I value morality as ought implies a moral obligation

For an argument to work there must be a clear development of all three important parts, if my
opponent fails to provide a complete explanation of all of these parts the claims are irrelevant.
Kreeft
1
explains.
Finally, the criteria of any argument; what makes an argument work, and what makes it not work. This is ust basic
common!sensical logic. "ince an argument is composed of propositionsclassic argument, a syllogism,
has two premises: an assumption and a conclusionand since a proposition is composed of
two terms, a subject and a predicate term, there are three parts to the argument: the terms,
the propositions, and the logic of the argument. "o there#s three things that can wrong with any argument. $he terms
can be ambiguous, the premises can be false, or the logic can be invalid. If none of those things goes wrong with the argument, then honesty and
intelligence demand that you agree that the conclusion is true. "o, there#s five things you can say to anybody#s argument.
$hus all arguments have a proactive burden to explain how they meet these parts then it has no
warrant. Independent of meeting this burden the argument is incoherent. $hus all arguments
must have a clear connection between a maor and minor premise and from that derive a coherent
conclusion. $hus arguments are articulated in terms of a syllogism.
$he fundamental minor premise is that we exist in relation to the not I.
First %ll attempts at understanding reality in any epistemological sense is based upon the
reflection upon the relation of the I to the not I. %llen &ood
'
explains
$here the transcendental ordering of thoughts begins with the Is self-positing (or as he also calls it,
)self!reverting* activity+ and argues that forming a concept of this actiity re!uires distinguishing it
from an opposed actiity, that of the obect or "not-I# ("& 1,-.'; cf. "& /,10!'1, -,1.!./+. $e first ac!uire
our concept of the I as an acting being through the concept of its interaction with the not-I
(the material world+. $he I as an acting thing, therefore, must also be material, a body ("& 1,-.2; /,23!31+. $he body is not an empirical
accompaniment but a transcendentally deduced re4uirement for being an active I at all, )5xperience could not teach us that we have a body.
$hat we have a body and that it is ours is something we have to know in advance, as a condition for the possibility of experience* (6% -,',13.+.
% disembodied 7artesian thinking substance is therefore incoherent, a transcendental impossibility. )%part from connection with a body 8an I9
would not be a person, but would be something 4uite inconceivable (if one can still refer to a thing which is not even conceivable as
:something;+* ("& 3,'.2+.
$his card tells us that our identity must be defined by a relation to the not I. %laims of
culpability now become irreleant because all epistemology for both adults and jueniles
are based solely in an identical relation so all empistemological conclusions function
identically or are unfounded.
"econd all normative commitments even if not all thought itself must also be based in the
relation to the other. &ood ' argues
1 <ro life <hilosphy $ranscript. http,==www.peterkreeft.com=audio=1.>prolife!philosophy=prolife!
philosophy>transcription.htm .
'
Fichte;s Intersubective I. ("tanford ?niversity, ?"%+ In4uiry, @olume -., Aumber 1 (February, 'BB3+
http,==www.stanford.edu=Callenw=webpapers=FichteIntersubective.pdf
Fichte himself realiDes that this argument taken by itself is too short to be convincing, )From this alone, however, the positing of individuality
would not follow, for it would indeed be possible that the I should posit that free activity outside its own solely through ideal activity, as a merely
possible one E possible to it itself, if it contained something perhaps beneficial, or also to other free beings* ("& -,'1.+. I can sufficiently
individuate my individual I, in other words, without supposing actual rational beings outside myself, by thinking of alternative possibilities to my
individual agency, adopted either by other possible beings or even by myself. Fut he does not find this reply decisive 11 either, since it ignores
the fact that what I must account for is not merely thinking of my I as an individual, but finding myself as an
indiidual, as a determinate obect. This finding, Fichte claims, is possible only through an experience as an obect of
the free actiity constituting my individual I; and this experience is possible only through the instantiation in
my consciousness of a distinctive concept, which Fichte calls the concept of a &summons (%ufforderung+. %nd this
is a concept, he argues, that re!uires for its explanation an origin in a rational being other than myself. Gere it
is important to realiDe that what I have to be aware of in order to be aware of my individual I is not so much activity in which I have already
engaged as possible activity in which I might engage. For me, my indiiduality consists not merely, and not fundamentally, in facts
that distinguish me from others but in possibilities of acting through which I actively determine who I am. In other words, the
awareness of my indiiduality must be fundamentally normatie. $his is so even if, as Fichte believes, the
fundamental norms of rational agency are every bit as obective or universally binding as the obective truths about the material world. For what
makes me an individual is the specific way I apply these universal norms to my actions, in my uni4ue situation and from my uni4ue perspective.
