Part I: The Implicitness of the Aesthetic

It is frequently acknowledged in the world of sport academia that sport, es- pecially when played at a
high level, has aesthetic qualities1 yet, interestingly, the aesthetic dimension is not always
acknowledged by those actually engaged in sport, whether as performers or spectators. It is often
persons, one step removed, who may have a more disinterested or impartial attitude to the outcome,
who are able to perceive that the aesthetic is an important element for those who participate in sport,
even if they themselves may not recognize it as such. For example, Knowles (13), whose interest in the
aesthetics of sport is in relation to photography, draws our attention to its implicitness for the
performer. He says:
There is the aesthetics of sport, the aesthetics of the equipment. The feel of standing at the crease in
the middle of the Basin Reserve *international cricket ground in Wellington+ is something you dont feel
sitting on the embank- ment. There are a whole range of emotions and aesthetic triggerings that
sportsman go throughfeeling the air, being out on the frozen turf of a rugby ground, walking on the
perfection of a golf green, and they dont even know that they love it. It comes through into them
invisibly, unconsciously, but it is there.
If you changed the colour of golf greens to orange, you would probably lose most of the golfers. If you
changed the turf to plastic, they probably wouldnt play golfit is the feel of the grass, that tiny little
hole with the elegant stick sticking out of it. (13: p. 1)
The spectators, too, can be often unaware that a considerable part of their enjoyment of sport has an
aesthetic aspect. They may consider their main interest is on making quantitative judgments, for
example, the measurement of what has been achieved in a particular contest, concerning the score, the
current positioning of teams, and who is likely to win given the state of play. Fans and devotees may
explain their consuming passion for sport for quite different reasons than aesthetic ones, where other
concerns are overriding, for example, in relation to their loyalty and allegiance to a particular team or
player. They may fail to recognize the aesthetic
84 WRIGHT
as a distinct part of their experience, which remains indistinguishable from just the sheer excitement of
a particular event. The aesthetic dimension is often implicit but can be expressed in our tone of voice or
gesture. One reason why the aesthetic remains implicit is perhaps because as partici- pants (whether in
the role of performer or spectator), we are often verbally inhibited when it comes to declaring our
aesthetic appreciation. We therefore fail to share our experience with others. Matravers argues that
because the aesthetic is not al- ways talked about, the aesthetic delight can often only be discerned
from the con- text and the conversational tone. It is not usually the words in an utterance by which we
pick up that it is aesthetic, but the way it is said (16: p. 271). On those very memorable occasions when
an aesthetic moment is so outstanding we lose our inhibitions and aesthetic evaluations are exclaimed
out loud, it is done by drawing on aesthetic concepts. For example, we may exclaim a movement to be
graceful! balanced! poised! or beautiful! It is the purpose of this paper to consider the nature of
these concepts. I shall proceed by looking first at the meaning of aesthetic concepts, drawing on the
ana- lytical work of other philosophers, in particular Zangwill (21), Sibley (19), Mea- ger (17), and
Hungerland (11), and then I shall examine the role these concepts play in our appreciation of sport. It is
my intention to show how an understanding of this role can make our aesthetic appreciation more
explicit and also show why technical excellence, while being a necessary condition, can never be a
sufficient one to guarantee aesthetic value in sport. I shall highlight the importance of the aesthetic
response in the connection we often make between aesthetic and techni- cal excellence.
