False Names, Demonstratives and The Refutation of Linguistic Naturalism in Plato's Cratylus - I. Smith

False Names, Demonstratives and the Refutation of Linguistic Naturalism in Plato's "Cratylus"
427 d1-431c3
Author(s): Imogen Smith
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2008), pp. 125-151
Published by: BRILL
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I"?/ phronesis
BRILL Phronesis 53 (2008)
125-151
www.brill.nl/phro
False
Names,
Demonstratives and the
Refutation of
Linguistic
Naturalism in Plato's
Cratylus
427 i Alc.1
Imogen
Smith
School
of Archaeology,
Classics and
Egyptology,
The
University of Liverpool,
12-14
Abercromby Square, Liverpool
L697WZ, UK
Imogen.
Smith
@liverpool.
ac. uk
Abstract
This
paper
offers an
interpretation
of Plato's
Cratylus
427dl-431c3 that
supports
a
reading
of the
dialogue
as a whole as
concluding
in favour of a conventionalist account of
naming.
While
many previous interpretations
note the value of this
passage
as evidence for Platonic
investigations
of false
propositions,
this
paper argues
that its demonstration that there can
be false
(or incorrect)
naming
in turn refutes the naturalist account of
naming;
that
is,
it
shows that a natural relation between name and nominatum is neither a
necessary
nor a
sufficient condition for reference. Socrates secures this outcome
by using
demonstratives
and their concomitants to show how
any putative
natural imitative link between name and
object may
be overridden. Furthermore, Socrates'
employment
of demonstratives and con-
text-dependent
statements in his case-studies of false
naming speaks
in favour of a
reading
of this
passage
as
primarily focussing
on
naming
rather than on
propositions
in
general.
Keywords
Plato's
Cratylus,
ancient
semantics, demonstratives,
falsehood
I. Introduction
Plato's
Cratylus
is
ostensibly
a discussion about the
right way
to character-
ise the relation between words and the world. It
pits
two
opposing
accounts
0
I would like to thank Dr.
James Doyle,
Prof. M.M.
McCabe,
Prof. Malcolm Schofield
and an
anonymous
reader at Phronesis for their
helpful
comments and
suggestions
on ear-
lier drafts of this
paper.
All translations are the author's own,
based on the new Oxford
edition of the text
(1995).

Koninklijke
Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/156852808X278703
1 26 /. Smith I Phronesis 53
(2008)
125-151
of
names,
a conventionalist one and a naturalist
one,
against
each other:
the conventionalist account of names
proposes
that it is a matter of con-
vention
(or
up
to
us)
what names we can use to
pick
out
objects;
the natu-
ralist
(or non-conventionalist)
account of names holds that in order for a
name to be an
objects
name,
there must exist some natural
fit,
or correct-
ness,
between the two.
At 391b Socrates
begins
to set out in detail a naturalist account of nam-
ing
which
proposes
that the forms of names are determined
by
the natures
of the
objects
that
they
name. There follows an
etymological analysis
of
some 110
names,
which can be
catalogued
into
groups covering many
aspects
of the Greek
conceptual
scheme:
proper
names,
gods,
natural enti-
ties,
ethical
concepts
and so on.2 The
etymological investigation
aims to
provide empirical support
for the naturalist thesis
by demonstrating
that
names are
analysable
into
component
names that
yield
a
description
of
their nominata.
Yet,
fascinating,
and
occasionally plausible,
as the
etymological
investi-
gation
is,
it fails to
prove by
itself what Socrates intends;
it does not dem-
onstrate that names are
naturally
correct for their nominata. This is because
it does not show that names are related to their nominata at all: one name
is resolved into a set of further names which must then themselves be sub-
ject
to the same
analysis,
this
process
continuing
ad
infinitum.
There is no
reason to
suppose,
at this
stage
in the
investigation,
that names are not
ultimately
conventionally
related to their nominata,
since an
etymological
analysis
cannot demonstrate
that there exists a natural relation between a
name and a nominatum,
by
means of which we can
explain
the
composi-
tion of names in terms of the
objects
in the world that
they
name.3 The
most that the
etymological
investigation
could show us would be that there
is a certain
consistency
within
language
whereby
the
meaning
of each name
appears
to be consistent with the
meaning
of its
components.4
2)
For a full account of the themes of the
etymologies
see
Sedley
(2003),
chs. 4 and 5.
3)
Socrates notes this
problem
himself at 421d6-422b8.
4)
Consistency
between the names in a
language
can be characterised as internal correct-
ness". This "internal correctness" can be
judged by
criteria internal to the
language.
A words
correctness is to be assessed in terms of its relation to other words in the
language,
but those
other words
may
themselves be
purely arbitrary
or conventional. It is
important
to note
that this
type
of "correctness" can
bypass philosophical questions
about reference: we can
discuss the correctness of a name without also
attending
to more
philosophically-loaded
questions concerning
the nature of the
relationship
between word and
object.
I. Smith I Phronesis 53 (2008) 125-151 1 27
Socrates has a solution to
this; however,
this solution has seemed remark-
ably implausible
to
many.
He
suggests
that at some
point
in our
analyses
of names we reach certain
names,
called
primary
or atomic
names,
that can
no
longer
be
subjected
to
etymological analysis,
and that we have to account
for how these names relate to their nominata in a different
way.
The rela-
tionship
that holds between atomic names and their
nominata,
Socrates
suggests,
is a mimetic one: the sounds or
phonemes
that make
up
a name
imitate the
qualities
that
go
to make
up
the essence of the nominatum.
Soc: Whenever we want to communicate
() something
with our
voices,
tongues
or
mouths,
do we not
successfully
communicate
by
these means whenever an
imitation
()
of an
object
arises
through
them?
Her:
Necessarily,
it seems.
Soc: So it's
likely
that a name is an imitation in sound ofthat
object
which it
imitates;
and the one who imitates whatever he imitates in sound is
using
names
().
423b4-10
Soc: If someone is able to imitate this
very thing,
the ousia of each
object,
in letters
and
syllables,
will he be
communicating
each
thing,
what-it-is,
or not?
Her: He
will,
of course.
423e7-424al
Socrates here
proposes
that a name is used to communicate or disclose an
object
to another because it is an imitation of its
object
(or
its
objects
essential
properties)
in sound. Successful reference with a
name, therefore,
takes
place
because there is a mimetic
relation,
a relation o
likeness,
between
the name and its nominatum. In
effect,
the maker of names works in much
the same
way
as someone who tries to
represent reality through painting.
Soc:
[We
have to
know]
how to
apply
each letter
according
to its
similarity
[to
the
object]
,
whether it is
necessary
to
apply
one letter to one
thing
or it is
necessary
to
apply many
letters which have been blended
together: just
as
painters
do when
they
want to make an imitation. Sometimes
they only
use red,
sometimes
they
use some other
pigment,
and sometimes
they
mix
together many
colours,
such
as when
they
are
depicting
a man or some other such
thing,
I
suppose: they
employ
each colour as each
picture
demands. In this
way
we shall
apply
letters to
things, using
one letter for one
thing,
when that seems
necessary,
and elsewhere
many
combined
together, forming
those
things
we call
syllables,
and then com-
bining
these
syllables,
out of which

