China Essay

That the efforts of the Communist Partys Great Movement to Resist America and Assist
Korea of 1950-1953 was as much a political success for the CCP as it was an invaluable
opportunity for the Beijing leadership to redefine and legitimatise Chinas security strategy.

US imperialism has over-extended its reach. It adds a new noose around its neck every time its
commits aggression anywherePeople of the world, unite and defeat the US aggressors and all their
running dogs. People of the world be courageous, dare to fightThen the whole world will belong to
the people. - Mao at a Public Address in 1964 (Karl, 2010)
Only one year after the creation of the Peoples Republic of China did its leaders decide to intervene
in the Korean War. Despite the considerable economic, social and political problems facing the new
state after decades of foreign occupation and civil war, the new Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
governing China had managed to persuade both the people and the military to intervene in the conflict
in an extensive campaign known as the Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea from
1950-53. Although China did not emerge completely victorious, its efforts can be seen as a much a
political success for the CCP as it was an invaluable opportunity for the CCP to redefine and
legitimatise Chinas security strategy. The Resist America and Assist Korea Campaign can be
deemed as a political success for the security of the CCP because it established the notion of self-
reliance in its foreign policy, it politically mobilised the population and that it acted as a catalyst for
the development of the Chinese military. Without these success stemming from the Resist America
and Assist Korea campaign, China would not be the prosperous nation it is today.
The Resist America and Aid Korea Campaign led Mao and his fellow CCP leaders to question the
lean to one side approach that had dominated foreign policy and consequently placed more emphasis
on the notion of self-reliance as the fundamental principle in maintaining Chinas security interests.
Although the Sino-Soviet Alliance between China and the Soviet Union had entered its strongest
phase during the Resist America and Aid Korean movement, eminent academic of Asian studies,
Dyson, suggests that the [Korean] war exacerbated the countries differences over ideology and
weakened the Chinese leaders respect for their counterparts. (Dyson, 2013). According to Linda
Benson, a respected historian and Professor of Asian studies, one significant factor that contributed to
Chinas dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union stems from the economic and military burden that was
tied to dependency on Soviet goods. For example, in addition to the unfair burden of the Treaty of
Alliance and Friendship signed in 1950 (which secured Soviet financial assistance for Chinas
reconstruction at the expense of a $300 million loan, the ceding to Soviet control of the resource-rich
Xinjiang region to and Soviet control of Port Arthur and Dairen), renowned historians and Professors
of Asian Studies, Yufan and Zhihai both point out that Mao still had to seek Soviet support because
of American weapon and air force superiority. (Yufan & Zhihai, 1990). Although Stalin doubted
Chinese military capability, he favoured Chinese troops to be involved in the Resist America and Aid
Korea conflict rather than the Soviet Red Army which in turn led to him to immediately agree to
equip 100 Chinese divisions with air force support and 100 Chinese divisions with Soviet-not free of
charge. However, historians have reached the general consensus that Stalin had underequipped the
Chinese Peoples Volunteers (CPV) and had only provided equipment for more than 60 army
divisions and more than 10 air force divisions. Jeanne Wilson, a reputable historian, corroborates the
lack of Soviet assistance in her publication as she explains that the Soviet Union deliberately
sought to keep Chinas armed forces dependent on the Soviets to prevent them from developing
connections in the West [The Soviet Union] did not allow schematics or any production material to
be passed to the Chinese. (cited in Li, 2014;Yufan & Zhihai, 1990) In spite of their common
ideologies, Stalins exploitation of the fragile and desperate Chinese economy marked the
deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations as a leading Professor of Chinese history, Chen Jian mentions
with respect to Stalins decision to renege air support from Chinas ground invasion, Mao had no
choice but to swallow the fruit of Soviet betrayal. Chinese animosity towards relations with the
USSR is supported and made profound even a decade after the Korean War in a Letter of the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party expressing Chinas role in the Korean War to the Central
Committee of the Communist Party Soviet Union at the height of the Sino-Soviet Dispute of 1963:
We made tremendous efforts and sacrifices and spent enormous sums of money for military
purposeswe have paid all principle and interest on the Soviet loans we obtained at that time, and
they account for a major proportion of our exports to the Soviet Union. In other words, the military
supplies provided China during the Resist America, Aid Korea were not free aid. (cited in
Nakajima, 1979). Professor of East Asian studies, Rebecca Karl mentions that it was Soviet military
aid in shorter supply than originally expected, [that] forced the Chinese to produce, substantially on
their own, clothing , food and equipment needed by their troops fighting in the frozen climes of Noth
Korea. Chinas self-reliance forged as a result of the Resist America and Aid Korea campaign
woud later withstand the implications of the Seventh Fleets 22 year trade embargo as summarised by
the words of eminent historian Brantley Wormack, being shut out of the world market did not
matter, the Soviet model of socialist devlopment in one country presented a heroic and plausible
alternative. It is evident that the relaiblity of the lean to one side approach, the cornerstone of
Communist Chinas foreign policy, was failing. Mao and the other Beijing leaders would put more
emphasis on self reliance as the fundamental princple in maintaining Chinas security interests.
