Jacqueline Yip

LSE, Group 4, Cora Lacatus, 31 Oct 2013

1
If realism is correct, there would be no role for international organisations.
Discuss.

Realism argues that International Organisations are unable to mitigate anarchys
constraints on cooperation. This essay will discuss how the key tenets of realism
challenge the effectiveness of international organisations and reduce its role in
international cooperation to a marginal factor. First, this essay will look at the
realist beliefs of anarchy, self-help and the security dilemma and how these
contradict the effects of international organisations. Then, it will explore the realist
proposition that states are primarily concerned with relative gains as opposed to
absolute gains and how international organisations are unable to mitigate this
uncertainty. Finally, realist views on the authority and power of international
organisations in the anarchical realm will be covered.

Neoliberal support for the role of international organisation is based on the belief
that states are atomistic actors and that the biggest obstacle to international
cooperation is cheating
1
. Neoliberalism claims that states are indifferent to the gains
achieved by others and only seek to maximise individual absolute gains. Therefore,
international organisations hold the key to collaboration as they can help formalise
cooperation, reduce costs and decrease concern for cheating by ensuring that all
participants comply
2
. Realism on the other hand, argues that states are positional
actors and that concern for relative gains and cheating are the major impediments
to cooperation. These realist arguments can be directly linked back to some of the
key propositions of realism; states are the primary actors
3
, states in anarchy are
preoccupied with power and security and are predisposed towards conflict and

1
Grieco, Joseph M. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism." International Organization 42.03 (1988): 485.
Print.
2
Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies
of International Organizations." International Organization 53.4 (1999): 699-732.
Print.
3
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace. New
York: Knopf, 1967. Print.
Jacqueline Yip
LSE, Group 4, Cora Lacatus, 31 Oct 2013
2
competition
4
and the international environment severely penalizes states if they fail
to protect their vital interests
5
. As states are the major actors in the international
realm with no governing body to regulate or protect, they are in constant fear for
their survival as independent actors with no one to turn to for help. This security
dilemma is fuelled by uncertainty, the self-help nature of the world and the
assumption that the international environment holds repercussions to those states
that do not protect their own interests.

Realists argue that states worry that todays friend may be tomorrows enemy in
war
6
, state are uncertain about one anothers future intentions and thus may be
weary of others future capabilities. A state cannot risk having other states have
relatively higher gains that might translate in their dominance in power in the
future and potentially being a dangerous enemy. The anarchic nature of the
international society means that there is no one to stop other state from engaging in
violence to dominate or threaten use of violence. This fear and uncertainty drives
states to make precautions for the future. By being relatively more powerful than
other states, states can ensure that they can defend themselves in the case of being
threatened by other states. Unlike liberal claims that states are primarily concerned
with absolute gains, realists claim that states may even sacrifice gains in their own
absolute capability to prevent others from achieving even greater gains. Waltz
suggests that this may be due to the fact that states first concern is not to maximise
power but to maintain their position in the system
7
International organisations play
a redundant role in promoting international cooperation, as states are not satisfied

4
Aron, Raymond. Peace and War; a Theory of International Relations. Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1966. 591-600. Print.
5
Waltz, Kenneth. "Reflections on Theory of International Politics : A Response to My
Critics." Neorealism and Its Critics. By Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia UP,
1986. N. pag. Print.
6
Grieco, Joseph M. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism." International Organization 42.03 (1988): 485.
Print.
7
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley
Pub., 1979. Print.
Jacqueline Yip
LSE, Group 4, Cora Lacatus, 31 Oct 2013
3
with assurance of a partners compliance in a joint arrangement due to their
insecure about the partner achieving higher relative gains. A state will refuse to
commit, cooperate or abandon an agreement if it believes that partners are
achieving, or potentially may achieve relatively greater gains. Solving the cheating
issue does not solve the relative gains problem, as they still have to worry about
gaps in gains translating into advantages that could lead to aggression
8
.
Furthermore, the fear of relative gains is applicable to all forms of mutual gains in
cooperation, not only those that directly increase the military or political power of
states. Economics gains could ultimately be converted to greater resources to
strengthen military power. According to Grieco, neoliberals wrongly assume that
the worst possible outcome is the lost opportunity cost. Whereas the security
dilemma of the realist world mean that the possible dangers are much greater and
that cooperation could ultimately lead to lost sovereignty or security
9
.

Mearsheimer argues that international organisations are basically a reflection of
the distribution of power in the world. They are a manifestation of self-interested
calculations and have no independent effect on state behaviour and thus their role
in encouraging peaceful cooperation is marginal and temporary. Many instances of
cooperation such as alliances were formed and broken during the World Wars such
as the German and Soviet alliance against Poland in 1939
10
. They effectively
represent the interests and balance of powers at the given time period and can be
explained by the realist belief of the competitive nature of the international society.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisations (NATO), which was formed during the cold
war as a military alliance, was effective in preventing a third World War and helping
the West win the Cold war. However, Waltz argues that NATO was formed merely as
a manifestation of the bipolar balance of power in Europe and it was effectively the

8
Mearsheimer, John. "The False Promise of International Institutions." International
Security 19.3 (1994): 5-49. Print.
9
Grieco, Joseph M. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism." International Organization 42.03 (1988): 485.
10
Schweller, Randall L. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State
Back In." International Security 19.1 (1994): 77-107. Print.
Jacqueline Yip
LSE, Group 4, Cora Lacatus, 31 Oct 2013
4
balance of power, not NATO, which maintained stability during the Cold War
11
.
Whilst neoliberals see the survival of NATO after the Cold War as a success of
international institutions, it could also be explained as a means maintaining and
lengthening Americas grip on European foreign and military policies.
12
NATO role
as a military alliance only lasted as long as the Soviet Union posed a genuine threat,
after such, its power and survival was influenced by Americas pursuit of its
interests.

