Goodridge v.

Department of Public Health JR

See
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rickless/Rickless/Courses_files/Lecture2
3-2007-Goodridge.pdf

Facts:
On March and April 2001, Hillary and Julie Goodridge (along with a number of
gay or
lesbian couples) applied for a marriage license in their local city or town hall, and
were
turned down by the clerk on the grounds that Massachusetts law does not permit
same-
sex marriages. The Goodridges sued the Massachusetts Department of Public
Health (which is in charge of marriage licensing), claiming that the relevant
provisions of the marriage licensing statute violate their due process and equal
protection rights under Article I and Article X of the Declaration of Rights of the
Massachusetts Constitution. When a Superior Court judge found for the
Department of Public Health in 2002, the Goodridges appealed to the Supreme
Judicial Court, which took the case and issued a 4-3 decision in November 2003.

Massachusetts Justification of the Same-Sex Marriage Ban
1. Providing a favorable setting for procreation
2. Ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing
3. Preserving scarce state and private financial resource
Issue:
WON Massachusetts ban on same-sex civil marriages violates the due process
and equal protection guarantees in the Declaration of Rights. YES
Marriage is a vital social institution. The exclusive commitment of two individuals
to
each other nurtures love and mutual support; it brings stability to our society. For
those
who choose to marry, and for their children, marriage provides an abundance of
legal,
financial, and social benefits. In return, it imposes weighty legal, financial, and
social
obligations. The institution of marriage at issue here is the legal institution of civil
marriage, not the religious institution of holy matrimony. Judicial revocation of the
same-sex ban in the area of civil marriage does not entail judicial revocation of
the same-sex ban in the area of religious marriage.

The Courts answer to the justification of Massachusetts ban:
1. The ability or intent to procreate is neither necessary nor sufficient for
marital eligibility. The only precondition of marriage is the exclusive and
permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another.
2. Restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples cannot plausibly further the
legitimate state interest in protecting the welfare of children.
3. The same-sex marriage ban bears no rational relationship to the goal of
economy.

Held:
The appeal was affirmed and found that same-sex couples had the right to
marry.


United States v. WIndsor ONG [no hard copy]
Facts:
1. Edith Windsor married Thea Spyer in Ontarioa, Canada in 2007. Spyer died in
2009 and left her estate to Windsor. Windsor wanted to claim federal estate tax
exemption for surviving spouse but was prevented from doing so by Section 3 of
Defense of Marriage Act. Windsor had to pay $363,053 for Spyers estate.
2. Section 3 of DOMA portion: the word marriage means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word spouse
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife
3. She filed a suit that contends that DOMA violates the principles of equal
protection in the 5
th
Amendment.
4. US District court for the Southern District o f New York ruled that Section 3 of
DOMA is unconstitutional. Court of Appeals for Second Circuit affirmed
judgment.
Issue:
1. Does SC of US have jurisdiction to consider merits of the case? Yes
2. Is the DOMA unconstitutional as a deprivation of equal liberty of individuals
which is protected by 5
th
Amendment? Yes
Ruling:
1. All parties agreed that SC has jurisdiction to decide the case
2. DOMA rejects the concept that incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage
are uniform for all married couples within each State. DOMA violates basic due
process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.
DOMA creates 2 condratictory marriage regimes within the same State. It forces
same sex couples to live as married under state law but unmarried under federal
law; it diminishes stability and predictability of personal relations.
SC Ruling: Judgment of lower courts affirmed

Silverio v. Republic RAYMOND (2007)

FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transexual, anatomically
male but feels, thinks and acts as a female. After consulting with different
doctors in the US, he underwent psychological examination and breast
augmentation. On January 27, in his attempt to transform himself into a woman,
he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Thailand. He was issued by Dr.
Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, a medical certificate attesting that the petitioner had in fact
undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel
Jacinto to Mely and his sex from male to female through a petition in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, no opposition to the petition was heard. During
trial, petitioner testified with his american fiance as well as Dr. Cruz. His petition
was granted.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging there is no law allowing change of entries in
the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. CA agreed with Republic. Hence
this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether a persons name can be changed on the ground of sex
reassignment?

A change of name is a privilege, not a right and is controlled by statute. Article 37
of the Civil Code provides that No person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority.

This provision was amended by Section 1 of RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) which
reads No entry in civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
its implementing rules and regulations. This vesting of jurisdiction in
aforementioned administrative officers makes these proceedings administrative
and not judicial in nature.

In Section 4 of RA 9048, grounds for change in name are as follows: 1) The
petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to pronounce, 2)The new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known
by that first name or nickname in the community and 3) The change will avoid
confusion. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners name may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and public interest. The proper
remedy would have been administrative by filing with the local civil registrar.

2. Whether a persons sex can be changed on the ground of sex
reassignment?

Determination of sex is a legal issue. A persons sex is an essential factor in
marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil
status. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides All other matters pertaining to civil
status shall be governed by special laws. There is no special law in the
Philippines governing sex reassignment. This is fatal to petitioners cause.

3. Whether a persons entries can be changed on the ground of equity?

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and
public policy consequences. Petitioner admits this would be just the first step
towards his eventual marriage to male fiance. Granting the change will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
marriage as it a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman. There are also various laws which apply particularly to women such as
the Labor Code provisions, certain felonies in Revised Penal Code, among
others. There is public policy involved which would substantially affect women.