Thus 'ichte connects the concept of my indiidual I with the concept of a determinate end or goal (Hweck+
of activity, and he regards the concept of an end as that through which an indiidual I can make a transition
from (as he puts it+ "determinability to determination# (6% -,', -0, 20!21, 102!103+ E that is, from the plural
possibilities of what I might be to the free decision that determines who I am. This transition inoles setting an end for myself,
constituting my reason for making this transition, and then actuali(ing that end. The concept of an end, therefore,
inoles that of a possible way of acting that I hae a rational ground for making actual. It is this
concept, Fichte argues, that can present itself to me only in the form of a &summons; and the concept of a
summons is something that re4uires the actual existence of another rational being as its explanation. )$he summons would thus contain within
itself the real ground of a free decision; i.e. it would be the determining agency that intervenes between that is determinable and what is
determinate* (6% -,',10.+. )Gow is the concept of an end possibleI* (6% -,',10/+. )The end is gien to us along with the
summons) From this it follows that indiidual reason cannot account for itself on the basis of itself
alone* (6% -,',100+. )I neer find myself e*cept insofar as I find myself summoned to act
freely# (6% -,',11-+. $herefore, "consciousness begins with consciousness of a summons# (6% -,',11.+.
In other words, my own self!consciousness begins with my consciousness of another;s consciousness as addressing me ()summoning* me+. $his
means that the mental states of others, as perceived by someone other than the I whose states they are, are as
transcendentally necessary to the self-consciousness of an I as are its own states. Fichte;s argument is that
transcendentally, the nature of mind is constituted as much by my awareness of the mentality of others as by my awareness of my own mentality.
This renders prescriptiist claims nonsense but those all come from my e*tension to the
world rather than receiing the summons form the world. $his card explains that In order to
be able to be free to act normatively I must have the ability to set an end for myself which can be
in some way derived and then pursued. Gowever only the summons of another can provide the
conditions for which I have something to pursue as an end. If I am ust me then I can;t pursue me
because I am me.
$hird the only way to make sense of a system of free choice of action is if those actions are born
solely out of free choice. "uch a system however can only be resolved by the respect being given
to the autonomous will of the other &ood / explains.
$he whole point of the summons, in fact, is that it is what first makes our individuality possible for us, through presenting us with the concept of
our own individual free action in the form of an obect of our consciousness. I think Fichte chooses the term %ufforderung because its meaning is
delicately balanced between the idea of something we merely can do and the idea of something we should do, or at least have some reason to do.
&hat is clear, however, is that it cannot mean something we are compelled to do or have no choice about doing. $hus if the translation
:summons; suggests legal coercion, then that is positively misleading as to Fichte;s meaning. $he decisive difference here is between an obect
that merely restricts our freedom and an obect that makes freedom possible. $his for Fichte is what is most basic to distinguishing the concept of
another I from the concept of the mere not!I (the material world+. $he not!I resists our ends or may be brought into conformity with them. It may
compel us to take one means to them rather than another, or it may make them impossible. Fut it cannot be the source from which we draw the
concept of those ends. + summons, however, is precisely an object of consciousness which makes the
concept of an end possible. Gow can a summons, in this sense, be considered a transcendental condition of free activityI &e
have seen that Fichte describes the summons as )contain8ing9 within itself the real ground of a free decision* (6% -,',10.+. To act freely,
on this conception, is to act in response to grounds or reasons. ,easons have the peculiarity that they are the only
possible determinant of what we do that does not compel or causally necessitate what we do, or restrict in any
way the possibilities we have open to us. + good reason e*plains why I do what I have reason to do, but neer
takes away from me the possibility of doing otherwise. In fact, it makes sense as a reason only as long as this
possibility exists. %ccordingly, there are two fundamentally different ways that facts in the world might be given to us as
agents, first, there are facts that causally necessitate what we do, restricting our freedom to do otherwise;
second, there are facts that determine what we do by presenting themseles as reasons for
acting. I think Fichte was struck by the fundamental importance of this difference, and inferred from it that there must be something 4uite
distinctive about the way that facts are given to us as reasons. Gis bold thought is that such facts can be gien to us only
through a distinctive kind of not!I that we regard as containing within itself the understanding of a reason, and hence free activity E in other
words, through a not-I that is itself an I, namely, an I other than my own I. -nly another rational
being would be capable of haing the concept of a free action and a ground or reason for free
action. $his is in fact the claim through which Fichte establishes this part of his argument. )I could therefore find a certain self!
