1

PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS,

INC. v. RICARDO DE VERA
G.R. NO. 157214, June 07, 2005, THIRD DIVISION,
(GARCIA, J.)

Petitioner Philippine Global Communications, Inc.
(PhilCom), is a corporation engaged in the business of
communication services and allied activities, while
respondent Ricardo De Vera is a physician by profession
whom petitioner enlisted to attend to the medical needs of
its employees. De Vera, via a letter dated 15 May
1981,
[3]
offered his services to the petitioner, therein
proposing his plan of works required of a practitioner in
industrial medicine. The parties agreed and formalized
respondent's proposal in a document denominated
as RETAINERSHIP CONTRACT
[4]
which will be for a
period of one year subject to renewal. Said contract was
renewed yearly.
[5]
The retainership arrangement went on
from 1981 to 1994 with changes in the retainer's
fee. However, for the years 1995 and 1996, renewal of the
contract was only made verbally. In December 1996,
Philcom sent a letter

bearing on the subject boldly written
as "TERMINATION RETAINERSHIP CONTRACT",
informed De Vera of its decision to discontinue the latter's
"retainer's contract with the Company, effective at the
close of business hours of 31 December 1996, because
management has decided that it would be more practical to
provide medical services to its employees through
accredited hospitals near the company premises.

On 22 January 1997, De Vera filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), alleging that that he had been actually employed
by Philcom as its company physician since 1981 and was
dismissed without due process. He averred that he was
designated as a "company physician on retainer basis" for
reasons allegedly known only to Philcom. Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On De Vera's
appeal to the NLRC, the latter reversed the decision and
held that he was a regular employee. Philcom appealed to
the CA and the latter modified the decision of the NLRC
by deleting the award of traveling allowance, and ordering
payment of separation pay to De Vera in lieu of
reinstatement.

ISSUE: Is Dr. Ricardo De Vera a regular employee of
Philcom?

HELD: NO
ART. 157. Emergency medical and dental services. It shall be
the duty of every employer to furnish his employees in any
locality with free medical and dental attendance and
facilities consisting of:
(a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when the
number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not
more than two hundred (200) except when the
employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces,
in which case the services of a graduate first-aider
shall be provided for the protection of the workers,
where no registered nurse is available. The Secretary
of Labor shall provide by appropriate regulations the
services that shall be required where the number of
employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall
determine by appropriate order hazardous
workplaces for purposes of this Article;

(b) The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-
time physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic,
when the number of employees exceeds two
hundred (200) but not more than three hundred
(300); and

(c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and full-
time registered nurse as well as a dental clinic, and an
infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed
capacity for every one hundred (100) employees
when the number of employees exceeds three
hundred (300).

In cases of hazardous workplaces, no employer shall
engage the services of a physician or dentist who cannot
stay in the premises of the establishment for at least two
(2) hours, in the case of those engaged on part-time basis,
and not less than eight (8) hours in the case of those
employed on full-time basis. Where the undertaking is
nonhazardous in nature, the physician and dentist may be
engaged on retained basis, subject to such regulations as
the Secretary of Labor may prescribe to insure immediate
availability of medical and dental treatment and attendance
in case of emergency.

Had only respondent read carefully the very statutory
provision invoked by him, he would have noticed that in
non-hazardous workplaces, the employer may engage the
services of a physician "on retained basis." As correctly
observed by the petitioner, while it is true that the
provision requires employers to engage the services of
medical practitioners in certain establishments depending
on the number of their employees, nothing is there in the
law which says that medical practitioners so engaged be
actually hired as employees,
[24]
adding that the law, as
written, only requires the employer "to retain", not
employ, a part-time physician who needed to stay in the
premises of the non-hazardous workplace for two (2)
hours.
[25]


Respondent takes no issue on the fact that petitioner's
business of telecommunications is not hazardous in
2

nature. As such, what applies here is the last paragraph of
Article 157 which, to stress, provides that the employer
may engage the services of a physician and dentist "on
retained basis", subject to such regulations as the Secretary
of Labor may prescribe. The successive "retainership"
agreements of the parties definitely hue to the very
statutory provision relied upon by respondent.
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that
courts may not construe a statute that is free from
doubt. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must
be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no
choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.
[26]
As it
is, Article 157 of the Labor Code clearly and unequivocally
allows employers in non-hazardous establishments to
engage "on retained basis" the service of a dentist or
physician. Nowhere does the law provide that the
physician or dentist so engaged thereby becomes a regular
employee. The very phrase that they may be engaged "on
retained basis", revolts against the idea that this
engagement gives rise to an employer-employee
relationship.