and

are created.3
424d6-425a2
5)
I have left

and

untranslated,
as the distinction Socrates is
making
128 /. Smith I Phronesis 53 (2008) 125-151
All
names,
Socrates
claims,
are
ultimately
derived from
primary,
or
atomic,
names which are
composed
of
phonemes
that imitate a certain character-
istic or
property.
These sound-imitations of
properties
are then combined
in various
ways
into
names,
which imitate the
complex objects
that com-
bine the
properties
so imitated.6
The mimetic
thesis, then,
proposes
that a name
picks
out or refers to
an
object
in virtue of
being
like it. Since likeness is the
only
factor in the
reference-
relation,
it will turn out that "correct" and
"incorrect",
and "true"
and
"false",
as
they
are
applied
to names in this
dialogue, may
be assimi-
lated to "like" and "unlike"
respectively.
Furthermore,
since reference is
determined
by
likeness,
the
only
sound combinations that will
qualify
as
names at all will be those that
qualify
as correct names. Thus it should be
clear that atomic names must be like their nominata if the resultant com-
pound
name is to be correct
for,
or true
of,
its
nominatum,
and to
qualify
for being
a name at
all,
since the
principle
of likeness exhausts the
sign
rela-
tion. So even at the
compound
level,
where names can be
subjected
to
the
principle
of likeness
(which
I will henceforth call
the mimetic relation or
mimesis)
determines whether
they
are the correct
names for their
objects,
and
furthermore,
whether
they
are those
objects'
names at all.
Once Socrates has finished
expounding
to
Hermogenes
the details of
a naturalist account of
naming,
the
spotlight
is now turned on
Cratylus,
who
initially
advanced the naturalist claim that there exists a certain natu-
ral correctness of names.
Cratylus
is wholehearted in his endorsement of
between the two is unclear. See Fine
(1977)
for one
interpretation
of the
significance
of the
distinction. It is not clear that the distinction made at
Sophist
262al -12
(which is,
roughly,
a distinction between a
predicate
and
referring
term)
can be
imported
into the
Cratylus.
At
399a9-b3,
merely appears
to mean a short
descriptive phrase
that can be
compressed
into an
by conjoining
the words that the
phrase
contains. Such a translation would
fit the
interpretation
here. At
421d6-e4,
again
seems to indicate
phrases
that names
have been resolved into after
and does not therefore need to denote
a
predicate
term. See also
Sedley (2003),
p.
162,
who
argues
in favour of
translating
as
"description."
6)
It is
important
to state what counts as an
object
here.
Briefly:
almost
any
referent of
any
word is
going
to count as an
object
in the relevant sense. Therefore
objects
will include
not
only physical objects,
but referents of
predicate
terms, abstractions,
actions
and,
pre-
sumably, anything
else we
might
class as
having independent
existence on Plato's view:
cf. 386d8-e8.
/. Smith I Phronesis 53
(2008) 125-151 1 29
the
account; however,
Socrates now claims that he is not so sure of his own
arguments
and
suggests
that
they
be
put
to the test. Much of the remain-
der of the
dialogue
(427d4-439bl0)
appears
to be an exercise in
subjecting
the
theory
to a series of
objections,
with
Cratylus taking up
its defence.
However,
Plato's verdict on the naturalist
theory
of
naming
is
widely
disputed.
The
dispute
has often been seen to turn on the conclusions
to what is often referred to as the

passage
(435b3-dl)
where
the
apparent ambiguities,
or
equivocations,
in what is said there make it
difficult for the reader to discern whether Plato
opts
for a naturalist account
of
names,
a conventionalist account,
a
hybrid
account,
or if he leaves the
entire discussion as a real
aporia.7
In this
paper,
I will
argue
that an earlier
passage
in the
dialogue,
at
427dl-431c3,
contains an
independent
refutation of the naturalist account
of names and so is
significant
for our
understanding
of the verdict of the
dialogue
as a whole. It is
possible
that this
passage's
role in the refutation
of naturalism in
naming
has
gone largely
unnoticed because it is often read
as
primarily concerning
false
propositions:
as
such,
its
implications
for
naturalism in
naming
are less well-documented.
I do not believe that false
propositions
are the main focus of the
passage (although
it
may provide
interesting insights
into Plato's
thought
on this
subject
at the time of the
dialogue).
Rather,
this
passage
sees Socrates
attacking
the naturalist thesis
that
Cratylus
is
defending:
this can be formulated as the claim that the
purported
natural reference relation,
the mimetic relation,
between name
and nominatum is a
necessary
and sufficient condition for reference. Fur-
thermore,
Socrates attacks the naturalist thesis
through
careful use of case
studies of realistic,
if
hypothetical,
examples
of successful,
yet
incorrect,
7)
Given that the
passage
at 435b3-dl
is one of the
major interpretive keys
to the
dialogue,
it is understandable that there are a number of
divergent
views on the
concluding position
of the
dialogue.
Numbered
among
those who
opt
for the conventionalist
interpretation
are:
Bestor
(1980),
Robinson
(1969),
Schofield
(1982),
Levin
(2001);
for naturalism see Kahn
(1973),
Kretzmann
(1971), Sedley
(2003);
for some
compromise
or
aporetic positions
see
Anagnostopoulos
(1971),
Mackenzie
(1986).
Discussions of the
possible positions
can be
found in
Sedley
(2003), pp.143-151,
Schofield
(1982), pp.
72-3 and Levin
(2001), p.
90.
See also Baxter
(1992), e.g. p.
187,
who reads the
dialogue
as
rejecting
naturalism and
Barney
(2001), pp.
136-7,
who ascribes a
"pessimism"
about names to Socrates "which is
reducible neither to naturalism nor to conventionalism;
though
it could
arguably
be seen
as a combination of the two".
1 30 /. Smith I Phronesis 53 (2008) 125-151
name use. These case
studies,
in
particular, rely
on demonstratives and
other
extra-linguistic
identifiers to "override" the mimetic link between
name and nominatum. The attack is
successful,
and the naturalist claim
that reference is constituted
by
mimesis must therefore be thrown out.
Moreover,
any
other characterisation of the reference relation that would
substitute some other non-conventional
binary
relation between name and
nominatum for mimesis
(should
one be
available)
would be refuted
by
the
same
argument.8
II. The Introduction of False
Naming
The re-examination of the naturalist thesis
begins
with Socrates
asking
Cratylus
whether it is
possible
to have better or worse names.
Cratylus
wishes to
deny
that names
vary
in
quality:
that one name can be of a worse
quality
than another and
yet
still be a name. It is
ostensibly by way
of refut-
ing Cratylus'
claim that names cannot
vary
in
quality
that the
possibility
of
falsehood in
naming
is introduced.
Socrates first elicits
Cratylus' agreement
that the creation of a name is an
instance of artefact
production,
and the
people
who craft names are a
type
of craftsman. While
Cratylus
concedes that the
products
of other crafts can
vary
in
quality,
he denies that the same is true of
names,
the
products
of
the craft of
namegiving.
Soc: Names are
given
(are said)
for the sake of instruction?
Cra: Of course.
Soc: And so shouldn't we
say
that this is a skill
(techn),
and has its
practitioners?
Cra: Yes.
Soc: Who are
they?
Cra:
They
are the ones
you
mentioned at the
beginning
-
the
lawgivers ().
Soc: And do we
say
that this skill arises in men in the same
way
as
any
other,
or not?
I
mean, some
painters
are
better,
and some are
worse,
aren't
they?
Cra: Of course.
Soc: And so the better
painters
come
up
with better
works,
their
paintings,
and the
others come
up
with lesser works?
And, likewise,
some builders build better
houses and some worse?
Cra: Yes.
8)
By characterising
the
point
like this I do not
suggest
that all semantic accounts that we
might
consider naturalistic
(a
causal
theory
of
language, say)
are
thereby
refuted.
/. Smith I Phronesis 53 (2008)
125-151 1 3 1
Soc:
Consequently,
don't some
lawgivers produce
better works and some
produce
worse?
Cra: At this
point,
I cease to
agree.
Soc: So
you
don't think some laws are better and others worse, then?
Cra: No I don't.
Soc: And
then,
it
seems,
you
don't think that both better and worse names have been
set down?
Cra: Indeed not.
Soc: Then all names are set down
correctly?
Cra: Insofar as
they
are names at all.
428e4-429bll
The
argument
of this
passage
can be formulated as follows:
51)
Namegiving/lawgiving
is a techn.
There is a hidden
assumption
here which must be made for the
argument
to follow:
52)
The same
general
claims can be made about all technai.
Implicit
in this
assumption
is the
supposition
that whatever we can
say
about one
specific
techn
{qua
techn)
we must be able to
say
about
any
other
species
of techn. I believe that this is
implied by
Socrates'
question
"And do we
say
that this skill arises in men in the same
way
as
any
other,
or not?" and is also
apparent
in the
opening
discussion o techn ax 387dlO-
390d8.
53)
We can
say
that,
in the case of other
technai,
they
can be
practised
with a
greater
or lesser
degree
of
competence.
54)
The
products
of these craftsmen will
vary
in
quality,
some
being
better and some
being
worse.
55)
Consequently,
we can
say
the same about the techn of
namegiving,
namely
that its
products
are better or worse.
Cratylus
denies
(S5),
however: he states in
response
that it is not
possible
to
give
a name
badly.
I shall call the claim that
Cratylus
makes here
(Cl).
Cl)
It is not
possible
to set a name down
badly (incorrectly):
1 32 /. Smith I Phronesis 53 (2008)
125-151
Which can be reformulated as:
C1R)
Either a name is well
(correctly)
set,
or it is not set down at all.
Cratylus'
assertion that names must be
uniformly
correct in order to be
names at all
prompts
Socrates to ask whether it is
possible
to call some-
thing by
a name that is not correct for it. In the dramatic context of the
dialogue
the transition from the
possibility
of
imperfect
names to the
pos-
sibility
of incorrect names is a smooth one.
However,
philosophically,
the
transition
appears
a little odd. All Socrates would need to do to refute
Cratylus' present position
is to demonstrate that there are
degrees
of cor-
rectness,
or
degrees
of
likeness,
with some names
being
more like their
objects
than others.
However,
the discussion that
immediately
follows
seems to
go beyond
what is
required:
as the
argument proceeds,
it
seems,
we see that Socrates is
going
to
explain
how it is
possible
to
get
a name that
is incorrect for
and,
on this
account,
false of
(ana
false of
because it is
unlike)
a
particular object
to attach to that
object
nevertheless. If it can be
shown that a "false" name
(which
presumably
attains that
requisite degree
of
dissimilarity
to
qualify
as incorrect or
"false")
attaches to an
object
then,
a
fortiori,
names which do not achieve
perfect
likenesses,
but meet some
lesser
requirement
of likeness
(that
is to
say
those which attain a
requisite
degree
of likeness but which are nevertheless
imperfect),
can be
assigned
to
the
objects
that
they
do not imitate
perfectly.
The
possibility
of
incorrect,
or
false,
naming
has far more drastic conse-
quences
for the mimetic
theory.
The mimetic
theory presented
demands
that the relation between name and nominatum consist
simply
of mimesis.
This would mean that mimesis would be a
necessary
and sufficient condi-
tion for reference and so would exhaust the
sign
relation.
However,
in the
section of the
dialogue
under discussion in this
paper,
Socrates draws atten-
tion to the
many
other factors that come into
play
in a successful
referring
event and which would override
any (already-existing) putative
mimetic
connection between name and nominatum and enable a name to attach to
an
object
that it is unlike. A conventional relation between name and
nominatum will turn out to be sufficient for reference on this account:
thus
likeness,
or
mimesis,
will not be a
necessary
condition.
Moreover,
like-
ness cannot even be sufficient for
reference;
since convention can override
any already-existing putative
mimetic
link,
there must be a further condi-
tion for successful reference: either there is a convention in
place
which
(2008) 125-151 1 33
accords with the natural relation of likeness or a
supplementary
under-
standing
between two interlocutors
(a convention)
that no convention is
in
place
at all. If one can use names to refer to nominata that
they
are
unlike
by agreeing upon
the
reference,
then one must also secure
agree-
ment to
get
a name to attach to an
object
that it is like rather than an
object
it is dissimilar to.9 In other
words,
it is the
agreement,
or conven-
tion,
that a name be a name of a
given
nominatum that is
doing
the work
in
securing
reference
-
any purported similarity
between name and nomi-
natum is neither here nor there. It is
perhaps
no
surprise
then that the
creator of names receives the
appellation