Part II: The Role of Aesthetic Concepts
What then do we mean by aesthetic concepts, for example, when we declare, a shot is beautiful, a
stroke has fine touch, a sprint is sheer speed? A good starting point is to recognize that judgments
are written into the meaning of these concepts. In this regard, the distinction that Zangwill (21) makes
between what he calls verdictive judgments and substantive judgments is very apposite. Drawing on the
earlier work of Austin (3), he explains verdictive judgments as those con- cerning whether something
has aesthetic merit and substantive ones as those refer- ring to particular qualities, for example,
garish, delicate, balanced. If we apply this distinction to the above examples in sport, then clearly
to say a shot is beautiful is to make a verdictive judgment, but to say a stroke has fine touch, a
sprint is sheer speed are to make substantive judgments. The ones that are only verdictive do not tell
us a great deal, only whether there is positive or negative aesthetic value. As Austin (3) drew our
attention to in his well known article, where he talks about the dainty and the dumpy as well as the
beautiful, aesthetic concepts can be wider than the verdictive. He said that substantive concepts, which
are also relevant to aesthetic judgments, tell us a great deal more than just verdictive ones. Austin
further argued that these two kinds of concepts are not unrelated, and there is a strong relationship
between the two. He believed that the point of the latter is to get us to investigate further those
substantive properties that are the basis of aesthetic value. Goodman (9), cited in Zangwill (21), also
argues that substantive judgments give us greater insight than just verdictive ones.
In the context of art he says:
To say a work of art is good does not after all provide much information, does not tell us whether the
work is evocative, robust, vibrant or exquisitely designed and still less what are its salient specific
qualities of colour, shape, or sound. (21: p. 64)
Similarly, we can apply the same argument to sport. To describe a game as beau- tiful tells us very
little; we do not know, for example, whether the game was flowing and sustained or sharp and
penetrating. Other writers, especially Sibley (19), Meager (17), and Hungerland (11), who paid
attention to the meaning of aesthetic concepts, argued that in order to support our aesthetic
judgments, we often refer to other qualities that are not in themselves aesthetic ones. Hungerland
argues that we come to see aesthetic quality by looking at something different. The links between
aesthetic and non-aesthetic qualities, she says, are both ob- vious and vital (11: p. 213). Similarly,
Meager says, Ultimately any application of an aesthetic concept should be explicable by reference to
the applicability of non-aesthetic concepts (17: p. 313). If we apply this to the context of sport, it could
be argued that these non- aesthetic qualities can be identified as the technical ones of physical
movement and that, while they are not in themselves aesthetic qualities, they may act as keys to unlock
the door to an aesthetic outlook. Within the context of a particular sport, for example, it is necessary to
know the rules that operate, how specified goals are realized, what counts as fulfilling a function well,
and what constitutes success. Appreciation of differences in style and how these are linked to technical
judg- ments will also be relevant. As Boxill says, the more we understand, the more we appreciate the
intricacies and difficulties involved (6: p. 513). In enabling us to recognize these aspects, the expert of a
particular sport will have a role to play that can be likened to the role of the art critic. Sibley says, When
we cannot quite say what non-aesthetic features make something unbal- anced or moving, the good
critic often puts his finger on something which strikes us as the right explanation (19: p. 64 ). In a
similar way, the sport expert can enable us to share his or her observations and learn to make
appropriate judgments and technical evaluations. This kind of initiation can help us to discern features
that are in themselves non-aesthetic, but which may help us to appreciate aesthetic features as well. We
may, for example, come to see a game as aesthetically excit- ing because our attention has been drawn
to a move that is risky, innovative, and technically excellent, at a critical moment in the game. However,
taking this analysis further it can also be argued that while technical understanding and technical ob-
servations are necessary, they will not be sufficient. Sibley (19), Meager (17), and Hungerland (11)
suggest that while the nature of the aesthetic description of an object depends on the nature of the
non-aesthetic properties of that object, no aes- thetic description of a work is implied by a purely non-
aesthetic description. At best the non-aesthetic rules out certain aesthetic evaluations.2 Meager says:
No description in non-aesthetic terms permits us to claim that these aesthetic terms must undeniably
apply to it or that any set of non-aesthetic properties would be casually sufficient for the correct
application of an aesthetic term. There are no sufficient conditions, no non-aesthetic features such that
the