With the recognition of the fact that petitioner consistently
engaged the services of respondent on a retainer basis, as
shown by their various "retainership contracts", so can
petitioner put an end, with or without cause, to their
retainership agreement as therein provided.

We note, however, that even as the contracts entered into
by the parties invariably provide for a 60-day notice
requirement prior to termination, the same was not
complied with by petitioner when it terminated on 17
December 1996 the verbally-renewed retainership
agreement, effective at the close of business hours of 31
December 1996.
Be that as it may, the record shows, and this is admitted by
both parties,
[28]
that execution of the NLRC decision had
already been made at the NLRC despite the pendency of
the present recourse. For sure, accounts of petitioner had
already been garnished and released to respondent despite
the previous Status Quo Order
[29]
issued by this Court. To
all intents and purposes, therefore, the 60-day notice
requirement has become moot and academic if not waived
by the respondent himself.

JEROMIE ESCASINAS, et al. v. SHANGRI-LAS
MACTAN ISLAND RESORT, et al.
G.R. No. 178827, March 4, 2009, SECOND
DIVISION (Carpio-Morales, J.)

Registered nurses Jeromie Escasinas and Evan Singco were
engaged by Dr. Jessica Pepito to work in her clinic at
Shangri-la's Mactan Island Resort of which she was a
retained physician. Escasinas and Singco filed a complaint
for regularization, underpayment of wages, non-payment
of holiday pay, night shift differential and 13th month pay
differential against respondents, claiming that they are
regular employees of Shangri-la. Shangri-la claimed that
petitioners were not its employees but of Pepito whom it
retained via a MOA, pursuant to Article 157 of the Labor
Code. Pepito for her part claimed that petitioners were
already working for the previous retained physicians of
Shangri-la before she was retained by Shangri-la; and that
she maintained petitioners' services upon their request.

The labor arbiter declared petitioners to be regular
employees of Shangri-la. Shangri-la and Pepito appealed to
the NLRC. The NLRC granted Shangri-la's and Pepito's
appeal finding that no employer-employee relationship
exists between petitioners and Shangri-la. The CA affirmed
the NLRC Decision. Petitioners insist that under Article
157 of the Labor Code, Shangri-la is required to hire a full-
time registered nurse, apart from a physician, hence, their
engagement should be deemed as regular employment, the
provisions of the MOA notwithstanding; and that the
MOA is contrary to public policy as it circumvents tenurial
security and, therefore, should be struck down as being
void ab initio. At most, they argue, the MOA is a mere job
contract.

ISSUE: Does Art. 157 require the engagement of full-
time nurses as regular employees of a company?

HELD:
NO. The Court holds that, contrary to petitioners'
postulation, Art. 157 does not require the engagement of
full-time nurses as regular employees of a company
employing not less than 50 workers.

Under Art. 157, Shangri-la, which employs more than 200
workers, is mandated to "furnish" its employees with the
services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time
physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic which
means that it should provide or make available such
medical and allied services to its employees, not necessarily
to hire or employ a service provider. As held in Philippine
Global Communications v. De Vera while it is true that the
provision requires employers to engage the services of
medical practitioners in certain establishments
depending on the number of their employees, nothing
is there in the law which says that medical
practitioners so engaged be actually hired as
employees, adding that the law, as written, only requires
the employer "to retain", not employ, a part-time
physician who needed to stay in the premises of the non-
hazardous workplace for 2 hours.

The term "full-time" in Art. 157 cannot be
construed as referring to the type of employment of the
3

person engaged to provide the services, for Article 157
must not be read alongside Art. 280 in order to vest
employer-employee relationship on the employer and the
person so engaged. The phrase "services of a full-time
registered nurse" should thus be taken to refer to the kind
of services that the nurse will render in the company's
premises and to its employees, not the manner of his
engagement.

Moroever, the Court holds that Pepito is a
legitimate independent contractor. That Shangri-la
provides the clinic premises and medical supplies for use
of its employees and guests do not necessarily prove that
Pepito lacks substantial capital and investment. Besides,
the maintenance of a clinic and provision of medical
services to its employees is required under Art. 157, which
are not directly related to Shangri-la's principal business -
operation of hotels and restaurants.


ZAIDA G. RARO v. EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION PROGRAM and GSIS (BUREAU
OF MINES AND GEO-SCIENCES)
FACTS.
Petitioner Zaida Raro states that she was in perfect health
when she was employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines
and Geo-Sciences in Daet, Camarines Sur. About four
years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent
headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take
sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical
treatment in Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder in
the Bureau.

