Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 11, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
SERENO, J .:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the Decision
[1]
promulgated on 18 July 2006 and the
Resolution
[2]
dated 10 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
84648.
The Facts
In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of
land located at 746 Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA),
[3]
Quezon City with an
area of 375 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
RT114558.
On 27 March 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904,
entitled An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial
Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning
Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof.
[4]
An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor
projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for
pedestrians against rain or sun.
[5]
Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an
arcade with a width of 4.50 meters and height of 5.00 meters along EDSA, from
the north side ofSantolan Road to one lot after Liberty Avenue, and from one lot
before Central Boulevard to the Botocan transmission line.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was
passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by the national
legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the
discretion of local government units. Under this particular ordinance, the city
council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the
ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus,
the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the
property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect,
property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians,
instead of using it for their own purposes.
The ordinance was amended several times. On 8 August 1960, properties
located at the Quezon City-San Juan boundary were exempted by Ordinance No.
60-4477 from the construction of arcades. This ordinance was further amended by
Ordinance No. 60-4513, extending the exemption to commercial buildings
from Balete Street to Seattle Street. Ordinance No. 6603 dated 1 March
1966 meanwhile reduced the width of the arcades to three meters for buildings
along V. Luna Road, Central District, Quezon City.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently,
sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building
being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that
he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos
request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, subject to the condition that upon
notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the
enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands.
[6]
Decades after, in March 2003, the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk
of EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila Councils (MMC) Resolution
No. 02-28, Series of 2002.
[7]
The resolution authorized the MMDA and local
government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks
and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and
obstructions.
[8]
On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice
Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building
Code of the Philippines(Building Code)
[9]
in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The
MMDA gave Justice Gancayco fifteen (15) days to clear the portion of the building
that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.
[10]
Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the
fifteen (15) days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was
referred to as the wing walls, of the ground floor structure. The records of the
present case are not entirely clear on the extent of the demolition; nevertheless, the
fact of demolition was not disputed. At the time of the demolition, the affected
portion of the building was being used as a restaurant.
On 29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco filed a Petition
[11]
with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q03-
49693, seeking to prohibit the MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City
from demolishing his property. In his Petition,
[12]
he alleged that the ordinance
authorized the taking of private property without due process of law and just
compensation, because the construction of an arcade will require 67.5 square
meters from the 375 square meter property. In addition, he claimed that the
ordinance was selective and discriminatory in its scope and application when it
allowed the owners of the buildings located in the Quezon City-San Juan boundary
to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to Seattle Streets to construct arcades at their option.
He thus sought the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 2904 and the payment
of damages. Alternately, he prayed for the payment of just compensation should
the court hold the ordinance valid.
The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid
exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. In
addition, it pointed out that Justice Gancayco was already barred by estoppel,
laches and prescription.
Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the
nullification of an ordinance that he had already violated, and that the ordinance
enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. It further stated that the questioned
property was a public nuisance impeding the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally,
the MMDA claimed that it was merely implementing the legal easement
established by Ordinance No. 2904.
[13]
The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September 2003 in favor of Justice
Gancayco.
[14]
It held that the questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling that
it allowed the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
The RTC said that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice Gancaycos 375
square meters of property were being taken without compensation for the publics
benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise held that the
ordinance violated owners right to equal protection of laws. The dispositive
portion thus states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the Court hereby
declares Quezon City Ordinance No. 2094,
[15]
Series of 1956 to be
unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. The respondents are hereby
permanently enjoined from enforcing and implementing the said ordinance, and
the respondent MMDA is hereby directed to immediately restore the portion of
the party wall or wing wall of the building of the petitioner it destroyed to its
original condition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The MMDA thereafter appealed from the Decision of the trial court. On 18
July 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) partly granted the appeal.
[16]
The CA upheld
the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction against the
enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. In so doing, it held that the
ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote
the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. The CA also
ruled that the ordinance established a valid classification of property owners with
regard to the construction of arcades in their respective properties depending on the
location. The CA further stated that there was no taking of private property, since
the owner still enjoyed the beneficial ownership of the property, to wit:
Even with the requirement of the construction of arcaded sidewalks within
his commercial lot, appellee still retains the beneficial ownership of the said
property. Thus, there is no taking for public use which must be subject to just
compensation. While the arcaded sidewalks contribute to the public good, for
providing safety and comfort to passersby, the ultimate benefit from the same still
redounds to appellee, his commercial establishment being at the forefront of a
busy thoroughfare like EDSA. The arcaded sidewalks, by their nature, assure
clients of the commercial establishments thereat some kind of protection from
accidents and other hazards. Without doubt, this sense of protection can be a boon
to the business activity therein engaged.
[17]
Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it
demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only
refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places
in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancaycos private property. Lastly, the
CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or
abate nuisances. Thus, the dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, the appeals are PARTLY GRANTED.
The Decision dated September 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
224, Quezon City, is MODIFIED, as follows:
1) The validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 2094,
[18]
Series of 1956,
issued by the City Council of Quezon City, is UPHELD; and
2) The injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the said Ordinance
is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
This ruling prompted the MMDA and Justice Gancayco to file their
respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration.
[19]
On 10 May 2007, the CA denied the motions stating that the parties did not
present new issues nor offer grounds that would merit the reconsideration of the
Court.
[20]
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the CA, Justice Gancayco and the MMDA
filed their respective Petitions for Review before this Court. The issues raised by
the parties are summarized as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM
ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904.
II. WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCOS
BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE
PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.
The Courts Ruling
Estoppel
The MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City both claim that
Justice Gancayco was estopped from challenging the ordinance, because, in 1965,
he asked for an exemption from the application of the ordinance. According to
them, Justice Gancayco thereby recognized the power of the city government to
regulate the construction of buildings.
To recall, Justice Gancayco questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance
on two grounds: (1) whether the ordinance takes private property without due
process of law and just compensation; and (2) whether the ordinance violates the
equal protection of rights because it allowed exemptions from its application.
On the first ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may still question the
constitutionality of the ordinance to determine whether or not the ordinance
constitutes a taking of private property without due process of law and just
compensation. It was only in 2003 when he was allegedly deprived of his property
when the MMDA demolished a portion of the building. Because he was granted an
exemption in 1966, there was no taking yet to speak of.
Moreover, in Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
[21]
we
held:
It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The
fact that petitioner acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City
Mayor in subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said
imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit of authority of respondent
City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of
one's authority are null and void and cannot be given any effect. The
doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise
null and void or ultra vires. (Emphasis supplied.)
