Paras v.

Comelec (Resolution) GR 123169,

Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the 1994 barangay election. A petition for his
recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay, which was approved by the Comelec. Petition signing was scheduled
on 14 October 1995, where at least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The
Comelec also set the recall election on 13 November 1995, but which was deferred to 16 December 1995 due to the petitioners opposition. To
prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action
2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed
the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay
recall election was without Comelec approval.
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant
petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. The petitioner contends that no recall can take place within one year preceding a regular
local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections slated on the first Monday of May 1996. He cited Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo
to support the argument, the Court in which case considered the SK election as a regular local election.
Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a regular local election in a recall proceeding
Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of
the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Further, the
spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. The too literal
interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the Court cannot countenance. A too-literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfill its
purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth. In the
present case, Paragraph (b) of Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may
be subject of a recall election. The Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a regular election, as this would render inutile the recall
provision of the Local Government Code. It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local
election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate.
The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for having become moot and academic, as the next regular elections involving the
barangay office concerned were seven months away. Thus, the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall
election, was made permanent.
TALUSAN V. TAYAG
04 Apr. 2001
Facts: The RTC, acting as a land registration court, ruled on the validity of the auction sale of the subject parcel of land. X believes the RTC has
no jurisdiction to resolve this issue and instituted a separate action to annul the auction sale.

Issue: Does the RTC, acting as a land registration court, have jurisdiction to resolve the said issue?
Held: Yes. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial and contentious cases, as well as those invoking
substantial issues. The court now has the authority to act not only on applications for original registration, but also on all petitions filed after the
original registration of title. Coupled with this authority is the power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions.
National Tobacco Administration v. COA
Issue: whether educational assistance given to individuals prior to the enactment of RA 6758 should be continued to be received?
RULING: Yes. Proper interpretation of section12 RA 6758 depends on the combination of first and second paragraph.
First sentence states that such other additional compensation not otherwise specified as may be determined by the DBM shall be deemed
included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. The second sentence states such other additional compensation, whether in cash or
in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standard shall continue to be authorized.
Cabada v. Alunan III
Issue: whether or not an appeal lies from the decision of regional appellate board (RAB) imposing disciplinary action against a member of the PNP
under Sec. 45 of RA 6975 regarding finality of disciplinary action
The court held that the gap in the law which is silent on filing appeals from decisions of the RAB rendered within the reglementary period should
be construed and harmonized with other statutes, i.e. Sec 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution because the PNP is part, as a bureau, of the
reorganized DILG, as to form a unified system of jurisprudence
Statcon: if RAB fails to decide an appealed case within 60 days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision is deemed final and
executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of DILG. Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal within
60-day reglementary period, its decision may still be appealed to the Secretary of DILG
Manila Lodge No. 761 v. CA
Issue: Whether the reclaimed land is patrimonial or public dominion.
RULING: to say that the land is patrimonial will render nugatory and a surplusage the phrase of the law to the effect that the City of Manila is
hereby authorized to lease or sell
A sale of public dominion needs a legislative authorization, while a patrimonial land does not.
Lapid vs CA
Facts:
Gov.Manuel Lapid & 5 other government officials were charged with alleged dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service for allegedly having conspired among themselves in demanding & collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a
control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per truckload of sand, gravel or other quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial
ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for such collection.
The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty for misconduct, which meted out the penalty of 1yr suspension without pay pursuant
to Sec.25(2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).
The DILG implemented the said Ombudsman decision.
Proceeding from the premise that the Ombudsman decision had not yet become final, petitioner argued that writs of prohibition & mandamus may
be issued against the DILG for prematurely implementing the assailed decision.
Issue:
WON the Ombudsmans Decision finding petitioner administratively liable for misconduct & imposing upon him a penalty of 1yr suspension
without pay is immediately executory pending appeal.
Held:
Sec.27 of RA 6770 provides that Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one months salary shall be final and unappealable.
The Rules of Produce of the Office of the Ombudsman likewise contains a similar provision. Section 7, Rule III of the said Rules provides: where the
respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration
of 10 days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as
prescribed in Section 27of R.A. 6770.