-
a "convention setter"
-
early
on in the
dialogue
(388el-5),
strongly suggesting
that
any given
string
of
phonemes requires
the assistance of convention to become a
name: to enter into the communal
parlance
and
successfully
refer.
If Socrates can show that the mimetic link can be overridden
by
conven-
tion in this
way
and so a name which is "incorrect" for an
object
can be
used to refer to that
object,
then the mimetic
theory,
as a
theory
of refer-
ence,
is refuted.
III. The Case Studies and Socrates' Use of Demonstratives
In
refuting Cratylus'
claim
(Cl)
that it is not
possible
to set a name down
badly (incorrectly),
Socrates
employs
a series of
example
statements to show
him that it
is,
in
fact,
possible
to
apply
a name to an
object
that it is incor-
rect for. We
might say
that this
passage only
constitutes an
argument
in a
loose
sense,
since
(Cl)
seems to be
denying
a self-evident fact
-
and denials
of self-evident facts are
notoriously
difficult to
produce arguments against.
Socrates instead
produces
clearer and
better-analysed examples
of
phe-
nomenal manifestations of
incorrect,
but nevertheless successful,
naming
until
Cratylus
is
compelled
to
accept
that,
contrary
to the
implications
of
the mimetic
theory
he
endorses,
using inappropriate
(false
or
incorrect)
names to refer to
things
is
possible,
and does occur.
Socrates' choice of
examples,
however,
is the
key
to
understanding
this
passage
as
constituting
a successful attack on the naturalist
theory
of
naming.
While the
examples
do not
belong
to a
single
kind of
linguistic
utterance,
9)
Cf. Schofield
(1982),
pp.
78-9.
(2008) 125-151
they
all share one
important
feature: all of them
point
to some extra-
linguistic aspect
of
naming
which overrides
any
other consideration in
securing
reference.
They
either contain
indexicals,
or
demonstratives,
or
imperatives
and
vocatives,
or are
accompanied by identifying
actions.10
In
response
to
Cratylus'
denial that names can
vary
in
quality,
and his
assertion that
they
must be correct in order to
qualify
as names at
all,
Socrates returns to a claim that
Hermogenes reported Cratylus
to have
made before the commencement of the
dialogue:
that
"Hermogenes"
is
not the name of the third interlocutor.11
Soc: What then? How about what we were
recently talking
about: shall we
say
that
the name has not been set down for our friend
Hermogenes
here
(
),
and it
only
fits him if he
belongs
to the race of Hermes,
or do we
say
that
the name has been set down for
him,
only
not
correctly?
Crat: In
my opinion,
Socrates,
it has not been set down for him: it
only appears
to
()
have been set down for
him,
but
actually
it is the name of someone
else,
whose nature the name
expresses.
429bl2-c5
Cratylus' response
can be broken down as follows:
C2a) "Hermogenes" appears
to be the name of the other
interlocutor;
however,
it is not in fact his name.
C2b) "Hermogenes"
is the name of some further individual who has the
nature that the name describes.
Although Cratylus
does not make this
explicit,
we need to add a third
claim.
C2c)
If no individual
qualifies
for the name
"Hermogenes"
(has
the
nature that the name
describes),
then the name
"Hermogenes"
is
not a name at
all,
since it is not a name of
anything.
The
exchange
between Socrates and
Cratylus
here
clearly
indicates the
extreme
consequences
of a
theory
of reference that
supposes
the
sign
rela-
10)
By identifying
action,
I mean an action that
accompanies
a statement which
perceptu-
ally grounds
the
object
of the statement in the intended referent. Actions such as ostensin
(pointing),
or
merely facing
an addressee would be included in this
category.
n)
383b6-7.
(2008) 125-151 135
tion to be exhausted
by
likeness.
We,
as
speakers,
have no control over the
reference of the words that we use. We
might
think that we are
talking
about a
particular object, say,
an
orange,
when we use the name
"orange",
but,
if the fruit in
question
is not
correctly
named,
and so not named at
all,
by
the term
"orange"
but instead the fruit that we
customarily
name
"apple"
is the nominatum that the name is correct
for,
then we
would,
on this
account,
be in fact
talking
about the fruit
normally
known as
"apple",
regardless
of our intentions.
Cratylus' position
seems to
ignore practical
situations such as the case where I
successfully manage
to
request
that
someone hand me an
"orange" meaning
the fruit I consider it to name and
somebody
hands me that fruit
understanding "orange"
to name the same
kind of fruit. It would seem that I have
managed
to
successfully
refer to the
object
I intended to
refer
to in this case.
We can also see from the
passage
that
Cratylus,
in line with the mimetic
theory
of
names,
denies a distinction between the establishment of a name
and
subsequent
use of a name. On the mimetic
thesis,
either a name is
correct for its nominatum
(and
so true of
it)
and
picks
it
out,
or incorrect
(and
so
false)
and fails to
pick
it
out,
regardless
of whether it
appears
in
what we would understand as a use or establishment context.12
Thus,
even
if some son of Zeus had been
baptised "Hermogenes",
that name would
not be correct for him and so would not refer to
him,
whereas the name
"Diogenes"
would refer to the son of Zeus
-
even if he had never been
called that before.
Cratylus'
use of here bears out this
interpretation,
suggesting
that the
apparent baptism
-
at
Hermogenes'
birth,
say
-
did not
constitute a real
(or successful)
baptism,
or
(more
accurately
for
Cratylus)
a successful first use of the
name,
because
"Hermogenes"
was an incorrect
name for him.
However,
as
Cratylus puts
it,
the name is
really
()
the
name of someone else
-
with no indication that the name
only
became
the name of the other
person
as a result of a
baptism
event. Because a
baptism
has no effect on
establishing
a name's reference on the mimetic
account,
it cannot be considered to be a distinct
speech
act over and above
ordinary
name use. For the
purposes
of
discussing
this
passage
of the Cra-
tylus,
then,
we can assume that
Cratylus
does not consider
baptisms
to
figure
in his semantic account and
apparent baptisms
are assimilated to
ordinary
cases of name use
(reference).
12)
Barney
(2001),
ch. 2 observes that a use/establishment distinction
appears
in Hermo-
genes'
initial statement of his conventionalism.
(2008) 125-151
Prima
facie, Cratylus'
distinction between a names
seeming
to be cor-
rect,
but
actually being
incorrect,
might
allow for
recognition
of cases of
incorrect,
but nevertheless
successful,
reference: that
is,
we can
get
the
wrong
names to attach to
things
and still
successfully
communicate what
we intend to. For
example,
if we both saw
Hermogenes sitting
on a horse
(alone)
and I
say "Hermogenes
is
sitting
on a
horse",
you
would
grasp
the
content of what I intended to communicate even
though "Hermogenes"
is
not the correct name for
my
intended
referent,
since we both hold the
same belief about what
"Hermogenes"
refers to.
However,
at the same
time,
Cratylus
wants to
say
that real
naming
is
something
different from
this. This would allow
scope
for
distinguishing
between correctness and suc-
cessful reference.
However,
as the discussion
proceeds,
we see that
Cratylus
cannot have such a distinction in mind. He seems even to
deny
that suc-
cessful reference
to with a name that is incorrect for is
possible
-
even if
two interlocutors understand the name in
question
to refer to x.
Socrates
goes
on to tease out the
implications
of
Cratylus'
view.
Soc: And when someone
says
that "he is
Hermogenes" (

