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in all candor, I
speak from experience, because when the Convention approved the Report in question, I was
one of its vice-presidents and the presiding officer.
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this Court (on a question involving Emil
Ong's qualification to sit as member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa)
11
in which this Court
allowed the use of the Committee Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit that the question of the Ong's
citizenship is a settled matter. Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of the Convention as well as G.R. No.
67201 of this Court, involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit, however, that what is
sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or not we will overturn the unanimous
ruling of 267 delegates, indeed, also of this Court.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul the decision * of respondent
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) dated 6
November 1989 which declared private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, and the resolution of the tribunal
dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners' motions for reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong
not qualified to be a Member of the House of Representatives and to declare him (petitioner Co)
who allegedly obtained the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly
elected representative of the second legislative district of Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-
03, petitioner Balanquit prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong and Co (petitioner
in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not qualified for membership in the House of Representatives and to
proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr.
were among the candidates for the position of Representative or Congressman for the second
district of Northern Samar during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private respondent
was proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May 1987 with a plurality of some sixteen thousand
(16,000) votes over petitioner Co who obtained the next highest number of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests against private respondent
with the tribunal, docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15 respectively. Both protests raised
almost the same issues and were thus considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in
relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, in
contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the same Constitution, for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the congressional elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held that respondent Jose L.
Ong is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and was a legal resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar for the required period prior to the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore,
declared qualified to continue in office as Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of
the Philippines, representing the second legislative district of Northern Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in the tribunal are the
following:
The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses Ong Chuan also known as
Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His place of birth is Laoang which is now one of the
municipalities comprising the province of Northern Samar (Republic Act No. 6132 approved on
August 24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution).
1. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived in Manila on
December 16, 1915. (Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter, he took up residence in
Laoang, Samar.
2. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was celebrated
according to the rites and practices of the Roman Catholic Church in the Municipality of
Laoang (Exh. E).
3. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a natural-born
Filipino citizen, both her parents at the time of her birth being Filipino citizens. (Exhibits
E & I)
4. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship, filed
his petition for naturalization with the Court of First Instance of Samar, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
5. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision approving
the application of Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization and declaring said petitioner a
Filipino citizen "with all the rights and privileges and duties, liabilities and obligations
inherent to Filipino citizens. (Exh. E)
6. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:
(1) Declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and executory;
(2) Directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization in
favor of the applicant Ong Chuan who prefers to take his oath and register his name as
Jose Ong Chuan. Petitioner may take his oath as Filipino citizen under Ms new christian
name, Jose Ong Chuan. (Exh. F)
7. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding oath of allegiance to
the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines as prescribed by Section 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, was issued the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization.
(Exh. G)
8. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee and a son born on
July 25, 1937 at Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was
elected delegate from Northern Samar to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
9. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that he had attended grade school in
Laoang. Thereafter, he went to Manila where he finished his secondary as well as his
college education. While later employed in Manila, protestee however went home to
Laoang whenever he had the opportunity to do so, which invariably would be as frequent
as twice to four times a year.
10. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of Laoang, he registered as a
voter therein and correspondingly voted in said municipality in the 1984 and 1986
elections.
11. Again in December 1986, during the general registration of all voters in the country,
Protestee re-registered as a voter in Precinct No. 4 of Barangay Tumaguinting in Laoang.
In his voter's affidavit, Protestee indicated that he is a resident of Laoang since birth.
(Exh. 7)
1

Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision having been denied,
petitioners filed the present petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's jurisdiction to review the
decision of the House Electoral Tribunal, considering the constitutional provision vesting upon
said tribunal the power and authority to act as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
2

On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present controversy, I believe that, contrary
to the respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence to review the
questioned decision of the tribunal and to decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. But as
early as 1938, it was held in Morrero vs. Bocar,
3
construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution which provided that ". . . The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, "upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of
due process of law." (Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867;
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
this Court is duty-bound to determine whether or not, in an actual controversy, there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived irregularities in the
conduct of a congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may
be contended with great legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal
should be final and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional directive, made the sole judge of
contests relating to such matters. The present controversy, however, involves no less than a
determination of whether the qualifications for membership in the House of Representatives, as
prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss
in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not
a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives,
solely because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the
tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for the office of
Member of the House of Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners who, at the same
time, claim that they are entitled to the office illegally held by private respondent. From this
additional direction, where one asserts an earnestly perceived right that in turn is vigorously
resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for this Court to consider
and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, asserts supremacy
over it in contravention of the time-honored principle of constitutional separation of powers.
The Court in this instance simply performs a function entrusted and assigned to it by the
Constitution of interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional
(and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three
branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the
State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of
governmental power (the Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p.
36).
4

Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to determine whether or
not private respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a public office which is
specifically reserved by the Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my considered opinion that the
respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in rendering its questioned decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently
stated.
The Constitution
5
requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years
of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section I
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-quoted constitutional
provisions. The first sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the basic definition of a natural-
born Filipino citizen. Does private respondent fall within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines under the
first sentence of Sec. 2 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution because he did not
have "to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." It bears
to repeat that on 15 May 1957, while still a minor of 9 years he already became a
Filipino citizen by declaration of law. Since his mother was a natural-born citizen
at the time of her marriage, protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine citizenship
at the moment of his birth and, consequently the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of
CA 473 that he was a Filipino citizen retroacted to the moment of his birth without
his having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such Philippine citizenship.
6

I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The
records show that private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan,
a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern
Samar. In other words, at birth, private respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born
Filipino citizen) because his father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized Filipino
citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was enforced at the time of private respondent's
birth on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were
considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino
citizens.
7

Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in relation to
the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, having been
born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth,
although from birth, private respondent had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the
citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor children of a
naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the Philippines prior to the naturalization of the
parent automatically become Filipino citizens,
8
this does not alter the fact that private
respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not
confer upon him the status of a natural-born citizen merely because he did not have to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be considered a natural-born citizen
by virtue of the operation of CA 473, petitioners however contend that the naturalization of
private respondent's father was invalid and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private
respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct proceeding for nullity of
naturalization as a Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a collateral attack on Ong
Chuan's naturalization is barred in an electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong
Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the challenge against Ong Chuan's
naturalization must emanate from the Government and must be made in a proper/appropriate
and direct proceeding for de-naturalization directed against the proper party, who in such case is
Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded the character of
impregnability under the principle of res judicata.
9
Section 18 of CA 473 provides that a
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon motion made in the proper proceeding by the
Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee,
10
this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of citizenship. He
may accept the offer and become a citizen upon compliance with the prescribed
conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of right. He can only
become a citizen upon and after a strict compliance with the acts of Congress. An
applicant for this high privilege is bound, therefore, to conform to the terms upon
which alone the right he seeks can be conferred. It is his province, and he is bound,
to see that the jurisdictional facts upon which the grant is predicated actually exist
and if they do not he takes nothing by this paper grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons, no other
person is entitled to such privilege, nor to a certificate purporting to grant it, and
any such certificate issued to a person not so entitled to receive it must be treated
as a mere nullity, which confers no legal rights as against the government, from
which it has been obtained without warrant of law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as delicate and
exacting nature, affecting public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only
under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor."
11

Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the petitioners that the
naturalization of private respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the Court should make a
ruling on the validity of said naturalization proceedings. This course of action becomes all the
more inevitable and justified in the present case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a
foreigner is holding a public
office.
12

It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of private respondent is derived
from his father. If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from the beginning, then there is
nothing from which private respondent can derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a
spring cannot rise higher than its source. And to allow private respondent to avail of the
privileges of Filipino citizenship by virtue of a void naturalization of his father, would
constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense against the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan, took the oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and the Philippine Government, as prescribed by Section 12 of CA 473 on
the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the
corresponding Certificate of Naturalization and for the applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite oath of allegiance of
one who has previously obtained a decision favorable to his application for naturalization, is
appealable. It is, therefore, improper and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the
issuance of said order and before the expiration of the reglementary period to perfect any appeal
from said order.
13

In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic,
14
this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of order
granting citizenship is irregular and makes the proceedings so taken null and void.
(Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs. Republic
of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan
(private respondent's father) was null and void. It follows that the private respondent did not
acquire any legal rights from the void naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be
considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-born Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of court to issue the
certificate of naturalization to Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the oath of allegiance was
final and not appealable, the resulting naturalization of Ong Chuan effected, as previously
stated, an automatic naturalization of private respondent, then a minor, as a Filipino citizen on
15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or perfection of the status of a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent acquired the status of a
natural-born Filipino citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that his mother was a natural-born
Filipino citizen. This in turn leads us to an examination of the second sentence in Article IV,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a manner of speaking, in relation to Section 1,
paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen to those who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The right or privilege of election
is available, however, only to those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution, and
before the 1973 Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely
abused its discretion as to exceed its jurisdiction in "distorting" the conferment by the 1987
Constitution of the status of "natural-born" Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine
citizenship all in its strained effort, according to petitioners, to support private respondent's
qualification to be a Member of the House of Representatives.
15

Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution contemplates that only the legitimate children of Filipino mothers with alien father,
born before 17 January 1973 and who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect
Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution are entitled to the status of
natural-born Filipino citizen.
16

The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional provisions' interpretation,
found reason to refer to the interpellations made during the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It
said:
That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution was (sic) intended by its (sic) framers to be endowed, without
distinction, to all Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935 Constitution is more
than persuasively established by the extensive interpellations and debate on the
issue as borne by the official records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
17

Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine citizenship was made irrelevant
to the case at bar, since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of the respondent
tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship, as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to
settle the controversy regarding the meaning of the constitutional provisions in question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations petitions and opinions
expressed in the 1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in ascertaining the
meaning of somewhat elusive and even nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of
the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by
the explanation offered by the framers.
18

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 2, Article IV in
relation to Section 1(3) of the same Article, appear to negate the contention of petitioners that
only those born to Filipino mothers before 17 January 1973 and who would elect Philippine
citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are to be considered natural-born
Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner Treas specifically asked
Commissioner Bernas regarding the provisions in question, thus:
MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and
Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of
who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as provided in Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution,
by adding that persons who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be considered natural-born. Am I right, Mr. Presiding Officer?
FR BERNAS: Yes.
MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills addition to Section 4 of the
1973 Constitution would be contrary to the spirit of that section?
FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter really. But whether
it is contrary to the spirit is something that has been debated before and is being debated
even now. We will recall that during the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the status of
natural-born citizenship of one of the delegates, Mr. Ang, was challenged precisely
because he was a citizen by election. Finally, the 1971 Constitutional Convention
considered him a natural-born citizen, one of the requirements to be a Member of the
1971 Constitutional Convention. The reason behind that decision was that a person under
his circumstances already had the inchoate right to be a citizen by the fact that the mother
was a Filipino. And as a matter of fact, the 1971 Constitutional Convention formalized
that recognition by adopting paragraph 2 of Section 1 of the 1971 Constitution. So, the
entire purpose of this proviso is simply to perhaps remedy whatever injustice there may
be so that these people born before January 17, 1973 who are not naturalized and people
who are not natural born but who are in the same situation as we are considered natural-
born citizens. So, the intention of the Committee in proposing this is to equalize their
status.
19

When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens, Commissioner Bernas replied to
Commissioner Azcuna thus:
MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this refer only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it
also cover those who elected it under the 1935 Constitution?
FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of
the provision of the 1935 Constitution, whether the election was done before or after 17
January 1973.
20

And during the period of amendments. Commissioner Rodrigo explained the purpose of what
now appear as Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution,
thus:
MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an inequitable situation.
Between 1935 and 1973, when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of
Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of
Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and, if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens, yet, but
not natural-born Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino mothers and
those born of Filipino fathers. So that from January 17, 1973 when the 1973
Constitution took effect, those born of Filipino mothers but of alien fathers are
natural-born Filipino citizens. Also, those who are born of Filipino fathers and
alien mothers are natural-born Filipino citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a Filipino mother
and that born of a Filipino father, why do we not give a chance to a child born
before January 17, 1973, if and when he elects Philippine citizenship, to be in the
same status as one born of a Filipino father namely, natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a mother vis-a-vis the
child. I would like to state also that we showed equalize the status of a child born
of a Filipino mother the day before January 17, 1973 and a child born also of a
Filipino mother on January 17 or 24 hours later. A child born of a Filipino mother
but an alien father one day before January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects
Philippine citizenship, but he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the
other child who luckily was born 24 hours later maybe because of parto
laborioso is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
21

It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-
born Filipino citizen was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to
their children becoming natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973,
effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers (with alien spouse) or
Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to
Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect Philippine citizenship upon their
reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The election,
which is related to the attainment of the age of majority, may be made before or after 17
January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of
the Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's individual interests,
22
and to foster
equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17 January 1973) to a Filipino
mother (with an alien spouse) and should have elected Philippine citizenship on 19 June 1969
(when he attained the age of majority), or soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a
natural-born Filipino citizen under the 1987 Constitution, the vital question is: did private
respondent really elect Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that private respondent
did not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to the ruling of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had exercised the
right of suffrage when he came of age, the same constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare) [sic] The acts of the
petitioner in registering as a voter, participating in elections and campaigning for
certain candidates were held by the Supreme Court as sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship. Accordingly, even without complying with
the formal requisites for election, the petitioner's Filipino citizenship was judicially
upheld.
23

I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently erroneous and clearly untenable,
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that
election of Philippine citizenship must be made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
Sections 1 and 2
24
of the Act mandate that the option to elect Philippine citizenship must be
effected expressly not impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare
25
which held that Esteban Mallare's
exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied election of
Philippine citizenship, is not applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal failed to
consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years
before CA 625 was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years before the 1935
Constitution (which granted the right of election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect
considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7,
1941, no particular proceeding was required to exercise the option to elect
Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party by Section 1, subsection 4,
Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.
26

Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he was an
illegitimate (natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus followed her citizenship. I
therefore agree with the petitioners' submission that, in citing the Mallare case, the
respondent tribunal had engaged in an obiter dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the Revised
Naturalization Law, providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino citizenship by
reason of the naturalization of his father, the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship
for him. For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private respondent's father was valid,
and that there was no further need for private respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he
had automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the
Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of Philippine citizenship as
contemplated by the Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship derived from one's
Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable time thereafter as
required by CA 625. Consequently, he cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am constrained to state that private
respondent is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is
disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the House of Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of required residence, inasmuch
as the Constitution requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be both a
natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident for at least one (1) year in the district in which he
shall be elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the petitioners can replace private
respondent as the Representative of the second legislative district of Northern Samar in the
House of Representatives.
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may take the place of private
respondent in the House of Representatives representing the second district of Northern Samar.
The ruling of this Court in Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal,
27
is controlling. There we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who
filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City
for the simple reason that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the
election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for mayor of that City.
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in effect, a quo
warranto proceeding even if it is labelled an election protest.
28
It is a proceeding to unseat the
ineligible person from office but not necessarily to install the protestant in his place.
29

The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an
ineligible candidate in an election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. In such a case, the electors have failed to make a choice
and the election is a nullity.
30

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in
the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676).
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate who lost in an
election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is
found ineligible for the office to which he was elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v.
Paredes (23 Phil. 238)
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because
of fraud or irregularities in the election is quite different from that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. . . . If it be found that the
successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in
an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must
retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a
contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible to any
other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots. . . . 31
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L. Ong, both of them having
the same father and mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention 32 t









PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
[P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005]
RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., protestant, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, protestee.
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
The moving finger writes, says Omar Khayyam in the Rubayyat, and having writ,
moves on. Nor all your piety nor wit, adds the poet, could lure it back to cancel half a
line; nor all your tears wash out a word of it.
Such is my view on the providential case for our consideration.
Before this Electoral Tribunal, composed pursuant to the Constitution, by all the fifteen
members of the Supreme Court, is a matter of first impression. We are tasked not only
to determine, as originally prayed for, who between the Protestant and the Protestee
was the true winner in the May 10, 2004 Presidential Elections, but also to decide now
whether the Protestants widow (Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe, popularly known as the
cinema star Susan Roces) could intervene and/or substitute for the deceased party,
assuming arguendo that the protest could survive his death.
If one were guided by folk wisdom expressed in the adage that in a democracy, the
voice of the people is the voice of God, then it would appear our task had been made
easy by fateful events. Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the
Congress as the representatives of the sovereign people and acting as the National
Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) the duly elected President of the Philippines. She obtained
12,905,808 votes, as against 11,782,232 votes for the second-placer, the movie actor
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ).[1] She took her Oath of Office before the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.
Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed
seasonably an election protest before this Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004. Mrs.
GMA, through counsel, filed her Answer with Counter Protest on August 5, 2004. As
counsels for the parties exchanged lively motions to rush the presentation of their
respective positions on the controversy, an act of God intervened. On December 14,
2004, the Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital.
The medical certificate, filed by counsel as part of the Notice of Death of the
Protestant, showed that he died of cardio-pulmonary arrest, secondary to cerebral
infarction.
However, neither the Protestees proclamation by Congress nor the death of her main
rival as a fortuitous intervening event, appears to abate the present controversy in the
public arena. Instead, notice may be taken of periodic mass actions, demonstrations,
and rallies raising an outcry for this Tribunal to decide the electoral protest of Mr. FPJ
against Mrs. GMA once and for all. The oracular function of this Tribunal, it would
appear, needs to be fully exercised to make manifest here and abroad who is the duly
elected leader of the Filipino nation. All these, despite the fact that the submissions by
the parties on their respective sides in the protest and the counter-protest are thus far,
far from completed.
Needless to stress, this Tribunal cannot shirk its constitutional duty. Yet, neither could
it go beyond its mandate under the Constitution and the law. Further, this Tribunal is
guided by its Rules, as well as the Rules of Court in a suppletory manner. Considering
the transcendental importance of the electoral contest involving the Presidency, a rush
to judgment is simply out of the question. Yet decide the matter we must, without
further delay, to prevent popular unrest and avoid further destabilization of government
at the highest level.
Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant, his counsel has submitted
to the Tribunal, dated January 10, 2005, a MANIFESTATION with URGENT
PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED
PROTESTANT FPJ, by the widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe, who signed the
verification and certification therein.
As movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the untimely demise of her
husband and in representation not only of her deceased husband but more so because
of the paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to
continue and substitute for her late husband in the election protest initiated by him to
ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004 elections. In support of
her assertion, she cites De Castro v. Commission on Elections,[2] and Lomugdang v.
Javier,[3] to the effect that the death of the protestant does not constitute a ground for
the dismissal of the contest nor oust the trial court of the jurisdiction to decide the
election contest. She stresses nevertheless that even if the instant protest case
succeeds, she is cognizant that as a mere substitute she cannot succeed, assume or
be entitled to said elective office, and her utmost concern is not personal but one that
involves the publics interest. She prays, however, that if subsequently determined that
the protestee Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo did not get the highest number of votes for
president, for protestee to be disallowed from remaining in office, and thus prevented
from exercising the powers, duties, responsibilities and prerogatives reserved only to
the duly-elected president or her legitimate successor.
In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs. GMA, relying on Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias[4]
and subsequent cases including analogous cases decided by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), asserts that the widow of a deceased
candidate is not the proper party to replace the deceased protestant since a public
office is personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs. She points out that the
widow has no legal right to substitute for her husband in an election protest, since no
such right survives the husband, considering that the right to file an election protest is
personal and non-transmissible.
Protestee also contends Mrs. FPJ cannot substitute for her deceased husband
because under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered
candidates who obtained the 2
nd
and 3
rd
highest votes for the presidency may contest
the election of the president and patently, Mrs. FPJ did not receive the 2
nd
and 3
rd

