Challenger disaster A NASA Tragedy

NASA's Shuttle program was begun in the 1970s, to create reusable craft for
transporting cargo into space.
Previous space craft could only be used once, and then were discarded. The first
shuttle, Columbia was launched in 1981. One year later, the Challenger rolled off
the assembly line as the second shuttle of the US fleet. They were followed by
Discovery in 1983 and Atlantis in 1985.
The Challenger flew nine successful missions before that fateful day of the
disaster in 1986.
The Challenger was scheduled to carry some cargo, the Tracking Data Relay
Satellite-2 (TDRS-2), as well as fly the Shuttle-Pointed Tool for Astronomy
(SPARTAN-203)/Halley's Comet Experiment Deployable, a free-flying module
designed to observe tail and coma of Halleys comet with two ultraviolet
spectrometers and two cameras.
One thing made this mission unique. It was scheduled to be the first flight of a
new program called TISP, the Teacher In Space Program. The Challenger was
scheduled to carry Sharon Christa McAuliffe, the first teacher to fly in space.
Besides McAuliffe, the Challenger crew consisted of mission commander Francis
R. Scobee; pilot Michael J. Smith; mission specialists Ronald E. McNair, Ellison
S. Onizuka, and Judith A. Resnik; and payload specialists Gregory B. Jarvis.
Christa was also listed as a payload specialist.


Shuttle Mission STS-51L was plagued by problems.
Lift off was initially scheduled from at 3:43 p.m. EST on January 22, 1986. It
slipped to Jan. 23, then Jan. 24, due to delays in mission 61-C and finally reset for
Jan. 25 because of bad weather at transoceanic abort landing (TAL) site in Dakar,
Senegal. The launch was again postponed for one day when launch processing
was unable to meet new morning lift off time. Predicted bad weather at Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) caused the launch to be rescheduled for 9:37 a.m. EST, Jan.
27, but it was delayed another 24 hours when ground servicing equipment hatch
closing fixture could not be removed from orbiter hatch.
The fixture was sawed off and an attaching bolt drilled out before closeout
completed. During this delay, the cross winds exceeded limits at KSC's Shuttle
Landing Facility. There as a final delay of two hours when a hardware interface
module in the launch processing system, which monitors fire detection system,
failed during liquid hydrogen tanking procedures. The Challenger finally lifted off
at 11:38:00 a.m. EST.
Seventy three seconds into the mission, the Challenger exploded, killing the entire
crew.
This launch of the Challenger was highly publicized because it was to be the first time a
civilian teacher was going to go into space. Her name was Sharon Christa McAuliffe. She
was going to teach lessons on TV while in space. When the Challenger exploded it must
have been a horrible shock if you were watching. The students who were taught by her
were devastated. And millions of students across the U.S. watched the explosion on TV.
Why?
Why would a highly successful U.S. shuttle just explode in mid air during take off
for no apparent reason?.
It was more of a temperature problem. The day of the launch, the launch pad was
15 degrees cooler than any other launch done by NASA.
Some strange things happened to the shuttle in the air before it exploded. After
launch, black puffs of smoke were coming from the right SRB (Solid Rocket
Booster). A SRB basically turns the fuel into a controlled explosion. The smoke
suggested that a rubber O-ring was burning. An O-ring makes sure that no gasses
escape from the SRB. The puffs of smoke ended 2.7 seconds into the flight.
Then, 58.8 seconds into the flight a small glowing flame was seen on the right
SRB.
At 59.3 seconds into the flight the flame was getting bigger, hotter, and brighter.
As the flame got hotter, it loosened the SRBs connection with the main fuel tank.
This eventually weakened it so much that the SRB broke off and collided with the
fuel tank, creating a humongous fireball that engulfed the Challenger, resulting in
its destruction. Strangely, the two SRBs survived the explosion. One SRB had
accidentally opened its parachute and detached from it. The people watching
thought it was the crews emergency escape system. Little did they know, there as
no such thing on the shuttle. Later the SRBs were remotely detonated by mission
control, so they wouldnt cause any harm to people on land.
The space program was nearly shut down, and it lost a lot of funding and support
because of this tragedy. Nevertheless NASA recovered and is continuing its
exploration of space. The Challenger disaster helps us remember there are bound
to be disasters in our exploration of space.
President Ronald Reagan appointed former secretary of state William Rogers to head a
scientific commission to investigate the explosion. The commission's report, issued two
months later, traced the cause to the rubber Orings used to seal the joints in the shuttle's
solid rocket boosters. The unusually cold weather on the morning of the launch stiffened
the Orings, allowing fuel to leak from the boosters and ignite a deadly fireball. The
Rogers Commission also discovered that NASA managers had not heeded warnings by
engineers at both MortonThiokol and the Rockwell Corporation on the evening of 27
January 1986, that a launch in temperatures of less than fifty degrees was likely to be
hazardous. Nearly three years and $2.4 billion later, NASA relaunched the U.S. space
program with its next shuttle, Discovery.
Challenger Quick Facts
The Challenger Was Launched on January 28, 1986
There were 7 people on the mission
The Challenger blew up 73.62 seconds after lift-off
The Challenger was never meant to fly. It was made for simulation and to
practice different designs
The Challenger had been into space 9 times before the accident
3 of the crew members were on the challenger on one of its earlier flights.
The Challenger was delayed 3 times before it took off.
At NASA they knew that the weather would be a problem but because of the
publicity, then decided to launch it and they made the wrong choice.
If Christie McAuliffe wasn't on the challenger, they probably wouldn't have died
because she brought the publicity to the Challenger.
Organizations / People Involved
Marshall Space Flight Center - in charge of booster rocket development

Larry Mulloy - challenged the engineer's decision not to launch
Morton Thiokol - contracted by NASA to build the solid rocket
booster
Alan McDonald - Director of the Solid Rocket Motors project
Bob Lund - Engineering Vice President
Robert Ebeling - Engineer who worked under McDonald
Roger Boisjoly - Engineer who worked under McDonald
Joe Kilminster - Engineer in a management position
J erland Mason - senior executive who encouraged Lund to `
reassess his decision not to launch

The Orbiter
The orbiter is carrying the payload and the people if it is manned mission.
The External Tank
The external tank supplies fuel to the SSME (space shuttle main engine). It carries
the oxygen at the upper portion and hydrogen in the lower portion. The function of the
oxygen is to prevent oxidation. These two are mixed and fed into the SSME.
The Solid Rocket Booster
The thrust from the SSME is not enough to carry the shuttle from earth. To meet the
initial high demand of thrust, Rockets using solid fuel are used on either side to the
shuttle, called the Solid Rocket Boosters. They are built in separate sections and joined
together at the launch site. The joints made at the field are called the field joints. To seal
the joints O-rings act as a sealant like the gasket used in a household pressure cooker.
The space shuttle in Fig. 2 shows the cross -section of the field joint, the failure of which
caused the tragedy.
The crew had no escape mechanism which was not considered as it
was too expensive and might reduce pay load.
Crew member's informed consent was not taken after someone
decided the field joint problem is less risky.
System's reliability was not assessed properly with the experiences
from previous launches.
NASA's unwillingness to wait for favorable weather to prevent
problems due to freezing was another factor.
Schedule first and safety second approach of NASA was predominant.
The flaw was in the decision making mentality.
Political pressure made the NASA authorities to adopt a casual attitude
towards all the safety issues