The punishment imposed upon petitioner is not among those listed as final and unappealable. The legal maxim inclusion unius est exclusio
alterus finds application. The express mention of the things included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements
taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties not enumerated in the said section are not final,
unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation
of the decision.
A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its
decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being
appealable would be rendered nugatory.
The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory only after it has become final and executory, execution pending
appeal being an exception to this general rule.
There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are immediately executory.
Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is immediately final and executory pending appeal, the
law expressly so provides.
Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not stay the award, judgment,final order or resolution unless
the law directs otherwise.final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.
Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the Ombudsman Act should apply in his case.
It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the
said case must prevail over the other. Considering however, that petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which
should govern his case.
It is suffice to note that the Ombudsman rules of procedure, Administrative Order No. 07, mandate that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary or fine equivalent to one
month salary are still appealable and hence, not final and executory.
Vda de Urbano v GSIS (2001)
Facts
In 1971, petitioners mortgaged their 200 sqm property in Q.C. to Gsis to secure a housing loan. Since they were unable to pay the loan, GSIS
foreclosed the mortgage in 1988. GSIS bid 154k on the property and emerged as the highest bidder.
In 1984, the petitioners tried to reclaim their property. They wrote to the GSIS Acquired Assets Department signifying their intent to reclaim. On
October 16, GSIS told them to pay the redemption price of 154k in full before Nov 18, 1984.
The petitioners asked for more time to recover the property while the Acquired Assets Dpeartment subsequently told them to pay 174k in cash
with an extension of 30 days to the November date. Failure to do so forfeited the reclamation of the property and sold in a public bidding.
The petitioners wrote again requesting for remortgage through repurchase of the property. The Gsis AAD declined.
The petitioners wrote to the Board for an approval to file a loan worth 240,000 with the GSIS real estate department to repurchase their foreclosed
property. Despite attempts from Vice Governor Mathay to adjust to a more liberal arrangement for the petitioners, the the petitioners were unable
to pay. GSIS then issued a TCT in its favor.
The respondent De La Cruz entered the picture and offered to purchase the property for 250,000 spot cash. Without knowledge of the rival offer,
the petitioners then offered a 50,000 downpayment with the 124k balance to be paid in 5 years. He also enclosed 10k in check as earnest money.
The Board informed them that it had adopted reolution 881 that declined their offer to repurchase.
At the same time, GSIS negotiated with Dela Cruz for the purchase of the property. They accepted her offer of purchase. A new TCT was issued to
her.
The petitioners, on the other hand, had their loan request rescinded because a certificate of award or sale was not issued in favor of the applicant.
Moreover, the applicant, Urbano the petitioner, was 81 years old and no longer a member of the GSIS. It wasnt given due consideration.
Having learned about the transaction with dela Cruz, the petitioners requested the formal investigation with the GSIS regarding the sale. Not
satisfied, they filed a case with the RTC of QC branch 102.
The petition was dismissed. The same view was upheld by the court of appeals.
Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Do petitioners have a right to repurchase the subject property?
2. Does GSIS have a duty to dispose of the subject property through public bidding?
3. Was Gsis in bad faith in dealing with petitioners?
Ruling: Petition Dismissed
Ratio:
1. No
Charter of the GSIS was PD 1146 which stipulated the power of the GSIS to acquire, utilize, and dispose of real or personal properties in the
Philippines or elsewhere. It was amended by PD 1981 which gave the GSIS the power to compromise or release any claim or settled liability to the
system.
SC- The laws granted the GSIS Board the power to exercise discretion in determining the terms and condition of financial accommodations to its
members with the dual purpose of making the GSIS more responsive to the needs of GSIS members. The laws also stipulated that the Board could
exercise discretion on whether to accept or reject petitioners offer to repurchase the subject property taking into account the dual purpose
enunciated in the whereas clause of PD 1981 which made the GSIS more responsive to the needs of its members.
With regard to the Boards exercise of discretion, in Natino v IAC, the Court also held that repurchase of foreclosed property after redemption
period imposes no such obligation on the purchaser (the board in this case) to re-sell the property since the property belongs to him (the board as
well)
The boards denial of petitioners request to purchase the subject property was not based on whim but on a factual assessment of the financial
capacity of the petitioners to make good their repeated offers to purchase the subject property. Based on the circumstances, the petitioners were
repeatedly unable to fulfill their obligations to pay. In the comments of the AAD manager, the observation was that the petitioners lacked the
capacity to pay up.