Raro was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be
suffering from brain tumor. By that time, her memory,
sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been lost.
A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with
the GSIS was denied. A motion for reconsideration was
similarly denied. Upon appeal to the Employees'
Compensation Commission, the GSIS decision was
affirmed.

Petitioner basically contends that if a claimant cannot
prove the necessary work connection because the causes
of the disease are still unknown
1
, it must be presumed that
working conditions increased the risk of contracting the
ailment.

ISSUE.

1
The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science
cannot, as yet, positively identify the causes of various types of cancer. It
is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's employment
appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly
paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth
x x x.
1) WON brain tumor which causes unknown but
contracted during employment is compensable
under the present compensation laws.
2) WON the presumption of compensability is
absolutely inapplicable under the present
compensation laws when a disease is not listed as
occupational disease.

HELD.
1) NO; the first thing that stands in the way of this
petition is the law itself.
Art. 167(l) of the Labor Code provides that
Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as
an occupational disease listed by the Commission,
or any illness caused by employment subject to
proof by the employee that the risk of contracting
the same is by working conditions. For this
purpose, the Commission is empowered to
determine and approve occupational and work-
related illnesses that may be considered
compensable sable based on hazards of
employment.
Moreover, Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation clearly defines
who are entitled. It provides: For the sickness
and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of
an occupational disease under Annex A of
these rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that
the risk of contracting the disease is increase
by the working conditions.

The law, as it now stands requires the claimant
to prove a positive thing that the illness was
caused by employment and the risk of contracting
the disease is increased by working conditions. To
say that since proof is not available (since medical
science cannot positively identify the causes of
various types of cancer), therefore the trust fund
has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal
requirement that proof must be adduced. The
existence or non-existence of proof cannot be
presumed.

Cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which
strikes people in all walks of life. Unless it be
shown that a particular form of cancer is caused
by specific working conditions, the Court cannot
conclude that it was the employment which
increased the risk of contracting the same.
2) YES; the new law discarded the concepts of
presumption of compensability and
aggravation and substituted a system based
on social security principles. The intent was to
restore a sensible equilibrium between the
4

employers obligation to pay workmens
compensation and the employees right to receive
reparation for work connected or disability.
Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or
his family against the employer, we now have a
social insurance scheme where regular premiums
are paid by the employers to a trust fund and
claims are pain from the trust fund to those who
can prove entitlement. It is now the trust fund
and not the employer which suffers if benefits are
paid to claimants who are not entitled under the
law. If diseases not intended by the law to be
compensated are inadvertently or recklessly
included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund
is endangered. Compassion for the victims of
diseases not covered by the law ignores the need
to show a greater concern for the trust fund to
which tens of millions of workers and their
families look for compensation whenever covered
accidents, diseases and deaths occur.

MANUEL BELARMINO, PETITIONER, VS.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION
AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 90204, May 11, 1990, FIRST DIVISION,
GRINO-AQUINO, J.
Oania Belarmino, was a classroom teacher of the DECS
assigned at the Buracan Elementary School in Dimasalang,
Masbate. On January 14, 1982, while performing her duties
as a classroom teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th
month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the
classroom floor. Moments later, she complained of
abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several days,
she continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pain and
a feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but, heedless of the
advice of her female co-teachers to take a leave of absence,
she continued to report to the school because there was
much work to do. On January 25, 1982, eleven days after
her accident, she went into labor and prematurely
delivered a baby girl at home. Her abdominal pains
persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high
fever and headache. She was brought to the Alino
Hospital in Dimasalang, Masbate on February 11, 1982.
Dr. Alfonso Alino found that she was suffering from
septicemia post-partum due to infected lacerations of the
vagina. She was discharged from the hospital after five
days on February 16, 1982, apparently recovered, but she
died three days later. The cause of death was septicemia
post-partum.

On February 14, 1984, GSIS denied the death claim of the
petitioner. It held that septicemia post-partum, the cause
of death, is not an occupational disease, and neither was
there any showing that aforesaid ailment was contracted by
reason of her employment. Further, the alleged accident
mentioned could not have precipitated the death of the
wife but rather the result of the infection of her lacerated
wounds as a result of her delivery at home. On appeal, the
ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS.