),
is
he not even
speaking falsely?
For
perhaps
this is not even
possible:
to
say
that
this is
Hermogenes
(

),
if he isn't?
Crat: What do
you
mean?
429c6-10
It is
by way
of
clarifying Cratylus' position
that Socrates introduces some
particular types
of
propositions:
1)

(429c6-7)
2)

(429c7-8)
Cratylus
has
suggested
in the
previous exchange
that either one uses the
name of the
object
it is
appropriate
for and names that
object upon using
it,
or one fails to name
anything
at all if no
object qualifies
for that name.
This
means,
as I have said
above,
one
might
be
intending
to name one
thing
(the
third
interlocutor)
but in fact be
naming
(and
referring
to)
something
else
(the
progeny
of
Hermes)
without
realising
it.
However,
Socrates' introduction of statements
containing
the demonstrative
and the indexical
(used
demonstratively
here)
seems to be a
way
of
excluding
the
possibility
that some
unknown,
or
unperceived, object
(at
the time of
stating)
could be the nominatum of the name or
subject
of a
/. Smith I Phronesis 53 (2008) 125-151 1 37
proposition.13
The demonstrative
picks
out an
object
in a
way
that an
unindexed assertion does not. Both and are means of identi-
fying
the
subject
to which the name is intended to
apply: they
are verbal
ostensions,
or
"pointings",
which
ground
the statements
containing
the
name
"Hermogenes" perceptually
in the man in
question.14
These
pronouns
together
with the
copulative
"is" and the name
"Hermogenes"
exclude the
possibility
that
"Hermogenes"
could
"really"
(in
Cratylus'
words)
refer to
anything
other than the
subject
of the
pronouns
that
they
are intended
to
apply
to.15
Cratylus
claims not to understand Socrates'
question,
"[Is this]
not even
possible:
to
say
that this is
Hermogenes
(