presence of some set or number of them will beyond doubt logically justify the application of an
aesthetic term. (17: p. 306)
In applying this argument to a sporting context, this means that, while the relationships between
technical qualities and aesthetic ones are important, they cannot on their own ensure the aesthetic
value of a particular movement or series of movements. This argument has strong implications when
considering why sport affords us aesthetic pleasure and is illustrated very well if it is applied to the con-
cept of grace. Grace is both a substantive and verdictive concept. In declaring that a move is graceful,
we are drawing attention to the technical qualities of func- tionality as well as commending its aesthetic
value. In the past, considerable lit- erature3 has established a close relationship between functionality
and grace. Move- ment or action, which is graceful, is described in terms of its efficiency, its economy, or
both. Cordner (8) has criticized this tight relationship. While not denying that there is such a connection,
he argues that grace cannot be tied just to functional- ityfirst, because there are many instances of
grace within sport which appear to have no connection with functionality and, second, because there
are plenty of examples where sporting movements are efficient and economical but lack grace. This
criticism can now be put more strongly. If, as Meager (17) argues, non- aesthetic qualities are relevant,
we cannot prove by argument or by assembling a sufficiency of conditions that something has aesthetic
value, then similarly it can be said that, while we might agree on those non-aesthetic qualities of
functionality, we may still not agree on whether a movement is graceful. It is in the nature of aesthetic
concepts that, while the reasons we give for our judgment will rest on technical quality, there is no
necessary connection between functional and aes- thetic qualities. To say a move was skilful, finely
timed, accurately delivered is no guarantee that it also has the aesthetic quality of grace. We now need
to consider what else is required.
Part III: The Importance of the Response
The reason that aesthetic qualities are not logically guaranteed by non-aes- thetic ones, Sibley argues, is
because a particular kind of perceptiveness is re- quired. He says that one has to be able to see
aesthetic qualities in a way one does not have to see the non-aesthetic ones. According to Sibley, our
ability to discern aesthetic features is dependent on having good eyesight, hearing, and so on. However,
people endowed with these normal faculties may still fail to discern them (19: pp. 78-79). Zangwill4
explains that the substantial point that Sibley, Meager, and Hungerland make is that an aesthetic
judgment comes from the expe- rience, but the description only gives reasons for that experience.
Matravers (16) explains this point more fully. He argues that having an experience described is not the
same as actually having the experience. If one wants to see a red cricket ball one should not go of in
search of a description. In this way aesthetic percep- tion parallels colour perception (16: p. 271).
Aesthetic beliefs, he says, are em- bedded in the experience. In making aesthetic judgment, we are not
only able to point out those non-aesthetic conditions upon which our judgment depends; we also
respond aesthetically. This is true of both the spectator and the performer. Without this emotional
response, there would be nothing to explain or give rea- sons for. The use of aesthetic concepts implies
there has been this response. The
response also shows that, while we might agree on non-aesthetic qualities, we do not always agree on
the aesthetic ones.
Technical Excellence and the Aesthetic Response
The importance of the aesthetic response, especially in making the differ- ence between the use of
aesthetic and non-aesthetic concepts, is particularly perti- nent when considering the relationship
between the aesthetic and the technical excellence of a sporting performance. It has been frequently
argued5 that when sport is technically excellent, it takes on aesthetic qualities. In a recent article, Kupfer
(16) draws our attention to where perfection as negation can provide the aesthetic experience. He gives
the example of the tennis ace.
The act completely achieves a definite objective of the sport by overwhelm- ing the athletes opponents,
negating them as competitors. The defining fea- tures of this sort of perfection aesthetically enhance
one another and in- clude: the inability of the opponent to respond, the completeness of the play, the
immediacy and economy of the act and the apparent self-sufficiency of the individual athlete. (16: p. 22)
Here the technical excellence is supreme, but it is not enough. While aesthetic judgments are often tied
to technical excellence, even perfection, they are also tied to the response that we have. Kupfer, for
example, also speaks in his article of the enjoyment and delight that accompanies the witnessing of
perfection (16: p. 22). By explicitly recognizing the aesthetic as a response and not simply a tech- nical
judgment, we have some way of explaining the huge kind of emotional re- sponse we have to great
moments in sport. There is the commitment, for example, to our team or the players who represent us.