Issue WON the death of Belarmino is compensable
Decision
Yes, Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation enumerates the grounds for
compensability of injury resulting in disability or death of
an employee, as follows:
SECTION 1. Grounds - (a) For the injury and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury
must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all
of the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place
where his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his
official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee
must have been executing an order for the
employer.
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or
death to be compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex
A of these Rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions.
True, the cause of death septicemia post-partum is
not listed as an occupational disease in her particular line
of work as a classroom teacher. However, her death from
that ailment is compensable because an employment
accident and the conditions of her employment
contributed to its development. The condition of the
classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and
suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of
recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the
premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic
consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor
brought about her premature delivery which caused the
development of post-partum septicemia which resulted in
death. Her fall therefore was the proximate or responsible
cause
2
that set in motion an unbroken chain of events,

2
Proximate cause - The efficient cause, which may be the most remote of an
operative chain, It must be that which sets the others in motion and is to be
distinguished from a mere preexisting condition upon which the effective
cause operates, and must have been adequate to produce the resultant
damage without the intervention of an independent cause.
5

leading to her demise. Thus as held in the case of Enriquez
v. WCC, where the primary injury is shown to have arisen
in the course of employment, every natural consequence
that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the
employment, unless it is the result of an independent
intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligence
or misconduct. Simply stated, all the medical consequences
and sequels that flow from the primary injury are
compensable. Mrs. Belarminos fall was the primary injury
that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom
teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from
it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery
of her baby, her septicemia post-partum, and death, are
compensable.
On the ground that the cause of the decedents
post-partum septicemia was the infected vaginal
lacerations resulting from the decedents delivery of her
child at home
3
for the incident in school could not have
caused septicemia post-partum. Such argument overlooks
the fact that septicemia post-partum is a disease of
childbirth, and premature childbirth would not have
occurred if she did not accidentally fall in the classroom.
Petition Granted.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(GSIS), PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS AND FELONILA ALEGRE,
RESPONDENTS.

FACTS
On December 6, 1994, SPO2 Alegre, a police officer
assigned to the PNP station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within
the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4
Tenorio officer of the Police Assistance Center located at
said complex, confronted him regarding his tour of duty. A
verbal tussle ensued between the two which led to the fatal
shooting of the deceased police officer.
On account of her husband's death, private respondent
Felonila seasonably filed a claim for death benefits with
petitioner GSIS which the latter denied on the ground that
at the time of SPO2 Alegre's death, he was performing a
personal activity which was not work-connected.
Subsequent appeal to the Employees' Compensation
Commission proved futile. But the CA, on appeal,
reversed the ECCs decision and ruled that SPO2 Alegre's
death was work-connected and, therefore, compensable.
Citing Nitura v. ECC and ECC v. CA the appellate court
explained that the work place of a peace officer is not

3
The court took judicial notice of the meager salaries that the Government
pays its public school teachers. Thus they were unable to afford hospital
care.
confined to the police precinct or station but to any place
where his services, as a lawman, to maintain peace and
security, are required. Policemen, by the nature of their
functions, are deemed to be on a round-the-clock duty.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON SPO2 Alegre's death lacks the requisite
element of compensability which is, that the activity being
performed at the time of death must be work-connected

RULING: YES.
Under the pertinent guidelines of the ECC on
compensability, it is provided that "for the injury and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury
must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all
of the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place
where his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his
official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee
must have been executing an order for the employer.
In Hinoguin v. ECC, the connection between his absence
from the camp where he was assigned and the place where
he was accidentally shot was the permission duly given to him
and his companions by the camp commander to go on overnight
pass. According to the Court, "a place which soldiers
have secured lawful permission cannot be very
different, legally speaking, from a place where they
are required to go by their commanding officer" and,
hence, the deceased is to be considered as still in the
performance of his official functions. The same thing
can be said of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside
of his station on permission and directive by his superior officer to
check on several personnel of his command who were
then attending a dance party. As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in
the ECC case, although he was not given any directive or
permission by a superior officer to be at the Mandaluyong
Police Station, his presence there was nonetheless justified
by the peacekeeping nature of the matter he was
attending to at the time that he was attacked and shot
to death, that is, bringing his son to the police station to
answer for a crime, a basic duty which any policeman is
expected and ought to perform.
Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines
of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, it is
not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre's widow
should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously,
the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he
met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was
6

intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it
did from no particular directive or permission of his
superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as
in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature
of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died
even without the explicit permission or directive of a
superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is
no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the
requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may be
called upon at any time to render police work as he is
considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not
on an approved vacation leave will not change the
conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in
a situation where he was required to exercise his authority
and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render
one pointing out that he already complied with the duty
detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to
policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact
validation of their acts to place them within the scope of
the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them
in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other
words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be
sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances
causing the death of a police officer but only to those
which, although not on official line of duty, are
nonetheless basically police service in character.
Petition granted.