),
if he isn't?".
However,
Socrates' reformulation of the
question
seems to
conceal a move from the
possibility
of
attaching inappropriate
names to
objects
to the
possibility
of false
speech
in
general.
Soc:
Well,
I mean is
your point
that
speaking falsely
is
altogether impossible?
After
all,
there are
very many people
who
say
this,
both now and in the
past.
13)
One
might object
that is
anaphoric,
rather than a true demonstrative in this
example.
However it
clearly
must have demonstrative force. When Socrates
says
'',
on
pain
of
begging
the
question against Cratylus,
he cannot be
envisaging
the name
"Hermogenes"
as
fixing
the reference of the item in
question.
For this reason I believe it
should be treated as a true demonstrative.
14)
The fact that these
examples
are
reported speech
should not
complicate
the matter. The
demonstratives
clearly
have the relevant force here either in
reported
or direct
speech,
since
the referent of the
reported speech
and the
subject
of the statement which is
reported
would
be the same.
15)
It is not
necessary
to discuss at
length
how the reference
fixing
of demonstratives is actu-
ally accomplished.
All that is
necessary
here is a
fairly
loose
(and,
one would
hope,
uncon-
troversial)
claim:
namely
that statements
containing
demonstratives
only
have
propositional
content when
conjoined
with an
extra-linguistic
context,
whether the reference is said to be
secured
by
"a
(visual)
presentation
of a local
object by pointing", (Kaplan
(1989),
p.
490),
"typically
directed
by
a
speaker's
intention to
point
at a
perceived
individual on whom he
has focused", (ibid.,
p.
582)
or "determined
by
the cues that a
competent
and attentive
addressee would
reasonably
take the
speaker
to be
explicating"
(Wettstein (1991),
p.
80),
and,
ignoring problems arising
from the
speaker's
intentions
being
misunderstood. I wish
the reader to concentrate on the
following:
(1)
That the
speaker
must have an
intention,
(2)
that intention must be
externalised,
or made
clear,
in some
way,
(3)
that the addressee
must have the
requisite competence
to
recognise
the
speaker's
intention in order for suc-
cessful communication to take
place.
138 /. Smith I Phronesis 53
(2008)
125-151
Cra:
Yes, Socrates;
because how can
anyone
who
says
that which he
says, say
that
which is not? Or isn't that what it is to
speak falsely:
to
speak
that which is
not?
429dl-d6
There is an
equivocation
here: while the inference from the
impossibility
of false
naming
to the
impossibility
of the
particular type
of false
proposi-
tion
(namely
"this is
x")
is
quite possibly legitimate,
the same cannot be
said for
inferring
the
impossibility
of false
propositions
tout court from the
impossibility
of false
propositions
of the kind mentioned here.
The introduction of the
paradox
that it is
impossible
to
speak falsely
seems a stretch
given
the
context,
and one should wonder whether Socrates
intends to deal with this
question
in earnest here. Recent
interpretations
have focussed on this
exchange
and it has been shown that Socrates ulti-
mately
fails to solve the falsehood
paradox
in this
dialogue.16
However,
to
understand the
argument's primary
aim as
attempting
to account for this
is a mistake. If Socrates were
primarily
concerned with the truth-value of
propositions
rather than reference
here,
we
might
assume that he would
choose less
problematic examples
for his case studies. Suitable
examples
would be
along
the lines of the Eleatic
Stranger's example
statement in
the discussion of falsehood in the
Sophist,
"Theaetetus
sits",
which has a
propositional
content and a
meaning independently
of its utterance.17
Socrates'
examples
here are
quite
different from the
example
in the
Sophist
all manifest a
context-dependence
associated with demonstratives
(although
not all are clear cases of demonstrative
use).
Socrates' use of such state-
ments,
all of which must be
accompanied by
certain
extra-linguistic
iden-
tifying
actions in order to have
propositional
content
(and
therefore a
truth-value)
at
all,
and his use of certain
speech
acts that have no truth-
conditions,
suggest
that he is not concerned with false
propositions
as
such,
but is rather
intending
to show that the
successful application
of a
16)
See,
e.g., Denyer
(1991),
pp.
79-82.
17)
Sophist
263a2. The
example
of the false
proposition
"Theaetetus,
who I am
talking
to at
the
moment,
is
flying", {Sophist
263a8)
is
slightly
more
complicated:
it is
strongly
indexed
to the context at hand. I
suspect
that Socrates does this to avoid the
response
that the sen-
tence
may
be true of a different referent of
"Theaetetus,
who
happens
to be
flying,"
and not
the
Stranger's
current interlocutor.
name to an
object
in
any given
situation is determined
by
factors other
than
any purported
"natural" or "correct" relation between name and
nominatum.
Were Socrates to make use of these
examples
in a discussion of the
pos-
sibility
of false
propositions,
he
might
be
taking
on much more than he
bargained
for: an
example
like "this is
Hermogenes"
looks more
likely
to
be
grist
to
Cratylus'
mill than an
adequate
tool of refutation for Socrates.
Consider the
following:
a man walks into an
empty
classroom and sees
written on the blackboard there "this is a
dog".
He walks into a second
empty
classroom and sees written on the blackboard "all bachelors are mar-
ried". In the second
case,
while we would
say
that the sentence 's
false
and
even
contradictory,
we would concede that it is
clearly meaningful.
The
sentence on the blackboard in the first classroom
however,
while it seems
to
say something,
does not have
any propositional
content.
Perhaps
this
sentence is
-
in a sense
Cratylus
would be
happy
for us to believe
-
mean-
ingless.
We
certainly
cannot ascribe a truth-value to the sentence on this
blackboard.
This scenario
can,
of
course,
be related to the
very peculiar
nature of
demonstratives: a sentence
containing
a demonstrative needs a context
(partly
determined
by
the intention of the
speaker)
to
complete
it: to
give
it
propositional
content. In order for successful communication of a state-
ment
containing
a demonstrative to take
place,
the referent either needs to
be identified
extra-linguistically, by
ostensin
(pointing,
or some other
conventionally-contrived
substitute),
or it needs to have the
requisite
envi-
ronmental salience for the hearer to know what the
speaker
intends to refer
to. In
short,
these sentences cause far too
many problems
to serve as
effective
examples
for Socrates in a
general
treatment of falsehood.
However,
if used
simply
to show that the successful
application
of incor-
rect
(or false)
names is
possible,
sentences
containing
demonstratives are
very
useful
-
especially
since the
meaning
and correct use of demonstra-
tives are never contested
by Cratylus.
Socrates' next move seems to confirm this
interpretation:
after
Cratylus
endorses the claim that all false
speech
is
impossible,
Socrates
swiftly
returns to the more
specific
case of
naming
and related
speech
acts.
This should indicate to the reader that the limited case of incorrect
(or
false)
naming
is of
primary
concern to Socrates. The
possibility
of some
types
of false
logoi,
in the sense of statements with
propositional
content,
may
be a
consequence
of the discussion
here,
but it is to all intents and
purposes merely
a bonus
arising
out of
any
refutation of the
impossibility
of false
naming.
Soc: Your
argument
is too
sophisticated
for me at
my age, my
friend. Nevertheless,
tell me this much: do
you
think that it's not
possible
to
speak
()
a false-
hood but
possible
to dechre
()
one?
Cra: I don't think it's
possible
to
speak
or declare one.
Soc: What about
telling
() one,
or
addressing ()
someone
falsely?
429d7-e3
Cratylus
denies that
speaking
()
falsehood
(defined
as
saying
what is
not)
is
possible.
Socrates
then,
rather
curiously, prompts Cratylus
into
asserting
the
following
related claims: it is not
possible
to declare false-
hoods
();
it is not
possible
to tell falsehoods
();
it is not
possible
to address someone
falsely ().
Prima
facie,
it is unclear what
distinction can be made between most of these
words,
and whether Socrates
intends each to
correspond
with a
genuinely
distinct
type
of
linguistic
utterance. These words
may simply
be
synonyms;
if
so,
the
repetition
seems
laboured.
However,
there
may
be
good
reason for Socrates'
apparent ped-
antry
here.
First,
by forcing Cratylus
to assert that
any meaningful
utterance con-
structed out of
linguistic components
that turn out to be false is
impossi-
ble,
he can rule out a
special
sense for
, say,
as
"speaking truly";
Cratylus might
have otherwise been
prepared
to countenance certain false
phrases
as
possible
if
categorised
under a different verb of
speaking, say
.18 Cratylus'
assertion that false
speech
is
impossible
on
any
under-
standing
of what it means to
speak
confirms that he will not have this
recourse.
Secondly,
while there
may
be little difference between
many
of these
apparent synonyms,
it is clear that
by
Socrates does have in
mind a
very particular speech
act that most concerns the
application
of
names to
objects
and is
narrowing
the
scope
of the discussion to focus on
18)
N.B. Binder and
Liesenborghs
(1976),
pp.
452-4,
who
reproduce
a
papyrus fragment
of
Didymus
the
blind,
recording
that
"[Prodicus]
equated
with
."
It must
also be noted that I
interpret
here as much looser than the
English "speaking
falsely", namely any
utterance that fails to meet the
requisite
success
conditions,
which
would cover more than the modern notion of "truth condition".
(2008) 125-151 1 4 1
this.19 The mention of so
many "types"
of
speaking
backs
Cratylus
into the
right
corner:
exposing
an
assumption
on his
part
that all utterances have
the same
character,
namely
that
they
are all assertions or declarations. If
Socrates can
prove
the
possibility
of falsehood in the case of statements
associated with

(addressing
someone),
he will have
disproved
the claim that falsehood is
impossible
tout
court,
and will have
proved
the
possibility
of successful reference with an incorrect name. Socrates
goes
on
to illustrate what he has in mind
by "addressing"
().
Soc: For
example,
if someone met
you
while
you
were
travelling
abroad, and,
taking
you by
the hand, said, "Hello,
Athenian
friend,
Hermogenes
son of Smikrion"
(,

