Hermenutica, Islamismo

Por Montserrat Abumalham

La trayectoria histrica de la crtica textual y de la interpretacin de textos en la
cultura rabe-islmica viene marcada por dos aspectos que conviene sealar. El
primero de ellos es la aparicin de una revelacin que pone en marcha todo un
proceso de transformacin de una cultura oral en una cultura escrita, de donde,
necesariamente, se deriva una preocupacin hermenutica. El segundo hecho
importante y paradjico es que no existe un desarrollo del pensamiento crtico, sino
por importacin de modelos, y la reflexin metodolgica en torno a la interpretacin
textual no aparece de modo sistemtico, salvo en el desarrollo jurdico.

A estos dos rasgos esenciales, hay que aadir la falta de separacin entre los
mundos de lo religioso y de lo laico; significativo, en este sentido es el hecho de
que el trmino que designa el mbito de lo religioso (din) est ligado a la idea de
ley, en tanto que no existe un trmino propio para designar el mbito de lo
no-religioso. Esta realidad supone que el lindero entre el pensamiento crtico
racionalista y el pensamiento crtico de carcter inspirado o que atiende a la
inspiracin sea muy leve. Asimismo, las ciencias encaminadas al desarrollo de una
metodologa crtica ponen su peso en aquellos aspectos que contribuyen a la
comprensin de lo revelado, mientras que las ciencias que no tienen como finalidad
estricta la comprensin de la revelacin, basculan entre la acumulacin sistemtica
de testimonios (shawahid) que sirven para probar la existencia de un fenmeno,
sea este lingstico, retrico o de otra ndole, y entre los mtodos propios de la
interpretacin religiosa.

Desde un punto de vista histrico, igualmente, el desarrollo del pensamiento
crtico en el mbito de la civilizacin musulmana, es creador en los primeros siglos
del Islam, se estanca a partir del siglo XIII d.C. y reemprende la marcha hacia la
mitad del siglo XVIII. Si debemos caracterizarlo de musulmn, slo el perodo
clsico, es decir el comprendido entre los siglos VIII al X, y, como mximo hasta el
siglo XII, es susceptible de ser calificado de este modo.

A partir del siglo XVIII, las influencias externas, la adopcin de ideologas
diversas y la interferencia de cuestiones, sociopolticas transforman de tal modo el
panorama que incluso los planteamientos, crticos de carcter ms marcadamente
islmico estn sujetos a un movimiento de reaccin frente a un estmulo externo al
propio motor interno de la cultura islmica. Esto ltimo no significa, sin embargo,
que el mundo intelectual musulmn o perteneciente a su rbita de influencia, sea
poco creador o slo creador por imitacin.

En este punto, se produce una revolucin que no aparece enmarcada en el
mbito del pensamiento y su metodologa, sino ms bien expresada mediante
formas literarias que no pretenden ser creadoras de modos crticos, pero que
encierran todo un planteamiento de ndole crtica que an se encuentra en fase de
desarrollo y que, desde luego, no ha sido objeto de un estudio serio por parte de la
historia de la filosofa. El hecho literario, como es natural, ha sido estudiado desde
la perspectiva de la crtica literaria, con lo que las formas han sido objeto de mayor
anlisis, frente a los referentes que sealan a un desarrollo del pensamiento crtico.

Sealadas estas cuestiones previas e insistiendo en la no separacin entre lo
laico y lo religioso se puede afirmar que, si entendemos el trmino hermenutica
como la elaboracin epistemolgica de la interpretacin, ms que poner en contacto
el mtodo hermenutico del Islam con los mtodos desarrollados en el mbito
occidental, tendramos que establecer paralelismos con la tradicin hermenutica
juda. En este sentido, aunque discutido y discutible, se pueden establecer puentes
de identidad entre el proceso de anlisis, fijacin e interpretacin del texto bblico y
sus desarrollos literarios y normativos, y el proceso seguido en torno al texto
revelado musulmn.

El Corn, aunque en una secuencia temporal diferente, posiblemente habra
seguido las diferentes etapas que afectaron al texto bblico, de modo que
podramos hablar de un perodo de conservacin y fijacin del canon cornico,
equivalente a la etapa de elaboracin masortica, seguidos de una serie de etapas
calificables como haggdica y haljica, de desarrollo midrsico o jurdico. Este
planteamiento se ve afectado por cuestiones diversas que hacen que no pueda
aparecer del todo como definitivo.

De una parte, surge el problema de la ausencia de documentacin que pruebe
un largo proceso de composicin y recomposicin del texto revelado. El Corn se
presenta como inmvil y unitario, no slo en la conciencia musulmana, sino
tambin en su apariencia histrica. El proceso de recopilacin y composicin es
demasiado breve y ha dejado pocos rastros que permitan saber qu mtodo o
mtodos, qu criterio o criterios, contribuyeron a darle el aspecto con el que desde
el siglo VIII se nos presenta. El indiscutible carcter de intocable del texto cornico
no permite de otro lado establecer, ms all de lo que suponga una derivacin legal
o teolgica, el proceso seguido por las posibles incongruencias textuales o
variantes. La prctica ausencia de materiales colaterales a la existencia del canon
cornico impide no slo la reconstruccin de etapas, sino adems la elaboracin
interna, desde la perspectiva musulmana, o externa, de la investigacin occidental,
de un procedimiento o una metodologa hermenuticos.

Si, por el contrario, se acepta el peso de inmutabilidad del texto y se considera
indiscutible su valor desde todos los puntos de vista: lingstico, literario,
normativo, en su doble vertiente gramatical y legal, filosfico, teolgico, histrico,
etc.; es decir, como la nica y vlida fuente de fuentes, en ese caso, todo el
desarrollo cientfico, cultural, literario que compone el bagaje de la civilizacin
islmica, casi hasta el da de hoy, constituye el verdadero dominio de un campo
hermenutico.

Dicho de otro modo, si consideramos que, en el Islam clsico y en su
desarrollo posterior, el nacimiento de ciencias como la Gramtica, la Lexicografa, la
Historiografa, las obras de carcter bio-bibliogrfico o genealgico, las
recopilaciones de carcter sapiencial, las antologas poticas y las retricas, y si se
apura el argumento, la Filosofa, la Medicina, la Astronoma, la Matemtica, etc.,
tienen su motor primero en una inquietud de carcter religioso, en un modo de
complementar la comprensin de todo un universo revelado en el texto cornico, se
puede afirmar que estamos, esencialmente, frente a una civilizacin hermenutica.

No se ha conservado memoria de la presencia de una labor de fijacin
cannica del texto del Corn. La conciencia de los musulmanes ve el texto revelado
como una unidad que no ha sufrido cambios histricos, a la que no se han
incorporado textos de diversas tradiciones, en la que no se han producido
traducciones o retraducciones, interpolaciones o exclusiones, a pesar de las largas
discusiones entre sabios musulmanes acerca de textos contradictorios o las teoras
elaboradas acerca de versculos satnicos.

S se conserva noticia de la fijacin escrita del texto que se revela y transmite
oralmente; con ese fin, una escritura, que se encontraba en una situacin poco
menos que embrionaria, se desarrolla, se ampla y se matiza. Esa escritura,
consonntica, debe desarrollar un sistema de notacin voclica para evitar, en una
lengua en la que la flexin interna es una de sus caractersticas ms destacadas, las
distorsiones en la lectura y comprensin del texto. As se llegan a establecer hasta
siete lecturas autorizadas, que no suponen, sin embargo, diferencias textuales
profundas y que afectan a palabras o partes relativamente dispersas y breves, pero
esta canonizacin del texto se lleva a cabo en muy poco tiempo, segn las
noticias que se nos conservan y no queda rastro material de otras posibles
variantes. No haba transcurrido ni un siglo desde la muerte del Profeta, cuando el
texto estaba completamente fijado, sin que aparecieran en torno a l textos
alternativos.

Esta fijacin por escrito, en un ambiente cultural profundamente oral,
despierta el inters por la fijacin de la lengua y de otras tradiciones laicas, pero
que pueden contribuir a la comprensin del texto revelado. Las historias
tradicionales que contaban los rabes beduinos empiezan a ser puestas por escrito
y la poesa igualmente.

La labor de sistematizacin ortogrfica, lxica y gramatical, surge de la
necesidad de dar lectura correcta al texto cornico. Las producciones profanas
contribuirn a ello. La primera exgesis no se hace sobre el propio texto revelado,
sino sobre los materiales lingsticos no revelados que pueden aportar luz y orden
en un texto que se ha recibido de forma fragmentaria.

La exgesis, una vez que cuenta con materiales cientficos de apoyo, comienza
a desarrollarse en lneas que de algn modo convergen, no slo con el desarrollo
histrico de la exgesis rabnica, como ya se ha apuntado, aunque esta
aproximacin no cuente con el respaldo masivo de la investigacin occidental, sino
con la aplicacin de mtodos internos y criterios que siguen de muy cerca al
mtodo rabnico. Se da una interpretacin de carcter lingstico, entendida como
desarrollo de los valores semnticos de los trminos, la bsqueda etimolgica que
ayude a precisar los campos semnticos y una precisin de los usos morfolgicos o
sintcticos o incluso fonticos que permita una lectura correcta del texto y su
comprensin. El Corn es fuente de anlisis lingstico; crea la norma y expresa la
norma o en l se reconoce la norma, pese a la conciencia de que en ocasiones
contraviene a esa misma norma por presentar formas arcaizantes, en desuso o
contrarias a lo registrado en otros textos y que se vuelve normativo. Junto a ello,
sin separacin de gneros sino de modo global, se da un anlisis de los significados
de los contenidos. Lo que produce desarrollos de ejemplificaciones y comentarios
de todo tipo.

Aparece un panorama que rene: la interpretacin literal, casi lexicogrfica; la
interpretacin teolgica, acompaada de interpretaciones literalistas o alegricas,
as como un aspecto absolutamente fundamental que es el de la fijacin normativa,
de modo que se da una interpretacin legislativa de la revelacin. A todo ello hay
que aadir, siempre dentro de esa concepcin globalizadora que supone un mtodo
explicativo que acta sobre cada palabra, sobre cada versculo y sobre cada
fragmento, el recurso a tradiciones que, aun no teniendo una relacin directa con la
revelacin, contribuyan a explicarla y darle sentido. Esto constituye un modo de
conservacin de conocimientos provenientes de diversas fuentes; as los
comentarios cornicos se convierten en verdaderas piezas de historia, historia
sagrada, mitologa -atendiendo a la reserva con la que ha de utilizarse el trmino
en este campo-, cosmologa, etc.

Sin embargo, y aunque se pueda calificar -como se ha hecho ms arriba- de
civilizacin hermenutica a toda la cultura rabe-islmica, el gnero que recoge
esta forma especial de hermenutica, a la que hacamos mencin, es el tafsr. Este
trmino es el empleado para designar al desarrollo, anlisis y comprensin del texto
cornico. La raz f-s-r muestra una significativa semejanza fnica y semntica con
la raz hebrea p-sh-r, de donde pesher ("comentario). Tasfir en rabe supone
fundamentalmente el comentario cornico .

Siendo sin duda la fuente primera de todas las ciencias que se desarrollan en
el mbito de la cultura musulmana, no cabe duda de que son aquellas que,
partiendo de esa inquietud religiosa, adems tienen una finalidad religiosa, las que
constituyen el cuerpo de la exgesis musulmana y en las que se pueden rastrear
mtodos que responden a una inquietud hermenutica. Tomando en consideracin
esto y sin olvidar que no existe una separacin entre lo religioso y lo laico en la
concepcin musulmana, cabe decir que son tres las ciencias fundamentales que,
apoyadas en el hecho religioso y con la finalidad de esclarecer los contenidos de lo
religioso, constituyen la produccin hermenutica musulmana. El Tafsr, al que ya
hemos hecho mencin, el Hadiz y el Fiqh.

La primera de estas ciencias, volcada sobre el texto cornico y el Hadiz, que
constituye la recopilacin de las tradiciones relativas a los hechos y dichos del
Profeta, para cuya identificacin como veraces se aplica un mtodo estricto de
comprobacin de las cadenas de transmisin (isnad), conforman la sunna, que
podemos entender como tradicin ortodoxa. Su derivacin legal, el Fiqh, estara
apoyada en esa concepcin ortodoxa.

Ello significa que dejamos de lado otra tradicin importante como es la
tradicin shi que, apoyada en las mismas fuentes, discute la veracidad de
determinados aspectos y que da lugar a diversas corrientes, as como a un
desarrollo jurdico diferente con matices importantes, a una comprensin teolgica
con diferencias notables y que desarrolla aspectos apocalpticos y escatolgicos que
van mucho ms lejos que lo recogido en la tradicin sunn. Sin embargo, desde el
punto de vista de los mtodos exegticos, de la formalidad de su presentacin y de
los conceptos bsicos manejados, no difiere grandemente de lo que aparece en la
tradicin ortodoxa. Hay que hacer hincapi, no obstante, en que los trminos
ortodoxia y heterodoxia, en Islam, deben ser manejados con un valor solamente
indicativo, aproximado y metafrico, si se quiere, en relacin a cmo se entienden
en otros mbitos.

El Tafsir tiene sus inicios en el propio siglo VII y su punto de desarrollo ms
importante en los siglos VIII-X o entre los siglos XII-XIII. Sin embargo, el mtodo
exegtico no cambia.

La primera aplicacin del tafsir se hace sobre el propio trmino que designa al
Libro Santo. El trmino quran, que para la mayora de los sabios occidentales, que
siguen la opinin de F. Schwally y de otros autores, vendra de la palabra siraca
keryana, lectura de las Escrituras, leccin, empleada en la liturgia cristiana, es
interpretado por la mayora de las autoridades musulmanas como un nombre verbal
de la raz q-r- (leer o recitar). Ambas opiniones se apoyan en el empleo que de
esta raz hace el propio texto cornico, en donde, sin embargo, no aparece con
tanta frecuencia como la raz tlw (recitar). Algunos autores musulmanes, al
comentar textos en que el nombre verbal derivado de esta raz q-r- apareca sin la
ltima de sus consonantes radicales, la hamza (` ), asignaron la palabra a la raz q-
r-n (reunir, recopilar), lo que dara indicio de una cierta conciencia de acopio de
materiales diversos. No obstante, esta asignacin no toma en cuenta el fenmeno
de la irregular representacin de dicha consonante en la escritura de la poca, as
como su desaparicin en la realizacin de diversos dialectos occidentales del rabe
Antiguo, entre ellos el dialecto de Meca. La conclusin ms verosmil es que la
palabra quran naci en el Corn mismo para representar la misma idea de la
palabra siraca keryana, pero se form sobre un tipo rabe frecuente de nombre
verbal.

Con el propio trmino Quran alterna el trmino kitab que aparece igualmente
en el texto revelado. La interpretacin de este trmino es an ms compleja que la
anterior.

En un cierto nmero de versculos pertenecientes a la primera poca del
Profeta en Medina, el Corn es presentado como un Libro (kitab) y el trmino Corn
se presenta como muy cercano al significado que hoy tiene como una de las tres
Escrituras reveladas, junto con el Antiguo y el Nuevo Testamentos (Qur., IX, 3), aun
cuando, en el momento en que se emplea en este sentido, an no haba concluido
la revelacin ni tampoco su fijacin por escrito.

El trmino kitab (libro, escrito) figura, en singular, 255 veces en el Corn y
otras 6 veces en plural (kutub). Es bastante raro que se aplique a un texto escrito
corriente, como por ejemplo a una carta (Qur., XX- VII, 28-9). Los comentaristas
tienden a interpretar estos trminos como designaciones de libros celestes, pero
reales, si bien no se encuentra en el Corn alusin o indicacin hacia un arquetipo
celeste y son los propios comentaristas los que introducen el concepto en el texto.
Concepto que, no obstante, ha sido adoptado por la mayor parte de los
investigadores occidentales.

La comprensin del proceso de constitucin de la revelacin y su
interpretacin y composicin va indisolublemente ligada a la personalidad del
Profeta Muhammad. Segn el punto de vista ortodoxo musulmn, el texto se
desarrolla de forma dramtica en un dilogo entre Al-lh, que dicta la revelacin, y
el Profeta con la mediacin de Gabriel, el arcngel. Sin embargo dice que el profeta
tena visiones de Al-lh e incluso que Al-lh le habla directamente sin intermediario
(Qur., 1-111, 10), Al-lh es la fuente directa de la revelacin (Qur., LX- XIII). De
otra parte, en textos coetneos en el proceso de la revelacin se aprecia una
relacin directa entre la idea de revelacin y la existencia de un kitab, es decir una
puesta por escrito, al tiempo que se aprecia un alejamiento de la voz de Al-lh
(Qur., XLII, 50 y ss.; XXVI, 192-3; XVI, 102). Tambin aparece la mencin a otras
posibles fuentes de emisin de la revelacin, pero empieza a cobrar importancia el
hecho de la fijacin por escrito (Qur., XXV, 4-6).

Los indicios que poseemos parecen mostrar que Muhmmad comenz a poner
por escrito un texto en los primeros aos de Medina, pero las responsabilidades
provenientes de la direccin de la comunidad musulmana que se desarrollaba
rpida mente le obligaron a dejar esta tarea inacabada. La tradicin del Profeta
(hadiz) apoya esta teora, ya que dice que Muhmmad dictaba a los escribas la
revelacin, les deca cmo deban disponerla o insertaba un nuevo versculo en
textos ya recogidos (Qur., XXV, 4-6). La disposicin de la re- velacin, transmitida
oralmente, obligaba a la revisin y readaptacin de textos revelados anteriormente
y el propio Corn hace mencin de las modificaciones aportadas al texto revelado
(Qur., II, 106; XVI, 101; XXII, 52). Estas interpolaciones o modificaciones se
producen por diversas causas que se explican porque el Profeta ha olvidado algo de
lo que le fue revelado, o bien Satn introduce algo (muchos comentaristas aportan
historias curiosas acerca de las interpolaciones y cambios en la lnea de los
llamados versculos satnicos. Todas estas historias son entendidas por la
investigacin occidental como creaciones de los exegetas) o, finalmente, Al-lh
sustituye un verso o una parte por algo an mejor. A partir del 632, fecha de la
muerte de Muhmmad, se produce la fijacin del texto, cuya historia, como se ha
visto, no est nada clara. Sabemos que la composicin del canon cornico pasa por
tres fases, difcilmente datables y delimitables.

La primera de ellas sera la de compilacin del texto y su disposicin, a partir
de fuentes orales, lo aportado por aquellos musulmanes que haban memorizado la
revelacin, y escritas, muchas de ellas conservadas en materiales muy dispersos y
perecederos (hojas de palmera, pequeos fragmentos de barro cocido, etc.). El
segundo estadio sera el del establecimiento del ductus consonntico. La afirmacin
de que la escritura rabe en esta poca se encontraba en un estado embrionario se
refiere fundamentalmente al hecho de que varios fonemas diferentes posean
grafas idnticas. El tercer paso para la fijacin del texto por escrito pasa por un
proceso segn el cual diferentes lecturas, es decir, diferentes formas de vocalizacin
del texto, son aceptadas como cannicas o reveladas, con lo que ello implica de
depuracin de la comprensin y fijacin del mensaje.

En todo este proceso, sin duda, aunque no de manera explcita, se produce
una elaboracin exegtica y hermenutica.

El corpus del hadiz queda constituido en el siglo IX, en que se culmina el
proceso de recopilacin de los materiales que recogen las tradiciones del Profeta,
as como queda establecido el mtodo de discriminacin de los transmisores, lo que
da lugar a toda una clasificacin que va desde las tradiciones consideradas como
autnticas (sahih) hasta aquellas otras que se consideran apcrifas o rechazables
(niatruk).

El Fiqh parte de supuestos prcticos y desarrolla un mtodo apoyado
fundamentalmente en la deduccin racional (qiyas) y en el acuerdo de los expertos
(iyrna). Las distintas escuelas jurdicas se fijan en torno a los siglos VIII y IX.
Establece el Fiqh la aplicacin prctica de la sharia (ley) que no discrimina entre la
concepcin laica y la religiosa, equiparando el terreno de las relaciones humanas o
el de las relaciones del hombre con Al-lh.

Dos aspectos del desarrollo del pensamiento islmico de suma importancia,
cuya evolucin histrica y metodologa seran por s mismas merecedoras de un
estudio separado son los constituidos por la teologa (kalam) de una parte y la
mstica (tasawwuf) de otra. La teologa, inspirada en la razn (`aql) y en los
mtodos filosficos desarrollados en la antigedad griega, tiene sus inicios en el
siglo IX, pero la aparicin, relativamente temprana, del libre pensamiento
(mutazila), rechazado quiz ms por razones polticas que propiamente
dogmticas, cort una va fructfera del desarrollo y renovacin de las ideas en este
dominio, de tal modo que los esfuerzos de muchos pensadores musulmanes del
presente, que son fieles a la tradicin, topan con este escollo con frecuencia.

En torno al siglo VIII, surgen las primeras escuelas de carcter mstico. Sobre
sus orgenes e inspiracin se ha discutido largamente. Sin embargo, se puede
afirmar que pertenecen y son expresin de una vivencia espiritual interna del
Islam, sin negar las influencias cristianas, persas o hindes, as como del
neoplatonismo. La mstica musulmana desarrolla, adems de un mtodo exegtico
complejo, un amplio cuerpo doctrinal, cuyos conceptos y vocabulario, as como sus
figuras ms destacadas y obras ms seeras han influido en todo el desarrollo
literario e ideolgico de la cultura musulmana. Su influencia no slo ha llegado
hasta hoy, sino que es fuente de produccin e inspiracin en el presente desarrollo
cultura del mundo islmico.

La mstica supone un sistema coherente de interpretacin que parte de la
libertad, de un lado, y del examen de la experiencia, de otro, por tanto de lo real.
Distingue dos mbitos fundamentales en la interpretacin y en el uso del lenguaje,
como son el mbito de lo literal y el mbito de lo simblico. La funcionalidad de
este ltimo mbito no supone la salida psicolgica o subjetiva, libre de toda rienda,
sino ms bien la conciencia racional de la importancia de dar un lugar a lo
imaginativo en la expresin de lo indecible. En este ltimo sentido es en el que la
teora de la interpretacin elaborada por la mstica musulmana puede atribuirse el
haber dado su verdadero valor al imaginario y haberlo creado, por decirlo as, en el
mbito de la cultura rabo-islmica. El xito del imaginario mstico ha sobrepasado
el propio lugar que te corresponda y ha inundado a toda la cultura islmica
posterior. En el momento presente, el recurso a ese imaginario, a sus smbolos y al
modo de creacin del mbito simblico, es un recurso productivo en la literatura y
en el pensamiento rabe.

Tambin dentro del llamado perodo clsico podemos situar el nacimiento,
desarrollo y fijacin de una serie de aspectos del pensamiento crtico a cuyo mbito
se pueden adscribir ciencias como la lexicografa, la gramtica, la retrica, el arte
del estilo y la crtica literaria. Todas ellas estn inspiradas en un primer estadio por
la necesidad de comprensin de la revelacin. El nacimiento de las escuelas
gramaticales, en torno al siglo VIII y IX, la sistematizacin lxica y su ordenacin
por races, atendiendo a aspectos fonticos ms que a campos semnticos, las
discusiones acerca de la mtrica o acerca de la definicin de recursos poticos y
estilsticos, su fijacin, variedades y licencias, as como la estructuracin
morfo-sintctica, desarrollan un mtodo crtico basado en la recopilacin de los
datos que los testimonios lingsticos aportan establecindose as el valor del
precedente, en el consenso acerca de su uso correcto y en un procedimiento de
difcil definicin que alude a lo rechazable o admisible por el odo.

Los argumentos a base de la existencia del precedente, del consenso, etc., se
asemejan a los utilizados por el hadiz o por el fiqh, de ah que la ciencia del estilo
se denomine fiqh al-luga, es decir la jurisprudencia de la lengua. Otras ciencias
como la retrica o el buen uso del lenguaje potico reciben denominaciones como la
de naqd crtica, que supone establecer qu es aceptable o no por el odo o qu
ha sido admitido tradicionalmente como correcto o badi que es aquello que se
considera elocuente. En definitiva, todas las ciencias clsicas de crtica estn
sometidas al concepto de ray, que podramos entender como opinin ponderada,
y que se apoya fundamentalmente en lo ya transmitido o aceptado.

Los siglos de decadencia poltica del Islam, entre el XIII y el XVIII, van
acompaados de una decadencia en lo cultural que se refleja en el nulo avance en
todos los aspectos y en la repeticin enciclopdica del saber acumulado, en todos
los campos, en los siglos de esplendor. El renacimiento cultural de los pueblos
musulmanes, especialmente del mundo rabe-islmico, se produce hacia mediados
del siglo XVIII, avanza a lo largo del siglo XIX, y -a pesar de las apariencias-
coloca al mundo rabe en la misma dimensin cultural que el mundo desarrollado, a
partir de los aos veinte del siglo que estamos terminando. Este renacimiento
cultural, denominado Nahda, afecta tambin a las ciencias religiosas, a la filosofa y,
en general, a todos los mbitos de la labor intelectual.

Sin embargo, las circunstancias histricas del mundo rabe, sometido a la
presin colonizadora de las potencias occidentales, sus procesos de
independizacin, ms o menos violentos, y la permanente situacin de conflicto en
que han vivido esos territorios durante este siglo, no han favorecido, junto a la
implantacin de ideologas de importacin o la intercomunicacin cultural, el
nacimiento o el desarrollo de formas autctonas diferentes de las tradicionales e
histricas, de una exgesis religiosa o de una hermenutica racionalista que no
estuviera marcada por cuestiones de carcter ideolgico.

La pervivencia de una llamada filosofa tradicional, la presencia de
reformadores religiosos moderadamente progresistas, junto a radicales
conservadores o a radicales progresistas de carcter netamente laico, pero muy
marcados ideolgicamente, ofrece un panorama complejo que resulta muy rico en
variables, pero pobre, en alguna medida, en la renovacin de los mtodos
exegticos, en el desarrollo de una metodologa hermenutica o en una reflexin
sobre las bases filosficas de la crtica.

No obstante, y a pesar de que se dan casos aislados de un desarrollo del
pensamiento crtico sistematizado que podramos enmarcar dentro de disciplinas
como la teologa, la filosofa, la sociologa, la psicologa o la politologa, la
creatividad en el campo literario es la que encubre una verdadera hermenutica de
la realidad tanto si sta se observa desde planteamientos religiosos como si se
observa desde una atalaya laica.

Es decir, la literatura rabe contempornea, sobre todo la escrita en los
ltimos treinta aos, encierra un planteamiento de observacin crtica y de
reconstruccin mtica de la realidad, cargada de smbolos abiertos, que hace prever
que la propia crtica literaria del mundo rabe islmico deber dejar los cauces de lo
estrictamente literario, para adentrarse en el desentraamiento de la estructura
filosfica que subyace en esos textos. Se ver as precisada de entrar por la va de
la objetivacin hermenutica de esos textos, apartndose de la descripcin formal
de los modos, temas y gneros literarios. Asimismo, sin abandonar las
metodologas propias de la crtica literaria con su necesaria definicin de gneros y
recursos literarios, se ver obligada a completar esa crtica con una comprensin de
los valores simblicos de los aspectos formales, lo que llevar, necesariamente, a la
especulacin crtica en un sentido ms amplio.

Es muy posible que en los prximos aos asistamos a la elaboracin de una
nueva metodologa que, partiendo del anlisis de los textos literarios, invada otros
campos propios de la Hermenutica como es la elaboracin de un sistema o
sistemas filosficos de crtica aplicable a cualquier realidad.


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MILLIOT, L., Introduction a ltude du droit musulman, Paris, 1953.

MODARRESi TABATABA1, H., An Introduction to the Shii Law, London, 1984.

MOMEN, M., An Introduction to Shii Islam, New Haven, 1985.
MOUTIARAC, Y., Le Coran et la critique occidentale, Beirut, 1972-3.

NicHOLSON, R.A., The Mystics of Islam, London, 1914, 3.1 ed. 1966.

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NWYlA, P., Exgese coranique et langage mystique, Beirut 1970.

RIPPIN, A., Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Quran, Oxford, 1988.

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VOLL, J.O., Islam: continuity and change in the modern world, London, 1982.

WANSBROUGH, J., Quranic Studies, Oxford, 1977.

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* Entrada Islamismo del Diccionario de Hermenutica, editado por la Universidad
de Deusto, 1998. Edicin a cargo de A. Ortiz-Oss y P. Lancros
Two Faces of the Qur!n: Qur!n and Mu"#af
Angelika Neuwirth
Introduction: Qur!n and Rhetoric, Bal!gha
Every prophet is given a sign that testifies to his rank as a messenger. Moses, who was
sent to the Egyptians, had to convince addressees with magic. To eclipse them he had to perform
a miracle, changing a rod into a snake and changing the snake back into the rod. Jesus made his
appearance in an age when the most prestigious discipline was medicine; he therefore had to
work a medical miracle: resurrecting the dead. Coming still later, Mu!ammad was sent to a
people who would no longer be won by physical miracles, butbeing particularly committed to
rhetoric, bal!ghademanded a more sublime prophetic sign. Mu!ammad, therefore, had to
present a linguistic and stylistic miracle to convince them. He presented a scripture, the Qur!n.
1
This review of the prophetic missions, often evoked since the time of its first transmitter,
the eighth- and ninth-century polymath al-J"!i#, seems to hit an important point in the perception
of the kind of scripture the Qur!n constitutes. Although one might object to the classification of
the two great messengers preceding Mu!ammad as professionals in magic and medicine, the
classification of Mu!ammad and the Qur!n as closely related to linguistics and rhetoric is
certainly pertinent. His communication of the message is in fact the central part of his mission,
unlike Moses and Jesus whose significance relies on both deeds and words. Not only by virtue
of Mu!ammads addressing a linguistically demanding audience should the Qur!n be
acknowledged as particularly closely related to bal!gha, but also for another reason about which
the authors of the above-quoted classification were arguably less conscious. I am referring to the
peculiar iunctim of speech and meta-speech in the Qur!n. Unframed by any narrative scenario,
the entire Qur!n is speech as such. Qur"nic speech, moreover, is not limited to the oral
communication of a message to listeners, but is often a metadiscourse, a speech about speech, a
comment on the Qur"nic message itself or on the speech of others. The Qur!nso one might
summarize the classifications of prophets related abovewas sent down not in an age where
amazement could be aroused by extraordinary deeds, but where a speaker successfully
confronted and vanquished another, eclipsing the argument of the other in what in Islamic
theology would later term ij!z, meaning to render the other rhetorically impotent. That age
was neither an age of magic, nor of science, but an age of exegesis. The Qur!n accordingly
Oral Tradition, 25/1 (2010): 141-156
1
Paraphrase of Al-J!"i# 1979. See also the summary in Pellat 1967:80.
presents itself as a highly rhetorical and often metatextual document that reflects an ongoing
debate.
In light of these considerations, the problem underlying the present crisis in Western
Qur"nic scholarshipthe seemingly unbridgeable divide between a traditional position that
regards the Qur!n as the literary outcome of a prophetic mission in Mecca and Medina during
the first half of the seventh century CE, and a skeptical position that ascribes its compilation to a
later syncretistic Mesopotamian community
2
appears to reflect a mistaken premise, very much
like the problem that tormented the customs inspector in the famous Tijuana anecdote (Boyarin
2004:1):
Every day for thirty years a man drove a wheelbarrow full of sand over the Tijuana border
crossing. The customs inspector dug through the sand each morning but could not discover any
contraband. He remained, of course, convinced that he was dealing with a smuggler. On the day of
his retirement from the service, he asked the smuggler to reveal what it was that he was smuggling
and how he had been doing so. Wheelbarrows; Ive been smuggling wheelbarrows, of course.
I mention this humorous anecdote to argue that what Qur"nic scholars should be looking
for is not the whereabouts of a literary compilation called Qur!n, let alone asking What the
Qur!n really says, but should instead be looking at the Qur"nic text as a medium of
transport, triggering and reflecting a communication. The Qur!n in its emergent phase is not a
pre-meditated, fixed compilation, a reified literary artifact, but a still-mobile text reflecting an
oral theological-philosophical debate between diverse interlocutors of various late antique
denominations. It is a text that first of all demands to be read as a drama involving multiple
protagonists. What is demanded is a change in focus from the exclusive perception of a reified
codex to a still-fluid pre-canonical text that can provide a solution to the historical problems that
Qur"nic scholarship addresses.
To understand this perspective, we need to remember that the Qur"nic age roughly
coincides with the epoch when the great exegetical corpora of monotheist tradition were edited
and published, such as the two Talmudim in Judaism and the patristic writings in Christianity.
These writings, not the Bible, as is often held, are the literary counterparts of the Qur!n. Daniel
Boyarin (2004) repeatedly stresses that the Talmud isno less than the writings of the Church
fathersimbued with Hellenistic rhetoric. Indeed, the Qur!n should be understood first and
foremost as exegetical, that is, polemical-apologetical, and thus highly rhetorical. The Qur!n is
communicated to listeners whose education already comprises biblical and post-biblical lore,
whose nascent scripture therefore should provide answers to the questions raised in biblical
exegesisa scripture providing commentary on a vast amount of earlier theological legacies.
This thesis contradicts the dominant views in present Qur"nic scholarship. More often
than not, the Qur!n is considered as a text pre-conceived, so to speak, by an author, identified in
Western scholarship with Mu!ammad, or anonymous compilers, a text that was fixed and
canonized somewhat later to constitute a liturgical manual and a religious guide for the Muslim
community. This view reflects Islamic tradition, which equally regards the Qur!n as an
142 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH
2
For the state of Qur!nic studies, see Neuwirth, Marx, et al. 2008.
auctorial text. Islamic tradition, however, does distinguish between the (divinely) authored
Book, labeled al-mu"#af, as the canonical codex, and the Qur"nic communication process,
labeled al-qur!n. Yet the hermeneutical predominance of the Qurans perception as mu"#af in
Islamic tradition is hard to deny. The shift from the original, that is, intra-Qur"nic concept of
qur!n, to the post-Mu!ammadan concept of mu"#af is, of course, due to the event of
canonization, which reconfigured the text from a historical document into a timeless symbol.
Aziz al-Azmeh (1994) has shown that texts become detemporalized through canonization, their
single units being considered indiscriminate in terms of chronology;
3
insteadso we have to add
they become amalgamated with myth, turning into testimonies of the foundational myth of
their communities.
The core of this paper will focus on the Qur!n not as the fixed corpus it became after the
death of the Prophet, al-mu"#af, but as a chain of oral communications conveyed to the Meccan
and the Medinan community, whose expectations and religious background are reflected in the
Qur"nic texts. Following Daniel Madigan (2001), I claim that the oral character of the
communication during the Prophets lifetime was never substituted by a written textnot
because the ongoing revelation process stood in the way of codification but rather because the
emerging conviction that the Word of God is not accessible to humans except through oral
communication. To highlight the notion of qur!n in the sense of oral communication, I first
will briefly survey the hermeneutical implications of a Qur"nic reading as either mu"#af or
qur!n. Then I will vindicate the claim that orality in the Qur!n is not limited to its function as a
mediality but successively acquires the dimension of a theologumenon (that is, a conviction
shared by the speaker and his audience). This will be demonstrated by tracing the strategies that
the Qur!n applies to justify its essentially oral character as a legitimate scriptural manifestation
and to challenge the rival concept of codified scripture. The third part focuses on literary devices
that serve as markers of Qur"nic orality. Finally, I will analyze an example of the Qur"nic re-
reading of earlier monotheistic traditions as an oral and public procedure.
Qur!n Versus Mu"#af
The study of the Qur!n as a post-canonical, closed text (that is, the text established after
the death of the prophet, which was codified a few decades later and acknowledged as
unchangeable), accessible only through the lens of traditional Islamic exegesis, is a legitimate
task for elucidating the communitys understanding of the Qur!n. It is an anachronistic
approach, however, when it is appliedas it tacitly often isto investigate the formation of the
Qur"nic message, that is, the dynamics of its textual growth and diverse changes in orientation
during the oral communication phase of the Qur!n. To evaluate the Qur!n historically one has
to be aware of the reconfiguration that the prophetic communication underwent in its redaction
and canonization: whereas the single units (s$ras) collected in the mu"#af are juxtaposed,
TWO FACES OF THE QURAN 143
3
Although in exegesis a rough grid ascribing the texts to particular situations of revelation (asb!b al-
nuz"l) has been laid over the text whose single units are more generally divided into Meccan and Medinan, this does
not prevent readers from applying a purely synchronic approach when explaining texts through others.
constituting a sort of anthology, the oral communications build dynamically on each other, later
ones often rethinking earlier ones, sometimes even inscribing themselves into earlier texts. Thus
there is ample intertextuality to be observed between s$ras absent from the mu"#af, where the
chronological order of the s$ras is no longer evident and the tension produced by dialectic
interactions between texts is extinguished (Neuwirth 2002). But Qur"nic texts viewed as
communications also refer to extratextual evidence, to unspoken intertexts, so to speak, drawing
on the discourses that were debated in the listeners circles. These fell silent once the text was
turned from a dramatic polyphonic communication into a monolithic divine account. The oral
Qur!n (to use a loose expression) may be compared to a telephone conversation where the
speech of only one party is audible, yet the unheard speech of the other is roughly deducible
from the audible one. Indeed, the social concerns and theological questions of the listeners are
widely reflected in the Qur!n text pronounced by the Prophets voice. To approach the text as a
historical document thus would demand the researcher to investigate Mu!ammads growing and
changing public, listeners who belonged to a late antique urban milieu, many of whom must have
been aware of and perhaps involved in the theological debates among Jews, Christians, and
others in the seventh century.
When studying the Qur!n from a literary perspective, it is even more perilous to use the
two manifestations of the text indistinctly. In view of their generic differences, both would
require different methodologies: the communication process comes closest to a drama, whereas
the mu"#af presents itself as a divine monologue, in generic terms, a kind of a hagiographic
account. The theory of drama that distinguishes between an exterior and an interior level of
communication (Pfister 1994) best illustrates the relation between canonized text and the
communication process. On the exterior level, which in literary texts is occupied by the author of
the printed dramatic text and his readers, the mu"#af authored by God addresses the readers of
the written Qur!n. Against that, on the interior levelin literary texts occupied by the
performers of the drama who are observed actingthe speaker, Mu!ammad, and his listeners are
interacting. This scenario demands that a number of extra-semantic signs, such as rhetoric and
structure, be taken into consideration (Neuwirth 1980). The divine voice here acts as a further
protagonist speaking continuously to the Prophet, seldom directly to the listeners, but the voice
permanently stages the various scenarios of the prophet-listeners-interaction through speaking
about the listeners, thus acting as a kind of invisible stage director or as a sort of reporter.
Looking back once again to the exterior level, the mu"#af, the divine voice has merged with that
of the Prophet to become the narrator, whereas the interacting audience has disappeared from the
stage completely, to become mere objects of the sole speakers speech. These two scenarios of
the Qur!nas a communication process and as a scriptural codexare thus essentially
different and consequently demand methodologies of their own.
Strategies of Vindicating Scriptural Orality
Returning to the thesis that the orality of the Qur"nic message, rather than being a
pragmatic medial option, amounts to no less than a basic theologumenon, let us look at the
Qur"nic strategies of vindicating scriptural orality as an appropriate manifestation of the divine
144 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH
word. The Qur!n, not unlike the other Scriptures, originated from a vast body of heterogeneous
traditions current in its geographical context, a selection of which, answering to the needs of an
emerging community, crystallized into a Scripture in its own right. What is characteristic of the
Qur!n, however, is its emergence from a milieu in which the phenomenon of Scripture,
materialized in written codices, was already familiar. As Nicolai Sinai (2006) has lucidly
demonstrated, it is in confrontation with the Judeo-Christian notions of scripturality that the
developing Qur!n had to stake its own claim to authority. What is striking here is that the
Qur!n did not subscribe to the concept of a written manifestation of scripture but established a
new image, that of an oral scripture; in William Grahams words, The Qur!n has always
been pre-eminently an oral, not a written text (2003:584). Daniel Madigan justly claims that
nothing about the Qur!n suggests that it conceives of itself as identical with the kit!b (the
celestial book) (cited in Sinai 2006:115), that is to say the Qur!n in no phase of its
development strove to become a closed scriptural corpus. This claim to an ontological
difference between the recitations and their transcendent source (ibid.:109), however,
presupposes that two conditions be fulfilled, and these can only be traced through diachronic
investigations that Madigan has avoided. First, it requires an awareness of the essentially oral
character of the emerging Qur!n as its entelechy, irrespective of the occasional employment of
writing for its memorization. Second, it requires a set of arguments to justify the striking absence
from the Qur!n of the conventional paraphernalia surrounding the revealed Word of God in the
neighboring religions.
Sinai has observed that in the earliest s$ras the divine origins, let alone the scriptural
source of the Qur"nic recitations, are not indicated. Obviously it took some time before the
claim to revelation that is implicit in the use of the prophetic address you was translated into a
consistent rhetoric of divine address, so as to raise the problem of its relationship to written
models (Sinai 2006:109). In view of the Qur"nic beginnings this is no surprise. The early s$ras
on closer examination reveal themselves as rereadings of the Psalms (Neuwirth 2008). They
clearly reflect the language of the Psalms not only in terms of the poetical form (short poetic
verses), but equally in terms of their imagery and the liturgical attitude of their speaker. This
thesis is unaffected by the absence of early translations of the Psalms into Arabic, since the
Psalm corpus, contrary to the other biblical books, was used primarily in liturgy, being recited by
heart so that complete or at least partial texts rendered in a more or less verbal form thus may
have been current through oral transmission. Though the early s$ras cannot be considered
faithful paraphrases of individual Psalms, early s$ras and Psalms alike are unique in expressing
the mood of their speaker articulated in close communication with the divine Other.
The step toward establishing an agency of authority in the texts was taken only at a later
stage, although still in early Mecca, arguably in response to a challenge from outside. This is
evident from verses like Q 69:41-42 (trans. by Arberry 1964:ii, 298):
4
Wa-m! huwa bi-qawli sh!irinqal#lan m! tumin"n
wa-l! bi-qawli k!hinin qal#lan m! tadhakkar"n
TWO FACES OF THE QURAN 145

4
See further the discussion in Sinai 2006:111.
It is the speech of a noble messenger, it is not the speech of a poetlittle do you believe.
Nor the speech of a soothsayerlittle do you remember.
A perceived misinterpretation of the recitations literary genre involving a particular mode of
inspiration is corrected through appeal to their divine origin (Q 69:43; trans. by Arberry 1964:ii,
298):
tanz#lun min rabbi l-!lam#n
A sending down from the Lord of all being
Sinai in his attempt to explain the Qur!ns contrasting of poetry/soothsaying with revelation
focuses on the issue of literary genre (2006:111):
The recitations literary novelty . . . engendered different attempts at categorization
among their audience not so much out of sheer curiosity, but rather because assigning
them to a textual genre was a pre-condition for grasping their communicative intent.
Muhammads recitations in defining themselves as tadhkirareminderor dhikr
warningor as tanz#lrevelationtake up a discussion which had initially been
conducted outside the Qur!n. The meta-level debate is thus interiorized, as it were.
Although the salient point in my view here is the need to reject a particularinferiorsource of
inspiration rather than a non-pertinent literary genre, it is certainly true that Qur"nic self-
referentiality must accordingly be understood as gradually emerging from a process of discussion
with an audience, the expectations and convictions of which had to be convincingly
addressed (idem). The recitations engagement with their audience is of course evident from the
strikingly dialectical structure of many early s$ras, as noted by Jane McAuliffe (1999:163):
The often argumentative or polemical tone of the Qur!n strikes even the most casual
readers. . . . The operative voice in any given pericope, whether it be that of God or
Mu"ammad or of another protagonist, regularly addresses actual or implicit antagonists.
The importance of such interactions as a formative factor in the emergence of the Qur"ns form
and content is evident.
Let us now turn to the Qur"nic engagement with the problem of its non-written form
and, moreover, the missing scriptural paraphernalia. As Madigan observes, the basic challenge
for any interpretation of the term kit!b consists in the fact that the Qur"n claims to be of a
piece with carefully guarded, lavishly appointed, and scrupulously copied sacred codices and
scrolls, while itself remaining open-ended, unwritten, and at the mercy of frail human
memory (2001:45; cited in Sinai 2006:113). This tension, according to Sinai, can be explained
as resulting from a need to balance the obvious situatedness of Mu!ammads recitation with a
strategic interest in imparting to them the glow of scripturality that was felt, by his audience, to
be an indispensable concomitant of genuine revelation (114). Equally the appeal to an
146 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH
archetypal celestial bookan issue that I will turn to presentlymay have been propelled by
polemics.
As often quoted, the most explicit reproach made by Mu!ammads opponents is the
question posed in Q 25:32: Why was the Qur"n not sent down to him as a single complete
pronouncementjumlatan w!#idatan?
5
The incompleteness and situatedness of the
communications obviously were viewed by the audience as a deficiency that set them apart from
conventional manifestations of the Word of God and thus needed to be compensated by
additional credentials more in line with the familiar models. These of course had to be related to
writing, since revelation in Jewish and Christian contexts was bound to the concept of a written
scripture.
Should the fact that some early s$ras of the Qur"nic revelations are credited with an
indirect participation in literacy be related to this expectation of the listeners? There is a cluster
of early s$ras that establish a relation to the celestial book. Thus in Q 80:11-16 the Qur"nic
communications are presented as being emanations, or excerpts, from the celestial ur-text:
kall! innahu tadhkirah
fa-man sh!a dhakarah
f# $u%ufin mukarramah
marf"atin mu&ahharah
bi-ayd# safarah
kir!min bararah
6
No indeed; it is a reminder
And who so wills, shall remember it
Upon pages high-honored,
Uplifted, purified,
By the hands of scribes, noble, pious.
The heavenly source of the Qur"nic communication is elsewhere labeled tablet (Q 85:22)a
reference to the Book of Jubileesand somewhat later, in Middle Mecca, even mother of the
book, umm al-kit!b (Q 43:4). Sinai justly claims that these verses posit a transcendent source
document, participation in which is supposed to invest Mu!ammads recitations with a mediated
kind of scripturality (2006:114). He comments (idem):
The manoeuvre clearly serves to accommodate both the Qur!ns orality and situatedness,
which could not very well be denied, and the prevailing assumption that when God
addresses man, writing somehow has to come into play. Yet contrary to audience
expectations, the kit!b is placed out of human reach, and is said to be accessible only in
the shape of the oral recitations delivered to Mu"ammad. To a certain extent then pre-
TWO FACES OF THE QURAN 147