determination only through ideal activity; through imitation of one that is present at hand, and present at hand without my doing (Huthun+JI
cannot comprehend this summons to self!activity without ascribing it to an actual being outside me that wills to communicate a concept of the
action demanded, and hence is capable of the concept of that concept; but such a being is a rational being, one that posits itself as an I, hence an
I* ("& -,''B!''1+. %t times Fichte gives this last point what we may call a genetic presentation, .eing an indiidual I, placing
before oneself an end, is something a rational being must be educated to do, through the
influence of another rational being. "% human being becomes a human being only among human beings.* 'reedom is possible
only through upbringing (5rDiehung+ through the influence of other free beings ("& /,/.!-B; cf. "& -,''1+. $he summons
should be understood as that kind of obect through which something like a reason for a free action can first be given to us. Fichte;s argument is
that application of the concept of another I is the transcendental condition for the possibility of our
awareness of a reason for acting. )It follows that if there are to be human beings at all, there must be more than oneJ$he
concept of a human being is not the concept of an individual E for an individual human being is unthinkable E but rather the concept of a species*
("& /,/.+. )/elf-consciousness therefore originates with my act of selection from a general mass of rational
beings as suchJ8% free individual9 subsists only in the whole, and by means of the whole, as a portion of the whole* (6% -,',100+. %cting
rationally, even acting autonomously, in other words, is not something a human being could do alone. %utonomy thus consists not in reecting the
influence of others, but in being influenced by others in the right way. 0ducation, and being given reasons for action, constitute an
essentially different way of being influenced by the world from any merely causal influence, through which one may be coerced, or manipulated,
or conditioned to behave, but not enabled to act freely or autonomously. If we embrace some conception of mind and action that cannot
distinguish what Fichte calls a :summons; from being causally influenced in general, then we should not expect to understand human freedom or
rational action at all. Fichte;s argument implies that those who think of human individuality and freedom as somehow distinct from, or even in
opposition to, human community, understand neither the nature of individual freedom nor the nature of community. Fichte;s view here, if correct,
would also have some important implications for our conceptions of reason and rationality. 1iing oneself a reason for acting is
deriatie from being gien a reason by others and from giving others a reason. 6iving others a reason is the
internaliDation of being given a reason by another, and giving oneself a reason is only an application to oneself of giving others a reason. Kust as
the nature of a mental state is not known exclusively by its owner, so a reason for me is not something answerable only to my perspective. Kant
is right that rational thinking is thinking for yourself, but also from the standpoint of everyone else.2 It follows that there is something
fundamentally wrongheaded about developing conceptions of rationality that are oriented exclusively to the agent;s standpoint 2the agent;s
desires, beliefs and preferences+. $he ideally rational person cannot therefore be conceived of (as often seems to happen in the theories of
rational choice theorists, game theorists, and economists+ as a calculating sociopath with a gambling addiction.
$his card ustifies why the only way for my action to be free to choose normatively is if it is
based only in the not I. $here is only the causally determined and then the reason, reason can
exist only within the mind of an other, thus to be free to take action I must get my options from
the mind of an other.
$hus the in order to be consistent with ethics, we must be basing ethics in terms of the
independent calls and relationships to others. Gowever the respect for the transcendental
summons of the other will imply that we must resist totaliDing creations of identity. $his alone
will allow us to maintain the separateness of the other. Lerrida
/
explains.