',

),
would he be
saying
these
things
or
speaking
these
things
or
telling
these
things
or
addressing
these
things
not to
you,
but to
Hermogenes
here,
or to no-one?
Cra: I think he would be
articulating
sounds in a different
way,
Socrates.
Soc: But even this is welcome. Because we can ask would he be
articulating
true
sounds or false sounds? Or would
part
of it be true and
part
of it be false? Even
this would be
enough.
Cra: I would
say
that the man would
just
be
making
a noise in this
case,
motioning
in
vain,
just
as if someone were
banging
on a brass
pot.
429e2-430a7
Socrates'
example
here shows that his
conception
of
addressing
()
shares
important
features with
,
the
example
state-
ment at 429c8-9. In both
cases,
the act of
addressing
involves
identifying
the
subject
of the statement
by
some means other than the name.
By taking
Cratylus by
the
hand,
and
directing
the words to
him,
the
foreigner
indi-
cates
extra-linguistically
who he intends the name
"Hermogenes
son of
Smicrion" to
apply
to.
The
present example
is a
greeting,
and
consequently
a
speech
act.
Although
we
might say
it has
felicity-conditions
or
success-conditions,
we would not
attribute truth conditions to it.20
Furthermore,
while a truth-value is sim-
ply
bivalent
(a
proposition
is either true or
false),
the criteria
marking
the
19)
C.f.Sedley(2003),p.l34.
20)
At least we would not attribute what we would understand to be truth conditions. The
mimetic
theory
of names entails a
conception
of true as "true of"
(cf.
e.g.
Fine
(1978),
p.
296).
But
then,
granted
this alternative
conception
of
truth,
such a
speech
act
ought
not
to be
possible
if mimesis is a sufficient condition for reference.
success or failure of a
speech
act do not all seem to be: success could be a
matter of
degree.
Thus a non-assertoric
speech
act does not have to be
perfectly performed
and can be considered more or less successful.
Beyond
this,
there
may
be a
point
at which a
speech
act does not succeed to the
required
standards,
but is successful
enough
for observers and audience to
understand the intentions behind such an act.21
In this
example,
the
"greeting" speech
act,
we find that the
extra-linguis-
tic identification of the addressee is even more
apparent
than in the first
two
examples.
1)
The word
"" clearly implies
that the
speech
uttered is directed towards the intended addressee.
2)
The
description
of
the
physical
act of
taking
the addressee
by
the hand further informs the
addressee that the addresser intends him/her as the
object.
3)
The use of
the vocatives
,
, ',
and even
,
regardless
of what
the name
names,
inform the addressee that the addresser is
engaged
in the
process
of
addressing
and that he/she is the
object
of that address
(since
vocatives are
only
used in these
contexts);
the use of the
imperative ,
a verbal
analogue
of the
vocative,
has the same effect.
All of these indicate the
object
of the address so
strongly
that
any
addressee who
grasped
this much about the
speech
act,
and understood
none of the
names,
would be able to understand that the
speaker
intended
to address him. Two of the identifications are
extra-linguistic
(1
and
2);
the
third
(a
grammatical point)
indicates the addressee in a manner that nei-
ther has been accounted for nor could be accounted for
by
the mimetic
theory
of
naming put
forward. We
may
therefore
suppose
that
just
a
single
component
inserted into the address in error would not cause the
speech
act to be infelicitous.
Moreover,
it is
likely
that a
greeting
act such as the
one under discussion would attain a
degree
of success even if the names
were nonsensical. The
agent
in this case has not failed to
accomplish any-
thing
at all: the external
identifying
factors have
clearly
overridden the
requirement
for the correct name to be used in
enabling
the addressee to
understand the intentions of the
speaker.
The addressee understands that
the
speaker
intends to address him and so the referent
(the
addressee him-
self)
has been secured. We would
consequently
be
justified
in
saying
that
21)
For
example,
if I choked at the
point
of
saying
"I do" at
my wedding,
this could be said
to be an unsuccessful
performance,
but the
congregation
would
presumably
have a
good
idea of
my
intentions.
(2008)
125-151 1 43
the
speaker
who meets
Cratylus
has
successfully managed
to communicate
that he is
greeting Cratylus
(his intention)
and so does
successfully
refer to
Cratylus
with the
partially
incorrect series of
referring
terms
,