There is the appraisal, That was done well: It was technically very difficult, and it was achieved
successfully. There is the recognition of exceptional and unique performance: We are not likely to see
this again; this kind of talent is rare and not witnessed very often. But our appre- ciation often goes
further than this. Our delight is not simply that a movement was technically superb or that it makes it
more likely our team will win, or that the performance we have witnessed may be the best we are ever
likely to see. We are also moved and uplifted by the dynamics and perceptual qualities of the move-
ments themselves. Indeed, I would argue this is true of all sports. The importance of the aes- thetic
experience is just as relevant to the so-called aesthetic sports and cuts across the non-purposive and
purposive distinction. In fact, it may be misleading to pay such close attention to the so-called non-
purposive or aesthetic sports that is, those defined by aesthetic criteria. Focusing on those kinds
of sports may make it look as if, providing those criteria are fulfilled, the performance will nec- essarily
have aesthetic value. However, these aesthetic criteria could be easily re-described in purely technical
language. The movements, which are prescribed, are dependent on principles to do with the level of
difficulty and biomechanical efficiency. In gymnastics, what counts is how well the movements are
performed, and these could be explained without reference to aesthetic goodness but rather in terms of
how close the movement comes to technical perfection. The movements are mostly pre-set. Even where
the move is new, it is still assessed on gymnastic criteria. However, appreciating the aesthetic is not
simply a question of knowing
and judging that certain criteria have been fulfilled. It is the experience that counts over and above what
these criteria might be. If we cannot prove by argument or by assembling a sufficiency of conditions that
something is aesthetic, then this is just as true of non-purposive as well as purposive sports. Technical
criteria are indeed relevant to our aesthetic appreciation, but they do not in any sense guarantee it. A
gymnastic sequence may be perfect, but we may not respond aesthetically to it. In fact, having to look
for certain set movements that exhibit gymnastic skill, where there is a pre-determined set routine, can
mitigate against this response. We need to distinguish between the flawless performance of the
gymnast, which looks vi- brant, dynamic, and uplifting, and the equally flawless performance of a
gymnast, but which looks tired, mechanical, and over-rehearsed. If technical criteria are made identical
to aesthetic ones, then it is with a loss to the uniqueness and value of the aesthetic response. Meager
says: There is no substitute for individual judge- ment with its spontaneity and speculation (17: p.
305).
Part IV: Aesthetic Concepts Do a Double Duty
In the past, if we have been guilty of equating the aesthetic with the techni- cal, then one important
reason for this is because the concepts we use perform a double duty. The concepts used often embrace
both aesthetic and non-aesthetic meaning. Matravers (16) draws our attention to how this can lead to
the meaning of certain terms being used ambiguously and how this can result in misunder- standing. He
gives an example of an aesthetic and non-aesthetic use of the same utterance. He asks us to imagine he
is standing with a friend in a cathedral and commenting on its vastness. His friend agrees, informing him
that the nave is over 200 feet long. Matravers argues that there is a misunderstanding. He is comment-
ing on the vastness of the cathedral metaphorically and experientially. In its aes- thetic sense, it gives
him a feeling of insignificance and of being overwhelmed, but his friend took his comment literally.
Something here is not being communicated. I did not just mean to say the thing was big but to draw my
colleagues attention to the dispositional prop- erty of the size to cause a feeling of insignificance, or of
being overwhelmed. (16: p. 274)
In sport we can see the same kind of double use of the same term. Consider the example of a powerful
golf swing. In describing it as powerful, an assessment is made in functional terms, but the concept of
powerful points to the aesthetic di- mension as well, the quality of the movement in its own right, which
is perceptual. We notice, feel, and respond to the power and beauty of the shot, which cannot be
reduced or explained by the recognition that the swing is instrumentally successful in achieving its end.