5
Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the author.
6
Cf. Q 85:21-22: bal huwa qur!nun maj#d f# law%in ma%fu' and Q 56:77-80: innahu la-qur!nun kar#m f#
kit!bin makn"n l! yamassuhu ill! l-mu&ahhar"n tanz#lun min rabbi l-!lam#n.
existing assumptions of the audience are embraced, yet at the same time are subjected to
a profound reconfiguration.
Although I share his conviction regarding the continuous impact of the audience on the
configuration of the emerging Qur!n, I would like to attribute some of the driving force behind
the foregrounding of the transcendent Scripture to the important role played by the Book of
Jubilees in the thinking of the community. That apocryphal text (cf. Najman 1999) had retained a
strong influence on Judeo-Christianity and was in no way absent from the scenario of late
antique theological debate. It is reflected in several early s$ras and can plausibly be considered a
source of inspiration in the Qur"nic relocation of the written Word of God exclusively in the
transcendent sphere. Still, the ongoing debate with opponents cannot be overestimated. And it is
this debate that should have propelled the promotion of the factual orality of the Qur"nic
communications to become a Qur"nic theologumenon.
Once more back to al-kit!b: what is the relation between the performed qur!n and the
celestial kit!b? Post-canonical thinking, of course, holds that both are identical. It is, however,
striking to observe that in some middle and late Meccan texts kit!b and qur!n are carefully kept
distinct. A few remarks concerning the background may be in place here. It is in middle and late
Mecca that the earlier undetermined s$ra structures develop into a structurally distinct shape: the
tripartite s$ra. This compositionanalogous to the structure of ecclesiastical and synagogal
servicespresents a biblical story as its core part, framing it by more dialogical initial and final
parts, entailing polemics/apologetics, or else hymns and affirmations of the rank of the
communication as a revelation (Neuwirth 1996). These s$ras attest to a new Sitz im Leben, a new
social-liturgical function. It is here that the reference to al-kit!b is reserved for the biblical
accounts in particular, figuring in the center of the triad. Later the dichotomy between (biblical)
recollections from the kit!b and other kinds of Qur"nic communications is loosened: al-kit!b
becomes the designation of a celestial mode of storage, whereas qur!n points to its earthly
performance. Yet in terms of form both are never deemed identical: the excerpts from the kit!b
are not received by the Prophet unaltered but have in the course of the transmission process been
adapted to the specific needs of the recipients. Sinai (2006:121) emphasizes the importance of
this difference that the Qur"n itself recognizes as a peculiarity, conceiving it as a hermeneutical
code, so to speak; it even receives a technical designation: taf"%l. The locus classicus for this
perception is Q 41:2 f. (Trans. by Arberry 1964:ii, 185):
tanz#lun min al-ra%m!ni r-ra%#m
kit!bun fu$$ilat !y!tuhu qur!nan arabiyyan li-qawmin yalam"n.
A sending down from the Merciful, the Compassionate
A book whose signs have been distinguished [or adapted] as an Arabic Koran, for a
people having knowledge.
148 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH
The heavenly kit!b is coded as an Arabic recitationnot implying, however, that it was
necessarily composed in Arabic from eternity on.
7
This means that even biblical stories that are
ascribed to al-kit!b do not involve the claim to verbal quotations from the celestial source, but de
facto constitute a kind of paraphrase adapted to the listeners scope. This observation equally
throws light on the factoften considered irritatingthat in the Qur!n individual stories are
told more than once and presented in different versions. In the light of the hermeneutics of taf"%l
these are to be considered as subsequent renderings of a particular kit!b-pericope, repeatedly re-
phrased and adapted to the changing communal situation. Sinai concludes (2006:126):
From the Qur!nic perspective, therefore, the celestial scripture cannot be given to man in
any other shape than mufa$$alan Q 6:114. The kit!b is partially accessible, but never
available, it can be tapped via divine revelation, but due to the need to tailor such
revelations to a specific target audience, the kit!b as such is at no ones disposal, not even
in the form of literal excerpts.
At this stage, orality has acquired the dimension of a Qur"nic theologumenon.
Markers of Orality
Proportions
Having discussed the development of orality as a Qur"nic theologumenon, let us now
turn to some of the textual characteristics that strikingly point to the oral composition of the text.
The most technically evident of these are quantitative regularities between verse groups that
often amount to clear and certainly intended proportions (Neuwirth 1981/2007).
Since the sensational hypothesis presented by David Heinrich Mller (1896) claiming a
strophic composition for the s$ras was dismissed without further scrutiny by subsequent
scholarship, the possibility that a firm hand was in full control of the composition and structure
of individual s$ras has been virtually excluded. Against this view, structures do become clearly
discernible beneath the surface through micro-structural analysis (Neuwirth 1981/2007). These
structures mirror a historical development. Particularly in the early short s$ras, distinctive verse
groups can be isolated that often form part of clear-cut patterns of proportions. Thus, Q 75 is
built on the following balanced verse groups: 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 5 + 5 + 5; Q 70 is made up of 6 + 7
+ 7 + 7 + 7 + 9; Q 79 entails two groups of nine verses, its proportions being strikingly balanced
5 + 9 / 6 + 6 + 6 / 9 + 5. Q 51 is made up of groups of 9 + 14 + 14 + 9 + 7 + 7 verses. Similar
TWO FACES OF THE QURAN 149
7
Sinai explains (2006:121), Elsewhere, in Q 10.37 too, this qur!n is qualified as taf$#l al-kit!b, a
sequence of excerpts or interpretative renderings from the celestial book. In a number of passages from Mecca II and
III the kit!b and qur!n are clearly distinguished. The transformation process leading from one entity to the other
being labeled as taf$#l. Sinai stresses that a taf$#l of something must always target a specific audience in a specific
situation. Q 41.44 wa-law jaaln!hu qur!nan ajamiyyan la-q!l" law l! fu$$ilat !y!tuhu provides additional
evidence for this. If the recitations had not been in Arabic, they would not have been properly adapted to their
intended audience (idem).
cases are found in many of those early Meccan s$ras that exceed some ten verses, proportions
being obviously a mnemonic device required when memorization without written support was
demanded from the listeners.
Clausulas
8
At a certain stage of the Middle Meccan period, verses that have become longer,
exceeding two-sentence structures, cease to be marked by expressive and frequently changing
rhyme formulas. Verses now start to display a more simple rhyme, mostly following the
stereotypical $n, %n-pattern that would hardly suffice to fulfill the listeners anticipation of a
resounding end to the verse. A new mnemonic-technical device is utilized to solve the problem.
This device is the rhymed phrase, a syntactically stereotyped colon that is distinguished from its
context insomuch as it does not partake in the main strain of the discourse but presents a kind of
moral comment on it, such as in the case of Josephs brothers plea, Give us full measure and be
charitable with us, which is commented on with the statement Truly God will repay the
charitable (Fa-awfi lan! l-kayla wa-ta"addaq alayn! inna ll!ha yajz% l-muta"addiqin. Q
12:88). Or else the clausula refers to divine omnipotence and providence, such as in the case of
Mu!ammads night journey: Sub#!na lladh% asr! bi-abdihi laylan [. . .] li-nuriyahu min !y!tin!,
innahu huwa l-sam%u l-ba"%r. Q 17:1, Glory be to Him who carried His servant by night . . .
that we might show him some of our signs, which is commented on with the clausula: He is
the All-hearing, the All-seeing. An elaborate classification of the rhymed phrases has shown that
the clausulas display a large number of divine predicates. Although it is true that not all
multipartite verses bear such formulaic endings but occasionally contain ordinary short sentences
in the position of the last colon, clausula verses still may be considered a characteristic
developed in the late Meccan period and present in later verses. Clausulas serve to turn the often-
narrative discourse of the extended s$ras into paraenetic appeals, thus immediately supporting
the communication of their theological message. In this manner they betray a novel narrative
pact between the speaker and his audience, the consciousness that there is a basic consensus on
human moral behavior as well as on the image of God as a powerful agent in human interaction,
a consciousness that has of course been reached only after an extended process of the
communitys education.
The Exegetical Qur!n: S$rat al-ikhl!" as an Example
Let us finally turn to an example of the Qur"nic absorption of earlier traditions that were
orally transmitted in its milieu andappropriated by the Qur"nic communityemerged in a
new shape that however still re-sounds their pre-Qur"nic acoustic and rhetorical shape. One of
the core texts of the Qur!n, the creed articulated in s$rat al-ikhl!" (112), the pure belief, is
celebrated in Islam as a textual, visual, and acoustic icon of unity (trans. by Arberry 1964):
150 ANGELIKA NEUWIRTH
8
See further Neuwirth 1980.
Qul huwa ll!hu a%ad / All!hu $-$amad / lam yalid wa-lam y"lad / wa-lam yakun lahu
kufuwan a%ad.
Say: He is God, one / God the absolute / He did not beget, nor is He begotten / And there
is none like Him.
The short text unit, made up of succinct verses with a proper end-rhyme, would, on first sight, fit
into the pattern of the neatly constructed poetical early Meccan s$ras were it not for the
introductory qul, say, that is characteristic of latermore discursivetexts. Indeed, upon
closer examination, the text is not as monolithic as it appears. It is hard to ignore the way verse 1
Say, God is One; qul huwa ll!hu a#adechoes the Jewish credo Hear Israel, the Lord, our
God, is One; Shema Yisr!&l, ad'nay &l'#&n$ ad'nay e#ad. It is striking that the Jewish text
remains audible in the Qur"nic version, whichagainst grammatical normsadopts the
Hebrew-sounding noun a#ad instead of the more pertinent adjective w!#id for the rhyme. This
ungrammaticality should not go unnoticed. I refer here to Michael Riffaterre (1978), who
coined the notion of the ungrammaticality, meaning the awkwardness of a textual moment that
semiotically points to another text which provides a key to its decoding. The particular kind of
ungrammaticality that is operating in our text can be identified with Riffaterres dual sign. To
quote Riffaterre (92):
The dual sign works like a pun . . . It is first apprehended as a mere ungrammaticality,
until the discovery is made that there is another text in which the word is grammatical;
the moment the other text is identified, the dual sign becomes significant purely because
of its shape, which alone alludes to that other code.
The Jewish text, as we saw, remains audible in the Qur"nic version. Why? This striking
translingual quotation is certainly not without function. It is part of a negotiation strategy: to
appropriate the Jewish credo by making it universal and thus acceptable to a non-Jewish
audience by underscoring that difference, addressing not Israel but any believer. This kind of
exegetical correction is a modification that the Qur!n applies to numerous earlier traditions. Yet
the audible resonance of the earlier text seems to be a clear oral address to Jewish listeners in
particular; the text might thus additionally entail a strategy to bridge the gap between the
Qur"nic and the Jewish communities.
But, as the following table shows, the s$ra refers to more than one earlier credo:
TWO FACES OF THE QURAN 151
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Verse 3He did not beget nor is he begotten; lam yalid wa-lam y$ladis a reverse
echo of the Nicene creed; it rejects the emphatic affirmation of Christs sonshipbegotten, not
made; gennthenta, ou poithentaby a no less emphatic double negation. A negative theology
is established through the inversion of a locally familiar religious text. This negative theology is
summed up in verse 4And there is none like Him; wa-lam yakun lahu kufuwan a#ad. The
verse that introduces a Qur"nic hapax legomenon, kufuwun, equal in rank, to render the core
concept of homoousios, not only inverts the Nicene formula of Christs being of one substance
with Godhomoousios to patribut also forbids thinking of any being as equal in substance
with God, let alone a son.
9
Although these verses negate the essential statement of the Nicene creed, they
nevertheless translate the Greek/Syriac intertext, adopting its rhetorical strategy of
intensification. The Nicene wording first emphatically denies Christs being made, begotten, not
made, and then goes on to top that verdict by proclaiming his equality in nature with the Father,
homoousios to patri, being of one substance with the Father. In the Qur!n, the no less
emphatic exclusion of the idea of sonship and fatherhood alikelam yalid wa-lam y$lad, he did
not beget, nor is he begottenis likewise topped by a universal negation stating that there is
no way to think of a being equal with God: wa-lam yakun lahu kufuwan a#ad. Again the pre-text
is audible in the final version.
Rhetorically, again, this text echoes the earlier Christian wording. Verses 3 and 4 are
certainly not primarily a polemic address to Christians, but, raising more general claims, have
become part of an integral new text, a universalist monotheistic creed. That text is a composite
counter-text to two powerful earlier texts, the creeds of both the Jews and the Christians, that can
both still be heard re-sounding through the new Arabic rhetorical shape. A cultural translation
has taken place, brought about most immediately by oral communication and continuing to rely
for its effectiveness on the still-audible rhetorical matrix of both the Jewish and the Christian
tradition. What for Islamic tradition has become an icon of unity reveals itself in the pre-
canonical Qur!n as living speecha suggestive example of the Qur!ns oral and at the same
time exegetical nature.
Freie Universitt Berlin
References
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TWO FACES OF THE QURAN 153
9
I am making use of Greek quotations here for the sake of simplicity, Greek being more familiar to present
readers than Syriac. I am of course aware that the creed may have been current in the Syriac language.
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TWO FACES OF THE QURAN 155
Models of Communication in the Quran:
DivineHuman Interaction
M. Zakyi Ibrahim
Abstract
This study uses models of communication, defined as struc-
tures of symbols and rules designed to correspond to the relevant
points of an existing structure or process,
1
to explain the
process of communication between God and human beings. The
invisibility of God to human beings, coupled with His difference
in nature, appear to make such interaction difficult but not
impossible to conceive.
A general communication model is constructed in accordance
with Quran 42:51. Later, specific models are drawn according
to the verses segments. Each model is elaborated by examples
from the Quran and the Hadith. In each model, I explicate the
process of divinehuman interaction by identifying the key ele-
ments of communication and their relationships.
To devise the models, this study depends heavily on the Quran,
identifies communication-related verse(s), analyzes the words
semantic components, and reveals the expressions rhetorical
implications, all drawn from the primary sources of the classical
and modern eras.
M. Zakyi Ibrahim is assistant professor of Islamic studies at the University of Winnipeg,
Canada. He has a B.A. from the Department of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human
Sciences (with a minor degree in mass communication) from the International Islamic
University, Malaysia, and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the Institute of Islamic Studies at
McGill University, Quebec, Canada.
Introduction
The study of communication grew very rapidly during the twentieth cen-
tury, from simple and modest to more complex forms. However, it has
received little attention from Muslim scholars.
2
Communication models, on
the other hand, have attracted virtually no attention despite their widespread
use in explaining and simplifying complex processes. They can organize
scattered information, simplify complicated and ambiguous processes of
communication, and help predict outcomes or reveal new facts about certain
realities.
3
The Quran outlines three possible ways by which God communicates
with human beings: inspiration, from behind a veil, and sending a messen-
ger (Quran 42:51).
4
These are complex processes of communication that,
without further clarification, may be difficult to understand. Muslim theolo-
gians have embarked upon elaborate discussions of the nature of Gods
speech, of which, essentially, confirm His act of communication.
5
But the
process of this divine communication obviously complex, at least when
compared to human communication was not explained in a detailed man-
ner. Thus, this article pursues the process of divinehuman interaction with
the goal of making it as comprehensible as possible by using specific exam-
ples from the Quran and various communication models. This is achieved
by identifying, in each example, the basic elements of the communication
process, namely, the source,
6
the message, the receiver,
7
the channel (medi-
um),
8
the response (effect),
9
the feedback,
10
and the noise.
11
The Functions of Communication Models
Before proceeding, it would be instructive to define communication mod-
els. Karl W. Deutsch defines them as structures of symbols and rules
designed to correspond to relevant points of an existing structure or
process.
12
A few decades later, Joseph A. Devito was more concise: They
are a visual or verbal description of processes.
13
Their main function is to
describe a complex process of communication in a simplified fashion by
identifying the most important components and key elements, and showing
the relationships between those elements.
14
If information and data about a particular reality are disjointed and dis-
organized, a model may be constructed to serve as an organizer. Thus, a
model brings together relevant information in an organized fashion and
identifies similarities and possible ways of reconciliation between seemingly
contradictory information. Aptly put, Denis McQuail and Sven Windahl
Ibrahim: Models of Communication in the Quran 71
explain that a model gives a general picture of a range of different particu-
lar circumstances.
15
This organizing capacity suggests an explanatory fea-
ture as well. For instance, when an unfamiliar and complex process of com-
munication is organized by pulling together all of the familiar processes, this
explanatory quality becomes apparent. Through a model, predictions may be
made and then put through a process of experimentation and testing in the
physical sciences, or they may serve as mere explanation when they are
operationally impossible. Even in the latter scenario, the possibility of new
facts being discovered points to a model as having a useful function.
16
From the above, the classification of models into structural and func-
tional is suggested. Structural models describe particular structures or
phenomena, such as a diagram for a radio set and its components. But
when systems and processes are described in such a way to show the key
elements and relations between them, as well as their influences on one
another, the models are referred to as functional.
17
The models constructed
in this study are essentially of the latter category, for they are meant to
describe the process of communication between God and human beings by
taking this ambiguous and complex picture and presenting it in a more
comprehensible and simplified fashion.
18
However, it must be stated that all models have shortcomings. For
example, some people argue that models seem to limit the peoples focus to
a narrow spectrum, as compared to the actual process being modeled,
which, without deeper observation, may be misleading. As McQuail and
Windahl observe: They [models] are inevitably incomplete, oversimpli-
fied and involve some concealed assumption.
19
This is, perhaps, the very
reason why models are so receptive to modifications and additions.
Now, given that the Quran is a communication from God, an explana-
tion of which models were used could be enormously helpful. More signif-
icantly, the Quran has outlined three possible ways by which God commu-
nicates with human beings: inspirational, from behind a veil, and by send-
ing a messenger (Quran 42:51). These are what we designate as modes of
divinehuman interaction. We construe these as ambiguous processes,
because God and human beings, according to Quran 42:11 and 112:4, have
different natures, and because their interaction seems to be a difficult
process, at least, of which to conceive. But since communication is not con-
fined to speech alone,
20
other forms of communication could make such an
interaction a possibility, despite this difference in nature. Gods invisibility
to human beings (Quran 6:104), coupled with the difference in nature,
make this interaction highly difficult but not impossible to understand.
72 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:1
Ibrahim: Models of Communication in the Quran 73
Hence, there is a need for further explanation, one that is viable, with the
aid of models.
In addition, Deutschs insight on the use of models to interpret unusual
processes is revealing. He states:
In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to both the use of sym-
bols in the process of thinking, and to the problems that arise when sym-
bols are combined into larger configurations or models particularly
when those are then used as an aid in investigating or forecasting [or
explaining] events that occur in the world outside the thinking system.
21
As to whether or not one can construct models from the Quran, some
scholars argue that once people begin to deliberately engage in system-
atic thinking, visualization, discussion, or explanation of a particular
process and structure, they are using models, whether or not they realize
it.
22
Explaining divine-human interaction according to the Quran by using
models is, therefore, highly practical, especially given the abundance of
traditional exegeses,
23
regardless of whether or not one fully appreciates
them.
So, I intend to construct models according the Quranic verses in order
to enhance understanding of them. I do not claim perfection, as the models
will be based on my own understanding of the divinehuman communica-
tion process, which, in turn, is gained from exegetical sources and the
Hadith literature. As McQuail states, any one is in a position to construct
his own model of a given aspect of [the] communication process.
24
On
account of this, models are always open to modification and additions, a
feature that causes them to develop rapidly.
General DivineHuman Communication Model
The Quran states:
It is not fitting for a human being that God should speak to him except by
inspiration [revelation], or from behind a veil, or by sending a messenger
to reveal, with His permission, what God wills, for He is Most High, Most
Wise. (42:51)
According to the Quran, these are the only ways by which God com-
municates with human beings. In his famous Asbab al-Nuzul, al-Wahidi
relates what he considers to be the circumstance (sabab al-nuzul) of this
verse without any chain of transmission: The Jews challenged the Prophet
that if he were really a prophet, then why did he not talk to and see God
simultaneously, as Moses did? They also insisted that they would not
believe him until he did. But that, replied the Prophet, did not happen to
Moses either. Thereafter, the verse in question was revealed to clarify how
God communicates with human beings.
25
Al-Zamakhshari, the medieval grammarian and commentator of the
Quran, cited this same tradition in his Al-Kashshaf. But Ibn Hajar al-
Asqalani (d. 1449), the celebrated traditionist and commentator of al-
Bukhari, wrote simply: I have not found it.
26
This cast doubt on the tradi-
tion itself, for it had no reliable source. Without having to rely on the tradi-
tion, it should be suggested that the verse was revealed to put the forms of
Gods interaction with human beings into perspective, irrespective of the cir-
cumstance. For his part, Muhammad al-Tahir ibn `Ashur (d. 1973) points out
that this verse was sent down to negate the unbelievers conviction that the
Quran was not from God. The main purpose of the entire surah, he reiter-
ates, is to establish that the Quran is Gods revelation to His messenger
Muhammad.
27
The Quran was not revealed in the way that the unbelievers sug-
gested. However, this does not mean that it is not from God, because God
speaks to human beings (e.g., messengers and other people) in only three
modes (channels), as identified in figure 1.
Figure 1: Divine-Human Communication: The General Model.
74 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:1
Ibrahim: Models of Communication in the Quran 75
This model shows how God interacts with human beings: God is the
source of the messages, and human beings are the receivers. The media
(channels) through which the messages pass, however, vary significantly
both from each other and from ordinary interpersonal communications.
Given that God and human beings are of different natures and that human
beings are subordinate to God, the media and the channels of their interac-
tion must reflect a superiorsubordinate relationship. Hence, these three
modes of communication: inspiration, from behind a veil, and through a
messenger. The hierarchical nature of this interaction is also the reason for
the vertical shape of this model and subsequent ones.
Additionally, the model indicates the effect of the divinehuman com-
munication, which may be either positive or negative. No mechanism for
feedback is reflected in this model, for although it is present, it will be con-
sidered during the discussion of specific models. Generally, there is noth-
ing like noise in divinehuman communication, as pointed out by
Mohammed Siddiqui.
28
But the way we construe this verse is that with
respect to some modes (e.g., the inspirational), there could be noise unless
the receiver is a messenger (Quran 22:52).
The Flow of Communication
Unlike Lasswells horizontal/linear communication model, divinehuman
communication should be perceived as being vertical, with God at the
apex passing down the message to human beings. Generally, the commu-
nication process flows either vertically or horizontally. This is symbolized
in figure 2.
Figure 2: The Communication Flow Model.
Line AB shows a superior communicating with a subordinate. In this
case of divinehuman interaction, A is God and B is the human being, either
a messenger or a regular person. Therefore, AB represents downward com-
munication. In ordinary human communication, A may be a parent, a man-
ager, or a teacher, while B may be a child, an employee, or a student. The
message in any downward communication and, in particular, any
divinehuman interaction, is to be taken very seriously, as there could be a
negative consequence. Line BA, on the other hand, describes the case of a
subordinate communicating with a superior, an upward communication.
Lines CD and DC show the interaction between colleagues: a relation-
ship that should be based on mutual respect. Since God has no associate, the-
ologically speaking, the vertical shape of modeling becomes the one and
only appropriate choice. Besides being the inexorable choice, the idea of
construing a divinehuman interaction in a vertical shape may be supported
further by the Qurans many suggestions
29
that God is physically above
human beings: in heaven. In fact, managers enjoy a superior status and pro-
duce downward communication, even though they are as human as their
employees, because they are placed on top of the organizational structure.
30
The Inspirational Model
Inspiration is the first mode, channel, and medium through which God
communicates with human beings. With its root as waha or awha, the
Arabic term wahy has many implications. According to Ibn al-Manzur in
his Lisan al-`Arab, wahy suggests a signal (al-isharah), writing, inspira-
tion (al-ilham), and hidden speech (al-kalam al-khafiy). More generally, it
indicates whatever meaning is imparted to someone in a hidden or near-
hidden form. All of these definitions support the fact that wahy is a form
of communication.
31
The Quran also uses this term in a variety of contexts, all of which
reveal its communicative implications. In his Nuzhat al-A`yun al-Nawazir
fi `Ilm al-Wuju! wa al-Nazair, Ibn al-Jawzi identifies seven ways in which
the Quran uses wahy: sending a messenger (al-irsal, 4:163, 6:19); signal
(al-isharah, 19:11); inspiration (al-ilham, 5:111, 16:68, 28:7); command
(al-amr, 99:5); speech (qawl, 53:10); notification through a dream (ruya,
42:51); and notification through whispering (waswasah, 6:121).
32
However, wahy technically refers to all heavenly messages given to a
selected prophet, either to implement them himself, or to convey them to a
group of people.
33
This definition is generally perceived to include the
76 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:1
Ibrahim: Models of Communication in the Quran 77
Quran and the prophetic traditions.
34
Meanwhile, this definition is not
exclusive in the first segment of our verse, Quran 42:51; rather, it covers all
the rest. But as Fakhr al-Din al-Razi points out, it is specifically used for the
first mode of divinehuman communication because it is an inspiration to
the heart that occurs suddenly (duf`ah). Therefore, considering the original
meaning of wahy, the suggestion here of its specific usages is appropriate.
35
Figure 3: DivineHuman Communication: The Inspirational Model.
The inspirational model depicts the message from God sent down to
human beings through one of two channels: either in a dream or in a wak-
ing state. Meanwhile, Ibn al-Jawzi, in his Zad al-Masir fi `Ilm al-Tafsir,
opines that the inspirational mode occurs only during a dream.
36
However,
al-Razi considers this mode to be semi-direct, because although there is no
intermediary between God and a human being, the latter does not hear the
former as He speaks.
37
Specific examples of Gods interaction with human beings through
inspiration, as illustrated in the Quran and identified by exegetes, include
Gods interaction with the mother of Moses, with Abraham, and with
David.
Gods Interaction with Moses Mother
The Quran says:
Behold! We sent to your mother, by inspiration, the message: Place him
into the chest and throw it into the river, and the river will cast him up on
the bank (20:38-39)
According to Muslim exegetes and historians, these verses are con-
nected with a particular historical event: Pharaoh Ramses IIs plot to kill all
of the male babies born to the Children of Israel. Due to its importance, this
event necessitated Gods interaction with Moses mother.
38
Gods communication with Moses mother became necessary, and
communicate He did: So We sent this inspiration to the mother of Moses
(Quran 28:7). What was the mode of this divinehuman communication?
Al-Razi, in his usual speculative style, cites six theories: It may have come
through a dream; as a firm and sudden determination in her heart; as inspi-
ration, which, to al-Razi, was equivalent to the second; as information
obtained from prophets of her time; as information obtained from previous
prophets; and through an angel who appeared to her, as Gabriel did to Mary,
the mother of Jesus.
39
Obviously, some of these theories are simply wild
speculations that may not agree with the use of wahy.
Asignificant element of this communication was the message that God
transmitted to her. Aptly put, this message was delineated in another verse:
Suckle him. But when you fear for him, cast him into the river. But do not
fear or grieve, for We shall restore him to you and shall make him one of Our
messengers (Quran 28:7). The message, on the other hand, contained sev-
eral important instructions to ensure its effectiveness. In this single verse are
gathered two clear orders, two prohibitions, and two glad tidings.
40
Notwithstanding al-Razis theories cited above, this important infor-
mation had to pass through the channels depicted in the model: either while
she was awake or through a dream. In this case, the channel may be vul-
nerable to noise, even though the messages crucial importance in this par-
ticular situation calls for complete accuracy and the lack of noise.
Therefore, Siddiqui is perfectly right in his assertion that the channel is
unrestricted it should be as free from noise as possible.
41
Yet, this is the only mode through which God continues to communicate
with human beings. According to prophetic traditions, God still interacts
with ordinary people, especially, but not exclusively, the intensely pious,
through what are considered good dreams and inspiration.
42
However,
78 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:1
Ibrahim: Models of Communication in the Quran 79
Ibn Sirin states that these good dreams are not confined to sleep only.
43
What
is important here is that these traditions not only support the possibility of
divinehuman interaction, but, above all, confirm its continuation.
Identifying God as the source of the message received in this channel
is difficult, for there is no absolute certainty in the case of non-messengers,
as Satan is equally capable of sending messages in this channel (Quran
114:5; 6:121). What is said about uncertainty regarding the source is equal-
ly true about the message, especially when the notion of noise comes into
play, for the messages validity, if fully grasped, depends largely on the
sources authenticity. Yet, in the case of Moses mother, the situation was so
crucial that she had to trust both the source and the message. But if so, then
why did she entertain so much fear? It is human to be afraid, replied al-
Razi, adding that even Moses himself, who later heard Gods command
directly to return to Pharaoh, was equally afraid to do so.
44
The model further indicates that the message received had a positive
effect upon her, as evidenced by her full compliance with it. The Quran
speaks of the consequence of her compliance (Quran 28:8-9). Feedback is
considered very important in modeling communication processes. Its
paucity in Lasswells basic model, along with Shannon and Weavers own
mathematical model, has been criticized.
45
It is, however, not so important in
divinehuman communication, although it may be present.
Feedback is an element that also makes the receiver a source and vice
versa. In this case, the source may lack and need the feedback in order to
expand his or her knowledge of a particular situation. While God is far from
being perceived as lacking any information (Quran 35:38), He needs no
feedback to shape His subsequent communication. However, sometimes
He may produce it in the form of responding to a persons supplication and
granting his or her wish. But this situation may not discourage people from
producing feedback in their communication with God. Hence, our models
provision of the element of feedback, either in a dream or a waking state.
Gods Interaction with Abraham
Another example of divinehuman interaction through the inspirational
mode, as reflected in the Quran, is Abrahams dream that inspired him to
sacrifice his son:
Then, when [the son] reached [the age of serious] work with him, he
[Abraham] said: O my son. I have seen in a dream that I offer you in sac-
rifice. What is your view about this? (Quran 37:102)
Muslim theology holds that the dreams of messengers, unlike those of
other people, are considered revelations from God.
46
In this example, God
(the source) communicates with Abraham (the receiver). In a dream, the
message may be either direct or indirect. Abrahams dream might have
been direct, or he might have seen something else and have had to interpret
it (indirect).
47
The message, in any case, was to sacrifice his son.
In his Qis"s al-Anbiya, al-Tha`labi narrates a tradition to the effect that
Abraham had vowed to sacrifice his son. Therefore, the message in the
dream was fulfill your pledge (awfi bi nadhrik).
48
This, of course, was
interpreted as the sacrifice. Although all sources point to the sacrifice of
Abrahams son as being the message, which son was to be sacrificed was
far more contentious. According to Reuven Firestone, one hundred thirty
authoritative statements consider Isaac to be the intended victim; one hun-
dred thirty three consider it to have been Ishmael.
49
But that Ishmael was
the intended victim has been far more popular among Muslims.
Clearly, the medium of the communication was a dream (Quran
37:102). It should be as free from noise as possible, since the dreams of
messengers are considered revelations, particularly when the message
needs to be adhered to strictly. Any noise can adversely affect the result,
and that, in turn, may vitiate the purpose of the interaction.
Abrahams consultation with his son may beg the assumption that his
confidence in the channel and its adequacy was, to say the least, shaky.
Some scholars argue that he had the dream several times, a situation that
may ensure certitude. It is not improbable, however, that those dreams were
somehow supported by a firmer revelation. There could have been several
reasons for consulting his son, namely, not to take him unaware, to ease the
tension, to involve him in making the decision, and, above all, to set a
precedence in consultation.
50
The effect of the message was undoubtedly positive. Even though
Abraham did not, in the end, perform the sacrificial act, Quran 37:104-5
declared it fulfilled. God did not really wish to see Abraham sacrifice his
son; instead, He wanted to test Abrahams belief (Quran 37:106). While
there is no evidence of feedback in this GodAbraham interaction, its occur-
rence cannot be totally discounted. This opinion is reflected in the model.
Gods Interaction with David
Athird example of the inspirational mode is seen in the following verse:
and to David We gave the Psalms (Quran 4:163). The examples perti-
80 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:1
Ibrahim: Models of Communication in the Quran 81
nence here is more particularly due to the channel through which the com-
munication took place. According to some exegetes, the Psalms (Zabur)
were poured directly into Davids heart. In other words, they were not trans-
mitted through an angel or a dream. There is actually not much evidence to
this effect. Al-Razi and al-Alusi depend on a tradition, transmitted on
Mujahids authority, for this conclusion, and most of the Muslim historians
neither mention this mode of transmission nor discuss the Psalms in any
detail.
51
While it is possible that the Psalms might have been revealed in the
fashion suggested above, unlike the Quran, it would be expressed in
Davids own words.
52
This channels credibility is confirmed by the fact that
the Quran considers the Psalms to have the same status as other divine
scriptures. The Psalms message consists of religious exhortations and
pieces of wisdom, which, when recited by David in his beautiful voice,
attracted even the jinn and the animals. This speaks well to its effective-
ness.
53
Perhaps.
In his short article on the Psalms, Joseph Horovitz claims that Muslims
are indulging in apologetics when they hold that the Psalms, like other
scriptures, contain a prophecy about Muhammad as well.
54
What is inter-
esting is the suggestion that Muslims claim that the Psalms contain an addi-
tional message, one that foretold Muhammad. In an attempt to substantiate
this claim, Ali Tabari devoted an entire chapter of his The Book of Religion
and Empire, to the subject.
55
It should be reiterated that, as a scripture, the Psalms message should
be free from noise and that what David produced was exactly the same as
what God had revealed to him, since He has guaranteed the accuracy of
messages sent through any messenger:
Never did We send a messenger or a prophet before you, but, when he
framed a desire, Satan threw some (vanity) into his desire. But Allah will
cancel anything (vain) that Satan throws in, and will confirm (and estab-
lish) His signs, for Allah is full of knowledge and wisdom. (Quran 22:52)
Finally, considering the meaning of wahyan in Quran 42:51, as illus-
trated by the above examples, it may be concluded that God still commu-
nicates with human beings via inspiration. In other words, ordinary human
beings may still receive messages from God, either in a dream or by being
directly inspired through their hearts. The message might be highly intan-
gible, since no one, except for a messenger, is infallible
56
or safe from
Satans entrapment. It is believed that when Abraham first had the dream to
82 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:1
sacrifice his son, he hesitated and did not rule out the possibility that Satan
was the source. Only when it was repeated did he accept it as a message
from God. The uncertainty of the source, the message, and the channel for
ordinary human being does not necessarily preclude present-day divine-
human communication.
The Behind-a-Veil Model
The second mode of divinehuman interaction is that from behind a veil,
which is referred to in the phrase aw min wara hijab (Quran 42:51). This
occurs when God speaks to someone while remaining invisible. It is
likened to a situation where, in the past, a king would speak to some of his
distinguished subjects from behind curtains, so that they could hear but not
see him.
Exegetes categorically cite the communication that took place
between God and Moses as an example of this type of interaction. Some
believe that Muhammad heard and spoke to God in the same manner on
the night of his ascension to Gods presence (laylat al-mi`raj). We will
inquire into this second example later on, for it must be considered differ-
ent from the method of transmission suggested by the phrase behind a
veil.
57
The example to be thoroughly studied here is suggested in the fol-
lowing model.
Figure 4: DivineHuman Communication: The Behind-a-Veil Model.
Ibrahim: Models of Communication in the Quran 83
Gods Interaction with Moses
The story leading to Gods interaction with Moses is a long one. Since this
section purports to describe the process of this interaction, the whole nar-
ration may be superfluous here. According to historians, Moses knew that
he was going to communicate with his Lord. The 40 days of fasting (Quran
7:142; 2:51) was a preparation for that.
58
When he left his people under the
supervision of his brother Aaron and went toward the fire on Mount Sinai,
Gods call came with suddenness: O Moses (Quran 20:11). From where
did that call come, and who was its source? Although the verb at this point
is in the passive form, nudiya (he was called), the next verse discloses the
source: Verily, I am your Lord. Other verses are explicit about both the
source (God) and the receiver (Moses) (Quran 79:16; 19:52).
59
Consequently, the model depicts both God as the calls source and sub-
ject. One need not search far in the Quran to be convinced that God actu-
ally was the source. It may not have been that simple for Moses, for in his
situation, two possibilities may be considered: either through necessary (i.e.,
unreflected) knowledge (al-`ilm al-d"#u#i) or through a miracle. The latter
possibility was favored by scholars, who speculated endlessly on its nature.
60
Moses certainty that God was the source is the most likely possibility.
The message that God willed to impart to Moses followed the call. This
included the entire lengthy conversation that took place thereafter.
However, the section that was geared toward his prophethood and its atten-
dant responsibilities was, strictly speaking, the core message of this inter-
action. The repetition of the pronouns suffix ya in inni and a$a following
the call was intended to introduce and emphasize the source, while elimi-
nating any hesitation.
The messages actual beginning is marked by:
Verily, I am Allah. There is no deity but Me, so worship Me (only) and
establish regular prayer for My remembrance. Verily, the hour is coming
and I am almost hiding it that every person may be rewarded for that
for which he [or she] strives. (Quran 20:14-15)
Again, the emphasis based on the repetition of pronouns is employed.
Exegetes observe that prophethood and its contents are compressed in this
verse. First, tawhid (monotheism) is established, and then a general order is
issued for worship, followed by a specific mention of prayer as an example
of worship, and, lastly, in order to indicate that the aforementioned orders
have consequences, the exact moment for reward is highlighted: the Day of
Judgment.
61
84 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:1
What is significant for this study, and closely relevant to communica-
tion, is the observation that self-introduction between those involved in
communication is vital to a sound and smooth interaction. This partly
explains why the message began with Verily, I am your Lord (Quran
20:12) and, more specifically, with Verily, I am Allah (Quran 20:14).
Moses self-introduction was superfluous, for God had already called him
by name when initiating the communication. Another important message
resulting from prophethood is Gods charging of Moses to return to
Pharaoh in Egypt (Quran 20:24; 79:17). Due to Pharaohs claim to be the
god of his people (Quran 79:24), Moses is told to challenge him on Gods
behalf.
How these messages got to Moses, namely, the channel, is one of the
intriguing questions in this section. The Quran is precise about Gods
interaction with Moses: And, indeed, God spoke to Moses (Quran
4:164). There is, in fact, little room for argument over this matter. However,
there is no consensus on the form of this conversation. According to the
model, God spoke to him from behind a veil. This is what exegetical books
reveal; but whether or not Moses actually saw God is yet another unre-
solved theological debate, even though Quran 7:143 seems to suggest that
he did not see Him.
The Mu`tazilites hold that whenever God intends to speak, He creates
that speech in something else so that He can be heard from it. In that sense,
Moses would have heard His speech from the bush, which would be
regarded as the speech of God only metaphorically. Here, the bush would
be the channel. However, this explanation was quickly rejected by oppo-
nents, who argued that the bush would, in that sense, be the actual speaker
(source) declaring its divinity to Moses. Needless to say, such a scenario
would be considered absurd and unacceptable.
62
The Mu`tazilites position is possible and would not necessarily lead to
anthropomorphism, against which they strove. But hearing the speech from
the bush does not make it the speaker. This danger avoided, their oppo-
nents argument would have lost its force. This conclusion is supported espe-
cially by the possibility that Moses heard the speech from all sides and
through his own body, a fact that he used to authenticate that the actual
source was God. Since he heard it through his body and that did not make
him the speaker, hearing it from the bush did not make it the speaker.
The Ash`arites, on the other hand, believe that Moses heard Gods eter-
nal speech,which, in essence, is without letters or a voice, and, adds al-Alusi,
there is no way of understanding how that [works] through the intellect.
63
Ibrahim: Models of Communication in the Quran 85
Al-Maturidi is recorded as rejecting this kind of speech and considering it
impossible that anyone could hear it. Therefore, what Moses heard was def-
initely made of letters and a voice. But the Ash`arites position has been
elaborated in the following manner: God creates a consciousness in Moses
hearing, such that he knows Gods speech without letters or voice. It is pos-
sible that an angel or a messenger may hear God in this form.
64
In such a
circumstance, the channel would be difficult to identify. But since it is not
impossible, it is exactly as put forth by the Quran: from behind a veil.
The Ash`arites description of Gods speech, frankly, may not tally
with Gods use of takliman in the Quran. According to one of the best
modern exegeses, Tafsir al-Manar, it is possible to interpret the speech of
God, as in Quran 2:253, in any form, since it is open to all possibilities.
But, it would be unacceptable to do so when any specification or empha-
sis is made by using takliman.
65
Both the Mu`tazilites and the Ash`arites
admit that God communicated with Moses, that the communication was
heard, and that it was heard from behind a veil. For the Mu`tazilites, the
latter is essentially right because Moses heard it through the bush. For the
Ash`arites, it is correct because it occurred neither through letters nor
voice. And for both groups, it is correct because Moses did not see God
(Quran 7:143).
The model shows the feedback (Moses response) to be direct rather
than occurring from behind a veil. This is because God hears and sees him
as he speaks. This notion is confirmed, in the course of this GodMoses
communication, when Moses and his brother were told to go to Pharaoh
(Quran 20:46). Consequently, as depicted in the model, the veil only
affects the messenger.
The first feedback Moses sent was in response to Gods question as to
what Moses was holding. Moses replies: That is my rod, on which I lean.
With it, I beat down fodder for my flocks, and in it I find other uses
(Quran 20:18). Among the characteristics of an effective feedback are
immediateness and informativeness.
66
While Moses feedback was not in
response to what may be perceived as the prime message, nor was it, in the
real sense, unknown to God, it was still immediate and informative. As to
the wisdom behind the question, scholars suggest that it was meant to pro-
duce calmess (itminan) and familiarity (inas); that after the rod turned into
a snake, Moses would not be afraid and the miraculous aspect would
become apparent.
67
The lack of real novel information in this feedback
does not make it any less effective, for the question was not intended to
yield any response affecting the subsequent message.
The next feedback was Moses long prayer (Quran 20:25-35). This
particular one was unique, because it also solicited another feedback. So, a
positive reply followed immediately: [God] said: Your prayer is granted,
O Moses (Quran 20:36). The model illustrates that divinehuman com-
munication from behind a veil always has a positive effect. It does not
occur with ordinary people, but rather with messengers.
68
All that Moses
was asked to do, as part of his prophetic duties and in preparation for his
challenge to Pharaoh, received a positive response. He also strictly adhered
to all of the instructions that he was given. Any lack of compliance and, for
that matter, negative outcome would have been anomalous within the con-
text of interaction from behind a veil.
Another typical (perhaps the only) example alongside the instance of
Moses may be that of Muhammad. This may be suggested in the tradition
of his night journey and ascension to Gods presence.
69
The tradition trans-
mitted on the authority of Ibn `Abbas suggests that God communicated
with Muhammad, and that the latter heard and replied to Him.
70
However,
this GodMuhammad interaction is not particularly considered to occur
from behind a veil, for God addresses Muhammad, stating: Although I
spoke to Moses, I did so from behind a veil on [Mount] Sinai.
71
But I spoke
to you on a carpet of nearness (bisat al-qurb).
72
Whether or not the Prophet
actually saw God as they were communicating is still debatable.
73
The Messenger Model
Listed last among the possible modes of divinehuman interaction is the
sending of a messenger. The exegetes interpret the messenger here either as
the Angel Gabriel, in particular, or other angels, in general. This means that
whenever God wills to convey a message to any human being, He sends it
through an angel. This model should be regarded as Gods standard way of
revealing His message to His messenger. Even though God communicated
with Moses from behind a veil, this does not preclude His sending
Gabriel to him at a later time.
74
Standard though the messenger mode may
be for prophethood, it is actually not exclusive to messengers, for Mary and
Sara (Abrahams wife) both received messages through an angel.
75
Gods Interaction with His Messengers
The model in figure 5, given below, depicts God as the source of the mes-
sage. Given that God created human beings so that they would worship
Him, they needed to be told how to worship Him and, most importantly,
86 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:1
Ibrahim: Models of Communication in the Quran 87
Figure 5: DivineHuman Communication: The Messenger Model.
why they were obliged to worship Him in the first place. This should be
viewed as the message.
To this end, special people (messengers) are chosen as intermediaries
between God and their people. Given that God does not speak directly to
human beings, generally speaking, angels were sent to those people whom
He willed to serve as messengers. This is shown in the model as the chan-
nel. Therefore, the chosen individual becomes the receiver, and thus the
messenger. Feedback is depicted as occurring in two ways: either through
the angel or directly to God. And the effect is always positive, because the
source, the channel, and the message are considered trustworthy.
Examples of this mode of divinehuman communication are numerous,
as far as the Quran is concerned, for God has sent many messengers,
76
and, in turn, sent angels to all of them. As for the numbers of messengers,
the Quran offers no information other than: We did aforetime send mes-
sengers before you. Of them there are some whose story We have related
to you, and some whose story We have not related to you (40:78).
Although the Quran is silent about this matter, it does mention some 25
names.
77
As shown in the model, the message comes from God, passes through
the angel and on to the messenger. Accordingly, it consists of all that is
revealed to that person or what is contained in a book sent to him. This
implies that the message may vary from one messenger to another. Yet, one
88 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:1
message is common to all of them: establishing monotheism and combat-
ing polytheism (Quran 16:36; 21:25). Significantly, this is the crux of
Gods message, the clearest example of which may be found with respect
to specific messengers. Strategically, the words so fear [respect] Allah and
obey me [the messenger] are repeated in the story of several messengers,
often with only a few verses between the repetitions.
All messengers came to convey the same general message. It would,
however, be incorrect to say this in the case of specifics and details. Clearly,
in Surat al-Shu`ara, the messages that follow the common ones express
unique concerns. For example, Lots people, who engaged in sodomy
(Quran 26:165-68), needed a different message from that of Shu`aybs peo-
ple, who had a propensity for commercial dishonesty (Quran 26:181-83).
Still, when it comes to describing Gods messages to His messengers,
the primary scriptures recognized by Islam (the Torah, the Gospel, the
Psalms, and the Quran) ought to be considered more carefully. Individual
distinctions become more critical when discussing the context of each. As
the present study is interested only in showing the different aspects of com-
munication, even a brief survey of these scriptures is unnecessary.
As seen earlier, Angel Gabriel is the standard channel who carries the
messages to the messengers. So, how does he convey these messages?
Basically, this happens in two ways. Prophet Muhammad, when he was
asked about the process of revelation, replied:
Sometimes, he [Gabriel] comes to me like the ring of a bell. That is the
toughest one on me. After he relieves me, I would grasp what he had said.
And on certain occasions, the angel comes to me in the form of a man and
I would grasp what he says to me.
78
In the first form, which seems to be the most frequent, only the mes-
senger may see the angel. However, other people may see the angel in the
second form. No channel could, in fact, be more dependable, for the Quran
has associated with it (him) all of the necessary qualities required to ensure
its credibility, including trustworthiness (al-amin). Commenting on Gabriel,
one Quranic commentary says:
Not only was the bringer of the revelation, Gabriel, an honorable mes-
senger, impeccable of deceit, but he had, in the angelic kingdom, rank and
authority before Allahs Throne and could convey an authoritative divine
message. He was, like the Holy Prophet, faithful to his trust. Therefore,
there could be no question of the message being delivered in any other
way than exactly according to the divine will and purpose.
79
This interesting commentary accurately sums up our point.
There is no room for noise in this type of revelation, for the messages
given to the messengers are meant to reach their people while maintaining
their accuracy. This would not be possible with noise. But, two causes of
noise may be considered. First, Satan is suspected of constantly trying to
corrupt Gods message to His messengers, which, according to some
exegetes, he can actually do. The popular story of the cranes (gharan%q) is
often used to illustrate this point, as is Quran 22:52, which was cited ear-
lier. The story has different renditions, as related by Ibn `Abbas. Most of
them, however, have no chains of transmitters, but are attributed to only one
Companion. It says that as Muhammad was reciting Quran 53:19-20,
which mentioned some of the Arabian gods, Satan made him add: And
those are the elevated cranes (gharan%q al-ula), and their intercession may
be sought. When the polytheists heard this verse, they prostrated along
with him.
80
The majority of exegetes argue that this incident never and could
never have happened to the Prophet, as described. To begin with, they use
the second segment of Quran 22:52 to prove that God will not allow this
to happen to a messenger. Second, there is the admission that the Muslims,
who were right behind the Prophet, never heard what the polytheists, who
were a bit further away, had heard. This means that Satan did not corrupt
the message by making the Prophet actually utter those words; instead, he
(Satan), in all likelihood, made the polytheists hear what he wanted them to
hear. This observation was made by al-Baghwi.
81
The other possibility of
noise has to do with a messenger making an error while conveying the mes-
sage. But the Quran has put Muhammad at ease from worrying about this
happening (Quran 75:16-19). As a result of the above analysis, noise is not
depicted in the model.
The model shows that feedback may flow either directly from the mes-
senger to God or indirectly through an angel. Ordinary human beings
engaging in direct communication with God is highly recommended. It is
therefore, needless to assert that its occurrence on the part of a messenger,
in the form of feedback, is clearly feasible. Still, the angelic channel is
possible for feedback.
Potentially, all of the messages sent to the messengers had salutary
effects. But their people may not have viewed these effects in quite the
same way. However, the messengers carried out their responsibilities, as
instructed (Quran 11:57; 7:79; 7:93).
82
Ibrahim: Models of Communication in the Quran 89
90 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:1
Gods Interaction with Mary
According to the Quranic definition, Mary, the mother of Jesus, was not a
messenger, but rather a devout person. Although some scholars, like Ibn
Hazm and al-Qurtubi,
83
consider her to be a messenger, this study does not.
The Quran has provided a complete account of her reception of Gods
message, which is considered as an example of the divinehuman commu-
nication through a messenger mode. However, as mentioned earlier, that is
unique but not exclusive to messengers.
In her youth, Mary received a message from God through angels
(Quran 3:42-43) of glad tidings and several commands. Other messages
were sent later, ones that were intimately related to the birth of her son
Jesus (Quran 19:19-26). Obviously, the channel was an angel. However,
the angel appeared to her in the form of a human being. Unlike a messen-
ger, who may receive revelation through an angel in two forms, a regular
person may only experience this in human form.
The channels authenticity will result in the messages credibility. But
how could Mary have been sure regarding the channel, particularly as the
angel appeared in the form of a man? The angels self-introduction (Quran
19:19) was not enough to calm her down. So, it was possible that a miracle
happened by which she ultimately knew, or that Zechariah might have made
her aware of certain signs by which she could identify an angel. Moreover,
as a young girl, Mary knew that God could do unusual things (Quran 3:37).
With a high degree of certainty, this communication was free from
noise. The angel was Gabriel, whose credibility Muslims have established.
Regarding the distortion of the messages, while there is little chance of
noise occurring in general interpersonal communication, this was typical
GodMary interaction, where noise is least expected in order to produce a
positive effect. As for the effect of this communication, her response to the
commands was positive. The Quran sees Mary as an excellent example of
devotion and belief in Gods command (Quran 66:12). Again, in order to
prove her positive response to His commands concerning her pregnancy
and its aftermath, the Quran, while omitting the rest of the proofs, men-
tions how she adhered to the last command (Quran 19:29).
84
Conclusion
This study has shown, among other things, that models can be tremen-
dously useful tools in explicating the Quran, especially in cases of divine
human interaction. Following the Quranic typology of Gods communica-
tion with human beings, this study has demonstrated that as God is always
the source and the human being is always the receiver, the message in the
inspirational mode may be intangible, and its transmittance through either a
dream or the heart makes it vulnerable. It is, nonetheless, the only mode
through which God continues to communicate with human beings.
In the behind-a-veil mode, God speaks directly to a person, with the lat-
ter hearing but not seeing Him. Moses is believed to have had the privilege
of conversing with God in this fashion. Some scholars argue that
Muhammad also did when he ascended to Gods presence. However, based
on the tradition of Muhammads night journey and ascension, this instance
of GodMuhammad interaction is excluded from the behind-a-veil mode.
Contrary to the inspirational, this mode is possibly free from noise.
The messenger mode portrays Gabriel as the channel. That is the stan-
dard, but not exclusive, way in which God interacts with messengers. Even
though some exegetes and historians see the possibility of noise here, we
have proven otherwise. All divinehuman communications have positive
effects, as demonstrated above, except, perhaps, in the inspirational mode,
where the source, the channel, and the message may be uncertain.
Feedback, the paucity of which in some conventional communication mod-
els subjects them to criticism, is not overly important in divinehuman
communication. Although God does not need any feedback to shape His
subsequent communication, it may exist in divinehuman interaction.
Hence, its reflection in the models.
Endnotes
1. Karl W. Deutsch, On Communication Models in the Social Sciences, The
Public Opinion Quarterly 16 (1952): 356.
2. Mohammed A. Siddiqui, Interpersonal Communication: Modeling
Interpersonal Relationship, An Islamic Perspective, The American Journal
of Islamic Social Sciences 5, no. 2 (1988): 239.
3. Surendra Singh, Models of Communication: An Overview, The Eastern
Anthropologist 37, no. 1 (1984): 16.
4. This study uses The Holy Quran: English Translation of the Meanings and
Commentary (Medina: King Fahd Holy Quran Printing Complex, 1411 AH).
5. Communication: The transmission or exchange of information, signal mes-
sages or data by any means, such as talk (verbal communication), writing
(written communication), telephone, telegraph, radio or other channels with-
in a group or directed to specific individuals or groups. Richard Webster,
Websters New World Dictionary of Media and Communications (New York:
Websters New World, 1990), 104.
Ibrahim: Models of Communication in the Quran 91
6. Source: Any person or thing that creates messages. Asource may be an indi-
vidual speaking, writing, or gesturing or a group of persons formulating an
advertising policy, or a computer solving a problem. Joseph A. Devito, The
Communication Handbook (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), 302.
7. Receiver: Any person or thing that takes in messages. Ibid., 255.
8. Avehicle or medium through which signals [messages] are sent. Ibid., 52.
9. Any bit of overt or covert behaviour in reaction to some stimulus. Ibid.,
267.
10. Information that is fed back to its source. Ibid., 117.
11. Noise: Anything that distorts the message intended by the source, anything
that interferes with the receivers receiving the message as the source intend-
ed [it] to be received. Ibid., 209.
12. Deutsch, On Communication Models, 356.
13. Devito, The Communication, 203.
14. Denis McQuail, Models of Communication, International Encyclopedia of
Communication (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 3:36.
15. Denis McQuail and Sven Windahl, Communication Models for the Study of
Mass Communication (New York: Longman Publishing, 1993), 2.
16. Deutsch, On Communication, 360-61.
17. McQuail, Communication, 2-3.
18. Again, the models presented here may be referred to as diagrammatical or
descriptive. Another type is mathematical, which is not part of this study. For
reviews of different communication models, see, McQuail, Communication.
19. Ibid., 3.
20. I acknowledge that speak is the word employed in Quran 42:51.
21. Deutsch, On Communication, 356.
22. Werner J. Severin and James W. Tankard, Jr., Communication Theories:
Origins, Methods, and Uses in the Mass Media (New York: Longman, 1991),
36.
23. This study draws heavily on classical and modern exegeses without any dis-
crimination. So, a deliberate attempt is made on many points to consult both
classical and modern sources.
24. McQuail, Communication, 3-4.
25. `Ali Ahmad al-Wahidi, Asbab al-Nuzul (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyah,
1982), 214.
26. Mahmud al-Zamakhshari, Al-Kashshaf `an Haqaiq Ghawamid al-Tanzil wa
`Uyun al-Aqawil (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-`Arabi, 1947), 4:234.
27. Muhammad al-Tahir ibn `Ashur, Tafsir al-Tahrir wa al-Tanwir (Tunis: al-Dar
al-Tunisiyah, 1984), 25:140.
28. Siddiqui, Interpersonal, 243.
29. Examples include Quran 67:16; 3:55; 35:10; 70:4; 16:45; and 16:50.
Obviously, there is a serious debate over the issue of God being physi-
cally above. Although this is rejected by the medieval commentator al-
92 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:1
Ibrahim: Models of Communication in the Quran 93
Razi, his modern counterpart, al-Alusi, affirms it. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Al-
Tafsir al-Kabir (Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turath al-`Arabi, 1980), 27:232;
Mahmud al-Alusi, Ruh al-Ma`ani (Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turath al-`Arabi,
1980), 29:15.
30. Richard Ellis and Ann McClintock, If You Take My Meaning: Theory into
Practice in Human Communication (London: Edward Arnold, 1990), 131.
31. Ibn al-Manzur, Lisan al-`Arab al-Muhit (Beirut: Dar al-Ma`rifah, 1988), 6:892.
32. `Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Jawzi, !"z#$% $'()`yu$ al-Nawazir fi `Ilm al-Wuju!
wa al-Nazair (Beirut: Muassasat al-Risalah, 1984), 621-22.
33. `Abd al-Al Salim Mukrim, Al-Fikr al-Islami bayn al-`Aql wa al-Wahy wa
Atharuh fi Mustaqbal al-Islam (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1982), 18.
34. About the inclusion of tradition in this definition, Muslims use Quran
53:3-4 as a justification. See `Abd al-Majid al-Najjar, Khilafat al-Insan bayn
al-Wahy wa al-`Aql: Bahth fi Jadaliyat al-Nass wa al-`Aql wa al-Waqi`
(Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1987), 55.
35. Al-Razi, Al-Tafsir, 27:189.
36. `Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Jawzi, Zad al-Masir fi `Ilm al-Tafsir (Beirut: al-
Maktab al-Islami, 1984), 7:297.
37. Al-Razi, Al-Tafsir, 27:187.
38. For an historical account from a Muslim perspective, see Muhammad ibn
Jarir al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk (Cairo: Dar al-Ma`arif, 1972)
1:387 and al-Hafiz ibn Kathir, Al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah (Beirut: Dar al-
Kutub al-`Ilmiyah, 1985), 1:223.
39. Al-Razi, Al-Tafsir, 22:51-52.
40. Ibn `Ashur, Tafsir, 20:72-75.
41. Siddiqui, Interpersonal, 243.
42. Ahmad ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, Fath al-Bari bi Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari (Beirut:
Dar al-Ma`rifah, 1980), 12:352; Al-Husayn ibn Muhammad al-Raghib, Al-
Mufradat fi Gharib al-Quran (Beirut: Dar al Ma`rifa, 1961), 516.
43. Muhammad ibn Sirin, Tafsir al-Ahlam (Beirut: Dar Maktabat al-Haya,
1986), 9.
44. Al-Razi, Al-Tafsir, 22:52.
45. McQuail, Communication, 15-17.
46. Ibn Hajar, Fath, 12:354.
47. Al-Alusi, Ruh, 23:128.
48. Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Tha`labi, Qisas al-Anbiya al-Musamma bi al-
Ara`is (Cairo: Dar Ihya al-Kutub al-`Arabiyah, 1347 AH), 65.
49. Reuven Firestone, Journeys in Holy Lands: The Evolutions of the Abraham-
Ishmael Legends in Islamic Exegesis (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1990), 135.
50. Ibid.; al-Razi, Al-Tafsir, 26:157; al-Alusi, Ruh, 23:129.
51. See for instance, Ibn al-Athirs Al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh, vol. 10 (Beirut: Dar al-
Kutub al-`Ilmiyah, 1987); Tarikh al-Tabari; and Ibn Kathirs Al-Bidayah.
94 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22:1
52. In this sense, it seems to be equivalent to what is termed as hadith qudsi.
53. Although the emphasis is laid upon the beauty of his voice as an enchanting
element.
54. Zabur, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1987 ed.
55. Ali Tabari, The Book of Religion and Empire, trans. A. Mingana (London:
Benard Quaritch Ltd., 1922), 88-92.
56. Some Muslims believe that some people who are considered saints may be
infallible. For more on the messengers infallibility, see Fakhr al-Din al-Razi,
`Ismat al-Anbiya (Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqafah al-Diniyah, 1986).
57. Divine-angel communication, although outside the scope of this study, is also
seen to occur from behind a veil, particularly those with whom God spoke
about the creation of Adam. Al-Alusi, Ruh, 25:55.
58. `Abd al-Hamid Mutawi, Musa Kalim Allah `alayhi al-Salam(Cairo: Dar al-
Kitab al-`Arabi, 1947) 96-97.
59. Despite the fact that pronouns are employed here, the preceding verse clari-
fies the attribution.
60. For details of these speculations, see al-Razi, Al-Tafsir, 22:16-17.
61. Al-Alusi, Ruh, 16:171.
62. Ibn `Ashur, Tafsir, 6:37.
63. Al-Alusi, Ruh, 16:169.
64. Ibn `Ashur, Tafsir, 6:37.
65. Muhammad Rashid Rida, Tafsir al-Quran al-Hakim al-Musamma Tafsir al-
Manar (Cairo: al-Hayat al-Misriyah al-`Ammah, 1972), 6:59. Grammatically,
takliman is put in a form identified as an absolute object (maf `ul mutlaq) and
is usually employed to emphasize an action. So, it would be inappropriate to
use it metaphorically.
66. Devito, The Communication, 120.
67. Isma`il ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Quran al-`Azim(Beirut: Dar al-Ma`rifah, 1987),
3:152.
68. It also occurs with angels or Satan. Al-Razi, Tafsir, 27:189.
69. Although with slightly different renditions, this may be verified through the
traditions gathered in Muslim ibn Hajjaj, Al-Isra wa al-Mi`raj kama Warada
fi Sahihay Muslim wa al-Bukhari wa al-Imam Ibn `Abbas Radiya Allah
`anhum (Beirut: Dar al-Maktabat al-Hayat, 1900).
70. `Abd Allah ibn `Abbas, Al-Isra wa al-Mi`raj (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-
Lubnani, 1983), 30-40.
71. According to this source, it is rendered as sur siyna (the wall of Sinai).
72. Ibn `Abbas, Al-Isra, 36.
73. With the majority, including Ibn Mas`ud, Ibn `Abbas and Ja`far ibn
Muhammad al-Baqir, believing affirmatively. Al-Alusi, Ruh, 25:56. The chal-
lenging question remains why was the GodMuhammad interaction not
included in the Quranic typology? The fact that it occurred in heaven might
explain why it was excluded from the list.
Ibrahim: Models of Communication in the Quran 95
74. Ibn `Ashur, Tafsir, 25:143-44.
75. A minority of scholars, especially Ibn Hazm, argues that the fact that these
women received inspiration through the angels makes them prophets (mes-
sengers). For a detailed discussion on the debate over prophecy of women in
general, see my Prophecy of Women in the Quran with a Special Focus on
Ibn Hazms Theory, (Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 2002).
76. As common as the idea of differentiating between prophets and messengers
is, there is no strong justification for doing so in the Quran. For more on this
difference, see al-Qadi `Iyad ibn Musa, Al-Shifa bi Tarif al-Mustafa (Beirut:
Muassasat `Ulum al-Quran, 1986), 1: 488-89. For additional sources and
my arguments against, see my Prophecy of Women in the Quran.
77. One hadith states that the exact numbers of prophets and messengers as
120,000 and 315, respectively. But this traditions reliability is questioned.
78. Ahmad `Abd al-Latif al-Zabidi, Mukhtasar S"hih al-Bukhari al-Musamma al-
Tajrid al-Sar%kh li Ahadith al-Jami` al-Sahih (Beirut: Dar al-Nafais, 1986),
1-2:21.
79. The Holy Quran: English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary
(Madinah: King Fahd Holy Quran Printing Complex, 1411 AH), 1990.
80. Ibn Kathir, Tafsir, 3:239.
81. Ibid., 3:240.
82. Although it would seem appropriate to discuss the effect of Gods message on
people in general, I omitted this since the latter were not the immediate
receivers. The effects were, therefore, considered limited to the messengers.
83. See my Prophecy of Women in the Quran.
84. Another divinehuman interaction that seemed to occur in this mode, as
reflected in the Quran, was the one between God and `Uzayr (Quran 2:259).
However, his name does not appear in that verse. For more, see Ibn Kathir,
Al-Bidayah, 2:40-42. In addition, Khidr, whose name also was never men-
tioned, seemed to have received a communication from God (Quran 18:65).
While it must have been included in the typology explained in this study, the
Quran does not expound its process. See Ibn Kathir, Al-Bidayah, 1:305-06.
1

Montgomery Watt and His Criticism on Wahy

Mohammad Fazril Bin Mohd. Saleh
International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM)

I ntroduction

Abdullah Ibn Amr reported that the Holy Prophet said: 'Allah will not take awav knowledge
(la vaqbidu al ilma) bv taking it awav from the servants, but He will take awav the learned (wa lakin
yaqbidu al-ilma bi qabdi al-ulama`),
1
so that when no learned man remains, the people will take the
ignorant as their leaders. They will seek religious opinion from them and these ignorant (leaders) will
deliver opinions without knowledge, when they would go astray and lead other to astray.
2


If one look carefully at our world today, one can see the messages floating around from all
directions, each try to communicate something for us to see, to hear, to feel and to accept. Some
messages may convey something positive or something wrong, negative and harmful. It is our
responsibility to develop within ourselves the ability to filter information in order to ensure that it does
not negatively affect our life. The ability to make use of messages positively and protect oneself against
their adverse eIIect depends upon one`s perceptual understanding oI realities and truth in their relative
as well as their absolute nature.
3
As a Muslim, we have to be aware and remain constantly conscious of
the truth and reality of our religion which is Islam. Indeed, we need to search for reliable sources and
information which interpreting the heart of religion, The Holy Quran and The Tradition of The Prophet
SAW which are known as wahy.

Since after the Medieval age, thousands of Occidental Intellectuals has been working hardly,
systematically, and creatively to produce a lot of works about Islam with prejudice and unfair
conclusion. This phenomenon is a result of confrontation between The West and Islam where the basis
of this clash is religion. It is exactly this relationship which inspires a permanent deepening of
ideologically fabricated misunderstandings between Islam and Christianity, leading to intensification of
dramatic confrontation these two religions.
4
Those works on Islam by the Westerners are known as

1
narraLed by lmam 8ukharl and Musllm
2
Wall al-uln Muhammad Abdullah al-khaLlb al-1abrlzl, Mlsbkot ol-Mosoblb. 1ranslaLlon by abdul Pameed Slddlql, (Lahore: lslamlc
ubllcaLlon, 1976), chap. 1 pg. 29
3
Cmar !ah, Al 8alagh", koowleJqe, looqooqe, 1booqbt & 1be clvlllzotloo of lslom, (!ohor 8haru: u1M ress, 2010), pg. 83.
4
lerld Muhlc, ulalogue of ClvlllzaLlons 1hrough 1he Corrldors of lalLh and Mlnd", koowleJqe, looqooqe, 1booqbt & 1be clvlllzotloo of
lslom, (!ohor 8haru: u1M ress, 2010), pg. 200.
2

'Orientalism. According to Edward W. Said, Orientalism is 'anvone who teaches, writes about, or
researches the Orient either in its specific or its general aspect, is an Orientalist, and what he or she
does is Orientalism.
5
Orientalism also reIers to 'a style of thought based upon an ontological and
epistemological distinction made between the Orient and the Occident.
6


Actually, the intention of this paper is to discuss briefly about the criticism on wahy by the
Orientalist in general and William Montgomery Watt (d. 2006) in particular. It is well known that some
Orientalist have been instrumental in discovering, editing, and publishing a number of original Arabic
works and manuscripts.
7
In the past as well as in modern times, scholars have dealt with it from time to
time. Some serious studies have appeared on the method and approaches of the Orientalist with regards
to Islamic themes in general and the wahy in particular. Those studies are among our references besides
several genuine works of W. Montgomery Watt (Watt) in order to discuss about the subject matter.

This paper will Iirstly discuss about Watt`s biographical background, consists oI, his liIe,
education, experiences and works. Watt is acknowledged as a leading European authority on Islam and
the Prophet at the present time. His works such as Muhammad at Mecca (1953), Muhammad at Medina
(1956), and Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman (1980) have been republished a number of times.
8

They have also been translated in a number of European Languages and also in Arabic and other world
languages. His works are among the most inIluential 'interpretation oI Islam in Europe. Secondly,
about the reality oI Islam under the topic oI 'The Worldview oI Islam. It is important to discuss about
world view as it projects the nature and reality of Islam, like mentioned by Syed Muhammad Naquib
al-Attas (al-Attas): 'a methaphvsical survev of the visible as well as the invisible worlds including the
perspective of life as a whole`
9
based on the true understanding of wahy as taught by Prophet
Muhammad SAW and the authority in Islam.

Also in this paper, wahy is being defined in the light of authenticity scholarship in Islam under
the topic 'Concept oI Wahy. The concept and process oI wahy in Islam is based on authentic reports.
The worldview of Islam reveals that the authorship of The Qur`an could only be ascribed to Allah.
10

Some author especially Orientalist including Watt declare that the Qur`an has been composed by the

3
Ldward W. Sald, Otleotollsm, (new ?ork: vlnLage 8ooks, 1929), pg 204.
6
lblJ.
7
Muhammad Mohar All, 5ltot ol-Nobl AoJ 1be Otleotollst, (Madlnah: klng lahd Complex of rlnLlng 1he Poly Curan, 1997), pg. 23.
8
lblJ. pg. preface.
9
Syed Muhammad naqulb Al-ALLas, 1he Worldvlew of lslam: An CuLllne", lslom ooJ tbe cbolleoqe of MoJetolty, (kuala Lumpur: lS1AC,
1994)
10
1hameem ushama, lssoes lo 1be 5toJy of 1be Ootoo, (kuala Lumpur: llmlah ubllsher, 2002), pg. 71
3

Prophet on his own or with the help of ohers.
11
Watt said that Prophet Muhammad SAW may have
been mistaken in believing The Qur`an to be a divine message
12
and described The Qur`an as 'the
Product oI Creative Imagination.
13
Watt in his works also mentioned about the nature of Islam in his
perspective.
14
He reiterates it as the 'Islamic Vision which he said is contained in wahy (the Qur`an),
came to Prophet Muhammad SAW and was shared by him with some of his fellow-citizen.
15
But the
problem with his understanding of Islamic Vision is absolutely contradicted with the reality of Islam
and this matter will be discussed under the topic 'Watt`s Treatment oI Wahy.


Biographical background


Professor William Montgomery Watt is one of the most famous scholars especially in field of
Islamic studies. Watt is acknowledged as a leading European authority on Islam and the Prophet at the
present time. He has died in age of 97 (24
th
October 2006)
16
The most famous three books written by
him focus on one person that is The Prophet Muhammad, acknowledged by experts to be classics in the
field.
17


Watt was born in Ceres, Fife where his father died when he was 14 months old. His father was a
Minister. He was educated at George Watson`s College, Edinburgh and continued taking degree at
Edinburgh and Oxford Universities where he took three degrees in six years.
18
In year 1937, Watt
discovered Islam that took him to a Muslim lodger, KA Mannan, a veterinary student from Pakistan.
According to Watt, he began to learn something about Islam that he had been largely ignorant about it.
But then Watt wrote that stated 'the dominant impression was that I was engaged not merelv in
arguing with this individual but in confronting a whole, century-old system of thought and life`
19
.

This discovery also has led him to the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, George Francis Graham
Brown. Brown has became the father figure to Watt, who agreed to join him in Jerusalem as his
chaplain, working on the intellectual approach to Islam. This also meant that he had to seek ordination

11
lblJ.
12
lblJ. pg. 73
13
W. MonLgomery WaLL, MobommoJ. ltopbet ooJ 1be 5totesmoo, (Cxford: Cxford unlverslLy ress, 1948), pg. 13
14
W. MonLgomery WaLL, wbot ls lslom, (8elruL: Llbrary of Lebanon, 1990), pg. 9
13
lblJ, pg. 13
16
8lchard Polloway, Wllllam MonLgomery WaLL" 1be CootJloo. LdlLlon 14
Lh
nov. 2006.
17
Carole Plllenbrand, arLlcle on rofessor W. MonLgomery WaLL", Jlobotqb MlJJle ost kepott Oolloe, WlnLer 2006
18
8lchard Polloway, op.clt.
19
see webslLe : www.alasLalrmclnLosh.com, !" $"%&'($&) )$%* +%*& ,-.% /'$&"%-0$.%1 - tbe kev ltof wllllom Mootqomety wott by 8ashlr
Maan & AlasLalr MclnLosh
4

in the Anglican Church, he was fast-tracked through Cuddesdon Theological College in a year and
ordain deacon in 1939. He was ordained in 1940, and aIter St Mary`s was closed because oI bomb
damage, Watt returned to Edinburgh to Iinish his training as a curate at Old St Paul`s, and begin work
on his doctoral thesis, 'Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam.
20

Returning to Scotland in year 1946, Watt became a lecturer in Arabic at Edinburgh, University
where he remained there until his retirement in 1979. He was given a personal chair in Arabic and
Islamic Studies in 1964.
21
Watt has wrote 30 books and scores of articles. He was towering figure in the
history of Edinburgh University Press, establishing the highly successful Islamic Surveys series in 1962
to bring the subject to a wider readership, and writing seven books for that press, all which are still in
print and are amongst the bestsellers. His other books have been translated into a vast array of other
languages. William was awarded many academic honors, he had visiting Professorships at the
University of Toronto, the College de France, and Georgetown University, and received the American
Giorgio Levi Della Vida Medal and was, as his first recipient, the British Society for Middle Eastern
studies award for outstanding scholarship.
22


Among his works are The faith and practice of al-Gha:li (1953), Muhammad at Mecca
(1953), Muhammad at Medina (1956), Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman (1961), Islamic Philosophy
and Theology (1962), Islamic Political Thought (1968),Islamic Surveys: The Influence of Islam on
Medieval Europe (1972), The Majesty That Was Islam (1976), What Is Islam? (1980), Muhammad's
Mecca (1988), Muslim-Christian Encounters: Perceptions and Misperceptions (1991), Islamic
Philosophy And Theology (1987), Islamic Creeds (1994), History of Islamic Spain, Islamic Political
Thought (1998) and A Christian Faith For Today (2002).
23


Watt`s stated that he doubted the appropriateness of conversion and felt that those of all faiths
should collaborate in friendship to stern the tide of materialism and secularization. He was not afraid to
express his radical theological opinions. The controversial ones in some Christian ecclesiastical circles.
He often pondered on the question of what influence his study of Islam had exerted on him in his own
Christian faith. As a direct result, he came to argue that the Islamic emphasis on the uncompromising
oneness of God had caused him to reconsider the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, which is vigorously
attached in the Qur`an as undermining true monotheism.
24


20
Carole Plllenbrand, op.clt.
21
lblJ.
22
lblJ.
23
See webslLe : www.wlklpeJlo.com/wllllommootqometywott
24
see webslLe : www.alasLalrmclnLosh.com, !" $"%&'($&) )$%* +%*& ,-.% /'$&"%-0$.%12 3456$%5
5


His aspirations to the highest degrees of objectivity are apparent in statements like 'I am not a
Muslim in the usual sense, though I hope I am a 'Muslim` as 'one surrendered to God`; but I believe
that embedded in the Quran and other expressions of the Islamic vision are vast stores of divine truth
from which I and other occidentals have still much to learn`
25
. This statement projects his love towards
knowledge and truth, even though some of his views on Islam is controversial and absolutely contradict
to the reality of Islam.


The Worldview of Islam

The worldview of Islam is the aqidah of Islam itself
26
. It projects the vision of the one reality
and truth. It encompasses both dunya and akhirah in which, as al-Attas put it, 'the dunya-aspect must
be related in a profound and inseparable way to the akhirah-aspect and in which the akhlak aspect was
ultimate and final significance. The dunya aspect is seen as preparation for the dunya-aspect.
Everything in Islam is ultimately focused on the akhirah aspect without thereby implying any attitude of
neglect or being unmindful of the dunva aspect`.
27


The worldview of Islam is a fixed unchanging, final and absolute vision because it is grounded
in and derived from wahy.
28
This is not merely a theoretical claim, for Muslim historical experience has
shown that the fundamental element of the worldview such as the conception of God, of the nature of
man and of the psychology of the human soul, and the meaning of knowledge, of happiness, of virtue
and vices, and of prophethood have no change throughout the long ages of Islamic epoch.
29


In the book 'What is Islam (1990), Watt stated that: 'while much of what valuable in the
nomadic Arabic outlook has been taken into the central core of Islam and there transformed, there
would also appear to be matters which have been given an Islamic dress without any fundament al
change.`
30
It is absolutely a false statement which describes Islam as a derivation of cultural and
philosophical elements but it is one whose source is wahy, confirmed by religion, affirmed by

23
W. MonLgomery WaLL, wbot ls lslom, pg. 21.
26
Cmar !ah, op.clt, pg. 83
27
Syed Muhammad naqulb al-ALLas, lslamlc WelLanschauung: A 8rlef Cverlew", lotom l51Ac ol-nlkmob, (kuala Lumpur: lS1AC, 1999),
yr. 3 lssue no.1, pg. 3
28
Adl SeLla Mohd uom, wotlJvlew of lslom AcoJemy. 1be coocept, (kuala Lumpur: PAklM, 2010), pg. 7
29
lblJ.
30
W. MonLgomery WaLL, wbot ls lslom, (8elruL: Llbrary of Lebanon, 1990), pg. 23
6

intellectual and intuitive principles.
31
This wahy is final, an it not only confirms the truth of preceding
revelations in their original forms, but includes their substance, separating the truth from cultural
creation and ethnic inventions.
32


The worldview of Islam consist of
33
: (1) belief in the oneness of Allah; (2) belief that Allah is
the creator of this universe; (3) belief that Allah is the sustainer of the world; (4) belief in the unseen
realities and the life to come; (5) recognition of the Holy Prophet Muhammad as the Messenger of
Allah, and (6) belief in the angels of Allah and the authority that defines the truth as separate from
falsehood (Qur`an: Yunus: 32).
34
For Muslims, Islam represents a way of life guided by proper
knowledge and ethical principles outlined in The Holy Qur`an and exemplified in the practical life of
The Holy Prophet
35
. As explain by al-Attas: 'the man of Islam has with him The Qur`an which is itself
unchanged, unchanging, and unchangeable; it is a Speech of God revealed in complete and final
form.
36



Concept of Wahy

God sends His words to His creation through an imperceptible message called as wahy.
37
The
imperceptible message has played a role in the formation of Islamic civilization and also like many
other concepts in terminology of Islam. Wahy has also be part of victim to the innumerable
misunderstanding.
38


In the ancient as well as the modern period, people were continuously occupied in generating
ambiguity on the overall concept, background and forms of wahy. There are many false perception and
accusations. It is due to the result of totally erroneous statements made about Islam in the West and
disseminated in the East either being a systematic denigration or is based on preposterous evidence.
There are many untruths were Iabricated and the most dangerous was that the Qur`an was authored by
the Prophet. According to the western scholars the Prophet invented it is wording and formulated it

31
Syed Muhammad naqulb al-ALLas, ltoleqomeoo to 1be Metopbyslcs of lslom. Ao xposltloo of 1be looJomeotol lemeots of 1be
wotlJvlew of lslom, (kuala Lumpur: lS1AC, 1993), pg. 4
32
lblJ. pg. 6
33
Cmar !ah, op.clt, pg. 83
34
Syed Muhammad naqulb al-ALLas, ltoleqomeoo, pg. 78
33
lsrar Ahmad khan, Ootoolc 5toJles. Ao lottoJoctloo, (kuala Lumpur: Zaman lslam Medla, 2000), pg. lnLroducLlon
36
Syed Muhammad naqulb al-ALLas, ltoleqomeoo, pg. 78
37
lsrar Ahmad khan, op.clt, pg. 33
38
lblJ.
7

style. The true perception of wahy must be explained to others and it will help one to understand the
position of Islam in the midst of other philosophies and way of life.