highest votes for she was not even a candidate for the presidency in the election that is
being contested.
Citing pertinent PET Rules, protestee also stresses that this Tribunal has no
jurisdiction over actions of surviving spouses to ascertain the vote of the electorate as
the Tribunal has jurisdiction only over election protests and quo warranto cases.
According to protestee, movant/intervenor Mrs. FPJ cannot use the public interest to
justify her request to be substituted for her husband. Public interest, i.e. the need to
dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate, is applicable only in election
contests, not in an action to merely ascertain the true and genuine will of the people.
She asserts that the only case herein cognizable by this Tribunal is an election protest
involving a protestant and a protestee, not between the electorate and the protestee.
Citing analogous HRET cases, protestee avers that in a case where the protestant, the
primary adversary in an election protest case dies, the public interest in said protest
dies with him.
Protestee also contends that in the adversarial nature of a protest case where one of
the parties dies, a correct ruling cannot be had because the dead protestant could no
longer refute his adversarys allegations because death has rendered him hors de
combat.
Further citing Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos,[5] protestee points out that this Tribunal,
nonetheless, confirmed its power to dismiss an electoral case on technical grounds.
She adds that if the Tribunal can do so on a technicality, all the more it could for a
stronger reason, that of protestants death.
In her Reply, movant/intervenor argues that reference of protestee to the HRET case
of Abadilla v. Ablan,[6] was erroneous inasmuch as said case was a congressional
protest and the controlling case is De Castro. She likewise contends that protestant
failed to distinguish between a right to an office which protestant concedes is personal
and non-transmissible vis--vis the right to pursue the process which is not personal
but imbued with public interest. She likewise stresses that the death of the protestant
abolished the personal/private character of the protest, as protestants right to assume
if he prevails, necessarily disappears, and the same cannot be transferred to anyone
else, protestants widow included. She insists, however, that the public interest
remains. Further, movant/intervenor posits that the protest having been commenced
cannot be abated by the death of the protestant and the only real issue is the
determination of the proper substitute. She avers that the Tribunals rule is clear on
who can commence and initiate a protest compared to the persons who can initiate a
quo warranto. She admits that in the former, only the second and third placers in the
presidential election are authorized to commence the contest, while in the latter, any
voter may initiate the petition. She contends that with no personal interest involved,
any registered voter can continue the duly-commenced protest as the real-party-in-
interest which is analogous to a quo warranto. She contradicts protestee and insists
that allowing any voter to substitute just like in a quo warranto will not open the
floodgate to whimsical protests, and the imagined political instability feared by
protestee will even more be pronounced if the protest is dismissed. Movant/intervenor
reiterates that the issue at hand involves just the continuation of proceedings by
allowing substitution and the taking over by the substitute of the prosecution of the
protest already duly commenced.
Plainly, the issue here is: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who
died during the pendency of the latters protest case?
The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET
Rules. It provides,
Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-
President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes
may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by
filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty
(30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2
nd
and 3
rd
placers, may contest the
election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the
real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a
scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate,
the candidate who received that 2
nd
or the 3
rd
highest number of votes would be the
legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.
This Tribunal, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it
does allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court,
decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals.[7]
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court.[8] This rule allows
substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule
that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal
representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16.
However, in our application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time ruled
that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to
the heirs upon death.[9] Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the
heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest.
In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias,[10] we recognized substitution upon the death of the
protestee but denied substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the real
parties in interest. Similarly, in the later case of De la Victoria v. Commission on
Elections,[11] we struck down the claim of the surviving spouse and children of the
protestee to the contested office for the same reason. Even in analogous cases before
other electoral tribunals,[12] involving substitution by the widow of a deceased
protestant, in cases where the widow is not a real party in interest, we denied
substitution by the wife or heirs.
This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending action.
We have held as early as Vda. de De Mesa (1966) that while the right to a public office
is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal
and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would
oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings.[13] Hence, we have
allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in
interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party
who is entitled to the avails of the suit.[14] In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias[15] and
Lomugdang v. Javier,[16] we permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-
mayor is a real party in interest considering that if the protest succeeds and the
protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor succeeds to the office of the mayor that
becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume office. In contrast, herein
movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of
President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that
protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.
We are not unaware that a contest before election tribunals has two aspects. First, it is
in pursuit of ones right to a public office, and second, it is imbued with public interest.
Indeed the personal aspect of the case is inextricably linked with the public interest.
For an election protest involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is imbued
with public interest which raises it into a plane over and above ordinary civil
actions.[17] But herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, has overly stressed that it is with
the paramount public interest in mind that she desires to pursue the process
commenced by her late husband. She avers that she is pursuing the process to
determine who truly won the election, as a service to the Filipino people. We laud her
noble intention and her interest to find out the true will of the electorate. However,
nobility of intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a person may
intervene in an election protest. Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court[18] is the
applicable rule on intervention in the absence of such a rule in the PET Rules. In such
intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the
matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will
either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not
immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the
declared president did not truly get the highest number of votes. We fully appreciate
counsels manifestation that movant/intervenor herself claims she has no interest in
assuming the position as she is aware that she cannot succeed to the presidency,
having no legal right to it. Yet thus far, in this case, no real parties such as the vice-
presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come forward to intervene, or to be
substituted for the deceased protestant. In our view, if persons not real parties in the
action could be allowed to intervene, proceedings will be unnecessarily complicated,
expensive and interminable and this is not the policy of the law.[19] It is far more
prudent to abide by the existing strict limitations on intervention and substitution under
the law and the rules.
Conformably then with the law, the rules and prevailing jurisprudence, this Tribunal
finds no justifiable reason to grant the petition/motion for intervention and substitution.
WHEREFORE, the motion of movant/intervenor JESUSA SONORA POE a.k.a.
SUSAN ROCES to intervene and substitute for the deceased protestant is DENIED for
lack of merit.
Acting on the protest and considering the Notice of the Death, submitted by counsel of
protestant RONALD ALLAN POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., we also resolve that
Presidential Electoral Tribunal Case No. 002, entitled Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, should be as it is hereby DISMISSED
on the ground that no real party in interest has come forward within the period allowed
by law, to intervene in this case or be substituted for the deceased protestant.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario,
and Garcia, JJ., concur.

