Although there may be occasions when this is all we mean, the possibility of misunderstanding, as in the
cathedral example, can arise. These kinds of expression will be partly actual, partly metaphorical. We
need to be aware that the concepts available to us have these two uses and to acknowledge the im-
portance of the aesthetic use. Because the numerical/quantitative/technical language is predominant in
sport, our language lets us down. When we are moved aesthetically through en- gagement in sport,
descriptions are inadequate because we have to use the lan- guage available to us, which already has an
instrumental stamp on it. This is not
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Aesthetic Implicitness 89
only true of sport but in other aspects of our lives, where the means-end distinction predominates.
When we experience the aesthetic in sport, we may use descriptions that are also functional in meaning
and, because of this, we may fail to communi- cate to others that our evaluation is, at least in part, an
aesthetic one. Our aesthetic enjoyment therefore remains implicit. If we are to recognize and celebrate
the aesthetic with others, we need to make a determined effort to start building up a vocabulary rather
as the poet does, in opposition to the main tendency of our lan- guage to describe and speak of our
world in instrumental terms. Indeed, this may be true not only of sport but in other aspects of our lives,
where the means-end distinction predominates. We need to draw our attention to the aesthetic
concepts that are appropriate in sport and to use them more explicitly and less ambiguously.
Part V: The Aesthetic Within a Wider Experience
It may also be true that the experience of the aesthetic is not always recog- nized for what it is because
it is always a part of a larger experience. The experi- ence is interrelated with other kinds of values. We
do not experience the aesthetic in sport in isolation; the experience is unified, and it may be difficult to
separate the aesthetic from other aspects of the whole. Recognizing what has aesthetic merit and the
nature of aesthetic apprecia- tion has to be understood in a particular context. We need to take into
account the nature of the activity and the differences in style. It is because our judgment is made within
the context of sport that the aims of sport are highly relevant. We are continuously aware of what it
takes technically to perform the movement success- fully. We enjoy watching the swimmer who glides
apparently effortlessly through the water, but at the same time we appreciate the technical effort and
skill that is required. (Interestingly, this not true of art forms. For example, in ballet, if we become aware
of the movements as difficult techniques that are being performed, the illusion of the dance is lost). We
also need to know what constitutes success in relation to the objectives of the sporting activity. In a
game, it would be quite inappropriate to appreciate aesthetically a shot at a goal, however good it
looked, if it failed to reach its target. Certainly the result, as Arnold (1) and others have argued, always
has to be rel- evant. The aesthetic pleasure is lost if the ball is out. We suspend judgment until we know
the outcome. We could say that aesthetic judgment is tied to, even sub- servient to, the purpose of
sport. It would be inappropriate to judge a sporting movement as having aesthetic value if it was
technically hopeless or unsuccessful. We also recognize that the quality of movement has to be
appropriate, according to the demands and character of that particular sport. The sport itself informs us
of what these qualities are. Grace is appropriate to an ice-skater, but not a wrestler; strength and power
are appropriate to a rugby player but not a synchronized swim- mer. The nature of sport as sport also
governs the experience. Sport is often very intense, not only because the outcome may matter a great
deal to us, but also because there are temporal and spatial limits that set it apart from other aspects of
our lives. We know a favorite sporting event will not last long and will not happen again (not in this
place, at this time, and in this particular way). There is imme- diacy about sport that is not true of other
objects that have aesthetic interest. We are present at the time of its making. Unlike a work of art
known to us in advance,
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90 WRIGHT
we cannot prepare ourselves for the aesthetic highs. We have to be attentive, to be on the lookout for
them. We are aware that aesthetic enjoyment within the event can be fleeting and unexpected. Playing
sport and watching sport live are essential parts of the experience. We cannot gain an aesthetic
experience simply by having the event described to us later by a friend. When they do happen, we