The literal meaning of wahy, according to Thameem Ushama, derives from the root or semantic
meaning of surah (quickness or promptness) and khafyah (secrecy). These two meanings describe the
real nature of wahy as it is revealed through human prophets and messenger. Literally the word wahy
also derives from 'aiha` which is means revelation, inspiration, quick signal, animal natural instinct
and etcetera. The lexical meaning of the Arabic word wahy is the secret inspiration that is felt only by
the one who inspires and the other who is inspired. The Qur`an has used this word both Ior instinctive
inspiration by Allah to His creation in general and for the revelation towards His prophets in
particular.
39

As mentioned by Israr Ahmad Khan, wahy means communication. It is taken by verbs from
'ahwa` that is for instances, denotes sentence of 'he communicated`.
40
Communication is the
backbone of life. It provides the means through which people can communicate to learn from one
another and exchange ideas in organizing normal life in which groups and individuals can live in peace,
harmony, security and prosperity.
41
According to Omar Jah, the first meaningful line of communication
to help men organize life on earth came in a dialogue between God and the Angles, when Allah
communicated to them His decision to appoint a khalifah to be entrusted with responsibility, to
administer the affairs of creatures on earth, to maintain law and order, to establish peace, security and
harmony.
42
The Khalifah appointed by Allah is properly equipped with divine knowledge to discern
truth from falsehood in belief, right from wrong in judgement and good from evil in action. This was
wahy (the divine message) communicated to all Messenger of Allah. The Holy Qur`an says 'O ve the
Messenger of Allah, do communicate what is being sent to down you, if you do not, you would not have
fulfilled vour mission`.
43


Wahy also bring the meaning that it is certainly message from the heaven (Allah). This meaning
agreed by Muhammad Abduh, who is according to him wahy it is a sublime knowledge (irfan)
imported in one`s heart (qalb) with absolute conviction and also it must be from Allah. Furthermore,
the wahy in the meaning above may be derived either through a medium (wasitah) and it is therefore
audible in nature by using a voice or it maybe without a medium and it was therefore requested directly

39
Abdullah ?usuf All, 7*& 8309 :;'<-"= 7'-".0-%$3" -"> ?3@@&"%-'9, (u.S.A: Amana CorporaLlon Maryland, 1983)
40
lsrar Ahmad khan, op.clt, pg. 33-36
41
Cmar !ah, op.clt, pg. 92-93
42
Surah al-8aqarah (2): 30-33
43
Surah al-Maldah (3): 69
8

to the heart of prophets. It is inaudible that is mean without a voice.
44
Watt described that Muslims take
what is revealed to human beings is also called as 'the word oI God. The Arabic term is kalam, and
this can be correctly translated speech`, since it also being used Ior God`s attribute to speech, while
kalima represented the single word.
45


Meanwhile, Al-Attas refers wahy as 'speech of God concerning Himself, His creation, the
relation between them, and the way to salvation communicated to His chosen Prophet and Messenger,
not by sound or letter, yet comprising all that He has represented in words, then conveyed by the
Prophet to the mankind in the linguistic form new in nature (Arabic Language of Qur`an) yet
comprehensible, without confusion with the Prophets own subfectivityand cognitive imagination. This
wahy is final, an it not only confirms the truth of preceding revelations in their original forms, but
includes their substance, separating the truth from cultural creation and ethnic inventions.`
46

Wahy projects the worldview oI Islam` as mention in the sub-topic before,
47
'the worldview of
Islam is a fixed unchanging, final and absolute vision because it is grounded in and derived from
wahy.
48
This is not merely a theoretical claim, for Muslim historical experience has shown that the
fundamental element of the worldview such as the conception of God, of the nature of man and of the
psychology of the human soul, and the meaning of knowledge, of happiness, of virtue and vices, and of
prophethood have no change throughout the long ages of Islamic epoch.`
49


Islamic perspective towards Divine Revelation is that God has not only created human beings,
but also continually guided them by raising series of prophethood since time immemorial starting with
Adam and ending it with the last Prophet Muhammad SAW and it stated that every prophet or
messenger must have received revelation (wahy) from God, which His Divine guidance (huda or
hidayah) directing people to lead their lives in accordance with the absolute command of God. The
command is of two kinds, that it is the instructions (al-awamir) and the prohibitions (al-nawahi). Those
who believed and obeyed the command are believers, and those who rejected are condemned as
unbelievers.


!"##$% '()"#*)+# ,- Wahy

44
1hameem ushama, A..;&. $" 7*& .%;>9 3B 7*& :;'<-", (kuala Lumpur: llmlah ubllsher, 2002), pg. 44-46
43
W. MonLgomery WaLL, lslom ooJ cbtlstloolty toJoy. A coottlbotloo to uloloqoe, (Ldlnburgh: unlverslLy of Ldlnburgh ress, 1991)
chap. 4, pg lnLroducLlon
46
Syed Muhammad naqulb al-ALLas, ltoleqomeoo, pg. 6
47
See subLoplc 1he Worldvlew of lslam" of Lhls paper, pg. 3
48
Adl SeLla Mohd uom, op.clt, pg. 7
49
lblJ.
9


We have discussed in the subtopics before about the nature of Islam and of wahy. Actually the
discussion beIore are quite clear to answer most oI Watt`s accusations and Ialse statements about wahy.
In several works of Watt, he has arrived at some conclusion about wahy. Major points raised by him
that will be discussed here are: (1) wahy is a projection oI Prophet`s ideas of socio-religious reforms
arising out of his time, environment and circumstances
50
; (2) wahy is derived from the ancient Arab
(pagan) poet has been influenced by the ideas and facts of other religions such as Christianity, Jews and
Zoroastrians which prevailing in Arabia at the time; (3) the wahy does not mean verbal communication
of a text, but suggestion or inspiration to give out the Qur`an and Jibril A.S was introduced at a later
stage as a conveyer of way; and (4) Satan has outsmarted the Prophet by putting into his mouth some
polytheistic ideas.

Watt admitted some similarities between wahy (which he mentioned as the work of the
Prophet) and works oI man`s creative imagination such as drama and poetry in the sense that both type
of works have a wide appeal and producing material from the collective unconscious.
51
Thameem
Ushama mentioned
52
that Watt has arrived at conclusion that Prophet Muhammad SAW may have been
mistaken in believing The Qur`an to be a divine message
53
and described The Qur`an as 'the Product oI
Creative Imagination.
54
The fact is wahy is neither the sudden visions of great poets and artists claim
for themselves; nor the apostolic inspiration of the writers of sacred scripture; nor the illuminative
intuition of the sages and people of discernment.
55
Israr Ahmad Khan put a question for this allegation:
'if it was Muhammad himself who developed the book, whv he did not, the attribute it to his name?`
56

Prophet would have undoubtedly hailed by his compatriots as well as the world today as the most
remarkable literary genius for producing the work with extraordinary language and messages.
57


Watt seems to have accepted the view the continuance of pre-Islamic (Jahiliah) attitudes
happened in the Qur`an as he try to find similarity of messages in both the Qur`an and the pagan
poetry
58
Also, he try to make conclusion that Qur`an in the earliest passage have no insistence on the

30
W. MonLgomery WaLL, wbot ls lslom, pg. 223. See also W. MonLgomery WaLL, MobommoJ. ltopbet ooJ 1be 5totesmoo, pg.
lnLroducLlon, see also pg. 19-20.
31
lblJ, pg. 223
32
1hameem ushama, lssoes lo 1be 5toJy of 1be Ootoo, (kuala Lumpur: llmlah ubllsher, 2002), pg. 71
33
lblJ. pg. 73
34
W. MonLgomery WaLL, MobommoJ. ltopbet ooJ 1be 5totesmoo, (Cxford: Cxford unlverslLy ress, 1948), pg. 13
33
Syed Muhammad naqulb al-ALLas, ltoleqomeoo, pg. 6
36
lsrar Ahmad khan, op.clt, pg. 16
37
lblJ. pg. 49
38
W. MonLgomery WaLL, wbot ls lslom, pg. 23
10

truth that there is no deity but God.
59
He claimed that in the early time of Islam, the doctrine of
monotheism is vague and admiration for superior culture like the people of Syria and Iraq (who believe
in one God) and influence of Judaism and Christianity made the acceptance of monotheism become
easier.
60
Firstly, as mentioned by M. Mohar Ali, Ior Muhammad`s emergence as Prophet must have
been marked by something new and better on his part than what was already known. None would paid
any attention to him and become his followers if his ideas were not clearly in advance of those of the
enlightened Meccans.
61
Secondly, the message of Tawhid and its principles in the Qur`an is very clear
as mentioned for instance in Surah al-Ikhlas(Qur`an: 112) and surah al-Kafirun(Qur`an: 109). Thirdly,
it is clear that Islam by its nature was conscious of his own identity from the time of its revelation.
62

When it appeared on the stage of the world history. Islam is already mature`, needing no process oI
growing up to maturity. Al-Attas stressed that wahy religion (revealed religion`) can only be that
which known itself from the very beginning and that self-knowledge comes from wahy itself, not from
history.
63
Israr Ahmad Khan argued that the Qur`anic account of many stories is essentially
different from the Biblical account, in many respect.
64
Also, the Qur`an states clearly about the
differences between Islam and Judeo-Christian traditions and religions.
65

In translating surah al-Najm Watt adopts Bell`s rendering oI the expressions wahy and awha as
'suggestion and 'suggested. These meaning are not all correct for Qur`anic wahy.
66
The meaning of
the word change with the change of the context. Indeed, a common English equivalent for wahy should
be communication rather than suggestion.
67
This meaning would fit in all situation.
68
Wahy maybe of
different types depending on the nature of the matter communication. Watt mentoned 'There is no
mention of Gabriel (Jibril A.S) in the Qur`an until the Medinan period.
69
According to M. Mohar Ali,
Watt invoked the opinion of Karl Ahrens who said that there is no mention of Jibril in the Meccan
passages of the Qur`an. Actually, Watt has misinterpreted the Qur`anic terms, words and passages.
Jibril is mentioned several times in the Qur`an (especially in Meccan passages) by several names which
reIers to the Archangel Jibril A.S such as 'Rasul Karim`
70
and 'al-Ruh.
71
Both names are refers to
the same individual whom mentioned as the conveyer of wahy who is also described as al-

39
lblJ. pg. 46
60
lblJ.
61
Muhammad Mohar All, op.clt. pg. 216
62
Syed Muhammad naqulb al-ALLas, ltoleqomeoo, pg. 4
63
lblJ.
64
lsrar Ahmad khan, op.clt, pg. 49
63
Surah al-8aqarah(2): 133
66
Muhammad Mohar All, op.clt. pg. 434
67
lsrar Ahmad khan, op.clt, pg. 33
68
Muhammad Mohar All, op.clt. pg. 433
69
W. MonLgomery WaLL, MobommoJ ot Mecco, (Cxford: Clarendon ress, 1988), pg. 16
70
Surah al-1akwlr(81): 19
71
Surah al-Cadr(97): 4, Surah al-Ma'arl[(70): 4, Surah al-naba(78): 38
11

amin
72
(nazzala bihi al-ruh al-amin) which means faithful and having been employed as a messenger by
God. Moreover, the specific mention of him by name Jibril as a conveyer of wahy can be found for
example in surah al-Baqarah(2): 97.

Watt`s most controversial view is his theory oI Satanic versus`.
73
He claimed that ayat 19-23 of
surah al-Najm is those verses. Watt said that: 'it is assumed in Islam that all such Satanic alterations in
the Qur`an have been discovered and corrected.
74
and '.Satan had managed to slip in the Ialse
versus oI the Iirst version without Muhammad noticing it...
75
But the Qur`an already stated that it is
impossible.
76
According to Israr Ahmad Khan, the incident involving those versus is totally different
with the story rose by Watt. He corrected Watt as in 5A.H., when a number of early Islamic community
took refuge in Abbysina, Prophet after having received the complete surah al-Najm (the Qur`an: 53)
from Allah, recited it to a large audience comprising the companions and non-believers. In the end as
the last word demand for doing prostration, Prophet made it and followed by the others including the
non-believers. The Quraysh, later on felt ashamed of their joining in doing prostration to Allah with
Prophet S.A.W, and to wash off this stigma fabricated the story that they follow the later in prostration
because they heard Prophet Muhammad praising their idol.
77
Israr Ahmad Khan also in his commentary
to this matter said that almost all the Orientalists described the Prophet as a genius, but Muhammad
S.A.W as an intelligent person cannot realize the nature of the two opposite messages which one is
allegedly Satanic versus and the other is genuinely divine versus: the Iormer appreciates the Arab`s
chief goddesses and the latter condemn them as falsehood. These two views are too distinct to escape
even an ordinary person`s mind.
78



Conclusion

From our brief survey, we can see that William Montgomery Watt (Watt) is one of the
westerners whose works (most of them) are systematically and scientifically written about Islam. As
stated by Edward Said: Orientalism` is 'anvone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient
either in its specific or its general aspect, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism.
79

Watt was absolutely belongs to them. However, his statements, theories, interpretations and

72
Surah al-Syu'ara(26): 193
73
W. MonLgomery WaLL, wbot ls lslom, pg. 46
74
W. MonLgomery WaLL, wbot ls lslom, pg. 223. See also pg.42
73
W. MonLgomery WaLL, MobommoJ. ltopbet ooJ 5totesmoo, pg. 61
76
Surah al-Paqqah(69): 44-46
77
lsrar Ahmad khan, op.clt, pg. 30
78
lblJ. pg. 31
79
Ldward W. Sald, Otleotollsm, (new ?ork: vlnLage 8ooks, 1929), pg 204.
12

assumptions about Islam at certain extent look contradict with the truth and reality of Islam (as
discussed before),
80
its Holy Prophet, its Holy Scripture, and Islamic themes including wahy, which
have became our primary subject of this paper. Also, at certain places, his conclusion are contradict and
irrelevant between one to another as for example criticized by M. Mohar Ali in the problem rose by
Watt about the Prophet`s literacy: '.what Watt says in his first paragraph is in fact rendered
irrelevant with what he says in his second paragraph dealing with the origin and meaning of iqra`
81


However, there are also positive aspect and effect of his works. He was known by many
scholars of the west as a legendary figure among scholars who in the field of Islamic studies. Also, he
dedicated his life to the promotion of dialogue between Christians and Muslims.
82
Before his death, he
came to argue that the Islamic emphasis on the uncompromising oneness of God had caused him to
reconsider the Christians doctrine oI the Trinity, which is vigorously attacked in the Qur`an as
undermining the monotheism.
83
Influenced by Islam with its 99 names of God, each expressing specials
attributes of God, Watt returned to the Latin word 'persona which meant a 'Iace or 'mask, and not
'individuals as it now means in English in order to explain the doctrine of Trinity in Christianity.
84
It
means, he tried to rationalized the concept as God is the only One not three but there are three faces of
one single God.

About wahy, it is clear to us that it is a medium of communication between God and mankind.
Wahy project the worldview of Islam which is the information of the absolute truth and reality. Wahy is
a kind oI man`s behavioral and spiritual needs. Man stands almost identical to animals without those
wahy.
Lastly, based on this survey, we arrived at the conclusion that Watt was a very famous figure in
Islamic studies especially in the West but his criticism to Islam and its themes especially wahy is
invalid, contradictory and irrelevant as it is disable to show the nature of Islam itself unlike the believe
of true Muslim. Hence, as a Muslim, we have to search for the true knowledge from authentic and
reliable people and sources especially in the world today.
85





80
See Loplcs before
81
Muhammad Mohar All, op.clt. pg. 474
82
8lchard Polloway, Wllllam MonLgomery WaLL" 1be CootJloo. LdlLlon 14
Lh
nov. 2006.
83
see webslLe : www.alasLalrmclnLosh.com, Ao lotetvlew wltb +%*& ,-.% /'$&"%-0$.%12 3456$%5
84
Carole Plllenbrand, arLlcle on rofessor W. MonLgomery WaLL", Jlobotqb MlJJle ost kepott Oolloe, WlnLer 2006
83
'Abdullah lbn Amr reporLed LhaL Lhe Poly ropheL sald: +!00-* )$00 "3% %-C& -)-9 C"3)0&>D& E0- 9-FG$>; -0 H$0@-I G9 %-C$"D $% -)-9
ftom tbe setvoots, bot ne wlll toke owoy tbe leotoeJ (wo loklo yopblJo ol-H$0@- G$ F-G>$ -0-H;0-@-JIK
narraLed by lmam 8ukharl and Musllm
14


Cited Bibliography


al-Attas, Syed Muhammad Naquib Prolegomena to The Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition of The
Fundamental Elements of The Worldview of Islam, Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1995.

. 'Islamic Weltanschauung: A BrieI Overiew, Forum ISTAC al-Hikmah, (Kuala
Lumpur: ISTAC, 1999), yr. 5 issue no.1.

. 'The Worldview of Islam: An Outline, Islam and the Challenge of Modernity,
Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1994..

Adi Setia, Mohd Dom. Worldview of Islam Academy: The Concept, Kuala Lumpur: HAKIM, 2010.

Ali, Abdullah Yusuf. The Holv Quran. Translation and Commentarv, U.S.A: Amana Corporation
Maryland, 1983.

Ali, Muhammad Mohar. Sirat al-Nabi And The Orientalist, Madinah: King Fahd Complex of
Printing The Holy Quran, 1997.

Hillenbrand, Carole. 'Article on ProIessor W. Montgomery Watt, Edinburgh Middle East Report
Online, Winter 2006

Khan, Israr Ahmad. Qur`anic Studies: An Introduction, Kuala Lumpur: Zaman Islam Media, 2000.

Muhic, Ferid. 'Dialogue oI Civilizations Through The Corridors oI Faith and Mind, Knowledge,
Language, Thought & The Civil ization of Islam, Johor Bharu: UTM Press, 2010.

Richard Holloway, 'William Montgomery Watt The Guardian. Edition 14
th
Nov. 2006.

Said, Edward W. Orientalism, New York: Vintage Books, 1929.

Al-Tabrizi, Wali al-Din Muhammad Abdullah al-Khatib. Mishkat al-Masabih. Translation by
abdul Hameed Siddiqi, Lahore: Islamic Publication, 1976.

Ushama, Thameem. Issues in The Study of The Qur`an, Kuala Lumpur: Ilmiah Publisher, 2002.

Watt, W. Montgomery. What Is Islam, Beirut: Library of Lebanon, 1990.

. Islam and Christianity today: A Contribution to Dialogue, Edinburgh: University of
Edinburgh Press, 1991.

. Muhammad: Prophet and The Statesman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948.

. Muhammad at Mecca, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.


U
CHAPTER 21
Hermeneutics: al-Tha<lab
Walid Saleh
Al-Thalab (d. 427/1025) is perhaps one of the most important Qura n exegetes of the
medieval Islamic world. The legacy of his Qura n commentary, al-Kashf wal-baya n an
tafs r al-Qura n (The Unveiling and Elucidation in Qura nic Interpretation; henceforth
al-Kashf ) has only recently begun to be studied. Al-Thalab s work ushered in the high
classical style of Qura nic commentary, and for centuries it remained the major source
for later exegetes, whether explicitly acknowledged or not, through direct channels or
indirectly. Moreover, al-Kashf, for reasons I will explain later in this chapter, would
become the Sunn work most widely utilized and abused by Sh polemicists in their
wars with the Sunn s. This prompted Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) to launch a blister-
ing critique of al-Thalab in an attempt to circumvent the Sh use of his work. Even-
tually, Sunn scholars downgraded the importance of al-Kashf and ceased to consider
it mainstream. By the time Sunn Muslim historians of Qura nic exegesis were writing
the history of the genre, al-Thalab had become persona non grata in the eld.
The history of al-Kashf s legacy thus documents the development of the genre of
tafs r as well as Sunn -Sh polemical wars. The recent edition and publication of al-
Kashf by a Sh scholar has only complicated the checkered history of this work. With
the increased intensity of Sunn -Sh polemic in the last decades, modern Sh schol-
ars who had become aware of the signicance of this work hurriedly prepared it for
publication (al-Thalab 2002). The result is an abysmal edition which is useless for pur-
poses of a close study of the work. Thus one of the major medieval Qura n commen-
taries is still unavailable in a critical edition (Saleh 2004: 22942). Moreover, copies of
this inferior edition are hard to locate.
Several features of al-Kashf made the prominent role it played in the history of
Qura nic exegesis possible. First, al-Thalab did not just write a new commentary;
rather he started by assessing the whole eld and evaluating its salient trends. The
introduction of al-Kashf represents an important moment in the development of the art
of Qura nic exegesis: it adopts a self-reective stance, and offers a detailed discussion of
the eld as it then stood. Readers are fully informed of what al-Thalab thought of the
BCQ21 11/29/2005 10:15 AM Page 323
U
major gures in the eld and why he excluded certain currents (namely, the Mutazilite
tafs r tradition). Moreover, he is one of a handful of medieval exegetes who listed all of
his sources in detail. He utilized over a hundred books, in addition to his personal notes
from the lectures of over 300 other scholars with whom he had studied. The intro-
duction to his commentary is thus an articulate assessment of the status of the eld on
the eve of the fth/eleventh century (Goldfeld 1984). The fastidiousness of his exhaus-
tive listing of sources was never matched: not content to use one version of a certain
work, he used all the available recensions in one instance four different versions of
the same work. To the degree that he collected his material independently from al-
T
.
abar (d. 310/923), we are now in a position to use al-Kashf in conjunction with al-
T
.
abar s work to study the early phase of Qura nic exegesis. Moreover, by incorporating
the material made available since the publication of al-T
.
abar s work, al-Kashf preserves
the collective engagement of Muslim intellectuals with the Qura n up to the fth
century. As a source for the fourth century, al-Kashf is indispensable. Finally, by drop-
ping the isna ds without sacricing the content, later exegetes, who were by then less
concerned with isna ds, preferred al-Thalab as the source for early material. Al-Kashf
was a handy and irresistible source for these exegetes, as it contained most of al-T
.
abar s
material and more.
An abundance of sources alone, however, could hardly account for such an epoch-
making work. Al-Kashf was inuential because it offered a resolution to many of the
problems facing the Sunn hermeneutical enterprise, resolutions that proved adaptable
and convincing because they were intellectually cogent. Al-Thalab s reformulation of
the craft of interpretation was to transform the eld and to the degree that one can
measure inuence in a eld where so many of the sources are still unedited his is
apparent in the whole spectrum of the medieval exegetical tradition. Al-Thalab s res-
olution of the hermeneutical impasse of Sunnism proved effective through six major
interpretive strategies. First, he refused the temptation to effect a rupture between
Sunn hermeneutics and philology. Second, he allowed tafs r, and hence the Qura n, to
accommodate all the major trends in pietistic Sunnism. Third, he integrated a narra-
tive style of interpretation into the philological system. Fourth, he turned exegesis into
an explicitly polemical tool against the non-Sunn camps. Fifth, he welded the prophetic
corpus of h
.
ad th to the craft of exegesis. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, he trans-
formed tafs r into a sophisticated discipline that absorbed new intellectual challenges
from outside Sunnism, digested them, and rendered them mainstream and innocuous.
Al-Thalab s transformation of tafs r as a discipline, I believe, shows the degree to
which tafs r was at the center of the intellectual life of medieval Sunn Islam; the failure
of modern scholars to incorporate the study of this genre into the general intellectual
history of medieval Islam is thus unfortunate. I will proceed to outline the six major
interpretive strategies through which al-Thalab sought to resolve the hermeneutical
impasse of Sunnism.
The Dtente with Philology
The discovery of philology early on in the Arabo-Islamic tradition has rarely been
accorded the revolutionary cultural signicance it deserves. Philologys role in under-
324 WALID SALEH
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mining any facile dogmatic interpretation of the Qura n was not negligible. One only
need to compare the content of Muqatil b. Sulaymans (d. 150/767) and al-T
.
abar s
commentaries to realize how professional the tone of the craft had become by al-
T
.
abar s time. The existence of a corpus of pre-Islamic literature made for a more dif-
cult situation. One did not fear offending God or the ulama by admitting to the content
of this pagan literature and its worldview: wine, hubris, debauchery, and idolatry were
all there to start with, and one was spared the urge to twist the rules of philology in
order to transform an abhorrent image. A philology honed on this corpus was soon to
acquire an irreverence that was barely in check when confronted with any other text,
even if it was divine speech. The philological geist of the age soon forced the Sunn
exegetes to postulate that Qura nic interpretation must be based on philology, yet they
were not so naive as to let a tool so untethered take full charge of their craft. The early,
pre-philological phase of the tradition was not dropped. In so far as it encapsulated a
proto-Sunn worldview, this layer was actually enshrined as canonical. As such,
however, there lurked within mainstream Sunn hermeneutics the danger of philology
running amuck. Sunn hermeneutics, by paying more than mere lip service to the role
of philology in its method, was always but one step removed from theological disaster,
should an exegete submit fully to the dictates of this tool at the expense of orthodoxy.
While tafs r forced the birth of Arabic philology, in many ways Arabic philology came
back to haunt it. Philology in the last resort was not a loyal servant for it could easily
show the imsy foundations of many of the proto-Sunn interpretations.
The fundamental claim to authority that tafs r as a discipline presented to the intel-
lectual elite was that it was a philological explanation of the Qura n. As such, it pre-
supposed that any reader of the Qura n, who was sufciently versed in Arabic, would
reach the same conclusions that the Sunn exegetes offered. Read philologically, the
Qura n, Sunn exegetes maintained, offered a Sunn worldview. This self-presentation
and assessment are, of course, easy to refute. Tafs r was primarily a doctrinal enterprise
that used philology as one of its tools. Sunn hermeneutics was thus based on a
paradox: philology was proclaimed the tool needed to understand the Qura n, yet
philology was not allowed to be the nal arbiter of any interpretation. Sunn hermeneu-
tics, in order to save its own theological reading of the Qura n and to present a coher-
ent interpretation, was ultimately willing to discard any philological reading (although
it had always maintained that philology was the way to understand the Qura n)
whenever it threatened to undermine a Sunn theological reading not supported by
philology.
In his monumental exegetical work, Ja mi al-baya n, al-T
.
abar offered the two cur-
rents of interpretation, theological and philological, side by side, pretending that one
did not negate the other. In his work, al-Thalab managed to rene the appearance of
the Sunn exegetical enterprise and to make it, through pseudo-philological methods,
conform more fully to the dictates of philology. Rhetoric, a rising new discipline, was
also admitted; the inuence of the philologists and their new lexicons is apparent in al-
Kashf. Far more signicant was al-Thalab s willingness to discard any traditionally
inherited interpretation that was blatantly unsound philologically, as long as dropping
it posed no dogmatic retreat or change in the Sunn worldview. Moreover, poetry in its
form as literature (adab), not merely as a handmaid to philology, was also allowed
to appear in the context of Qura nic interpretation. Poetry, the pinnacle of human
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creativity, was given a place inside tafs r not only as a tool but as a self-contained artis-
tic manifestation. The combined effect of these decisions was to give mainstream
Qura nic exegesis a philological gravitas it had hitherto lacked (Saleh 2004: 13040).
We should keep in mind that two other options were available to al-Thalab to
resolve the clash between philology and theology. The rst was a loosening of the bond
between Sunn hermeneutics and philology, an option that was an exceedingly attrac-
tive one for Sunn ideologues. Sh and S
.
u f hermeneutics had done that already,
showing that such a move was not only feasible, but had no apparent disadvantages.
The other extreme was also tempting: a realignment of Sunnism so as to conform to a
more thorough philological reading of the Qura n. Yet, both would have resulted in a
profound intellectual loss and the desertion of two major tenets of Sunnism: conser-
vatism and intellectual hubris. Al-Thalab was thus the architect of a major resolution
to this perennial tug-of-war between philology and dogma, and his solution was and
remains the happy medium that Sunnism claims. However, it should be mentioned that
the two other options were also attempted within Sunnism, if only after al-Thalab . Al-
Wah
.
id (d. 468/1076), al-Thalab s main student, did try in his magnum opus al-Bas t
.
to align Sunnism with a philological reading of the Qura n. The attempt left him in a
frenzied, albeit productive, intellectual crisis which he never seemed to have resolved.
Ibn Taymiyya chose the other solution and dropped philology from his hermeneutical
manifesto and thus consolidating (or possibly giving rise to) one of the major compet-
ing trends inside Sunn hermeneutics, that I have termed radical hermeneutics (Saleh
2004: 20527).
Tafs r and Pietistic Sensibilities
If there is a leitmotif in al-Thalab s hermeneutics, it is the proclamation of the salvic
message of the Qura n. Every verse is a potential herald of Gods mercy and compas-
sion towards the believers. Moreover, for him, faith entailed an ontological differentia-
tion between the believers and the rest of humanity, and al-Thalab was determined to
render this differentiation hermeneutically operative. Both of these features were also
emphasized by the dogma of the intercession of Muh
.
ammad (shafaa) on behalf of his
community, which he imbedded into the meaning of the Qura n. Tafs r left little doubt
that a Muslim, no matter what, could be eternally damned. Pietistic Sunnism, mean-
while, had transformed the recitation of the Qura n into one of the highest forms of
devotion; despite the protestations of the h
.
ad th camp that most of the prophetic tradi-
tions that supported such a view were fabricated, the sentiment was too strong not
to prevail. Al-Thalab accordingly began his exegesis of every sura in the Qura n
by recounting such traditions. Mere recitation was proclaimed salvation here. The
all-engulng salvic quality of reciting the Qura n, once unleashed, could not be con-
tained, and reading parts of the Qura n became as efcacious as reading all of it. What
the traditions cited by al-Thalab were implying was that the Qura n is, at once, an all-
encompassing and a self-encompassing instrument of salvation, such that a part rep-
resents the whole and the whole is reducible to certain parts. The collective redemptive
powers of the Qura n are thus attainable by reading portions of it. This synecdochic
326 WALID SALEH
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aspect of the Qura n can make sense only on the salvic plane: redemption comes
complete to the believer (Saleh 2004: 1038). The result of this view was to allow the
Qura n to compete with other forms of devotion that were being developed by the likes
of the S
.
u f s.
Moreover, al-Thalab made sure that the content of the verses themselves declared
an afrmation of the naja h
.
(salvation) that awaited the faithful. Al-Thalab took pains
to show this aspect of the Qura n where one least expected it. Here, the ability of the
exegete to make the Qura n conrm the primary message that Sunnism wanted it to
convey was supreme. The technique of achieving this was carried out in two forms:
positive and negative. The positive approach was to nd salvic import in an otherwise
innocuously nonsalvic verse; the negative was to conne the import of harsh divine
pronouncements about recalcitrant human nature to nonbelievers, hence to make sure
to differentiate the believers ontologically from the nonbelievers.
I will start by giving examples of the positive approach. Q 55:19, which states, He
[God] let forth the two seas that meet together was understood by all exegetes up to
al-Thalab s time as a reference to salt and fresh water seas, and al-Thalab offers inter-
pretations that reect this understanding. Having disposed of the traditional interpre-
tations, however, he offers a new meaning: There exists between human creatures
(al-abd) and his Lord two seas. The rst one is the sea of salvation (al-naja h) and it is
the Qura n; whoever upholds the Qura n is saved. The second is the sea of perdition
(hala k) and it is this world; whoever grasps on to it and takes it as his resort, he shall
perish. Let us untangle this interpretation. First, al-Thalab was drawing on the
Qura ns presentation of the sea as paradigmatic of human life. The many statements
in the Qura n of human defeat in front of the mysteries of the seas has already made
the sea a synonym of both Gods wrath and his benevolence (Q 17:6670). To safely
journey through the seas is totally predicated on Gods love and mercy. Since life itself
is presented as a journey, then crossing a sea becomes part of the march of the faith-
ful towards salvation. Moreover, the sea was used as a metonymic image of Gods word
in the Qura n (Q 18:109; 31:27). The interpretation offered by al-Thalab is thus a bril-
liant reconguration of the myriad uses of the sea in the Qura n and salvation becomes
a journey through a sea that both is the Qura n and can only be traversed by the Qura n
itself. There is also an echo here of the prophetic catechetic view of the Qura n as both
the judge and the prosecutor. Notice how the world, hence the terra rma, becomes an
image of a sea of perdition, for although it is rm it can still inundate and drown one
in its fatal attractions (Saleh 2004: 109). The reality of salvation is thus counterintu-
itive. It is important to emphasize that nothing in the verse supports such an elaborate
reading, apart from the word sea.
Another example of this positive salvic interpretation is how al-Thalab under-
stood Q 93:5, The Lord shall give thee [Muh
.
ammad], and thou shalt be satised. The
verse is rhetorically cold towards the believers; this was an intimate conversation
between God and Muh
.
ammad, and the believers are nowhere in the picture. God,
despite all his protestation that His face is facing all humanity, is all too focused on
Muh
.
ammad. Al-Thalab ensured that the believer intrudes into these moments of inti-
macy between God and Muh
.
ammad, and so he turned the verse into nothing but a
reference to the believers salvation. Al-Thalab adduced a tradition which states that
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Muh
.
ammad can only be satised if none of his followers remains in hell (Saleh 2004:
1247). This was vintage al-Thalab : Gods mercy and Muh
.
ammads intercession were
made into one here; this interpretation was also an implicit attack on a major tenet of
Mutazilite doctrine that the grave sinner will be damned for eternity.
An example of the negative salvic interpretation is how al-Thalab dealt with
Q 102:12, striving for acquiring more [wealth] distracts you until you visit your
graves. The whole tone of sura 102 is recriminatory towards humanity. Greed blinds
human beings to see that death is at hand and that the reckoning on the day of judg-
ment would entail an account of how wealth was spent. Human beings are depicted as
recalcitrant, unbending, and unimaginative. Certitude of what life is about comes only
at a belated moment of recognition (Q 102:5). To leave this sura as it is, is to raise ques-
tions about faiths ability to transform human nature. Al-Thalab thus offered an inter-
pretation of the verses that limits their reference to pre-Islamic Arabs or Jews. In either
case, they are not about death making human life vain, but about the greed that blinds
the unfaithful. The believers are thus immune from such an assessment, and to the
degree that the faithful are not implicated in this scenario, they are a different order of
beings (Saleh 2004: 1624).
The other aspect of pietistic Sunnism that al-Thalab made tafs r accommodate was
the admonitory sensibility and its rhetoric. In doing so, al-Thalab extended trends
already present in the Qura n. The aim here was to transform the whole rhetoric of the
Qura n into such a discourse. Although I have chosen the word admonitory, I am in
reality describing two complementary rhetorical stratagems: one admonitory, the other
exhortatory, or what is known in Islamic pietistic literature as tarh b (instilling fear) and
targh b (instilling hope). Moreover, woven into these two rhetorical modes of interpre-
tation was an afrmation of the dictates of the shar a: one is also cajoled and pushed
into fullling the obligations imposed by Gods law. This aspect of al-Kashf was a major
factor in its popularity. The work is uncanny in its mixture of the high philological tone
and the common voice of the pietistic tradition. At the moment one is drawn into
reading a long list of vocabulary, gathered by philologists, about the stages of human
life, one is reminded of the ephemeral quality of this life. It is mostly in these admoni-
tory sections that pietistic poetry was cited by al-Thalab .
Narration and Exegesis
One of the remarkable features of al-Thalab s hermeneutics was his rening of
methods already in existence in the tradition to suit the new tastes of his audience.
Nothing shows this skill more than his transformation of narrative elements in tafs r
into a coherent highly developed technique. This he did in two ways: the rst was to
elaborate on elements already present in the narrative parts of the Qura n itself and
turn them into artistic productions (for more on this see the chapter in this book on his
Tales of the Prophets). This is what I would call the grand narrative technique, where
a repeated story in the Qura n is developed in one instance to cover the story concerned,
thus giving a full narrative of what would be a recurring story in the Qura n. The
second was the micro narrative style, in which a narrative unit, complete in its
328 WALID SALEH
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elements, was used to explain a particular verse without it appearing in other contexts
and, more importantly, without apparent connection to the verse in question. This tech-
nique I have termed ctive narrative (Saleh 2004: 1616).
The second of these two methods can be illustrated as follows. Q 93:7, Did he not
nd you erring (d
.
allan, literally lost) and guide you generated unease among Muslim
commentators, for it alluded to (if it did not state) the pagan past of Muh
.
ammad. This
would have been unproblematic were it not for the development of the doctrine of the
infallibility of Muh
.
ammad, which in its more strict forms denied that Muh
.
ammad could
have been a pagan before he was called to prophecy. The ways in which commentators
sought to change the meaning of this verse are varied. Most of the solutions offered to
undo this verse were at odds with the meaning of the word d
.
allan; thus philology was
always undermining these techniques even when not actively doing so. Why not defeat
philology at its own game? Could it be that Muh
.
ammad was physically lost? Why not
understand the term in its original lexicographic meaning, denuding it of its acquired
metaphoric meaning, and use the very method of philology to defeat it? Could it not
be that Muh
.
ammad was lost when he was a child, something that happens to every
child at one time or another? Crude as this ploy sounds, it has many advantages. It is
philologically sound, and if a story could be found, or invented, to support it, the story
would not be implausible. Al-Thalab offers ve such stories. Each tells the story of
Muh
.
ammad being lost when he was a child, then found again and reunited with his
grandfather. The rst represents the earliest level of the invention of this interpretation:
Muh
.
ammad was lost in the valleys of Mecca and then God guided him back to his
grandfather. This is a skeletal story, whose aim is to undo the verse, and little heed was
given to the narrative structure and development of the story. By the time we reach the
fth story, however, we have a long narration that weaves together various motifs to
create a miraculous childhood story of the grand savior of humanity. The whole cosmos
is now implicated in the drama of this prophet; the universe is alerted to the disap-
pearance of this child; the old gods of Arabia are fearful of him being found again, and
refuse to answer a quest for an oracle of his whereabouts; and a heavenly voice, no less,
guides the grandfather to the hiding place of this child. He was found under a blessed
tree, in a contemplative mood, eating from the blessed leaves of this tree.
The ctive narrative method employed many strategies to achieve plausibility. When
necessary, the meaning of a phrase was taken literally instead of guratively, or the
opposite a gurative use of a word was chosen and the literal discarded, even though
such a reading was not supported by the rhetorical Arabic tradition. Ethnographic
information, poetic citation, and detailed dramatization, including dialogues and
monologues, were all employed to make the narrative coherent. It should be clear that
ctive narrative interpretation was an attractive exegetical method since there were no
restrictive hermeneutical rules on the exegete save coherence.
Exegesis and Theology
To state that medieval Qura nic interpretation was theological is to state the obvious,
especially if what we mean by theology is the bolstering of a system of belief. What I
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am referring to here is, however, a far more explicit articulation of the aims of exege-
sis as both dener and defender of a theological outlook. Al-Thalab introduced
theology, or at least a more explicit theological outlook, into tafs r. He rarely let an
opportunity to explain how Sunnism understood a certain verse, what Sunnism
thought of this or that theological point, or how others had gotten it wrong, pass him
by. If there was an enemy to attack, it was Mutazilite theology and to a lesser degree,
the Sh ites. Al-Thalab never tired of vilifying these camps, their views and doctrines.
Moreover, al-Thalab achieved the inclusion of theology in tafs r without turning to
the language of scholastic kala min his theological discussions. Here, he showed his true
colors as a brilliant cultural ideologue who, while versed in the language of theology,
was willing to simplify it for an audience that lacked the training for such a discipline.
I will here give just one example of his subtle way of achieving this. Q 31:27, which
reads, Though all the trees in the earth were pens, and the sea [was ink] seven seas
after it to replenish it, yet would the words of God not be spent. God is All-hearing, All-
seeing, was understood by al-T
.
abar to refer to Gods word itself, and not to its nature.
Al-Thalab meanwhile achieved two things when he offered an explanation of this
verse. First, he read it as an afrmation of the doctrine of the uncreatedness of the
Qura n, and second, he saw in it a legitimizing statement for the craft of exegesis. He
stated that this verse implies that the word of God is uncreated because that which is
without end to it or to what relates to it (or is connected to it), i.e., its meaning, is uncre-
ated. Here a kala mconcept which states that innite things cannot be created was used
to argue that Gods word, since it was declared inexhaustible and thus innite in quan-
tity, must be uncreated. Both the kala m concept and its corollary were here presented
in a catechetic style, easy to digest and consent to, and thus required little background
in theology (Saleh 2004: 1). Al-Thalab opened the door for later exegetes to build on
this approach, and to the degree that Sunnism saw the need later to turn exegesis into
a kalamized discipline it offered such a transformation in the work of Fakhr al-D n
al-Raz (d. 606/1209).
Prophetic H
.
adith and Tafs r
At the heart of the hermeneutical enterprise of al-Thalab lies his weaving together of
two of the fundamental facets of the medieval Islamic religious traditions: the prophetic
h
.
ad th and the enterprise of Qura nic exegesis.
1
This fusion was in a sense the culmi-
nation of the process of integration of the different aspects of the Islamic culture in
medieval times. The prophetic h
.
ad th, an edice that was nearing its completion both
through the production of massive compilations and the elaboration of the science of
h
.
ad th (ulum al-h
.
ad th), stood apart, as it were, from Qura nic exegesis as it reached its
rst grand articulation in the commentary of al-T
.
abar . Al-Thalab brought the two
together and initiated what was to be a continuous relationship between the two
streams of medieval productions. The two revelations, the written and the prophetic or
oral, were reunited, thus creating in the hermeneutical event a structure resembling
the character of Muh
.
ammad, who was the only individual in whom both were once
united: the Qura n (present as lemmas) and the sunna (present as exegesis) made into
330 WALID SALEH
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one. The Qura n, read through the prophetic sunna, became, like Muh
.
ammad once was,
the incarnation of that which would guide the Muslim nation. The formulation of tafs r
as the embodiment of both divine revelation and prophetic revelation necessarily made
it a replacement of Muh
.
ammad, his true caliph or successor who was to lead the
community. The failure of the Caliphate on the religious level opened the door to a
structuring of religious knowledge as Muh
.
ammads successor. In tafs r the Sunn com-
munity had, in effect, its immanent prophet through textual at.
There are here two issues that need to be addressed; the rst is that most of the inno-
vations introduced by al-Thalab were effected through the citation of prophetic h
.
ad th.
When a verse was read to declare Gods mercy and offer salvation to the believers,
invariably it was read in this way through the agency of a h
.
ad th or a prophetic tradi-
tion. Thus for example, Q 93:7, which I have already presented, was read through the
eyes of a h
.
ad th, as discussed above. Moreover, the admonitory rhetorical style was
already highly developed in h
.
ad th, and al-Thalab only needed to transport this device
wholesale into his work. The other issue that deserves mentioning is the consequences
that this binding of the two revelations posed to Sunn hermeneutics. If allowed
supremacy, this method could overhaul the Sunn hermeneutical project, and implicit
in this method was a capitulation to the prophetic h
.
ad th as the decipherer of divine
speech. As long as the prophetic interpretive method was embedded in an encyclope-
dic approach that was guided by philology, it was always a controllable method. The
danger was to follow through with the implicit foundation of such a method: the equat-
ing of the meaning of the word of God with the prophetic word to the exclusion of any
other possible hermeneutical approach into the Qura n. Given the abundance of
prophetic logia, it was only a matter of time before the one inundated the other. This
possibility and approach are what I have termed radical hermeneutics and one of
the most intriguing issues for tafs r scholarship is to investigate the history of this
hermeneutical radicalization. For the time being I am still convinced that such a
method did not see its full articulation until the appearance of Ibn Taymiyya. But
another candidate might well be Ibn Ab h
.
atim (d. 327/938). In either case, the sig-
nicance of al-Thalab remains central. He either anticipated the trend if my assess-
ment holds; or al-Thalab curbed it for at least four centuries, if I am wrong. His
resolution, however, remains the default position of most of the encyclopedic exegeti-
cal tradition and as such ensured a heavy counterbalance to the unavoidable later
prominence of radical hermeneutics.
Tafs r as the Absorber of New Challenges to Sunnism
The main contention of my assessment of the cultural signicance of medieval tafs r
is that tafs r was the medium through which Sunnism absorbed and appropriated any
new development in Islamo-Arabic culture. Tafs r started with philology, which was
fully put in the service of interpreting the word of God, yet without tafs r fully submit-
ting to philologys unbending rules. Theology, which could have been simply rejected
through a negative theology, an option made possible through the work of the
h
.
anbalites, was instead appropriated and its premises, if not its difcult language,
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admitted into tafs r. (Of course with al-Raz the language of scholastic theology became
the language of tafs r itself, and as such tafs r was willing to discard even its character
in order to overcome any intellectual challenge). My contention is that tafs r was
making the whole world comprehensible by making an understanding of the world
seem to issue from the word of God. Tafs r thus was a legitimizing tool more than
anything else. Nowhere else is this apparent than in al-Thalab s appropriation of
S
.
u f hermeneutics and Sh pietistic sympathies with the ahl al-bayt (family of
Muh
.
ammad).
Al-Thalab informs us in his introduction that he was going to include the mystical
level of interpretation in his commentary (Saleh 2004: 87). It is clear that he has read
the work of al-Sulam (d. 412/1021) with the author himself and included a large
portion of that work in his own commentary. Far more signicant to the history of mys-
tical tafs r is that al-Thalab has quoted material from other mystics that seem to have
been lost and only available in his work. A more denite assessment of this aspect of
al-Kashf awaits a more thorough study of the mystical quotations and their relation-
ship to al-Sulam s work. All indications suggest that al-Thalab was the rst to allow
mystical interpretations into mainstream Sunn tafs r, thus anticipating the work of al-
Qushayr (d. 465/1072) as well as al-Ghazal (d. 505/1111).
The circumference of al-Thalab s exegetical circle is thus unique in Islamic history;
it almost encompassed every layer, from the earliest (the Ibn Abbas traditions) to that
of his own contemporaries including the mystical level. Thus, at the very moment the
philological approach was given primacy in Qura nic exegesis, the mystical approach
was also admitted, creating in the Qura n a text that was both fully decipherable
through the intellect and utterly beyond the realm of reason at the same time. The word
of God was both manifestly clear (mub n) and ineffable (sirr). As the text was being con-
ned, it was also being set free.
Moreover, by admitting the mystical interpretation into his commentary, al-Thalab
made the Qura n the most polyvalent text in Islamic culture: it was the only text deci-
pherable both philologically and mystically. What is also signicant about al-Thalab s
polyvalent reading of the Qura n was his judicious refusal to accord any level of reading
a preferential wink. The readings were piled atop one another and arranged (almost
chronologically), and the reader was never advised to favor one over the other. Mysti-
cal interpretations were not only admitted into the commentary, a feat in itself, but they
were treated equally. We have also to note the mode in which al-Thalab admitted mys-
tical interpretations. There was no justication for their incorporation, no apologies,
and no embarrassment; it is as if the mystical vision was part of the general culture
and not the object of a Kulturkampf in early medieval Islam. His incorporation of this
material is an audacious gesture and a testimony to his sagacity, for shortly after al-
Thalab mysticism, as an intellectual current, would move from the periphery to the
center.
What were the implications of the introduction of this new mode of interpretation
into the mainstream exegetical tradition? The primary result of this infusion was to
transform the prosaic in the Qura n into the profound. By that I mean that the lan-
guage of the Qura n, especially when philologically clear and syntactically trans-
parent, would become prolic with meanings, meanings which were not possible or
332 WALID SALEH
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imaginable to extract through the usual methods available hitherto to Sunn exegetes.
As a rule al-Thalab would quote mystical interpretations most copiously when inter-
preting the prosaic verses where quotations and interpretations from the traditional
camp were scarce due to the lack of obvious problems in the text. The result was a
loquacious Qura n, a Qura n profuse in meaning at every level (Saleh 2004: 15161).
One should not think, however, that al-Thalab was simply quoting the mystical
interpretations available to him without ltering the material. The mystical interpreta-
tions available in al-Kashf are remarkably nonmetaphysical. By that I mean they are
less concerned with the question of the nature of God and more concerned with Gods
relationship to humanity. These remarks are the result of a preliminary survey of this
material and it awaits a detailed study to compare it with al-Sulam s Qura n com-
mentary before it will be possible to supplement them.
As a paradigmatic example of al-Thalab s approach in al-Kashf, I will discuss here
the interpretation of Q 53:10, and He revealed to His servant that which He revealed
(wa-awh
.
a ila abdihi ma awh
.
a). The verse presents several problems. First there is an
ambiguous reference to something revealed, the pronoun ma; consequently one is apt
to ask about what was revealed. Second, the identity of the servant is not given. Or at
least if we do know Muh
.
ammad is the most obvious candidate, of course an exegete
might not be willing to consent to this identication. For if it is indeed Muh
.
ammad who
was the recipient of direct revelation, then why did God need Gabriel to do his work on
other occasions according to the traditional theory of Qura nic revelation?
Which problem in Q 53:10 an exegete decides to tackle tells us more about his
approach and concerns than about the verse itself. Al-T
.
abar , for example, was more
interested in solving the riddle of the ambiguous identity of the servant. Though he
quoted authorities who thought it was Muh
.
ammad who was the recipient of the reve-
lation, he was unwilling to grant this interpretation any validity. Al-T
.
abar did not want
to jeopardize the neat theory of revelation that had become standard by his time. Al-
Thalab , on the other hand, offered a far more systematic interpretation of the verse.
First, he gave two possibilities for the identity of the servant: it could be Gabriel or
Muh
.
ammad. He did not editorialize, both are valid interpretations. Neither of the two
possible meanings was given more weight. Moreover, al-Thalab was also interested in
the reference of the pronoun ma. It could mean that which God revealed or the verse
could mean, He revealed to his servant that which God revealed to him. The signi-
cance of this tautology would become apparent later on. It could also be that what was
revealed was a whole sura of the Qura n, sura 94.
Al-Thalab then introduced an interpretation that had not been adduced before. It
has been reported that God revealed to him (Muh
.
ammad) that paradise is barred to
prophets till you enter it, and it is barred to the non-Muslim nations till your nation
enters it. What God has revealed to Muh
.
ammad was thus not a Qura nic sura or verse,
which was always claimed to be the substance of Muh
.
ammads revelatory experience,
but a salvic message that the Muh
.
ammadan nation will be the rst to be saved. The
ambiguity is now clear. The Qura n once more was always expressing one message, and
when probed it can be revealed: Muslims are saved.
Yet there is more. Quoting al-Nu r , an early Baghdadi mystic (d. 295/907), al-
Thalab informed the reader that what was revealed to Muh
.
ammad was a secret (sirr).
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Two lines of poetry are quoted that stated that secrets between lovers (presumably
between Muh
.
ammad and his God) are impossible to disclose. Here is a totally different
approach to the problem of the ambiguity in the verse regarding the nature of the thing
revealed to Muh
.
ammad. The very wording of the verse was, according to the mystics,
indicative of its meaning. There is simply no problem in Q 53:10. God did not specify
what He revealed because it was a secret that should not be made known. Clearly, the
mystics were eager to claim that Muh
.
ammad received revelations that were above and
beyond the Qura n, a sort of esoteric knowledge that resembled theirs.
Something, however, has been divulged. Al-Thalab has already revealed to the
reader what God has told Muh
.
ammad. The secret of the Qura n is that it proclaims one
truth: God will save the Muslim nation. By calling that which has been already disclosed
a secret, al-Thalab allows the reader to experience the revelatory moment anew as an
intimate conversation with God. The disparate units of interpretation as offered by al-
Thalab have a cumulative effect because of the way the material has been presented.
First, we are told of what was revealed; then, we are told it is a secret. The reader is
already privy to the mystery that he realizes could not be disclosed either by speech or
writing. The salvic message of the Qura n is both ineffable and resounding.
Sh < Traditions in Al-Kashf
The publication of al-Kashf in 2002 by a Sh scholar in Beirut represents the culmi-
nation of a rather fascinating story of the reception history of the work. Unraveling
this complex history has proven to be the key to understanding major developments
both in the history of medieval exegesis and Sunn -Sh polemical wars. It is not only
that al-Kashf played a foundational role in establishing the high classical style of
Qura nic interpretation, but it was a pivotal text in the war between Sunnism and
Sh ism. Without a proper understanding of the history of this text no understanding
is possible of these two issues.
Al-Thalab was active during a low point in the history of political Sunnism; both
the Buyids and the Fat
.
imids had shown the degree to which political Sunnism could
retreat. One of the ways in which Sunnism could defang the appeal of Sh ism was to
adopt much of its pietistic language and sensibilities, most notably its love of the ahl al-
bayt, the household of Muh
.
ammad. If Sunn s could show as much adoration and fervor
in their love of Muh
.
ammads family and descendants, then surely the Sh propaganda
about their suffering and usurped rights could be made less appealing. This was pre-
cisely what al-Thalab sat out to do in the context of tafs r. The Sh interpretations of
the Qura n that claimed that certain verses were references to Al , the cousin and son-
in-law of Muh
.
ammad, were adduced in his commentary. Citing such material was,
however, never allowed to become the vehicle for any justication of Sh ideology. Al-
Thalab is vociferous in his attacks on the Sh ites and their political claims. He did not
abandon Sunnism nor, for that matter, harbor pro-Sh sympathies. There was no
ambiguity in his commentary as to where he stood on this issue. His was a thoroughly
Sunn understanding of the early caliphal history. His pro-Al material was embedded
in a highly intricate web of stratagems designed to rob such material of any ideologi-
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cal justication for Sh ism. The aim was to make the love of Muh
.
ammads family as
Sunn as anything else without giving in to Sh political ideology.
The introduction of Sh material into the mainstream of the exegetical tradition
by al-Thalab was thus not an act of subterfuge by which pro-Sh sympathies were
insinuated into the Sunn worldview. It was certainly not an oversight, the result of a
compulsive gathering of Sh material that somehow was done inadvertently, as Ibn
Taymiyya would later claim. Al-Thalab saw nothing Sh in loving the family of
Muh
.
ammad and his descendants; the love of the ahl al-bayt constituted an act of
tazkiya, a sort of purication and validation of ones faith. It was as Sunn an act as
any other. Thus, al-Thalab was, by incorporating Sh material in his commentary,
robbing it of any Sh signicance and making it part of the Sunn world. The pro-Sh
material was declawed insofar as it need not imply a hatred for the companions of
Muh
.
ammad or an implicit hierarchization of the merits of Muh
.
ammads successors,
with his relatives on a rank higher than that of the rst three caliphs. As long as a
Sunn theologian did not subscribe to the doctrine of the imamate, then no amount of
love to ahl al-bayt, excessive as it might be, would turn him into a Sh or decrease his
Sunnism (Saleh 2004: 1867).
The danger of such an approach should be apparent. Taken out of the complex web
of arguments and presentation in which al-Thalab embedded these pro-Sh inter-
pretations, they could be easily used as proof by Sh polemicists that their claims for
Al s supremacy were admitted to even by Sunn s. Indeed Sh polemicists found in al-
Kashf a treasure trove of pro-Sh material. Taken out of its context, it was an unbeat-
able argument against the Sunn s. Indeed, the prestige of al-Thalab s work meant that
the work was one of the Sh polemicists most precious nds. Soon, the situation called
for a drastic answer, and Sunnism, in the person of Ibn Taymiyya, would rise to the
occasion (Saleh 2004: 21521). Ibn Taymiyya in his Muqaddima f us
.
ul al-tafs r (Intro-
duction to the Foundations of Exegesis; see Saleh 2004: 21619), as well as in his
Minha j al-sunna al-nabawiyya (The Path of Sunnism; see Saleh 2004: 21821)
mounted a concerted effort to undermine the reputation of al-Thalab . To the degree
that Ibn Taymiyyas assessment was eventually to prevail, it was successful. The aim of
his attacks was to downgrade the signicance of al-Thalab as a mainstream, trust-
worthy, Sunn scholar. As such he was not part of orthodoxy, and the relevance of using
him in arguments by the Sh polemicists was weakened.
Al-Tha<lab and Medieval Qur>a nic Exegesis
The current that al-Thalab developed, what I have termed the encyclopedic exegeti-
cal tradition, would become the prevalent form of interpretation in the medieval period.
Many were the challenges posed to this approach, yet its dominance and continuity
endured. This has more to do with tafs rs malleability and the exegetes own under-
standing of its main function: defending and dening Sunnism. Al-Thalab s enlarge-
ment of the encyclopedic approach was an attempt to resolve the cultural struggle that
raged within Islamic societies all over the Muslim world during the period between the
fourth and sixth century of the hijra. The object of this struggle was the soul of the
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educated man in the Arabo-Islamic synthesis. The rise of adab (belle lettres) and adab
encyclopedic compilations as the embodiment of what a learned individual was to
know and cherish was a threat to the wish of the religious-minded to make the Qura n
the center of the learning experience. But not only was adab making strides in this
battle, but so, too, was mysticism or S
.
usm, with its claim both to understand human
condition and proffer remedies for it. If these two strands, which were at the center of
the Sunn community, were not enough, we have to keep in mind the great danger that
the Sh camp posed to the Sunn -minded communities. Sh ism, that is, intellectual
Sh ism, was also making advances over the breadth of the Islamic world and under-
mining everywhere the intellectual foundations of Sunn orientations (we need only
remember the biography of Ibn S na (d. 428/1037) and the works of al-Ghazal ). It is
al-Thalab , I argue, whom we should credit with rising to the challenge of adab, S
.
usm,
and Sh ism, to reassert the centrality of a Sunn -interpreted Qura n in the lives of the
educated.
Al-Thalab was also a member of a school of interpretation that I have called the
N shapu r school of tafs r. His student, al-Wah
.
id wrote three Qura n commentaries,
the most important of which, al-Bas t
.
, is still unedited and unpublished. To describe
al-Bas t
.
as revolutionary is not an exaggeration. Another author who was also heavily
inuenced by al-Thalab was al-T
.
b (d. 743/1343). Nothing can be said of his
work since no scholar has even investigated it. Thus, even a monographic study of an
author like al-Thalab remains incomplete for we are unable to measure the full
degree of his works inuence till we have the whole spectrum of the tradition accessi-
ble to us.
To explain the voluminous medieval tafs r tradition as the result of a compulsive
habit of medieval copying, as some modern scholars have opined, is to overlook the
intellectual foundations and concerns of one of the most formidable of religious sci-
ences of medieval Islam. While modernity has unseated most of the other medieval dis-
ciplines, tafs r remains central as a discipline in fashioning an Islamic outlook even to
this day. It is unfortunate that the history of the medieval exegetical tradition is the
least studied of Islamic disciplines. The neglect is compounded by the fact that both
Western scholars and Arab intellectuals saw little value in studying this medieval pro-
duction. Arab nationalism and the intellectual movement it generated were interested
in the Arabic belle lettres medieval tradition and saw little value in devoting any effort
to issuing critical editions of compilations on the meaning of the Qura n; the result
is that no major Qura n commentary was edited by the giants of Arab scholarship;
Western scholars meanwhile were concerned with the early history of the exegetical
tradition, and had only perfunctory concern for the later periods. The result is that we
lack access to the complete spectrum of this tradition. Recently, however, the situation
is improving, since there seems to be a concerted effort to publish this literature (due
to the rise of Islamism in the Arab world and to the retreat of Arabism as the intellec-
tual paradigm). What is needed is a change from the diachronic study of tafs r to a more
systematic synchronic study of tafs r works in the form of monographic studies on indi-
vidual scholars or works. We are still at the very early stages of outlining the history of
this genre and major intellectual gures who were primarily exegetes, like al-Wah
.
id ,
al-Baghaw (d. 516/1122), al-Zamakhshar (d. 538/1144), al-Raz , al-T
.
b , al-Bayd
.
aw
336 WALID SALEH
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(d. 685716/12821316) and many others, have hardly received the attention
they deserve.
Notes
1 Since research into medieval exegetical tradition is still in its infancy, assessments such as the
one I am going to suggest in this subsection are unavoidably provisional. Although investi-
gation of the exegetical works of Ibn Ab H
.
atim al-Raz (d. 327/938) and Ibn Mardawayh (d.
401/1010) may lead me to reverse this conclusion, I am presuming that the welding together
of the non-interpretive prophetic mainstream h
.
ad th with Qura nic exegesis was the work of
al-Thalab . When I rst published my monograph on al-Thalab , however, I was not fully
aware that these two gures have to be investigated more thoroughly before one may come
to the conclusions I have advanced (Saleh 2004: 226). This is much easily said than done:
Ibn Mardawayhs work is lost, and there seems to be some confusion as to how much of the
commentary of Ibn Ab H
.
atim has survived. At present, I see no reason to change my con-
clusions, but I feel uncertain enough that I ought to voice my doubts to the reader. If any-
thing, this caveat should summon specialists to turn their attention to these two gures in
order to disentangle the history of tafs r. Since the magisterial work of al-Suyut
.
(d.
911/1505), al-Durr al-Manthur, is the repository of material from the above mentioned
authors, a study of this work is urgently needed in order to clarify the situation further, and
a study of it may be the only way out of the impasse created by our inadequate grasp of the
tradition.
Further reading
Goldfeld, Isaiah (1984) Qura nic Commentary in the Eastern Islamic Tradition of the First Four Cen-
turies of the Hijra: An Annotated Edition of the Preface of al-Thalab s K ta b al-Kashf wal-Baya n
an Tafs r al-Qura n. Srugy Printers and Publishers, Acre.
Saleh, Walid A. (2004) The Formation of the Classical Tafs r Tradition: The Qura n Commentary of
al-Thalab . E. J. Brill, Leiden.
Al-Thalab (2002) Al-Kashf wal-baya n al-maruf bi-Tafs r al-Thalab , ed. Ab Muh
.
ammad
b. Ashu r. Dar Ih
.
ya al-Turath al-Arab , Beirut.
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Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, vol. 14 (2004) pp. 101144
DOI:10.1017/S0957423904000025 2004 Cambridge University Press
AL-G~ AZAz LI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY: THE
INTRODUCTION OF AVICENNAN PSYCHOLOGY INTO
AS{ARITE THEOLOGY
FRANK GRIFFEL
The traditional argument of Muslim theologians that aims to
verify the claims of a true prophet and distinguish him from an
impostor is based on the acceptance of miracles performed in
history and testied through an uninterrupted chain of tra-
dition (tawa tur). A second argument that equally involves
transmission through tawa tur is based on the prophets virtu-
ous and impeccable character establishing the trustworthiness
(s *idq) of the prophet. These are, for instance, the types of
proofs (singl. h*ug g a) mentioned by the Baghdadian Mutazil
al-G{a h*iz * (d. 255/869) in his monograph H* ug ag al-nubuwwa.
1
For theologians of the Aarite school this approach to the
verication of prophecy posed a problem. According to classi-
cal Aarite theology, good is what God commands and bad is
what he forbids.
2
If God chooses prophets to reveal knowledge
about what is right and what is wrong, and thus also reveal
knowledge about how to live a virtuous life, how can those
whom the prophets call upon know that the prophets have a
virtuous character before they even know the criteria for
virtue? Early Aarite theologians indeed accepted that all
prophets had a most virtuous character. This fact, however,
1
Al-G{a h*iz *, H* ug ag al-nubuwwa (Rasa il al-G{a h*iz *, ed. Abd al-Sala m Muh*ammad
H* a ru n, 7 vols. [Cairo, 1399/1979], vol. 3, pp. 22381), pp. 246, 260. On miracles and
their denition as bringing-about original e#ects (ih

tira al-tima r) cf. pp. 259#.