Aow, having said this!!again very simply, in a way which is too simple!!I think we do not have to choose between unity and multiplicity. Mf
course, deconstruction!!that has been its strategy up to now.!insisted not on multiplicity for itself but on the
heterogeneity, the difference, the disassociation, which is absolutely necessary for the relation to the
other. $hat disrupts the totality is the condition for the relation to the other. $he privilege granted to unity,
to totality, to organic ensembles, to community as a homogeniDed whole!!this is a danger for responsibility, for decision, for
ethics, for politics. $hat is why I insisted on what prevents unity from closing upon itself, from being closed up. This is not only a matter of
description, of saying that this is the way it is. It is a matter of accounting for the possibility of responsibility,
of a decision, of ethical commitments. $o understand this, you have to pay attention to what I would call singularity.
"ingularity is not simply unity or multiplicity. Aow, this does not mean that we have to destroy all forms of unity wherever they occur. I have
never said anything like that. Mf course, we need unity, some gathering, some configuration. Nou see, pure unity or pure multiplicity!!when there
is only totality or unity and when there is only multiplicity or disassociation!!is a synonym of death. $hat interests me is the
limit of eery attempt to totali(e, to gather, versammeln!!and I will come to this 6erman word in a moment, because it is
important for me--the limit of this unifying, uniting moement, the limit that it had to encounter,
because the relationship of the unity to itself implies some difference. $o be more concrete, take the
e*ample of a person or of a culture. $e often insist nowadays on cultural identity!!for instance, national
identity, linguistic identity, and so on. /ometimes the struggles under the banner of cultural identity, national
identity, linguistic identity, are noble fights. Fut at the same time the people who fight for their identity must pay
attention to the fact that identity is not the selfidentity of a thing, this glass, for instance, this microphone,
but implies a difference within identity. That is, the identity of a culture is a way of being
different from itself; a culture is different from itself; language is different from itself; the person is different from itself. Mnce you
take into account this inner and other difference, then you pay attention to the other and you understand that fighting for your own identity is not
exclusive of another identity, is open to another identity. %nd this prevents totalitarianism, nationalism, egocentrism, and so on. $hat is what I
tried to demonstrate in the book called $he Mther Geading, in the case of culture, person, nation, language, identity is a self!differentiating
identity, an identity different from itself, having an opening or gap within itself 8 %712!10= MG.!119. That totally affects a
structure, but it is a duty, an ethical and political duty, to take into account this
impossibility of being one with oneself. It is because I am not one with myself that I can speak with the other and address
the other. $hat is not a way of avoiding responsibility. Mn the contrary, it is the only way for me to take responsibility and to make decisions.
$hat raises one of my 4uestions regarding Geidegger. %s you know, deconstruction owes a lot to Geidegger. $hat is a complex problem that I
cannot take up now. Aevertheless, one of the recurrent criti4ues or deconstructive 4uestions I pose to Geidegger has to do with the privilege
Geidegger grants to what he calls @ersammlung, gathering, which is always more powerful than dissociation. I would say exactly the opposite
8cf. "dO-.!20= "oO'/!'.9. 1B -nce you grant some priilege to gathering and not to dissociating,
then you leae no room for the other, for the radical otherness of the other, for the radical singularity
of the other. I think, from that point of view, separation, dissociation is not an obstacle to society, to
community, but the condition. &e addressed this a moment ago with the students. 11 3issociation, separation,
is the condition of my relation to the other. I can address the -ther only to the e*tent that
there is a separation, a dissociation, so that I cannot replace the other and ice ersa. $hat is
what some French!speaking philosophers such as Flanchot and Pevinas call the Qrapport sans rapport,Q the relationless relation 8cf. Foi1-!129. 1'
The structure of my relation to the other is of a 4relation without relation.4 It is a relation in which the other remains
absolutely transcendent. I cannot reach the other. I cannot know the other from the inside and so on. $hat is not an obstacle but the condition of
love, of friendship, and of war, too, a condition of the relation to the other. "o, dissociation is the condition of community, the condition of any
unity as such.
/
Leconstructionism in a nut "hell. Fordham ?niversity <ress; ' edition (Kanuary 1, 1..3+
$hus the standard is avoiding totaliDing fictions of the other. Mr to put it more simply we need to
avoid constructing a legal fiction in which we define another identity based upon our constructed
view of them.