The petitioners are not entitled to a request for repurchase as a matter of right. The Board exercised its discretion in accordance with law in
denying their requests and the GSIS cant be faulted for their failure to repurchase as it acted under the petitioners application under Operation
Pabahay. The sale to respondent cant be annulled on such invoked right.
2. No. The agreement with de la Cruz was valid.
Pets.- aver that Sec. 79 of PD 1445 and the COA Circular 86-264 mandated the GSIS to dispose of the assets through public bidding and only upon
its failure, through a public sale.
GSIS contended that SEC 79 of PD 1445 did not apply because it covered unserviceable govt property and not acquired assets.
SC- Gsis was right. Why? The provision (SEC 79) applies only to unserviceable govt property or those no longer needed. The house was obviously
not unserviceable. And it was still used by petitioners.
With regard to COA Circular 86-264 or the General guidelines on the divestment or disposal of assets of government owned corporations the law
stipulated that it availed of an exception to the requirement of disposition through public bidding and such exception applied to sales of
merchandise held for sale in the regular course of business. The Court read it in relation to Coa circular 89-296 which provided for Audit
Guidelines on the Disposal of Property and other Assets of Government Agencies, which also did not apply the public bidding disposal
requirement to merchandise or inventory held for sale in the regular course of business nor to the disposal by govt financial institutions of
foreclosed assets or collaterals acquired in the regular course of business and not transferred to the Govt under proclamation no 50.
The modes of disposal included Public auction and sale thru negotiation.
Doctrine: With regard to these 2 laws, the Court held the question whether the subject property was covered by the said Circular or falls under its
exception. It held that 89-296 was to be interpreted with 86-264 in adherence with stat con wherein statutes that relate to the same thing ought to
be taken in consideration in construing any one of them, and it is an established rule of law that all acts in pari material are to be taken together as
if they were one law.
Moreover, the court looked into the intent of both laws and held that these were used to generate more revenue for GOCCS through the
disposition of its non-preforming assets. (Look into PD 50 or the asset privatization trust in the case) According to the court, the policy intent on the
disposition of acquired assets then governed the case at bar.
Was the property covered by the public bidding exceptions in these laws? The court said yes, which meant that their sale negotiation fell under the
regular course of business, and thus did not offend the requirements of the said coa circulars.
3. No.
GSIS denial of petitioners further requests for repurchase of subject property was based on a factual determination of the petitioners financial
capacity and the GSIS charter, PD 1146. Also, GSIS sold the property to dela Cruz only after giving them one year to repurchase.
The petitioners, on the strength of the Valmonte case, cant also impute bad faith on GSIS when it was secretly negotiating with Dela Cruz. In the
Valmonte case, the court held that the constitutional right to information was limited to matters of public concern to transactions involving public
interest.The sale of the property was not imbued by public interests as it was a purely private transaction. Pets. Cant demand to be informed of
such public negotiation since they had no interest on the subject property since they failed to comply with the GSIS terms of repurchase and the
denial to repurchase under the GSIS terms.
JMM Promotions Vs. NLRC
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was
relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train
performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which
included an Artists Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the
Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of
their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power. Police power concerns government enactments
which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed
Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its
ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists,
particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of
performing artists to high risk destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very
least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits
deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid
that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Republic VS. COA
FACTS: On August 1988, private respondent Dolor filed an application before the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte, for the confirmation and
registration of her title to a residential lot located at Daet, Camarines Norte.
On November 25 1988, when the case was called for initial hearing, the Fiscal entered his appearance on behalf of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines. Respondent Dolor moved that an order of general default be issued against the whole world except petitioner which had filed an
opposition.
At the hearing on 20 December 1988, respondent Dolors counsel marked as Exhibits A to D, respectively, the Notice of Initial Hearing, the
Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette (October 17, 1988 issue), the Affidavit of Publication of the Editor of
the Weekly Informer, and the Certification or Return of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff.
Satisfied that respondent Dolor had a registerable title over subject property the trial court confirmed her title thereto and ordered its registration
as her exclusive property.