Recently, in British American Tobacco v. Camacho,
[22]
we likewise held:
We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the
undertaking to comply with all issuances of the BIR, which at that time it
considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false misrepresentation or
misleading act. Indeed, petitioner cannot be faulted for initially undertaking to
comply with, and subjecting itself to the operation of Section 145(C), and only
later on filing the subject case praying for the declaration of its unconstitutionality
when the circumstances change and the law results in what it perceives to be
unlawful discrimination.The mere fact that a law has been relied upon in the
past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional is not a
ground for considering petitioner estopped from assailing its validity. For
courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it
in bona fidecases for determination, and the fact that the question has not
been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised
later. (Emphasis supplied.)
Anent the second ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may not question
the ordinance on the ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the
exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an
exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually
granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the
demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the
ordinance may be attacked with regard to its different treatment of properties that
appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do
so.
Zoning and the regulation of the
construction of buildings are valid
exercises of police power .
In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association,
[23]
we discussed the nature of
police powers exercised by local government units, to wit:
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as
the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of
the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and
justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general
welfare.
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate
this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the
agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body.
To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first
determine whether there was a valid delegation of police power. Then we can
determine whether the City Government of Quezon City acted within the limits of
the delegation.
It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the
city council, police power by virtue of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or
the Revised Charter of Quezon City,
[24]
which states:
To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide
for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful
fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of
subsection (jj) of this section.
Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the
construction of buildings, the Charter also expressly provided that the city
government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that
may be erected within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing
them.
[25]
With regard meanwhile to the power of the local government units to issue
zoning ordinances, we apply Social Justice Society v. Atienza.
[26]
In that case,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila City enacted an ordinance on 28
November 2001 reclassifying certain areas of the city from industrial to
commercial. As a result of the zoning ordinance, the oil terminals located in those
areas were no longer allowed. Though the oil companies contended that they stood
to lose billions of pesos, this Court upheld the power of the city government to
pass the assailed ordinance, stating:
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the
government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
to promote the general welfare.
However, the interference must be
reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or
means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a
reasonable relation to the end in view.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning
ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is situated from industrial to
commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal
legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a
given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future
projection of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of the
businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer be
permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and
residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the
protection and benefit of the residents of a locality.Consequently, the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected
cannot be said to be unjust... (Emphasis supplied)
In Carlos Superdrug v. Department of Social Welfare and
Development,
[27]
we also held:
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be
diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer
loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated.
Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory
effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view
of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the case at bar, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of
Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of
arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of
their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort,
and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage along the
sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City.
More especially so because the contested portion of the building is located on a
busy segment of the city, in a business zone along EDSA.
Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code,
[28]
which was passed after the
Quezon City Ordinance, supports the purpose for the enactment of Ordinance No.
2904. The Building Code states:
Section 102. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the
principles of sound environmental management and control; and to this end, make
it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework
of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their location,
site, design quality of materials, construction, occupancy, and maintenance.
Section 1004 likewise requires the construction of arcades whenever existing
or zoning ordinances require it. Apparently, the law allows the local government
units to determine whether arcades are necessary within their respective
jurisdictions.
Justice Gancayco argues that there is a three-meter sidewalk in front of his
property line, and the arcade should be constructed above that sidewalk rather than
within his property line. We do not need to address this argument inasmuch as it
raises the issue of the wisdom of the city ordinance, a matter we will not and need
not delve into.
To reiterate, at the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national
building code enforced to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of national
application that prohibited the city council from regulating the construction of
buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction.
The wing walls of the building are not
nuisances per se.
The MMDA claims that the portion of the building in question is a
nuisance per se.
We disagree.
The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption
from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are
not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely
affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a
structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or
endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3)
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with
the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5)
hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per
accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons
and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of
necessity.
[29]
Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the
building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its
demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact
alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the
structure.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only
courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. In AC
Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp.,
[30]
we held:
We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of
R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring,
preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing,
however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a
nuisanceper se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find,
as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a
nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and
destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not
such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of
law. If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that
question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.
(Emphasis supplied.)
MMDA illegally demolished
the property of J ustice Gancayco.
MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of
2002, it is empowered to demolish Justice Gancaycos property. It insists that the
Metro Manila Council authorized the MMDA and the local government units to
clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places
in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. It further alleges that it
demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance
No. 2904 as amended.
However, the Building Code clearly provides the process by which a
building may be demolished. The authority to order the demolition of any
structure lies with the Building Official. The pertinent provisions of the Building
Code provide:
SECTION 205. Building Officials. Except as otherwise provided herein,
the Building Official shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this
Code in the field as well as the enforcement of orders and decisions made
pursuant thereto.
Due to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may designate incumbent
Public Works District Engineers, City Engineers and Municipal Engineers act as
Building Officials in their respective areas of jurisdiction.
The designation made by the Secretary under this Section shall continue until
regular positions of Building Official are provided or unless sooner terminated for
causes provided by law or decree.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 207. Duties of a Building Official. In his respective territorial
jurisdiction, the Building Official shall be primarily responsible for the
enforcement of the provisions of this Code as well as of the implementing rules
and regulations issued therefor. He is the official charged with the duties of
issuing building permits.
In the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or its
premises at all reasonable times to inspect and determine compliance with the
requirements of this Code, and the terms and conditions provided for in the
building permit as issued.
When any building work is found to be contrary to the provisions of this
Code, the Building Official may order the work stopped and prescribe the
terms and/or conditions when the work will be allowed to resume. Likewise,
the Building Official is authorized to order the discontinuance of the
occupancy or use of any building or structure or portion thereof found to be
occupied or used contrary to the provisions of this Code.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. When any
building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the
Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending
upon the degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice
to further action that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and
694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions,
Inc.
[31]
is applicable to the case at bar. In that case, MMDA, invoking its charter
and the Building Code, summarily dismantled the advertising media installed on
the Metro Rail Transit (MRT) 3. This Court held:
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the
dismantling of Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media.
MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the
billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure
by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron
Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA's powers were limited
to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and
administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power.
Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:
...The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development
authority". It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually
summed up in the charter itself, viz:
Sec.2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.- xxx.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative
functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority
over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without
diminution of the autonomy of local government units concerning purely
local matters.
The Court also agrees with the CA's ruling that MMDA Regulation No.
96-009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks'
billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting,
installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media
applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the
BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the
areas as to which the prohibition applied. Moreover, MMC Memorandum
Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages and other
advertising media in MRT3, because it did not specifically cover MRT3, and
because it was issued a year prior to the construction of MRT3 on the center
island of EDSA. Clearly, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have
included MRT3 in its prohibition.
MMDA's insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No.
1096 (Building Code) and its implementing rules and regulations is not
persuasive. The power to enforce the provisions of the Building Codewas
lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in
MMDA, considering the law's following provision, thus:
Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement. -
The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code
including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof
is hereby vested in the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary."