%s a summary of the framework.
%ll thought, normativity and free choice is solely based out of a relation to the not I or the other.
$his is because first, our own identity can self conception only makes sense in relation to what
we are not, or the not I.
"econd because normative choice is based upon our interrelation in other words from the free
summons of the other.
%nd third because freedom can only exist in reason which is tethered not in the physical world
but in the mind of the not I.
Gowever by using totaliDing legal fictions we undermine any basis for our free choice to act
morally by destroying the other and replace it with our own conception not external to us.
5ach of these individuals arguments function in terms of a maor and minor premise to ultimately
prove the maor premise of the affirmative case which is that we ensure a coherent relation to the
Aot I.
$his maor premise if further ustified because if ustice is based in a relation to the other it must
be by definition incalculable and thus unexplainable in terms of our legal e4uations and fictions.
Lerrida ' explains
If someone tells you 4I am just,4 you can be sure that he or she is wrong, because being just
is not a matter of theoretical determination. I cannot know that I am just. I can know that I
am right. I can see that I act in agreement with norms, with the law. I stop at the red light. I am right. $hat is no problem. .ut that
does not mean that I am just. To speak of justice is not a matter of knowledge, of theoretical
udgment. $hat5s why it5s not a matter of calculation. 6ou can calculate what is right. Nou can udge;
you can say that, according to the code, such and such a misdeed deserves ten years of imprisonment. $hat may be a matter of calculation. .ut
the fact that it is rightly calculated does not mean that it is just. + judge, if he wants to be
just, cannot content himself with applying the law. 7e has to reinent the law each time. If he
wants to be responsible, to make a decision, he has not simply to apply the law, as a coded program, to a given
case, but to reinent in a singular situation a new just relationship8 that means that ustice cannot be reduced
to a calculation of sanctions, punishments, or rewards. $hat may be right or in agreement with the law, but that is not ustice. 9ustice, if it
has to do with the other, with the infinite distance of the other, is always une!ual to the
other, is always incalculable. 6ou cannot calculate justice. Pevinas says somewhere that the definition of
ustice!!which is very minimal but wkhich I love, which I think is really rigorous!!is that justice is the relation to the other.
1- That is all. -nce you relate to the other as the other, then something incalculable comes
on the scene, something which cannot be reduced to the law or to the history of legal
structures. That is what gies deconstruction its moement, that is, constantly to suspect, to
critici(e the gien determinations of culture, of institutions, of legal systems, not in order to destroy
them or simply to cancel them, but to be just with justice, to respect this relation to the other as justice.
$he minor premise is that treating uveniles as adults is necessary to ensure that we avoid a
totaliDing fictions of uveniles.
$he concept of childhood as utiliDed in the uvenile system is itself a legal fiction. Kordan K. $itus
5xplains
%lthough the history of children is replete with controversy (cf. %riRs, 1.3B=1.3'; deOause, 1.0-; Gunt, 1.0B; <ollock, 1.1/; "hahar,
1..B=1..'+, scholars agree that childhood was differently regarded in the past. /timulated by the
work of historians such as %riRs and originating within constructionist and interpretie perspecties in
sociology (Ferger S Puckmann, 1.33+, the term childhood has become an analytical one, used as con-
ceptual classification open to ariation rather than a simple biological descriptor. +n
emerging paradigm recogni(es the socially constructed character of childhood (Kames, Kenks, S
<rout, 1..1; Kenks, 1..3; <rout S Kames, 1..B+. :arious configurations of dis- courses on children offer
coe*isting and yet conflicting ideologies. 3iscourses, considered as refle*ie and social
practices of acting on the world, "systematically form the objects of which they speak*
(Foucault, 1.0', p. -.+. % powerful discourse can constitute a "r;gime of truth* (Foucault, 1.1B, p. 1/1+,
framing what we think and say about children and how we treat them. The modern iew
that children are inherently and essentially different in their nature from adults has
followed from two competing strands of discourse incorporating contrasting images of
children.
$he construction of the uvenile as an other is integrated into the logic of the uvenile system
defining the way that we treat them as well as the way we construct the identity of adults.