cannot put them on hold, although we try to do so. There is the replay, the frozen slide, but the moment
cannot be quite recaptured, and a replay is always second best. Others have also recognized the
importance of the immediacy of sport to aesthetic enjoy- ment. Graham (10) comments:
Even in the age of video recorders when games can be recorded for poster- ity, there is relatively little to
be gained from repeated viewing of them, leaving aside external gains like acquiring a better mastery of
the techniques of the game. (10: p. 21)
Part VI: Conclusion
Sporting activities did not evolve, nor were they designed to bring about, aesthetic qualities. By
definition, their main aim is to produce movement that is highly skilful because of the degree of
difficulty a particular sport demands due to the artificial obstacles that have to be overcome. Yet, as
many have argued, there is a connection, if only a contingent one, between skilful performance and
aesthetic quality, and it is exactly this quality that, in part, gives sport its intrinsic value. For while these
qualities are, in one sense, a byproduct of achieving ends that demand skilful means, they do help to
explain the intrinsic satisfaction sport can give us. However, the importance of the aesthetic to our
enjoyment of sport is not always acknowledged by those intimately engaged in it. This is in part due to
the fact it is interrelated with other values and is part of a larger experience. However, it is also due to
our language, which can prohibit us from making our aesthetic judgments out loud and share them with
others. To make us more explicitly aware of the aesthetic element in our apprecia- tion of sport, I have
argued we need to look more closely at the nature of aesthetic concepts and the role they play when we
describe the aesthetic in sport. On the account given, while non-aesthetic qualities are necessary
conditions, they are never sufficient. In particular, efficiency and economy of movement can never
ensure aesthetic worth. We need to be aware that our language may let us down, and the terms we use
to describe our response may mislead us. We have to be aware that the concepts we use can be
ambiguous and embrace both aesthetic and technical meaning. However, knowing about these concepts
as a series of beliefs is not what we are after. It is the experience or emotional response that makes the
aesthetic pos- sible. It demands from us a certain openness: An awareness of the possibilities that are
continuously thrown up by the nature of sport and that cut across the purposive and non-purposive
divide. Sport thrills are dependent on perceptual qualitative experience as well as on the judgments we
make in quantitative terms. There is of course the difficulty that at the heart of aesthetic judgment lies
subjectivity. This makes our aesthetic judgments open to the criticism that there are no aesthetic
standards, in the same way that there are technical ones. At best we might find inter-subjective
agreement. In order for this to happen, at the very least, we have to
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Aesthetic Implicitness 91
share our experiences with one another. There is a need to increase our under- standing of how
aesthetic concepts in sport can enhance our enjoyment. By explicitly acknowledging and using aesthetic
concepts, we will become more alive to values we may take for granted, which may otherwise be lost
under the weight attached to the importance of a quantitative result of a win or a loss. We need to be
more receptive to aesthetic possibilities, acknowledging that the aesthetic in sport is far- ranging,
involving an emotional response and not just the recognition of a techni- cally efficient or functionally
excellent performance.







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Notes
1See, for example, Aspin (2), Best (5), Boxill (6), Cooper (7), Kaelin (12), Kupfer (14), Reid, (18), and
Wertz (20). 2The relationship is an asymmetric one, which only works negatively. A non-aes- thetic
description might imply that a particular term could not be correctly applied aestheti- cally. A certain
description may make a description inapplicable or inappropriate. In other words, concepts may be
governed negatively by certain conditions, for example, an ill- timed move cannot be graceful, a slow
start cannot look speedy, a fumbled catch can- not look clean cut, a pole vaulter who falls back on
takeoff cannot soar. 3The close connection between grace and functionality has been argued in
particular by Best (5) and Kupfer (15). 4Zangwill says, What is important is the mental act of making a
pure judgement of aesthetic value and merit. The mental state is only available in the experience itself
(21: p. 319). 5For example, this point has been argued strongly by Boxill (6) and Kupfer (14).
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