There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by
DPWH to implement the Building Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not
include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations.
Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of a fine of not more than two hundred
pesos (P200.00) or by imprisonment of not more than thirty (30) days, or by both
such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court, Provided, that if the
violation is committed by a corporation, partnership, or any juridical entity, the
Manager, managing partner, or any person charged with the management thereof
shall be held responsible therefor. The ordinance itself also clearly states that it is
the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the
ordinance.
As pointed out in Trackworks, the MMDA does not have the power to enact
ordinances. Thus, it cannot supplement the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance
No. 2904 merely through its Resolution No. 02-28.
Lastly, the MMDA claims that the City Government of Quezon City may be
considered to have approved the demolition of the structure, simply because
then Quezon City Mayor Feliciano R. Belmonte signed MMDA Resolution No.
02-28. In effect, the city government delegated these powers to the MMDA. The
powers referred to are those that include the power to declare, prevent and abate a
nuisance
[32]
and to further impose the penalty of removal or demolition of the
building or structure by the owner or by the city at the expense of the owner.
[33]
MMDAs argument does not hold water. There was no valid delegation of
powers to the MMDA. Contrary to the claim of the MMDA, the City Government
of Quezon City washed its hands off the acts of the former. In its Answer,
[34]
the
city government stated that the demolition was undertaken by the MMDA only,
without the participation and/or consent of Quezon City. Therefore, the MMDA
acted on its own and should be held solely liable for the destruction of the portion
of Justice Gancaycos building.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO
L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the
City Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON.
AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON.
HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON. ROMUALDO S. MARANAN,
HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F.
CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE
JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON.
CHIKA G. GO, HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON.
ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON. DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA.
PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON. FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q.
BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON. BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON
R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA.
LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON.
LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors of the
City of Manila,Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J .:
I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you
feel bad after.
Ernest Hermingway
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1
It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less
immoral than if performed by someone else, who would be well-intentioned in his dishonesty.
J. Christopher Gerald
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I
The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental law
of the land. It is foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it
need be, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily" in the words of Justice
Laurel, and uphold the constitutional guarantees when faced with laws that, though not lacking in
zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality.
The pivotal issue in this Petition
1
under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision
2
in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower court),
3
is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783
(the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.
4
The antecedents are as follows:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.
5
It built and opened Victoria Court
in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as
a hotel.
6
On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
7
(RTC Petition) with the lower court
impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito
L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that
the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
8
Enacted by the City Council
9
on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March
1993, the saidOrdinance is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
10
The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary
notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-
Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East,
Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be
allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms
of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools
in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited
to:
1. Sauna Parlors
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
4. Beerhouses
5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
10. Dance Halls
11. Motels
12. Inns
SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said
officials are prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting
licenses and accepting payments for the operation of business enumerated in the
preceding section.
SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the
businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the
date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to
transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to
other kinds of business allowable within the area, such as but not limited to:
1. Curio or antique shop
2. Souvenir Shops
3. Handicrafts display centers
4. Art galleries
5. Records and music shops
6. Restaurants
7. Coffee shops
8. Flower shops
9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for
wholesome family entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele.
10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural
shows, stage and theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.
11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided
for in the zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-
storage depot, dock or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry
with any machinery, or funeral establishments.
SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction,
be punished by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS, or both, at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, that in case of juridical person,
the President, the General Manager, or person-in-charge of operation shall be liable thereof;
PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of subsequent violation and conviction, the
premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.
Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)
In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its
enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court
considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were
not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and
neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and
moral welfare of the community."
11
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following
reasons: (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4
(iv)
12
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 499
13
which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area
as a commercial zone with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper
exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation
to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected; (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post
facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its
enactment; (5) The Ordinanceviolates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and
constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact
that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and
(6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis
exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area
but not outside of this area.
14
In their Answer
15
dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City
Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government
Code,
16
which reads, thus:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
. . . .
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in
order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
. . . .
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or
amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools,
public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other
places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for
amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community
or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or,
prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social
and moral welfare of the community.
Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila,
17
petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in
the above-quoted provision included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of
exhibition and amusement.
18
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect
the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article
III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409,
19
otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila (Revised Charter of Manila)
20
which reads, thus:
ARTICLE III
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD
. . .
Section 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers:
. . .
(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two
hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a
single offense.
Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private
respondent had the burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.
21
Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as
the latter simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to
remain a commercial zone.
22
The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be assailed
as ex post facto as it was prospective in operation.
23
The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal
protection clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and real
differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila.
24
On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte
temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance.
25
And on 16 July 1993, again
in an intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC.
26
After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the
petitioners from implementing the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
27
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of
1993, of the City of Manila null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction that had been issued by this Court against the defendant. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
28
Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal
29
on 12 December 1994, manifesting that
they are elevating the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law.
30
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra
vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in
holding that the questioned Ordinancecontravenes P.D. 499
31
which allows operators of all kinds of
commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring
the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
32
In the Petition and in its Memorandum,
33
petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made
before the lower court. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the
inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local
government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and
conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code.
34
They allege that theOrdinance is a valid exercise
of police power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of validity.
35
In its Memorandum
36
dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra
vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. It reiterates that the
questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power; that it is violative of due process,
confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it is violative of the
equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated
discretion in the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.
This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-
Malate area being its home for several decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the area's
many turn of events. It relished its glory days and endured its days of infamy. Much as the Court
harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to restore its lost grandeur, it
believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end. The Court is of the opinion, and so
holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore
null and void.
The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates
a constitutional provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of
persons enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts
at rendering them worthless.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must
not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
37
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution
and to the laws.
38
The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test
of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be
constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the
enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are
able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter.
39
This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The
national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or
modify or violate it.
40
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of
the City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are
endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of
their creation.
41
This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the
general welfare clause, viz:
SECTION 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this
case, thesangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code.
42
The
inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable
and for the public good.
43
In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise
of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:
SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy.
44
SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
45
SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.
46
Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
47
A. The Ordinance infringes
the Due Process Clause
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . ."
48
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy
of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice,
49
and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the
police power.
50
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and
property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice; to
protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction
without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure to all persons
equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law.
51
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and
partnerships are "persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
52
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called
"procedural due process" and "substantive due process."
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues
are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when
it takes a particular action.
53
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate
reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process
looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the government's action.
54
Case law in the
United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level
of scrutiny used.
55
For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied,
substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights,
then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary
to achieve a compelling government purpose.
56
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power
cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically
57
as its exercise is subject to a
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of
the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears
emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare.