ISSUE: Petitioner assailed the trial courts decision before the CA on a purely jurisdictional ground. Petitioner argued that it was incumbent upon
respondent Dolor to show proof that on or before the date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988, there had been compliance with the
requirements specified by Sec. 23 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree, , to wit:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date
and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order
By publication. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a
notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; Provided,
however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
The records show that while the trial court stated that the jurisdictional requirements were complied with on 25 November 1988, they were yet to
be presented on 20 December 1988 before its Branch Clerk, the designated Commissioner.
In its decision dated 16 July 1991, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court, , rationalizing thus
We find that the requirements of Sec. 23 of PD No. 1529 have been complied with in the instant case. The record shows that the Notice of Initial
Hearing set on November 25, 1988, issued by the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration had been published in
the September 10, 1988 issue of the Weekly Informer and in Volume 84, No. 42 of the Official Gazette issue of October 17, 1988
The appellant (Republic) claims that while the presiding judge of the trial court stated that the jurisdictional requirements have been complied
with on November 25, 1988, the jurisdictional requirements have yet to be presented on December 20, 1988 before the Branch Clerk of Court.
Hence, appellant argues, the Order of November 25, 1988 had no basis in fact and in law; there was no notice to interested persons adjoining
owners, and the whole world; and jurisdiction to hear and decide the case has not yet been conferred with the court on November 25, 1988.
Petitioner concludes that the late publication did not vest jurisdiction in the trial court.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC is VACATED and
SET ASIDE, and the application of private respondent for the confirmation and registration of her title over the property described therein is
DENIED.
By reason of the defective notice of initial hearing, all the proceedings conducted by the trial court which culminated in its decision granting the
prayer of respondent Dolor are declared VOID and it was error for respondent CA to have sustained the same.
The jurisdiction is not conferred by the marking of the relevant documents as exhibits, but by the fact that all the requirements of Sec. 23, PD 1529
had been complied with as shown by those documents proving compliance therewith. The trial court is not precluded from taking cognizance of its
own record. But, the rule is not without exception. As borne out by the records, at the scheduled date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988 and
even during the actual hearing on 20 December 1988, the publication requirement in the Official Gazette was yet to be complied with. Although
the Notice of Initial Hearing was included for publication in the 17 October 1988 issue of the Official Gazette, specifically Vol. 84, No. 42, thereof,
the same was however released for publication only on 31 January 1989
In petitioners brief filed before respondent CA, we note that the issue of late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette was
raised squarely. But for no apparent reason, the issue was ignored in the questioned decision. Indeed, respondent court could have easily resolved
the issue in favor of petitioner supported as it was not only by competent evidence but also by ample jurisprudence
The primary legal principle against which the legality of all the proceedings conducted by the trial court should be tested is jurisdiction. In order to
ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction, the provision of the law in point should be inquired into. Section 23 of P.D. 1529 explicitly provides that
before the court can act on the application for land registration, the public shall be given notice of the initial hearing thereof by means of
publication, mailing, and posting. In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, citing Caltex v. CIR, 8, this Court ruled that in all cases where the
authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory it must be strictly complied
with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. So that where there is a defect of publication of petition, such defect deprives the court of jurisdiction.
And when the court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, the same lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects.
Regarding applications for land registration, the purpose of publication of the notice of initial hearing is the same: to require all persons concerned
who may have any rights or interests in the property applied for to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the application
should not be granted.
Section 23 of P.D. 1529 does not provide a period within which the notice should be published in the Official Gazette but for reasons already
obvious, the publication should precede the date of initial hearing. While there is no dispute that the notice was included in Vol. 84, No. 42, 17
October 1988 issue of the Official Gazette, this particular issue was released for publication only on 31 January 1989 when the initial hearing was
already a fait accompli. The point of reference in establishing lack of jurisdiction of the trial court was 31 January 1989 because it was only on that
date when the notice was made known to the people in general. Verily, the late publication of the notice defeated the purpose for its existence
thereby reducing it to a mere pro forma notice.

NOTES: In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, an issue similar to the one presented in the present petition was posed, that is, whether
the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the Official Gazette forty-seven (47) days after the hearing, instead of at least thirty (30) days
prior to the date of hearing, was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine the petition. We answered in the negative since
the purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a
petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court
for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case.