On al-G{a h*iz *s view that all of Muh*ammads character points towards his
prophethood cf. pp. 280f. Both criteria are brought to knowledge either through
eyewitness evidence (iya n), or through credible report (h

abar). Cf. T. Fahd,

Nubuwwa, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, ed. H.A.R. Gibb et al.
(Leiden and London, 1954#. ) vol. 8, pp. 93b97a and Josef van Ess, Theologie und
Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra. Eine Geschichte des religisen
Denkens im frhen Islam, 6 vols. (Berlin and New York, 199197), vol. 4, pp. 112f.,
63844.
2
Richard M. Frank, Moral obligations in classical Muslim theology, Journal
of Religious Ethics, 11 (1983): 20523, pp. 207#.
became apparent only after their message gained acceptance
within their community and it cannot be regarded as a viable
verication of the claim of a prophet to those he calls upon.
Al-Aar (d. 324/935), for instance, is said to have accepted a
number of indications that allow humans to distinguish a
prophet from ordinary people.
3
He does not mention the claim
based on the impeccable moral conduct of prophets. In fact, he
stresses that in order to distinguish a true prophet from other
people who are close to God (awliya ), but who have no
message to reveal, one should put ones trust only in the
occurrence of true prophetic miracles.
4
The epistemological principle that underlies the rejection to
verify the claims of a prophet through reference to his moral
conduct is the fundamental distinction between human and
divine knowledge in early Aarite theology. While God has
provided humankind with the capacity to gain knowledge of,
for instance, the natural world surrounding us, the kind of
knowledge provided through prophecy originates from outside
this human sphere. Any human attempt to distinguish a
prophet from an impostor by judgment of whether his conduct
is right or wrong, assumes either a knowledge of what is right
or wrong, received prior to the revelation, and must therefore
be dismissed as an attempt to judge Gods message by a human
standard, or is a circular verication of Gods revelation by
itself.
3
Ibn Fu rak (d. 406/1015) reports that al-Aar accepted four kinds of
indications for the truthfulness (s *idq) of the messenger: One way is that
miracles attest this. Miracles are the things that when the messenger claims to
have the message come about in violation of the habitual practice that has
occurred previously. A second way is the conrmation of the prophets veracity
(tas *dq) expressed by those people who witnessed the miracles. A third one is
that, through the prophets veracity (s *idq) in his message, those to whom the
prophet is sent achieve knowledge about the necessity (of his prophecy). And a
fourth one is that messengers who were before him have announced him and
identied him (by specifying) his characteristics and his personality in his time,
his epoch, his name, and his state. (Ibn Fu rak, Mug arrad maqa la t al-S{ayh

Ab
al-H* asan al-Aar , ed. Daniel Gimaret [Beirut, 1986], p. 176.1620. ) On prophecy
and the evidence (itba t) for prophecies in Aarite theology cf. Daniel Gimaret,
La doctrine dal-Ashar (Paris, 1990), pp. 45367, particularly pp. 459f. and
Michael E. Marmura, Avicennas theory of prophecy in the light of Asharite
theology, in W.S. McCullough (ed. ), The Seed of Wisdom. Essays in Honour of
T.J. Meek (Toronto, 1964), pp. 15978, 1614.
4
Ibn Fu rak, Mug arrad maqa la t al-Aar , pp. 176.21177.3; Gimaret, La doctrine
dal-Ashar , p. 460.
102 FRANK GRIFFEL
The systematic character of this rejection is most clearly
developed in the writings of the Aarite theologian
al-G{uwayn (d. 478/1085). He argues that while humans are
able to gain theoretical knowledge of what is true and false
about, for instance, natural phenomena, and are able to do so
independent from revealed knowledge, such a capacity does
not exist in the case of normative practical knowledge.
Humans are, rst of all, incapable of determining what is good
and bad in matters of religious obligations.
5
Equally, the moral
quality of an action or a persons character cannot be assessed
through rational judgment (aql). Human epistemological
capacities are too weak and therefore unable to penetrate what
it really means for an act to be morally good ( h*asan). What
al-G{uwayn has in mind here is that human moral judgments
are intrinsically a#ected by their interests and therefore
cannot recognize the real moral nature of an act.
6
As a result, humans are unable to distinguish a true prophet
from a false one solely through an assessment of his teachings
or his moral character. The genuine prophet endows human-
kind with truths that are unattainable through means other
than prophecy. Prior to the prophets missions, those to whom
they are sent have no means to know what will be the
knowledge prophets are sent to convey to them.
7
The distinc-
tion between a true prophet and an impostor therefore relies
solely on prophetic signs (a ya t) which according to
al-G{uwayn can only be miracles (mug iza t). Miracles are
extraordinary actions that are beyond the capacity of humans.
5
Al-G{uwayn, al-Ira d ila qawa t *i al-adilla f us *u l al-itiqa d, ed. Muh*ammad
Yu suf Mu sa and Al A. Abd al-H* amd (Cairo, 1369/1950), p. 258.4f. Regarding
the Ira d, cf. the recent English translation A Guide to Conclusive Proofs for the
Principles of Belief by Paul E. Walker (Reading, 2000).
6
Al-G{uwayns Kita b al-Burha n f us *u l al-qh, ed. Abd al-Az *m al-Db, 2nd
ed., 2 vols. (Cairo, 1400 [1979/80]) vol. 1, pp. 93f. Cf. George F. Hourani,
Juwayn s criticism of Mutazilite ethics, The Muslim World, 65 (1975): 16173
( = id., Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics [Cambridge, 1985], pp. 12434); A.
Kevin Reinhard, Before Revelation. The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought
(Albany, 1995), p. 68. Cf. also Tilman Nagel, Die Festung des Glaubens. Triumph
und Scheitern des islamischen Rationalismus im 11. Jahrhundert (Mnchen, 1988),
pp. 21416.
7
Al-G{uwayn, al-Ira d, p. 304.4f. Nothing in the prophets message, however,
violates reason. The sending of prophets is an expression of Gods grace that
makes even the most intelligent people (al-uqala ) believe in God and continue to
follow the judgments of reason (ibid., p. 306. ult.f. )
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 103
They are acts of God, performing the function to announce the
truthfulness (s *idq) of a prophet.
8
While this is the view of Aarite theologians in the 10th and
11th century, later thinkers of the same tradition express
a contrary position. Fah

r al-D n al-Ra z (d. 606/1210), for

instance, taught that verifying the claims of a prophet by
recourse to miracles that are alleged to him bears so many
methodological problems that it is inferior to the method based
on a judgment on the message as well as the moral character of
the prophet. Being well aware of the problematic character of
such a view, al-Ra z backs it with the statement that earlier
scholars including the inuential Aarite theologian al-G~aza l
(d. 505/1111) have expressed the same opinion.
9
In fact, at the beginning of his compendium on the methods of
jurisprudence, al-G~aza l states that rationality points towards
the fact that the Prophet told the truth.
10
And in a well-known
passage from his autobiography al-Munqid min al-d*ala l, he
argued that certainty about prophecy (yaqn bi-al-nubuwwa)
can only be achieved by comparing the message of the prophet
with what has already been rmly established in the mind of
the believer. Knowledge of prophetic miracles, like the chang-
ing of a stick into a serpent, cannot provide such rmness,
since miracles may always be interpreted as sorcery (sih*r) and
deception (tah*yl). While knowledge of miracles may in fact
support some kind of belief in prophecy, rm belief that is equal
to the power of knowledge (al-ma n al-qawy al-ilm ) is
achieved only through assent to the prophets message created
by the immediate notion of truth the believer nds within
himself.
11
8
Al-G{uwayn, al-Ira d, pp. 307f.
9
Fah

r al-D n al-Ra z , Muh*as *s *al afka r al-mutaqaddim n wa-al-mutaah

irn min
al-ulama wa-al-h*ukama wa-al-mutakallim n, ed. T*a ha Abd al-Rau f Sad (Cairo,
1978), p. 208.1214. A second, more reliable edition of the text is contained in
Nas *r al-Dn al-T*u s, Talh

s * al-muh*as *s *al al-maru f bi-naqd al-muh

as *s *al, ed.
Abdalla h Nu ra n (Teheran, 1980/Beirut, 1985), p. 351.15f.
10
Al-G~aza l , al-Mustas *fa min ilm al-us *u l, 2 vols. (Bu la q, 132224 [190406]) vol.
1, p. 6.6f.: al-aql yadullu ala s *idq al-nab y.
11
Al-G~aza l , al-Munqid min al-d*ala l ( = al-Munqidh min al-d*ala l/Erreur et
dlivrance, ed. and trans. into French by Farid Jabre, 3rd ed. [Beirut, 1969]), pp.
44.511, 43.17f.
104 FRANK GRIFFEL
This passage has confused many interpreters of al-G~aza l.
12
The text implies that humans are endowed with certain knowl-
edge that precedes the message of the prophets. If prophecy can
be veried by a comparison of the prophets message with the
immediate notion of truth the believer nds in himself, then
this immediate knowledge must be epistemologically indepen-
dent of the prophets message. To deny that miracles are the
principal method of verifying prophecy implies that there is a
strong independent source of knowledge of what is true, a
source that does not come with prophecy.
This article will analyze the development and change in the
Aarite views on prophecy that occurred roughly between 1100
and 1200. While al-G{uwayns teachings on prophecy and its
verication are deeply rooted in early Aarite epistemology,
later Aarites like Fah

r al-Dn al-Ra z explain prophecy in

terms of Ibn S na s psychology. This article will rst analyze
al-Ra zs views on prophecy and briey compare them to Ibn
Sna (d. 429/1037) in order to make his reliance on Avicennan
psychology apparent. In the second part of this article, I will
analyze al-G~aza ls views on prophecy and determine how he
introduced elements of Avicennan psychology into the Aarite
theological tradition. This paper will attempt to determine the
nature and e#ect of the earliest inuence of Ibn S na s philo-
sophical interpretation of prophecy on the Aarite theological
discourse. Al-G~aza ls position towards Ibn Sna s interpret-
ation of prophecy shall rst be approached from his comments
in al-G~aza ls two books of refutation ( radd), i.e. the Taha fut
al-fala sifa and the Fad*a ih* al-ba t *iniyya. Finally, Ibn S na s
subsequent inuence will be analyzed from its Sitz im Leben in
al-G~aza ls theology, his elaborate theory of interpretation
(tawl) in the rst six chapters of his book Fays *al al-tafriqa
12
Duncan B. MacDonald, The life of al-Ghazza l , with especial references to
his religious experience and opinions, Journal of the American Oriental Society,
20 (1899): 71132, p. 96; Arend Th. van Leeuwen, Ghaza l als Apologeet van de
Islam (Leiden, 1947), pp. 958, p. 181; Vincenco M. Poggi, Un Classico della
Spirituali Musulmana (Rome, 1967), pp. 2425; George F. Hourani, Ghaza l on
the ethics of action, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 96 (1976): 6988,
pp. 87f. ( = id., Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, pp. 13566, pp. 165f. );
Richard M. McCarthy, Freedom and Fulllment. An Annotated Translation of
Al-Ghaza l s al-Munqidh min al-d*ala l and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghaza l
(Boston, 1980) ( = quoted according to the second edition Deliverance from Error
[Louisville/Kenn., 2000]), p. 120; Richard M. Frank, Al-Ghaza l and the Asharite
School (Durham and London, 1994), pp. 67f.; Sabine Schmidtke, The Theology of
al-Alla ma al-H* ill (d. 726/1325) (Berlin, 1991), p. 151.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 105
bayna al-Isla m wa-al-zandaqa. I will argue that the Avicennan
teachings on the soul and its components which al-G~aza l
introduces ll a place in Aarite theology that has been left
blank by the self-imposed epistemological restrictions of this
schools theology. Al-G~aza l neglects these restrictions and this
lling-of-a-blank-space in Aarite theology leads to important
changes in the schools approach to prophecy.
I. FAH

R AL-DI zN AL-RAz ZI zS APPLICATION OF IBN SI zNAz S

PSYCHOLOGY
In his compendium on theology, the Muh*as *s *al, which was
written early in his life, Fah

r al-Dn al-Ra z discusses

three methods of proofs that aim to verify the claims of a
prophet. The rst method he calls evidence through miracle
(z*uhu r bi-mug iz), the second inference from moral conduct
(istidla l bi-al-ah

la q). The third method is based on the infor-

mation gathered from previous prophets (ah

ba r al-anbiya
al-mutaqaddimn).
13
In this work, he points out that infor-
mation on events in the distant past that has been passed down
through generations of scholars through tawa tur is not as
reliable as the knowledge of events that one has witnessed
oneself. Al-Ra z discusses other methodological reservations
against the proof through miracles and tawa tur. He also
dismisses as weak the second method to verify the claim of a
prophet through inference from moral conduct.
14
Even if the
virtuous character of a person can be established, it would be
a sign of distinction but not a su$cient sign for prophecy.
15
In his later work al-Mat *a lib al-a liya al-Ra z revisits the issue
and treats it more systematically. In this work, he expresses a
much more rationalist view than in his al-Muh*as *s *al and
dismisses all these three kinds of verications in favor of a
fourth criterion, not mentioned in the Muh*as *s *al. In the Mat *a lib
al-a liya he begins his treatment by saying that arguments that
13
Al-Ra z , Muh*as *s *al, ed. Cairo, pp. 20812, ed. Teheran/Beirut, pp. 3506. Cf.
Max Horten, Die spekulative und positive Theologie des Islam (Leipzig, 1912),
pp. 82f.
14
On the reservations that rationalist Muslim theologians since al-Naz *z *a m (d.
221/836) voiced against the verication of prophecy through tawa tur cf. van Ess,
Theologie und Gesellschaft, III, 3824; IV, 334f.; id., Die Erkenntnislehre des
Ad*udaddn al-I zc (Wiesbaden, 1966), pp. 30810.
15
Al-Ra z , Muh*as *s *al, ed. Teheran/Beirut, p. 306. This passage is missing in the
Cairo edition.
106 FRANK GRIFFEL
involve tawa tur cannot be regarded as attestations that convey
certainty.
16
He presents instead a line of thinking understood
as a much more decisive argument rst in favor of the necess-
ary existence of prophecy and secondly of the method of
verifying the claims of a prophet.
17
The argument begins with
the premise that human perfection is knowledge of what is true
(h*aqq) and of what is good (h

ayr).
18
In regard to this perfec-
tion, humans fall into three classes: rst, those who are
completely devoid of such knowledge, these are the ordinary
people (a mmat al-h

alq wa-g umhu ruhum). Secondly, those who

are perfect in their knowledge of the true and the good, but who
are unable to make up for the deciencies of other people.
These are the awliya . Thirdly, those who are both perfect in
their knowledge and who also have the capacity to make up for
the deciencies of others. These are the prophets.
19
The second major premise of al-Ra zs argument for the
necessary existence of prophecy argues from the unequal
distribution of human perfection. Just as there are many people
who have a very limited capacity to know what is true and
what is right, there must be at least one individual in every
epoch who is endowed with both theoretical and practical
perfection.
20
The same kind of argument proves, according to
al-Ra z, the existence of a person in a series of epochs that
surpasses these perfect individuals and qualies as the sub-
lime messenger ( al-rasu l al-muaz *z*am), the legislator
(wa d*i al-ara i ) and the one who guides to the truths
16
Fah

r al-D n al-Ra z , al-Mat *a lib al-a liya min al-ilm al-ila h , ed. Muh*ammad
Abd al-Sala m S{a h n, 3 vols. (Beirut, 1420/1999), part 8 (included in vol. 3), pp.
446. The eighth book of the Mat *a lib al-a liya on prophecy is also edited by
Ah*mad H* ig a z al-Saqqa under the title al-Nubuwwa wa-ma yataallaqu biha
(Cairo, 1985) where this passage is pp. 1339. This edition is to be preferred.
Ah*mad H* ig a z al-Saqqa later published a full edition of the Mat *a lib (Beirut, 1407/
1987) which was not available to me. Al-Ra z dismisses tawa tur because the
traditions that Jews, Christians and other religious groups transmit prove the
possibility of collective error.
17
Al-Ra z , al-Mat *a lib al-a liya, ed. Beirut, p. 25, ed. Cairo, p. 107. For a short
version of this argument cf. Fah

r al-Dn al-Ra z , Maa lim us *u l al-dn, ed. Ah*mad

Abd al-Rah m al-Sa yih* and Sa m Af f H* ig a z (Cairo, 1421/2000), pp. 6670.
Al-Ra z s argument is analyzed by Binyamin Abrahamov, Religion versus
philosophy. The case of Fah

r al-Dn al-Ra z s proof for prophecy, Oriente

Moderno, 80 (2000): 41525. Cf. also Schmidtke, The Theology of al-Alla ma
al-H* ill, pp. 151f.
18
Al-Ra z , al-Mat *a lib al-a liya, ed. Beirut, p. 61.11f., ed. Cairo, p. 163.1315.
19
Ibid., ed. Beirut, p. 61f., ed. Cairo, p. 164.
20
Ibid., ed. Beirut, p. 62, ed. Cairo, p. 164f.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 107
(al-ha d ila al-h*aqa iq). He is the master of times (s *a h*ib
al-adwa r).
21
Al-Ra zs argument intends to explain the appearance of a
prophet as well as prove the necessary existence of prophecy.
Al-Ra z argues that prophecy is possible and, further, that it
must exist.
22
His proof is as follows: While perfection and
imperfection are in themselves possible, both together are
viewed as a necessary condition of humankind.
23
Perfection is
divided into two categories, rst, those perfect individuals who
cannot make others perfect the awliya and secondly, those
who can render others perfect, the prophets. The fact that
humankind generally falls into two groups, ordinary people
(awa mm) and the elect ( h

awa s *s *) regarding theoretical

and practical wisdom is therefore proof for the existence of
prophecy. Prophets are most perfect humans who combine the
wisdom accessible to the h

awa s *s * with the capacity to convey it

to the awa mm.
24
This argument implies an important assumption that is
hidden in the rst premise, namely that humans are capable
of reaching theoretical and practical perfection without
prophecy. This capacity is, of course, unequally distributed.
But al-Ra z assumes that at least some humans are able to
distinguish rationally the genuine prophet from the impostor
solely through the consideration of his message.
25
The second
group of people ( awliya ) would surely be able to judge the
prophets veracity according to whether he calls to right or to
21
Ibid., ed. Beirut, p. 63, ed. Cairo, p. 166f.
22
It is not su$cient to say that al-Ra z s argument is a necessary proof for
the existence of prophecy as Abrahamov does in Religion versus philosophy,
pp. 420f. Necessity can be understood in at least two ways. First, regarding the
epistemological status of the argument (i.e. being logically necessary, allowing no
doubts) or, secondly, regarding the ontological status of what is proved to be
necessary (i.e. existing necessarily, not being able not to exist). Al-Ra z s
argument claims necessity in both these two meanings.
23
This is expressed in al-Ra z s muqaddima ra bia of his proof, al-Mat *a lib
al-a liya, ed. Beirut, p. 62.3f., ed. Cairo, p. 164.20f.: Deprivation (al-nuqs *a n) is
common within humankind and may even encompass all of it. Except that there
must be (la budda) among them a perfect individual remote from deprivation. The
argument (dall) for this is as follows [. . .].
24
Ibid., ed. Beirut, p. 62.59, ed. Cairo, pp. 164.23165.4. This statement is
apodictic: la budda wa-an tu g ada ah

a s * ka mila fa d*ila, wa-la budda wa-an

yu g ada f ma baynahum ah

s * yaku nu akmalahum wa-afd*alahum.

25
In fact, al-Ra z just like Ibn S na in the 3rd chapter of the 10th book of the
Metaphysics in the S{ifa lays down the elements of a successful prophetic
message; al-Mat *a lib al-a liya, ed. Beirut, pp. 6972, ed. Cairo, pp. 17580.
108 FRANK GRIFFEL
wrong. This opens the possibility of verifying a prophets
message and distinguishing the true prophet from the impostor:
We say: First of all we know what is true (h*aqq) and what is right (s *idq)
regarding the things we are convinced of ( al-itiqa da t). And regarding
the things that we do (al-ama l), [we do know] what is right ( s *awa b). If
we know this, and we then see a man who calls the people to the true
religion, and we see that his message includes a strong incitement for
people to change from falsehood to truth, then we know that he is a true
prophet and that one has to follow him. And this method [to verify the
claims of a prophet] is closer to reason (aql), and there is less
uncertainty in it.
26
Al-Ra z claims that this method of verifying the claims of a
prophet falls together with the one of inference from moral
conduct (istidla l bi-al-ah

la q) mentioned by some of the theolo-

gians of the classical period.
27
As mentioned above, this method
is methodologically superior to proofs based on the reports of
prophetic miracles since it does not involve reliance on other
peoples judgments or on tawa tur.
28
It can be shown that al-Ra zs argument for the necessity of
prophecy rests on the writings of Ibn S na or those ascribed to
26
Al-Ra z , al-Mat *a lib al-a liya, ed. Beirut, p. 61.610, ed. Cairo, p. 163.712. I
follow the text in the Cairo edition. Cf. al-Ra z , Maa lim us *u l al-d n, p. 69. Cf.
also the translation in Schmidtke, Theology of al-Alla ma al-H* ill, p. 151f.
27
Al-Ra z singles out al-G{a h*iz *, Muh*as *s *al, ed. Cairo, p. 208.1214, ed. Teheran/
Beirut, 351.15f.
28
This second method (i.e. the one not involving tawa tur) is methodo-
logically similar (yag ra mag ra . . . and min ba b . . . ) to a demonstratio quare sive
propter quid (burha n al-lima; al-Ra z , al-Mat *a lib al-a liya, ed. Beirut, p. 74, ed.
Cairo, p. 184; Maa lim us *u l al-dn, p. 70.7#. ) The traditional way to prove
prophecy through miracles is described as methodological similar to a demons-
tratio quia (burha n al-inna), which is according to al-Ra z in strength inferior to
the burha n al-lima. The two types of demonstration are distinguished by the
status of the middle term. Both may have the same structure and may be formally
identical, but in the case of a burha n al-lima the middle term is just a concept
whose extramental existence is not proven. It therefore does not prove the
extramental being of the object, but rather what kind of attributes it has if it
exists. To prove, for instance, that a unicorn must be mortal would be a burha n
al-lima. The burha n al-inna of al-Ra z s terminology would argue for the existence
of a thing from empirical evidence like in this case eyewitness reports. It is
inferior because of the problem of tawa tur. Al-Ra z s second method is similar
to a burha n al-lima since it proves the existence of prophecy through the why
of prophecy (al-lima) and argues from there for its need and subsequently for its
existence. Al-Ra z concedes that he is unable to prove the that (al-inna) of
prophecy with something resembling a burha n al-inna. No eyewitness report will
give su$cient evidence for such a proof. On the distinction between the two
kinds of demonstration cf. still Carl Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande,
2nd ed., 3 vols. (Graz, 1885; reprint Darmstadt, 1957) vol. 2, pp. 324#.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 109
Ibn Sna . Al-Ra z seems to have been impressed by the argu-
ment that an attribute must exist in perfection whenever it
exists in deprivation. Al-Ra zs method to verify the claims of a
prophet through comparison with what is already known to be
true and to be good is a result of his philosophical treatment
of prophecy and is thus equally inspired by philosophical
literature.
Ibn Sna developed two di#erent arguments aiming to prove
the necessity of prophecy. Proofs for the necessity of prophecy
aim to demonstrate in an apodictical manner that prophecy
must exist and that the world cannot be without it.
29
The rst
of these two arguments is from the psychological part of
al-S{ifa . In this work, Ibn Sna presents a teleological argument
based on Gods attribute to choose the best for his creatures.
Prophecy is necessary because humans are by nature beings
that can only exist and survive through association with other
humans. Their nature determines the formation of partnerships
and these partnerships need legislation. The best legislation is
ordained through prophecy to elected human beings. Before
presenting this argument, Ibn S na had already proven that
God must necessarily act for the best of his creation. The
equally proven possibility that prophecy exists becomes in light
of this latter premise a necessity.
30
This argument for the necessary existence of prophecy,
however, seems to have had no impact on al-Ra z. The premise
that God must act for the best of his creation is, in fact, quite
far-reaching and for an Aarite di$cult to swallow. But
al-Ra z seems to have been impressed by a second Avicennan
argument for the necessity of prophecy that appears in a weak
version in the psychological part of al-S{ifa and in a stronger
version in one of the shorter writings of the Avicennan corpus,
F itba t al-nubuwwa t.
31
Al-Ra zs main argument is that the
29
The two meanings of epistemological and ontological necessity are combined
in this statement. Cf. note 22.
30
Ibn Sna , De anima ( = Avicennas De Anima, ed. Fazlur Rahman [London,
1959]), pp. 1718, 24850; cf. al-G~aza l s report of these passages in the next
chapter.
31
Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect. Their
Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect (New
York and Oxford, 1992), p. 87, note 56 disputes Ibn Sna s authorship of this text.
Davidsons doubts are prompted by the texts references to al-aql al-kull and
al-nafs al-kulliyya which do not tally with Ibn Sna s scheme of emanative things.
The issue is, however, unresolved since scribal errors may be responsible for
110 FRANK GRIFFEL
intellectual weakness of some humans proves the necessary
existence of at least one individual who possesses both theor-
etical and practical wisdom and who is able to convey it to
those who lack such perfection. In al-Ra zs Mat *a lib the
character of this statement is demonstrative.
32
But it can easily
be objected that while such an individual may indeed exist,
why does al-Ra z think that he must exist? In the psychological
part of al-S{ifa , Ibn Sna gives an argument in favor of the
existence of an outstanding mind that is blessed with a wide-
ranging as well as a quick capacity to nd theoretical knowl-
edge through intuition (h*ads). This argument is repeated
in al-Nag a t.
33
The faculty to come to theoretical knowledge
intuitively through syllogisms is unequally distributed among
humans. The fact that there are people who are extremely weak
in this faculty leads to the conclusion that there is also the
potential for an individual who has it in perfection.
34
Michael
E. Marmura does not consider this passage to present a
demonstrative proof for the existence of prophecy. He believes
these inaccuracies. Because al-G~aza l and al-Ra z , for instance, may have
accepted this text as a work by Ibn Sna , we will include F itba t al-nubuwwa t
and refer to it as an Avicennan text.
32
Cf. supra footnotes 23 and 24.
33
Ibn Sna , al-Nag a t, ed. Muh*ammad S*abr al-Kurd (Cairo, 1357/1938),
p. 167.1319.
34
Ibn S na , De anima, p. 249.1118.: [The capacity to hit the middle term
(al-h*add al-awsat *) in a syllogism] is one of those things that vary both in terms of
quantity and quality. [. . .] Because these variations are not limited by a (xed)
border, but always subject to increase and decrease, and because these variations
end on the decreasing side with somebody who does have no intuition (h*ads) at
all, the variations must (yag ibu an) also end at the increasing side with someone
who has intuition in regard to all problems or at least most of them, and with
someone whose intuition comes in the shortest time or at least quite a short
time. This passage is also translated into English in Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna
and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden, 1988), p. 162 and into German and
discussed in id., Avicenna: De anima, in Kurt Flasch (ed. ), Interpretationen:
Hauptwerke der Philosophie: Mittelalter (Stuttgart, 1998), pp. 90107, 97f. Much
of the understanding of this passage rests on the passage the variations must
end . . . (fa-yag ibu an yantah . . . ) in the middle of the sentence. This sentence
does not indicate logical necessity, but rather states the fact that the variation of
humans being endowed with h*ads necessarily ranges from having no insight at all
to having the perfect insight of a prophet. This does not mean that there are
necessarily persons who have these kinds of insight. It just means that the
possibility for the existence of these people exists in a necessary manner. When
al-G~aza l paraphrases this passage (cf. infra footnote 45) he rightfully replaces
the yag ibu an . . . with g a za an . . . (it is possible that . . . ) thus making it
clear that Ibn Sna here just states that prophecy is possible, not that it is
necessary.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 111
that in this passage Ibn Sna argues for the possible existence
of such a mind and concludes that in the psychological part of
al-S{ifa at least, Ibn S na does not claim to give a proof for the
necessary existence of a prophetic mind.
35
Al-Ra z, however,
does claim that the existence of the prophet is necessary and he
might have read this somehow ambiguous passage to mean that
it proves the necessary existence of a person with perfect
h*ads.
36
Al-Ra zs argument may be better explained from one of the
shorter Avicennan texts, F itba t al-nubuwwa t. This text openly
claims to demonstrate the necessary existence of the holy
intellect (al-aql al-quds ) or angelic intellect (al-aql al-
malak), i.e. the prophets faculty to receive perfect theoretical
knowledge without mediation. F itba t al-nubuwwa t says that
the capacity to nd theoretical knowledge solely through
intuition (h*ads) exists actually or potentially in many humans.
If an attribute exists actually or potentially in a being, it must
be an accident of this being. In order for an attribute to exist
accidentally in one being, it must exist essentially in a di#erent
being. This being is the angelic intellect of the prophets,
whose necessary existence is thus demonstrated.
37
The proof is
deeply rooted in Avicennan ontology and in the distinction of
beings into necessary and possible. It is, indeed, in its structure
similar to Ibn Sna s proof for the existence of a necessary
being by virtue of itself ( wa g ib al-wug u d) i.e. God from the
35
Michael E. Marmura, Avicennas psychological proof of prophecy, Journal
of Near Eastern Studies, 22 (1963): 4956, p. 49, note 1. In his Avicenna: De
anima, pp. 94f. and in his Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, p. 162, note
36, Gutas points to the connection of this sentence in the De anima with the
proof properly expounded in F itba t al-nubuwwa t (cf. infra, note 37). Marmura
says that Ibn Sna argued for the fact that the potential for prophecy exists in a
necessary manner. This does not imply that prophecy itself exists necessarily. His
analysis is supported by Ibn S na s conclusion of the argument in De anima,
p. 249.18f.: It is thus possible that there is a person amongst humans whose soul
has been rendered so powerful through extreme purity and intense contact with
intellectual principles that he blazes with h*ads. (Cf. the translation in Gutas,
Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, p. 162. ) Cf. also Ibn S na , al-Nag a t,
p. 166.1321 and Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam (London, 1958), p. 31.
36
Abrahamov, Religion versus philosophy, p. 421, for instance, does not
believe that al-Ra z succeeds in his proof. He is, however, unaware of the
Avicennan background.
37
Ibn S na (?), F itba t al-nubuwwa t (Proof of Prophecies), ed. Michael E.
Marmura, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1991), pp. 425. This proof and its problems is
discussed in Marmura Avicennas psychological proof of prophecy, pp. 526.
112 FRANK GRIFFEL
existence of beings that are by themselves only contingent
(mumkin al-wug u d), i.e. the world that surrounds us.
38
Most elements of al-Ra zs favored method to verify the
claims of a prophet are inspired by those parts of the S{ifa
where Ibn Sna gives further explanations of the prophets
o$ce. These parts have no real argumentative role in the
Avicennan proof for the existence of prophecy other than to
illustrate that prophecy is nothing out of the ordinary and, in
fact, quite within the reach of human understanding.
39
Ibn S na
teaches that the majority of humankind is incapable of grasp-
ing metaphysical truths like the one, for instance, that God is
not located in space, or that he is neither inside nor outside of
this world. The prophets teachings should acknowledge this
fact and lead the populace on a direct way to virtuous actions
that does not aim at their theoretical perfection.
40
A true
prophet can therefore be distinguished from a false one
through his combination of the di#erent characteristics of
prophecy, mainly the acquisition of wisdom, the teaching of
justice, and the union with the active intellect.
41
This includes
the implicit assumption that at least some humans already
know wisdom and justice before the prophets revelations, and
this knowledge puts them in a position to distinguish the
true prophet from the impostor. For Ibn S na just like for
al-Ra z the characteristics of prophecy and its aims were most
perfectly accomplished by Muh*ammad and by the law that he
brought.
42
II. AL-G~ AZAz LI zS CRITICISM OF THE FALAzSIFAS
DOCTRINE OF PROPHECY
Nowhere in his extant writings does al-G~aza l refute Ibn Sna s
demonstrative argument for the necessary existence of proph-
ecy. He was aware of Ibn S na s teleological argument from the
38
Dimitri Gutas, Intuition and thinking: The evolving structure of Avicennas
epistemology, in Robert Wisnovsky (ed. ), Aspects of Avicenna (Princeton, 2001),
pp. 138, at pp. 29f.; id., Avicenna: De anima, p. 96; Marmura, Avicennas
psychological proof of prophecy, p. 53.
39
I.e. meaning that prophecy is possible in logical terms and thus also a
possible being.
40
Ibn Sna , al-S{ifa , al-Ila hiyya t, ed. Ibra h m Madku r et al., 2 vols. (Cairo,
1960) vol. 2, pp. 4413. This passage is analyzed by Michael E. Marmura,
Avicennas theory of prophecy, pp. 169f.
41
Ibn S na , al-S{ifa , al-Ila hiyya t, II, 455.1317.
42
Ibid., 450.7; Ibn S na (?), F itba t al-nubuwwa t, p. 47.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 113
De anima of the S{ifa , which argues that God must choose the
best for his creation. Al-G~aza l reproduces a concise version of
this argument at the very end of his Maqa s *id al-fala sifa.
43
The
second argument from Ibn S na s De anima in favor of the
possible existence of the extraordinary theoretical capacities of
a prophet also appears in the Maqa s *id.
44
More signicantly, in
his Taha fut al-fala sifa al-G~aza l reproduces this argument
almost verbatim from Ibn S na s De anima.
45
Al-G~aza l does
not mention the stronger version of this argument from the
Avicennan text F itba t al-nubuwwa t, which claims to proof the
necessary existence of a human with a perfect theoretical
faculty.
The Taha fut al-fala sifa deals with the philosophers views
on prophecy in the introduction to the part on the natural
sciences (t *abiyya t) and in the preceding 16th discussion on
the celestial souls the last discussion in the part on meta-
physics. In the introductory chapter to the natural sciences,
al-G~aza l gives an account of Ibn S na s teachings on prophecy
from the De anima of the S{ifa . The passage presents three
elements of Ibn Sna s psychological teachings on prophecy. All
three concern the distinct ways of how prophets receive their
revelation and how they perform miracles.
46
First, al-G~aza l
reports that it is possible for prophets to receive imaginative
revelation.
47
He gives a concise account of Ibn S na s view that
43
Al-G~aza l , Maqa s *id al-fala sifa, ed. Muh*ammad S*abr al-Kurd , 2nd ed. (Cairo,
1355/1936), part 3, p. 76.514. Divine providence (ina ya ila hiyya) necessitates the
sending of prophets who teach humankind the benets of this world and the next
just as it necessitates sending rainfall for this world to prosper.
44
Ibid., part 3, pp. 74.ult.75.8.
45
Al-G~aza l , Taha fut al-fala sifa ( = Algazel, Tahafot al-falasifat, ed. Maurice
Bouyges [Beirut, 1927]), p. 273.710. Signicantly, the it must be that . . .
(yag ibu an . . . ) of Ibn S na s (De anima, p. 249.16) text is here replaced by it can
be that . . . (g a za an . . . ), making it clear that Ibn S na does not argue for the
necessary existence of an individual who has extraordinary h*ads, but just for the
possible existence of him.
46
Al-G~aza l , Taha fut, pp. 2724. On Ibn Sna s three elementary parts of
explaining prophecy cf. Dag N. Hasse, Avicennas De Anima in the West. The
Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 11601300 (London and Turin,
2000), pp. 1546; Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, pp. 3052, and Abdelali
Elamrani-Jamal, De la multiplicit des modes de la prophtie chez Ibn S na , in
Jean Jolivet and Roshdi Rashed (eds. ), tudes sur Avicenne (Paris, 1984), pp. 125
42.
47
Imaginative revelation is a term used by Fazlur Rahman in his Prophecy
in Islam, pp. 36#. It is maintained here in order to distinguish this way of
revelation from intellectual revelation mentioned below.
114 FRANK GRIFFEL
prophets receive revelations as visions in their imaginative
faculty (quwwa mutah

ayyila). Al-G~aza l explains this in Ibn

Sna s terminology. Prophets lack impeding forces that in the
case of ordinary people suppress visions while they are awake
and receive sense data. Therefore, prophets receive in their
waking hours visions that ordinary people receive in their
sleep.
48
Secondly, al-G~aza l reports Ibn S na s teachings on intellec-
tual revelation.
49
He gives an account of the view that prophets
receive revelations as theoretical knowledge in the intellectual
faculty of the prophets ( quwwa aqliyya naz *ariyya). Prophets
have the power of intuition (quwwat al-h*ads) and have the
capacity to immediately nd the middle term of a syllogism.
This capacity makes the prophets achieve perfect theoretical
knowledge without instruction, solely through intuition
(h*ads).
50
Thirdly and nally, al-G~aza l in this passage gives an account
of Ibn S na s view on the ability of prophets to perform miracles
by virtue of an exceptionally powerful practical faculty of
the soul (quwwa nafsiyya amaliyya). Since all souls have the
capacity to e#ect physical changes in our own bodies, the
extraordinary powers of the prophets souls have the capacity
to bring about changes in natural objects outside of their own
bodies. Prophets have the capacity to cause storms, let rain
fall, cause earthquakes, or cause people sink into the ground,
but they are not capable of changing a piece of wood into an
animal or of splitting the moon.
51
The rst two elements of Ibn Sna s explanation of prophecy,
i.e. imaginative and intellectual revelation, pass through al-
G~aza ls Taha fut without further comment or criticism. Only
the fala sifas explanation of miracles is criticized by al-G~aza l.
First, he stresses that he does not reject their explanation and
that he agrees with the fala sifa on the prophets capacity to
make other bodies do their bidding.
52
But al-G~aza l objects that
48
Al-G~aza l , Taha fut, p. 72.10f., cf. Ibn S na , De anima, p. 173.12.
49
Intellectual revelation is also a term coined by Fazlur Rahman in
Prophecy in Islam, pp. 30#.
50
Al-G~aza l , Taha fut, pp. 272.ult.274.2; cf. Ibn S na , De anima, pp. 24850. On
the foundation of Ibn S na s theory of h*ads within the Aristotelian system of
epistemology cf. Gutas, Avicenna: De anima, pp. 96105.
51
Al-G~aza l , Taha fut, pp. 274.3275.11; cf. Ibn S na , De anima, pp. 199201.
52
Al-G~aza l , Taha fut, p. 275.12f.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 115
this capacity is limited to a change of some accidents within
the bodies. Prophetic miracles, he argues, also include the
change of essential qualities like in the transformation of a
stick into a serpent.
53
Such miracles are implicitly denied by
the fala sifa, and it is this denial which leads directly into the
17th discussion of the Taha fut on causality.
The Taha futs 17th discussion on causality may be initially
caused by Ibn S na s explanation of prophecy, it does, however,
not touch on this issue. This is quite di#erent in the case of the
16th discussion of the Taha fut. The subject of this discussion is
the fala sifas teachings on celestial beings, i.e. their position
that the spheres are connected to intellects and their denial of
the existence of an actual Preserved Tablet (al-lawh* al-
mah*fu z *) in the heavens as it is mentioned in Qura n 85:22.
54
Here, al-G~aza l rst concedes that the fala sifas view on
celestial beings having souls is indeed not impossible (laysa
muh*a lan).
55
Similarly, he implicitly concedes that the view of
prophecy as knowledge being received from these celestial
souls is possible.
56
His argument against these two views is
epistemological; it denies the fala sifas claims to have real
insight into these matters. He confronts their epistemological
incapacity with the religious point of view based on the
authority of revelation. While the interpreters of revelation
have certain knowledge, the fala sifa only claim to have
possible knowledge in these matters:
53
This is the prophetic miracle that Moses performed in front of Pharao, cf.
Qura n 7.107, 20.69, 26.45.
54
According to al-G~aza l , the fala sifa interpreted the lawh* mah*fu z *
metaphorically and understood it as a reference to past and future events that the
prophets see in their visions, the imaginative faculty (quwwa mutah

ayyila) [. . .]
sees the Preserved Tablet, the forms of future particular events become imprinted
in it (al-G~aza l , Taha fut, p. 273.810). Al-G~aza l s own understanding of the lawh*
mah*fu z* in his later writings like al-Arba n f us *u l al-dn is, however, hardly
di#erent from the fala sifas position (cf. Richard M. Frank, Creation and the
Cosmic System [Heidelberg, 1992], p. 45).
55
Al-G~aza l , Taha fut, p. 255.17.
56
According to Ibn Sna , the source of prophetic visions must be one of the
celestial souls (nufu s sama wiyya) which are attached to celestial bodies, the
spheres of the planets. These souls have knowledge of the unknown (al-g ayb).
The source of imaginative visions requires a bodily organ and this excludes the
celestial intellects and the necessary existent being (wa g ib al-wug u d) itself as the
source of the visions. (Ibn S na , al-S{ifa , al-Ila hiyya t, II, 437f. ) In al-G~aza l s
report of the fala sifas teachings the source of prophetic visions is called the
angel (al-malak); al-G~aza l , Maqa s *id al-fala sifa, part 3, pp. 75f.
116 FRANK GRIFFEL
There is no need for any of the things you [fala sifa] have mentioned, for
there is no proof (dall) in this.
57
Nor do you have a proof [for your
interpretation] of what the religious law conveys regarding the Tablet
and the Pen. For the people versed in the law (ahl al-ar ) do not
understand by the Tablet and the Pen the meaning [you have given to
these terms] at all. Consequently, there is nothing for you to cling to
[your interpretation] in the religious law.
58
Al-G~aza l clearly understands that Ibn Sna in his De anima
does not claim to demonstrate that prophets receive revelation
on the two ways outlined, i.e. on the way of imaginative and
intellectual revelation. These are arguments for the possibility
of prophecy and not proofs for its existence.
59
The statements
on prophecy in the psychological part of al-S{ifa were under-
stood as explanations of how prophecy must occur, if it occurs.
Al-G~aza l points out that even the fala sifas teachings that
revelation is received as a result of a connection between
celestial beings and the prophets souls are purely explanatory
and not demonstrative.
60
Al-G~aza ls subsequent criticism is based entirely on the
fala sifas inability to prove that revelation is received from the
celestial souls. If not proven, these teachings are rendered false
by the text of the Qura n. Here, he implicitly applies his law
of interpretation (qa nu n al-taw l), as he calls it in his later
works. The text of the divine revelation may only be subject to
allegorical interpretation (tawl) and therefore understood to
have an inner meaning ( ba t *in), if the validity of its literal
meaning (z*a hir) is contradicted through a demonstrative proof
57
The usage of the word dall, any kind of argument, instead of the stronger
burha n, demonstrative argument, a fortiori stresses al-G~aza l s claim that the
fala sifa are unable to prove their claims.
58
Al-G~aza l , Taha fut, p. 261.25, cf. the English translation by Michael E.
Marmura in The Incoherence of the Philosophers/Taha fut al-fala sifa, a parallel
English-Arabic text, translated, introduced, and annotated by M.E. Marmura
(Provo, 1997), p. 160.
59
Cf. Marmuras notes to his translation of al-G~aza l s Taha fut al-fala sifa,
p. 241, note 6; his Avicennas psychological proof of prophecy, p. 49, note 1; and
his Avicennas theory of prophecy, p. 167.
60
From what he says in his Metaphysics, Ibn S na leaves no other possibility
than that the source of prophetic visions can only be the celestial souls (cf. supra,
footnote 56). In his most explicit treatment of prophetic visions in the
psychological part of al-S{ifa , Ibn Sna leaves open from where the prophets
faculty of imagination receives the visions that make up prophecy. The visions
formed in the prophets imaginative faculty are here described as resulting from a
connection between the unknown (g ayb), between the soul, and between the
inner faculty of imagination. (Ibn S na , De anima, p. 178.1f. )
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 117
(burha n).
61
Both revelation and demonstration must lead to
the same conclusions. If Muslims like the fala sifa try to alter
one source of truth, i.e. revelation, with the support of argu-
ments that are based on some kind of reasoning, but not on
demonstrative reason (burha n), their interpretations must be
rejected. This applies to the fala sifas view that the prophets
receive their knowledge from the celestial intellects and not
directly from God:
With what [argument] would you deny someone who says that the
Prophet knows the hidden through Gods apprising him of it by way of
[direct] initiation (ibtida )?
62
It follows that the fala sifas teachings on the involvement of
celestial souls in the process of revelation are arbitrary in
terms of the philosophical discourse (mutah*akkam). These
teachings are false in religious discourse, since they contradict
the outward meaning (z*a hir) of the revealed text. The Qura n
teaches direct revelation from God to his prophets.
Al-G~aza ls second book of refutation (radd), the Fad*a ih*
al-ba t *iniyya wa-fad*a il al-mustaz *hiriyya contains a much more
rigorous condemnation of the fala sifas views on prophecy. The
Mustaz *hir as this book became known is a refutation
(radd) of the contemporary Isma l dawa, who here are
pejoratively called Ba t *inites (those who arbitrarily follow
an assumed inner meaning (ba t *in) of revelation). The reason
why al-G~aza l discusses philosophical views on prophecy in
this book lies in his assumption that the Isma l movement and
the philosophical movement agree on certain issues. Early on
in the book al-G~aza l expresses his understanding that the
Isma l views on prophecy which were reported to him are
close to the teachings of the fala sifa,
63
and with some
distortion and change extracted from the teachings of the
61
On this rule cf. my Apostasie und Toleranz. Die Entwicklung zu al-G~aza l s
Urteil gegen die Philosophie und die Reaktionen der Philosophen (Leiden, 2000),
pp. 30419, 3335, 432f., and 466f., or Marmura, Avicennas theory of prophecy,
p. 177, or his Al-G~azali on bodily resurrection and causality in Tahafut and The
Iqtisad, Aligarh Journal of Islamic Thought, 2 (1989): 4675, 49.
62
Al-G~aza l , Taha fut, pp. 260f. Cf. the English translation by M. Marmura,
p. 159.
63
wa-al-manqu l anhum qar b min madhab al-fala sifa (al-G~aza l , Fad*a ih*
al-ba t *iniyya wa-fad*a il al-mustaz *hiriyya, ed. Abd al-Rah*ma n Badaw [Cairo, 1383/
1964], p. 40.18f. ).
118 FRANK GRIFFEL
fala sifa.
64
The lack of reliable (written) information on the
Isma l teachings may have led him to discuss the more readily
accessible views of the fala sifa instead and assume a certain
congruity between the two.
Like in the Taha fut al-fala sifa, al-G~aza l here also distin-
guishes between several elements of the fala sifas views and
never explicitly condemns all of them.
65
Here, in the
Mustaz *hir, al-G~aza l is concerned with the socio-political
aspects of the fala sifas teachings on prophecy. The eighth
chapter of this book is devoted to a legal examination of the
Isma ls teachings.
66
The question discussed here is whether
the di#erent elements of the Isma ls dawa are from the
Muslim jurists point of view error ( h

at *a ), innovation ( bida),
or unbelief ( kufr). According to al-G~aza ls criteria for toler-
ated and non-tolerated views, the rst two categories of error
and innovation present no serious problem. These views are
false, but give no reason to act for the authorities. Unbelief,
however, is for al-G~aza l a serious legal o#ense that the
apparatus of state prosecution has to tackle.
67
Elements of the fala sifas views on prophecy fall under the
category of unbelief (kufr). In a lengthy passage in the eighth
chapter of the Mustaz *hir, al-G~aza l provides a report of the
Ba t *inites teachings on prophecy. A closer examination of
the passage, however, reveals that al-G~aza l draws entirely on
the teachings of Ibn S na , taken mostly from al-S{ifa and from
smaller books on the afterlife.
68
Al-G~aza l concedes in a rst
64
fa-ha dih al-mada hib ayd*an mustah

rag a min mada hib al-fala sifa f

al-nubuwwa t maa tah*rf wa-tag y r (ibid., p. 42.3).
65
On the strategy of al-G~aza l s criticism in the Taha fut cf. my Taql d of the
philosophers: Al-Ghazalis initial accusation in the Taha fut, in Sebastian
Gnther (ed. ), Insights into Arabic Literature and Islam. Ideas, Concepts, Modes
of Portrayal (Leiden, forthcoming).
66
Al-G~aza l , Fad*a ih* al-ba t *iniyya, pp. 14668. This chapter is selectively
translated in McCarthy, Freedom and Fulllment, pp. 22634; and Ignaz
Goldziher, Streitschrift des Gaza l gegen die Ba t *inya-Sekte (Leiden, 1916), pp. 51
4, 713. Cf. also Henri Laoust, La politique de G~aza l (Paris, 1970), pp. 3569.
67
Cf. my Apostasie und Toleranz, pp. 28291 and my Toleration and exclusion:
al-Sha and al-Ghaza l on the treatment of apostates, Bulletin of the School of
Oriental and African Studies, 64 (2001): 33954.
68
Al-G~aza l , Fad*a ih* al-ba t *iniyya, pp. 1515. I have dealt with this passage in
my Apostasie und Toleranz, pp. 293303. On the Avicennan writings on the
afterlife that al-G~aza l draws on cf. Jean R. Michot, La destine de lhomme selon
Avicenne. Le retour Dieu (maa d) et limagination (Leuven, 1986), pp. 4954, 190
8. There is a second smaller passage earlier in the Mustaz *hir that also criticizes
the Isma ls views on prophecy. It is within the fourth chapter on the exposition
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 119
step that these views do not explicitly violate any central
element of the Muslim creed. Those who adhere to these views
profess Gods unity and deny polytheism, and when it comes to
certain details of the religious law they interpret them with-
out explicitly denying them. Their interpretation (tawl)
acknowledges the validity of the religious law (ar ) in
principle.
A closer look into their teachings, however, reveals that they
implicitly deny important elements of the religious law. One
doctrine they deny is bodily resurrection in the afterlife.
69
Already in the Taha fut this point led to the condemnation of
the fala sifa as unbelievers.
70
Here in the Mustaz *hir, al-G~aza l
approaches the fala sifas teaching from a broader angle. The
group criticized in this passage of the Mustaz *hir, hold, al-
G~aza l reports, that the symbolic character of the revelation is
to the benet ( mas *lah*a) of the ordinary people ( awa mm).
71
Revelation on the other hand teaches close to nothing to those
who achieve knowledge through demonstration (burha n).
Since the intellectual capacities of the ordinary people are too
weak to understand the hidden things, God according to this
group that we identify with the fala sifa created prophecy,
which teaches these matters in a metaphorical language using
rhetorical and poetical means of representation.
After a lengthy discussion in which he indicates his hesi-
tation, al-G~aza l nally condemns this approach towards
prophecy on the grounds that it includes the implicit assump-
tion that the prophets message is benecial but not the whole
truth.
72
Since truth is, however, the most important claim of
the prophets message, these (i.e. the fala sifas) views of proph-
ecy include an implicit accusation of lying. The accusation to
lie or not to tell the truth (takdb) is the opposite of belief
(tas *dq), i.e. belief in the prophets veracity and the truth of
their mission. The fala sifas interpretation of the socio-political
of the Isma l doctrines (Fad*a ih* al-ba t *iniyya, pp. 402) and it reports the
teachings on prophecy as a process of emanation from the celestial souls.
Al-G~aza l here refers the reader to his earlier criticism of these teachings in the
Taha fut (Fad*a ih* al-ba t *iniyya, p. 42.5).
69
Al-G~aza l , Fad*a ih* al-ba t *iniyya, p. 152.
70
Al-G~aza l , Taha fut, p. 376.
71
Al-G~aza l , Fad*a ih* al-ba t *iniyya, p. 153.1f. On the respective teachings of the
fala sifa cf., for instance, Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, pp. 5264.
72
Al-G~aza l , Fad*a ih* al-ba t *iniyya, p. 153.16#.
120 FRANK GRIFFEL
role of prophecy in society is tantamount to unbelief ( kufr) and
apostasy from Islam.
73
III. AL-G~ AZAz LI zS PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH TO PROPHECY
IN HIS FAYS*AL AL-TAFRIQA
Al-G~aza l develops his own explanation of prophecy in the
context of an elaborate argument on the distinction between
interpretations of the Muslim revelation that are allowed and
tolerated in Islam and those that are not allowed and consid-
ered clandestine apostasy ( zandaqa). Al-G~aza l expounds this
argument in the rst six chapters of the Fays *al al-tafriqa bayna
al-Isla m wa-al-zandaqa. The Fays *al was written late in al-
G~aza ls life between 491/1098 and 503/1109.
74
The work deals
with the criteria of membership in the Islamic community and
thus serves as the background for understanding al-G~aza ls
condemnation of the fala sifa and the Ba t *inites earlier in his
life.
75
The book begins, however, with an apology. Al-G~aza l
states in an address to an unknown student that he himself has
been accused of unbelief because of his teachings. He reminds
73
The same condemnation is expressed in al-G~aza l s al-Iqtis *a d f al-itiqa d, ed.
Hseyn Atay and Ibrahim Agh ubuku (Ankara, 1962), p. 249.69 and is the
small work Mira g al-sa lik n (the latter is analyzed in Rahman, Prophecy in
Islam, pp. 98f. )
74
On the dating of the Fays *al cf. my introduction to the German translation of
the Fays *al, ber Rechtglubigkeit und religise Toleranz. Eine bersetzung der
Schrift Das Kriterium in der Unterscheidung zwischen Islam und Gottlosigkeit
(Zrich, 1998), pp. 435 and Maurice Bouyges, Essai de chronologie des uvres de
al-G~azali (Algazel), ed. Michel Allard (Beirut, 1959), pp. 46f. The Fays *al is a
genuine work of al-G~aza l . It is mentioned by al-G~aza l in his al-Munqid min
al-d*ala l, p. 24, and in his al-Mustas *fa min ilm al-us *u l, I, 185.
75
Cf. my Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam, pp. 30435. For further literature on
the Fays *al cf. Frank, Al-Ghaza l and the Asharite School, pp. 7680; Anke von
Kgelgen, Averroes und die arabische Moderne. Anstze zu einer Neubegrndung
des Rationalismus im Islam (Leiden, 1994), pp. 3439; Iysa A. Bello, The Medieval
Islamic Controversy Between Philosophy and Orthodoxy. Ijma and Taw l in the
Conict Between al-Ghaza l and Ibn Rushd (Leiden, 1989), pp. 5365; Hava
Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in Al-Ghazzali (Jerusalem, 1975), p. 37; Laoust, La
politique de Ghazali, pp. 3506; Hans-Joachim Runge, ber G~azls Fais *al-
al-tafriqa baina-l-islm wa-l-zandaqa. Untersuchung ber die Unterscheidung von
Islm und Ketzerei, Dissertation Kiel, 1938. This last publication contains a
German translation. The text has also been translated into Spanish by Miguel
Asin Palacios, El justo medio en la creencia: Compendio de theologa dogmtica de
Algazel (Madrid, 1929), pp. 499540, into French by Farid Jabre in his La notion
de certitude selon Ghazali (Paris, 1958), pp. 40635 and into English by McCarthy
in Freedom and Fulllment, pp. 12549. Cf. also my German translation ber
Rechtglubigkeit und religise Toleranz.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 121
his student that there are few scholars who have a clear
understanding of the criteria for unbelief (kufr) in Islam. Many
accuse their theological opponents of kufr even if they disagree
only in minor points. In order to understand the nature of
unbelief, one should rst draw attention to its denition.
Michael E. Marmura pointed out that while the classical
Aarites view prophecy from the perspective of Gods
attributes, the fala sifa analyze prophecy from the prophets
perspective or that of those who are addressed.
76
Such a shift in
perspective from an Aarite towards a philosophical attitude
occurs in the second chapter of the Fays *al. Here, al-G~aza l
denes unbelief as the implicit or explicit accusation against
Muh*ammad not telling the truth.
I say, unbelief is the assumption the messenger peace and prayer be
upon him utters falsehood in anything that comes with him.
77
Belief, al-G~aza l continues, is to acknowledge the truth ( tas *dq)
of everything that comes from Muh*ammad.
Al-G~aza ls two denitions of belief and unbelief rely on the
opposition between tas *dq and takdb. Both terms cannot be
easily translated into English. Tas *dq originally means to
assume that a person is s *a diq or has s *idq. In order to be s *a diq
someone must fulll two conditions not combined in any
English word. A person who is s *a diq is rst of all trustworthy,
i.e. the person reports information to the best of his or her
knowledge and does not lie. Secondly, the information that a
person, who is s *a diq, conveys is true.
78
Tas *dq is both the
acceptance of the claim for truthfulness of the messenger and
the truth of the message. This claim is lost if the person violates
only one of these two conditions. Takdb, the assumption that
76
Marmura, Avicennas theory of prophecy, pp. 161, 169, 174.
77
Al-G~aza l , Fays *al al-tafriqa bayna al-Isla m wa-al-zandaqa, ed. Sulayma n
Dunya (Cairo, 1381/1961), pp. 134.7f. References to the text of the Fays *al are
according to the most widespread edition by S. Dunya . The text of this edition is,
however, only of poor quality. It has been checked and if necessary amended with
Mus *t *afa al-Qabba n s edition (Cairo, 1319/1901), with Mah*mu d Bg u s (Damascus,
1413/1993), and with the MSS Berlin, We 1806 and Istanbul, Shehit Ali Pasha
1712.
78
On s *idq cf. al-G~aza l , Ih*ya ulu m al-dn, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1346 [192728]) vol. 4,
pp. 331f. (XXXVII, 3, 1). It is possible that a person is sincere and truthful in a
report that he or she gives, but nevertheless reports things that are not true. On
tas *dq as the denition of faith in Islam cf. Wilfried Cantwell Smith, Faith as
Tas *dq, in Parviz Morewedge (ed. ), Islamic Philosophical Theology (Albany,
1979), pp. 96119 and van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre, pp. 70f.
122 FRANK GRIFFEL
someone has lost his or her s *idq, occurs if either the message
that the person conveys turns out to be false, or if it turns out
that the messenger did not report it to the best of his or her
knowledge. The fala sifas views of prophecy, for instance,
include the assumption that the prophetic message is true, but
only in a metaphorical sense in order to serve for the benet
(mas *lah*a) of society. Despite the fala sifas acknowledgment
that the prophets message is true, the fala sifas assumption
raises the question of whether the prophet has conveyed his
message to the best of his knowledge. For al-G~aza l, such a view
translates into takdb al-naby, the accusation that the prophet
has not told the truth or was not truthful, and is considered
unbelief.
Both tas *dq and takdb as denitions for faith/belief (ma n)
and unbelief ( kufr) have a long tradition in Islamic theology
that cannot be dealt with here.
79
In all these discussions,
however, God is the object of the believers tas *dq. Belief,
according to the classical Aarite denition is tas *dq bi-
Alla h, i.e. to accept the truthfulness of God and the truth of
his message.
80
Unbelief is according to the Aarite denition
takdb bi-Alla h, i.e. to believe that God is either not truthful
or that his message is not true.
81
Both these denitions appear
in the writings of al-G~aza ls teacher al-G{uwayn and those of
al-G~aza ls colleagues as students of the Niz *a miyya in
Nishapur.
82
The change of perspective in al-G~aza ls approach to proph-
ecy occurs when he denes belief as tas *dq al-rasu l and
unbelief as takdb al-rasu l. The discussion of the assumed
s *idq or kidb that forms the basis of belief or unbelief shifts from
the transcendental sphere of God to the human sphere of the
79
Cf. my Apostasy und Toleranz, index; Richard M. Frank, Knowledge and
taqld. The foundation of religious belief in classical Asharism, Journal of the
American Oriental Society, 109 (1989): 3762; van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre,
pp. 95#.
80
Al-Aar : Kita b al-Luma ( = The Theology of al-Ashar . The Arabic Texts of
al-Ashar s Kita b al-Luma and Risa lat Istih*sa n al-khawd* f ilm al-kala m, ed.
R.J. McCarthy [Beirut, 1953]), 180. On the early Aarite concept of belief as
tas *dq bi-Alla h or li-Alla h cf. Frank, Knowledge and taql d, pp. 40#. and
Gimaret, La doctrine dal-Ashar , pp. 4724.
81
Al-Ba qilla n , Kita b al-Tamh d, ed Richard J. McCarthy (Beirut, 1957), p. 348.
82
Al-G{uwayn, al-Ira d, p. 397.12; Abu al-Qa sim al-Ans *a r (d. 511 or 512/1117
19) al-G~unya f al-kala m, MS Istanbul, Ahmet III 1916, fols. 228af.; al-Kiya
al-Harra s (d. 504/1110) Us *u l al-dn, MS Cairo, Da r al-Kutub, kala m 290, fols.
241bf. is unspecic on the object of tas *dq, but denes kufr as takdb bi-Alla h.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 123
prophet. Only this transformation allows al-G~aza l to develop
an elaborate system to verify the s *idq of the Islamic message
and of its messenger. In the following I will try to explain this
system. It relies on the congruency between mental represen-
tations of a person and his utterances. Divine transcendence
forbids the application of such a verication to God. Applying
criteria to verify whether a nominal Muslim holds tas *dq
or takdb in respect to Muh*ammad, however, leads to the
development of a psychological explanation of prophecy.
Al-G~aza ls change of the denition of belief is clearly inu-
enced by peripatetic philosophy. Here, al-G~aza l is inspired by
the peripatetic usage of the word tas *dq in the distinction of all
knowledge into tas *dq and tas *awwur.
83
Tas *dq is an equivocal
word and in the logical works of the Arabic peripatetic
tradition it refers to propositional knowledge as opposed to
knowledge that is expressed in only one word. In addition to
the usage in this tas *awwur-tas *dq distinction, which goes back
to authors like al-Fa ra b, Ibn S na also uses tas *dq to denote
the act of assent to a proposition and speaks in at least one
passage of di#erent degrees of assent ( tas *dq) that can apply
both to concepts and to propositions.
84
It is this last usage of
Ibn S na that has inuenced al-G~aza l.
85
In the next step
83
Van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre, pp. 95#., 110f.; Deborah L. Black, Logic and
Aristotles Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy (Leiden, 1990),
p. 71; Renate Wrsch, Avicennas Bearbeitung der aristotelischen Rhetorik: ein
Beitrag zum Fortleben antiken Bildungsgutes in der islamischen Welt (Berlin,
1991), pp. 22, 24; Harry A. Wolfson, The terms tas *awwur and tas *dq in Arabic
philosophy and their Greek, Latin and Hebrew equivalents, The Moslim World,
33 (1943): 11428; Elamrani-Jamal, De la multiplicit des modes de la prophtie
chez Ibn S na , pp. 126#.
84
On this second meaning of tas *dq in Ibn Sna s logical works cf. his Second
Analytics ( = al-S{ifa , al-Mant *iq, al-Burha n, ed. Ibra h m Madku r and Abu al-Ala
Af f [Cairo, 1375/1956]), pp. 51.852.2 which distinguishes the strength of tas *dq
according to the means of persuasion (iqna ) that support the proposition. The
word tas *dq is strictly speaking equivocal in three meanings: (1) belief, (2)
propositional knowledge, and (3) the truth judgment that supports the
proposition (tas *dq) itself. In this last meaning the word tas *dq also applies to
tas *awwur (non-propositional knowledge). This is expressed in Ibn Sna s al-Nag a t,
p. 60.13f., where he says that it is possible that there is a tas *awwur without
tas *dq like, for instance, in the case that someone imagines (yatas *awwaru) the
words of another man who says that an empty room exists and he (scil. the rst
man) does not consider it true (wa-la yus *addiqu bihi). (On this cf. van Ess, Die
Erkenntnislehre, p. 100. )
85
Cf. al-G~aza l s treatment of the several equivocations of tas *dq in his
al-Iqtis *a d f al-itiqa d, p. 225.1115 where di#erent degrees of tas *dq are
mentioned. For a more thorough discussion of the di#erent meanings of tas *dq
124 FRANK GRIFFEL
al-G~aza l limits assent to propositions: In order to be veried,
tas *dq and takdb must apply to a proposition rather than
to a person.
86
He means that the proposition must be compared
to its own object, i.e. the beings that correspond to the
propositions contained in the revelation.
87
In the third chapter of the Fays *al al-G~aza l explains the
meaning of both tas *dq and takdb. In order to verify the faith
or belief (tas *dq) of a Muslim one cannot simply ask whether he
a$rms the truth of the whole book of revelation. The faith of a
believer can be veried only through an inquiry into whether
he a$rms (s *addaqa) the objects of the revelation. Al-G~aza l
analyzes what it means to a$rm a proposition. All this is stated
in a very dense and short passage, and it is striking that
al-G~aza l does not expound his underlying ideas of tas *dq,
neither does he refer to a book where he has done so. The
essence of his teaching is presented in two sentences that
immediately follow each other:
fa-aqu lu al-tas *dqu innama yatat *arraqu ila al-h

abar bal ila al-muh

bar.
88
I say that tas *dq has to apply only to the proposition, indeed to the object
[of the proposition].
In the next sentence al-G~aza l gives an explanation of the
meaning of tas *dq:
and how they are used by al-G~aza l in his Fays *al cf. my introduction to ber
Rechtglubigkeit und religise Toleranz, pp. 346.
86
Al-G~aza l has an interesting technique to nonchalantly weave important
premises of his later arguments or assumptions of his views into early passages of
his writings. Equally here, where in the rst chapter he already denes tas *dq
and takdb as applying only to propositions. During a passage where he discusses
the three books of revelation (Torah, Gospel, and Qura n) and their character as
propositions (h

abar), he reminds his readers that these books also contain

imperatives and prohibitions and says, These three [books of revelation] are
di#erent in their essences (h*aqa iq). How could it be otherwise, since the
denition of a proposition (h

abar) is: That which is subject to a$rmation and

negation (tas *dq and takdb). These two, however, can not be applied to an
imperative and not to a prohibition. But how is it possible that one thing is
subject to tas *dq and takdb and at the same time it is not? And how can the
negation and the a$rmation to one thing be united? (Fays *al, p. 132.69). The
fact that the books of revelation contain di#erent imperatives and prohibitions
leads to the conclusion that only the propositions they contain can be compared
in term of their truth-claims.
87
Cf. Ibn S na s denition of tas *dq in his al-S{ifa , al-Mant *iq, al-Madh

al, ed.
Ibra h m Madku r et al. (Cairo, 1953), p. 17.16f. Tas *dq is when there comes about
in the mind a connection between this picture (or form) and the things
themselves in the way that the picture is correlating (mut *a biq) to the things.
88
Al-G~aza l , Fays *al, p. 175.15f.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 125
h*aqqatuhu al-itira fu bi-wug u di ma ah

bara al-rasu lu [. . .] an
wug u dihi.
89
The essential meaning [of tas *dq] is to accept the being of that thing
whose existence the Prophet [. . .] reports of.
This last sentence is confusing due to the double appearance of
wug u d, being or existence. This word has been used
before within Muslim theology and within the Aarite school,
mostly, however, as the nomen regens in genitive constructions
in the sense of the existence of something or of someone.
This is how al-G~aza l employs it in the second appearance
within this sentence, ah

bara an wug u dihi. Here the nomen

rectum of the genitive construction is represented by the
possessive pronoun hu which stands in for the earlier appear-
ance of wug u d within this sentence. In this rst appearance,
wug u d refers more abstractly to a given being or an entity. This
latter usage of wug u d, in the following translated as being,
is known from other of al-G~aza ls writings.
90
What is reported
of, is therefore the wug u d al-wug u d, the existence of the
being.
The sentence starts with the assumption that the Prophet
both in the revelation and in the h*adt reports of wug u d, of
being. Both h*adt and Qura n are the kind of proposition
(h

abar) whose object ( al-muh

bar in the sense of al-muh

bar
anhu)
91
is mentioned in the rst sentence. Tas *dq for al-G~aza l
means to acknowledge or to accept that such objects of the
Prophets propositions exist. An explanation of the next step in
al-G~aza ls text will give a better understanding of what he
means by the acknowledgment of being (al-itira f bi-wug u d).
What now follows is a categorization of all being (wug u d)
that the Prophet reports of into ve categories. It is clear that
these ve categories of being are understood to be the objects
of propositions. Al-G~aza l here applies a theory of represen-
tation in which a proposition contains elements of language
that represent objects of the outside world. On this occasion
outside means outside of language. Such an object outside of
89
Ibid., p. 175.17.
90
Cf., for instance, al-G~aza l , Miya r al-ilm, ed. Sulayma n Dunya (Cairo, 1961),
pp. 76.7f., 330.1#., 383.1#.; id., Ilg a m al-awa mm an ilm al-kala m, ed. Muh*ammad
M. al-Bag da d (Beirut, 1406/1985), pp. 107f. and id., Ih*ya ulu m al-dn, II, 18.11.
(XXI, 9,1) or IV, 218.2 (XXXV.2). This usage seems to be inspired by philosophical
literature.
91
Cf. Ibn S na s usage of al-muh

bar anhu in al-S{ifa , al-Ila hiyya t, I, 34.7.