Aoon
-
explains

The ast majority of the children in the juenile justice system ! those that are Flack or Frown ! may
be treated as others in two ways. $hey may be othered as a result of their status as children, and they may be
othered because they are not white. -therness deried from both binaries contributes to the functioning
of the juenile justice system and contributes to the increased harshness of that system. %.
$he %dult!Mther Finary %hildren are other than adult, and by their construction, they also produce the
meaning of adulthood. %hildren are small, weak, immature, trusting, playful, and physically
undeeloped, while adults are big, strong, mature, skeptical, serious , and physically deeloped.
.ecause children differ from adults, they are treated differently. 7ow they are treated,
howeer, turns on how their otherness is constructed. $he child as other has two aspects, one positive and one
negative. In the positive conception of children#s otherness, children are valued. In the negative, they are not. Foth negative and positive
interpretations of the child as other exhibit the typical features of otherness. %s others, children define the adult self, are abstractions, cannot
define themselves, and are controlled. 1. $he <ositive 7onception of the 7hild as Mther In the positive expression of children#s otherness,
children are treated as inchoate adults, as beings with great potential that should be nurtured and developed. n1/' 7hildren are represented as
sweet, kind, vulnerable, and, at least in theory, as special obects of attention, love, and care. n1// $hey are valued for what they are, as well as
for what they can become. 7hildren are to be protected from potential harm and from negative influences on their emotional, moral, and physical
development. %s children are represented with these positive 4ualities, they are represented as haing !ualities that
adults do not hae, 4ualities that are transient and ephemeral; indeed, that is one reason why children are viewed as special. In this
way, children construct the meaning of adulthood. If children are trusting, loving, malleable, and dependent, then
adults ought not retain these 4ualities. %learly, these positive 8T0B19 4ualities of childhood are socially constructed.
n1/- <ot all children are trusting and loving. The iew of children and the perceived 4ualities that children are
thought to e*hibit change oer time. n1/2 These !ualities do not change in response to
!uantitatie research about children5s lies and thoughts. ,ather, the iew of children
changes as adult perceptions, attitudes, and consciousness change. $hat is, children are abstracted by
-Kenneth F. Aunn. %U$I7P5, "NO<M"I?O, $G5 5AL MF %LMP5"75A75, $G5 7GIPL
%" M$G5U, U%75 %AL LIFF5U5A$I%P $U5%$O5A$ IA $G5 K?@5AIP5 K?"$I75
"N"$5O. Le<aul Paw Ueview. "pring, 'BB'
adults in response to adult needs. A1/3 %hildren cannot define themseles. 5ven within the positive interpretation of
children#s otherness, children cannot determine what it is to be a child, what 4ualities children must have, and what
4ualities children should not have. Indeed, the inability of children to define themseles or their reality is
one of the things that make them children in the eyes of adults. This aspect of the treatment of children
is captured in the old saying, 4children are to be seen and not heard.4 Uarely in this society are
children, even children who are loved and valued, heard. n1/0 7hildren are not allowed to vote and are not otherwise allowed representation on
political issues that are of the greatest importance to them. n1/1 In the case of children who are part of the positive construction of childhood, this
voicelessness is understood as necessary for the child#s own good. It is intended to protect the child from the compromises and influences of
politics and to prevent the child from making decisions that may compromise the child#s best interests, as those interests are understood by adults.
A1/. %lthough fear of the child is less important, control is an important feature of the positie
interpretation of children5s otherness. + child5s lack of control and an adult5s insistence on
control is an e*pected part of the representation of childhood. n1-B %gain, t his insistence on controlling
8T0B'9 the child is justified as necessary to protect the child and as a circumstance demanded by what is in the child5s best interests.
n1-1 Fut because children do not think like adults, behave like adults, nor value the same things as adults, children are also feared as potential
agents of change. $he possibility always exists that the next generation will not uphold and reproduce the institutions that adults have established.