.
Socrates has here
exposed
a
significant deficiency
in the naturalist
mimetic thesis he has
expounded
in the
preceding part
of the
dialogue.
The context in which communication takes
place,
its related
speech
acts
and the
physical presence
and absence of the items to be discussed alter the
degree
of success of reference
-
yet
all of these factors are excluded
by
a
theory
which maintains that likeness exhausts the
sign-relation. By
fore-
grounding
the
context-dependent
nature of
communication,
Socrates
pow-
erfully
demonstrates that the kind of
explanation provided by
the mimetic
theory
cannot do the
job
of
explaining
how names refer to
things.22
This
interpretation
is at odds with Williamss
explanation
of the
exchange.
He
suggests
that
Cratylus
denies that a
significant
statement
has been made in this
case,
because the two conditions that
(he believes)
Cratylus requires
for
meaningful speech
to have occurred have not been
satisfied.
[Cratylus]
can
reasonably say
that there is a
speech
act,
which
may
be called "address-
ing
someone
by
name" such that there are two
separate
conditions of its
being
true
that addresses
y by
name,
(i)
addresses
(speaks
to,
directs words to
etc)
y;
(ii)
In the course of
(i)
uses a name which is the name of
y.23
Williams s condition
(ii)
can be inferred from the text
here;
that is to
say,
on
Cratylus'
view,
must use a name which is the name of
y
for the
speech
act to be successful.
However,
there is
nothing
in the text to indicate that
Cratylus
is committed to
(i).
It is far more
plausible
that
Cratylus
denies
22)
N.B. The
example proper
name that Socrates uses here seems to
deliberately
name nei-
ther
Hermogenes,
nor
Cratylus. Hermogenes,
as Socrates notes at the
beginning
of the
dialogue,
has the
patronymic "Hipponicus".
We
might suppose
that "Smicrion" is
Cratylus'
patronymic,
but that is not clear to us from the
dialogue.
This has been remarked
upon
many
times:
e.g.
Williams
(1983),
p.
86
n.2,
Kahn
(1973),
p.
161
n.l,
Baxter
(1992),
p.
10.
Presumably having
the name
only half-right
for
Hermogenes
is intended to
prevent Craty-
lus from
claiming
that the
stranger
would
actually
be
addressing Hermogenes
-
whoever
that turns out to be
-
although
the
stranger appears
to be
addressing
him.
23>
Williams
(1983),
p.
87.
that
meaningful speech
has occurred because the name
"Hermogenes
son
of Smicrion" does not name an
individual, since,
presumably, Cratylus
believes that there is no individual that
qualifies
for the name. In
fact,
in the
original question,
Socrates seems to
anticipate
the
possibility
that,
should an individual
qualify
for the name in
question, yet
that indi-
vidual not be
present
at the
addressing, Cratylus might
claim that the
address would nevertheless be to that individual: "would he be
saying
these
things
or
speaking
these
things
or
telling
these
things
or
addressing
these
things
not to
you,
but to
Hermogenes
here,
or to no-one?"
(429e7).24
Had Socrates inserted a name of someone who
merely
was not
present
at
the
addressing
event,
rather than the name of a non-existent
individual,
Cratylus
could have asserted that the absent individual was
being
addressed.
Cratylus' response
("I
think he would be
articulating
sounds in a
different
way,
Socrates.")
is
surely
more
easily
read as
resulting
from the
non-existence of the referent of
"Hermogenes
son of Smicrion" rather than
from
any non-identity
between the
object
of an address and the name of
that
object. Cratylus'
earlier claim that
Hermogenes
"is the name of
another,
whose nature the name
expresses", supports
the
ascription
to him
of a belief that reference is a fixed relation between a name and its
object
regardless
of the context of its utterance or the intentions of its utterer.
The belief that the mimetic
principle
exhausts the
sign
relation
prevents
Cratylus
from
considering any
other factors at all
(for
example,
that is
directing
words to
y).
If mimesis alone determines whether a name
qualifies
as a name of
any given object,
then intentions or
extra-linguistic identify-
ing
mechanisms
(such
as
grasping
another's
hand,
or
pointing)
would have
no affect on the
sign
relation. It
is, then,
Cratylus'
failure to
acknowledge,
in this
case,
that Williams s condition
(i)
is
necessary
for successful com-
munication that leads him to
deny
the
possibility
of
successfully applying
a name to an
object incorrectly.
His
only response
can be that the sounds
that are
produced
in the
hypothetical
address
by
the
foreigner
lack
significance,
since no
object
exists that
qualifies
for the name "Hermo-
genes
son of Smicrion": hence he
says,
"I would
say
that the man would
just
be
making
a noise in this
case,
motioning
in
vain,
just
as if someone
were
banging
on a brass
pot"
(430a4-5).
So
far,
Cratylus'
strict adherence to the restrictive
implications
of the
mimetic
theory
results in his continued denial of what is
evidently
the case
24)
Note that
Hermogenes
would not be with
Cratylus
in the
hypothetical foreign
location.
/. Smith I Phronesis 53 (2008) 125-151 145
in
language
use,
for the reasons I have set out above. In the face of
this,
Socrates returns to the
analogy
with
pictures,
which he
employed
in con-
structing
the mimetic
theory
(424d6-e3),
in a
further,
more detailed illus-
tration of incorrect
naming.
Soc: Let's find
out,
Cratylus,
if we cannot somehow be reconciled. Wouldn't
you
agree
that a name is one
thing,
and the
thing
that the name names is another?
Cra: I would.
Soc: And so
you
also
agree
that a name is an
image ()
of a
thing?
Cra:
Absolutely.
Soc: And
you say
that
pictures
are also
images
of
things,
albeit in a different
way?
Cra: Yes.
Soc: Come on
then,
for
perhaps
I don't understand
exactly
what
you
mean, and
you
may
be
right:
is it
possible
to
assign ()
and
apply
both these
types
of
images
-
paintings
and names
-
to the
things
which
they
are
images
of,
or
not?
Cra: It is
possible.
Soc: Think about this first then: someone could
give
a likeness of a man to a
man,
and a likeness of a woman to a
woman,
and do the same with other
things,
could
they
not?
Cra: Of course.
Soc: And,
in
contrast,
they
could
give
an
image
of a man to a woman and an
image
of a woman to a man?
Cra: That's
right.
Soc: And are both of these
assignations
correct,
or
just
one of them?
Cra:
Just
one of them.
Soc: The
one,
I
think,
which
applies
the
appropriate
and similar
image.
Cra: In
my opinion, yes.
Soc:
Just
so we
stop arguing
then,
you
and
I,
since we're
friends,
accept my
state-
ment. I call this kind of
assignment,
in both instances of
images
-
pictures
and
names
-
correct,
and
additionally,
in the case of
names,
correct and true. The
other kind of
assignment,
which
assigns
the unlike
image,
I call incorrect, and
false in the case of names.
430a8-d7
Cratylus accepts
that
(1)
both names and
pictures
are
types
of imitations
(),
and that
(2)
a correct
assignment
involves attribution
()
of a
picture
to the
object
that it is like. He also here
accepts
that
(3)
incor-
rect
assignment
involves the attribution of a
picture
to an
object
it is unlike
and,
importantly,
he
accepts
that
(4)
incorrect
assignments
of
pictures
can
take
place.
However,
he
stubbornly
refuses to
acknowledge
that names can
be
incorrectly assigned
in the same
way.
(2008)
125-151
Cra: But incorrect
assignment may
be
possible
in the cases of
pictures,
but not in the
case of
names,
where it is
necessary
that all
assignments
be correct.
430d8-e2
Socrates
responds
with
yet
another decisive
example
of a realistic situation.
He
proposes
the
example
of
handing
someone an
inappropriate picture,
and then
repeats
the
procedure,
but this
time,
instead of
pictures,
he uses
names.
Soc: What do
you
mean? How are
they
different? Is it not
possible
to
approach
a
man and
say,
"this is
your picture"
and show
him,
perchance,
a likeness of him-
self
or,
perchance,
a likeness of a woman? And
by
"show" I mean to
bring
the
likeness before his sense of
sight.
Cra:
Well,
yes.
Soc: What then? Can I not
again approach
the man and
say
to him "this
()
is
your
name"? I
mean,
a name is an imitation
just
as a
picture
is;
can I not
say
to
him "this is
your
name" and then
bring
before his sense of
hearing (

) perhaps
an imitation of
himself,
saying
he is
a
man,
or an imitation of the female of the human
race,
saying
that he is a
woman? Or does it not seem to
you
to be
possible
and to
occasionally happen?
Cra: I am
willing
to concede that
you
are
right,
Socrates.
430e3-431a6
Socrates
suggests
that,
just
as
presenting
a
person
with a
picture accompa-
nied
by
a statement
associating
that
person
with a
picture
is sufficient suc-
cessfully
to attach that
picture
to the
person
in
question, regardless
of
whether that
picture
is correct for him or
not,
presenting
an unlike name
to someone with the relevant
accompanying
statement is also sufficient for
assigning
that name to that
person,
albeit
incorrectly.
This is the most
powerful
demonstration of
extra-linguistic
identification
securing
reference and
disclosing
the intentions of the
speaker.
It is
impor-
tant to note that this
example
does not make use of
propositions
at
all;
it
concerns
merely
the act of
applying
a name to an
object.
We can see those
extra-linguistic
factors that Socrates envisions
being
involved in
securing
a
referent:
1) :
a movement toward the individual who is to be the
recipient
of the name.
2)
Bringing
the name into his
perception:
thus the name is
perceptually
anchored in the individual in
question:

.
(2008)
1 25-151 1 47
3)
The
presentation
of the name is
accompanied by
a statement con-
taining
a demonstrative
(with
deictic suffix
-i)
which
directly
refers to the
perceptually
available
object
(the name-sound)
and a
2nd
person possessive pronoun, tying
the name to the addressee
without the use of
any
further names. This then further indicates to
the addressee that the
speaker
means to
apply
the name to him.25
All of these factors contribute to the success of
attaching
a
name,
even an
incorrect
name,
to an
object:
so influential are
they
in
informing
the
addressee of the intentions of the
speaker.
Socrates
here, therefore,
irrefutably
shows the
strength
of these extra-
linguistic
factors in
overriding
the likeness condition
required
for a name
to refer on
Cratylus'
account. But if such
extra-linguistic
factors can over-
ride the
purported
mimetic link between word and
object,
then it follows
that the
principle
of likeness is not a
necessary
or a sufficient condition for
successful reference. It is not
necessary
because I can
apply
a name to an
object
where no mimetic relation holds between the
two;
it is not sufficient
because I can
apply
a name which names one
object
to a different
object,
so
overriding
-
and
breaking
(at
least
temporarily)
-
the mimetic link
between a name and the
object
that it is
putatively
correct for.
IV. The Conclusion of the
Argument:
False Names and False
logoi.
Socrates concludes the discussion
by returning
to the
problem
of false
logoi.
Soc: If this is how it is,
then it's
good
for
you
to concede it. For we need not
fight
about it
any longer.
So if this kind of
assignment
takes
place,
we will call the one
kind
speaking
the truth,
and the other kind
speaking falsely.
And if this is
right,
and it's
possible
to
assign
names
() incorrectly
and not to
apply
what is
appropriate
to each
thing,
but sometimes what is
inappropriate,
it would also be
possible
to do the same
thing
with
.
And if we can do this with names
25)
It
might
be worth
noting
that there are
parallels
between Socrates' scenario here and
modern causal accounts of
name-giving
(or
dubbing)
events:
particularly
in
respect
of the
strong perceptual grounding
of names in
objects
that both exhibit. Cf. Devitt and
Sterelney
(1993),
pp.
67-68. While
Socrates,
is
not,
of
course,
initiating
a
dubbing
event,
he is
manifestly
aware of the
importance
of
perceptually grounding
a name in its
object
for over-
riding
an
original
name
(even
if
only
for a
very
short
period).
and
,
we must
necessarily
be able to do it with
logoi.
For
logoi,
I
think,
are combinations of these two. Or what would
you say, Cratylus?
Cra: All
right
then. You seem to be
making
sense to me.
431a7-c3
Socrates, then,
claims to have shown two
things:
(1)
that it is
possible
to attach
inappropriate
(incorrect)
names to
objects
and
consequently
also
(2)
that false
logoi
are
possible.
In other
words,
false
speaking
is
possible
because it is
necessarily
entailed
by
the
possibility
of false
naming.
It is
worth
remarking
on Socrates' claims
here,
since I have
interpreted
the
pas-
sage
as
primarily concerning
an
explanation
of our
apparent ability
to
attach names to
objects they
are false
of,
rather than the
problem
of mean-
ingful
false
propositions.
There are
grounds
for
supposing
that the
impossibility
of false
proposi-
tions follows from the
assumption
that names
(all words)
refer in virtue
their likeness to their
objects.
The
point
often made about the broad exten-
sion of the Greek term