126 FRANK GRIFFEL
the proposition is considered a muh

bar in the rst sentence

quoted above and a wug u d in the second. Such a theory of
representation applies to all propositions, and therefore also
applies to propositions within the Qura n and the h*adt corpus.
Although al-G~aza l does not give an example at this stage of his
text, an illustration may be taken from Sura 12, the Sura of
Yu suf. When the Qura n, for instance, reports the fact that
Yu suf had been thrown into a well from which he is picked up
by slavetraders who sell him to Egypt (Qura n 12.1520), all the
elements of this report like Yu suf, the well, the slavetraders,
and Egypt are considered wug u d, being. Each of these
elements are beings that Muh*ammad reports of, i.e. the muh

bar
of the rst above sentence. To believe in this report, and
thus to believe in the Qura n and in the truthfulness of the
messenger, means to acknowledge that Yu suf, the well, the
slavetraders, and Egypt did indeed exist. This is to accept
the being of that thing whose existence the Prophet reports of.
The believer who trusts the veracity of the report a$rms these
objects and the reported facts, i.e. he a$rms the relationship
that these objects have to one another just as they are reported.
For al-G~aza l, faith in the Prophet and his revelation is exactly
this acknowledgment.
In his categorization of being into ve degrees, all the
elements mentioned in this passage from Sura 12 belong to one
category of being. This is the real being (al-wug u d al-da t)
that comprises all objects of the outside world. Outside here,
means outside of the human mind. Al-G~aza l writes:
The real being is the true and rm being (al-wug u d al-h*aqq al-ta bit)
which is outside of sense perception and the intellect. But sense
perception and the intellect take an image (or: form, s *u ra) of it, and this
is called perception (idra k). This is like the being of the heavens or the
earth, the animals, plants, and this is evident (or: outwardly, z*a hir). And
it is known that most people do not know any being that is di#erent.
92
For al-G~aza l there are four other kinds of being, and all these
kinds are beings within the mind of a person, or more speci-
cally, beings within the mind of the Prophet. The four oblique
degrees of beings are as follows:
Second degree of being, the sensible being ( al-wug u d al-
h*iss): From the examples that al-G~aza l gives in his distinction
92
Al-G~aza l , Fays *al, p. 176.47.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 127
of the ve degrees of being it becomes clear that not all
propositions within the Qura n and the h*adt can be inter-
preted in the above manner. Both al-Buh

a r and Muslim report

in their collections the following prophetic h*adt:
The paradise (al-g anna) was presented to me on the surface of this wall.
93
Al-G~aza l uses this example in order to explain that the
underlying being of paradise cannot be a real and rm one.
It is easy to prove that the paradise is much bigger than the
surface of whatever wall Muh*ammad saw it on. The word
g anna refers to a being that cannot be a real one, but it must
be a being that is only perceived through the Prophets
sense perception. This being is a sensible being (al-wug u d
al-h*iss).
Third degree of being, the imaginative being (al-wug u d
al-h

aya l): In the following h*adt, the being has not been
presented by the senses:
It was as if I saw Yu nus ibn Matta in two coats of cotton, how he is ready
to receive orders and how the mountain responds to him. And God
exalted says to him, at your service, Yu nus (labbayka ya Yu nus)!
94
The sentence begins with it was as if . . . which indicates
that all this happened nowhere else than in the Prophets
imagination. The corresponding being of Yu nus is therefore an
imaginative being al-wug u d al-h

aya l within the Prophets

faculty of imagination.
The fourth degree of being is the conceptual, or intellectual
one (al-wug u d al-aql ). The prime example here is Gods hand.
According to al-G~aza l, it can be demonstrated ( an burha n)
that God does not have a hand. The existence of such a hand as
a real and rm being, as a perceived being, and as an imagined
being must therefore be denied. If the being of such a hand can
somehow be acknowledged, this can only be done as a concep-
tual being: the hand exists in order to represent the concept of
giving and taking. Al-G~aza l denes hand as being the
capacity to give and take.
95
This is the essence ( h*aqqa) of
hand. God also has the capacity to give and take and this
93
Ibid., p. 179.20.
94
Ibid., p. 180.67.
95
Ibid., pp. 178.17, 1803.
128 FRANK GRIFFEL
correspondence within the eld of essential attributes leads to
the identication of the word hand, meaning human hand,
with Gods capacity to give and take.
Finally, the fth and last degree of being is the so-called
similar being (al-wug u d al-ibh). While in the case of the
conceptual being a correspondence in the eld of essential
attributes leads to the fact that one being stands for the other,
here, the correspondence is in the eld of accidental attributes.
An example is anger. God is sometimes referred to as being
angry. The description of the essence of anger is that which
brings blood to boil because one seeks satisfaction. God
cannot be associated with these emotions and is high exalted
above this. However, Gods anger is similar to human anger in
the sense that it aims to punish. The aim to punish is not an
essential quality of anger, but only an accidental one, and this
is the only level on which the two beings can be connected. The
word Gods anger in the revelation refers on the level of a
similar being to Gods will to punish.
96
The following chart shall clarify al-G~aza ls distinction of the
ve degrees of being.
The criteria for the distinction into ve degrees of being
originate in the philosophical theory of the inner senses the
h*awa ss ba t *ina. Following in the footsteps of Aristotelian
and late antique philosophy, the fala sifa divided the human
apparatus of post-sensationary perception into several psycho-
logical faculties.
97
The h*iss (or: h*iss mutarak) is the place that
collects the perceptions of the ve outward senses, the h

aya l
is the place where the multitude of single perceptions would be
put together to one object. This would be the faculty of
imagination. Conceptual knowledge about the denitions of
things and their substance is located in the aql. This three-fold
distinction of the inner senses is the most basic in Arabic
96
Ibid., p. 183.513.
97
Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect, pp. 98#.; Harry A.
Wolfson, The internal senses in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew philosophical texts,
in I. Twersky and G.H. Williams (eds. ), Studies in the History of Philosophy and
Religion (Cambridge (Mass. ), 197377), vol. 1, pp. 250314; Gotthard Strohmaier,
Avicennas Lehre von den Inneren Sinnen und ihre Voraussetzungen bei
Galen, in P. Manuli and M. Vegetti (eds. ), Le opere psicologiche di Galeno
(Naples, 1988), pp. 23142.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 129
peripatetic philosophy, and al-G~aza l applies it in various
passages of his Ih*ya ulu m al-d n.
98
The division of the Fays *al al-tafriqa is most close to the
Avicennan treatise on the evidence for prophecies F itba t
al-nubuwwa t. Here, entities are divided into three kinds of
98
Cf., for instance, al-G~aza l , Ih*ya ulu m al-dn, IV, 219. 4th line from bottom
(XXXV, 2); cf. also III, 18.11. (XXI, 9, 1) where the world and its beings are
described in three categories (1. ) the real being (wug u d h*aqq), imaginative
(h

aya l ) being, and conceptual/intellectual (aql ) being. Jules Janssens in a

recent article analyzes how al-G~aza l s works show di#erent applications of Ibn
Sna s di#erent models to explain the inner senses based on di#erent books by Ibn
Sna , Al-Ghazza l and his use of Avicennian texts, in Mikls Marth (ed. ),
Problems in Arabic Philosophy (Budapest, 2003), pp. 3749.
Fig. 1.
130 FRANK GRIFFEL
worlds (awa lim): a lam h*iss, a lam h

aya l, and a lam aql.

99
This division is applied in a key passage of the short treatise
that interprets a h*adt, which talks about the ways that lead to
human salvation.
100
But al-G~aza ls division of entities in
the Fays *al may well be inspired by other passages in the
Avicennan corpus, most notably chapter 4 in the psychological
part of al-S{ifa or even by Ibn Sna s medical writings. Ibn
Sna s concept of mental faculties and their place in the human
brain includes a general division into sense perception, image-
bearing capacities, and conceptual capacities that is manifest
on di#erent levels of human faculties.
101
Al-G~aza l reproduces
the various Avicennan divisions in the 18th discussion of the
Taha fut al-fala sifa.
102
The existence of inner faculties is not
called into question during the course of this discussion.
103
Al-G~aza l rather criticizes the fala sifas claim to know their
doctrine of the soul apodictically and through reason alone.
104
In one of the smaller works attributed to al-G~aza l, the
Maa rig al-quds f mada rig marifat al-nafs, the author devel-
ops a division of the soul that follows most closely the divisions
of Ibn Sna into sense perception (h*iss), imagination ( h

aya l),
and intellect (aql).
105
In this book, the notions of both the soul
99
Ibn S na (?), F itba t al-nubuwwa t, p. 58.5f.
100
Ibid., p. 55.4#.
101
Cf. Gutas, Intuition and thinking, pp. 8#.
102
Al-G~aza l , Taha fut al-fala sifa, pp. 298303.
103
Ibid., pp. 303.11304.5.
104
The 18th discussion of al-G~aza l s Taha fut al-fala sifa has recently been
analyzed in Timothy J. Gianotti, Al-Ghaza l s Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul.
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Ih*ya (Leiden, 2001),
pp. 95103. Gianotti adequately summarizes al-G~aza l s criticism saying his
objection is not with the philosophers doctrine of the soul per se; rather with
their assertation of how their knowledge is won (ibid., p. 101). An important
aspect of al-G~aza l s criticism is, however, overlooked. It is generally true that if
the fala sifa present a doctrine that violates the outward meaning (z*a hir) of
revelation, the fala sifas incapacity to prove demonstrably a certain element of
their doctrine renders this element false in light of the authority of revelation.
Here, however, the case is di#erent since al-G~aza l concedes that nothing in the
fala sifas doctrine of the soul violates ar (Taha fut, p. 303.11f. ) The authority of
revelation is, however, still at stake. Al-G~aza l wants to force the fala sifa to
concede that their doctrine of the soul is not known through reason alone. Such
an acknowledgment would destroy their claim that revelation cannot teach
anything to those who are familiar with the demonstrative method.
105
Al-G~aza l , Maa rig al-quds f mada rig marifat al-nafs, ed. Mah*mu d Bg u
(Damascus, 1413/1992), pp. 56f. This division includes a fourth category, wahm
(estimation), between h

aya l and aql. I am grateful to Hikmatullah Sahib who

made much of his unpublished work on the Maa rig al-quds accessible to me.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 131
and prophecy are explained entirely in terms of Avicennan
divisions and terminology. Indeed, the text responds to many of
the problems that are created by al-G~aza ls treatment of Ibn
Sna s psychology in the Taha fut.
106
The fact that this text is
not only very close to Ibn Sna s doctrine of the soul but also
includes large parts of almost verbatim quotations from Ibn
Sna s De anima led to doubts concerning al-G~aza ls author-
ship of this book.
107
Al-G~aza l, however, has never been shy to
borrow from other peoples writings, and the fact that the
author of this text copied much of his book from Ibn Sna does
not at all exclude al-G~aza l from being this author.
108
Al-G~aza l nevertheless makes changes in Ibn S na s model of
interpretation, since he adds the entities of a real and rm
being as the very rst one. Similarly, the fth category of
wug u d ibh is not mentioned in this context by Ibn S na . But
the distinction between wug u d aql and wug u d ibh is equally
inspired by the writings of the ayh

al-ras. In the third and

the seventh book of his Metaphysics, Ibn S na deals with
the di#erent categories of union, and here he distinguishes
between a union that is based on substance and one that is
based on accident.
109
In his textbook of the philosophical
teachings, the Maqa s *id al-fala sifa, al-G~aza l reproduces this
distinction and connects it with metaphors (mag a z). He further
divides the union per accident and refers to the union that is
106
Most of these questions are put together by Timothy J. Gianotti in his
Al-Ghaza l s Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul, pp. 115f., who is unaware of the
existence of the Maa rig al-quds.
107
Voiced rst by Georges Vajda, Le maa rig al-quds f mada rig marifat
al-nafs attribu al-G~aza l et les crits dIbn Sna , Israel Oriental Studies, 2
(1972): 4703 and seconded by Jules Janssens, Le Marij al-quds f madrij
marifat al-nafs: un lment-cl pour le dossier Ghazzl-Ibn Sn?, Archives
dhistoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen ge, 60 (1993): 2755.
108
Cf. Jules Janssens forthcoming article Al-Ghazza l and his use of
Avicennian texts where he renounced his earlier view that this book is not
written by al-G~aza l and counts it now amongst the writings of al-G~aza l . The
author was a highly original thinker whose ideas are quite complex, and the
words of Georges Vajda, le Maa rig mriterait une tude densemble are still
valid. A comparison between Ibn Sna s psychology and that of al-G~aza l which
includes the Maa rig al-quds has been attempted by G{ama l Rag ab S db,
Naz *ariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn S na wa-al-G~aza l (Cairo, 2000) and Muh*ammad
H* usayn Abu Sada, al-Ata r al-s na wiyya f madhab al-G~aza l f al-nafs
al-insa niyya (Cairo, 1991).
109
Ibn Sna , al-S{ifa , al-Ila hiyya t, I, 97.4152; II, 303.15304.4; cf. id., Kita b
al-Nag a t, p. 99.
132 FRANK GRIFFEL
based on the identical quality ( kayyya) of two things as a
union through mua baha.
110
The most explicit passage in the writings of Ibn S na where
the four distinctions that al-G~aza l uses are all exemplied is
probably in Ibn S na s al-Ia ra t wa-al-tanbha t:
Sometimes a thing is perceived (mah*su san) when it is observed; then it
is imagined (mutah

ayyalan), when it is absent through the represen-

tation of its image (or: form, s *u ra) inside; just as Zayd, for example,
whom you have seen, but now is absent from you, is imagined by you.
And sometimes [the thing] is apprehended intellectually (maqu lan)
when the concept (mana ) man, for example, which exists also for
other people, is formed out of Zayd. When [the thing] is perceived by the
senses, it is found covered by things which are foreign to its essence and
which, if they had been removed from it, would not e#ect its essence
(ma hiyya).
111
IV. THE FUNCTION OF AL-G~ AZAz LI zS FIVE DEGREES OF BEING
It is clear that all elements of this theory of representation are
inspired by the writings of Ibn S na . Signicantly, al-G~aza l
follows the ayh

al-ras not only in points of detail, he also

applies an Avicennan ontological model of being (wug u d).
Aarite kala m before al-G~aza l did not consider the mental
states of humans as beings. The classical Aarite position is
that being (wug u d) and equally thing (ay ) is every thing
that can be a$rmed (matbu t), and this denition seems to
exclude mental states.
112
Al-G{uwayn, however, developed an
110
Al-G~aza l , Maqa sid al-fala sifa, part 2, pp. 379. My English translation of
similar being has been chosen following the Latin translation of Domenicus
Gundissalinus (Logica et philosophia Algazelis philosophia Algazelis Arabis
[Frankfurt, 1969] = reprint of the Venice, 1506 print, fol. 21v) who translates the
union through mua baha as unio per simultudo.
111
Ibn Sna , al-Ia ra t wa-al-tanb ha t, ed. Sulayma n Dunya , 4 vols. (Cairo, 1960
68), vol. 2, pp. 367f. The passage is translated and discussed by Dag N. Hasse,
Avicenna on abstraction, in Wisnovsky (ed. ), Aspects of Avicenna, pp. 3972, at
pp. 60f.
112
Cf. al-G{uwayns statement in the Ira d, p. 174.10f that the ahl al-h*aqq
agree upon the view that all being (kull mawg u d) can be seen. The matter,
however, is not that simple, as al-G{uwayns student al-Ans *a r points out in his
S{arh* al-Ira d. First Part, MS Princeton University Library, ELS 634, fols. 160b#.
Recent studies have conrmed the complexity of this subject. Cf. Richard M.
Frank, The non-existent and the possible in classical Asharite teaching,
Mlanges de lInstitut Dominicain dtudes Orientales, 24 (2000): 137 and id.,
The Aarite ontology: I. Primary entities, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 9
(1999): 163231. The ontological positions of mutakallimu n and fala sifa seem to be
less distinct from one another than initially thought and may indeed be
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 133
interesting theory of mental states as interior speech in the
self (al-qawl al-qa im bi-al-nafs).
113
He developed this category
in order to solve ontological problems that arose with the
assumption of Gods speech being eternal. It describes speech
that exists in the minds of persons and that is not represented
by sounds. Al-G{uwayn never applied his model of mind-speech
to the Prophet Muh*ammad. It seems that al-G~aza ls notion of
mental beings that correspond to the propositions of the
revelation is a development of this mind-speech concept. In any
case, it would be impossible to develop the concept of being
that corresponds to revelation without Ibn S na s notion of
wug u d as a denotation of all possible human knowledge. The
connection between h

abar and wug u d is entirely Avicennan.

114
More important within the scope of this paper is the under-
standing of prophecy that this theory of ve degrees of being
develops. In order to proceed to further assessments, the
purpose of this model must rst be understood. After the
build-up of this quite elaborate theory of representation in
chapters 2 to 4 of the Fays *al, al-G~aza l presents in chapter 5 the
purpose of the ve-fold division. The aim of the book is to
develop a criterion how to distinguish a tolerated interpret-
ation (tawl) of revelation from one that is considered unbelief
and apostasy from Islam. Chapter 5 begins with the sentence:
You should know that everybody who reduces a statement of the
lawgiver to one of these degrees is amongst those who believe. Takdb is
the case only when all these meanings are denied and when it is said
that the statements (of the lawgiver) have no meaning and are only pure
falsehood (kidb), that the aim behind (such a false statement) is to
connected from the early days of their generation, cf. Robert Wisnovsky, Notes
on Avicennas concept of thingness, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 10 (2000):
181221, and Jean Jolivet, Aux origines de lontologie dIbn S na , in Jolivet
and Rashed (eds. ), tudes sur Avicenne, pp. 1128.
113
Al-G{uwayn, al-Ira d, p. 104.5#. I am grateful to Paul Walker and David
Vishano# who directed me to this passage. Cf. Nagel, Die Festung des Glaubens,
p. 147. The concept of soul speech is discussed in some length in al-Ans *a r s S{arh*
al-Ira d. First Part, fols. 87b#.
114
Cf. the Chapter I.5 of Ibn S na s Metaphysics where being in the soul
(wug u d f al-nafs) is qualied as that which is reported of ( allad ma yuh

baru
anhu ). The act of reporting (ih

ba r) is in its essential meaning reporting of the

existent thing (al-mawg u d) in the soul, and only in its accidental meaning
reporting of the existent thing outside [of it]. (al-S{ifa , al-Ila hiyya t, I, 34.79. ) In
his Iqtis *a d f al-itiqa d, p. 62.12, al-G~aza l gives the example of the connection
between what is known and what is the object of this knowledge as an example
for a necessary connection: ma ulima wuqu uhu fa-wuqu uhu wa g ib.
134 FRANK GRIFFEL
present things as they are not (talbs), or to improve the conditions in
the present world (mas *lah*at al-dunya ).
115
Unbelief and apostasy is the failure to acknowledge that
there are beings that correspond to the reports of revelation.
Corresponds in this regard means not only a correspondence
of words to objects of the outside world, but also to the
Prophets sensible perceptions, to his imaginations, and to his
metaphors either as metaphors based on similarities of essen-
tial or of accidental attributes. Unbelief is the case only when
all these possibilities are denied and when it is said that some
reports of the books of revelation do not correspond to any-
thing. In all other cases, jurists should not concern themselves
with the alleged apostasy of people who interpret revelation.
116
Al-G~aza l should be considered bold for his optimism that his
colleagues on the Qa d*s chairs would really follow him
through this quite complicated text and apply this rule in order
to identify alleged apostates. We know that al-G~aza l did not
have a positive opinion on the intellectual capacity of his peers
in the Islamic sciences, and this rule is in fact not the last word
on this subject. In the eighth chapter of the Fays *al, al-G~aza l
presents both a rule of thumb (was *iyya) and a more detailed
law (qa nu n) that are much more likely to be applied by
jurists. The qa nu n is based on a distinction between core
elements of the Muslim creed and less important elements and
does indeed explain the legal background of al-G~aza l own
condemnation of the fala sifa and the Ba t *inites, something the
present rule doesnt even attempt to do.
117
In addition to these
already confusing ideas about how to determine kufr in Islam,
the Fays *al also contains a most interesting theory of how the
ve degrees of being can be used in order to determine a true
interpretation (tawl) of revelation from a false one.
118
115
Al-G~aza l , Fays *al, p. 184.14.
116
Ibid., p. 184.6f.
117
On al-G~aza l s criteria of distinguishing unbelief from belief according to
the fundamental elements of the creed (us *u l al-aqa id) and his subsequent
law (qa nu n) cf. Fays *al, pp. 195.6#. and my Apostasie und Toleranz, pp. 30419.
118
On this law of interpretation (qa nu n al-taw l) which is distinct from the
law referred to in the previous footnote, cf. Fays *al, pp. 1879 and my Apostasie
und Toleranz, pp. 3335. The content of the law of interpretation is explained
earlier in this paper, cf. footnote 61.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 135
V. AL-G~ AZAz LI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY
The concept of prophecy that al-G~aza l reveals in the course
of his explanations in the rst six chapters of the Fays *al
al-tafriqa regards the Muslim revelation as a literal represen-
tation of objects that are outside of its text. Revelation
here is understood as a text that represents being, which
is outside of language. Al-G~aza l does not distinguish between
the Qura n and the h*adt and his examples are taken from
both textual sources, although mostly from h*adt. Since he
aims to clarify problems that arise with people doing
tawl, it is clear that this involves both Qura n and the h*adt
corpus.
The being that is represented in the text of revelation can be
of two di#erent kinds. First, the text represents events that
have happened at the time of the Prophet or before. In this case
the being that the text represents is considered a real one
(da t), and in all these cases the text must be understood in its
literal sense. But there are a number of revelations that cannot
be understood this way. In these cases, al-G~aza l assumes that
the text represents sensible or mental impressions of the
Prophet that appeared either in his sensual faculty (h*iss), in
his faculty of imagination ( h

aya l), or in his rational faculty

(aql). Here, the text of revelation represents something that
was going on either in the sense perception or in the mind of
the Prophet. It is important to note that al-G~aza l does not
touch on the subject of the origins of these sensible or mental
impressions.
Al-G~aza ls approach to the subject of prophecy in the rst six
chapters of the Fays *al is in its details as well as its overall
concept of how prophecy can be understood by humans inu-
enced by Avicennan psychology. The ve degrees of being stem
from Avicennan writings. Moreover, the perspective to regard
the Muslim revelation as a conglomerate of propositions
(singl. h

abar) and the approach to verify belief (tas *dq) in the

Muslim revelation through reference to the correspondence of
the propositions with their objects is clearly philosophical. If
we further regard the terminology that al-G~aza l has chosen,
most notably the choice of being (wug u d) for the object of a
proposition (al-muh

bar anhu), we have to admit that almost

everything in the rst six chapters of the Fays *al al-tafriqa is
Avicennan.
136 FRANK GRIFFEL
There are, however, important elements in Ibn S na s teach-
ings on prophecy that al-G~aza l does not adopt. These elements
are, in fact, criticized in some of his earlier writings. Most
notably, these are two notions: First, the view that the sensible
and mental impressions, which are the object of revelation,
are caused by emanations from celestial souls or are the
emanations themselves. Al-G~aza l seems to reject anything
connected to the emanationism of the fala sifa.
119
Secondly, the
view that the metaphors, which are a result of the Prophets
sensible and mental states, are representing things in a way
di#erent from what they are (talbs) and are struck only for the
educational benet of the ordinary people is rejected. The
latter notion is, in fact, vehemently denied in the Fays *al,
120
and
al-G~aza ls elaborate theory of comparing the propositions of
revelation with their objects tries to counter attempts to allow
talbs within the text of revelation.
121
Al-G~aza l maintains that
the Muslim revelation presents things exactly as they are or as
are they were. As they are or were means, as they were either
119
Richard M. Frank, Currents and countercurrents, in Peter Rifel and Tony
Street (eds. ), Islam: Essays on Scripture Thought and Society (Leiden, 1997), pp.
11134, p. 127. Al-G~aza l seems to replace some references to emanation in the
teachings of the fala sifa with references to a process of revelation (wahm) in his
own teachings. It needs, of course, to be analyzed what wahm really means for
al-G~aza l .
120
Cf. supra footnote 115.
121
It is also evident that even if al-G~aza l has been inspired by Ibn S na s
ontology, he doesnt follow him fully in the relationship between h

abar and
wug u d. According to Ibn Sna it is impossible that there is a h

abar which has no

corresponding wug u d (Ibn Sna , al-S{ifa , Ila hiyya t, I, 32.1214. ) Ibn Sna s
ontology regards something that exists only in the mind of a person (wug u d f
al-dihn, ens rationis, or Gedankending as Immanuel Kant put it) as a being just
like any other thing outside of the mind (ibid., 34.7f. ) Predication is always
predication of something, and there is no predication of the absolute
non-existence (al-madu m al-mut *laq) without the implication that it does exist
(ibid., 32.ult. ) The possibility that an object doesnt exist, however, is implied in
al-G~aza l s concept of the verication of revelation. The unbelievers deny that
there is a being corresponding to the h

abar of the revelation. They imply that the

report of the revelation is made up and that nothing corresponds to it. Al-G~aza l
does indeed not accept Ibn Sna s ontological assumption that everything that is
possible by itself (mumkin al-wug u d) is also existing (mawg u d or ay ). He
criticizes this notion in the discussion of the fourth argument for the pre-eternity
of the world in the Taha fut al-fala sifa, p. 71.613. What is possible is according to
al-G~aza l not already existing. In fact, the change from possibility to actuality is
the result of an act of the creator. The predication of possible beings does not
already involve a statement on the existence of the objects of predication. This is
also the ontology he follows in his Maqs *ad al-asna , his Iqtis *a d, and other of his
works, cf. Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System, pp. 53f and 62f.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 137
happening in the past, or happening in the Prophets sensual,
imaginative, or rational faculty. In the Fays *al, al-G~aza l ends
his inquiry exactly at this point and does not push his investi-
gation further into the providence of these beings. This
self-restriction must be understood as a reection of the
classical Aarite bila kayf-attitude to questions of prophecy.
The reader understands that God created and creates both the
events represented in the text of the Muslim revelation as
well as the frames of mind of the Prophet that are equally
represented in this text. Humans, however, still seem to be
unable to understand how these states are created.
VI. CONCLUSION: HOW TO VERIFY THE CLAIMS
OF A PROPHET?
In his monograph on Prophecy in Islam, Fazlur Rahman wrote
that among all the authors covered in that book al-G~aza l
proved to be the most di$cult one, if not an outright imposs-
ible one to understand in any coherent manner.
122
Fazlur
Rahman based his analysis of al-G~aza ls views on prophecy on
the Maa rig al-quds and was puzzled by the authors strategy to
use philosophic doctrines in order to defend what Rahman calls
orthodox Islam. This, according to Rahman, is puzzling since
in some of his books al-G~aza l condemned views of the fala sifa
on prophecy as unbelief ( kufr).
123
But then follows the chap-
ter on the characteristics of prophecy, which is almost word
for word borrowed from Avicenna.
124
Since al-G~aza ls authorship of the Maa rig al-quds is still
disputed, this paper aims to analyze one of al-G~aza l undisputed
texts and thus show that al-G~aza ls views on prophecy are
heavily inuenced by Ibn Sna both in detail as well as in the
overall concept of how prophecy can be understood by humans.
Al-G~aza l accepts a great deal of the Avicennan teachings on
prophecy, mostly the model that the prophet receives the
revelation in his inner senses and verbally represents these
impression in his speech, the revelation. It is noteworthy that
while Ibn Sna recognizes only two kinds of impressions on the
prophets inner senses, imagination and conceptual knowledge,
122
Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, p. 94.
123
Rahman quotes al-G~aza l s Mira g al-sa lik n, which repeats the earlier
condemnation of the Fad*a ih* al-ba t *iniyya analyzed above.
124
Ibid., p. 98.
138 FRANK GRIFFEL
al-G~aza l divides these impressions into four. His division does
not follow Ibn S na s two-fold division of imaginative and
intellectual revelation in the De anima, but follows the theory
of the inner senses in philosophical literature and thus
involves more divisions.
125
The elements al-G~aza l adopts from Ibn Sna are all of a kind
that he did not condemn in his two books of refutation, the
Taha fut al-fala sifa and the Fad*a ih* al-ba t *iniyya.
126
There
remain, in fact, a number of elements in Ibn Sna s teachings
on prophecy that al-G~aza l criticizes in these books and that
do not appear in al-G~aza ls teachings. Al-G~aza ls usage of
Avicennan psychology must be understood as an attempt to
enrich Aarite theology on a subject area where it had not
developed any specic views. The epistemological self-
restriction that is implied in the bila kayf of early Aarite
theology causes this theological system to become quite recep-
tive to the incorporation of elements from peripatetic philos-
ophy once the restrictions are lifted. Al-G~aza l thus introduces
an Avicennan psychological explanation of prophecy into
Aarite kala m. He does so by pushing his inquiry into proph-
ecy further than his predecessors, and he sets new boundaries
for the self-imposed restrictions of Aarite epistemology. Al-
G~aza l, however, seems to maintain the bila kayf when it comes
to the source of the divine message and how it was communi-
cated to the human soul of the Prophet. Al-G~aza ls contribu-
tion lies in the adaptation of Avicennan ideas by transforming
them to accord with his theology.
As a result, we can rst of all conclude that the many
Avicennan elements in the Maa rig al-quds as well as the great
number of textual borrowings from Ibn Sna s books within this
text are not alien to al-G~aza ls view on prophecy. Judged from
its content, there is no reason to suggest that the Maa rig
al-quds is not authored by al-G~aza l or, if it is indeed a
compilation by some of his students, not authorized by him as
one of his genuine publications.
125
This must not be understood as a departure from Ibn Sna . His two-fold
division of revelation in imaginative and intellectual should also be regarded as a
result of the various divisions of the inner senses (h*awa ss ba t *ina), cf.
Elamrani-Jamal, De la multiplicit des modes de prophtie chez Ibn S na ,
pp. 12936.
126
And books depending on this like, for instance, al-Iqtis *a d f al-itiqa d or
Mira g al-sa lik n.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 139
With the introduction of Avicennan elements comes an
important change in the perspective from which prophecy
is approached. Unlike his Aarite predecessors, al-G~aza l
explains all events that happened on the human side of the
phenomenon of prophecy. The Prophet Muh*ammad received
knowledge of past and future events as well as sensible images
and concepts that all form the foundation of the text. In his
Fays *al, al-G~aza l does not touch on the subject of who actually
coined the words of the revealed text. But since the goal of the
inquiry is to establish a method to verify Muh*ammads s *idq (his
trustworthiness and the truth of his message), it must somehow
be assumed that it was the Prophet who formed the words of the
revealed text. His capacity to represent correctly his knowl-
edge of past and future events or his mental states is what the
unbelievers deny. The believers assume that Muh*ammad has
expressed the right words that represent the events in past and
future or the states of his soul exactly as they were or will be.
This is a novel view of prophecy not only for the Aarite
school but for the Muslim theological discourse as a whole. It
is caused by the change of perspective in the second chapter of
the Fays *al. Al-G~aza l approaches prophecy no longer from the
perspective of God, but from that of the humans who receive it.
It is more appropriate to say that al-G~aza l approaches proph-
ecy from the side of the revealed text. His change of the
denition of belief from tas *dq bi-Alla h, as in the classical
Aarite school, to his tas *dq al-rasu l
127
leads to a focus on
the text of revelation and his author. And while al-G~aza l may
maintain that God is the ultimate author since he rst caused
the frames of mind of the Prophet and secondly also the words
that the Prophet chose to express these frames of mind,
al-G~aza l treats the text of revelation as if it is authored by a
human, i.e. by Muh*ammad.
This change of perspective has signicant repercussions on
various elements of al-G~aza ls theology and there remains
much work to be done in order to analyze its impact on
G~azalian thinking. One such repercussion is al-G~aza ls com-
ment on the verication of prophecy in his inuential auto-
biography al-Munqid min al-d*ala l. Here, he openly departs
from the classical Aarite view that prophecy is veried only
though miracles. But like in his introduction of certain
127
Al-G~aza l , Fays *al, p. 134.9.
140 FRANK GRIFFEL
elements of Avicennan thought in the Aarite theological
edice, al-G~aza ls rejection of the classical verication of
prophecy is not a rejection of the overall Aarite model of how
to verify prophecy. Al-G~aza l does not go as far as al-Ra z, for
instance, who states that humans know what is true in terms of
theoretical knowledge and what is right in practical knowledge
before revelation. Al-G~aza l holds that humans have the
capacity to know what is true only in certain elds of theor-
etical knowledge. This capacity fails in some elds of theoreti-
cal knowledge like, for instance, the question of whether the
world is pre-eternal or created in time. It also fails in the whole
eld of normative practical knowledge, where humans have no
impaired judgment of what is right or what is wrong indepen-
dent of revelation.
128
In his views on the relationship between
revelation and the sources of knowledge that are independent
from revelation al-G~aza l is unlike al-Ra z and his statement
that humans have certain normative practical knowledge, for
instance still deeply rooted in classical Aarite epistemology.
According to the Munqid, knowledge about the fact that
Muh*ammad reached the highest levels of prophecy is necessary
or immediate knowledge (ilm d*aru r). The necessity of this
knowledge is, according to al-G~aza l, not conveyed through
prophetic miracles. Necessary knowledge about Muh*ammads
prophecy is rather acquired through the experience (tag riba)
that Muh*ammad said the truth (s *adaqa) in all of his reports.
129
Such experience comes through a comparison of a prophets
deeds and sayings with what is already known to be true. An
example is given in the case of medicine and jurisprudence.
If you know medicine and jurisprudence, it enables you to
identify jurists as well as physicians from witnessing their
actions (ah*wa l) and listening to what they say, even if you
havent witnessed them (in person).
130
Those who have a
thorough insight into the knowledge conveyed in the books of
jurisprudence can easily determine that a man like al-S{a , for
instance, was a jurist. Similarly, those who have a thorough
insight into the books of medicine can easily say that a man
128
Reinhard, Before Revelation, pp. 72f.; Hourani, Ghaza l on the ethics of
action, ( = id., Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, pp. 13566); Michael E.
Marmura, Ghaza l on ethical premises, The Philosophical Forum, N.S. 1 (1969):
393403.
129
Al-G~aza l , al-Munqid min al-d*ala l, p. 43.18-ult.
130
Ibid., p. 43.1214.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 141
like Galen was indeed a physician. They compare the deeds
and words of this particular physician and this jurist with
their own theoretical knowledge of the respective eld and
judge that they were acting in concordance with this theoreti-
cal knowledge. Such a comparison leads to the necessary
knowledge that al-S{a was a jurist and Galen a physician.
131
The same can be done in the case of the prophet. In a rst
step, al-G~aza l implicitly acknowledges that humans are
endowed with certain knowledge about prophecy that is inde-
pendent from revelation and that precedes the message of the
prophets. This assumption, however, does not violate the
Aarite principle that there is no normative practical knowl-
edge independent from revelation. The kind of knowledge that
al-G~aza l has in mind is not practical knowledge about what is
right or wrong, but is theoretical knowledge about the e#ects
of a prophets work. The experiences that verify prophecy are
described as follows:
If you have understood the meaning of prophecy and spend much time
reecting on the Qura n and the ah

ba r, you will achieve the necessary

knowledge that Muh*ammad is on the highest level of prophecy. This is
supported by the personal experience (tag riba) of what he says about the
ritual duties and the e#ects they have on the purication of the souls
(lit. hearts, qulu b).
132
Trying out the ritual duties of Islam leads to the realization
that they purify the soul. If al-S{a is considered a jurist by
virtue of his skills to make legal judgments and Galen is
considered a physician by virtue of his skills to heal the sick,
then Muh*ammad must be considered a prophet by virtue of his
skills to purify souls. While al-S{a s claim is veried through
the e#ectiveness of his work in jurisprudence and Galens
claim through his e#ectiveness in medicine, the prophets claim
131
Ibid., p. 43.1416.
132
Ibid., p. 43.1720. Al-G~aza l uses heart (qalb) synonymous to what in
philosophy is called soul. Cf., for instance, the second denition of qalb in
Ih*ya ulu m al-dn, III, 3 (XXI, 1), or the same denition in Maa rig al-quds, p. 21.
In his al-Risa la al-Laduniyya (in: al-Qus *u r al-awa l min rasa il Ima m al-Ghaza l
[Cairo, 1964], pp. 97122), p. 101.1315 al-G~aza l says that those engaged in S*u sm
(al-mutas *awwifa) use qalb for the substance (g awhar) that the philosophers
(al-h*ukama ) call al-nafs al-na t *iqa. MS Berlin, Spr. 1968 (Ahlwardt 3210), fol.
41b probably has the more complete textual version and says that the
mutas *awwifa call this substance sometimes the qalb and sometimes the ru h*.
Three lines later, both texts have: al-qalb and al-ru h* are for us (indana ) names
for al-nafs al-na t *iqa. On the usage of qalb in the meaning of soul cf. also
Gianotti, Al-Ghaza l s Unspeakable Doctrine, pp. 13, 178.
142 FRANK GRIFFEL
to prophecy is veried through the e#ectiveness of their work
on the individual souls of the believers. Thus, the body of
theoretical knowledge that veries the prophets claim is
knowledge of the soul, i.e. psychology. The prophets work, his
deeds and words, falls into the eld of psychology, and it is the
theoretical knowledge in psychology, knowledge about the
divisions of the soul, the inner senses (h*awa ss ba t *ina), and
their faculties, that the actions of a prophet must be compared
to. For the ordinary believer this eld may be determined by his
personal experience on matters of the soul or by the experience
of how reections on the Qura n and the Sunna e#ect his soul.
For scientists like al-G~aza l, however, this eld is dened in
terms of Ibn Sna s books on the soul. Such an explanation of
prophecy in terms of psychology is part of al-G~aza ls project in
the Fays *al. The yardstick for the verication of a prophet lies,
therefore, in the judgment whether his deeds and words fulll
the criteria and have the e#ects that knowledge about the soul
(laid down in psychological literature) ascribes to the actions
of a true prophet.
133
Thus correcting his predecessors in the Aarite school,
al-G~aza l teaches that within the eld of human knowledge
where rationality is able to prove its case independent from
revelation there lies a yardstick for distinguishing the true
prophet from the impostor, a yardstick that they have simply
overlooked. If the actions of the prophet fulll the require-
ments set out in the books on the soul, then this fulllment
provides the most conclusive argument for the truth of his
mission and the truthfulness of his o$ce. Against the fala sifa,
133
This criterion for verifying the claims of a prophet doesnt seem to be
entirely unknown to Aarite scholarship. It seems to be close to the third
criterion of al-Aar reported by Ibn Fu rak (cf. footnote 3). In al-G~aza l it is
clearly inuenced by both philosophical literature as well as S*u sm. As stated
earlier, the statements on prophecy in the psychological part of Ibn S na s al-S{ifa
were understood as explanations of how prophecy must occur, if it occurs (p. 117
of this paper). Much of the philosophical body of literature on prophecy should
be understood as setting such standards for the acceptance of a true prophet.
Philosophical literature often compares the work of the prophet with the work of
the physician. Cf., for instance, al-Fa ra b , Kita b Tah*s *l al-saa da (The Attainment
of Happiness) (Hayderabad, 1345), pp. 46f., ed. G{afar Azl Ya s n, 2nd ed. (Beirut,
1403/1983), p. 97. An illuminating example of the dispute between fala sifa and
religious scholars on whether the e#ect of the prophets work can be compared to
that of the physician is the discussion between one of the authors of the Rasa il
Ih

wa n al-S*afa , Muh*ammad ibn Maar al-B st al-Maqdis , with a young scholar

named al-H* arr reported by al-Tawh*d in al-Imta wa-al-mua nasa, ed. Ah*mad
Amn and Ah*mad Zayn, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1373/1952), vol. 2, pp. 11#.
AL-G~AZAzLI zS CONCEPT OF PROPHECY 143
however, al-G~aza l also rmly maintains that despite the fact
that prophecy can be explained in the science of the human
soul, there is a surplus of knowledge once true revelation has
set in. This excess knowledge exists in elds where demon-
strative reasoning fails to yield certainty. These elds are, for
instance, normative practical knowledge, i.e. judgments about
the moral value of an act, and certain questions in the eld of
theoretical knowledge like, for instance, the afterlife, and
knowledge of the beginning of the world. Knowledge of the
source of the prophets revelations also seems to be a point that
al-G~aza l regards as being not accessible to demonstrative
knowledge and thus subject to the information one nds in the
literal meaning of the Qura nic text. In all his explanations of
prophecy al-G~aza l never explicitly touches upon this topic
other than maintaining that the ultimate source of revelation
is God.
134
While he explains prophecy from the perspective of
human psychology, such inquiry always reaches its limits
where the human touches the divine.
135
134
One of the more explicit passages where al-G~aza l deals with the source of
revelation is in Maa rig al-quds, p. 115.2122 (translated in Rahman, Prophecy in
Islam, p. 97) where the revelation is portrayed as coming from spiritual beings
(ru h*a niyya t), who are determined to preserve the order of the word and who act
according to Gods command (amr).
135
I would like to thank Peter Adamson, Richard M. Frank, Tariq Ja#er and
two anonymous readers for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this
article.
144 FRANK GRIFFEL

xi
Preface
From the earliest centuries of Islam, Muslim mystics, or Sufs as they are now mostly called, refected
upon the verses of the Qurn, expounding their insights and inspired comments to others who
might beneft from them. Tese comments were not intended to contradict or stand in place of
the literal readings of the Scripture; rather they were a way of going beyond them in order to draw
out inner meanings that sprang from, and were informed by, states, stations and spiritual realities
(haqiq) experienced by the mystics. Tis process of eliciting inner meanings from the Qurn,
termed by some Sufs istinbt, meaning literally drawing up water from a well, might take the
form of brief, elliptical and allusive comments, or lengthier and more detailed explanations. Tese
early comments were eagerly memorised and passed on by the mystics associates and followers,
since they were seen not only as a profound way of understanding the Qurn, but also as a source
of guidance and illumination for anyone aspiring to travel the spiritual path.
As with other religious sciences, the early esoteric interpretations of the Qurn were, to begin
with, mainly transmitted through the oral tradition, and for the most part they appear to have
remained as scattered comments preserved in disparate sources until the time when the ffh/
eleventh-century Suf, Ab Abd al-Rahmn al-Sulam (d. ::/:o::) compiled his anthology of Suf
Qurn commentary, the Haqiq al-tafsr (Realities or Truths of Interpretation). Sulam arranged
all the exegetical material he could gather, comments that had been attributed to many diferent
mystics, in a verse-by-verse commentary on the Qurn.
Te Tafsr al-Qurn al-azm (Commentary on the Great Qurn) of Sahl b. Abd Allh al-Tustar
(d. :8,/8o) is remarkable in having been compiled much earlier than this, by Tustars immediate
disciples and within one generation of his death, and in having been preserved as a commentary
on the Qurn through an authenticated chain of transmission, until it was frst written down by
a scribe in the mid-sixth/twelfh century. Tus it may claim to be the earliest extant Suf Qurn
commentary ascribed to a single author. What is more, Tustars disciples integrated within this
exegetical corpus a large number of apposite sayings of their master as well as accounts of events in
his life. Tis makes it possible to situate the interpretations within the compass of Tustars thought,
and to gain a greater understanding of the profound connection between his mystical doctrines
and his exegesis of the Qurn.
Tustar was among the most important and infuential mystics of the early, formative period
of Islamic mysticism, and many later famous Sufs and thinkers drew upon his ideas and cited
his sayings, including Ab Hmid al-Ghazl (d. ,o,/::::), Shihb al-Dn Yahy al-Suhraward (d.
,8,/:::) and Muhy al-Dn Ibn Arab (d. o,8/::o). Te fourth/tenth-century Suf author Ab Tlib
al-Makk (d. ,8o/o), who had fully imbibed Tustars teachings through contact with the circle
of his followers in Basra, contributed to the promulgation of his thought and sayings through his
treatise on Sufsm, the Qt al-qulb (Nourishment of Hearts), which was freely used by Ghazl
in the composition of his celebrated Ihy ulm al-dn (Revival of the Religious Sciences). Among
Tustars signifcant contributions to the doctrines of Sufsm are his emphasis on the remembrance
of God (dhikr), on complete trust in God (tawakkul) and his discourse on the Muhammadan Light.
Tis volume represents the frst translation into English of Tustars Tafsr, and indeed of any
complete Suf commentary on the Qurn. Te printed text we have used is the most recent edition
published in Lebanon by Dr al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, and edited by Muhammad Bsil Uyyn al-Sd.
Tafsr al-Tustar
xii
Tis appears to be a replication of the Cairo edition published in :::, and is not a critical edition
of the text. However, we were fortunate in obtaining CDs of three manuscripts of the Tafsr, and
have consulted these manuscripts throughout the process of our translation. Tis has enabled us
to fll in a number of lacunae, and correct numerous mistakes in the current published edition.
All the additions that we have made on the basis of these manuscripts have been clearly marked
between half brackets, thus: ', and referenced in the footnotes along with the folio numbers of
each manuscript, and likewise, any corrections we have made have been recorded in the notes.
Te corrections made to the text are not exhaustive, but have assisted, we hope, in clarifying many
unnecessarily obscure passages. Te manuscripts we have used are as follows:
MS Ftih o,8, dated 8,:/:o8
MS Ftih ,88, dated o,/:,,8
MS Zhiriyya ,:,, dated twelfh/eighteenth or thirteenth/nineteenth century.
In the footnotes, we have referred to these as MSS Z,:,, Fo,8 and F,88, and have cited them in
this order, rather than in their chronological order, since it was the Zhiriyya manuscript that was
frst available to us. Te MSS Z,:, and F,88 form part of the same manuscript tradition, whilst
MS Fo,8 represents the second manuscript tradition Professor Gerhard Bwering, in his study
of the manuscripts of Tustars Tafsr, has identifed two groups of manuscripts overall, and we have
thus had access to representatives of both. A comparison of the manuscripts of the Tafsr in general,
and of the two manuscript traditions in particular, reveals only minor diferences between them.
1
As is the case with most Suf commentaries on the Qurn, Tustars Tafsr does not comprise
interpretations of every single verse. Nonetheless there are comments on a selection of verses, or
parts of verses, from all the sras of the Qurn, amounting to around :ooo verses in total. Tese
comments, as they appear in both the published edition and the manuscripts, mostly follow the order
of the Qurn itself, the main exception being sections of verse ordering in Sras : and , (al-Baqara
and l Imrn). In cases where there is a divergence from the verse order, we have not corrected
it, unless such a change was warranted by the manuscripts. All citations of the Qurnic text are in
italic. In accordance with the wishes of our patrons, we have used the Aal al-Bayts omcial transla-
tion of the Qurn, with a few minor amendments which were ofen, though not always, required
to comply with Tustars particular understanding of the meaning of a word in the verse. Indeed,
any examination of a variety of Qurn translations will demonstrate the polysemy of its language.
Te editor of the Dr al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya edition of Tustars Tafsr, while not making any
substantial changes to the earlier Cairo edition of the text, has sourced many of the hadths and
traditions that are cited in the commentary. We felt it useful to include these as they are, even
though we did not have access to the same editions of all the hadth collections he was using, and
were therefore not able to check all his references. Tose that we were able to check, we found to
be correct. We have additionally sourced quite a number of hadths for which the editor had not
provided references, though we were unfortunately not successful in sourcing all those that are
cited in the commentary. Where two editions of the same hadth collection have been referred to,
they are diferentiated by the place and/or date of publication.
For a Suf text that is so allusive in nature, and in which terms are used in subtly diferent
ways in the various contexts, we decided that rather than providing a glossary of technical terms,
it might be more useful to compile a detailed index, in which various meanings and applications
of a particular term will be given along with the references to the relevant page and note numbers.
Te Introduction to the Translation presents detailed explanations and discussions of the salient
doctrines presented in the Tafsr, as well as some of the more unusual concepts and complex aspects
of Tustars teachings.
It is worth explaining here the use of a few of the terms that occur frequently in this volume.
As indicated above, the term Suf, as a noun or adjective, is now generally used to denote either a
: Te manuscripts of Tustars Tafsr are fully discussed in Gerhard Bwering, Te Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical
Islam: Te Qurnic Hermeneutics of the Sf Sahl at-Tustar (d. :8/8o) (Berlin and New York, :8o), pp. :oo,.
xiii
Preface
proponent of mysticism in Islam, or related to, and associated with, Islamic mysticism, respectively.
In the Introduction to the Translation, and in some of the notes to our translation, the word Suf has
been used with this meaning. However, it is worth bearing in mind that this is a retrospective use of
the term Suf, which in the early period was mainly associated with mystics of Baghdad, and only
gradually, from the sixth/twelfh century on, gained wider currency in the Muslim world. Tustar
never once uses the Arabic equivalent for Suf in his Tafsr (that is, tasawwuf or sf); instead, he
speaks of the mystic (rif, pl. uraf) or the friend of God (wal, pl. awliy). Te second term
that should be mentioned here is the word marifa, a term applied by Sufs to mean a divinely-
bestowed mystical or experiential knowledge of God that is beyond the level of knowledge attained
merely through instruction or discursive reasoning. For this we have used the conventional English
translation gnosis. Te word nafs (pl. anfus or nufs) can be used to mean self , person or soul,
according to context. In the Qurnic verses translated in this volume, the word soul has mostly
been employed for nafs. In the translation of the passages of commentary we have translated nafs
as soul in those contexts where Tustar seems to imply more generally the spiritual, immaterial
and immortal part of the human being. However, we have used the word self for nafs in the more
numerous instances where Tustar designates diferent levels and aspects of the nafs within the
human being, as, for example, the spiritual self (nafs al-rh) natural self (nafs al-tab), evil-inciting
self (nafs ammra bil-s) and so on. Te all-important word tawhd meaning literally making or
understanding as one, we have translated as either attesting to or professing Gods oneness, when
Tustar appears to imply an active commitment to belief in the oneness of God, or realising Gods
oneness, when he seems to imply by tawhd a more profound mystical experience of Gods oneness.
We have retained the masculine gender in translating verbs and pronouns, assuming them to
be intended inclusively. Likewise in the Introduction to the Translation, the use of the masculine
gender or the terms man or mankind is intended to be inclusive of both genders.
Te translation has employed the transliteration system used by the International Journal of
Middle East Studies (IJMES). Te t marbuta has been rendered a in the presentation of Arabic
equivalents, when the word is not in the construct state (e.g. haqqa), but at in the construct form
(e.g. haqqat al-mn). Only the names of less well-known places have been transliterated. Standard
abbreviations have been used for titles of encyclopaedias: e.g. EI
:
for the Encyclopaedia of Islam
(Second edition); EIr for the Encyclopaedia Iranica; and EQ for the Encyclopaedia of the Qurn.
Te abbreviation of journal titles is as in the Index Islamicus. Te honorifc may God bless him and
grant him peace (salla Llhu alayhi wal-salam), which traditionally follows the mention of the
Prophet, has been represented as () in the translation; while the honorifc peace be upon him, or
them (alayhi/alayhim al-salm) following the mention of other prophets is represented as (, ).
Te traditional honorifc for may God be pleased with him, her or them (radiyaLlhu anhu/h/
hum/hum) following the mention of others is presented as (, , ). When cross-referencing in
the footnotes, we have referred to the Introduction to the Translation as IT and the Introduction
to the Commentary as IC; cross references to other notes appear by page and note number. Within
Qurnic quotes, square brackets indicate a word or phrase (additional to the Qurnic text) that has
been added to clarify the meaning; parentheses indicate that a part of the Qurnic text has been
added that is not in the Tafsr to provide necessary context for the reader.
In conclusion, we would like to add that the Tafsr al-Qurn al-azm does not represent the
entirety of Qurnic interpretations attributed to Tustar; a large number of other comments in his
name are included in Sulams Haqiq al-tafsr, as well as in Sulams supplement to this work, the
Ziydt haqiq al-tafsr. We had considered the idea of including the translation of these comments
as an appendix to the present publication, but decided that this, in itself no small undertaking,
would be better attempted once Professor Bwerings critical edition of the Haqiq al-tafsr has
been published.

xv
Introduction to the Translation
i. S.ui .i-TUs1.vs Svivi1U.i Fovm.1io .u uis Ti.cuivs
1
S
ahl b. Abd Allh al-Tustar was probably born in :o,/8:8 in Tustar (pronounced in Persian as
Shshtar) in Khzistn, south-western Iran, and it is here that he spent the early years of his
life.
2
When still a young boy, he was introduced to Sufsm by his maternal uncle Muhammad b.
Sawwr, and at the age of seven begged his uncle to allow him to wear the patched frock (muraqqa)
an indication that he had been initiated into the mystical path.
3
Sahl would rise in the early hours
and watch his uncle performing his nightly vigil.
4
It was his uncle who initiated Sahl into the Suf
practice of remembrance of God (dhikr Allh), when one night he told him to recite inwardly with-
out moving his tongue the words, God is with me, God is watching over me, God is my Witness
(Allhu ma, Allhu nzir, Allhu shhid). To begin with, Sahls uncle told him to recite these
words three times. Ten, when Sahl reported to him that he had done this, he instructed him to
recite the words seven times every night, and when Sahl had accomplished this, he fnally increased
the number to eleven times each night, urging the young Sahl to continue this practice every day
until he went to his grave, and explaining to him that he would derive great beneft from them in
this world and the next. Tustar relates that he soon experienced from this practice a sweetness
(halwa) in his heart, and he states that afer continuing the practice for two years, this sweetness
was felt in his innermost being or secret (sirr).