FPJ CASE: Tecson, et. al. v. Commission on Elections

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President
of the Republic of the Philippines for the May 2004 national elections under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ
represented himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Various petitioners sought to disqualify FPJ in his bid for the presidency on the
contention that he made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, his parents were foreigners;
his mother an American and his father, a Spanish national since his father was the son
of Lorenzo Pou, who was a Spanish subject. Moreover, they argue that granting Allan
F. Poe, his father, was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to his son, since FPJ is an illegitimate child of an alien mother, Bessy
Kelley. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions
first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessy Kelley and second, even if no such prior marriage existed, Allan
Poe married Bessie Kelley only a year after the birth of FPJ.
The Supreme Court, in this case, held that Fernando Poe Jr. is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and must be allowed to continue his bid for the Presidency of the
Republic.
Justice Vitug, being the ponente in this case, cited five conclusions that can be
drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents presented by both sides.
First, the parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessy Kelley. Second, FPJ was born to
them on August 20, 1939. Third, Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each
other on September 16, 1940. Fourth, the father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Pou. And
fifth, at the time of his death on September 11, 1954, Lorenzo Pou was 84 yrs. old.
Petitioners presented documentary evidence that indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou,
married to Marta Reyes and the father of Allan Poe. While the record of birth of
Lorenzo Pou was not presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified
him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the
time of his death on September 11, 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ
showed that he was born on May 17, 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a
mestiza mother, Marta Reyes. Petitioners also introduced an uncertified copy of a
supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan Poe and Paulita Gomez on 5 July
1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of
their marriage to be on September 16, 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was
stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley
to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of
FPJ, would disclose that he was born on August 20, 1939 to Allan Poe, a Filipino,
twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, twenty-one years
old and married.
The marriage certificate of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of
FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the
custody of a public officer. Both contending parties have submitted these documents in
evidence during the proceedings before the COMELEC. In line with this fact, Section 3
Rule 130, Rules of Court states When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in
a public office.
Being public documents, therefore, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute
prima facie proof of their contents in line with Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Consequently, since a certification was issued by the Officer-in-Charge of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information about the
marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez can be found and that the certificate of
their marriage presented was only an uncertified photocopy, it was not greatly
considered by the Court in this case.
Citizenship of Grandfather
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11
September 1954, at the age of 84 years old, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus
be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the
Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner argued that Lorenzo Pou was not in
the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there
was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives
Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other
place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou
was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, the Court presumed that the residence of the person at the time of his death
was also his residence before death. In fact, it would be extremely doubtful if the
Records Management and Archives Office had complete records of all residents of the
Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that if Lorenzo Pou is assumed to be in the
Philippines in 11 April 1891, being a Spanish subject who continued to reside in the
Philippines without preserving his allegiance to the Crown of Spain, then he was
converted to a Filipino citizen in accordance with the Philippine Bill of 1902. Lorenzo
Pou now being a Filipino, Allan Poe is also a Filipino upon birth and Fernando Poe Jr.
is likewise held to be a natural-born Filipino in accordance with the 1935 Constitution.
On Legitimacy or Illegitimacy
The opinion of Joaquin Bernas, SJ is most convincing in the issue at hand. He
stated that the Court must ask what the lis mota was in each of the cases cited by the
petitioners to support their contention that birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ
an illegitimate child and therefore he would follow the citizenship of his mother, an
American.
Among the cases cited were Morano v. Vivo (20 SCRA 562), which was about a
stepson of a Filipino but the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father,
Chiongbian v. de Leon (82 Phil. 771), which was about a legitimate son of a father who
had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution, and Serra
v. Republic (91 Phil. 914), which was about an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and
a Filipino mother. The facts in these cases were not the same as those in the case at
bar. Moreover, in another case, Paa v. Chan (21 SCRA 753), which was about the son
of an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, the argument was
based from an obiter dictum, which was absolutely unnecessary for the case and
cannot be given great weight.
Father Bernas further stated that aside from the fact that such pronouncement
that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father cannot run for public office would have no
textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate
child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction
between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother.
In the case of People v. Cayat, jurisprudence has established a test to determine
valid classification. Although distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children
rests on real differences, these differences may justify distinction for one purpose but
not for another. In fact, it must be considered that it was not the fault of the child that
his parents had illicit liaison. To disqualify the illegitimate child from holding an
important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is
neither justice nor rationality in that. Thus, it transgresses the equal protection clause.
Another amicus curiae, Mr. Justice Mendoza, also reiterated that where
jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother,
it did so for the benefit of the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had
custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate
child. It was to help the child, not prejudice or discriminate him.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child was also used as basis in this case
since it abolished all discriminations on account of birth or other status. The
Convention protects in the most comprehensive way all rights of children: political
rights, civil rights, social rights, economic rights and cultural rights. A violation of one
right is considered a violation of the other rights. It also embraced the rule that all
actions of a State concerning the child should consider the best interests of the child.
This was, however, attacked by Justice Carpio in his dissent by stating that FPJ cannot
invoke the Convention since he is no longer a child when the convention was ratified in
the Philippines in September 1990 and, thus, has no retroactive effect. Moreover, he
stated that the Convention has the status of a municipal law and its ratification could