58
Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
59
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
60
It must be evident that
no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can
work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal
rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
61
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights
62
a violation of the due process clause.
The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer
of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges,
hotels and motels. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila
63
had already taken judicial notice of the
"alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part
to existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and
exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."
64
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable
regulations looking to the promotion of the moral and social values of the community. However, the
worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community's social ills can be
achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments
will not per seprotect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of
sexual disease in Manila.
Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and
establishments of the like which the City Council may lawfully prohibit,
65
it is baseless and
insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night
clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. This is not
warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful
pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the
illegal prostitution is of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a
human frailty, may take place in the most innocent of places that it may even take place in the
substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance. If the flawed logic of
the Ordinance were to be followed, in the remote instance that an immoral sexual act transpires in a
church cloister or a court chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila ordering the
closure of the church or court concerned. Every house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles
for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places
where there are impure men. Indeed, even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians churches
continually recall the presence anduniversality of sin in man's history.
66
The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be said
to be injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the
deplorable human activity that may occur within its premises. While a motel may be used as a venue
for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a
house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption. If that were
so and if that were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its supposed
social ills, it would be extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not,
in its every nook and cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as
the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man
out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The
City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not to
the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.
While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they
unwittingly punish even the proprietors and operators of "wholesome," "innocent" establishments. In
the instant case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those
individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the
investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of Manila so
desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose
reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their
licenses for these violations;
67
and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there
are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
Means employed are
constitutionally infirm
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and
inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated
establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which
"to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert
said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." Further, it states in Section 4
that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently."
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes,
the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's
fundamental right to liberty and property.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into
mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right
of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."
68
In accordance with this case, the rights of the
citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the
concept of liberty.
69
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents,
70
sought to clarify the meaning of
"liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognizedas essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
"liberty" must be broad indeed.
In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in
making these choices, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood where they formed under compulsion
of the State.
71
Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of
the Ordinancemay seek autonomy for these purposes.
Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their
bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premisesbe it stressed that their consensual
sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the
Constitution.
72
Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of
their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice.
73
Their right to liberty under the due
process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government, as long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the
exception.
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it
must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the
beginning of all freedomit is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.
74
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc,
75
borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly
stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his
isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which
his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which
are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that experience
personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set
by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no
longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which
should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
76
There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court
chooses to exercise restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should. The previous
pronouncements of the Court are not to be interpreted as a license for adults to engage in criminal
conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not diminished. The Court only reaffirms and
guarantees their right to make this choice. Should they be prosecuted for their illegal conduct, they
should suffer the consequences of the choice they have made. That, ultimately, is their choice.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent
of the beneficial use of its property.
77
The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the
enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to
wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed
businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for
any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation.
78
It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation." The provision is the most important protection of property
rights in the Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take
property. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the
property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the government takes
away a person's property to benefit society, then society should pay. The principal purpose of the
guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
79
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
80
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,
81
it was held that a taking also could be found
if government regulation of the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
82
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation
becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and
therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S.
Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of
considering the facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require that the
economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government and thus borne by
the public as a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons subject
to the public action.
83
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking
if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use.
84
A regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or
productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of
nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the use
prohibitable.
85
When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he
has suffered a taking.
86
A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require
compensation under the takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short
of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending
on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to
which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of
government action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to
prevent the government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
87
A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct
investment-backed expectations of the owner.
88
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited" establishments three (3) months
from its approval within which to "wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of
the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the
area." The directive to "wind up business operations" amounts to a closure of the establishment, a
permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his
establishment to accommodate an "allowed" business, the structure which housed the previous
business will be left empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will
likewise leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount
of money invested to build the edifices which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a
period of time. It is apparent that theOrdinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of
property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to
convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in
cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a "taking" of
private property.
The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the
Ermita-Malate area. In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an
additional burden imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers. The
proffered solution does not put an end to the "problem," it merely relocates it. Not only is this
impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The conversion into allowed enterprises is
just as ridiculous. How may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop, art
gallery or music lounge without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private
property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the
government. The burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed
permanently after a subsequent violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits them as
a whole.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance,
although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a "wholesome" property to a use which can
not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by
zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of
justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units which have always received
broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. It needs
restating that the property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of eminent domain is
intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore "wholesome."
89
If it be of public benefit that a
"wholesome" property remain unused or relegated to a particular purpose, then certainly the public
should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private property for public
use.
90
Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. It in no
way controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments
covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of
prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending
upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid.
The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.
91
Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and
constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not
admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled discretion by the law
enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
92
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,
93
as cited in People v. Nazario,
94
the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any
sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." The
ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance
what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' "
Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments "tend to
disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare
of the community." The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing
the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of
imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an interference into personal and
private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we take a resolute stand to uphold
the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.
Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable regulation which is a far cry from
the ill-considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.
In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas,
95
the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating
"sexually oriented businesses," which are defined to include adult arcades, bookstores, video stores,
cabarets, motels, and theaters as well as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual encounter
centers. Among other things, the ordinance required that such businesses be licensed. A group of
motel owners were among the three groups of businesses that filed separate suits challenging the
ordinance. The motel owners asserted that the city violated the due process clause by failing to
produce adequate support for its supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours resulted
in increased crime and other secondary effects. They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour
limitation on the rental of motel rooms placed an unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of
association. Anent the first contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of the
legislative judgment combined with a study which the city considered, was adequate to support the
city's determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than ten (10 ) hours should be
included within the licensing scheme. As regards the second point, the Court held that limiting motel
room rentals to ten (10) hours will have no discernible effect on personal bonds as those bonds that
are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than ten (10) hours are not those that have played
a critical role in the culture and traditions of the nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals
and beliefs.
The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. It
imposed reasonable restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.
The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,
96
it
needs pointing out, is also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure
which regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business in order to put an end to practices
which could encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due
process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this
case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
97
The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of
property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it
cannot, even under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
98
The
guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.
99
The "equal protection of
the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."
100
It limits governmental discrimination. The
equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.
101
The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise:
What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration:
"The ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside
the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of
men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the
idea of law." There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact exists "cannot
approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into
account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a
meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare
be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty
and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at
the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason." Classification is thus not ruled
out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally
and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated
in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and
the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle
is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances
which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges,
those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast
on some in the group equally binding on the rest.
102
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is
reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal
protection clause.
103
The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be
valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
104
In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial
establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason
exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on
substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less
noxious if located outside the area.
The standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is also discriminatory as
prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to
women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any less
grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the assumption that there is an ongoing immoral
activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in harness? This
discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important
government objectives.