Chinas experiences in the Resist America and Aid Korea Campaign projected it as a prominent
global power and thus it marked the prelude of the future Sino-Soviet split.
The Resist America and Aid Korea Campaign also led to the political mobilisation of the general
population as well as implicating the removal of counter-revolutionaries as a means to consolidate and
enhance Chinas security status. Most notably, the Resist America and Aid Korea Campaign led to
the establishment of the The Chinese Peoples Committee of the Movement to Fight against the U.S
invasion of Taiwan and Korea which in turn politically indoctrinated and mobilised the home front
to actively participate in the war effort. Leading scholar Chen Jian explains that the semi-official
committee called upon the entire country to use propaganda including newspapers, radio
broadcasts, magazines, wall posters, movies, dramas, songs, speeches, store windows and
exhibitionsto wage a profound propaganda campaign and to educate the people all over the country,
so they would be able to understand thoroughly that the U.S imperialists had committed crimes in
their aggression towards Asian countries and destruction of the world piece, and that U.S imperialists
were totally defeatable. (Jian, 1994) The CCPs inculcation of a new image for the United States as
politically and economically aggressive against China led to the mobilisation of soldiers, workers,
students and women united to Beating American Arrogance. With every success on the battlefield
translating to a success on the home front, the Resist America Campaign emerged as a conduit of
patriotic energy attracting people to the communist party and its cause. According to Barnes, a
Professor of Asian Studies, prior to 1949 the Chinese Communist Party possessed 2.7 million
members but by the end of the Korean War in 1953, party membership had ballooned to 6 million
members (Barnes, 2013). Likewise, in factories throughout China, industrial workers gathered to
unanimously denounce the United States and its capitalist allies such that every ounce of industrial
production would be a small victory in the fight to Resist America. For example, Chao Kuok Yu, a
labour hero at the number three factory in the city of Mudanjiang, issued a call for industrial workers
in Northeastern China to increase their production in the name of Resisting America. The competition
was well received throughout the Northeastern provinces reaching Octobers production goals in a
mere 28 days (Barnes, 2013). Lee Kuan Ching, another exemplary worker at National Model Workers
Representative Meeting corroborates with this account of the ubiquitous patriotic pledge as after
repairing a damaged locomotive he explained, The more we repair, and the more we gain strength
for resisting America and assisting Korea. Respected objective historian Rawnsley concludes [the
Resist America and Aid Korea Campaign] served to produce a lasting and enduring Chinese national
identity. It can be seen that the indoctrination and political mobilisation of the masses strengthened
and consolidated the CCPs domestic programmes which in turn ensured that they remained
unchallenged (Rawnsley, 2009). The Resist America Campaign also suppressed internal opposition to
the communist government. A respected academic in Asian Studies, Dyson comments that the CCP
conscripted those who had resisted the communist takeover and had used political mobilisation to
rally support against the states enemies seemingly those described by the CCP as the claws and
teeth of the American invaders. (Dyson, 2013) This is made clear by the propaganda poster
illustrated in Figure 2 where it encourages all good Chinese to do their duty for the new China (it is
no coincidence that the scene is framed against an industrial background) and rid China of the bad
Chinese. It should be noted that ironically, that most senior CCP members include Dong Biwu
reportedly opposed Chinas entry. Chen & Praeger mention in their harsh criticism of the regime that
the suppression of counterrevolutionaries saw in the ensuing months a crescendo of mass trials,
mass executions and wholesale persecution of all those believed or suspected to be hostile to the
regime. Millions of people met sudden death and many more were condemned to long-term labour in
camps such that the patriotic crusade would satisfy only the most dedicated Communists (Chen &
Praeger, 1967). It is evident that these campaigns against the enemies of the people left no doubt
that the Communists would brook no interference with what they were setting out to do. Through the
Resist America, Aid Korea Campaign, China was able exert control over its population as well as
suppress internal opposition which in turn ensured the domestic security of the new regime.




