must be returned to
here;
appears,
in this
dialogue
at
least,
to cover
nearly
all
categories
of words: not
just
proper
names and
nouns,
but also
any referring
term,
adjective,
adverb,
verb and
any
other
predicate
term.
Furthermore,
we have no reason to
believe that Socrates does not hold
properties,
actions etc. to be real
objects
(in
fact
every
reason to believe the
opposite),
and so we must also acknowl-
edge
that he has no reason to hold that
they
are not named
by exactly
the
same mechanism as are the
objects
of other
referring
terms. In
short,
the
homogenous ontology proposed by
Socrates at the
beginning
of the dia-
logue
(386e-387b)
suggests,
and the mimetic
theory
of names
entails^
that
there is no difference in function between a
predicate
and a
referring
term:
both
pick
out their
objects by being
like them. And since the

imitate their
objects,
a
sentence,
as a
complex
of

which
pick
out
their
objects by
imitation,
will
pick
out its
complex
of
objects by imitating
them.26 So the mimetic
theory
leaves us with two
possible
outcomes for a
sentence
-
either it imitates
(is like)
a
complex
set of
objects
(or
state of
affairs)
and
picks
out that state of
affairs,
or it does not imitate a
complex
set of
objects
and does not
pick
them out.
26)
Socrates' view of
,
at 422c7-dl 1,
implies
that
logoi
will be
composed
of

of uniform
function,
all
picking
out their
objects by imitating
them.
The
passage
under discussion in this
paper,
then,
may provide
invalu-
able evidence for an
early
Platonic account of how one can attach a false
proposition
to a
portion
of the world
by
means of demonstratives and
extra-linguistic
factors;
the account of false
propositions
mooted here
would be a
by-product
of the discussion of false
naming.
A discussion of
this further
point
is
beyond
the
scope
of this
paper.
However,
if the
pur-
pose
of the
argument
was to show false
speech
to be
possible,
then Socrates
is
surprisingly
brief in both his treatment of the issue and his
triumph.
The
brevity
of the
conclusion,
and Socrates'
apparent unwillingness
to
go
into
the detail of his
inference, is,
by
contrast, understandable,
if it is not
really
the
question
of
false-speaking
that is at issue here.
So,
regardless
of the
argument
s
potential
contribution to ancient debates
concerning
the
pos-
sibility
of false
logoU
we can infer that this was not Plato s
primary
aim in
including
it.
V. Conclusions
In this
paper
I have made a number of related
interpretative
claims con-
cerning
how
Cratylus
427dl-431c3 should be read.
I have
suggested
that Socrates is
attacking
a version of
linguistic
natural-
ism that
Cratylus
defends;
namely,
the thesis that likeness is both
necessary
and sufficient for
naming. Cratylus
asserts at the
beginning
of the
dialogue
that a name which is incorrect for an
object
cannot be a name for that
object
at all. It follows from the mimetic
theory
of reference that Socrates
expounds
and
Cratylus
endorses that a name must be correct for an
object,
in the sense of
being
like
it,
in order to
pick
out,
or refer to that
object.
Thus the relation of likeness between name and nominatum is understood
to be both a
necessary
and sufficient condition for reference on this account.
On
Cratylus'
view,
mimesis exhausts the
sign-relation.
I have also shown that Socrates'
argument depends
on a certain feature
of real
languages, namely
demonstratives,
and
employs
them and related
devices to override
any putative
mimetic
(natural)
relation between a name
and its
object.
Socrates' concentration on
example
statements
containing
these features
strongly suggests
that it is false
naming
rather than false
propositions
that are his main concern here. All of the
examples
are
geared
towards
investigating
what constitutes a
necessary
and sufficient condition
for
getting
names
(correct
and
true,
or incorrect and false in Socrates'
terms)
to attach to
things.
However,
we cannot
say
that the
examples
likewise
150 /. Smith I Phronesis 53 (2008) 125-151
elucidate the
problems
connected with the
possibility
of false
propositions.
None of the statements in Socrates'
examples
could be counted as
having
propositional
content
unqualifiedly. Speech
acts such as those
exemplified
at
(429e2-6)
and
(430e8-431a6)
do not have truth conditions. Uncontex-
tualised statements
containing
demonstratives such as those cited at
(429c7)
and
(429c9)
are
incomplete
and so cannot have a truth value or truth-
conditions until contextualised. Of course Plato did not have the
logical
distinctions to hand that are available to modern thinkers. But it is
plau-
sible to
suppose
that he had some awareness that his
examples
were
pecu-
liar
cases,
and that these
examples
would be useful in an
investigation
into
questions concerning
reference,
but far more
problematic
for
questions
concerning
the
possibility
of false
propositions.
Finally,
it should be clear that Socrates' attack is successful:
through
the
introduction of
particular types
of
proposition
which
rely
on the context
of their utterance and
extra-linguistic
indication of their
speaker
s inten-
tions,
Socrates forces
Cratylus
to concede that it is
possible
to use a name to
refer to an
object
that it is
unlike,
or incorrect for. Since the
putative
mimetic link between name and
object
can be
overridden,
then mimesis is
neither a
necessary
nor sufficient condition for reference. It follows from
this that the reference relation is not constituted
by
likeness.
Furthermore,
by
the same
argument,
no other natural
binary
relation will be
necessary
or
sufficient for reference since the
conventionally
contrived features of lan-
guage
that Socrates has introduced in this discussion would override
any
proposed
natural relation between name and nominatum.
It must be
pointed
out that the
possibility
that atomic names have a
mimetic value
(are
like certain features of the
universe)
is never ruled out
by
this discussion. After
all,
the
picture
of the woman
incorrectly assigned
to a man is nevertheless a
picture
of a woman. The
argument
is not intended
to discredit the idea that names have a mimetic value.
However,
the
argu-
ment has shown
that,
regardless
of whether names
do,
in
fact,
have such
mimetic
values,
mimesis is neither
sufficient,
nor
necessary
for reference
(and
thus the
sign
relation cannot be constituted
by
likeness).
A name
may
have to be as like its
object
as
possible
to be a "correct"
name,
but it does
not have to be like its
object
to function as a name for that
object.
And
once this has been
accepted,
one has to wonder what
significant
role mimesis
-
or
any
other natural reUtion
-
can
play
in an account of reference.
(2008) 125-151
.
151
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