CELERINO VALERIANO v. EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GSIS
G.R. No. 136200, 8 June 2000, THIRD DIVISION,
(Panganiban, J.)

Valeriano was employed as a fire truck driver assigned at
the San Juan Fire Station. When he was standing along in
the street, he met a friend. They decided to proceed to
Bonanza Restaurant for dinner. On their way home, the
owner-type jeepney they were riding in figured in a head-
on collision with another vehicle. Due to the strong impact
of the collision, he was thrown out of the vehicle and was
severely injured. As a result of the mishap, petitioner was
brought to several hospitals for treatment.

Valeriano filed a claim for income benefits under PD 626,
with the GSIS. His claim for benefits was opposed because
the injuries he sustained did not directly arise or result
from the nature of his work. Then he appealed to the ECC
but the ECC ruled against him.

ISSUE:
Are Valerianos injuries and resulting disability
compensable since firemen, like the police and military, are
always on alert?

RULING:
NO.
Thus, for injury to be compensable, the
standard of "work connection" must be substantially
satisfied. The injury and the resulting disability sustained
by reason of employment are compensable regardless of
the place where the injured occurred, if it can be proven
that at the time of the injury, the employee was acting
within the purview of his or her employment and
performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental
thereto.

Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job
as a firetruck driver was related to the injuries he had
suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a
purely personal and social function -- having dinner with
some friends -- is clear from the records of the case. His
injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they
sustained while he was performing an act within the scope
of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his
superior. Thus, we agree with the conclusion reached by
the appellate court that his injuries and consequent
disability were not work-connected and thus not
compensable.

Hinoguin v. ECC and Nitura v. ECC espoused the position
that the concept of "work place" cannot always be literally
applied to a soldier on active duty status who, to all intents
and purposes, is on a 24-hour official duty status, subject
to military discipline and law and at the beck and call of his
superior officers at all times, except when he is on vacation
leave status. In each case death benefits were granted, not
just because of the principle that soldiers or policemen
were virtually working round the clock. More important, there
was a finding of a reasonable nexus between the absence of the
deceased from his assigned place of work and the incident causing his
death. The 24-hour duty doctrine should not embrace all
acts and circumstances causing the death of a police
officer, but only those that can be categorized as police
service in character.

The Court recognizes the importance and laud the efforts
of firemen in our society. Indeed, the nature of their job
requires them to be always on alert, like soldiers and police
officers, and to respond to fire alarms which may occur
anytime of the day. Be that as it may, the circumstances in
the present case do not call for the application of Hinoguin
and Nitura. Following the rationalization in GSIS, the 24-
hour-duty doctrine cannot be applied to petitioner's
case, because he was neither at his assigned work
place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors
when he met an accident. But the more important
justification for the Courts stance is that he was not
doing an act within his duty and authority as a
firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the
7

time he sustained his injuries. We cannot find any
reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as
a firetruck driver.


RUBEN T. LIMBO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.
Petitioner Ruben T. Limbo was employed at Nestl
Philippines, Incorporated from November 25, 1966 to
December 31, 1996, first, as a salesman until he was
promoted as Area Sales Supervisor in 1977.
Sometime in December 1994, Limbo was confined for one
week at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) because of
joint pains. His work-up revealed that he had elevated
BUN, creatinine and anemia. When Limbo was subjected
to a renal ultrasound, it was further discovered that he had
chronic renal disease and he was forthwith referred to a
nephrologist and was advised to undergo a kidney
transplant. On January 2, 1995, Limbo underwent a renal
transplant at the PGH and was discharged therefrom on
January 13, 1995.
Limbo filed a claim for compensation benefits before the
Social Security System (SSS), invoking Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 626, as amended. However, the claim was
denied on the ground that Limbos illness, end-stage renal
disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy, had no causal
relationship to his job as Area Sales Supervisor. Limbo
promptly appealed to the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC). In a decision, dated December 2,
1998, the ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS and
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
Issue:
WON end-stage renal disease secondary to uric acid
nephropathy is compensable under P.D. 626, as amended
RULING:
Yes.
Under the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation, (f)or the sickness and the resulting
disability to be compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A
of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied;
otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.
[1]
Concededly, end-stage renal disease
secondary to uric acid nephropathy is not among the
Occupational Diseases under Annex A of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation. This, however,
would not automatically bar petitioners claim for as long
as he could prove that the risk of contracting the illness
was increased by his working conditions.
Petitioners job description showed that he was
responsible for the following:
(1) Territorys collection, merchandising, market
hygiene and promotion goals;
(2) Nestls principal satisfaction provider to the
companys customers and business partners,
government and other significant entities;
(3) Principal Liason of the territory with the National
Sales Manager, Areas Sales Manager and other
Nestl units;
(4) Leads and manages territory sales force and
3
rd
party support
Mr. Limbo suffered from a long history of hypertension
and gout. This has led to several complications like
hypertensive heart disease, hypertensive nephrosclerosis
and eventually renal failure. He was hypertensive while
still employed and certainly, the stress at work could have
aggravated his condition.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, a physicians report
is the best evidence of work-connection of workmens
ailments and can be the basis of an award even if the
physician was not presented as a witness.
[6]
We have no
reason to doubt the findings of Dr. Mejia who is an expert
in her field of work. Verily, petitioner was able to show
that his ailment was work-related.