105
Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with
prevailing laws.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units
to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of motels, hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv),
which provides that:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
. . .
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in
order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
. . .
(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports . . . .
While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or
amusement facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which reads as follows:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
. . .
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in
order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
. . .
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or
amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools,
public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other
places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for
amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community
or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or,
prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social
and moral welfare of the community.
Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate
relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from
cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of
such establishments. It is well to recall the rulings of the Court inKwong Sing v. City of Manila
106
that:
The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code,
means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not
be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit." Consequently, under the power to
regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to the
mode in which the employment or business shall be exercised.
107
And in People v. Esguerra,
108
wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of Tacloban
which prohibited the selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the municipality is
empowered only to regulate the same and not prohibit. The Court therein declared that:
(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to
regulate or to license and regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly withheld.
109
These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion
110
that they were modified by the Code
vesting upon City Councils prohibitory powers.
Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance
halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in
the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend "such other
events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the
community or annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in
order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the second and third
clauses, respectively of the same Section. The several powers of the City Council as provided in
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the
use of which indicates that the clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of each
other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a single enumeration or
paragraph.
111
These powers, therefore, should not be confused, commingled or consolidated as to
create a conglomerated and unified power of regulation, suppression and prohibition.
112
The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or
entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing
schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or
amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other
events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the
community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the
City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which
are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the
nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising
out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City
Council.
113
Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others.Expressio unius
est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human
mind. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or
remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict
construction.
114
The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general
welfare clause of the Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise
without merit. On the first point, the ruling of the Court in People v. Esguerra,
115
is instructive. It held
that:
The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section
2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other
provisions of the same Code, and therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating liquors, for
the power to regulate the selling, giving away and dispensing thereof is granted specifically
by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that, under the general power granted by
section 2238, a municipal council may enact the ordinance in question, notwithstanding the
provision of section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and nugatory, because
the power to prohibit, includes the power to regulate, the selling, giving away and dispensing
of intoxicating liquors.
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will
must necessarily prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis
posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant
thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter, which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that
which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative will.
116
If there is an
inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter, which
cannot be removed by any fair and reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of
the legislative will which must prevail and override the earlier.
117
Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions
contrary to those of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have
been divided into two general classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or
irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the two can remain in force and those which
occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a substitute
therefor. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest expression of the
legislative will should prevail.
118
In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws, acts, city charters,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly." Thus, submitting to petitioners' interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila
empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the Charter stating such must be
considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions granting the City
Council mere regulatory powers.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious
to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a
nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is
not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
119
Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and
establishments in another section of the Code which is reproduced as follows:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city
government, and in this connection, shall:
. . .
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for
habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment
and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction,
maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or
exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities
inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
. . .
If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain
terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section.
The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of ill-repute and
expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the
Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these establishments may only
be regulated in their establishment, operation and maintenance.
It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That these
establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the
Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or
operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses
as among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section also defined
"amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment," "synonymous to relaxation, avocation,
pastime or fun;" and "amusement places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and
other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the
show or performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as
legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which
means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection,
giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them
useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where
words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the
same principle applies.
120
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D.
499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate
area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of
commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair
shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is
that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of
the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.
121
As
succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority:
122
The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local
political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents
vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the
Congress, the local government units cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of
their principal. In the case before us, the enactment in question, which are merely local in
origin cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
123
Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule,
it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the
invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper
evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.
124
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses
may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the
Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the
concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power
legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our
support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of theOrdinance has no statutory or
constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot
prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their
transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection of laws not even under the guise of police power.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring
the Ordinancevoid is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 155478. April 29, 2005]
SPOUSES GUILLERMO and ANDYLYNN HIZO, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and SAMMIE BACORRO, represented by Attorney-
in-Fact BENILDA BACORRO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision
[1]
of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64612 and its resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Maria Tabayoyong acquired from the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHHC) (now the National Housing Authority), a parcel of
residential land located at Roxas District in Quezon City, with an area of 200
square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-
120464. The property, identified as Lot 6, Block LCH-28, Subdivision Plan
No. Psd-10783, is bounded on the northeast by a road lot, Lot 16 (now Jasmin
Street), and by Lot 13 on the southwest. She then had her house constructed
on a portion of the property. In 1966, she also allowed her sister, the
grandmother of petitioner Andylynn Hizo, to build a house on a portion of the
property. There, Linda Noble resided together with her daughter Andylynn and
the latters husband, Guillermo Hizo. In time, Tabayoyong left the Philippines
and resided in the United States of America (U.S.A). The grandparents of
petitioner Andylynn Hizo also left for the U.S.A., leaving the house in the care
of the spouses Hizo, who, in turn, leased a portion of the house to tenants
from whom they received rentals.
On March 9, 1999, Tabayoyong sold the property to her nephew, private
respondent Sammie T. Bacorro, a Filipino citizen, who later became a
naturalized U.S. citizen. Based on the said sale, Bacorro was issued TCT No.
N-205447 over the property in his name on April 30, 1999.
[2]
He then prepared
a contract of lease over a portion occupied by the spouses Hizo for a monthly
rental of P2,000.00. The contract was then sent to them for their consideration
and approval, but the latter rejected the same. In a Letter dated August 30,
1999, Bacorro wrote to the spouses Hizo and demanded that they vacate the
property, but the latter refused to do so.
Bacorro filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the spouses Hizo in
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Quezon City. He prayed that, after due
proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor, thus:
WHEREFORE,
it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court render judgment
ordering the defendants, including any and all persons claiming right under it, to
vacate the subject premises and to pay the plaintiff the rentals thereon from June 1999
up to and including those that may accrue hereafter, plus the sum of P75,000.00 as
attorneys fees.
The plaintiff also prays for such other measures of relief which are just and equitable
under the premises.
[3]
In their Answer to the complaint, the spouses Hizo alleged that Bacorro
had no cause of action against them because it was their parents who built
their house in 1966 on the property which was owned by the
PHHC.
[4]
Moreover, a criminal complaint was filed against Tabayoyong
and Bacorro for falsification of a public document based on the latters
allegation in the deed of absolute sale that he was a Filipino citizen (when in
fact he was a naturalized American citizen).