His uncle later said to him, Sahl! If God is with
someone, and beholds him and watches over him, can he then disobey Him? You should never do
so.
5
Tis teaching concerning the remembrance of God that his uncle had instilled in him had a
profound infuence on Tustar, and was to become a cornerstone of his mystical doctrine, as we
shall see. Muhammad b. Sawwr also imparted to his nephew some instruction in Qurnic exegesis,
and hadth.
6
Little is known about Muhammad b. Sawwrs spiritual background other than that
he may have had some connection to Marf al-Karkh (d. :oo/8:,), whom, according to Tustar,
he once described as one of the signifcant masters and spiritual forbears.
7
: For the frst four sections of this introduction, I am indebted to the excellent study on Sahl al-Tustar by Gerhard Bwer-
ing, Te Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam: Te Qurnic Hermeneutics of the Sf Sahl at-Tustar (d. :8/8o)
(Berlin and New York, :8o), as well as the PhD thesis of M. K. I. Gaafar, Te Suf Doctrine of Sahl al-Tustar, with a
Critical Edition of his Rislat al-hurf (Cambridge University, :oo). For the remaining sections of the Introduction,
my main source has been the Tafsr itself.
: An alternative date of :oo/8:, is given in the sources, but both Bwering and Gaafar appear to favour the later date of
:o,/8:8 as more likely.
, Abd Allh al-Ansr, Tabaqt al-sfyya (Kabul, :o:), p. ::o.
Ab al-Qsim al-Qushayr, al-Rislat al-Qushayriyya f ilm al-tasawwuf (Cairo, :oo) p. 8,; trans. Alexander D. Knysh
as Qushayris Epistle on Sufsm (Reading, :oo,), p. ,,.
, Ibid, pp. 8,.
o In the Tafsr Tustar quotes quite a number of hadth transmitted to him by his uncle Muhammad b. Sawwr.
, Ab Abd al-Rahmn al-Sulam, Tabaqt al-sfyya (Leiden, :oo), p. ,.
Tafsr al-Tustar
xvi
Even as a child, Tustar showed a strong inclination to lead an ascetic, solitary and contempla-
tive life.
8
He attended lessons with a Qurn teacher only on the condition that he should be allowed
to return home afer one hour lest his spiritual concentration (himma) be dissipated.
9
It was said
that he lived on barley bread alone until the age of twelve.
10
At the age of thirteen, he experienced
a spiritual crisis in the form of a profound question that persistently troubled him. He requested
that he should be allowed to travel to Basra to discover whether any of the learned men of that city
would be able to answer his question. Finding no one who was able to help him there, he travelled
on to the island of Abbdn (in present-day south-western Iran), where a famous ribt or spiritual
refuge and retreat is said to have been established by followers of Hasan al-Basr. It was here that
Tustar met Ab Habb Hamza b. Abd Allh al-Abbdn, who was at last able to provide him with
an answer to his question.
11
He remained with Ab Habb for some time, in order to beneft from
his knowledge and become trained in the ways of Suf adab, that is, the disposition and modes of
conduct proper to the mystical path.
12
It was also in Abbdn, Tustar relates, that one night he saw
the words: God, there is no god save He, the Living, the Eternal Sustainer [:::,,], written in green
light on one line across the sky from East to West.
13
Afer this period of training under a spiritual master, Tustar returned to his native town of
Tustar, where for some twenty years he mainly lived a solitary life, subjecting himself to exceptionally
rigorous ascetic disciplines with periods of sustained and severe fasting indeed, he is cited many
times in Suf literature as exemplifying the benefts of hunger and fasting. Te following account
is taken from the Risla of Qushayr:
Ten I returned to Tustar. By that time, my diet had been reduced to the point that [my people]
would buy barley for me for a dirham, grind it, and bake it into bread for me. Every night about
dawn, I would break my fast with merely an ounce [of that bread], without salt or condiment.
Te dirham lasted a year for me. Afer that, I resolved to break my fast once every three days,
then once every seven days, then once every twenty-fve days. I continued this practice for
twenty years.
14
Although based in Tustar during this period, afer a few years Tustar did make another journey
away from his home town, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca in the year ::/8,. According to some
reports, it was at Mecca that he frst encountered Dhl-Nn al-Misr (d. :,/8oo).
15
It is not known
whether or not Tustar formally became a disciple of Dhl-Nn, staying with him and remaining
in service to him for a period of time, but there is little doubt that a strong spiritual association was
established between the two mystics.
16
One report does state that Tustar travelled to Egypt to visit
Dhl-Nn, where the latter taught him about the nature of true trust in God (tawakkul), which
is in fact one of the key doctrines that Tustar expounds in his Qurn commentary.
17
Moreover, a
8 Qushayr, Risla, p. 8. Fard al-Dn Attr, Tadhkrat al-awliy (Tehran, ::), p. ,oo.
Qushayr, Risla, p. 8; Attr, Tadhkrat al-awliy, p. ,o,.
:o Qushayr, Risla, p. 8; Attr, Tadhkrat al-awliy, p. ,oo.
:: According to Ibn Arab, Tustars question related to the heart and whether or not it prostrated before God. Te answer
he was given was, Yes, it does, forever. Muhy al-Dn Ibn Arab, al-Futht al-Makkiyya (Beirut, :oo,), vol. :, p. :o:;
vol. :, p. :o; vol. ,, pp. :o and :::o.
:: Qushayr, Risla, pp. 8,.
:, Tis is mentioned in Tustars commentary on :::,,.
: Qushayr, Risla, p. 8,; trans. Bwering, Mystical Vision, p. ,,.
:, Sulam, Tabaqt, p. :; Ab Nuaym al-Isfahn, Hilyat al-awliy (Cairo, :,:8), vol. :o, p. :o; Qushayr, Risla, p.
8,.
:o Both Ansr, Tabaqt, p. ::,, and following him Nr al-Dn Abd al-Rahmn Jm, Nafaht al-uns min hadart al-quds
(Tehran, ::), p. oo, refer to Tustar as a disciple or pupil (shgird) of Dhl-Nn. While, as Bwering reports, Samn
and Ibn al-Athr both describe Tustar as having associated with (sahiba) Dhl-Nn. See Bwering, Mystical Vision,
p. ,o, who cites Abd al-Karm b. Muhammad al-Samn, Kitb al-Ansb, facsimile edition (Leiden, :::), f. :oob and
Izz al-Dn Al b. Muhammad Ibn al-Athr, al-Lubb f tahdhb al-ansb (Cairo, ::o,), vol. :, p. :,o.
:, Te report is to be found in a work compiled by Jall al-Dn al-Suyt on Dhl-Nns life and teaching, published by
Arthur J. Arberry as A Biography of Dhul-Nn Al-Misr, in M. Rm and M. D. Ahmad, Arsh Presentation Volume
xvii
Introduction to the Translation
report in the Kitb al-Luma of Ab Nasr al-Sarrj (d. ,,8/8) indicates that Tustar certainly held
for Dhl-Nn a deference akin to that which a disciple would traditionally hold for his master,
for when asked why in earlier years he had refrained from teaching, he answered: I did not like
to engage in discourse concerning mystical knowledge as long as he [Dhl-Nn] was alive, out of
reverence and respect for him.
18
Later, both the philosopher/mystic Shihb al-Dn Yahy Suhraward Maqtl (d. ,8,/:::), and
Ibn Arab (d. o,8/::o) were to assume in diferent ways a defnite transmission of knowledge
from Dhl-Nn to Tustar. Suhraward linked the two mystics not only to each other, but to the
Hermetic tradition. He explained that of the two currents of ancient wisdom which together formed
the basis of his Philosophy of Illumination (Hikmat al-ishrq), the current which he called the
Pythagorean leaven, that is, the branch of Greek/Pythagorean wisdom that had been transmitted
through Hermes, had come down to Dhl-Nn and from him had passed to Tustar and his party,
whence it had been transmitted to the East.
19
According to Ibn Arab, both Tustar and Junayd had
derived mystical teachings from Dhl-Nn, as well as from other mystics.
20
A comprehensive study
of the sayings and teachings of Dhl-Nn al-Misr, and a careful collation between these and the
corpus of sayings collected from Tustar is required before the extent and nature of infuence of
Dhl-Nn on Tustars thought can be ascertained.
Suhraward was not alone in linking both Dhl-Nn and Tustar to the Hermetic tradition,
21

and there is at least some circumstantial evidence to support this. Dhl-Nn was born and brought
up in Ikhmm, Upper Egypt, a major centre of Hermeticism in the Graeco-Egyptian world.
22
Ibn
Nadm names him as being among the philosophers who spoke about the art of alchemy, and two
works on alchemy, now no longer extant, were said to have been written by him under the guidance
of the famous alchemist, Jbir b. Hayyn (d. ca :oo/8:,).
23
Yet the numerous sayings in the name of
Dhl-Nn that have been preserved in the works of Sufsm are entirely concerned with the mystical
path.
24
Dhl-Nn was known as the leader (imm) among the Sufs,
25
and is said to have been the
frst mystic to have made a distinction between allusion (ishra) and outward expression (ibra),
as well as devising the concept of mystical states and stations.
26
As for Tustar, one anecdote cer-
tainly indicates that he had knowledge of alchemy,
27
and he included both alchemy and astronomy
(New Delhi, :o,), pp. :::,.
:8 Ab Nasr Abd Allh b. Al (al-Ts) al-Sarrj, Kitb al-Luma fl-tasawwuf (London and Leiden, ::), p. :8:.
: Te Khusrawan leaven, on the other hand, was transmitted into Islamic mysticism through Ab Yazd Bistm (d.
:o:/8,), Husayn b. Mansr al-Hallj (d. ,o/::) and Ab al-Hasan Kharaqn (d. :,/:o:). See Shihb al-Dn Yahy
al-Suhraward, Kitb al-Masr wal-mutraht, in Henri Corbin, Opera Metaphysica et Mystica (Istanbul, :,), vol. :
p. ,o:f. For other references see Bwering, Mystical Vision, p. ,:.
:o Ibn Arab, Futht, vol. :, p. :88.
:: For example, the philosopher and historian Ab al-Hasan al-Qift (d. oo/::8), in his Tarkh al-hukam, states that
Dhl-Nn was well-versed in alchemy and the secret hermetic sciences, and mentions both Sahl al-Tustar and al-
Hrith al-Muhsib as being exponents not only of the esoteric knowledge associated with Sufs, but also of the legacy
of the second/eighth-century alchemist and philosopher Jbir b. Hayyn (d. ca :oo/8:,). See al-Qift, Tarkh al-hukam
(Leipzig, :o,), pp. :oo and :8,. For other examples see Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. ,,.
:: See Garth Fowden, Te Egyptian Hermes: A Historical Approach to the Pagan Mind (Cambridge, :o), and especially
pp. ::oo on Zosimus of Ikhmm; and Peter Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, Mysticism and Magic (Oxford, :,), p. ,8.
:, Ibn al-Nadm, Fihrist (Leipzig, :8,::), pp. ,,8 and ,,,; cf. Louis Massignon, Essai sur les origines du lexique technique
de la mystique musulmane (Paris, :::), p. :o,.
: See, for example, sayings of Dhl-Nn cited in Annemarie Schimmels Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill, NC,
:,,), pp. :f.; and Margaret Smith, Studies in Early Mysticism in the Near and Middle East (London and New York,
:,:), pp. ::f. and :,of.
:, Jm, Nafaht al-uns, p. :8, citing Khwja Abd Allh Ansr.
:o Ibid, pp. :,8. It is also worth mentioning that Dhl-Nn is said to have studied with Imam Malik. Moreover, under
the rule of the Caliph al-Mamn he was persecuted for his belief in the uncreated Qurn. Again, see Nafaht al-uns,
p. :,.
:, Sarrj, Kitb al-Luma, pp. ,: and ,:of.; Qushayr, Risla, p. o,,. On the death of a person named Ishq b. Ahmad
(evidently an alchemist who had repented and then become Tustars disciple), Tustar entered his cell and found some
alchemical materials there, a lump of gold, a lump of silver and two bottles containing red and yellow liquids. Tustar
Tafsr al-Tustar
xviii
or astrology in his categorisation of four branches of knowledge, comprising: al-tibb (medicine),
al-nijma (astronomy/astrology), al-diyna (religion) and al-kmiy (chemistry/alchemy).
28
Among
the works attributed to Tustar is an astrological chart, known as a Zirja which, if it ever existed,
has not survived.
29
An extant treatise on the signifcance of the letters of the alphabet is attributed to
him, known as Rislat al-hurf, and Tustar is reported to have commiserated with another mystic,
Ab Abd Allh al-Husayn b. Makk al-Subayh, who was being persecuted for his knowledge of
the divine names and attributes and of the science of the letters (ilm al-asm wal-sift wa ilm
al-hurf).
30
However, the anecdote which shows Tustars knowledge of alchemy also implies that
he did not see ft to practice it himself.
31
His treatise on letters is not concerned with the sciences of
jafr or abjad,
32
but is concerned with the cosmological symbolism of the letters.
33
Again, it can be
said that the examination of Tustars tafsr and other works attributed to him, as well as the corpus
of his sayings that have been preserved in the works of later Sufs, shows the essentially mystical
nature of his thought.
34
It is worth bearing in mind that during the second and third centuries of the Hijra, there was
considerable interest in the diferent traditions of science and wisdom that had been preserved and
were now being translated from Greek, Syriac and other languages into Arabic, especially in the
Fertile Crescent.
35
Dhl-Nn had grown up in a centre of Graeco-Alexandrian learning, and Tustar
not far from Jundishapur, which had been a great centre for the translation of medical and other
scientifc texts. Tus it is no surprise that these two mystics should have been acquainted with, and
possibly have drawn upon, the rich and diverse sources of knowledge that were accessible to them.
It appears that at this time there may have been a particular intellectual fuidity, with boundaries of
knowledge being less sharply drawn between Sufsm other streams of thought. What is remarkable
is not the fact that these early mystics should have been in contact with, or have drawn upon, such
sources of knowledge, but rather the way in which aspects of this knowledge, and terms in which
threw the gold and silver into the River Tigris, and poured the bottles of liquid onto the ground, at the same time ex-
plaining to the disciple who was with him, Muhammad b. Slim, how the elixir of those liquids could transmute copper
and lead into gold and silver.
:8 Kalm Sahl, MS Kprl, ,:,, f. oa.
: See Bwering, Mystical Vision, p. ,, citing Ibn Khaldns Kitb al-Ibar (Beirut, :o:), vol. :, p. :oof, and a much later
work of Isml Ps al-Bghdd (d. :,,8/::o), Hadiyat al-rifn (Istanbul, :,:,), vol. :, p. ::.
,o Tis is recorded in Sarrjs Kitb al-Luma. See Arthur J. Arberrys publication of lacunae from the Luma, entitled Pages
from the Kitb al-Luma (London, :,), p. .
,: As can be seen from the story related in n. :8 above. Tis is not to say that mystics in general, and Muslim mystics in
particular, were necessarily opposed to alchemy, which was rich in symbolism and could even be practised as a spiritual
discipline. On the spiritual dimensions of alchemy, see Fowden, Egyptian Hermes. On Sufsm and alchemy, see Pierre
Lory, Alchimie et mystique en terre dIslam (Lagrasse, :8). Tustars objection may have been to its practice purely in
material terms. Interestingly, we fnd him using the language of alchemy in the Tafsr.
,: On the science of divination according to the numerical values of the letters in the Qurn, see T. Fahd, Djafr, EI
:
, vol.
ii, p. ,,, (although Fahd does not make a clear distinction between jafr and the cosmological and metaphysical specula-
tions on the letters made by mystics); Azartash Azarnoosh, Abjad, trans. R. Gholami, Encyclopaedia Islamica, vol. :, p.
,,.
,, See Gaafars doctoral dissertation, which includes an edition, translation and commentary on Tustars Rislat al-hurf.
Te treatise was subsequently published along with other works ascribed to Tustar in idem (Muhammad Kaml Ibrhm
Jafar), Min al-turth al-Tustar al-sf: dirsa wa tahqq (Cairo, :,), vol. :. See also Pilar Garrido Clementes article,
El Tradado de las Letras (Rislat al-hurf) del Suf Sahl al-Tustar, Anuario de Estudios Filolgicos : (:ooo), pp. 8,:oo,
which comprises a discussion and Spanish translation of the treatise; and idem, Estudio, Traduccin y edicin de las
obras de Ibn Masarra de Crdoba: la Ciencia de las Letras en el Sufsmo, PhD thesis (University of Salamanca, :oo,).
, Tat is to say, discussions of a theological and ethical nature are mainly centred on Tustars vision of the spiritual purpose
of mans existence, as has been discussed by both Bwering and Gaafar in their comprehensive studies of the teachings
of Tustar.
,, On this subject see Richard Walzer, Greek into Arabic (Oxford, :o:); Franz Rosenthal, Te Classical Heritage in Islam,
translated from the German by Emile and Jenny Marmorstein (London, ::); Dimitri Gutas, Greek Wisdom Literature
in Arabic Translation (New Haven, CT, :,,); idem, Greek Tought, Arabic Culture (:ndth/8th:oth centuries) (London,
:8); and idem, Greek Philosophers in the Arabic Tradition (Aldershot, :ooo).
xix
Introduction to the Translation
they were expressed were assimilated, and integrated by them, so as to become part of the language
they used to expound their doctrines.
36
ii. TUs1.v .s Svivi1U.i M.s1iv, .u uis Disciviis
According to Tustars own statement quoted above, he began teaching afer the death of Dhl-Nn,
in the year :,/8oo. At this time he must have begun teaching publicly, that is, to a larger group
of followers, though it is possible that he had already been imparting instruction to those of his
disciples who were closest to him, such as Muhammad b. Slim (d. :,/o), who claimed to have
been with him for his whole life.
37
Sometime between the years :o:/8,o and :o,/8,,, Tustar was
forced to leave Tustar and fee to Basra along with his disciples.
38
Traditional sources are agreed that
a local scholar, or at least someone claiming or purported to be a devout man of learning, roused
the people against him. Both Sarrj and Fard al-Dn Attr (d. before o:,/:::o) state that it was
Tustars particular emphasis on the need for repentance (tawba) that was the focus of the scholars
disapproval,
39
while according to a report quoted from Sulam, the antagonist made the accusation
that Tustar was claiming to be visited by angels, spirits and devils with whom he had conversed.
40

Tustar was, according to the diferent accounts, accused either of committing evil acts or of heresy,
and driven out of the city.
41
Once he had settled in Basra, Tustars life was not entirely free of controversy, for on one occa-
sion, he was challenged by two Shf jurists, Ab Zakariyya al-Sj and Ab Abd Allh al-Zubayr,
who took objection to his statement: I am the proof of God (hujjat Allh) for you in particular and
for the people in general, and went to question him as to whether he considered himself to be a
prophet or a righteous saint. Tustars response to their objections eventually led them to acknowl-
edge his spiritual superiority.
42
Tustar made his home in Basra until his death in :8,/8o. He was
apparently happily married and had at least one child.
43
Tustar had numerous disciples, some of whom remained with him for many years, while others
stayed only a short time. Among his long-standing disciples, the most important were: Muhammad
b. Slim and the latters son Ahmad b. Slim (d. ,,o/o,), both of whom transmitted and expounded
numerous sayings and teachings of Tustar; Ab Bakr al-Sijz who received permission to transmit
,o One obvious example in the case of Tustars Tafsr is his reference to red sulphur (kibrt ahmar) (Tafsr, ::o:). Many
other examples could be found, such as his defnition of diferent dispositions or natures (tabi) within the human
being (Tafsr, :::,,). On the diverse sources of terms assimilated into the mystical language of Mansr b. al-Hallj, see
Massignon, Te Passion of al-Hallj, trans. Herbert Mason (Princeton, :8:), vol. ,, pp. of.
,, According to Sarrj, Kitb al-Luma, p. :,,, or many years, according to Qushayr, Risla, p. o,; while he was his disciple
for between thirty and sixty years according Ansr, Tabaqt al-sfyya, p :,8.
,8 For a discussion of the likely dates of Tustars move to Basra see Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. ,8f.
, Sarrj, Kitb al-Luma, p. o,. Tis is also mentioned among the lacunae from Sarrjs Luma in Arberry, Pages, p. ,
and in Attr, Tadhkirat al-awliy, p. ,oo. Te objection was to the fact that Tustar expressed the view that repentance
(tawba) was a religious obligation (farda), and that just as the sinner must repent of his sin, so also the obedient person
(mut) must repent of his acts of obedience.
o Ibn al-Jawz, Talbs Ibls (Cairo, :,o), p. :o:. Perhaps this was a misrepresentation of Tustars account of his encounter
with a jinn, which is discussed below.
: Gaafar (dissertation, pp. ::,) suggests other factors which may have aroused the opposition of the ulam in Tustar,
such as the wide publicity concerning Tustars miracles or charismata, some of his wild and ambiguous utterances
(shataht) and his continuous criticism of various classes of religious scholars, Qurn reciters and ascetics. Bwering,
however, conjectures that there may have been political reasons for his departure, for which see Bwering, Mystical
Vision, pp. ,o,.
: Bwering, Mystical Vision, p. o, citing Abd al-Wahhb al-Sharn, Tabaqt al-kubr (Cairo, :,:,/:8,), vol. :, p. o,; and
Ibn al-Jawz, Talbs Ibls, p. :o. Ab Abd Allh al-Zubayr is also mentioned by Sarrj as having persecuted al-Subayh
(see above p. xviii and n. ,o), the mystic with whom Tustar commiserated, and to whom he pointed out that people
were not able to tolerate the knowledge they were speaking about. See Arberry, Pages, p. .
, Gaafar (dissertation, p. :,o) notes, without citing any sources, that from Tustars description of the way that she brought
up their son, it appears that his wife was also something of an ascetic.
Tafsr al-Tustar
xx
Tustars Tafsr in the year :,,/888; and Umar b. Wsil al-Anbar, who narrated anecdotes about
Tustar and elucidated some of his Qurn interpretations. Others who are named by the sources as
direct disciples of Tustar include Husayn b. Mansr al-Hallj, who became his disciple at the age of
sixteen and stayed with him only two years, perhaps moving to Basra with Tustar, but then going on
to join Junayds circle in Bagdhad; Hasan b. Khalaf al-Barbahr (d. ,:/:), a well-known Hanbal
theologian and jurist of Baghdad; Ab Muhammad b. Husayn al-Jurayr (d. ,::/:), who went
on to become one of of Junayds foremost disciples, supervising his circle afer his death; and Ab
al-Hasan b. Muhammad al-Muzayyin al-Tirmidh (d. ,:8/,), who was also a disciple of Junayd.
44
Tustars disciples not only transmitted his teachings and aphorisms, they also related their
own observations about their masters spiritual states, as well as sayings in which Tustar himself
described his mystical experiences. Many of these are included in the text of the Tafsr. Among them
are reports of some miraculous events which Tustar either described to them, or they themselves
witnessed. Ab Bakr al-Sijz assumes Tustars account of meeting a man who eats a pomegranate
from Paradise, and his vivid description of how it tasted, to be an indication that Tustar himself
had tasted the fruit.
45
Umar b. Wsil relates how one night Tustar held his fnger in the fame of a
lamp for nearly two hours without feeling any pain.
46
Yet another anecdote tells of two men who
came to visit Tustar afer the afernoon prayer, and then mysteriously vanished. When Muhammad
b. Slim enquired where they had gone, he replied that one of them prayed the sunset prayer in
the East, and the other in the West.
47
Tustar himself describes his encounter and conversation
with a jinn who was of such a great age that he had met both Jesus and Muhammad.
48
He was also
famed for his intimacy with wild beasts and birds. In the Tafsr it is related that he kept a room in
his house which he called the room for predatory beasts. Te beasts would approach him, and he
would admit them into that room, ofer them hospitality, feed them some meat, and then let them
go free.
49
He warned one of his young disciples that if he was afraid of predatory beasts he should
not keep company with him.
50
Many other anecdotes recount diferent miraculous occurrences
involving Tustar.
51
However, Tustar did not pay any particular regard to these miracles or rather, charismata.
52

For example, when people remarked at having seen him walking upon water, he recounted to them
an incident in which the muezzin of the mosque had rescued him from drowning once when he fell
into a pool.
53
When asked how a person might reach the rank of such charismatic gifs, he replied,
Whoever abstains from the world for forty days in true faith and sincerity, will have charismatic
gifs (karmt) manifested to him from God, Mighty and Majestic is He. So, if [such gifs] are not
manifested to a person, it is due to the lack of true faith and sincerity in his renunciation.
54
Several
anecdotes about Tustar illustrate his humility. For example, one day someone remarked to him, O
Other disciples and associates of Tustar are discussed in detail by Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. ,8.
, Tafsr, :::,.
o Tafsir, :::o.
, Tafsir, :::
8 Tafsr, ,:::.
Tafsr, :o:o:; see also Sarrj, Kitb al-Luma, p. ,:o, where Sahls house was called the house of predatory beasts (bayt
al-sabu).
,o Tafsr, ,::,. A similar anecdote (Qushayr, Risla, p. ,, Attr, Tadhkira, p. ,o) relates that a young visitor found a
viper in the house and became afraid, whereupon Tustar warned him that no one reaches the reality of faith (haqqat
al-mn) as long as he fears anything on the face of the earth.
,: Other anecdotes about charismatic episodes connected with Tustar are cited in Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. o8,:.
,: Te term charismatic gifs or charismata (translating karmt, sing. karma) is used here to distinguish it from other
kinds of miracles defned in Arabic by the word (mujizt, sing. mujiza). Te former are associated with saints or
friends of God, while the latter are the preserve of prophets. On this subject see Josef W. Meri, Te Cult of Saints among
Muslims and Jews in Medieval Syria (Oxford, :oo:), pp. ,,o and Kitb Kasr al-shahwatayn, trans. Timothy J. Winter,
Al-Ghazl on Disciplining the Soul and on Breaking the Two Desires (Cambridge, :,), p. ,, n. A.
,, Qushayr, Risla, p. ,o,; Attr, Tadhkira, pp. ,o8.
, Tafsir, ,::,; Attr, Tadhkra, p. ,:.
xxi
Introduction to the Translation
Ab Muhammad! Look what [God] has done with you and how He has elevated you! But he was
totally unafected by these words and said, It is He who is sought, He who is sought!
55
Regarding
his mystical knowledge, he is quoted as having said:
Indeed, God willing, I have been granted wisdom and [knowledge of] the unseen which I was
taught from His unseen secret (min ghayb sirrihi), and thus He sumced me from the need for
all other knowledgeand He completed what He had begun with me out of His grace and
benefcence.
56
Tis statement is an indication of Tustars constant awareness of his dependence on God, and of
his perpetual consciousness of Gods presence, precisely the teaching that had been instilled in him
by his uncle. Tus it is related that he said, My state during the ritual prayer and before entering
ritual prayer is the very same.
57
Mention has been made of Tustars apparently extreme imposition of hunger and fasting on
himself. But the sources indicate that this practice was for him not a matter of self-mortifcation; it
was rather that, as Bwering has observed, he was wholly sustained by God.
58
Tus it is reported that
when questioned on the subject of provision, Tustar stated that the believers daily bread (qt) is
God, his sustenance (qiwm) is the remembrance of God, and his nourishment (ghidh) is religious
knowledge (ilm).
59
He certainly extolled the spiritual benefts of certain ascetic practices, as when
he said, God created the world and placed knowledge and wisdom in hunger, and ignorance in
satiety.
60
He also recommended that his disciples lead a life of simplicity, as when he advised them:
Let your food be barley, your sweetmeat dates, your condiment salt and your fat yoghurt. You
should let your clothes be of wool, your houses be mosques, your source of light the sun, your
lamp the moon, your perfume water, your splendour be in cleanliness, and your adornment
wariness (hadhr) [of God]...
61
However, it is clear that he neither expected nor demanded that his disciples should attain the same
level of abstinence as him. One of his disciples reports:
Sahl used to intensify his ecstasy (wajd) for seventy days, during which he would not eat
anything, while he would order his companions to eat meat once a week so that they would
not become too weak for worship. However for him, when he ate he would become weak, and
when he became hungry he would gain in strength. He would sweat during the severe cold of
winter while wearing only one shirt.
62
Tustar explained the principle as follows:
One should always adopt hardship for oneself, but when giving counsel to others, one should
choose what is bearable and easy. To do this is to follow in the footsteps of the Prophet, who,
when confronted with a particular matter concerning the community, used to choose what
was light and gentle, but when the matter concerned himself, would apply that which is hard-
est and most severe.
63
Moreover, Tustar had some knowledge of medicine, yet it is reported that for thirty years he suf-
fered from an illness which he used to treat in others, whilst not applying the treatment to himself.
64

,, Tafsr, ::o:.
,o Tafsr, ::,.
,, Sarrj, Kitb al-Luma, p. :, .
,8 Bwering, Mystical Vision, p. ,o.
, Ibid, citing Ab Tlib al-Makk, Qt al-qulb f mumalat al-mahbb, : vols. (Beirut, :,), vol. :, p. :8:.
oo Tafsr, ,:,:.
o: Tafsr, ,::,:.
o: Tafsr, :,:,.
o, Kalm Sahl b. Abd Allh, MS Kprl ,:,, ,:a; ed. Gaafar (Jafar), Min al-turth al-Tustar, vol. :, p. :,o. Tis was also
the principle which Tustar followed with regard to the practice of total trust in God (tawakkul) and earning (kasb), for
which see, for example, his commentary on :,:,8 in the Tafsr.
o Murada, MS Kprl ,:,, f. :,ob, :oo; Sarrj, Kitb al-Luma, pp. :o,. See also Qushayr, Risla, pp. o8:, ,o.
Tafsr al-Tustar
xxii
Towards the end of his life he became weakened both by this illness and by the efects of age, to the
point that he could not get up from where he was sitting. Even so, Sarrj reports that when it came
time for prayer, he would stand upright like a pole in the prayer niche.
65
Concerning his qualities,
Ab Bakr al-Sijz relates:
It was his way and his conduct to be full of gratitude and remember [God] a great deal. He was
also constant in observing silence and refection. He would dispute little and was of a generous
spirit. He led people through his good character, mercy and compassion for them, and by giv-
ing good counsel to themTruly God flled his heart with light, and made his tongue speak
with wisdomIf it wasnt for the fact that nobody can be valued alongside the Companions
because of their companionship and witnessing [of the Prophet ], then one would say that
he was as one of them. He lived a praiseworthy life and died as a stranger in Basra, may God
have mercy upon him.
66
Afer his death, Tustars close circle of disciples divided broadly into two groups. Ab Muhammad
al-Jurayr and Ab al-Hasan al-Muzayyin went to Baghdad and entered the circle of Junayds disciples.
Hasan al-Barbahr and Umar b. Wsil also went to Baghdad, and are known to have preached in
the Hanbal quarter of the city. Te sources indicate that all these disciples eventually moved to, or
spent a period in Mecca, where they would have disseminated Tustars teachings among the com-
munity of renunciants (zuhhd) and metics (mujwirn) who chose to live close to the Sanctuary.
67

Muhammad b. Slim and his son Ahmad b. Slim, on the other hand, remained in Basra, where
they assembled a group of associates (ashb) around them, who came to be known as the Slimiyya.
Some teachings of this so-called group of Suf theologians,
68
were later denounced by the Shrz
Suf Ibn Khaff (d. ,,:/8:),
69
the Hanbal theologian, Ab Yal b. al-Farr (d. ,8/:oo,),
70
and
following the latter, the Hanbal Suf Abd al-Qdir al-Jln (d. ,o:/::o,).
71
Some of these points
may well amount to misreadings of sayings attributed Tustar and his followers, such as the words:
God has a secret; if He were to make it manifest, the divine providence would be rendered null.
Te prophets have a secret; if they were to make it manifest, prophethood would be rendered null.
Te learned have a secret; if they were to make it manifest, knowledge would be rendered null.
72
o, Sarrj, Kitb al-Luma, p. :,,; Attr, Tadhkira, p. ,o.
oo Tafsr, :o:o:.
o, See Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. 88f. for sources.
o8 According to the geographer al-Maqdis (d. ,8o/o), the Slimiyya were a group of popular preachers and ascetic Suf
theologians at Basra. See Abd Allh Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Maqdis (al-Muqaddas), Ahsan al-taqsm f marifat
al-aqlm (Leiden, :8,,), pp. ::o and :,o. Tey were also designated as a band of kalm scholars by Abd al-Qhir al-
Baghdd in his al-Farq bayn al-fraq (Beirut, :,,), p. :, (cited by Tobias Mayer, Teology and Sufsm, in Timothy J.
Winter, ed., Te Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Teology [Cambridge, :oo8], p. :o:).
o Tese were apparently compiled in a treatise that is no longer extant, al-Radd al Ibn Slim, for which see Bwering,
Mystical Vision, p. ,, citing Fuad Sezgin, Geschichte des Arabischen Schriftums (Leiden, :o,), vol. :, p. oo,; Massignon,
Essai, p. ,: and Ab al-Hasan Al al-Daylam, Srat-i Ibn-i Khaff, translated into Persian by Rukn al-Dn Yahy b. al-
Junayd al-Shrz, ed. Annemarie Schimmel (Tehran, :8); see editors introduction, p. ,:.
,o In his al-Mutamad f usl al-dn (Beirut, :,), pp. ::,::. Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. ,, has translated the
eighteen objectionable points listed by Ibn al-Farr.
,: Abd al-Qdir al-Jln, al-Ghunya li-tlib tarq al-haqq (Cairo, :,::/:o), vol. :, pp :oof. According to Bwering,
Mystical Vision, p. ,, Jln copied the list of Ibn al-Farr, omitting fve of the points.
,: Tis, the ffh proposition in Ibn al-Farrs list, may be traced to a saying cited in Makks Qt al-qulb, vol. :, p. :; and
Abd al-Wahhb al-Sharn, Tabaqt al-kubr (Cairo, :oo,), vol. :, p. :::. Te saying as it appears in Makks Qt al-qulb
is attributed anonymously to one of them, and might be translated as follows: Te divine lordliness (rubbiyya) has a
secret which, if revealed, would render prophesy (nubuwwa) null; prophesy has a secret which, were it to be uncovered,
would render knowledge (ilm) null; and the knowers of God (ulam biLlh) have a secret which, were God to reveal
it, would render the laws (ahkm) null. Te sustenance of faith and continual existence of the Law [is ensured] through
the withholding of the secret. Trough it [Gods] management [of things] (tadbr) is implemented and on its basis the
command[s] and prohibition[s] are ordered. I am grateful to Harith Bin Ramli both for locating this citation and for
the translation of this extract, which is largely his. Te statement is slightly reminiscent of part of Tustars comment on
::::o8: For sure, the inner truth [or secret, sirr] has not been revealed to people, for if it were disclosed to them then
they would have perceived it. Nor have they witnessed [it], for if they had witnessed it, the whole matter would be over,
xxiii
Introduction to the Translation
Or:
Te [divine] volition (irda) is a branch of the divine will (masha), and the divine will is the
root of the divine volition. Te divine will is eternal and the volition is originated.
73
Other points may amount to distortions of sayings of Tustar or his followers, or an exoteric, literal-
ist reading of some esoteric sayings. Te latter is likely, for example, in the case of the eighteenth
proposition: God is present in every place, and there is no diference between the divine Trone
and other places.
74
It was through the Slimiyya that Tustars teachings reached Ab Tlib al-Makk (d. ,8o/o).
Makk grew up in Mecca, where he is said to have studied with the Suf Ab Sad al-Arab (d.
,:/,:), who was of Basran origin and had been for a time in the circle of Junayd in Baghdad.
Later Makk went to Baghdad, where he studied for a while under Ab Nasr al-Sarrj, and then to
Basra, where he spent time with the Slimiyya, although it is not known whether or not he ever met
Ahmad b. Slim in person. Eventually he returned to Baghdad, where he ended his days. Makks best
known work, the Qt al-qulb (Nourishment of Hearts), was to become one of the most important
sources for the transmission and propagation of Tustars sayings.
75
Bwering notes that Tustar is
quoted some two hundred times in the work, while there are also sayings of Ahmad b. Slim. He
refers to the former as the master of our master (shaykh shaykhin), which would indicate that he
regarded Ahmad b. Slim as his master.
76
Te Qt al-qulb was later copiously used as a source by
Ab Hmid al-Ghazl in the composition of his Ihy ulm al-dn,
77
which has been described as
an enlargement and popularisation of the Qt al-qulb,
78
and as a brilliant reworking of this ofen
dense and at times abstruse compendium on piety.
79
It has recently been argued that another work
attributed to Makk, bearing the title Ilm al-qulb (Knowledge or Science of Hearts) is in fact a
composition of unknown authorship dating from the ffh/eleventh century.
80
iii. TUs1.vs Wovxs
Pre-modern bibliographical sources list some fourteen titles of diferent works ascribed to Tustar.
81

However, only two of those listed works fnd equivalents of real signifcance among Tustars extant
works, namely his commentary on the Qurn and a work on the stories of the prophets (Qisas
al-anbiy), though even then there is no precise correspondence between titles.
82
On the other hand,
and that is a grave matter.
,, Te thirteenth proposition in Ibn al-Farrs list, which may be compared to sayings of Tustar cited in Kalm Sahl b.
Abd Allh, ed. Gaafar, in idem (Jafar), Min al-turth al-Tustar, Part :, pp. :o: and ,o,; MS Kprl ,:,, f. ,:b and ::a.
Gaafar has summarised this teaching as it appears in f. ,:b, as follows: Gods Will (or Uncreated Will, masha), is
associated with His Knowledge, while Gods Volition (or Creative Will, irda) is associated with His Omnipotence.
Te masha is the gate of Knowledge (bb al-ilm); the irda is the gate of Omnipotence (bb al-qudra).
, Compare the statement in Makks Qt al-qulb (vol. :, p. ::), His proximity to the earth and to everything is as His
proximity to the Trone
,, Makk, Qt al-qulb. Translated into German with introduction and commentary by Richard Grmlich as Die Nahrung
der Herzen (Stuttgart, ::,).
,o Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. :,,.
,, Ab Hmid Muhammad al-Ghazl, Ihy ulm al-dn (Damascus, ::,/:,).
,8 Ali Hasan Abdel-Kader, Te Life, Personality and Works of al-Junayd (London, :,), p. xiv.
, Ahmet T. Karamustafa, Sufsm: Te Formative Period (Edinburgh, :oo,), p. 88. Te infuence of Makks work on Ghazls
Ihy is also discussed by Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in al-Ghazzl (Jerusalem, :,,), pp. ,,, and by Kojiro Nakamura,
Makk and Ghazl on Mystical Practices, Orient :o (:8), pp. 8,:.
8o See Nasrollah Pourjavady, Bzmnda-yi kitb-i al-Ishrah wal-ibrah-i Ab Sad Khargsh dar kitb-i Ilm al-qulb,
Marif :,, no. , (:) ,:; now republished in idem, Pazhhishh-yi irfn: just-u-j dar manbi-i kuhan (Tehran,
:ooo), pp. o,:.
8: For a full list of these see Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. 8::.
8: Te only pre-modern bibliographical source to allude to the Tafsr is the Tabaqt al-mufassirn of Shams al-Dn
Muhammad al-Dwd (d. ,/:,,8), who does not mention any title, but names Tustar as the author of a Qurn
Tafsr al-Tustar
xxiv
we fnd among extant works ascribed to Tustar, titles of several works not listed among the early
bibliographical sources. Important among these are three collections of Tustars sayings that are
preserved in a manuscript in the Kprl Library in Istanbul, MS, no. ,:, (dated seventh century
.u). Tey are entitled: Kitb al-Sharh wal-bayn li-m ashkala min kalm Sahl (Explanation and
Elucidation of Dimcult Points in Sahls Doctrine); Kitb al-Murada wal-radd l ahl al-frq wa
ahl al-daw fl-ahwl (Remonstrance and Refutation of the People of Factions and of the People
of Pretensions Concerning Mystical States); Kalimt al-imm al-rabbn Sahl b. Abd Allh al-Tustar
(Sayings of our Lordly Guide, Sahl b. Abd Allh al-Tustar).
83
Another extant work attributed to
Tustar but not listed in the bibliographical works is the Rislat al-hurf (Treatise on the Letters),
which appears to have been preserved in one manuscript only, held in the Chester Beatty collec-
tion, CH. Beatty ,:o,/,. Te treatise is a short work, most of which comprises a metaphysical and
cosmological exposition of the relation between God, His names, His attributes and His creation,
and the signifcance of the letters.
84
Among those extant works ascribed to Tustar that are also mentioned in bibliographical sources
is the Tafsr al-Qurn al-azm, which is preserved in six extant manuscripts and will be discussed
in a separate section below. A work of not entirely unquestionable authenticity is the Latif al-qisas
(Subtleties of the Stories [of the Prophets]), which comprises :, chapters, :: of which relate subtle
refections on a particular prophet, beginning with Adam and ending with Muhammad, while the
remaining three chapters consist of Suf anecdotes and sections on ritual prayer and the Basmala.
85

Another title listed among Tustars works, the authenticity of which is less likely, is the Rislat
al-manhiyt (Treatise on Illicit Acts),
86
while the Risla fl-hikam wal-tasawwuf (Treatise on
Wisdom and Sufsm),
87
represents a collection of Tustars sayings gleaned from Qushayrs Risla
fl-tasawwuf.
Aside from these works in Tustars name, many of his sayings have been preserved in the works
of Sufsm, among the most important being the Kitb al-Luma of Ab Nasr al-Sarrj and the Qt
al-qulb of Ab Tlib al-Makk (mentioned above). Both of these writers had direct contact with
the second generation of Tustars followers. Other early sources for Tustars sayings include the
so-called manuals of Sufsm, such as those of Kalbdh,
88
Hujwr
89
and Qushayr; biographical
or hagiographical works such as the Tabaqt al-sfyya of Sulam (d. ::/:o::), and the Hilyat
commentary. Te extant work on stories of the prophets bears the title Latif qisas al-anbiy and is preserved in MS
Talat, mag. :8,, whereas Hjj Khalfa in his Kashf al-zunn (Leipzig, :8,,), vol. , pp. ,o, and ,:8, and Isml Psh in
his Hadiyat al-rifn, vol. :, p. ::, list a work entitled simply Qisas al-anbiy.
8, Te frst and third of these collections of sayings are also preserved in the Asad Library, MSS, :o:, and ,,:, respectively.
Te content of these works is discussed by Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. ::o, and by Gaafar, dissertation, pp. :f. As
was noted above, Gaafar has also edited and published these works in Gaafar (Jafar), Min al-turth al-Tustar.
8 Regarding the authenticity of this work, Bwering (Mystical Vision, pp. :,8) expresses the view that the internal criteria
do not go further than to prove a similarity of ideas. Gaafar, however, argues for its authenticity in his dissertation, pp.
,,, as does Pilar Garrido Clemente in her article, El Tradado de las Letras. A critical edition of this work is included
in her PhD thesis cited above, n. ,. On the question of authenticity, we might also refer again to the report in Sarrjs
Kitb al-Luma mentioned above (Arberry, Pages, p. ), where Tustars comments indicate that he was in sympathy
with Subayh who was known for his knowledge of Gods names, attributes and the science of the letters, precisely the
subject matter of the Rislat al-hurf.
8, Bwerings view is that external evidence would confrm Tustars authorship of the work, since Hjj Khalfa not only
lists a Qisas al-anbiy as among Tustars compositions, but also quotes the frst sentence of the work, which exactly
matches that of the manuscript. However, Bwering suggests that the internal evidence is not so strong, since, while
some subject matter resembles that of the Tafsr, there are no particular sayings or passages corresponding to any mate-
rial in other works ascribed to Tustar, or to his sayings in other Suf sources. See Mystical Vision, pp. :o:,.
8o Te treatise is held in Tehran, Tehran Faculty of Law, :,:j.
8, Tis treatise is held in Istanbul, Ayasofa ::8/.
88 Ab Bakr Muhammad b. Ishq al-Kalbdh, Kitb al-Taarruf li-madhhab ahl al-tasawwuf (Cairo, :,); English trans.,
Arthur J. Arberry as Doctrine of the Sufs (Cambridge, :,,).
8 Al Uthmn Jullb al-Hujwr, Kashf al-mahjb (Tehran, :oo); references in the text are to the Tehran, :oo edition;
English trans., Reynold A. Nicholson as Kashf al-mahjb: Te Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufsm (London, :::).
xxv
Introduction to the Translation
al-awliy of Isfahn (d. ,o/:o,8);
90
and other treatises, such as the Kitb Atf al-alif al-malf of
Daylam (f. oo/:ooo).
91
iv. Tui Tzrs|v zi-Qcvz zi-Az|m
Evidence suggests that Tustars Tafsr, like many other Suf works of this period, was not a writ-
ten composition of Tustars hand, but was delivered orally by him to a circle of disciples, who
preserved and transmitted it. At a later date the Tafsr was then compiled and written down, with
some additions.
92
Although the earliest extant manuscripts of the Tafsr date to the ninth/ffeenth
and tenth/sixteenth centuries,
93
the authorities cited by an anonymous scribe in the introduction
of the original archetype of these manuscripts make it possible to date this archetype considerably
earlier, to the mid-sixth/twelfh century.
94
However, since numerous comments cited in the name
of Tustar by Ab Abd al-Rahmn al-Sulam in his Haqiq al-tafsr
95
are identical word for word
with comments in the Tafsr, it is possible that the latter already existed in written form at least by
the late fourth/tenth or early ffh/eleventh century. Since Sulam includes some comments ascribed
to Tustar that are absent from the Tafsr, it may be assumed either that the former had derived
these comments from a separate written or oral source, or that he was drawing comments from a
larger version of the text.
96
In his detailed analysis of the history, structure and compilation of Tustars Tafsr, Bwering
has identifed three structural layers in its composition, marking stages in its compilation: the
frst comprises Tustars actual comments on the verses; the second includes a number of Tustars
aphorisms on mystical topics (usually those raised in the comments) as well as illustrative mate-
rial taken from the stories of the prophets, probably added by Tustars disciples; the third level
represents further insertions into the text by later hands, and includes exegetical proof texts taken
from the Qurn and ahdth, the lengthy explanation of a poem, and anecdotes about Tustar. Two
of Tustars disciples who appear to have been the main compilers of the Tafsr, and who are most
ofen named in the Tafsr, are Ab Bakr al-Sijz and Umar b. Wsil, while Muhammad b. Slim is
also mentioned (as Ibn Slim), though only three or four times.
97
Te Tafsr includes comments on selected verses of all the sras of the Qurn, amounting to
comments on some :ooo verses in all. As Bwering has suggested, it is likely that Tustars exegesis
of the Qurn was delivered during sessions in which the Qurn was recited.
98
Afer the recita-
tion of portions of the Qurn, he would have commented on certain verses, or parts of the verses,
according to meanings that he was moved to expound. In its present written form, the comments
follow on from the verses, and, with a few exceptions (most notably in Srat al-Baqara and Srat
o Isfahn, Hilyat al-awliy.
: Ab al-Hasan Al al-Daylam, Atf al-alif al-malf all-lm al-matf (Cairo, :o:); French trans. by Jean-Claude
Vadet as Le trait damour mystique dal-Daylami (Geneva, :8o); English trans. by Joseph N. Bell as A Treatise on
Mystical Love (Edinburgh, :oo,). For a detailed account of the respective importance of these works and many later
Suf works as sources for the Tustar tradition, see Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. :8:.
: For a detailed study of the history, authenticity, structure and compilation of Tustars Tafsr, see Bwering, Mystical
Vision, Chapter III.
, MS Gotha ,: is dated 8:,/:::, MS Ftih o,8, 8,:/:::, while MS San o: is dated ,o/:,,o and MS Ftih ,88, o,/:,,8.
A full discussion of the MSS is given in Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. :oo,.
Te two authorities mentioned are Ab Bakr al-Balad (d. ,o/:::o) and his grandson Ab Nasr al-Balad (d. afer
,,:/::,o). See Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. :o,8.
, Ab Abd al-Rahmn al-Sulam, Haqiq al-tafsr, MS British Museum Or. ,,; ed. Sayyid Imrn (Beirut, :oo:).
o For a list showing the presence of comments on diferent verses of the Qurn ascribed to Tustar in the Haqiq al-tafsr
of Sulam, the Aris al-bayn f haqiq al-Qurn of Rzbihn b. Ab Nasr Baql (Lucknow, :,:,/:88), al-Muwfaqt f
usl al-ahkm of Ibrhm b. Ms al-Shtib (d. ,o/:,88), (Cairo, :::), and al-Shif bi-tarf huqq al-mustaf of Iyd
b. Ms al-Qd (d. ,/::), (Damascus, :,:), as against Tustars Tafsr, see Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. ::,:o.
, See Mystical Vision, pp. ::8,,.
8 Ibid, pp. :,,f.
Tafsr al-Tustar
xxvi
l Imrn), are arranged according to their conventional numbering. Te nature of the exegetical
content is varied, and includes exoteric interpretations which either provide additional information
and context for the verses, or explain and expand upon their literal meaning,
99
as well as comments
that might be considered ethical in nature.
100
However, there is sumcient content of an esoteric
nature for Tustars commentary to have been counted as part of the Suf tradition of Qurnic
exegesis.
101
It was, moreover, liberally used as a source for later Suf commentaries, such as those
of Sulam, Maybud (f. sixth/twelfh century)
102
and Rzbihn Baql (d. ooo/::o). In addition
to its exegetical content, the Tafsr al-Qurn al-azm includes other material of a largely esoteric
nature, such as discussions of mystical topics which arise in the interpretations, anecdotes about
earlier mystics and about Tustar himself, and numerous aphorisms of Tustar concerning diferent
aspects of the mystical path.
v. TUs1.vs Avvvo.cu 1o QUvl I1ivvvi1.1io
Tustars Tafsr includes a number of traditions and statements which give us some idea of the
principles underlying his interpretation of the Qurn. Several of these speak of diferent levels of
meaning in the scripture, and among them are three quoted from Tustar himself, all of which are
presented in the Introduction to the Commentary.
Te frst is cited in the context of a discussion of the process of revelation:
God sent down the Qurn in fve instalments of fve verses at a time: fve clear verses (muhkam),
fve ambiguous verses (mutashbih),
103
fve concerning what is permissible (hall), fve con-
cerning what is prohibited (harm), and fve parabolic verses (amthl). Te believer who has
gnosis (marifa) of God, Exalted is He, adheres to what is clear in it, believes what is ambiguous,
holds as permissible that which it has made permissible, holds as prohibited that which it has
prohibited and comprehends its similitudes, as He has said: but only those understand them
[the similitudes] who know [::,] that is, those who have knowledge (ilm) of God, Exalted
is He, and especially those who have gnosis (marifa) of Him.
104
In the passage above, Tustar has indicated an esoteric understanding or gnosis (marifa) of the
similitudes (amthl) or parabolic verses of the Qurn. In a second statement he mentions knowledge
of both the inner and outer levels of meaning in the Qurn, as when he states in the Introduction
to the Commentary:
God has said, Mighty and Majestic is He, We have made it an Arabic Qurn [,:,] that
is, we have expounded it in a clear Arabic tongue in the letters of the alphabet which God
has clearly set forth for you, and by which you attain to knowledge of [its] inner (btin) and
outward (zhir) [meanings].
105
Comments of this type are too numerous to list, but we may cite here ,:8,, :::,, ::,, ,:: and o,:: as examples.
:oo As, for example, in the commentary on ,::,, ,:,o, ,:o8 and :,:8,, though it should be borne in mind that it is ofen
dimcult to make a watertight distinction between the ethical and the mystical.
:o: On Suf hermeneutics see: Massignon, Essai sur les origines, trans., Benjamin Clark, Essay on the Origin of the Technical
Language of Islamic Mysticism (Paris, :,); Paul Nwyia, Exgse coranique et langue mystique (Beirut, :,o); Bwering,
Mystical Vision, esp. pp. :,,:; Suf Hermeneutics and Medieval Islam, Revue des tudes islamiques ,,, (:8,8); pp.
:,,,o; Te Light Verse: Qurnic Text and Suf Interpretation, Oriens ,o (:oo:), pp. ::,; and Te Scriptural Senses
in Medieval Sf Qurn exegesis, in Jane D. McAulife et al., eds., With Reverence for the Word (Oxford and New York,
:oo,), pp. ,,o:; Pierre Lory, Les Commentaires sotriques du Coran daprs Abd al-Razzq al-Qshn (Paris, :8o);
Kristin Z. Sands, Sf Commentaries on the Qurn in Classical Islam (London and New York, :ooo); Annabel Keeler,
Suf Hermeneutics: Te Qurn Commentary of Rashd al-Dn Maybud (Oxford, :ooo), especially ch. ,; and Suf tafsr
as a Mirror: Qushayr the murshid in his Latif al-ishrt, JQS , (:ooo), pp. :::.
:o: Ab al-Fadl Rashd al-Dn Maybud, Kashf al-asrr wa uddat al-abrr (Tehran, :,:oo).
:o, Te clear (muhkam) and ambiguous (mutashbih) verses are mentioned in the Introduction to the Commentary and
in ,:,. Tey will be discussed below, p. , n. :o.
:o IC, p. o.
:o, IC, p. ,.
xxvii
Introduction to the Translation
Tustar says more about the inner and outer levels of meaning in a passage earlier in his
Introduction:
Every verse of the Qurn has four senses: an outward (zhir) and an inward sense (btin), a
limit (hadd) and a point of transcendency (matla). Te outward sense is the recitation and
the inward sense is the understanding (fahm) of the verse; the limit defnes what is lawful and
unlawful, and the point of transcendency is the hearts place of elevation (ishrf) [from which
it beholds] the intended meaning, as an understanding from God, Mighty and Majestic is
He (fqhan min Allh azza wa jalla). Te outward knowledge [of the Qurn] is a knowledge
[accessible to the] generality (mm); whereas the understanding of its inner meanings and its
intended meaning is [for] a select few (khss)
106
In this latter statement, Tustar has indicated both that the inner meanings are intended for a
select few, and that the understanding of these meanings comes from God. A similar principle is
expressed when he states:
Truly God has not taken as a friend (wal) one of Muhammads nation (umma) without teaching
them the Qurn, either in its outward or inner aspects. Tey said, We know about its outward
aspect, but what is its inner aspect? He replied, Tat is its understanding (fahm); and it is its
understanding that is intended.
107
More than once in the Tafsr, Tustar warns against interpreting the Qurn according to ones
own whims or desires (ahw). Commenting on the words, As for those in whose hearts is deviation,
they follow the ambiguous part, desiring sedition and desiring its interpretation[,:,], he glosses sedi-
tion as unbelief , and interprets the words desiring its interpretation as a reference to interpretation
according to the desire of their lower selves. Later in the commentary on this same verse [,:,], but
this time on the words those rooted in knowledge, he cites a saying of Al b. Ab Tlib:
[Tose rooted in knowledge] are the ones whom knowledge has protected from plunging [into
the interpretation of the Qurn] according to some whim (haw) or with set argument[s]
(madrba), without [awareness of] the unseen [mysteries] (dn al-ghuyb). [Tis is] due to
Gods guidance of them, and His disclosing to them His unseen secrets (asrrihi al-mughayyaba)
from within the treasure chests of knowledge.
Along with the sense that the esoteric meanings and unseen mysteries of the Qurn are something
precious that may be directly disclosed by God (to a certain chosen few, or His friends), Tustar
also conveys his awareness of the arcane, sometimes inexpressible nature of the inner meanings of
the Qurn, and the humbling sense that the Qurn can never be fathomed. One example occurs
in his commentary on the words, Say, If the ocean were ink for [writing] the words of my Lord, it
would run dry [:8::o]:
His Book is part of His knowledge, and if a servant were given a thousand ways of understand-
ing each letter of the Qurn, he would not reach the end of Gods knowledge within it. Tis
is because it is His pre-eternal speech, and His speech is one of His attributes, and there is no
end to any of His attributes, just as He has no end. All that can be comprehended of His speech
is as much as He opens to the hearts of His friends.
In another statement, he indicates that even were the mysteries of the Book to be fathomed, they
are beyond expression or even allusion. Te context is Tustars commentary on Abrahams request
for an increase in certainty, related in ::o:
Te one who is close (qarb) [to God] has access to understanding (fahm), conjecture (wahm) and
interpretation (tafsr). But the one who is closest (aqrab) is beyond understanding, conjecture
:oo IC, p. :. An almost identical statement is cited by Sulam as a tradition of Al b. Ab Tlib in the introduction to his
Haqiq al-tafsr. On this tradition and more generally on theories of four levels of meaning in the Qurn, see Bwering,
Te Scriptural Senses, pp. ,o,,. On the levels of meaning in Qurnic exegesis, see also A. Keeler, Suf Hermeneutics,
pp. o8:.
:o, IC, p. ,.
Tafsr al-Tustar
xxviii
and interpretation, and what is beyond that cannot be contained by expression (ibra) or
allusion (ishra).
108
Te statements cited above go some way to explaining the varied nature of the content of the Tafsr,
and the ofen allusive, elliptical and even obscure style of the esoteric interpretations. However, some
of this abstruseness may also be due to the fact that the comments were initially delivered orally as
extemporary, inspired responses to the recited verses, such that the Tafsr was eventually compiled
from the notes of disciples who were themselves probably already familiar with the teachings that
Tustar was conveying through his exegesis. Indeed many of the aphorisms contained in the Tafsr,
which Bwering suggests were added later, may precisely have been added for the beneft of later
aspirants in the circle of Tustars disciples, who did not have this familiarity with his doctrines.
Te esoteric meanings which Tustar elicits from the Qurnic verses and expounds through
his commentary were clearly intended to convey spiritual guidance and illumination. For the most
part, they provide direct guidance designed to assist the seeker with progress on the spiritual path,
and include: discussions of qualities and virtues to which the seekers should aspire; vices which
they should avoid; knowledge about the inner make-up of the human being; and descriptions of
mystical experience. Other interpretations of an esoteric nature comprise Tustars metaphysical
and cosmological discussions, such as those of the Muhammadan Light, the covenant which God
made in pre-eternity with all of humanity, known as the Covenant of Alast, and the miraculous
Night Journey (Isr) and Ascension (Mirj) of the Prophet.
109
Tese interpretations appear to derive, or spring from, the verses in diferent ways.
110
Ofen they
arise as metaphorical or allegorical interpretations, as in Tustars commentary on the words, Tat
you may warn [the people of] the mother of cities, and those around it [::,], which he interprets
in the following manner:
In its outward meaning, it [the mother of cities] refers to Mecca. In its inner meaning it refers
to the heart, while those around it refer to the bodily members (jawrih). Terefore warn them,
that they might safeguard their hearts and bodily members from delighting in acts of disobedi-
ence and following [their] lusts.
Another example of a metaphorical or allegorical interpretation occurs in his commentary on the
words, and the sun and moon are brought together [,,:]:
Its inner meaning is the following: the moon represents the light of the sight of the physical
eye, which pertains to the natural self (nafs al-tab), and the sun represents the light of the sight
of the eye of the heart, which pertains to the spiritual self (nafs al-rh) and the intellect (aql).
Or again, his commentary on the words, and the raised canopy [,::,], which he glosses as:
Te pleasing and pure act, through which no reward is sought except God, Exalted is He.
In the frst of these three comments, it is to be noted that Tustar has juxtaposed his exoteric and
esoteric interpretations. Tis he does in numerous contexts, as in the following example, which
comprises frstly an explanation at the literal level and then an esoteric interpretation of the words,
By those sent forth in succession [,,::]:
By this is meant the angels who are sent with the good of His commandIn its inner meaning
it refers to spirits of the believers which are sent inspiration (ilhm) that is in accordance with
the Book and the Sunna.
:o8 Tis saying occurs as part of the long commentary on a poem which is cited in the commentary on ::o. It is possible,
therefore, that these are the words of Ab Bakr al-Sijz, or whoever was commenting on the poem. It may nonetheless
be said to refect Tustars teachings.
:o Te content of these interpretations will be discussed in the section on Tustars mystical teachings below.
::o For a full discussion of Tustars method of Qurn interpretation, see Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. :,,f. For a dis-
cussion of the method of esoteric interpretation in Qushayrs Latif al-ishrt (Cairo, :o8,:) and Maybuds Kashf
al-asrr, see Keeler, Suf Hermeneutics, pp. 8:o.
xxix
Introduction to the Translation
Another mode of esoteric interpretation takes the form of a discussion of the spiritual or ethical
signifcance of a word mentioned in a verse, as for example when he comments on the words, So
be forgiving with gracious forgiveness [:,:8,]:
[One should be] without resentment (hiqd) or censure (tawbkh) afer forgiving someone; this
is to overlook [someones misdeeds] graciously (ird jaml).
Sometimes these comments constitute Tustars reply to a question put to him about a succinct
interpretation he has given, as when he glosses Jacobs exhorting himself to comely patience [::::8]
with the words patience and contentment, and when asked about the sign of this, replies, It is not
to regret what has happened. When further asked how a person can attain comeliness of patience,
he explains:
By knowing that God, Exalted is He, is with you, and by the comfort of [the concomitant sense
of] well-being. Patience may be compared to a bowl which has patience at the top and honey
underneath.
Another form of esoteric interpretation springs from what Bwering has termed Qurnic
keynotes.
111
Tis is where a particular word or expression sets of a train of mystical thought or
associations in the commentator.
112
Te resulting interpretation may or may not bear any obvious
relation to the context in which the keynote word appears. We fnd it exemplifed, for example, in
Tustars commentary on the words, When God wishes to guide someone, He expands their breast to
Islam [o:::,], where the verb wishes (arda, from the root r-w-d) leads Tustar into a discussion of
the terms murd and murd, both drawn from the same root. Tis subject may already have been in
his mind since he refers to an earlier verse in the same sra which mentions those who seek Gods
countenance, and therefore already indicates the aspirant or one who seeks [God] (murd), while
the one who is [divinely] sought is picked up from the words, God wishes (or seeks):
Truly God has distinguished between the one who seeks (murd) and the one who is [divinely]
sought (murd), even though they are both from Him (min indihi). But He simply wanted
to distinguish the elite (khss) from the generality (umm), and so He singled out the one
who is sought (murd) in this sra and others. He also mentioned the one who seeks (murd),
representing the generality, in this sra in His words, Exalted is He: Do not drive away those
who call upon their Lord, morning and evening, seeking His countenance [o:,:].
Another example of an interpretation arising from a keynote or association of ideas occurs in
Tustars commentary on the words, If trouble should befall a man, he cries out to Us [in supplication],
whether lying on his side [:o:::], which in their Qurnic context refer to people who are heedless
of God, and call on Him only when they are amicted. However, here Tustar is moved to speak of
the true meaning of supplication, related to the verb translated as he cries out (da):
Supplication (du) is freeing oneself (tabarr) of everything save Him, Exalted is He.
Given the complex nature of the doctrines expounded by Tustar, the fact that they are some-
times allusively expressed, and the fact that they are scattered throughout the pages of his Tafsr,
the following sections will be devoted to a discussion of some of the key mystical teachings that are
presented in the work. Striking in Tustars expositions is the extent to which he uses the imagery
and metaphors of light, especially when discussing divinely-inspired knowledge and guidance.
::: See Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. :,o,.
::: On this subject see also Nasrollah Pourjavady, Latif-i Qurn dar majlis-i Sayf al-Dn Bkharz, Marif :8 (:oo:),
pp. ,:.
Tafsr al-Tustar
xxx
vi. Mvs1ic.i Ti.cuics
A. The Qurn and the Prophet
Troughout the Tafsr, Tustar emphasises the centrality and importance of the Qurn and the Sunna
or exemplary practice of the Prophet. In his view, the Qurn and the Prophet together provide a
complete source of guidance for humanity, as well as acting as mediators between God, the Inefable
and Transcendent One, and His creation. For example, in the Introduction to the Commentary, he
draws on a Qurnic metaphor used in ,::o,, when he states that the Qurn is a rope (habl) between
God and His servants, and when asked to explain this defnition he says:
Tis means that they have no way to Him save through the Qurn, and through understanding
[all] that has been addressed to them therein concerning that which is required of them, as well
as putting that knowledge into practice for Gods sake with complete sincerity, and following
the exemplary way (sunna) of Muhammad , who was sent to them.
113
Tustar cites numerous traditions concerning the nature of the Qurn, including a hadth of the
Prophet which states, Te Qurn is Gods wisdom (hikma) among His servants. Whoever learns
the Qurn and acts according to it, it is as if prophethood were incorporated within him, except
that he does not receive revelation He also repeatedly emphasises the importance of the Sunna,
as when he says, Mindfulness of God (taqw) signifes the Sunna, and no obligatory act (fard) is
complete without the Sunna;
114
or again when he states, All action is futile except that which is
done with sincerity (ikhls), and sincerity is not achieved except through adherence to the Sunna.
115

Te Sunna, he explains, has no limit, and this is explained as meaning:
No one has fear like the fear of the Prophet , and [the same goes for] his love (hubb), his
longing (shawq), his abstinence (zuhd), his contentment (rid), his trust (tawakkul), and his
[noble] characteristics (akhlq). Indeed, God, Exalted is He, has said [of him]: Assuredly you
possess a magnifcent nature [o8:].
116
Regarding the Qurns role of mediation, Tustar cites a hadth according to which the Prophet
describes the Qurn as an excellent intercessor whose intercession is accepted (shf mushaa),
and a truthful advocate (mhil musaddaq),
117
while of the Prophets mediating role he states, [God]
has made the Emissary the most elevated and the greatest mediator (wsita) between you and Him.
118
In the Introduction to the Commentary, Tustar shows how the Qurn and the Prophet are
inextricably linked. For example, he states, God, Exalted is He, sent down the Qurn to His Prophet,
and made his heart a mine of His oneness and of the Qurn.
119
Both the Qurn and the Prophet are
also linked in being identifed with light. Regarding the Qurn, for example, Tustar states God has
made the Qurn a light and has said: but We have made it a light by which We guide whomsoever
We wish of Our servants [::,:];

and he understands the words and [those who] follow the light
which has been revealed with him [,::,,], to be a reference to the Qurn, of which the heart of the
Prophet is the mine.
120
Tustar also describes the Prophets breast (sadr) as a light, and Ab Bakr
al-Sijz explains this as meaning: it is a repository of light from the divine Substance (jawhar), which
is the original locus of light within the breast.
121
Te star of piercing brightness [8o:,] is interpreted
::, IC, p. ,.
:: Tafsr, ,::.
::, Tafsr, :,,.
::o Tafsr, :8:,o. Te explanation is given by Matt b. Ahmad who, according to Bwering was also known as Ahmad b.
Matt, and although not listed as one of Tustars disciples, appears to have been close to him.
::, IC, p. ,.
::8 Tafsr, ::,.
:: IC, p. ,.
::o IC, pp. f.
::: IC, p. :.
xxxi
Introduction to the Translation
by Tustar as an allusion to the heart of the Prophet, resplendent with the realisation of Gods one-
ness, the upholding of His transcendence, constancy in the practices of remembrance, and in the
contemplative witnessing of the Omnipotent; while in his commentary on the verse, By the dawn
[8::], Tustar explains that its inner meaning refers to Muhammad , from whom the lights of
faith, the lights of acts of obedience and the lights of the two worlds of existence gushed forth.
Tustars teachings concerning the Qurn and the Prophet have theological and metaphysical,
as well as cosmological, dimensions (as can be seen in the last quote above). At the beginning of
the Introduction to the Commentary, he appears to associate the Qurn with Gods pre-eternal
knowledge, for when asked about whether Gods knowledge about His servants was apparent to
Him before or afer He created them, he cites in answer the verse, It is a Glorious Qurn [8,:::], and
adds, that is, it is a Book [that was] fxed in a Preserved Tablet [8,:::] before they were created.
122