Finally, realists doubt the extent that International Organisations can reduce
uncertainty and act as a sanctioning and regulating body for international
cooperation. According to Weber, International Organisations can become
autonomous sites of authority through bureaucratization. Bureaucracies provide a
framework for social interaction and respond to increasingly technical demands of
modern life in a predictable and stable way
13
. As a result, they exemplify rationality
and are technically superior to other forms of rule. They symbolise a form of
rational-legal authority, which is accepted as socially recognised relevant
knowledge as their embodiment of rationality makes people willing to submit
14
.
However, Webers explanation only explains the normative power of international
organizations and not a concrete ability and authority to implement punishment
and increase transparency between states. In order for an international
organisation to be able to sanction and regulate activity of cooperating states, a
certain degree of sovereignty must be pooled. Waltz would argue that international
anarchy is the principal force shaping the motives and actions of states.
15
Under the

11
Waltz, Kenneth N. "Structural Realism after the Cold War." International Security
25.1 (2000): 5-41. Print.
12
Waltz, Kenneth N. "Structural Realism after the Cold War." International Security
25.1 (2000): 5-41. Print.
13
Weber, Max. Economy and Society; an Outline of Interpretive Sociology. New York:
Bedminster, 1968. Print.
14
Weber, Max. Economy and Society; an Outline of Interpretive Sociology. New York:
Bedminster, 1968. Print.
15
Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, State and War. New York [u.a.: Columbia Univ. Pr., 1962.
Print.
Jacqueline Yip
LSE, Group 4, Cora Lacatus, 31 Oct 2013
5
high degree of uncertainty, states cannot trust others and must maximise their
survival through pursuing measures that enhance their own self-interests. States
are unlikely to hand over enough control to international organisations in order to
establish a sense of trust and authority in the international organisation needed to
establish transparency, equity and guarantee of sanctions on cheaters. Furthermore,
international organisations are established by member states and therefore their
intentions and interests factor into the decisions and actions of the international
organisationRealists believe that states are the primary actors in the world stage
and that the international environment severely penalizes states who fail to protect
their vital interests.
16
Realists therefore would argue that the international
organisation itself cannot be an objective third party due to the pursuit of self-
interests by states as a result of their need to survive in a self-help system and their
fear of being penalized
17
.

This essay concludes that realist beliefs of the anarchic, self-help nature of the
international realm maintain that international organisations play a marginal role, if
at all, in facilitating international cooperation. The security dilemma and fear caused
by the core foundations in the realist world mean that states are positional actors
and not atomistic actors. States fear cooperation that may lead to relatively higher
gains to partners and therefore a potential advantage in aggression and dominance
in the future. International organisations may be able to prevent cheating but it
cannot reassure states of their future security and position. Furthermore, states are
unable to surrender a sufficient degree of sovereignty for international
organisations to effectively sanction and regulate cooperation. The pursuit of self-
interest also prevents member states from creating an objective, third party
international organisation.

16
Grieco, Joseph M. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism." International Organization 42.03 (1988): 485.
17
Waltz, Kenneth. "Reflections on Theory of International Politics : A Response to
My Critics." Neorealism and Its Critics. By Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia
UP, 1986. N. pag. Print.

Jacqueline Yip
LSE, Group 4, Cora Lacatus, 31 Oct 2013
6

Word count: 1700

Works Cited
Aron, Raymond. Peace and War; a Theory of International Relations. Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1966. 591-600. Print.
Axelrod, Robert M. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic, 1984. Print.
Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of
International Organizations." International Organization 53.4 (1999): 699-
732. Print.
Grieco, Joseph M. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism." International Organization 42.03 (1988):
485. Print.
Mearsheimer, John. "The False Promise of International Institutions." International
Security 19.3 (1994): 5-49. Print.
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace. New
York: Knopf, 1967. Print.
Schweller, Randall L. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back
In." International Security 19.1 (1994): 77-107. Print.
Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, State and War. New York [u.a.: Columbia Univ. Pr., 1962.
Print.
Waltz, Kenneth N. "Structural Realism after the Cold War." International Security
25.1 (2000): 5-41. Print.
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley
Pub., 1979. Print.
Waltz, Kenneth. "Reflections on Theory of International Politics : A Response to My
Critics." Neorealism and Its Critics. By Robert O. Keohane. New York:
Columbia UP, 1986. N. pag. Print.
Weber, Max. Economy and Society; an Outline of Interpretive Sociology. New York:
Bedminster, 1968. Print.