On March 6, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Bacorro,
ordering the spouses Hizo and all persons claiming rights under them:
a) to immediately vacate the subject premises located at No. 92 Jasmin Street,
Roxas District, Quezon City, and restore peaceful possession thereof to herein
plaintiff;
b) to pay the plaintiff the amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) as
monthly rental, to be computed from June 1999 and every month thereafter, until
subject premises shall have been finally vacated;
c) to pay the plaintiff the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) for
and as attorneys fees; and
d) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[5]
The spouses Hizo received a copy of the decision on March 27, 2000 and
appealed the same on April 4, 2000. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 00-41612 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). However, on March 31,
2000, Bacorro filed an Urgent Motion for a Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal. The trial court granted the motion in an Order dated April 12,
2000. Apparently unaware of the same, Bacorro filed another motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution on April 12, 2000 and set it for hearing on April
24, 2000. The spouses Hizo filed an Omnibus Motion for the recall of the April
12, 2000 Order, with an alternative plea for a stay thereof after the approval of
their supersedeas bond.
[6]
They also prayed for the elevation of the records of
the case to the RTC. On May 29, 2000, the MTC denied the Omnibus Motion
filed by the spouses Hizo and authorized the sheriff to enforce its decision.
[7]
The spouses Hizo filed a motion for the reconsideration
[8]
of the Order,
appending thereto the Sketch Plan of Geodetic Engineer Monico Macalindol.
It was indicated therein that a 2/3 portion of the house was located in Lot 13,
Blk. LCH-28, Psd-10783. Upon the denial of the motion, the spouses Hizo
filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC, assailing the April 12, 2000 and May
29, 2000 Orders of the MTC. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-
41094. The spouses Hizo adduced in evidence a copy of a Relocation Survey
prepared and signed by Renato Obra and Rommel A. Perez, showing that 1/3
portion of their house occupied 18 square meters of Bacorros property, while
a 2/3 portion thereof occupied a portion of the lot between Lot 6 and Lot 13.
The petition was later dismissed.
In the meantime, the spouses Hizo filed their Memorandum on Appeal with
the RTC in Civil Case No. 00-41612, and appended a copy of the Relocation
Survey Plan of Obra and Perez. They maintained that the 2/3 portion of their
house, which was outside Bacorros property, should not be demolished; the
MTC should have dismissed the complaint on the ground that the bigger
portion of their house was outside the perimeter of Bacorros property.
For his part, Bacorro averred in his Memorandum on Appeal that the 2/3
portion of the spouses Hizos house occupied a portion of Lot 13 a public
alley and, as such, the same was a nuisance which should be demolished.
In the meantime, Bacorro filed an urgent motion to direct the sheriff to
enforce the writ of execution issued by the MTC. The spouses Hizo opposed
the motion, contending that the enforcement of the writ on the 2/3 portion of
their house located on Lot 13 was illegal. On October 10, 2000, the court
issued an Order
[9]
granting Bacorros motion, finding irrelevant the spouses
Hizos contention that only a 1/3 portion of their house occupied the property
owned by Bacorro.
On January 29, 2001, the RTC rendered judgment affirming the appealed
decision with modification. It ruled that Bacorros right of possession was
limited to only an 18-square-meter area where the house of the spouses Hizo
stood.
[10]
The RTC further declared that the 2/3 portion of the said house
located on a portion of Lot 13 was a public alley, as shown by the Report of
Land Registration Authority Surveyor Jonathan Limpiada, appended as Annex
H of Bacorros Memorandum.
[11]
The spouses Hizo received a copy of the
decision on February 7, 2001.
Upon Bacorros receipt of the decision on February 28, 2001, he filed a
Motion to Clarify the Decision on March 14, 2001
[12]
and prayed for the
demolition of the entire house owned by the spouses Hizo. The said motion
contained the following prayer:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that the court clarifies to defendants that:
1. Defendants have no right whatsoever to re-occupy the house or any portion
thereof as the land on which the house is situated partly on plaintiffs property and on
a public alley; and
2. Defendants have no right-of-way over plaintiffs property that will enable them
to re-occupy wholly or partly the house in dispute;
3. Plaintiff further moves and prays that he be allowed to demolish the whole
house, it being an integral whole and by its very construction and location cannot be
partly demolished without causing the total destruction of the whole house.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief as the Honorable Court may deem just and
equitable in the premises.
[13]
The spouses Hizo opposed the motion on the ground that the decision
was clear and unambiguous. They also manifested that they would file a
motion with the MTC for the execution of the decision as affirmed by the RTC
upon the remand of the case records. They also averred that a motion for
clarification of the decision was not a motion for reconsideration thereof;
hence, did not stop the period for appeal via a petition for review with the CA
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
[14]
As such, they claimed that the decision
of the court had become final and executory.
On April 19, 2001, the RTC issued an Order
[15]
granting the motion filed by
Bacorro. The fallo of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds plaintiffs motion to clarify the
decision and cause the demolition of the entire house in order and holds as follows:
(1) That defendants have no right whatsoever over the subject property, the
house and the adjoining public alley;
(2) That since defendants have no right over the subject property, the house and
the public alley, the court finds that there is no basis for them to move for the
execution of the decision in their favor; and
(3) That since defendants have no right over the house, the court will not direct
them to demolish any portion of the house that rests on plaintiffs property; and
(4) That plaintiff is authorized to demolish that portion of the house which rests
on his property as well as the part which rests on the public alley.
Further, let the records of this case be remanded to the lower court for the
implementation of the decision as modified and the order of demolition.
SO ORDERED.
[16]
The RTC declared that Bacorro had sought a partial reconsideration of its
decision when he prayed for the demolition of the spouses Hizos house on
the ground that it partly rested on both Bacorros property and a public alley
immediately adjoining the latters property. It is also declared that it was
established that the public alley was an alternative access through which
Bacorro could enter or exit from his property, and as such, the non-demolition
of the subject house would block the latters access; moreover, such structure
constituted a fire hazard which endangered the life and property of Bacorro.
The RTC went on to declare that Bacorros actual possession or right to
possession would not be fully and sufficiently protected and restored as long
as the house or any part of it remained where it was.
[17]
The spouses Hizo filed a petition for review of the April 19, 2001 Order of
the RTC before the CA. They alleged that for Bacorros failure to file a motion
for the reconsideration of the RTC decision or to appeal therefrom via a
petition for review, such decision had become final and executory under Rule
42 of the Rules of Court. They further averred that the respondents motion
for clarification of the said decision did not toll the period for appeal; hence,
the decision of the RTC could no longer be amended or modified. The
spouses Hizo claimed that, as such, the RTC erred in issuing the assailed
order modifying its decision. They further averred that even if the motion filed
by Bacorro is considered as a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision,
the April 19, 2001 Order was, in effect, an Amended Decision. Moreover, the
2/3 portion of the house located in an alienable public land could not be
demolished at the instance of Bacorro.