PABLO A. AUSTRIA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS AND EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION (SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM),
(CENTRAL AZUCARERA TARLAC), Respondents.


Petitioner Pablo A. Austria was employed as bag piler at
Central Azucarera de Tarlac. As bag piler, his duties were
to: carry and pile sacks of refined sugar; relocate and move
stock piles for shifting or return to the refinery; assist the
production checker in random weighing of production;
clean the warehouse, piling conveyor and its surroundings;
assist in the repair and maintenance work during off-
season; and do other related work assigned to him from
time to time by his superior. In 1994, petitioner began to
feel severe back pain. His MRI revealed a small disc
protrusion at L4 and L5 level, for which he underwent
Laminectomy. Later, x-ray photographs taken revealed
osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine.

On account of his osteoarthritis, petitioner filed with the
SSS a claim for compensation benefits under PD 626 as
amended. The claim was granted and petitioner was
awarded permanent partial disability benefits for eight (8)
8

months starting September 1, 1995, a second release for
seven (7) months starting May 10, 1996, and a third release
for fifteen (15) months starting April 1, 1997.

Petitioner thereafter requested the SSS for conversion of
his permanent partial disability benefit to permanent total
disability benefit. The SSS denied the request. It reasoned
that based on clinical records submitted, there was no
progression of the illness. On appeal, the ECC affirmed
the decision of the SSS. The ECC held that considering
the degree of his disability at the time he was separated
from the service, petitioner has already availed of the
maximum benefits to which he is entitled on account of
his osteoarthritis.

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court dismissed the petition, ruling that the law
does not allow the conversion of permanent partial
disability to permanent total disability.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can claim for
additional benefits for converting of his permanent partial
disability to permanent total disability.

Held: Yes.

PD 626 as amended provides three types of disability
benefits to qualified employees: (1) temporary total
disability, (2) permanent total disability, and (3) permanent
partial disability. In the case at bar, petitioner was granted
by the SSS, as affirmed by the ECC, permanent partial
disability benefit, but he seeks to avail of permanent total
disability benefit. Under Section 2 Rule VII of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, a disability
is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or
sickness, the employee is unable to perform any gainful
occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days;
and a disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the
injury or sickness, the employee suffers a permanent partial
loss of the use of any part of his body. We held in Vicente
v. Employees Compensation Commission that:

". . . the test of whether or not an employee suffers from
permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of
the employee to continue performing his work
notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by
reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee
is unable to perform his customary job for more than 120
days and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X
of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability,
then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from
permanent total disability regardless of whether or not he
loses the use of any part of his body.


Disability is intimately related to ones earning capacity. It
is the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the
same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that she
was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of
work which a person of her mentality and attainment
could do. It does not mean an absolute helplessness but
rather an incapacity to perform gainful work which is
expected to be permanent. Total disability does not require
that the employee be absolutely disabled, or totally
paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such
that she cannot pursue her usual work and earn therefrom.


Applying the foregoing standards, we find petitioner
entitled to permanent total disability benefit under the law.
His duties require him to carry heavy loads of refined sugar
and to perform other manual work. Since his work
obviously taxes so much on his back, his illness which
affects his lumbar spine renders him incapable of doing his
usual work as bag piler. Hence, his disability to perform his
regular duties may be considered total and permanent.

Contrary to the assertion of the Court of Appeals, there is
nothing in the law that prohibits the conversion of
permanent partial disability benefit to permanent total
disability benefit if it is shown that the employees ailment
qualifies as such.

Petition was GRANTED.