Ratio:


HELD:
Petition denied.
Republic v. Cagandahan INIGO
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981, registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up developed secondary male characteristics and
eventually diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). On December 11, 2003,
respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch
33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
Respondent alleges that she had clitoral hypertrophy in her early years, at age six, after an
ultrasound, it was discovered that she had small ovaries but at 13 years old, tests revealed that
her ovarian structures had diminished, stopped growing and had no breast or menses. For al
intents and purposes, as well as in disposition, considered herself male. To prove her claim,
respondent presented Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH, who
issued a medical certificate stating that respondent is genetically female but her body secretes
male hormones, has two sex organs of which the female part is undeveloped.
RTC granted respondents petition.
ISSUE:
Can a genetically female but predominantly male person request for change of name and sex?
RULING:
The Court ruled that the governing law with respect to change of name and sex is RA 9048.
Respondent, indisputably, has CAH, as such, is characterized by inappropriate manifestations of
male characteristics, although are genetically female. CAH people also have ambiguous
genitalia, appearing more male than female but have internal female reproductive organs which
may become undeveloped. These individuals are commonly referred to as intersex, and
respondent, having reached the age of majority, and having decided to be male, considering that
his body produces high levels of male hormones is a preponderant biological support for
considering him male.
Decision:
Republics petition is denied. RTC Branch 33 decision is affirmed.

Littleton v. Prange (1999) Hardberger, J. JONI [no hard copy]
Facts:
- Appellant Christie Lee Littleton is a transexual, one whose self-identity does not
correspond to her physical anatomy. She had undergone a sex reassignment
operation in 1979 and had amended her birth certificate to change her sex during
the pendency of the suit.
- Littleton sued Appellee Dr. Mark Prange for malpractice for the death of her
husband. Prange, challenging Christies capacity to sue as the surviving spouse,
assailed the validity of the Littletons marriage on the ground that Christie was
born a man and cannot be married to another man.

*As distinguished from homosexual, transexuals believe and feel they are of the
opposite sex. As distinguished from transvestite, they do not believe they are
dressing in the opposite sexs clothes but rather their own sexs clothes.

Issues: WON a marriage between a man and a post-operative transexual
woman is valid? NO

Held: The facts stated in her original birth certificate were true and accurate as of
the time it was recorded; that is, at the time of birth. She was then anatomically
and genetically a male. In the absence of legislation granting post-operative
transexuals the right to marry as females, her marriage is therefore invalid.

In re Estate of Thomas Trevino Araguz III RIA [no hard copy]

Eigenmann v. Guerra (1964) Bengzon, J. JM
Court of Appeals: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
which denied the annulment of the marriage

Facts:
Sometime in 1957, Eduardo Eigenman, an actor-singer, met Maryden
Guerra, a dancer, at the Clover Theater in Manila, and thereafter they
decided to marry.
Plaintiff and defendant filed for a marriage license with the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City on October 25, 1957
The two were married on November 5, 1957

Issue:
Whether the grounds for annulment as stated by Plaintiff-Appellant are valid:
1. Plaintiff was less than the statutory age at the time of the marriage NO
2. Plaintiffs consent was not freely given NO
3. Lack of authority by law of the officer to administer oath NO
4. Lack of written and sworn parental consent on the part of the Plaintiff NO

Ratio:
1. Plaintiff represented himself to be over 25 years of age in the application
for marriage license, which led the defendants-appellees to believe that he
was capacitated to marry without need of parental consent. He is now
precluded, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, from asserting or
proving otherwise.
2. The remark of Froilan Guerra, Marydens father, is not the kind of threat
envisioned by the law that would constitute a valid ground for the
annulment of a marriage.
3. A marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained. Lack of authority on the part of the subscribing
officer would not render the marriage void where the essential
requirements for its validity were present, and this irregularity is primarily
the lookout of the subscribing officer or his superior.
4. The written and sworn consent, as required in Article 61, pertains only to
the issuance of the marriage license and such formal requisite is not
essential to the validity of a marriage solemnized under a license,
provided that the other requisites for a valid marriage are present. The
consent may be given in any form, such as in this case, where the
appellants mother did not object to the marriage, despite her presence
during the ceremony.

Ruling:

Judgment affirmed, costs against the appellant

People v. Santiago MIGGY

FACTS:
- Nov. 23, 1926: Felipe Santiago (appellant) asked Felicita Masilang, 18 years
old, his niece by marriage, to accompany him across the river on some errand.
- After crossing, appellant conducted the girl to a grassy place that hid them from
public view (around twenty paces from the highway).
-Appellant raped Felicita by force and against her will.
-After that, the appellant brought the girl to the house of Agaton Santiago, his
uncle. Agaton, on the other hand, brought in a protestant minister who facilitated
the marriage of Felipe and Felicita.
ISSUE:
WON marriage is binding
-NO. Article 4 FC: The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). One of the
essential requisites for a marriage to be valid is that consent must be freely given
in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
- Moreover, the consent of the girl was vitiated by duress. The marriage
ceremony, likewise, was a mere device of the accused to avoid criminal liability
under the proviso to section 2 of act no. 1773 of the Philippine Commission.
HELD:
Judgment (of trial court) affirmed