We have already seen above that he identifes the Qurn with Gods knowledge and His speech,
explaining that His speech is therefore (like His knowledge) one of His attributes. Not surprisingly,
therefore, he also unequivocally asserts the uncreated nature of the Qurn, as when he comments
on the words, And there would never come from the Compassionate One any reminder that is new
but that they used to disregard it [:o:,], and says:
Tat is, whenever there came to them, through revelation, knowledge of the Qurn which was
new to them and of which they had no prior knowledge, they would turn away from it. Tis
is not to say that the Reminder (dhikr) [i.e. the Qurn] itself is created (muhdath), however,
for it is from among the attributes of the essence of God, and is therefore neither existentiated
(mukawwan) nor created (makhlq).
123
In another context, Tustar suggests that the Qurn contains the Names and Attributes of God.
In his commentary on the disconnected letters at the commencement of Srat al-Baqara, Alif lm
mm [:::], he observes, Each book that God, Exalted is He, sent down contains a secret and the
secret of the Qurn is contained within the [disconnected] letters which open the sras, because
they are Names and Attributes [of God]. Before this, Tustars interpretation of the Basmala in the
concluding section of the Introduction to the Commentary indicates more about the signifcance
and mystery held in the letters of the Qurn:
Te b stands for bah Allh (the magnifcence of God), Mighty and Majestic is He, the sn
stands for san Allh (the resplendence of God), and the mm stands for majd Allh (the
glory of God), Mighty and Majestic is He. Allh is the Greatest Name, which contains all His
names. Between its Alif and Lm there is a cryptic letter, something of the unseen from
an unseen to an unseen, a secret from a secret to a secret, a reality from a reality to a reality.
124
B. The Muhammadan Light
Tustar was among the early Muslim mystics to have contemplated the idea of the Muhammadan
Light (nr Muhammadiyya).
125
Te idea is twofold: frstly that Muhammad had a special time in
pre-existence, alone with God; the second is that all of creation was created from the Muhammadan
Light.
126
Tese doctrines are frst discussed in the context of ,::,:, a verse which recounts the
::: IC, p. :.
::, Te doctrine of the majority of Sunni Muslims now is that the Qurn is uncreated and eternal. Among those who
opposed this view were, to begin with, the Jahmites and then the Mutazilites. On this subject see Richard C. Martin
Createdness of the Qurn, EQ, vol. :, p. o,; Montgomery Watt, Early Discussions about the Qurn, Muslim World
o (:,o), pp. ::o and o:o,; Wilferd Madelung, Te Origins of the Controversy Concerning the Creation of the
Qurn, in idem, Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam (London, :8,), pp. ,o:,; and Walter M. Patton, Ahmad
b. Hanbal and the Mihna (Leiden, :8,).
:: IC, pp. 8.
::, He may well have been the earliest Sunni mystic to have formulated such a doctrine, although in Sh and Imm circles
the idea seems to have existed earlier. See, for example, Uri Rubin, Pre-existence and Light: Aspects of the Concept of
Nr Muhammad, Israel Oriental Studies , (:,,), pp. o:::; and Arzina Lalani, Early Sh Tought: Te Teachings of
Muhammad al-Bqir (London, :oo), pp. 8o:.
::o A similar doctrine in Sufsm was that Muhammad, the frst in creation, was created for God, while the rest of creation
Tafsr al-Tustar
xxxii
pre-eternal covenant which God made with humanity (the Covenant of Alast): And, [remember]
when your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins their seed, and made them testify
about themselves, [saying], Am I not your Lord? Tey said, Yea, indeed, we testify
127
In the fol-
lowing extract, Tustar expounds his doctrine of the Muhammadan Light:
Te seed (dhurriyya) comprise three [parts], a frst, second and third: the frst is Muhammad ,
for when God, Exalted is He, wanted to create Muhammad , He made appear (azhara) a light
from His light, and when it reached the veil of divine majesty (azama) it prostrated before
God, and from that prostration God created an immense crystal-like column of light, that was
inwardly and outwardly translucent, and within it was the essence of Muhammad .
128
Ten
it stood in service before the Lord of the Worlds for a million years with the essential charac-
teristics of faith, which are the visual beholding of faith (muyanat al-mn), the unveiling of
certainty (mukshafat al-yaqn) and the witnessing of the Lord (mushhadat al-rabb). Tus He
honoured him with this witnessing a million years before beginning the creation.
129
Also in the context of ,::,:, Tustar discusses the creation of Adam and the descendants of Adam
from the Muhammadan light, and it can be seen that there are varying degrees of illumination in
their creation:
Te second among the progeny is Adam . God created him from the light of Muhammad .
And He created Muhammad , that is, his body, from the clay of Adam .
Te third is the progeny of Adam. God, Mighty and Majestic is He, created the seekers [of
God] (murdn) from the light of Adam, and He created the [divinely-]sought (murdn)
from the light of Muhammad . Tus, the generality among people live under the mercy of
the people of proximity (ahl al-qurb) and the people of proximity live under the mercy of the
one brought near (al-muqarrab) [i.e. the Prophet] With their light shining forth before them
and on their right [,,:::].
Te Prophets time alone with God is also alluded to in Tustars commentary on ,,::,: And verily
he saw Him another time. He states:
Tat is, in the beginning when God, Transcendent and Exalted is He, created him as a light
within a column of light (nran f amd al-nr), a million years before creation, with the
essential characteristics of faith (tabi al-mn), in a witnessing of the unseen through the
unseen (mushhadat al-ghayb bil-ghayb).
Te derivation of other creatures (or the light of other creatures) from the Muhammadan Light is
also referred to in a number of other passages, as in the following:
He [God] made the gushing forth of the wellsprings of the heart of Muhammad , with the
lights of knowledge of diferent kinds, a [sign of] mercy for his nation, because God, Exalted is
He, honoured him with this honour. For the light of the prophets is from his [Muhammads]
was created for Muhammad. Later this idea became popularised and known simply as the doctrine of law lka, being
an abbreviation of If it were not for you We would not have created the spheres (law lka la-m khalaqtul-afk), on
which see Annemarie Schimmel, And Muhammad is His Messenger (Chapel Hill, NC, :8,), pp. :,::.
::, In the so-called Covenant of Alast, the word alast is a reference to Gods question, alastu, Am I not?
::8 Interestingly, Tustar speaks here of the essence (ayn) of Muhammad; later Sufs, especially afer Ibn Arab (d. o,8/::o)
would refer not only to the Muhammadan Light (nr Muhammadiyya) but also to the Muhammadan Reality (haqqa
Muhammadiyya). See Michel Chodkiewicz, Seal of Saints: Prophethood and Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn Arab
(Cambridge, :,), ch. .
:: A parallel passage is cited in both the Atf al-alif of Daylam, p. ,,, and the Ilm al-qulb attributed to Makk, Ilm al-
qulb (Beirut, :oo), p. ,, which according to Bwerings translation reads: When God willed to create Muhammad,
He made appear a light from His light and disseminated it. It spread in the entire kingdom [of pre-existence]. When
it reached the majesty it bowed in prostration. God created from its prostration a mighty column of dense light like
a crystal glass that is as thick as the seven heavens and outwardly and inwardly translucent. On the Muhammadan
Light according to Tustar, see Bwering, Mystical Vision, pp. :,,; on the Muhammadan Light in Suf literature, see
Schimmel, Muhammad, ch. ,.
xxxiii
Introduction to the Translation
light, the light of the heavenly dominions (malakt) is from his light and the light of this world
and the Hereafer is from his light.
130
And the above-cited passage:
By the dawn [8::] refers to Muhammad , from whom the lights of faith, the lights of acts of
obedience and the lights of the two worlds of existence gushed forth (tafajjarat).
C. Theology
Te theological doctrines that Tustar expounds in his Tafsr are for the most part those that were
adhered to by the majority of early Sunni traditionalist Muslims.
131
Among these doctrines, that of
the uncreated Qurn has been discussed above. Another key theological doctrine that is presented
early in the Introduction to the Commentary is that of Gods pre-eternal knowledge of all human
acts, and His decreeing everything in accordance with His knowledge:
Gods knowledge of His servants and what they would do was complete before He created them.
[Tis does not imply] His forcing them into disobedience, coercing them into obedience, or
leaving them out of His divine plan. Rather, it draws attention to that which those who deny
His decree are promised, for He says: whoever will, let him believe, and whoever will, let him
disbelieve [:8::], in the way of a threat, since they [actually] have no power (hawl) or strength
(quwwa) except in accordance with that which is contained in His pre-eternal knowledge con-
cerning them, which will come to be, from Him, [but] through them and for them.
132
Later in the course of his commentary, Tustar adds that Gods pre-eternal knowledge inevitably
has to be manifested, since Gods knowledge is a fnal decree that cannot change to other than that
which the All-Knowing knows, Mighty and Majestic is He.
133
Tustars doctrine concerning the carrying through of the divine decree by human beings is
interestingly nuanced. He teaches that God created both good and evil, and He commanded the
good and forbade evil. However, as he indicates in the above passage, the compliance or otherwise
to the divine command by human beings does not involve any coercion (jabr) on the part of God;
rather, the matter of obedience depends upon His granting of protection (isma), success (tawfq)
and help (mana), while disobedience is the result of His withdrawing His protection from, or His
abandonment (khidhln) of, a person:
Indeed, God, Exalted is He, has created good and evil and established the command and pro-
hibition. He has made us worship Him through the good and linked that with success (tawfq),
while He has forbidden us from evil and linked the perpetration of it to the relinquishing of
[His] protection (isma), and abandonment (khidhln) [by Him]. All of these are of His crea-
tion. Whoever is successful in [doing] good has a duty to show gratitude (shukr), and whoever
has been lef to do evil must repent and cry out for Gods help, Mighty and Majestic is He.
134
In another passage, the same principle is expressed slightly diferently, and here he mentions the
attribution of acts to human beings:
:,o Tafsr, :::o.
:,: On the development of Muslim theology see Josef van Ess, Teologie und Gesellschaf im :. und . Jahrhundert Hidschra:
eine Geschichte des religisen Denkens im frhen Islam (Berlin, ::,); idem, Te Flowering of Muslim Teology, trans.
Jane Marie Todd (Boston, :ooo); Montgomery Watt, Te Formative Period of Islamic Tought (Edinburgh, :,,); Morris
S. Seale, Muslim Teology (London, :o); Robert Caspar, A Historical Introduction to Islamic Teology: Muhammad and
the Classical Period, trans. P. Johnstone (Rome, :8); Tilman Nagel, Te History of Islamic Teology: From Muhammad
to the Present, trans. Tomas Tornton (Princeton, :ooo); Michael Marmura (ed.), Islamic Teology and Philosophy
(Albany, :8); Richard C. Martin, et al., Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mutazilism from Medieval School to Modern
Symbol (Oxford, :8,); and Timothy J. Winter (ed.), Te Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Teology (Cambridge,
:oo8).
:,: IC, pp. ::.
:,, Tafsr, :::.
:, Tafsr, ,o:o.
Tafsr al-Tustar
xxxiv
Amiction and well-being are from God, Mighty and Majestic is He. Te command and pro-
hibition are from Him; protection and the granting of success are from Him; and reward and
punishment are from Him. However, actions are attributed (mansba) to the children of
Adam, so whoever performs a good action must express gratitude to merit thereby an increase
[in goodness]; and whoever performs a wicked act must seek forgiveness, so that he thereby
merits forgiveness.
135
In both these passages Tustar is urging that human beings should recognise the omnipotence of
God, who has predetermined all that they do, and whose help or abandonment is instrumental in
their accomplishment of all predetermined acts of good or evil. Yet in addition, especially in the
second passage, he is indicating that even Gods predestination of wicked acts leaves a door open
to salvation through repentance and forgiveness, and that through gratitude for good works, man
may gain access to an increase in good works.
136
Te closely related doctrines of the divine decree, infallibly carried out in accordance with Gods
pre-eternal knowledge, of Gods omnipotence, and of humanitys total helplessness and depend-
ence on God, prevail throughout the Tafsr. It could more specifcally be called a mystical theology
since Tustar shows how, as well as having profound implications for mans ultimate salvation, it can
impact upon his inner spiritual states. He teaches that people should be aware not only that God
controls all things, but also that He sumces for them in every way. Indeed, their downfall occurs
precisely when they start to believe in their own power (hawl) and strength (quwwa), and try to
rely on their own planning and management (tadbr) of their afairs. He fnds many opportunities
to illustrate this principle. For example, in the continuation of the passage cited above from his
commentary on ::::, he states:
Amiction from God is of two kinds: an amiction of mercy and an amiction of punishment. An
amiction of mercy leads the amicted person to show his utter need (ifiqr) for God, Mighty and
Majestic is He, and leads him to the abandonment of devising (tadbr). However, an amiction
of punishment leads the amicted person [to rely] on his own choice (ikhtiyr) and devising.
Another example of this teaching is to be found in his commentary on the words those who believe
in the unseen (ghayb) [::,], where Tustar directly links believing in the unseen with disclaiming
all power and strength:
God is the unseen and His religion is the unseen, and God, Mighty and Majestic is He, has
ordered them to believe in the unseen, to acquit themselves of [every claim] to power and
strength concerning that which they have been commanded to do and prohibited from doing,
in faith, speech and action, and to say, We have no power (hawl) to keep ourselves from diso-
bedience save through Your protection (isma), and we have no strength (quwwa) to obey You
save through Your aid (mana).
Tose who are damned from pre-eternity, however, are those who claimed their own power and
strength, as exemplifed by Pharaoh, who claimed to have power, strength and ability, and said,
Whenever I wish to believe I will believe, but when he actually came to believe [once he had seen
the approach of his doom], it was not accepted from him, as God, Exalted is He, said, Now when
hitherto you have disobeyed and been of those who do corruption? [:o::]
137
One of the most interesting and unusual applications of this doctrine is in Tustars interpre-
tation of the story of Adams fall or slip from grace in Paradise [::,o]. He describes how when
Adam entered the Garden and saw all that was in it, he said, If only we could stay here forever; yet,
:,, Tafsr, ::::. We might compare Tustars use of the concept of the attribution of acts by human beings to the doctrine
of acquisition (kasb) which later came to be particularly associated with Ashar theology. On the doctrine of kasb see
W. Montgomery Watt, Te Origin of the Islamic doctrine of Acquisition, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (:,), pp.
:,,; idem, Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam (London, :8); Daniel Gimaret, Tories de lacte humaine
en thologie musulmane (Paris and Leuven, :8o).
:,o Perhaps this statement may in part be intended to discourage a sense of fatalism. But it is also interesting how Tustar
emphasises the need for a spiritual response to predestination.
:,, Tafsr, ::,.
xxxv
Introduction to the Translation
indeed, we have an appointed time that extends to a known limit. Tis, he explains, was Adams
hearts acquiescing in the whispering or evil prompting (waswasa) of his lower self (nafs),
138
and
it was thus that Satan could have access to him and ofer to lead him to the tree of eternity that he
longed for, which would be the means to attain immortality and everlastingness. Further on in his
interpretation of this primordial event, Tustar observes that Satan had access to Adam because of
the latters preoccupation with his own devising and planning (tadbr), and he adds:
[Adams] thought [for everlasting life] did not involve any considered refection which might
have made it a form of worship, but rather it was a kind of thinking that springs from a natural
disposition (jibilla) in his lower self (nafs).
Tus Adams reliance on his devising (tadbr) represented, as Tustar shows in his long commentary
on this verse, a moment of forgetfulness and an absence of the remembrance of God, and we shall see
later that remembrance of God is a touchstone of all Tustars teachings concerning the spiritual path.
Te prophet Jonah is also shown by Tustar to have succumbed, like Adam, to reliance on his
own devising, this being his only sin, before he was chosen by God and made of the righteous.
139

Tustars general admonition on the basis of this doctrine is summarised in his commentary on the
words He directs the command from the heaven to the earth[,::,]:
He reveals to His servants from His knowledge that which is a means of guidance and salva-
tion for them. Te person who is content with the destined provision resulting from Gods
management [of things] (tadbr) for him, will have the evil of his own devising disposed of and
removed from him. Tus [God] will have returned him to a state of contentment (rid) with
the divine decree, and rectitude (istiqma) in face of the unfolding of what is destined for him.
[Such people] are among those who are brought into proximity [with Him] (muqarrabn).
Truly, God, Exalted is He, created people without any veil, and then made their devising [for
themselves] (tadbr) into their veil.
Tis last passage in particular illustrates the mystical dimension of Tustars theology, and its poten-
tially transformative impact upon the inner life of the human being.
D. The Spiritual Destiny of Human Beings: Cosmology and Eschatology
Te doctrine of the divine foreknowledge and decree is also to be found in Tustars interpretation of
the pre-eternal covenant made between God and all of humanity (Covenant of Alast), as recounted
in the Qurnic verse ,::,:, which we shall again cite here:
And, [remember] when your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins their seed,
and made them testify about themselves, [saying], Am I not your Lord? Tey said, Yea, indeed,
we testify
In his long interpretation of this verse, Tustar not only expounds his doctrine of the Muhammadan
Light, as discussed above, but he also pays close attention to the Covenant itself, which in fact he
understands as two covenants, taken separately, frst from the prophets and then from all the progeny:
God, Exalted is He, took the prophets from the loins of Adam, and then He extracted from
the back of each prophet his progeny in the shape of specks possessing intellects (uql). Ten
he took from the prophets their pledge, as is stated in His words, We took from the prophets their
pledge: as (We did) from you and from Noah [,,:,]. Te Covenant that they were bound to was
that they would convey from God, Exalted is He, His commandments and prohibitions. Ten
He called them all to amrm His lordship, with His words, Exalted is He: Am I not your Lord?,
and He manifested His omnipotence [to them], so they said: Yea, indeed, we testify. [,::,:]
Ten He returned them to the loins of Adam , and subsequently He sent the prophets to
remind them of His Pact and Covenant.
:,8 Te word waswasa, derived from the onomatopoeic root w-s-w-s, means literally a whisper or whispering, but usually
in religious texts in the sense of an evil prompting, incitement or temptation. Two derivatives from this verb are used
in the fnal sra of the Qurn, ::: and ,.
:, Tafsr, o8:.
Tafsr al-Tustar
xxxvi
As can be seen, Tustar has here stated that the progeny were in the shape of specks possessing
intellects (uql). Later in the Tafsr, in his commentary on the words, O you who believe, fear God,
and let every soul consider what it has sent ahead for tomorrow[,::8], he warns that on the Day
of Resurrection everyone will be questioned about three things: that which he owes to himself, that
which he owes to the knowledge between him and his Lord, and that which he owes to the intellect.
Te believers, then, must be concerned in this life to fulfl the pre-eternal Covenant made with God,
and to be among those who verify the amrmation made in the response, Yes we testify, with the
awareness that they will certainly be answerable for it in the Hereafer. Tis verifying is none other
than the realisation of the oneness of God (tawhd). Tus he interprets [those] who stand frm in
their testimony [,o:,,], as:
[Tose] who stand frm, upholding that to which they have testifed, namely that there is no
god except God, and who do not shirk with regard to it in any of their deeds, words or states.
Tustar does not fail to remind those whom he is addressing of the accounting that they will inevi-
tably face at the Resurrection,
140
and he also warns them not to be complacent, for they do not
know in what state they will die. Tus when he comments on the words, And no soul knows in
what land it will die [,::,], he says: [It does not know] what its state (hukm) will be when it dies:
[eternal] bliss (sada) or wretchedness (shaqwa). Te use here of the word hukm, which can have
the meaning of ordinance or decree, is a reminder that the nature of our end is dependent on the
divine decree, and for this reason, he follows his interpretation of the verse with two prayers of
the Prophet Muhammad, asking that God should make him die in His religion, as well as prayers
of the prophets Abraham and Joseph asking that they should die in a state of submission to God.
Believers must, therefore, be aware that until their last breath they should be constantly renew-
ing their pre-eternal Covenant by professing and realising the divine oneness, and, since they have
no idea what is in Gods pre-eternal knowledge, they should pray for His mercy and assistance in
this. Tustar must certainly have known that such awareness would be intensifed by his many quite
literal comments on the eschatological verses of the Qurn recounting the torments of Hell and
delights of Paradise, to which he sometimes adds vivid details.
141
Again, he makes it clear that it is
those who denied the divine oneness who will be consigned to Hell, whereas the reward for belief
in Gods oneness will be Paradise.
142
However, Tustar does not see Paradise as being confned to the delights that are portrayed in
the Qurn. He understands there to be two Paradises: one, the Garden with all its delights, pro-
vides the rewards for the bodily members; the other, the reward for the realisation of Gods oneness,
contains the delight of the vision (nazar) of God and the manifestation of the divine unveiling
(tajall al-mukshafa), this itself being permanent subsistence with the Permanently Subsistent One
(baq maal-Bq).
143
Moreover, those who have devoted themselves completely to God will have
no desire for the delights of the Garden, but wish only to be with God. Commenting on the words,
And enter My paradise [8:,o], he says:
It has been related in a report that the angels say to those solely devoted to Him (munfaridn)
on the Day of Resurrection, Proceed to your resting places in Paradise, to which they say,
What is Paradise to us when we have devoted ourselves solely to [Him] because of a special
understanding which has been [granted] to us from Him? We do not want anything save Him
that is the only good life (hayt tayyiba).
Whilst in his Tafsr Tustar shows the greatest and ultimate reward for the realisation of Gods
oneness to be the encounter with God, subsisting with Him and the beatifc vision of Him, which
:o Examples of such comments occur in Tafsr, ::::; :o:,,; :,::; ::8,; :,:: and :; and o::8.
:: As, for example, in Tafsr, ,,::,; o,:: and :, o:,:; ,o:::; 8::,; Sra 8,; 8:; Sra 88 and 8::.
:: e.g. Tafsr, 8,::8.
:, Tafsr, ,:o and ,o. Tustar also states in his commentary on o::8 that those who perceived none other than God [in
this world] will be rewarded with life with Life itself (hayt bi-hayt), eternity with Eternity itself (azaliyya bi-azaliyya),
and a mystery with Mystery itself (sirr bi-sirr), while in his commentary on :::: he describes the reward as: a mystery
with Mystery itself (sirr bi-sirr), life with Life itself (hayt bi-hayt), and eternity with Eternity itself (azaliyya bi-azaliyya).
xxxvii
Introduction to the Translation
are to be anticipated and hoped for in the Hereafer, he does also indicate that mystics who have
attained the highest states may taste in this life experiences of encounter with God, described as
the unveiling (mukshafa) and witnessing (mushhada) of God. Tus in his commentary on the
words, As for the righteous, they will be in bliss (nam) [8:::,], he states:
Te bliss of the elect among His servants who are the righteous (abrr) is the encounter with
Him (liquhu) and the witnessing (mushhada) of Him, just as their bliss in this world was in
the witnessing of Him and proximity (qurb) with Him.
We fnd in the Tafsr only a few glimpses into the nature of this experience. One of the best
examples may be seen in the commentary on a mystical poem, probably composed by Tustar,
which is quoted in the context of the long commentary on :::oo. In this poem, the experience of
face-to-face encounter with God (kifh) is compared to the spiders web which appeared over the
entrance to a cave in which the Prophet and Ab Bakr were hiding when they were escaping from
Mecca.
144
Commenting on this analogy, either Tustar or one of his disciples explains:
His saying: Like the spiders web covering the entrance of a cave, [is an allusion to] the cave of
mystics (rifn) [which is] the[ir] innermost secret (sirr), and the[ir] beholding (ittil) of the
Lord of the Worlds, when they reach the station of face-to-face encounter (maqm al-kifh),
that is, the immediate vision of direct witnessing (iyn al-iyn) beyond what has been [ver-
bally] elucidated (bayn). Ten there is nothing between the servant and God except the veil
of servanthood, due to his contemplation (nazar) of the attributes of lordship (rubbiyya),
ipseity (huwiyya), divinity (ilhiyya), and [Gods being] eternally Self-Sumcing and Besought
of all (samadiyya ill-sarmadiyya), without any obstacle or veil.
145
Tustar draws from the words, And brought him near in communion [::,:], which allude to the
special proximity accorded to the prophet Moses, a more general observation about the grace of
unveiling (mukshafa):
Tat is, being secretly called for the unveiling (mukshafa), [an unveiling] which is not con-
cealed from hearts, in [intimate] conversation (muhdatha) and loving afection (wudd), just
as He said, Exalted is He, Truly those who believe and perform righteous deeds for them the
Compassionate One shall appoint love (wudd) [::o], meaning that [through] this unveiling,
the mysteries are received without any mediation. Tis is a station given by God to those who
are true and faithful to Him both in secret and openly.
Parts of Tustars interpretation of the miraculous Ascension or Mirj of the Prophet [,,:::8] also
suggest that aspects of the Prophets conduct are being presented to provide a model for the conduct
of mystics in their experiences, as when Tustar comments on ,,::,, Te eye did not swerve, nor did
it go beyond [the bounds]:
He did not incline to the evidences of his self (shawhid nafsihi), nor to witnessing them
(mushhadatih), but was totally absorbed in the witnessing (mushhada) of his Lord, Exalted
is He, witnessing (shhid) the attributes [of God] that were being manifested [to him], which
required frmness from him in that place (mahall).
And when he comments on the words of the next verse, Verily he saw some of the greatest signs of
his Lord [,,::8]:
Tat is, those of His attributes which became manifest through His signs. Tough he saw them,
he did not let slip [his gaze] from his witnessed Object (mashhd), and did not withdraw from
the vicinity of his worshipped Object (mabd) but rather [what he saw] only increased him
in love (mahabba), longing (shawq) and strength (quwwa).
Aside from these glimpses into experiences of union or proximity with God or the mystical
unveiling and contemplative witnessing of Him, most of the spiritual teachings in Tustars Tafsr
are concerned with outlining essential prerequisites of the Path, models to be emulated, qualities
: Te spiders web and a doves nest next to the caves entrance persuaded those among the Quraysh who were pursuing
them that there was no point in entering, and so the Prophet and Ab Bakr were saved.
:, Tafsr, :::oo.
Tafsr al-Tustar
xxxviii
to be aspired to and proprieties (db) of spiritual conduct to be upheld, especially in relation to
others. Te spiritual aim of the mystical way is, as he indicates, to attain complete sincerity (ikhls)
in the worship of God and in the attestation of His oneness, and the key to it is, as we shall see, the
remembrance of God. Before outlining in more detail Tustars teachings about the principles and
practice of the spiritual path, we shall look at his perception of the interior world of the human being
and his teachings regarding the nature of, and relationship between, faith, knowledge and certainty.
E. Spiritual Psychology
:. The inner make-up of the human being
Sufs did not simply understand the human being to be made up of body, soul and spirit; they
developed a subtle and complex science of the inner human make-up, which one might call a spir-
itual psychology or science of the soul. Te Qurn itself speaks of the human heart (qalb) upon
which God inscribes faith [,8:::], and which was able to take on the Trust (amna) [,,:,:];
146
the
spirit (rh) [e.g. ,::; :,::; ,8:,:]; the pith or inner substance (lubb, used in the plural, albb) [e.g.
:::,, :,; ,:,, :o]; the breast (sadr) [e.g. ,::; :::::; :,:,; ::]; and many times of the soul, self or
ego (nafs).
147
Moreover, the Qurn speaks of diferent forms of the latter, namely, the evil-inciting
self (al-nafs al-ammra bil-s) (alluded to in :::,,), the self-reproaching or blaming self (al-nafs
al-lawwma) [,,::] and the self at peace (al-nafs al-mutmainna) [8::,]. Tese Qurnic designa-
tions no doubt inspired and informed the development of the Sufs own ways of understanding
the spiritual psychology of human beings.
148
Tustar was among the early Muslim mystics who expounded an understanding of the complex-
ity of the inner human make-up.
149
In general terms, he seems to perceive two sides or propensities
within the human being, one which tends toward earth and the physical and sensory pleasures, and
the other which tends toward heaven and the spiritual realm. He expresses this overall scheme in
diferent ways in the Tafsr (see diagram, below). Most ofen, he contrasts two sides of the self
(nafs). Tere is on the one hand the self of mans basic nature (nafs al-tab, but also occasionally,
nafs al-jibilla), which we have rendered as the natural self ; and on the other, the self of the spirit
(nafs al-rh), which we have rendered as the spiritual self .
150
Te former is associated with dark-
ness, and the latter with light, as when Tustar interprets the night when it enshrouds [:::] as the
natural self (nafs al-tab) and the day as it unveils [:::] as the spiritual self .
In a few instances, Tustar appears to employ the word rh (spirit) on its own synonymously
with nafs al-rh. Te term tab on its own, however, is almost always used by him to designate mans
basic nature, or his physical appetites and instincts, though in one context he speaks of four inborn
natures or dispositions (tabi), which are all part of his basic nature (tab). Tey are: the animal
nature (tab al-bahim), the satanic nature (tab al-shaytn), the sorcerous nature (tab al-sahara)
and the devilish nature (tab al-ablisa). All of these are potentially negative forces within the
:o Te Trust (amna) is discussed below, p. ::, n. o.
:, On the diferent usages of the term nafs (pl. anfus or nufs) in the Qurn, see T. E. Homerin, Soul, EQ, vol. ,, p. 8o.
:8 On the connection between the development of Suf concepts and terminology in relation to the Qurn, see Paul Nwyia,
Exgse coranique (Beirut, :,o) and Massignon, Essai.
: Other early mystics to have developed such schemes are al-Hrith al-Muhsib (d. :,/8,,), Ab al-Husayn al-Nr (d.
:,/o,) and al-Hakm al-Tirmidh (d. between :,/o, and ,oo/:o). On Muhsib, see Josef van Ess, Die Gedank-
enwelt des Hrit al-Muhsib (Bonn, :o:); Gavin N. Picken, Te Concept of Tazkiyat al-Nafs in Islam in the Light of
the Works of al-Hrith al-Muhsib, PhD thesis (University of Leeds, :oo,). Nr is said to be the author of a work
entitled Maqmt al-qulb, ed. with introduction by Paul Nwyia in Mlanges de lUniversit Saint-Joseph (:o8), pp.
::,,, while a comparable work on the inner make-up of human beings is ascribed to al-Hakm al-Tirmidh, entitled
Bayn al-farq bayn al-sadr wal-qalb wal-fud wal-lubb (Cairo, :,8); English trans. by Nicholas Heer, with Kenneth
L. Honerkamp, Tree Early Suf Texts (Louisville, KY, :oo,).
:,o Te use of this construct is unusual in Suf texts, if not unique to Tustar, and it may initially be tempting to understand
the word nafs here in its idiomatic usage for emphasis in Arabic, as in nafs al-shay, meaning the thing itself . However,
we have discounted this interpretation partly because it occurs rather too frequently to be merely for emphasis, and
partly for other reasons which will become apparent in the course of this discussion.
xxxix
Introduction to the Translation
human being and should be combatted in diferent ways.
151
Tus Tustar appears to distinguish
mans natural self (nafs al-tab) from his basic nature (tab).
Twoioiu Iiv Cos1i1U1io oi 1ui HUm. Biic
[lower] self nafs spirit rh
nafs natural self nafs al-tab/nafs al-jibilla spiritual self nafs al-rh rh
dense natural self nafs-al-tab al-kathf luminous spiritual self nafs al-rh al-nr
basic nature / natural instinct tab heart qalb
qalb
natures / dispositions tabi (discernment of the heart ftnat al-qalb)
tab physical appetite / animal instinct tab al-bahim
satanic nature tab al-shaytn intellect aql
aql
sorcerous nature tab al-sahara (understanding of the intellect fahm al-aql)
devilish nature tab al-ablisa
FUv1uiv Disic.1ios oi 1ui Siii (nafs)
evil-inciting self al-nafs al-ammra bil-s self at peace al-nafs al-mutmainna
self-reproaching / blaming self al-nafs al-lawwma self of gnosis nafs al-marifa
lustful self al-nafs al-shahwniyya
In fact, the term nafs on its own is frequently used by Tustar to designate the darker, earth-
bound side of the human being that is opposed to the spiritual self (or spirit). In these instances,
we have translated the word nafs as lower self . An example is the following passage:
Te lower self (nafs) desires the world because it comes from that, but the spirit (rh) desires
the Hereafer because it comes from that. Gain ascendancy over the lower self and open for it
the door to the Hereafer by glorifying [God] (tasbh) and seeking forgiveness for your nation.
152
Here, Tustar is indicating that the lower self can potentially be saved through the glorifcation of
God. Elsewhere, he shows that the natural self (nafs al-tab) can be allied or brought into coalition
with the spiritual self (nafs al-rh) through the remembrance of God (dhikr). Tus he interprets
the forenoon [,::] as the spiritual self , and the night when it is still [,::] as the natural self when
it fnds repose with the spiritual self in constant remembrance of God, Exalted is He. In another
context he emphasises the salutary role of both the remembrance of God (dhikr) and gratitude
(shukr), as in his commentary on the words, when souls shall be coupled [8::,], where he states:
Te natural self and spiritual self will be joined together and will be mingled in [their partaking
of] the bliss of Paradise inasmuch as they were allied in this world in keeping remembrance
constantly and upholding a state of gratitude.
In an interesting passage, Tustar contrasts the inner process which takes place at death with
that which occurs during sleep. He explains that both the luminous spiritual self (nafs al-rh al-nr)
and the dense natural self (nafs al-tab al-kathf) have a subtle substance (latf). When a person
dies, God removes from him the subtle substance of the luminous spiritual self, separating it from
the subtle substance of the dense natural self, and by this [luminous spiritual self] he compre-
hends things, and is given the vision (ry) [of God] in the heavenly kingdom (malakt). When
a person sleeps, however, God removes from him only the subtle substance of the dense natural
self, so that when he awakens, he is able to recover a subtle breath from the luminous substance
of the spiritual self, because it is by virtue of the light of the subtle substance of the spiritual self
that the natural self has life. Tus, the natural self derives life from the spiritual self, while the life
:,: Tafsr, :::,,.
:,: Tafsr, ::o::.
Tafsr al-Tustar
xl
of the spiritual self, as Tustar explains, is by virtue of the remembrance [of God] (dhikr), indeed
its sustenance is remembrance, while the sustenance of the natural self is food and drink. He then
adds the observation:
Whoever cannot reconcile these two opposites, I mean by that, the natural self and the spiritual
self, so that the subsistence (aysh) of the two together is by remembrance, and the endeavour
[to accomplish] remembrance, is not a mystic (rif) in reality.
153
So far we have seen the natural self (nafs al-tab or nafs al-jibilla), the [lower] self (nafs) and basic
nature (tab) opposed to the spiritual self (or the spirit), but in his overall twofold scheme Tustar
sometimes contrasts the lower self (nafs) with the heart (qalb), as, for example, when he explains:
If your lower self overpowers your heart, it will drive you to the pursuit of desire (haw). But
if your heart overpowers your lower self and your bodily members, it will tether them with
propriety (adab), compel them into worship (ibda), and then adorn them with sincerity in
servanthood.
154
He also interprets the two seas [,,::] as: the sea of the heart, full of gems, and the sea of the lower
self. Between these two is a barrier that they do not overstep [,,::o]. Likewise, in his interpretation
of the words, He knows what enters the earth [,,:], he states: Te earth is the natural self, and
thus He knows among the things which enters it that which is wholesome or corrupt for the heart.
In many places in the Tafsr, Tustar presents a more complex twofold scheme of the inner
constitution of human beings, comprising on one side the natural self (nafs al-tab), or lower self
(nafs), and on the other, the heart (qalb), the intellect (aql) and the spiritual self (nafs al-rh)
(again, see the diagram on p. xxxix) An example of such a scheme occurs in his commentary on the
words, By those that deliver the reminder [,,:,], which in its exoteric sense is understood to refer to
the delivering of the revelation by the angels to prophets:
Tis is the revelation (wahy) through inspiration (ilhm) which the spiritual self (nafs al-rh),
the intellect (aql) and the heart (qalb) cast upon the natural self (nafs al-tab), and this is the
hidden form of reminder (dhikr khafy).
Sometimes Tustar refnes these defnitions further, specifying the understanding of the intel-
lect (fahm al-aql) and discernment of the heart (ftnat al-qalb) as well as the spiritual self (nafs
al-rh),
155
or with minor variations, as when he speaks of the intuition of the spiritual self (dhihn
nafs al-rh). One example is when he explains that the vision of God in the Hereafer will be the
share of the intuition of the spiritual self, the understanding of the intellect and the discernment
of the heart, since they were present without the natural self when God addressed human beings
in molecular form in pre-eternity. He adds that the natural self will nonetheless receive some share
of the beatifc vision in Paradise, like a fragrant breeze, due to its being fused with those lights.
156

Tese three faculties (heart, intellect and spirit or spiritual self) work together in diferent ways to
overcome or transform the lower or natural self, as Tustar shows, for example, when he explains
the repetition of the words, truly with hardship comes ease [:,]:
God, Exalted is He, has magnifed the state of hope in this verse out of His generosity and His
hidden grace, and thus He mentions ease twice. Indeed, the Prophet said, Hardship will
not overwhelm the two eases. By this he meant: the discernment of the heart (ftnat al-qalb)
and the intellect (aql) are the two eases which overcome the natural self, and return it to the
state of sincerity (ikhls).
:,, Tafsr, ,::.
:, Tafsr, 8:.
:,, Tafsr, :8::: and ::o:. Te juxtaposition of these three in this form is a further indication that Tustar is not using the
word nafs in its emphatic meaning in the construct nafs al-rh.
:,o Tafsr, :::o. We may note here that Tustar had stated in the passage on death and sleep cited above that the substance
of the luminous spiritual self is separated from the substance of the dense natural self at death, since it is through the
former that man is able to comprehend things and enjoy the beatifc vision in the Hereafer.
xli
Introduction to the Translation
Interestingly, Tustar does not, like later Sufs, suggest a particular hierarchy among these diferent
faculties within the human being.
157
Neither does he include along with the heart, the intellect and
the spiritual self, that important inner faculty so ofen mentioned in Sufsm, the [innermost] secret
(sirr), also translated as mysterium, mystery or inmost being.
158
However, he does mention the
sirr separately, in a number of contexts. It seems that he understands the innermost secret (sirr) to
be at the very deepest level of the human being. Most ofen, it is associated with the contemplative
witnessing of God (mushhada) and with certainty (yaqn), and as such it will be seen in several
extracts cited in Section below. At other times he speaks of the innermost secret when he wishes to
describe the deepest and most sincere attainment of a spiritual virtue, such as humility,
159
veracity,
160

neediness for God,
161
surrender to Him,
162
and fear of Him.
163
In one instance, he contrasts the
innermost secret (sirr) within the human being with the outer self (zhir). Te life of the former
is in Gods remembrance, while the life of the latter is in praising and thanking God.
164
:. The nafs
We have seen reference to mans natural self (nafs al-tab or nafs al-jibilla), [lower] self (nafs) and
also basic nature (tab), being opposed to the heart, intellect and spiritual self or spirit. Describ-
ing the nafs, Tustar states that when God created it, He made ignorance its nature and desire the
closest thing to it,
165
and in another context he shows it to be in partnership with Satan.
166
When it
is clearly in this role we have translated nafs as lower self , as noted above. But Tustar, like other
Sufs, also appears to understand the nafs to have a number of diferent levels according those
mentioned above that are spoken of in the Qurn, namely the evil-inciting self (nafs ammra bil-
s), the self-reproaching or blaming self (nafs lawwma) and the self at peace (nafs mutmainna),
though he refers to these only in one or two instances. About the evil-inciting self, he states that it
is lust (shahwa), which itself is the role played by mans basic nature (tab).
167
He identifes the self-
reproaching or blaming self with the evil-inciting self.
168
Elsewhere, he speaks of the lustful self
(nafs shahwniyya)
169
and the self of gnosis (nafs al-marifa),
170
which seem to be manifestations of
the natural or lower self and the spiritual self, respectively. Moreover, in one context he identifes
the self at peace (nafs mutmainna) with the spiritual self (nafs al-rh).
171
In many Suf texts, the
diferent aspects of the nafs, such as those of the nafs ammra, nafs lawwma, and nafs mutmainna
are understood as stages in its spiritual development. Without spiritual discipline, man remains
enslaved to the dictates of the evil-inciting self, but through rigorous spiritual discipline and with
the assistance of divine grace, the nafs may gradually be transformed into the self at peace (nafs
mutmainna).
172
Tustar, however, does not appear to see them as one nafs that is transformed, but
:,, On these hierarchies, and levels within the inner world of the human being see Keeler, Suf Hermeneutics, pp. :,f.
:,8 Te term sirr is used by diferent Suf authors in various ways, but is generally used to defne a subtle centre of percep-
tion or locus of mystical experience deep within the human being. On this subject see Shigeru Kamada, A Study of the
Term sirr (secret) in Suf Latif Teories, Oriens : (:8,), pp. ,:8.
:, e.g. Tafsr, ,:o.
:oo e.g. Tafsr, ,,:8.
:o: e.g. Tafsr, ,,::,.
:o: e.g. Tafsr, ,,:8.
:o, e.g. Tafsr, :,:::.
:o Tafsr, :o:::,. In this case, innermost secret (sirr) would appear to represent nafs al-rh, and outer self (zhir), the nafs
al-tab, here in coalition with the nafs al-rh through the remembrance of God.
:o, Tafsr, :::,,.
:oo Tafsr, :::,:.
:o, Tafsr, :::,,.
:o8 Tafsr, ,,::, :.
:o Tafsr, ,,:.
:,o Tafsr, :::,,.
:,: Tafsr, 8::,.
:,: Or, according to the terminology of some schools of Sufsm, beyond the nafs mutmainna to reach higher stages of the
nafs.
Tafsr al-Tustar
xlii
as the twofold nafs (the natural and spiritual self), which can, through the remembrance of God, be
brought into coalition, though they will not partake of the same experience in Paradise.
173
. The heart (qalb)
In his Tafsr, Tustar pays particular attention to the heart. Like other Sufs he sees the heart as the
seat or locus of faith within the human being, and this has its basis in the Qurn, for example in
the words of ,8:::: He has inscribed faith upon their hearts and reinforced them with a spirit from
Him Commenting on these words, Tustar states that this inscription on the heart is the work
of God, not the work of the servant, and he describes it as a gif of faith (mawhibat al-mn). He
also speaks of the heart as being a locus of the realisation of Gods oneness (tawhd) and of gnosis
(marifa), love (mahabba) and intimacy (uns) with God. Interpreting the Much-frequented House
(Bayt Mamr) [,::] in a metaphorical way, he states:
In its inner meaning, it refers to the heart: the hearts of mystics are frequented (mamra)
by His gnosis (marifa), His love (mahabba), and intimacy (uns) with Him. It is to this [the
mystics heart] that the angels make pilgrimage, for it is the House of the Realisation of Gods
Oneness (bayt al-tawhd).
Tustar states that God created the heart for Himself ,
174
and in one instance interprets the House
of God (i.e. the Ka ba) esoterically to represent the heart. Tus when he comments on the words,
Purify My House for those who circumambulate it [::::o], he states: Just as God has commanded
the purifcation of His House [at Mecca] from idols, so also He has commanded the purifcation of
that house of His in which He deposited the mystery of faith (sirr al-mn) and the light of gnosis
(nr al-marifa), namely, the heart of the believer. Tustar again employs the symbolism of the house
for the heart when he comments on houses [lying] deserted [:,:,:], and explains:
Teir houses are an allusion to hearts; for there are hearts which are inhabited (mir) through
remembrance (dhikr), and there are those which are ruined (kharib) through heedlessness
(ghafa). Whomsoever God, Mighty and Majestic is He, inspires with [His] remembrance, He
has freed from oppression (zulm).
175
Yet again showing the heart to be Gods property, he states:
Truly the heart is [like] a house: if it is unoccupied it goes to ruin, while if it is occupied by
other than its owner, or by other than one whom the owner has settled there, it will also go to
ruin. Terefore, if you wish your hearts to be in good repair, do not let your prayer in them be
other than to God, Exalted is He.
176
Te heart, therefore, needs to be protected from heedlessness and from being occupied with other
than God, and Tustar shows that, although it is the seat of faith, it can be diverted from the true
direction. As was seen above, Adams banishment from Paradise was because his heart acquiesced
in the desire and devising of his lower self. In one context he states that although the heart is the
most benefcial part of the human being, it is also the most dangerous, due to its tendency to turn
back and forth and fuctuate (taqallub) and its depth, and he compares it to a sea across which one
must journey.
177
Te heart has a light of insight, through which it can overcome desire and lust.
But Tustar warns:
When the hearts sight is blind to what is within it, lust will overcome him and heedlessness
will [amict] him at regular intervals. Consequently his body will stray into sin without being
guided to God under any circumstances.
178
:,, For example, the natural self will not be granted the vision of God.
:, Tafsr, ::8,.
:,, Tat is, the oppression of, or wrongdoing towards, their own selves.
:,o Tafsr, ::::o.
:,, Tafsr, ,o::.
:,8 Tafsr, :::o.
xliii
Introduction to the Translation
Interestingly, in his commentary on :::o, he also speaks of an inner heart, which is the position
from which the servant stands before his Master without being agitated or busied by anything, but
in a state of tranquillity and stillness in Him. It may be that what Tustar is referring to here is that
which he elsewhere describes as the function of the innermost secret (sirr).
Te hearts locus is the breast (sadr), which acts as a medium of transmission between the heart
and the body. Te breast is itself described as the locus of Islam, so it can be said that just as mn
(faith) is situated within islm, so the heart is situated within the breast. (For references on breast
or sadr see Index iii).
. Knowledge, faith and certainty
In the main, Tustar speaks of three kinds of knowledge in the Tafsr: knowledge (ilm), gnosis
or mystical knowledge (marifa), and understanding (fahm), although in a few contexts he also
mentions wisdom (hikma).
Gnosis (marifa) difers from knowledge and understanding in that its locus is, as Tustar con-
sistently states, the heart (qalb). Te light of gnosis was, as we saw, a deposit from God within the
heart, along with faith. Conversely, he describes the nature of vengeance which God took on those
who angered Him [,:,,] as being: [His] removal of the light of gnosis (nr al-marifa) from their
hearts, the lamp of the realisation of [His] oneness (sirj al-tawhd) from their innermost secrets
(asrr), and entrusting them to their own selves. Tus gnosis cannot be acquired through ones
own eforts, but is granted by God. Like other Suf authors, Tustar understands marifa to be the
experiential, mystical apprehension of God or of the divine mysteries. He also extends gnosis to
include the inner meanings of the Qurn,
179
and to the signs or portents of God in creation and
within the human being. Tus in his commentary on the words and in yourselves too [are signs],
do you not see? [,::::], he cites a tradition according to which God has created within the soul of
the son of Adam one thousand and eighty portents, three hundred and sixty of which are appar-
ent and three hundred and sixty of which are hidden, and revealed only to a prophet or veracious
person, and he adds:
Truly God, Exalted is He, has veiled the hearts of those who are heedless (ghfln) from His
remembrance due to their pursuance of lusts, which [prevent them] from perceiving these por-
tents. However, He has unveiled them to the hearts of those who have gnosis of Him (rifn),
thereby causing them to attain it [sincerity].
Tustar shows gnosis (marifa) to be beyond knowledge (ilm), as is indicated when he glosses the
words, but only those understand them [the similitudes] who know [::,] with the words, that is, those
who have knowledge (ilm) of God, Exalted is He, and especially those who have gnosis (marifa) of
Him. Moreover, he states that it is by granting gnosis that God elevates the rank of whomever He
wills.
180
Tis principle is endorsed when he comments on the words, And on the Heights are men
[,:o], and indicates that another dimension of gnosis is the knowledge of the inner states of men:
Te People of the Heights are the people of gnosis (marifa). God, Exalted is He, said: who
know each by their mark [,:,]. Teir standing is due to the honour (sharaf) they enjoy in the
two abodes and with the inhabitants of both[God] honoured them by allowing them to see
into the secrets of His servants and their states in this world.
Tustar also teaches that the attainment of marifa is associated with the experience of sufering
and need. For example, he states, Truly amiction is a doorway between the people of gnosis (ahl
al-marifa) and God, Mighty and Majestic is He,
181
and exhorts his disciples:
Say in your supplication (du): O my Lord, if you cook me, Ill bear it and if you roast me,
Ill be happy. It is essential that You be known, so favour me with gnosis (marifa) of You.
182
:, IC, p. o.
:8o Tafsr, o::,.
:8: Tafsr, :::, :.
:8: Tafsr, :::8,. See also the commentary on ,:,8, where Tustar states that gnosis of the secret [divine] mystery is to be
found entirely through a sense of neediness (faqr) [for God].
Tafsr al-Tustar
xliv
Understanding (fahm) is, like gnosis (marifa), shown in the Tafsr to be an aspect of esoteric
knowledge, though unlike gnosis its locus is the intellect (aql), as can be seen in the many cases
when Tustar speaks of the three allied tendencies of the spiritual self (nafs al-rh), the under-
standing of the intellect (fahm al-aql) and the discernment of the heart (ftnat al-qalb).
183
In this
sense, understanding is among the pre-eternal gifs from God which assist the human being in
overwhelming the natural or lower self:
He [God] said, Truly, We gave ascendancy (sallatn) over your dense natural self to the subtle
[substances] (latif) of your spiritual self, intellect, heart, and understanding (fahm), all of which
pre-existed as a momentous gif (mawhiba jalla) before the creation appeared by a thousand
years, and thus did they subdue the natural self.
184
Ofen, however, the term understanding (fahm) is employed in a particular sense that is associated
with the Qurn,
185
and indeed, in the Introduction to the Commentary there is a separate section
devoted to those who seek the understanding of the Qurn (fahm al-Qurn). In this section,
understanding is shown to be, on the one hand, a full and wholehearted grasping of the meanings
of the Qurn, and particularly of its commands and prohibitions, as when Tustar states: they have
no way to Him save through the Qurn, and through understanding [all] that has been addressed
to them therein concerning that which is required of them;
186
On the other hand, understanding
is ofen more specifcally associated with the comprehension of the inner meanings of the Qurn.
In the same section of his introduction, he speaks of Gods teaching the Qurn to His friends, both
in its outer and inner aspects, and as was mentioned above, when asked by his disciples what he
means by its inner aspects, he replies, Tat is its understanding (fahm); and it is its understanding
that is intended.
187
It will also be recalled that in Tustars defnition of four levels of meaning in the
Qurn, he equated understanding (fahm) with the inward sense (btin).
188
Like gnosis, understand-
ing is granted as a grace from God. Tus, commenting on the similitudes that We strike for the sake
of mankind [::,], he states:
Te similitudes which God strikes for man are available for everyone [to see], since the evidences
of [His] omnipotence (qudra) are [in themselves] proof of the [existence of] the Omnipotent.
However, it is only His elect (khssa) who fully understand them. Tus, knowledge is rare and
understanding granted by God (fqh an Allh) even rarer.
However, the prerequisite for such a bestowal from God is fulflment of what is commanded by
Him, as Tustar states:
Tere are those who have been granted understanding by virtue of their maintaining the
practice of what is commanded and the avoidance of what is forbidden, both inwardly and
outwardly, and by their amrmation of it [the Qurn] with the light of the insight of certainty
(nr basrat al-yaqn)
189
Interestingly, Tustar also points out that human understanding (fahm) has limits as does the
intellect (aql), which will be discussed below, whereas he does not mention limits with regard
to gnosis (marifa). In the Introduction to the Commentary he states about the Qurn, It is that
which is beautifully ordered in its outward form and profound in its inner meaning. It is, moreover,
that before which all understanding (fahm) is powerless.
190
As we saw above, he also describes a
state that is beyond understanding:
:8, See section : and diagram above.
:8 Tafsr, :,. Note that the understanding of the intellect was also present with the spiritual self and the discernment of
the heart at the Covenant of Alast, without the presence of the natural self. See above, p. xl.
:8, As, for example, in the commentary on :::o, ,:,, ,::o, ::,.
:8o IC, p. ,. See also the commentary on ::o:.
:8, IC, p. ,.
:88 IC, p. :.
:8 IC, p. ,, as also is indicated in the commentary on the Basmala, IC, pp. 8. Conversely, acting arrogantly can result in
a persons being deprived of the knowledge of the Qurn, as is shown in Tustars commentary on ,::o.
:o IC, p. :.
xlv
Introduction to the Translation
Te one who is close (qarb) [to God] has access to understanding (fahm), conjecture (wahm)
and interpretation (tafsr). But the one who is closest (aqrab) is beyond understanding, con-
jecture and interpretation, and what is beyond that cannot be contained by expression (ibra)
or allusion (ishra).
191
Te term knowledge (ilm) is employed in a number of ways in Tustars Tafsr. In some
instances, he uses it in a general way when it is opposed to ignorance, as when he comments on the
words, And He appointed darknesses and light [o::], and states that its inner meaning is that light
is knowledge (ilm) and darkness is ignorance (jahl);
192
or when he comments on ,,:,:, Yet among
them is the one who has wronged himself (zlim), the one who is moderate (muqtasid) and the one
who is foremost in good deeds (sbiq), where he interprets the foremost as the one who is learned
(lim); the midmost as the one who is learning (mutaallim), and the one who has wronged himself
as the one who is ignorant (jhil). In another context he uses the metaphor of life and death, when
he contrasts peoples knowledge with their ignorance of themselves (by which he means, perhaps,
ignorance of their true human responsibility of realising the oneness of God):
God, Exalted is He, created all creatures. Ten He brought them to life by the name of life. Ten
He caused them to die by their ignorance of themselves. Tose who live through knowledge
are the living; otherwise they are dead through their ignorance.
193
Usually, however, Tustar applies the word ilm to an outer knowledge of the oneness of God, of His
commands and prohibitions and of the Sunna of the Prophet, as is evidenced by his admonitions
concerning the need to put such knowledge into practice. Indeed, he repeatedly asserts that without
being implemented, knowledge is not merely without beneft, it is detrimental, as when he states:
Tis whole world consists of ignorance except for where knowledge is to be found. All knowl-
edge is a testimony against [the one who possesses it], except for that which is acted upon.
194
And again:
Every possessor of knowledge (lim) who has been given knowledge of evil but does not avoid
it is not a [true] possessor of knowledge. Similarly, whoever has been given knowledge of the
acts of obedience but does not practise them is not a [true] possessor of knowledge.
195
In a number of contexts, he also warns of the uselessness or danger of knowledge that is attained
for purely worldly reasons. Here he is contrasting two attitudes among those who have an under-
standing of the Qurn:
Tere are but two [kinds of] men who understand the Word [of God]: the frst wants to under-
stand so he can speak about it from a position [of authority], and his lot is nothing but that;
the other hears it and is occupied with acting upon it to the exclusion of all else. Tis person is
rarer than red sulphur (al-kibrt al-ahmar) and more precious than all that is dear.
196
In another context, it is related that a certain Ab Hamza al-Sf visited Tustar and discussed with
him the subject of intoxication. He informed Tustar that he had heard it said that intoxication was
of four kinds: Te intoxication of drink, the intoxication of youth, the intoxication of wealth and
the intoxication of authority. To this Tustar replies:
Tere are two kinds of intoxication about which he did not inform you: the intoxication of the
scholar who loves this world, and the intoxication of the worshipper who loves to be noticed.
197
Te locus of knowledge is, according to Tustar, the intellect (aql):
:: Tafsr, :::oo.
:: Te verse is cited in his commentary on ,::oo, in which he actually links knowledge to belief, and ignorance to disbelief.
:, Tafsr, :o:::.
: Tafsr, :,,.
:, Tafsr, :::88.
:o Tafsr, ::o:.
:, Tafsr, :o:o,. See also his commentary on :,::,, where among seven veils which veil the believer from God, knowledge
is named because of the vainglory it breeds among peers.
Tafsr al-Tustar
xlvi
Know that God, Exalted is He, when He wished to make His knowledge apparent, deposited
His knowledge in the intellect (aql). Ten He ruled that no one could have access to any of it
[His knowledge] except through the intellect. Tus whoever has been deprived of his intellect
has also been deprived of knowledge.
198
Tustars saying that no one can have access to Gods knowledge except through the intellect is an
indication that he understands the intellect to be more than simply a repository of knowledge. In fact,
the intellect has its own particular function, as can be seen in the many instances when the intellect
or understanding of the intellect (fahm al-aql) is associated with the spiritual self and the heart.
It was seen that the heart should not be allowed to acquiesce in the desires of the lower self,
199