Thus, children are feared and controlled until they hae been properly sociali(ed and no
longer represent a threat to adult institutions. A1-' '. $he Aegative 7onception of the 7hild as Mther $he positive
conception of childhood is not the only way that children#s otherness may be articulated. In addition to the positive conception of the child as
other, which values children, there exists a negative conception that views children as a threat or burden. n1-/ The negatie
perspectie of children5s otherness sees children as a drain on scarce resources. n1-- They
are a drain because they are dependent, ine*perienced, and needy. 7hildren re4uire attention, love,
training, and material support, and although these needs may be considered as necessary investments in the negative interpretation of children#s
otherness, 8T0B/9 they are simply seen as costs. n1-2 In addition, the negative otherness of children poses a threat. 7hildren need to be
controlled and, in the negative view of children#s otherness, the child as other is uncontrollable. The negatie otherness of
children also shapes the adult self, p erhaps een more so than the positie interpretation of otherness. $hile
adults may e*hibit some positie traits of children, such as kindness and trust, the distinction between
adults and the negatie child as other is much more stark. -ne becomes an adult to the
e*tent that one jettisons the negatie attributes of childhood, such as lacking independence
and being unable to take care of oneself. n1-3 7hildren#s lower degree of intellectual development figures largely in the
distinctions made between children and adults. n1-0 7hildren, unlike adults, are not able to think for themselves. Fecause they are not yet fully
developed intellectually, children do not think in the linear, rational way that adults do, which is privileged in &estern cultures. n1-1
7onse4uently, children are not trusted with important decisions.
Aoon 7ontinues.
-therness manifests itself in the juenile justice system both in the way that youth are
treated within the system and in the way the system itself is iewed within the broader
society. =erceied as others, +frican +merican youth receie harsher treatment from actors
within the juenile justice system. In addition, the way that +frican +merican youth are
represented in the broader society has fueled a drie to make the juenile justice system
tougher, harder, and more punitie. This transformation of the juenile courts has led to
the obseration that we hae somehow reached the 4end of adolescence.4 In the remaining sections of
this %rticle, I will explore how otherness affects micro!level discretionary decisions made by actors in the uvenile ustice system and macro!level
policy decisions made concerning the overall structure and purposes of the uvenile ustice system.
$his alteration and constructed identity effects the actions we take for them rendering it a fiction.
%dditionally the status 4uo transfer apparatus of the uvenile system further constructs identities
for individuals. $itus ' explains
The way we define children incorporates assumptions about how we ought to treat them. +
discourse that romantici(es childhood assumes not only that children are inherently good, but
also that their malleability makes them susceptible to influence and vulnerable to corruption, necessitating
their protection. +lternatiely, adopting a iew of the child as wicked and sinful suggests that
children should be carefully controlled, disciplined, and restrained to train them. Uesearchers have begun to detail how
the ariable social construct of childhood both helps constitute the legal order and is a
social product of that social institution (%insworth, 1..1; 5mpey, 1.0.; Feld, 1...+. Throughout the course
of the last century, the legal boundary of childhood has shifted between these two dichotomous images as
)youthful offenders have been transformed from innocent children to hardened adult criminals* ("cott, 'BB', pp. 11-!112+. The juenile
justice system , likewise, has shifted from )child saving* to )public accountability* ("ealander, 'BB/, p. 1.+
while attempting to reconcile the dissonance created by the "competing images of when a
child is a criminal and the criminal is a child# (Feld, 1..., p. 3+. Kuvenile transfer provisions reflect this )cul! tural
and legal reformation of the social construction of :youth; from innocent, immature, and dependent children to responsible, autonomous, and
mature offenders* (Feld, 'BBB, p. 1'.+. % sacrificial crisis arises when the presumed innocent and vulnerable nature of the uvenile offender is
)iconologically irreconcilable* with that of the seriousness of violent criminality (Kenks, 1..3, p. 1'2+. For 6irard (1.0'=1.00+, the sacrificial
crisis is defined as )a crisis affecting the cultural order. This cultural order is nothing more than a regulated
system of distinctions in which the differences among indiiduals are used to establish their
&identity and their mutual relationships# (p. -.+. $he crisis is resolved when the offender is expelled from the
uvenile ustice system for being insufficiently child!like (Kames S Kenks, 1..3; Kenks, 1..3+, declared to be not a child and denied the social
protections associated with the uvenile court. %n intercourt transfer permits the minor to be )charged, held, released on bail, prosecuted,
sentenced, and incarcerated in the same manner as an adult* (%laska "tatute, 'BB-a+. %s demonstrated below, such transfer also serves as an
institution! aliDed means of constructing the uvenile as scapegoat.