not have amended the express requirement in the Constitution that only natural-born
citizens of the Philippines are qualified to be President. He further noted that the
Convention does not guarantee a child a citizenship at birth, but merely the right to
acquire a nationality in accordance with municipal law. When FPJ was born in 1939,
he was apparently under United States law an American citizen at birth. After his birth
FPJ also had the right to acquire Philippine citizenship by proving his filiations to his
alleged Filipino father in accordance with Philippine law. At no point in time was FPJ in
danger of being stateless. Clearly, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention to claim he is a
natural-born Philippine citizen.
The majority opinion and the dissenting opinions also discussed the concepts derived
from the Civil Code in relation to this issue. However, this was not given great weight
by the Court since the distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy codified in the
Civil Code should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or
infringe on the domain of political law.






















EN BANC
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR.,
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are
deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,1[1] that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who
enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge
the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our
people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe,
Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a
natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial
roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the
fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than
distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no
such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after
the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004,
petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy
of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in
Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a
certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office,



attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo
Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National
Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the
more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d)
Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No.
20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the
certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract
between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said
office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during
World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit.
Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration.
The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay
the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No.
161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and
Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC
deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged
misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before
the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the
Omnibus Election Code -
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any
interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy
of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court per Rule 642[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 653[3] of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also
reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial
power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly
elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view
could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed,
and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest
government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke
the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in
assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003
and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted
before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:





"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and
the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and
vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.
Roxas,4[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes involving contests on
the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The
constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No.
1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear
and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-
President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same."
Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption
of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have
implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now
be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario.
Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which,
although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the
winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and
Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo
warranto shall not include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-
President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes
may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by
filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty
(30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.5[5] In such context, the
election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest





number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-
election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before
it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez
vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on
the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in
the administration of justice and in the holding of an office.6[6] Aristotle saw its
significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as
being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-
sufficient existence.7[7] The concept grew to include one who would both govern and
be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be
expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand,
and with concomitant obligations, on the other.8[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was
active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the
general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th
century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established
the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty
and justice.9[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political
power.10[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social
citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and
social security.11[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern












welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of
development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the
internationalization of citizenship.12[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but
"subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."13[13] In church records, the natives were
called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the Inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish
laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer
number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship
laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those
explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.14[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion,
promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the
Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts;15[15]
however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the
Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,16[16] the Royal Decree of
23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the
Philippine Islands,17[17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870,
which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July
1870.18[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands
because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of
the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special
laws.19[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December
1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
citizens. -


