On July 29, 2002, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition,
holding that the assailed order of the RTC was an interlocutory one, and that
the spouses Hizo should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court for the nullification of said order. The CA also held that the
RTC treated Bacorros motion for clarification as a motion for the
reconsideration of its decision and, in fact, modified its decision and ordered
the spouses Hizo to vacate the subject property. The CA concluded that
Bacorros motion suspended the running of the period for him to appeal the
decision. Besides, even if its decision had become final and executory, the
RTC had the authority to clarify its decision.
The spouses Hizo filed a motion for a reconsideration of the decision,
insisting that:
I
THERE IS NO ANY (SIC) EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT RESPONDENTS
POSITION THAT THE 2/3 PORTION OF THE LAND UPON WHICH
PETITIONERS RESIDENTIAL HOUSE IS ERECTED IS A PUBLIC ALLEY; IF
AT ALL, WHAT WAS PRESENTED BY THE RESPONDENT IS A MERE
SKETCH PLAN, ALLEGEDLY PREPARED BY A PERSON WHO IS NOT AN
ENGINEER, NOR A COMPETENT PERSON; ON THE CONTRARY, SAID 2/3
PORTION IS AN OPEN SPACE IDENTIFIED AS LOT NO. 13, BLK. LCH. 28,
PSD. 10723 PER THE APPROVED SURVEY/VERIFICATION PLAN,
CONDUCTED BY THE LRA, AS COMMISSIONED BY THE COURT,
THROUGH ITS LICENSED GEODETIC ENGINEER.
II
GRANTING ARGUENDO (WITHOUT HOWEVER ADMITTING), SUBJECT 2/3
PORTION OF LAND IS A PUBLIC ALLEY (THE TRUTH [IS] IT WAS NOT),
HAS (sic) PRIVATE RESPONDENT SAMMIE BACORRO, THE REQUIRED
PERSONALITY TO FILE AN EJECTMENT SUIT AGAINST THE PETITIONER,
INSOFAR AS THE 2/3 PORTION OF THE LOT OCCUPIED BY THE PLAINTIFF
IS CONCERNED?
III
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR DEMOLITION CANNOT TAKE THE
PLACE OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, AND FOR FAILURE TO
[DO] SO FILE THE REQUIRED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, THE
TRIAL COURT NOT ONLY SERIOUSLY ERRED BUT EVEN COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT SAID:
Anent plaintiffs motion to demolish the whole house, it is apparent that plaintiff is
seeking for a partial reconsideration of the decision which this court can entertain as
the same was filed within the reglementary period. (2
nd
to the last par. of the April 19,
2001 Order)
[18]
However, on September 30, 2002, the CA issued a Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Hizo.
The spouses Hizo, now the petitioners, came to the Court for relief under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. They contend that their petition in the CA was,
in fact, a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, from the April
19, 2001 Order of the RTC, which was in fact and in effect an amended
decision of Civil Case No. 41612. The petitioners assert that the period to file
their petition for review of the said amended decision is to be reckoned from
their receipt of the April 19, 2001 Order (amended decision) on April 25,
2001. Since they filed their petition for review with the CA on May 8, 2001,
their petition was filed within the fifteen-day period therefor.
The petitioners further aver that Lot 13, the property on which a 2/3 portion
of their house is located, is an empty space and not a public alley. They
allege that the said house is not a nuisance, and could not be ordered
demolished by the RTC. The petitioners further argue that even if the finding
of the RTC that the property on which the 2/3 portion of their house is
constructed on a public alley were true, the respondent has no cause of action
against them for unlawful detainer and the demolition of said portion of their
house. The petitioners insist that, in its original decision, the RTC ruled that
the government (not the respondent) had the right to cause their eviction from
the property and the demolition of the said portion of their house, and in an
action for abatement of nuisance, not one for unlawful detainer. The
petitioners maintain that the Survey Plan Reports of Geodetic Engineers
Rommel Perez and Renato Obra stating that Lot 13 is an open space and not
a public alley should prevail over the Survey Report of Jonathan Limpiada
(which states that Lot 13 is a public alley).
In his comment on the petition, the respondent averred that since it is the
contention of the petitioners that the decision of the RTC had become final
and executory when he filed his motion for clarification thereof, then the April
19, 2001 Order of the RTC must be an interlocutory order. Hence, the
remedy of the petitioners was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, and not a petition for review under Rule 42. He further
contends that an appeal under Rule 42 of the Rules is proper only if the order
or resolution subject of the appeal is a final order or resolution. The
respondent asserts that the April 19, 2001 Order of the RTC merely clarified
its decision, and did not make any substantive modification thereof. The
respondent asserts that, whether Lot 13 (the property on which the 2/3 portion
of the house of the petitioners stands) is a public alley or an open space is a
question of fact which cannot be raised in this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45; so is the issue of which survey plan should
prevail, whether that of Obra and Perez, or that of Limpiada. The respondent
posits that the petitioners have no right to stay in the public alley and are
obliged to vacate the same.
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether or not the petition
for review filed with the CA was the proper remedy of the petitioners, and
whether it was filed on time; (2) whether the Court may delve into and resolve
the factual issues raised by the petitioners; and (3) whether the CA erred in
affirming the April 19, 2001 Order of the RTC and dismissing the petition for
review filed by the petitioners.
The Ruling of the Court
On the first issue, the CA ruled that the petitioners appealed the Decision
of the RTC, dated January 29, 2001, via petition for review on May 8, 2001, a
copy of which was received by them on February 7, 2001; hence, the petition
was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. The ruling of the appellate
court is incorrect. Even a cursory reading of the petition for review filed by the
petitioners will readily show that they appealed the April 19, 2001 Order of the
RTC. Indeed, in their petition, the petitioners prayed that the court set aside
the said order, and that the Decision dated January 29, 2001 be reinstated,
thus:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully requested of this Honorable Court that this
petition be favorably GRANTED, and the assailed 19 April 2001 Order be SET
ASIDE, and the 29 January 2001 decision be REINSTATED it being already final,
and it be categorically pronounced that the 2/3 portion of the land, as well as the
house built thereon, which petitioners actually owned, occupied/possessed be declared
as free and/or excluded from the respondent courts order of
ejectment/demolition. And even on the 1/3 portion of the house which extend to
plaintiffs title, that the law on demolition such as Sec. 10(d), Rule 39 in relation to
Art. 546 Civil Code be OBSERVED. And finally, that petitioners be ordered
RESTORED/REINSTATED to their subject house/land at least up to the 2/3 portion
of the land/house they occupied being outside plaintiffs title.
Petitioner further respectfully requests for such other reliefs that may be just and
equitable under the premises.
[19]
However, the Court agrees with the appellate courts ruling that the so-
called motion for clarification filed by the respondent of the decision of the
RTC is, in fact, a motion for partial reconsideration of the same, and not
merely what it purported to be per its caption: Motion for Clarification. Even
the RTC itself considered the said motion as a motion for the partial
reconsideration of its decision.