Figure 1 Im a battlefield hero as well as a labour hero! (1950)
(cited in Rawnsley, 2009)
Figure 2 Suppress counter-revolutionaries, safeguard good
circumstances! (1951) (cited in Rawnsley, 2009)
Finally, the Resist America and Aid Korea Campaign pressured China to industrialise and develop
modern technology and equipment for war. Prominent historian in Asian History, Xiaobing Li states
The Korean War emphasised the technology gap and poor logistics between the adversaries and
Chinese. This is strongly supported by a Professor of Political Science, Scobell who raises That the
prospect of a relatively unsophisticated [Chinese] peasant army with little armour, artillery and no air
force or navy against the most technically advanced armed forces in the world possessing nuclear
weapons was extremely daunting. (Scobell, 1999) In fact, reputable scholar of the Liberal Arts,
Crocker agrees in saying that China had greatly underestimated the determination, mobility and
firepower of the United Nations Command forces which in turn denied them ultimate victory
(Crocker, 2002). The trivialisation of modern technology can be traced back the political
indoctrination of soldiers as Defence Minister Lin Piao addresses in an article in 1965, The essence
of Comrade Mao Zedongs theory of army building is thatit does not rely purely on weapons and
technique; it relies on politics, on the proletarian revolutionary conscious and courage of the
commanders and fighters. (cited in Chen & Praeger, 1967) However, after the Spring Offensive,
China narrowed the gap by purchasing weaponry from the USSR and standardising equipment in the
army. Throughout the 1950s it had spent $2 billion on arm purchases according to Li. Pressured by
the Soviet Unions increasing reluctance to defend the PRC and the constant threat of U.S retaliation,
China was motivated to establish a strong modern army to enhance [Chinas] prestige and influence
in the international arena. (Li, 2014) For instance, in 1951, 67.4% of officers were illiterate which
prompted the establishment of officer training academies. By 1959 China had 129 military academies,
26 war colleges, 72 technology institutes and the enrolment of 253,000 students. In addition to
improvements in training, China began its first nuclear weapons program in 1955 with its first test in
1960, first nuclear bomb in 1964 and first hydrogen bomb in 1967. Fifteen years after the Korean War,
China had become a nuclear power. As many historians such as Dyson believe, the Resist America
Campaign had changed the role of the Chinese soldier from one whose position was held in low-
esteem to one where they are now known today as the most beloved people. (Dyson, 2013) The
development of Chinas military was integral in consolidating and projecting Chinas image as one of
the leading communist countries against the USA. Its increasing political ambition and rising
international position demanded a strong modern army to safeguard its borders.
A 2006 survey asked Chinese college students about their perceptions of the Korean War. On a seven-
point scale (with 7 indicating a strongly positive response, [China] won received an average of 4.96,
[It was a Chinese] victory received an average of 4.80, and [China was] heroic received an
average score of 4.74. These scores were significantly higher than those American college students
reported. And whilst the survey was conducted over a fairly small population, the results nevertheless
indicate that the image of the war described reflected the popular beliefs of the Korean War (cited in
Dyson, 2013). Without a doubt, the Resist America and Aid Korea Campaign can be deemed as a
political success for China as it was able to legitimatise its security strategy by establishing Chinas
self-reliance as a nation, by politically mobilising the masses and by advancing Chinas military. By
1952, the Communists felt confident enough to launch openly their plans for socialism as a prelude to
communism as it was the political success brought about by the intensive reforms of the Resist
America and Aid Korea Campaign that led to the commencement of the First Five Plan launched on
January 1, 1953.




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