(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of
Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants
of any town of the Monarchy.20[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of
decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an
upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law
dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political
laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually
intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the
United States.21[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of
the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined
by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain
by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such
territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property,
including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall
also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject
in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in
the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making,
before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of
this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of
which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the
nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."22[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be
Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however,
also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United
States.







The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine
Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."23[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of
the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11
th
day of April 1899. The term
inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was
a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or
before 11 April 1899.24[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April
1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the
time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of
territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the
Philippine Archipelago within that period.25[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment
to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do
not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would
become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."26[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had
for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first
Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his
slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also
known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902,
as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -









That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since
become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United
States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United
States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April
1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of
some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a
mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link
with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as
being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption
of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law
provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their
Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory
situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino
citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino
mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to
correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino
women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of
the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated
by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on
the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."27[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring
citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis28[28] had been in
vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of





Customs29[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution
and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor30[30] (1947), jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by
birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou,
married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo
Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him
to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of
his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F.
Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou,
and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an
uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same
certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a
Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an
American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20
August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly,
an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries
on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the
only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years
old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a
natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are
documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have
been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before
the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted





as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by
respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts
which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of
marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death
of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted
by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three
documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded
in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate
of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie
proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made
therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the
routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record
which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have
occurred.31[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September
1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed
that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a
colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines
during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing
record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the
same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be
San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be
sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at
the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely
doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete
records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation Under Civil Law.



Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status
of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the
father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son
according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December
1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines
took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity.
Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent;
voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.32[32] Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil
Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the
latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of
the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by
which such father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or
sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as
being an authoritative document of recognition.33[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,34[34] the
Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here
really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy
of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been
voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it.
While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the
original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all
that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the
data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth
certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a
natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in
such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent
recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only
other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document." In







Pareja vs. Pareja,35[35] this Court defined what could constitute such a document as
proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those
executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and
those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public
document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be
made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in
any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers
and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural.
Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child
had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy
which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the
heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought
during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing,"
so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a
genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument
(one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private
writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article
175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a
state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within
which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both of the parties.



x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code
reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36[36] the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be
decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that
Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place
according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of
laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea
of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in
favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to
merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to
indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect
his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions
on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the
family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of
precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and
obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among members of a
society for the protection of private interests."37[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38[38] the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern
Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all
questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the







matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between
them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority,
division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil
effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are
questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article
15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found
in different parts of the Civil Code,39[39] such as on successional rights and family
relations.40[40] In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the
child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but
such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law41[41] and not his
political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory
attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in
the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain,
the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines
and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish
Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code
became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains
and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on
the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status
should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of
filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien
to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should
govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from
being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -







Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and
the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected
with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already
dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the
declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d)
declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must
be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie
Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove
the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house,
and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe,
more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's
Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
x x x x x x x x x
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while
they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also
introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth,
Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at
our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the
liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more
children after Ronald Allan Poe.
x x x x x x x x x
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald
Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of
Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from
body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs.
Court of Appeals,42[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing
-
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of
the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has
two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from
the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open
to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to
rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the
results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to
reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child.
According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5,
1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent
marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The
veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by
no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a
marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a
Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or
on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship
of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this
Court in Morano vs. Vivo,43[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon44[44] and Serra vs.
Republic.45[45]




On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is
most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement
would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the
pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a
decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite
the Court to look closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino
father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese
mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the
naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did
not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by
election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2)
of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The
issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still
needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about
the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan
claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his
father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in
fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not
Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was
not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum.
The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would
not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based
on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It
was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs.
Vivo.
x x x x x x x x x








"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in
the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not
once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate
child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction
between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by
People vs. Cayat.47[47] I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children
and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do
not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose
but not for another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service?
What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from
becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit
liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own?
To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish
him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that.
And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court),
Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed
similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta,
should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had
custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate
child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are
those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent
justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none
provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction
over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the
COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the
petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ
from running for the position of President in the 10
th
May 2004 national elections on the



contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of
candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G.
R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the
latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential
election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court
can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not
the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and,
in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him
from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the
year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section
78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed
to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given
to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there
has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC,48[48] must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
"Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634,
entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.



No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., see separate opinion, concurring.