[20]
The respondent was, thus, prompted to file his motion for reconsideration,
as in its decision, the MTC ordered the petitioners, as the defendants therein,
to immediately vacate the subject property located at No. 92 Jasmin Street,
Roxas District, Quezon City, and surrender possession thereof to the
respondent, the plaintiff therein.
[21]
The MTC was of the impression that the
entire house of the petitioners was constructed on the respondents
property. But on appeal, it appeared that the petitioners relocated their house,
and based on the Relocation Survey Plan of Obra and Perez, only 18 square
meters of the subject property was occupied by 1/3 portion of the petitioners
house, and that the 2/3 portion thereof is located on open space, beyond the
perimeter of the respondents property. The report of Obra and Perez was
confirmed by Jonathan Limpiada, a surveyor of the Land Registration
Authority except that, contrary to the first report, the property on which the 2/3
portion of the petitioners house stood on a public alley. Based on the said
reports, the RTC rendered judgment affirming the decision of the MTC with
the modification that the petitioners should vacate and return possession to
the respondent only that portion of his property with an area of 18 square
meters, occupied by 1/3 portion of the petitioners house, since the complaint
of the respondent for unlawful detainer did not allege factual circumstances of
a complaint for abatement of a nuisance. Moreover, the MTC held that it is the
local government that should act to clear the public alley and restore the same
to its intended use:
The technical description of plaintiffs title which appears in the deed of sale plaintiff
executed with Maria Tabayoyong sufficiently identify the property of the plaintiff and
based on separate geodetic surveys conducted by LRA surveyors Oba and Limpiada
commissioned by defendants and plaintiff, respectively, a portion of defendants
house encroached plaintiffs lot. Accordingly, defendants will be required to
demolish only whatever is constructed within the boundaries of plaintiffs property.
There is no question that the part of defendants house occupying the public alley is a
nuisance. However, the complaint does not allege factual circumstances of a
complaint for abatement of a nuisance, thus, this Court cannot make a pronouncement
on this matter. Moreover, it is the local government that should act to clear the public
alley and restore it to its intended use.
[22]
The respondent maintained that the entire house of the petitioners should
be demolished based on the findings of the MTC that the petitioners were not
the owners of the house; hence, had not established their right over the
same. Also to be considered is the fact that the house is partly built on his
property and partly on a public alley, which made the house a nuisance that
can be abated. The respondent also maintained that the lack of means of
ingress and egress of the petitioners, except through the gate to Jasmin
Street, is due to the petitioners act of constructing their house on his property
and on a public alley. Moreover, according to the respondent, the demolition
of a portion of the petitioners house which occupied his property would
necessarily result in the total demolition of the house.
In fine, the respondents motion was not merely for the clarification of the
decision of the RTC, but was, in effect, for the modification of some factual
findings of the RTC, and the consequent complete affirmation of the MTC
decision, including the demolition of the entire house of the petitioners.
The Order of the RTC dated April 19, 2001, granting the respondents
motion and affirming in toto the decision of the MTC and ordering the
demolition of the entire house of the petitioners, was, in fine, an amendment
of its January 29, 2001 Decision. As such, it was final, and appealable to the
CA via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court within the
period therefore to be reckoned from receipt, by the petitioner, of the April 19,
2001 Order of the court.
[23]
It must be stressed that the said Order finally
disposed of the case. Nothing more remained to be done by the court except
to await the parties next move.
[24]
We agree with the contention of the petitioners that the RTC erred in
issuing its April 19, 2001 Order declaring that the petitioners had no right over
their house, and authorizing the respondent to demolish the said structure,
including that portion which occupied Lot 13, a public alley.
It was obviously imprudent, if not capricious, on the part of the RTC to
authorize the respondent to demolish the house of the petitioners. The task of
enforcing the writ of execution issued by the court is lodged on the
sheriff.
[25]
Under Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff shall not
destroy, demolish or remove any improvements on the property except upon
special order of the court after due hearing and after the petitioners, as
defendants, have failed to remove the same within the reasonable time fixed
by the court. If the petitioners enter the property for the purpose of executing
acts of possession or in any manner disturbing the possession of the
respondent, the petitioners may be cited for contempt.
[26]
Undeniably, the action of the respondent against the petitioners in the
MTC is one for unlawful detainer. He sought to exercise his possessory rights
over his property, Lot 6, Block LCH-28 covered by TCT No. RT-120464. The
only issue in the said case is the physical and natural possession of the
property subject of his complaint
[27]
and not that of any other property, including
Lot 13. The respondent, as plaintiff, was burdened to prove prior physical
possession of the property before 1966 when the petitioners grandparents
occupied a portion of his property and constructed a house thereon.
[28]
The
respondent adduced evidence that, indeed, the petitioners occupied a portion
of his property with an area of 18 square meters where the 1/3 portion of their
house is located. Hence, as declared by the RTC in its January 29, 2001
Decision, the petitioners were obliged to vacate that portion of the property.
The respondent had no cause of action against the petitioners for unlawful
detainer over a portion of Lot 13 on which the 2/3 portion of the house was
constructed, for the reason that the respondent is not the owner, nor does he
have any possessory rights over the said lot which is a public alley. Indeed,
the respondent did not pray in his complaint for the eviction of the petitioners
from Lot 13.
While it is true that the petitioners had not claimed ownership nor
possessory rights over Lot 13, the RTC acted beyond its jurisdiction in
allowing the respondent to cause the demolition of that portion located in Lot
13, which is beyond the perimeter of his property. The jurisdiction of the RTC
is limited to evicting the petitioners from that portion of the respondents
property with an area of 18 square meters. That the demolition of 1/3 portion
of the house of the petitioners may cause the destruction of the rest of the
house does not constitute a justification for the court to order the demolition of
the entire structure.
In People v. Court of Appeals,
[29]
this Court held that if a court is authorized
by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only and undertakes to
exercise the jurisdiction in a case to which the statute has no application, the
judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make a particular
judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the RTC on appeal is confined to determining whether
the decision of the MTC ordering the eviction of the petitioners from the
respondents property is in accord with the evidence and the law. It does not
include the jurisdiction to order the eviction of the petitioners and the
demolition of their house located on Lot 13, which is a public alley. As the
RTC declared in its Decision dated January 29, 2001, if the respondent
believes that a portion of the petitioners house on Lot 13 is a nuisance, or that
the petitioners and their tenants should not be allowed to use his property
(including the gate to Jasmin Street as a means of ingress and egress) then
the remedy of the respondent is elsewhere, not in the MTC in an action for
unlawful detainer.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the April 19, 2001 Order of the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 00-41612 is SET ASIDE. The March 6,
2000 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court, as affirmed by the Regional Trial
Court with modification, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.