but this does not indicate a dual nature for the heart. Te intellect, however, does have a dual nature,
according to Tustar. Included in the context of ,,:, God has not placed two hearts inside any man,
is the following observation:
[Tat is, he does not have] one heart with which he approaches God, and another heart with
which he manages the afairs of this world. [On the other hand], the intellect (aql) does have
two natures (tabn): a nature which is orientated towards this world, and a nature which is
orientated towards the Hereafer (khira). Te nature which is orientated towards the Hereafer
is in coalition (mutalif) with the spiritual self (nafs al-rh), whereas the worldly-orientated
nature is in coalition with the lustful self (nafs shahwniyya).
Te side of the intellect that is oriented towards the Hereafer, therefore, has a key role to play in
relation to the heart. In another part of his commentary on ,::8, Tustar explains:
If [the servant] is involved in an act [motivated by] his lower self, and something comes to his
heart which guides him to remembrance and obedience, that is the role played by the intellect
(mawdi al-aql).
Tis may be partly where the believers answerability will lie, when at the Resurrection he is ques-
tioned in relation to what he owes his intellect.
200
Yet, despite the important role of aql, the servant must also recognise its limitations. In his
discussion of the locks on the heart mentioned in ,::, Tustar explains that when God created the
hearts He secured them with locks. Te keys to those locks were the realities of faith, and the only
ones who were vouchsafed the opening of their hearts through those realities were [Gods] friends
(awliy), messengers (rusul) , and the veracious (siddqn). Te rest of people leave this world
without the locks on their hearts being opened. He then adds:
Te renunciants (zuhhd),
201
devout worshippers (ubbd), and scholars (ulam) will leave this
world with locked hearts because they sought the keys to them with the intellect (aql), and thus
strayed from the path. If only they had sought them by having recourse to divinely-bestowed
success (tawfq) and grace (fadl), they would have attained them [the keys].
In his commentary on the words, And He creates what you do not know [about] [:o:8], he states:
Te inner meaning of these words [is that] God, Mighty and Majestic is He, has taught you
to restrain yourself when your intellect (aql) fails to grasp the efects of His creation and the
multifarious dimensions of [His] knowledge, so that it [your intellect] does not meet it with
denial, for He has created what you do not know about, neither you nor anyone else among
His creatures except those whom God has taught, Mighty and Majestic is He.
:8 Tafsr, :o:::.
: As was discussed above in relation to Adams banishment from Paradise, above p. xxxv.
:oo See above, p. xxxvi.
:o: Te term zuhd is ofen translated as asceticism, though it is more precisely a renunciation and disdain for the world.
Michael Cooperson, in his book Classical Arabic Biography: Te Heirs of the Prophets in the Age of al-Mamn (Cambridge,
:ooo), has coined the word renunciant as a translation of the word zhid (pl. zuhhd).
xlvii
Introduction to the Translation
As can be seen from the two passages above, Tustar teaches that there is a knowledge of
unseen things or realities which God imparts not to all, but to a select few of His creatures.
202
In
another context, when he is commenting on those who are rooted in knowledge (al-rsikhna
fl-ilm), mentioned in ,:,, he discusses three categories of knowledge and four diferent ways in
which God imparts knowledge (and here the term knowledge [ilm] is clearly not being restricted
to an outer level). He observes that those rooted in knowledge are shown to be exceptional because
of their saying, according to the verse: All is from our Lord, and he then explains that they (the
rsikhna fl-ilm) reveal three kinds of knowledge, since those who know may be designated in
three ways: rabbniyyn, nurniyyn and dhtiyyn. Te precise nature of the connection Tustar
intends between each of these kinds of knowers and the divine lordliness, light and essence is not
made clear by these allusive terms.
203
However, given that he has specifed about these three kinds
of knowers of God that they say, All is from our Lord, we might render them somewhat freely as:
those whose knowledge derives from, or is through, the divine lordliness, light and essence, respec-
tively.
204
Another approach would be to interpret these three designations of knowledge as being
manifestations of the divine lordliness, light and essence.
205
Tustar discusses these three categories
of knowers of God (rabbniyyn, nurniyyn and dhtiyyn) once more in his commentary on ,:,,
with a particular focus on the rabbn. Here again the context suggests a kind of knowledge that
is received directly from God, a knowledge through Gods knowledge, which Tustar here subtly
compares to prophetic knowledge. Tus he cites the Qurnic words, She asked, Who told you this?
He said, I was told by the All-Knowing, the Aware [oo:,], and adds, Anyone who informs you of
something which conforms to the Book and the Sunna, is an informant (munbi). Hence Tustar
is also suggesting that an aspect of the rabbn knowledge is its transmission to others, and this is
confrmed by a saying of Al b. Ab Tlib that he cites in this context, where the knower whose
knowledge derives from the divine lordliness (lim rabbn) is contrasted with the one acquiring
knowledge (mutaallim). Returning to his commentary on ,:,, we fnd that afer Tustar has discussed
three of the highest modes of knowing, or of receiving knowledge from God, he then presents a
diferent scheme comprising four modes of divinely-bestowed knowledge. Tese are: revelation
(wahy), theophany (tajall), knowledge directly bestowed by God (ind) and knowledge from
the divine presence (ladunn).
:o: Tis was also mentioned above in relation to the understanding of the inner meanings of the Qurn. See above, p. xxvii.
:o, Bwerings translation of the three designations in his Mystical Vision (pp. ::,) reads: those who perceive God as
Lord, those who perceive God as Light and those who perceive God as Essence.
:o Te idea of knowing or perceiving the essence of God is problematic, since not only theologians but most Sufs con-
sider the divine essence to be unknowable. In other instances in the Tafsr, when mentioning some connection with
the divine essence, Tustar appears to be cautious, as in his discussions of certainty (Tafsr, ::o and :), which will be
discussed below. A passage quoted from Tustar in the chapter on Tawhd in Qushayrs Risla may be helpful here:
Te essence of God may be characterised (mawsfa) through knowledge (ilm), not grasped through comprehension
(ghayr mudraka bil-ihta), nor seen by human eyes (marya bil-absr) in this world, though it is found (mawjda)
through the realities of faith (haqiq al-mn), without any limit (hadd), comprehending (ihta) or indwelling (hull).
In the Hereafer eyes will see it manifested in His dominion and omnipotence. He has veiled the creatures from gnosis
(marifa) of the profundity (kunh) of His essence, but He gives them an indication to it (dallahum alayhi) by His signs
Qushayr, Risla, p. ,o,.
:o, In Chapter ,8 of the Kitb al-Taarruf, On Manifestation (or theophany, tajall) and Veiling (istitr), Kalbdh opens his
discourse with the following saying attributed to Tustar: Manifestation has three degrees (ahwl): a manifestation of
[the] essence (dht), which is unveiling (mukshafa); a manifestation of the attributes of the essence (sift al-dht), which
is illumination (mawdi al-nr ); and a manifestation of the decree [or power] of the essence (hukm al-dht), which is
the Hereafer and what it entails. See also the Qt al-qulb, vol. :, pp. ::,, where Makk states that God has elevated
His essence above hearts (qulb) and [modes of] thought (afr); it can neither be imagined through the intellect (aql)
nor depicted through thought (fkr) lest fanciful supposition (wahm) should take hold of it. He continues by saying that
Gods essence cannot be contemplated by any thought, understood by any intellect or perceived by any comprehension,
unless or until it be by a manifestation (tajall) through His benefcence (ihsn), as in the frst place He had manifested
[it] through His loving compassion (hann). Tis manifestation, Makk states, may be to His friends today (i.e. in this
life) through the lights of certainty (anwr al-yaqn) in [their] hearts, whereas it will be a visual beholding of the eyes
(muyanat al-absr) tomorrow (in the Hereafer).
Tafsr al-Tustar
xlviii
Tustar speaks of divinely-bestowed knowledge in other contexts, ofen using the image of
light, where knowledge is particularly associated with guidance from God. For example, in the
Introduction to the Commentary he is quoted as saying, According to the measure of light which
has been allotted to a person by God, Exalted is He, he will fnd guidance for his heart and insight
(basra).
206
In his commentary on the words, Tose are upon guidance from their Lord [::,], he states:
By the light of His guidance hearts witness Him in confdent abandonment to Him due to a
light from His light, by which He singled them out in His pre-eternal knowledge. Tus they
do not speak except with guidance, and their inner perception is solely directed towards that
guidance. So those who are guided by [this light] are never lef by it. Tus they are [constant]
witnesses to it because they are never absent from it.
Tustar also speaks of his own experience of this direct guidance from God, as when he states, as
noted above, Indeed, God willing, I have been granted wisdom and [knowledge of] the unseen
which I was taught from the unseen of His secret (min ghayb sirrihi), and thus He sumced me from
the need for all other knowledge
207
In these passages, Tustar is indicating a profound and arcane connection between the depths
of human consciousness and God, and he consistently employs allusive terms to describe such
mystical experiences, as, for example in the following statement:
In reality, the servant only beholds (yanzuru) God by means of a subtle substance (latfa),
through its connection to his heart. Tis subtle substance pertains to the attributes of the
Essence of his Lord. It is neither brought into being (mukawwana), nor created (makhlqa),
neither conjunct [with God] (mawsla), nor cut of [from Him] (maqta). It is a secret (sirr)
from a secret to a secret, an unseen [mystery] (ghayb) from an unseen to an unseen.
208
We fnd an analogous mode of expression in Tustars discussions of certainty (yaqn). Tus in the
continuation of the above passage, he states:
Certainty (yaqn) is through God, and the servant fnds certainty due to a cause (sabab) that
comes directly from Him to the servant, according to the measure of the gifs that God has
apportioned him, and the wholeness of his innermost heart (suwayd qalbihi).
Tustar discusses certainty in a number of passages in the Tafsr, showing it to be beyond
knowledge, and to be an advanced form of faith. Certainty also has degrees. Tus in the context of
his commentary on Abrahams request that God show him how He gives life to the dead [:::oo],
Tustar is asked if Abraham was in doubt concerning his faith, and was therefore making this request
of God in order to restore his faith, he answers:
His question was not out of doubt; he was merely asking for an increase in certainty (ziyda
yaqn) to the faith he already had. Tus he asked for an unveiling of the cover of visual behold-
ing with his physical eyes, so that by the light of certainty, his own certainty regarding Gods
omnipotence might be increased, and [his certainty] regarding His creative [power] might
be consolidated... [Terefore] the request for profound peace of mind (tumanna) signifed a
request for an increase in his certainty.
A detailed explanation of the degrees of certainty and its relation to faith is outlined when Tustar
comments on the word rahba, meaning awe in ::o. He observes that endurance and struggle
are part of faith when it is for the sake of God (mn liLlh). But when the heart ceases to have
fear of any other than God, and is therefore in a state of true awe (rahba) towards Him, then the
light of certainty is unveiled. Ten the servant, who had been abiding in faith for the sake of God,
attains the level of faith through God (mn biLlh). At this level, his amrmation of the oneness
of God has reached a point of stability, and his heart is in a state of tranquil and confdent repose
with God. Ten he is taken to a deeper realisation of certainty when, as Tustar explains, the light
of certainty (nr al-yaqn) unveils the knowledge of the eye of certainty (ilm ayn al-yaqn) and
:oo IC, p. .
:o, Tafsr, ::,.
:o8 Tafsr, :::.
xlix
Introduction to the Translation
this is the attainment of God.
209
But this certainty that leads to the eye of certainty is not something
that is brought into being (mukawwan) or created (makhlq); it is rather a light from the light of
the essence of God. Here, lest he be misunderstood, Tustar adds that what he means by this is
not any indwelling (hull), conjoining (jam) or conjunction (ittisl) with God; rather it is due to
the true realisation of Gods oneness (tawhd) and obedience to God and His Prophet. He further
explains that according to the strength of the servants perception (basar) of God (i.e. his certainty),
he will attain both awe (rahba) and full awareness of God (taqw). We also fnd that he associates
the eye of certainty with a wholeness, an all-ness or entirety of perception on three occasions
when he speaks of ayn al-yaqn he follows it with the words wa kulliyyatihi.
210
Tustar sums up the
importance of certainty at the end of this passage when he states:
Know that human beings will vary in rank on the Day of Resurrection according to the measure
of the light of certainty that they possess. Te weightier the certainty a person has, the heavier
will his scales weigh [in his favour], even though there might [otherwise] be less in his scales.
F. The Spiritual Path
:. Precepts and proprieties
In the preceding sections we have discussed some passages in which Tustar shows glimpses of
the experiences of certainty and mystical unveiling that might be encountered by those who are
advanced on the spiritual path. But in the Tafsr we also fnd numerous passages in which he
presents instruction for aspirants, to guide them from the most elementary stages through to the
highest attainments of the Way.
All important is, of course, the opposing and controlling of the lower self (nafs) and its desires,
which was alluded to in some passages on spiritual psychology discussed above. Te following is an
example of a specifc exhortation to control the self (or lower or natural self), which constitutes a
metaphorical interpretation of the words, It is He who has made the earth tractable for you[o,::,]:
God, Exalted is He, created the souls in a humble state. Whoever subdues (adhalla) his self
by opposing it, actually saves it from temptations, tribulations and trials. However, whoever
debases (adhalla) his self and follows it, will be brought to humiliation and destroyed by it.
In other passages, Tustar interprets holy war (jihd) as the struggle or battle with the lower self.
Tus, he states:
All forms of obedience to God involve struggle with the lower self (jihd al-nafs). Tere is no
struggle easier than the struggle with swords, and no struggle harder than opposing the lower
self.
211
When someone asked him, I have wealth and strength and I want to perform jihd. What do you
command me to do? he answered:
Wealth is knowledge (ilm), strength is intention (nya) and jihd is the struggle with the lower
self (mujhadat al-nafs).
212
:o Here also Tustar is clearly not using the term ilm in an outer sense. Te juxtaposition of the knowledge of certainty
(ilm al-yaqn) and the eye of certainy (ayn al-yaqn) have their origin in the Qurn :o::, and ,, and in the latter verse
the expression ayn al-yaqn is actually used, and suggests a degree of certainty that is as direct and immediate as seeing
with the eyes (see the passage cited above, p. xxxvii, regarding the meaning of the expression of iyn al-iyn derived
from the same verbal root -y-n). In later Islamic mysticism a further degree of certainty was added, that of the truth of
certainty (haqq al-yaqn), an expression that is also to be found in the Qurn, ,o:, and o:,:. On the development of
terminology denoting diferent levels of experienced or realised truth and certainty, see Nasrollah Pourjavady, Parvna
u tash: sayr-i tahawwul-i yik tamthl-i irfn dar adabiyyt-i Frs, Nashr-i Dnish, Year :o, no. : (:), pp. ,:,.
::o Tafsr, ::o, :; :o::,.
::: Tafsr, 8:,:.
::: Tafsr, :o:::o.
Tafsr al-Tustar
l
In another metaphorical interpretation, this time of the words, O Prophet, struggle against the
disbelievers and the hypocrites [:,,], he states:
Struggle against your lower self with the sword of opposition! Place upon its [back] the bur-
dens of remorse (nadam), and guide it through the desert plains of fear (khawf), so that you
may turn it back to the path of repentance (tawba) and contrition (inba). Repentance is not
acceptable save from one who feels perplexed at his concerns, and grief-stricken at heart due
to what has befallen him.
In the latter passage Tustar has associated opposing the lower self with repentance. Like other
Sufs, he sees repentance (tawba) as an initial step on the way,
213
and so he says, Te frst thing that
a novice is instructed to do is to change his reprehensible actions into praiseworthy ones, which
is repentance.
214
However, in his commentary on this same verse [::::] he insists that repentance
should be perpetual:
Of the rights [due to God] in this world there is none whose fulflment is more incumbent upon
humanity than repentance. Indeed it is obligatory [for them] at every moment and instant, and
there is no punishment severer on them than the lack of knowledge of repentance.
215
In a similar vein, he emphasises the need for vigilance and self scrutiny. For example, he states:
Te real believer is the one who is not heedless of his lower self and his heart, but scrutinises
his states (ahwl), and keeps a close watch over his moments (awqt). He observes his increase
[in a good state, distinguishing it] from his decline, and shows gratitude on seeing an increase,
but when there is a decline devotes himself [to remedying it] and makes supplication.
216
And elsewhere:
Te capital (ras al-ml) of wisdom consists of three things: the frst is disciplining the lower
self (riydat al-nafs) concerning things which are reprehensible; the second is emptying ones
heart of any love for carnal lusts (shahawt); and the third is standing guard over ones heart
by warding of [unwarranted] thoughts which occur to it (khatart). Moreover, whoever is
mindful of God when [unwarranted] thoughts [come upon] his heart, will have [God] protect
him in his bodily acts.
217
Tustar supplies numerous practical rules and guidelines for the spiritual life. Like many Sufs, he
recommends fasting, seclusion and the night vigil, though he also advocates silence:
All goodness comes together in four things: an empty stomach, seclusion from people, the
night vigil, and observing silence.
218
He describes hunger as one of Gods secrets,
219
and states, God, Exalted is He, created the world
and placed knowledge and wisdom within hunger, and placed ignorance and transgression within
satiety.
220
Apart from these particularly rigorous disciplines, Tustar generally advocates a simple
life for aspirants. He warns against four traits that will prevent the aspirant from attaining anything:
If he likes to eat tasty food, dress in fne clothes, see his commands executed and his possessions
increase.
221
When asked to defne the proprieties of the Way he states:
::, In several Suf manuals tawba is presented as the frst stage on the Path, as for example in the Risla of Qushayr, where
it is the frst among the stations (maqmt), and the Manzil al-sirn of Abd Allh al-Ansr (Cairo, :o:), where it
is second only afer awakening (yaqza).
:: Tafsr, ::::.
::, See above, p. xix, where Sarrj, among others, suggested that it was Tustars insistence on the obligatory nature of
repentance, to which the person who had him expelled from Tustar took objection.
::o Tafsr, 8::,.
::, Tafsr, :::o.
::8 Tafsr, :o:o:.
:: Tafsr, ,:,:.
::o ibid.
::: Tafsr, :,:,.
li
Introduction to the Translation
[It is that you should] let your food be barley, your sweetmeat dates, your condiment salt, your
fat yoghurt. You should let your clothes be of wool, your houses be mosques, your source of
light the sun, your lamp the moon, your perfume water, your splendour be in cleanliness and
your adornment wariness (hadhr) [of God]. Moreover, you should let your work consist in
being content (irtid) or he said: contentment (rid) , your journeys provision (zd) be
piety, your eating be at night, your sleep in the day, your speech be remembrance (dhikr), your
resolve (samma)

and your aspiration (himma) be for contemplation (tafakkur), your refective
thought (nazar) be to take example (ibra), and your refuge (malja) and the one who helps
you (nsir) be your Lord. Persevere in this until you die.
222
In the above passage Tustar has combined instructions for the practical side of life as well as giving
guidelines for spiritual conduct. Te Tafsr also contains a great number of short passages present-
ing diferent prescriptions and formulae for the spiritual life. Just a few examples will be cited here:
Te backbone (qiwm) of religion and this world is in three things: knowledge (ilm), propriety
(adab) and initiative (mubdara). However, the ruin of religion and this world comes from
three things: ignorance (jahl), folly (khurq) and laziness (kasal).
223
Tere are four things which are among the buttresses (daim) of religion: to uphold the truth
even against your own self and others; to renounce falsehood in yourself or others; to love
people who are obedient to God and to detest those who disobey Him.
224
Here he lists six vices and six virtues:
Te servant will not get the taste of faith until he quits six vices [lit. character traits, khisl]: he
should quit what is forbidden (harm), illegal possessions (suhut), what is dubious (shubha),
ignorance (jahl), intoxicant[s] (muskir), and ostentation (riy); [on the other hand] he should
adhere to [six virtues]: knowledge (ilm), putting his actions right (tashh al-amal), integrity of
heart (nash bil-qalb), veracity of the tongue (sidq bil-lisn), correct conduct (salh) in associat-
ing with people, and sincerity (ikhls) in the way he deals with his Lord.
225
And here he outlines the fundamentals of worship:
Te basis of worship is the profession of Gods oneness (tawhd) along with living according to
what is lawful, while avoiding the harm [of others] (ka al-adh). Furthermore, a person can-
not accomplish living by what is lawful without abandoning the harm of others, and likewise
he does not abandon causing harm save through living by what is lawful. If you know how
to abide by what is lawful, how to abandon causing harm, and the [correct] intention (nya)
behind actions, as well as you know the Ftiha, then your faith will become pure, as will your
hearts and bodily members. Indeed, these are the fundamentals.
226
And here he defnes three modes of excellence:
Te most ascetic (azhad) of people are those who have the purest source of food; the most devout
(abad) of people are those who are most earnest in their efort to uphold His commandments
and prohibitions; and the most beloved (ahabb) of them to God are those who are the sincerest
(ansahuhum) towards His creatures.
227
Noticeable among these precepts and guidelines is Tustars concern with correct conduct towards
others, and avoidance of harm to them. In other passages he specifcally focuses on this. For exam-
ple, he states:
::: Tafsr, ,::,:.
::, Tafsr, ::,:.
:: ibid.
::, Tafsr, 8::,.
::o Tafsr, ,:o. Te Ftiha is the frst sra of the Qurn, which is recited in each raka of the canonical prayer.
::, Tafsr, o:,:.
Tafsr al-Tustar
lii
Te earth will not consume the body of anyone who keeps the following three qualities: refrain-
ing from harming people, bearing the harm that comes from them and doing good to them.
228
And here he states the same idea, this time using the earth as a simile.
Know that the servant does not attain true faith (haqqat al-mn) until he becomes as the
earth for the servants of God it endures the sufering that they [impose] upon it and they
[derive] benefts from it.
229
Tustar also warns more than once against judging or criticising others. For example, he observes:
No one looks upon the slips of [other] people except an ignorant wrongdoer, and no one [may]
make known that which he has looked upon [of the faults of others] except God.
230
In his commentary on the words and shun much suspicion [:::], he further warns against hold-
ing a bad opinion (s al-zann) of others, and when asked to explain in this context a hadth of
the Prophet, Be on your guard with people, [by holding a] bad opinion (s al-zann), he replies:
Te meaning of this is [that protection from people] is [through holding a] bad opinion of
yourself, not of other people. In other words, accuse your own self for not treating them fairly
in your dealings with them.
He continues with an explanation of the psychology of bad opinion, in which he mentions not only
holding a bad opinion of other human beings, but also of God:
Bad opinion comes from ignorance and pertains to the natural self (nafs al-tab).

Te most
ignorant person is the one who estranges his heart [from God] without being aware of it. Indeed,
God, Exalted is He, has said: And that suspicion of yours which you held about your Lord has
ruined you, so you have become among the losers [:::,]. Certainly, the servant is deprived of
blessed provision and prayer at night because of bad opinion.
Te rewards for holding a good or beautiful opinion (husn al-zann) of God, however, are immense,
as Tustar shows. He discusses husn al-zann in two quite diferent ways. Te frst occurs in the
context of a discussion of Gods forgiveness in the commentary on :8:
If no one has any grievance against him, and his sins are only between him and God, Exalted is
He, indeed He forgives those sins, for He is the Magnanimous, the Generous. It has been related
from the Prophet that he said, A servant may be brought forward on the Day of Resurrection
and directed to the Fire, but then he will say, Tis is not in accordance with what I supposed
[my outcome would be].
231
Ten God, Mighty and Majestic is He, will ask, What was your
opinion of Me? to which he will reply, Tat You would forgive me, upon which God, Mighty
and Majestic is He, will say, Truly I have forgiven you, and He will direct him to Paradise.
Here, husn al-zann is being shown as the means to salvation in the Hereafer, but in another context
in the Tafsr, husn al-zann is shown to be the means to the most immediate experience of proximity
with God. Tis particular, mystical understanding of husn al-zann is presented in the poem which
was already cited above, the frst line of which indicates that good opinion can be a means to direct
or face-to-face encounter (kifh) with God, and that it traverses every veil. Te frst two couplets
of this allusive and evocative poem may be rendered as follows:
The abundant sufficiency (kifyt) of direct encounter [with God] (kifh),
[attained] through my good opinion of Him,
Is like the spiders web covering the caves entrance.
Good opinion has traversed every veil,
Good opinion has traversed beyond the light of fire
232
::8 Tafsr, ,o:,.
:: Tafsr, :,:.
:,o Tafsr, 8,::. See also the commentary on :::.
:,: lit. Tis is not in accordance with my opinion (m kadh zann).
:,: Te poem follows the commentary on :::oo.
liii
Introduction to the Translation
Te meaning of husn al-zann here is not clear, though it might be described as the souls being
predisposed for complete reliance upon, and confdence in, God. Tis may also be seen in another
context where Tustar links husn al-zann with certainty (yaqn).
233
When asked how one might
know the soundness of a persons certainty he replies, By the strength of his confdence (thiqa) in
God, Exalted is He, and his good opinion (husn al-zann) of Him.
234
Husn al-zann is thus the souls
reaching a state of complete readiness, openness and receptivity, a state in which God may sumce
for it in bringing it to Him. So Tustar cites a tradition of the Prophet:
Yesterday I saw an amazing thing; a servant between whom and God there was a veil, but then
when his good opinion of God appeared, He drew him in from behind the veil.
235
:. Emulation and aspiration
Tustar ofen speaks of the importance of emulation (iqtid) without always mentioning who is to
be emulated and whose example is to be followed. Clearly, the frst example to be followed is the
Prophet through his Sunna, as Tustar emphasises on many occasions, including the following:
Te believer has one face, without a reverse side; he makes repeated [advances] and never
retreats. You will see him striving for the cause of Gods religion and His obedience, upholding
Gods oneness and the following of His Prophet , constantly making humble entreaty of God
and seeking refuge in Him in the hope of connecting to Him through following [exemplary
guidance] (iqdid).
236
However, in the following passage he does not state who is to be followed:
Te livelihood (aysh) of angels is in obedience (ta); the livelihood of the prophets is in
knowledge and waiting for relief; and the livelihood of the veracious (siddqn) is in emula-
tion (iqtid).
237
While Tustar shows the Prophet to be the supreme model for the believers, he also describes
others whom he wishes to be seen as examples to be emulated. In some cases, he indicates their
position in the spiritual hierarchy among successors to the Prophet, as when he observes that the
veracious (siddqn) are heirs to the secrets of their [the prophets] sciences.
238
Tey have attained
the stage in which they speak only in four ways: in God, through God, for God and with God. He
understands the foremost mentioned in ,o::o, as follows:
Tey are those for whom Gods election (ikhtiyr) and special friendship (wilya) preceded
them before they were even brought into existence. Te ones who are brought near [to God]
[,o:::] are in stations of proximity (manzil al-qurb), and [enjoy] the ease of intimacy (rawh
al-uns). Tey are the ones who were the foremost (sabaq) in this life. Te prophets were the
foremost in having faith in God. Te veracious (siddqn) and martyrs (shuhad) among the
Companions and others were the foremost in having faith in the prophets.
In another passage it is those who are sincere and mindful of God (al-mukhlisn al-muttaqn) who
are portrayed as the best among the community:
Te best among people are the Muslims, the best among Muslims are the [true] believers, the
best among believers are the scholars who act upon their knowledge, the best among those
who act [upon their knowledge] are the fearful (khifn), and the best among the fearful are
those who are sincere and mindful of God (al-mukhlisn al-muttaqn), whose sincerity and
mindfulness of God remains with them up until their death.
239
:,, And it is worth noting that the poem itself occurs as part of Tustars lengthy commentary on :::oo, which discusses
Abrahams desire for an increase in certainty. See above, IT, p. xlviii.
:, Tafsr, ::o.
:,, Tafsr, :::oo.
:,o Tafsr, :::::.
:,, Tafsr, :::,.
:,8 Tafsr, ,8:::.
:, Tafsr, 8::o.
Tafsr al-Tustar
liv
A part of emulation is the desire to be close to those who have attained proximity with God, to
whom Tustar ofen refers as the friends (awliy) of God. Tus, in his commentary on part of the
prayer of Solomon, and include me, by Your mercy, among Your righteous servants [:,::], he explains:
Tis means, Grant me proximity to Your friends (awliy) so that I may be among their com-
pany, even though I have not reached their station (maqm).
We have seen also that in his commentary on ,::,:, Tustar explains that the seekers (murdn)
were created from the light of Adam , while the [divinely] sought (murdn) were created from
the light of Muhammad . Following this statement he observes:
Tus, the generality among people live under the mercy of the people of proximity (ahl al-qurb)
and the people of proximity live under the mercy of the one brought near (al-muqarrab)
With their light shining forth before them and on their right [,,:::].
240
Apart from passages which exhort seekers to emulate, or keep close to, those who have attained
spiritual perfection, friendship and proximity with God, there are also passages which describe
qualities and virtues to which they should aspire, such as veracity (sidq),
241
patience or forbearance
(sabr),
242
and humility. On the virtue of the latter he states that pure servanthood is self-abasement
(dhull) and humble submission (khush),
243
while in his commentary on the story of Korah (Qrn)
he states:
Te fortunate person (sad) is he who averts his eye from [looking upon] his states and acts;
to him is opened the way of receiving grace (fadl) and being gracious to [others] (ifdl), whilst
keeping sight of Gods favour in [the accomplishment of] all acts.
244
Closely related to humility is poverty (faqr), by which is not meant the outer poverty of not owning
things (discussed above), but an inner sense of poverty or utter neediness (ifiqr) vis--vis Gods
infnite wealth, plenitude and lack of need (istighn). Tus when he comments on the words O
mankind! It is you who stand in need of God [,,::,], Tustar states:
Tat is, You [depend] upon Him in your very selves, for truly when God created all creatures,
He imposed upon His servants neediness (faqr) for Him, while He is the Rich and Independ-
ent (al-Ghan). Furthermore, whoever claims to be wealthy has been veiled from God, Mighty
and Majestic is He. On the other hand, whoever shows his need for God, will fnd that He
joins his need to His wealth.
In his commentary on the words: You will not attain mindfulness of God until you expend of
that which you love [,::], Tustar fnds an opportunity to discuss the quality or state of love, which
he illustrates with a story about Jesus, who successively meets three groups of people. Te frst,
with emaciated bodies and pale faces, when questioned by Jesus, explain that their state has been
brought about through the fear (khawf) of God. He tells them that they will be granted safety from
that which they fear. Te second group of people he encounters are even more emaciated than the
frst. Tey inform him that their state is due to their yearning (shawq) for God, and he tells them
that God has made it incumbent upon Himself to grant them that which they long for. Finally he
comes across a group who are even more emaciated, but whose faces are radiant like full moons.
When questioned by Jesus, they reveal that their condition is due to love (hubb). Jesus tells them
three times that they are the people of proximity (muqarrabn). Tustar then adds, Tus, whoever
loves God, Exalted is He, is one of the people of proximity, for if anyone loves something, they
hasten towards it.
:o Te one brought near being Muhammad.
:: e.g. Tafsr, ,,:8 and ::,:.
:: Tafsr, :o,:,, for example.
:, Tafsr, ,,::,.
: Tafsr, :8:,8.
lv
Introduction to the Translation
. Trust, mindfulness of God and sincerity
Tree spiritual qualities or virtues which Tustar particularly stresses in the Tafsr are: trust, that is,
complete trust in God (tawakkul); mindfulness or full awareness of God (taqw); and sincerity
(ikhls), which means making all ones actions purely for God, and freeing oneself from all other
than Him. Tese three qualities are themselves ofen linked both to each other and to other quali-
ties, as we shall see.
Tustar defnes trust (tawakkul) as the frst of four pillars of faith,
245
and as the last of seven
lines of faith that God inscribes upon the hearts of His friends.
246
One of his longest discussions
of tawakkul occurs in his commentary on the words, So turn away from them, and put your trust
in God [:8:]. Here, he defnes trust as a means of livelihood (aysh) for those who possess it, and
further states that the divine omnipotence (qudra) will not become apparent save to the one who has
complete trust.

In the section on mystical theology above, mention was made of Tustars teaching
that the downfall of human beings lies in reliance on their own devising and management (tadbr),
and that they must therefore look only to God for the management of their afairs. Tis latter involves
their realising that all power (hawl) and strength (quwwa) belongs to God. In this same discussion
of trust in the context of :8:, he explains that it involves three things: submission of the body in
servanthood, attachment of the heart to the divine lordliness (rubbiyya), and disclaiming all power
and strength. He also shows trust to be closely related to the state of sukn, that is, the servants
tranquil reliance on God and complete acquiescence in what God has destined for him. He states
that trust has a thousand ranks, the lowest of which is the ability to walk upon air.
247
When asked
how that level might be reached, he states:
Te frst thing is gnosis (marifa), then amrmation (iqrr), then the profession of Gods oneness
(tawhd), then submission (islm), then the perfection of faith (ihsn), then the committing of
ones afairs [to God] (tafwd), then trust (tawakkul), and fnally the state of tranquil reliance
(sukn) on God, Mighty and Majestic is He, in every situation.
248
Elsewhere Tustar shows tawakkul to be connected to other qualities and capacities. For example,
when asked about the reality (haqqa) of trust, he replies: It is to be at ease (istirsl) with whatever
God wants.
249
Hence it is close to the quality of contentment (rid). Tis connection is clearly
illustrated by the following statement:
God is content with your performing for Him just a days worship at a time, so be content with
Him for the provision you receive a day at a time.
250
A similar admonition is to be found when Tustar discusses diferent ways in which the servants of
God might worship, ending with the one who worships with equity or justice (insf), that is, one
who does full justice to worship. Asked to explain insf in worship, he answers:
It is that none of your bodily members moves unless it be for God. Furthermore, when you
ask Him for the next days provision your equity has lef you, for the heart cannot bear two
concerns (hammayn).
251
In other words, Tustar is here associating tawakkul, that is, not asking for the next days provision,
with equity, which is acting only for God and being concerned with none other than Him, and
this, as we shall see, is also how he understands sincerity. Tustar also links tawakkul with taqw
(mindfulness of God), when he states, Trust in God is not admissible from anyone except those
:, Tafsr, ,::oo. Te other three pillars are complete submission (istislm) to Gods commands; contentment (rid) with
what God has preordained, and gratitude (shukr) for His blessings. Tese, Tustar adds, are accompanied by mindfulness
of God (taqw).
:o Tafsr, ,8:::.
:, Tis is another indication that Tustar did not attach any particular importance to charismatic gifs. See above, p. xx.
:8 Again, this occurs in the commentary on :8:.
: Tafsr, :::o,.
:,o Tafsr, ,::::.
:,: Tafsr, ,o:::.
Tafsr al-Tustar
lvi
who are mindful of God, and mindfulness of God is not acceptable except with trust in God.
252
In
another context, Tustar compares mindfulness of God (taqw) and certainty (yaqn) to the two
pans of a pair of scales, while trust (tawakkul) is the pointer which indicates increase and decrease
in the other two.
253
Many passages in the Tafsr emphasise the importance of taqw, and the need to fear or be
fully aware and mindful of God. For example, in his lengthy commentary on the words, So fear Me,
O people of pith [:::,] he states:
Whoever hopes for Gods favour (karma), Mighty and Majestic is He, should be mindful of
Him, for truly it is through mindfulness of God that [the servant] may attain His favour and
admittance into Paradise, abide in His vicinity, and triumph with a tremendous victory.
Taqw is, in Tustars words, the best travelling companion leading to the remembrance (dhikr) of
God.
254
Elsewhere, he links taqw to sincerity (ikhls), as when he states in a passage cited above:
the best among the fearful are those who are sincere and mindful of God (al-mukhlisn al-muttaqn)
whose sincerity and mindfulness of God remains with them up until their death.
255
Te diferent resonances of the Arabic word used for sincerity, ikhls, which in its root (kh-l-s)
can have the meaning of both being pure and unmixed and becoming free of , are illustrated
in Tustars discussions of the term in his Tafsr. Te importance of this quality, state or station is
emphasised in many contexts.
256
For example, among the list of aphorisms which appear at the
end of the Tafsr is the recommendation, You must have sincerity (ikhls) to keep you safe from
[satanic] whispering.
257
Elsewhere, he recommends, Seek sincerity with an [inner] intention, for
only the sincere can recognise ostentation (riy).
258
In another context he warns that discernment
(ftna) is not attained through efort, but by acting with sincerity for God.
259
We have seen that sincerity (ikhls) is linked to mindfulness or full awareness of God (taqw),
but sincerity is also linked to both faith and certainty. For example, in his commentary on the words,
And they were only commanded to worship God, devoting religion purely to Him[8:,], Tustar states:
All knowledge is concerned with acts, until the person attains sincerity (ikhls). Ten when
he reaches sincerity, he will attain profound peace (tumanna). For the one whose knowledge
[has become] certainty (yaqn) and whose works are [done in] sincerity will fnd that God
removes from him three things: anxiety (jaza), ignorance (jahl) and action (amal), and will
grant him patience (sabr) in exchange for anxiety, knowledge in exchange for ignorance, and
the abandonment of choice in exchange for action but this will only be the case for those
who are fully aware of God (muttaqn).
Or again in the following passage, where sincerity is shown to be a manifestation, fruit or branch
of certainty:
Certainty (yaqn) is the heart of faith, patience (sabr) is the backbone of faith, and sincerity
(ikhls) is the perfection of faith, for through sincerity the servant reaches true amrmation
:,: Tafsr, o,::. See also :8:.
:,, Tafsr, o,::.
:, Tafsr, :::,
:,, Tafsr, 8::o.
:,o Tustar does not defne these qualities or virtues as being either a state (hl) or station (maqm), perhaps because
the diference between these two as technical terms had not yet been generally or formally established in Sufsm. On
the emergence of a systemisation of states and stations in Islamic mysticism see Nasrollah Pourjavady, Nahj al-khss
(athar az Ab Mansr-i Isfahn), Tahqqt-i Islm, Year , (:88), no. :, pp. :, and especially pp. :of. Two
early mystics who are accredited with developing a scheme of stages in the spiritual path areShaqq Balkh (d. :,/8:o),
whose short treatise, the Adab al-ibdt, concerned the waystations (manzil) of the path, see P. Nwyia, Exgse coranique,
pp. ::,o; and Ab Sad al-Kharrz (d. :8o/8 or earlier) who spoke of progress through diferent stations (maqmt),
for which see Isfahn, Hilyat al-awliy, vol. :o, p. :8.
:,, See p. ,::.
:,8 Tafsr, ,::.
:, Tafsr, ::o:.
lvii
Introduction to the Translation
(tasdq). Furthermore, through true amrmation he attains realisation (tahqq), and through
realisation he reaches God (al-Haqq). Sincerity is the fruit of certainty, for certainty is witness-
ing (mushhada) in the innermost secret (sirr)
260
In his commentary on the words, Ten they pray to God, becoming sincere [in their] faith in Him
[:o:::], Tustar states:
Sincerity (ikhls) is witnessing (mushhada). Te light of the heart is in two things: in its root,
it is faith (mn) and in its branch (far), it is sincerity. Sincerity is a matter of great importance
(khatar) and the one who possesses it is wary lest his sincerity should not prevail till death
He presents a number of diferent defnitions of sincerity, or the way that sincerity may be
attained, some of which appear straightforward, as when he says, whoever subdues his lower self
through propriety serves God, Mighty and Majestic is He, with true sincerity (ikhls).
261
Other
defnitions may be less simple than they appear, as when he interprets the words, Say Indeed I have
been commanded to worship God devoting [my] religion purely to Him [,:::] thus:
Sincerity (ikhls) is responding (ijba), and whoever has no response has no sincerity.
Presumably the response is to Gods command that worship should be devoted solely to him. Tustar
then explains what this implies:
Te astute (akys) refected upon sincerity and did not fnd anything except the following: that
everything the servant does, whether done in secret or openly, is for God alone, Mighty and
Majestic is He, and is mingled neither with desire nor with the self.
Similarly, commenting on the words And they were only commanded to worship God, devoting
religion purely to Him [8:,], he states:
Sincerity has three facets: worshipping purely for God (ikhls al-ibda liLlh), acting purely
for Him (ikhls al-amal lahu), and [keeping ones] heart purely for Him (ikhls al-qalb lahu).
. Remembrance of God (dhikr)
As can be seen, these virtues involve the seeker being wholly centred upon, aware of, and devoted
to God, all of which are in fact aspects of the remembrance of God (dhikr). Tustar not only shows
the remembrance of God to be an essential key to the mystical path, he also describes it as the very
sustenance of the spiritual self and the intellect, just as it is the sustenance of the angels.
262
When
discussing the nature of the provision from God mentioned in ,:,, he states:
Provision (rizq) is of two kinds: the provision that is remembrance for the spiritual self (nafs
al-rh), the intellect (aql) and the heart (qalb), which is like the sustenance of the angels
their very life (aysh) is in remembrance, and were this to be withheld from them they would
perish. Te other kind of provision is that which is eaten, drunk and so on for the beneft of
ones physical nature.
Elsewhere, commenting on [those who] remember God frequently [:o:::,], he explains:
God, Exalted is He, created the innermost secret (sirr) and made its life consist in His remem-
brance. He created the outward self (zhir) and made its life consist in praising (hamd) and
thanking (shukr) Him. He appointed for both of them duties (huqq), which are works of
obedience (ta).
Tis emphasis on the importance of remembrance of God may well have its roots in the instruction
given to the young Sahl by his uncle Muhammad b. Sawwr that he should recite to himself eleven
times a day, God is with me, God is watching over me, God is my Witness. We fnd this teaching
:oo In a short section on faith at the end of his commentary on Sra ,.
:o: Tafsr, ,::,o.
:o: Tafsr, ,8:::.
Tafsr al-Tustar
lviii
echoed more than once in the Tafsr, as when, in the context of the words and the men who remember
God ofen and the women who remember God ofen [,,:,,], he states:
Te one who observes true remembrance is he who is aware that God witnesses him. He per-
ceives Him with his heart as being close to him, and therefore feels shame before Him. Ten
he gives Him priority over himself and over everything else in every situation.
Another instance is when Tustar is asked to explain remembrance, and answers:
It is the realisation (tahqq) of the knowledge that God, Exalted is He, witnesses you, and it is
that you see Him close to you with your heart. Tus, you feel shame before Him and give Him
priority over yourself in all your afairs.
263
In these two cases, remembrance has an ethical dimension, or function, and this is also indicated
when, in the context of this same verse, Tustar is asked to explain the meaning of the Prophets
words, Te world is accursed and what it contains is accursed, save the remembrance of God (dhikr
Allh), Exalted is He, and replies:
His saying the remembrance of God here means the abstinence from what is not lawful, that
is, when something unlawful comes his way he remembers God, Exalted is He, and he knows
that God is watching him, so he avoids that unlawful thing.
264
However, remembrance also clearly has a contemplative dimension, as is shown when Tustar
explains the inner meaning of the command, Glorify the name of your Lord Most High [8,::]:
It [means] to proclaim His transcendence above having rivals (addd) and equals (andd).
Tis is its outward meaning. In its inner meaning it is to witness Him through remembrance
(dhikr) during the ritual prayer, without witnessing anything else.
265
Of course, this is not intended to imply that remembrance should be limited to the occasion of ritual
prayer. Tustar advises that the remembrance of God should be with His servants at every moment,
a point which he is at pains to emphasise when he gives his disciples the following admonishment:
In truth I say to you without any falsehood, in certainty without a doubt, that any person who
spends a breath in other than Gods remembrance does so while being heedless of God, Mighty
and Majestic is He.
266
Te same principle is here expressed in another way;
Tere is not a servant who desired God with a genuine resolve, without everything vanishing
from his [consciousness] besides Him.
267
In the following passage Tustar indicates the profundity of remembrance, employing diferent
forms of the verbal root dh-k-r:
Te life of the spirit (hayt al-rh) is in the remembrance [of God] (dhikr), the life of remem-
brance is in the one who remembers (dhkir), and the life of the one who remembers is in the
One who is remembered (madhkr).
268
Finally, Tustar discusses the highest level of remembrance, which is purifed of all other than
God. Here he is taking up the word remember as a keynote from a verse speaking of Abrahams
remembrance of the Abode [,8:o]:
:o, Tafsr, ,::o,.
:o ibid. Again, this is reminiscent of the admonition given to Tustar by his uncle. See above, p. xv.
:o, One is reminded of the defnition of spiritual virtue (ihsn) in the famous hadth of Gabriel, which is explained as To
worship God as if you see Him, for if you do not, He surely sees You. Te hadth is listed in Ab Zakariyya Yahy al-
Nawaw, An-Nawaws Forty Hadth, selected and translated by Ezzeddin Ibrahim and Denys Johnson-Davies (Lebanon,
:8o), pp. :8,:, and also in the Kitb al-mn in the Sahh collections of both Bukhr and Muslim. Qushayr discusses
some spiritual implications of this hadth in the twenty-fourth chapter of his Risla, Bb al-murqaba (Cairo, :oo),
pp. o,,; trans. Knysh, pp. :o:,.
:oo Tafsr, ,::o,.
:o, Tafsr, ,,:.
:o8 Tafsr, ,8:::.
lix
Introduction to the Translation
He [God] purifed Abraham, Ishmael and Isaac from the remembrance of this world through a
remembrance of Him, purely for [His sake] (khlisatan), not for the attainment of recompense.
Neither did they witness themselves in it [their remembrance]; rather, they remembered Him
through Him and for Him. Furthermore, the one who remembers God through God is not
like the one who remembers God through the remembrance of God.
Te state which Tustar is here describing, in which the mystic, represented by Abraham and his sons,
is totally freed of himself to the point that it can be said that he remembers God through God, was
defned by other mystics as the state of annihilation from self (fan) and subsistence in God (baq),
and is now generally understood in Sufsm as attainment of the ultimate state on the spiritual path.
269
vii. CociUsio
It is hoped that the foregoing discussion will have given the reader some idea of the depth and scope
of doctrines presented in Tustars Tafsr. As can be seen, they range from theological discussions
of the divine attributes, through cosmological refections on the Prophets time alone with God in
pre-eternity and the derivation of the two worlds from the well-spring of the Muhammadan Light,
to eschatalogical portrayals of what is in store for those who are blessed and those who are doomed
in the Hereafer; and from glimpses of the highest experiences of realised mystics, through descrip-
tions of spiritual virtues, to practical guidelines for the way of life of intitiates, and instructions
for their conduct on the path. Although the profoundest moments of illumination and intimacy
with God are for the most part allusively expressed in the Tafsr, we fnd that Tustar articulates
and expounds in a clear and precise manner his understanding of spiritual psychology and the
workings of the inner world of the human being, with its two sides, the one tending toward the
earth and the realm of darkness, namely mans lower self (nafs) along with his basic human nature
(tab ), and the other tending toward heaven and the realm of light, namely mans spirit (rh), heart
(qalb) and intellect (aql). Likewise he shows how these two sides can and should be brought into
coalition through the remembrance of God.
During this period, knowledge of the states (ahwl) and stations (maqmt) of the spiritual
path had not generally been subjected to any formal systematisation in Sufsm,
270
yet Tustar presents
numerous discussions of topics such as repentance (tawba), spiritual poverty or neediness for God
(faqr), patience (sabr), contentment (rid), complete trust in God (tawakkul), mindfulness of God
(taqw) and sincerity (ikhls), and in one or two instances incorporates some of these into a scheme
of progress through spiritual stages.
271
Many of his sayings on these topics, which he regarded as
necessary virtues or attributes for spiritual wayfarers, were to be cited in the manuals and treatises
of later Suf authors.
In the Tafsr, Tustars teachings are inevitably dispersed through his interpretations of diferent
Qurnic verses. However, when these fragments and gems of wisdom are brought together and col-
lated, we fnd, as Bwering has noted, a mystical synthesis of ideas that is marked by its coherence
and specifc terminology, and we can get a clear impression of Tustars mystical world view.
272
A
thread that runs consistently through his teachings is the theme of light, which represents for him
divine guidance at all its levels: the Qurn is light; the Prophet, in his primordial existence was light,
and continues to be light, radiating the light of faith and guidance to believers and to the world,
and it is a light from the light of the essence of God that brings the mystic to the highest level of
certainty and the attainment of God.
:o In his Tafsr, Tustar does not use these two terms fan and baq as they are frequently applied by Sufs to the concom-
mitent states of annihilation from self and subsisting in God. However, he does use the term baq as a permanent
subsisting with God in Paradise, as for example in his commentary on ,:o and ,o. See above, p. xxxvi, and n. :,. Ab
Sad al-Kharrz is accredited with being the frst mystic to have discussed fan and baq as mystical states.
:,o See above, n. :,o.
:,: e.g. Tafsr, :8:.
:,: Bwering, Mystical Vision, p. :o,.
Tafsr al-Tustar
lx
Tustars mystical world view, or perhaps we might call it his spiritual universe, is frmly framed
within his theological, cosmological and eschatological beliefs, and this is, as he sees it, precisely
the challenge which faces all human beings, and which he encourages aspiring mystics to take up.
God is the Transcendent, the Unknowable, yet as he says, Truly behind the names and attributes
are attributes which no comprehension can penetrate, for God is a blazing fre and is inaccessible.
Yet we have no option but to plunge in [and try to reach Him].
273
Our destiny is pre-determined
for us by God, and it is actually and only through our knowledge that He is in control of all things,
our acceptance of what He has destined for us with contentment (rid), and our complete trust
(tawakkul) and tranquil acquiescence (sukn) in Him, that we can be freed from the veil of our own
management of things (tadbr).
274
In the Tafsr, Tustar reminds us that at the Covenant of Alast all
human beings bore witness to Gods lordship, and that all human beings will defnitely be answer-
able in the Hereafer for the extent to which they have kept that Covenant (i.e. the profession of
Gods oneness). Te intense awareness of those two moments of encounter with God, one which
took place in pre-eternity and the other that is to come, place the mystic in the immediacy of the
present moment in which He stands before his Lord.
Annabel Keeler
November :o:o
:,, Tafsr, ,::8o. See the discussion of this saying in T. Mayer, Teology and Sufsm, in T. Winter, Cambridge Companion
to Classical Islamic Teology, p. :o,.
:, Tafsr, ,::,; also ,:,, and :o:,.
Ibn Taymiyya and the Rise of Radical
Hermeneutics: An Analysis of An Introduction to
the Foundations of Qur!nic Exegesis*
Walid A. Saleh
When he first encountered Ibn Taymiyya, Ab! "ayy#n al-Andalus$
(d. 745/1344), the leading grammarian and Qur#n exegete of
Mamluk Cairo, could hardly contain his praise for the newly arrived
Damascene. Ab! "ayy#n had never seen the likes of this man (m!
raat ayn!ya mithl h!dh! al-rajul): he refused money from the sultan,
berated the Mamluks for their impieties, and urged the community
to fight. What courage, what disregard for wealth and authority!
Ab! "ayy#n even wrote a few lines of poetry in praise of his new
hero. True, he went over the top in these verses, claiming that Ibn
Taymiyya was the awaited Messiah (al-im!m alladh" qad k!na
yunta#ar); but then again Ibn Taymiyya was known to engender such
adoration in his followers. Leave it, however, to Ibn Taymiyya to
turn an ardent admirer into a determined foe. Soon enough, in one
of their meetings, while disputing a grammatical point, Ibn
Taymiyya heaped insults on S$bawayh, the father of Arabic grammar,
even deriding Ab! "ayy#ns deference to his authority. After all,
S$bawayh was not the prophet of grammar, Ibn Taymiyya mockingly
growled (m! k!na S"baywayhi nab"ya al-na$w); nor was he infallible
(wa-l! k!na ma%&man). Any other insult would have been forgiven,
but not an insult against S$bawayh. Ab! "ayy#n not only removed
the piece of poetry from his d"w!n (it was preserved for us by the
historian Ibn "ajar), but later returned the favor and heaped insults
on Ibn Taymiyya in his major work, the Qur#n commentary al-Ba$r
al-mu$"'.
1
This anecdote shows the degree to which Ibn Taymiyyas
conservatism was directly linked to his iconoclasm. By confining his
respect to the early generations of Islam he was free to escape the
binding authority of any other figure in subsequent Islamic
intellectual history, no matter how highly regarded such a figure
might be amongst his contemporaries. Ibn Taymiyya would soon
take the tradition of Qur#nic exegesis to task and show his utter
124 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
disregard for the whole outlook that was at the basis of Ab!
"ayy#ns academic work.
The small treatise Muqaddima f" u%&l al-tafs"r (An Introduction to the
Foundations of Qur!nic Exegesis) by Ibn Taymiyya has had a
remarkable influence on the history of Qur#nic exegesis. Barely 15
folios, it not only proclaims a new hermeneutical program that
became the foundation for a subgenre of tafs"r that would generate
several major Qur#nic commentaries, but it boldly attempts to
overhaul the entire history of Qur#nic exegesis. The treatise, as Ibn
Taymiyya makes clear in its preface, was dictated from memory,
probably during his last stint in jail, without access to his notes or
books, and as such it shows a slight degree of disorganization and
some fluidity in its composition.
2
This makes it sometimes difficult
to comprehend fully what Ibn Taymiyya was attempting to say. Yet
the author was successful in conveying to a number of influential
medieval readers a systematic program of interpreting the Qur#n
and assessing the merit of any Qur#nic commentary. Ibn Taymiyya
was offering more than just a method of interpretation; he was also
offering a judgment upon the collective literature of the Qur#nic
commentary tradition.
The final two chapters of this treatise, in which Ibn Taymiyya
adumbrated his new theory, were incorporated in toto in the
introduction of Ibn Kath$rs (d. 774/1373) Qur#n commentary, the
first major commentary to put into practice the theory of Ibn
Taymiyya (or at least attempt to do so).
3
The verbatim quotation of
these two chapters at the beginning of what proved to be the prime
example of this new type of Qur#n commentary is a strong
indication of Ibn Taymiyyas influence in reshaping the exegetical
tradition.
4
Ibn Taymiyyas treatise was thus influential in its own
right, and because of the incorporation of its most important section
in Ibn Kath$rs Qur#n commentary. This article will offer a detailed
analysis of Ibn Taymiyyas Introduction, an account of its background,
and the reasons for its influence and continued relevance.
Given that Ibn Taymiyya left no substantial work on tafs"r, his
influence in this field is all the more in need of explication.
5
It is a
testament to the intellectual breadth of Ibn Taymiyya that it should
leave such a lasting imprint on an already well established field. By
the time Ibn Taymiyya wrote his treatise the field was already
replete with illustrious exegetes, the likes of al-%abar$, al-Thalab$,
al-W#&id$, al-Baghaw$, al-Zamakhshar$, Ibn A'iyya, and al-R#z$, to
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 125
name some whose works have been published so far. There were
several reasons for the success of this treatise in influencing the
genre of Qur#nic exegesis, but perhaps the most obvious is that Ibn
Taymiyya was the first to offer a systematically articulated
prescriptive theory of Qur#nic interpretation in a pure formthat
is, as a separate treatise; his work was thus assured a precedence
and as such an influence that were never matched.
6
It is not that
scriptural exegesis was lacking in theorizing about hermeneutics,
and one could hardly speak of an intellectual vacuum in the field;
indeed the opposite was true. The fact is, however, that commentators
were more willing to offer their interpretation than their theoretical
hermeneutical position. When such theories were presented they
were usually part of introductions to Qur#n commentaries, and as
such, their impact was limited by their being part of a far more
important composition.
7
But even if one wrote a Qur#n commentary it was no guarantee
of influence in the field, and it is even more unlikely that one stood
a chance to influence the field if one were to theorize about tafs"r
without leaving a commentary. Ibn Taymiyyas theory itself must
have reflected a close affinity with certain intellectual currents in
late medieval Islam for it to secure such a lasting influence for itself.
Ibn Taymiyya couched his theory within an ideological framework
that was difficult to unseat or refute. Subsequently, the effect of Ibn
Taymiyyas theory was not only that it generated a new form of
Qur#nic commentary writingor, to be more accurate, saved an
existing form from its internal contradictionsrather, his theory
would also offer a formidable challenge to medieval hermeneutics
that proved insurmountable in the long run. The road to prominence
took some centuries, yet one can speak of a steady increase in the
influence of this treatise. Indeed, there is hardly another comparable
work in the history of Qur#nic hermeneutics. It single-handedly
provided the basis for the consolidation of what I have termed
radical hermeneutics, which would culminate with the publication
of al-Durr al-manth&r f" al-tafs"r bi-al-math&r by al-Suy!'$.
8
The
repercussions of this treatise can be observed across the intellectual
history of the Islamic world, and they were not confined to late
medieval Islamic intellectual history; in fact, the triumph of this
mode of hermeneutics, radical hermeneutics, was assured only in
the latter part of the 20th century. Ibn Taymiyyas treatise has now
126 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
become the basis for how modern conservative Muslim intellectuals
conceive of Qur#nic exegesis.
The Organization and the
Introduction of the Treatise
The popularity of Ibn Taymiyyas treatise and its small size means
that there exists a rather large number of editions and reprints.
9

The so-called Salaf$ edition was published in 1936 (Taraqq$
publishers) and reprinted with corrections in 1965 (Salaf$ press,
hence the name).
10
The one used for this study (and the only critical
edition) is by Adn#n Zarz!r. It is based on one manuscript and the
earlier edition, which itself was based on two different manuscripts;
thus Zarz!rs edition utilized three manuscripts in all. All other
reprints and editions are pirated copies of these three earlier
publications (mostly of the Salaf$ 1965 reprint, which became the
most widely used). It is important to emphasize, however, that there
has not been an exhaustive study of the manuscript tradition of this
treatise.
11
Ibn Taymiyya claims in his preface to the treatise that he was
asked by some colleagues to write them an introduction which
contains general rules (qaw!id kulliyya) that can be used to
understand the Qur#n and enable one to know its interpretations
and meanings, and enable the reader, when examining interpretations
that are based on tradition (manq&l) and those which are based on
reason (maq&l), to distinguish between the truth and the falsehood
therein. Moreover, the introduction should also supply a guide for
how to judge between interpretations.
12
The urgency for such a
work is necessitated, according to Ibn Taymiyya, because the books
written on tafs"r are full of worthy and unworthy material; some of
the material is manifestly false while some self-evidently true.
13
Ibn
Taymiyya then offers a succinct definition of what constitutes
knowledge: Knowledge is that which is truthfully transmitted from
an infallible [individual] or a statement that can be defended by an
accepted [logical] proof. Anything else is either a fabrication
[attributed to an infallible source] to be rejected, or a statement that
is impossible to verify [logically], either positively or negatively.
14

Ibn Taymiyya is, therefore, stating that there exist two kinds of
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 127
knowledge: divine, whose source is from an infallible informer
(usually a prophet) and which can be verified through ascertaining
the degree of the reliability of the transmission route it has
traversed; and rational knowledge, which has to be verified through
logical proofs. This epistemological definition will undergird the
whole theory offered in Ibn Taymiyyas introduction. For tafs"r to
have any claim to authority and to be a truthful representation of
what the Word of God means, one should be able to prove that it is
knowledge. Interpretations of the Qur#n can only be treated as
knowledge in so far as one can show they belong to one of the two
types Ibn Taymiyya defines; only then can one be certain of their
veracity. Ibn Taymiyya makes clear to his readers which kinds of
tafs"r have the status of knowledge and what the grounds are for
such a claim.
As a way of final justification for writing his Muqaddima, Ibn
Taymiyya states that the Muslim community (umma) is in dire need
of understanding the Qur#n, for it is, among other things, the sure
way to salvation. This point is supported by a string of citations
from Hadith and the Qur#n all emphasizing the central role of the
Qur#n in the life of the Muslim community.
15
Ibn Taymiyya finishes
his preface by informing the reader that he wrote this introduction
in a summary form (mukhta%ara) from memory (min iml! al-
fu!d).
16
The Muqaddima is divided into six chapters, the first four of which
are offered as preliminary groundwork and justification for the
theory of interpretation that is elaborated in the final two chapters.
17

The Muqaddima can thus be divided into two major parts. Yet it is
not clear at first what the relationship is between the first four
chapters and the final two, and it is only by making explicit this
relationship that we are able to comprehend fully the scope and the
ambition of Ibn Taymiyyas treatise. The definition of knowledge
given at the introduction is the key to clarifying the relationship
between the two parts of the treatise; it is the only thread that can
string together its disparate elements. I will offer first an analysis
of the content of the first four chapters (which are usually
overlooked when dealing with this treatise) and then show in what
way they are related to what follows them.
18
It will become evident
that these preliminary four chapters are the foundation of Ibn
Taymiyyas theory of hermeneutics.
128 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
Chapter One
In this chapter Ibn Taymiyya raises the issues that will form the
backbone of his treatise, and statements made here will become the
basis for the next three chapters. He declares in this chapter that
Mu&ammad, or the Prophet, as Ibn Taymiyya refers to him, clarified
(bayyana) to his Companions the meanings of the Qur#n (ma!n"),
just as he delivered to them its wording (alf!#ahu).
19
What Ibn
Taymiyya is implying is that Mu&ammad not only proclaimed the
Qur#n to the Muslims, but also its meaning, and apparently this
meaning of the Qur#n was something distinct from the Sunna as
generally understood. Sunni jurisprudence had already posited the
Sunna of Mu&ammad as the interpreter of the Qur#n, but only in a
loose sense of interpretation, that is, not as commentary but as
clarification of obscure rules in the Qur#n. Thus the transformation
here, though subtle, is nonetheless profound: the Prophet is
presented as having commented on the Qur#n, in the manner of an
exegete, to his Companions and hence there is another corpus of
prophetic material that is, strictly speaking, not part of the
traditional understanding of the Sunna. The Sunna in turn is
understood by Ibn Taymiyya to include a prophetic commentary on
the Qur#n. Granted he does not explicitly make this point, yet it is
an inescapable conclusion that follows from the import of his
statements in this chapter.
20
Ibn Taymiyyas aim is thus to turn the
commentary literature into prophetic knowledge, and as such
interpretation itself, as issuing from an infallible individual,
becomes a type of knowledge that is in agreement with his definition
of what constitutes knowledge. One needs only to verify that it is
indeed from Mu&ammad for it to become authoritative. Hence
inherited interpretations are to be assessed in the same way as one
assesses Hadith, using the customary tools of the science of
Hadith.
21
This is a rather radical redefinition of Qur#nic exegesis
elevating it to the level of prophetic knowledge. It raises the stakes
considerably and brings with it immediate counter-arguments,
which Ibn Taymiyya sets out to demolish in the subsequent chapters.
The first question (or at least the one that Ibn Taymiyya attempts
to circumvent) is this: if tafs"r is knowledge, and hence has a degree
of certitude that is accorded prophetic knowledge, how do we
account for the differences among the interpretations given to a
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 129
particular Qur#nic verse, since this would mean that knowledge is
contradictory, which should be impossible. To this unstated
objection Ibn Taymiyya will devote considerable attention, both in
this first chapter and in subsequent chapters.
Having stated his thesis, that Mu&ammad taught the meaning of
the Qur#n with its wording, Ibn Taymiyya then cites proofs for the
validity of the thesis. First he cites a prophetic tradition that states
that the companions of Mu&ammad used to learn ten verses of the
Qur#n at one time, and then learn what these verses teach of
knowledge and praxis; they thus learned the Qur#n, knowledge
and praxis, all together.
22
The implication here is clear: the Qur#n
was not received in a vacuum; rather it was received with its
knowledge and praxis. Indeed such was the case that the
Companions took a long time learning parts of the Qur#n, an
indication that memorizing it was not the only issue at hand.
23
The second proof is based on the Qur#n. Ibn Taymiyya cites three
phrases from three verses (38:29, 4:28, 23:6) which use the Arabic
root d-b-r (to reflect, consider, contemplate) in various forms; these
verses command the believers to reflect on the Qur#n. Ibn Taymiyya
denies that reflection on a certain verse could take place without
first understanding the verse. The unstated conclusion is that God
could not have imposed a duty that cannot be fulfilled, and hence
understanding the meaning of the Qur#n was a given.
24
Ibn
Taymiyya then cites verse 12:2 (We have sent it down as an Arabic
Qur#n so that you may understand); the verb used here is the
Arabic taqil&n (to comprehend, understand), and Ibn Taymiyya
affirms that comprehending speech presupposes understanding
it.
25
He then sums up this section by stating a truism: the aim of
speech is to understand its meaning, and not merely its individual
word components; as such, the Qur#n as speech falls under this
rule.
26
Clearly Ibn Taymiyya has no clear-cut proof for his assertions
that Mu&ammad commented on the entire Qur#n, or else he would
have produced it. The claim that Mu&ammad interpreted the entire
Qur#n was not found as such anywhere in the tradition, and the
contrary was actually always asserted: Mu&ammad was not in need
of interpreting the Qur#n. It was in the language of the Arabs
precisely so that they should have no excuse if they did not get the
message of God. Indeed, the mainstream argument for the
justification of the craft of commentary was that unlike the
Companions, whose Arabic was impeccable and who therefore
130 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
understood the Qur#n with no mediation, later Muslims were in
need of interpretation because they did not have such perfect
Arabic.
Ibn Taymiyya then adduces a proof from the practice of the
colleges of his time, projecting onto the past the state of
contemporary scholastic methods of reading texts. Custom prevents
specialists, he asserts, when they read a book in their corresponding
art, like medicine and arithmetic, from reading it without its
explication (yastashri$&hu). The case should be more so with the
Qur#n, since it is their protector and in it exists their salvation
and their happiness, and the rectitude of their religion and the
functioning of their worldly affairs.
27
The Companions must have
learned the Qur#n with its interpretation; this is the only sensible
way to behave.
Suddenly, Ibn Taymiyya offers a conclusion that does not seem
to follow from what has preceded so far. He states that disagreement
(niz!) between the Companions regarding the interpretation of the
Qur#n is rare; its occurrence among the Successors is a bit more
common. The incidence of disagreement among these two
generations, Ibn Taymiyya adds, is, however, far less than the
differences among the subsequent generations. As I have indicated
earlier, this concluding paragraph both anticipates an objection to
Ibn Taymiyyas paradigm and removes a contradiction from this
paradigm. The objection would be against his raising the status of
interpretations of the Qur#n to the level of prophetic knowledge,
since as truthful knowledge it should not admit contradiction, but
we do know that there are contradictions; hence his insistence that
there is little or no contradictions in the tafs"r that comes from the
two early generations of Muslims. The paradoxical inconsistencies
inherent in Ibn Taymiyyas redefinition of tafs"r are thus removed,
since the contradictions and differences that exist in tafs"r are really
not part of what he would consider tafs"r and belong to later
generations of exegetes.
As usual with Ibn Taymiyya, he then offers a catchy statement
intended to summarize what he has said thus far: The nobler the
age the more consensus and agreement there is, and the more
knowledge.
28
What is the import of such a statement? We should
not discount a circular argument here, which can be stated as
follows: since Muslims agree that the most noble of generations to
ever live was that of the Companions and the Successors, it then
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 131
follows that they left us with less discord and more knowledge than
any other generation. Granted this is an argument not stated
explicitly in this treatise, but it underlies its rationale. As we can
see, Ibn Taymiyya is vacillating between two stratagems to uphold
the supremacy of the interpretations of the salaf. One is to imply
(sometimes clearly, sometimes obliquely) that the salaf were simply
transmitting prophetic lore that Mu&ammad taught about the
meaning of the Qur#n; the other is that the salaf as the most pious
and most learned of Islam were the font of knowledge. These two
rationales are both offered, and Ibn Taymiyya seems to be of two
minds as to which one to choose.
Finally Ibn Taymiyya comes clean and states his maq%&d, or aim
in this chapter: the Successors received Qur#nic interpretations
from the Companions, just as they received from them the Sunna.
They might have discussed these interpretations, but if so, it was in
the same manner as they did with the Sunna, by way of using tafs"r
as a guide for discovering (istidl!l) or deducing rules (istinb!').
29
It is
here that we see Ibn Taymiyya implying that tafs"r is a prophetic
Sunna that is distinct from the Sunna, yet Sunna all the same. Having
been received from the Companions, who, we were told, received it
from the prophet, Qur#nic interpretation has its origin with
Mu&ammad.
30
Ibn Taymiyya has thus offered the rationale as to why
precedence should be ascribed to the interpretations of the
Companions and Successors, namely because these interpretations
are a part of prophetic knowledge. Having now laid the foundation
and provided the general outline of his preliminaries, he proceeds
to explain and elaborate on these foundations before offering his
theory of interpretation.
Chapter Two
The aim of this chapter is to explain why there is disagreement
among the salaf regarding the meaning of the Qur#n or, more
accurately, to explain away the existence of such differences or
disagreements. Calling the first two Muslim generations ancestors
(salaf) at this stage in the treatise is a rhetorical shift meant to make
an emotional effect in what so far has been a dry argumentative
treatise. Ibn Taymiyyas success can in part be attributed to his
rallying of his followers behind an emotional concept, al-salaf al-%!li$
132 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
(pious ancestors), the equivalent of the Shiis Ahl al-bayt (Household
of Mu&ammad) shibboleth. Ibn Taymiyya begins this chapter by
stating that disagreement in tafs"r among the ancestors is miniscule
(qal"l), while their disagreement on judicial rules is greater than
their disagreement on tafs"r.
31
This is a most fascinating statement,
for Ibn Taymiyya is in effect willing to admit to the inconsequentiality
of disagreement in matters of lawthe kind of legal pluralism which
Sunnism enshrines as a sign of the merciful Godwhile he seems to
think that much more hangs on a harmonious or concordant
interpretation of the Qur#n. When push comes to shove, Ibn
Taymiyya is even willing to side with Shii jurisprudence in certain
matters, without that affecting his Sunni standing in his eyes;
32
but
he seems to think that how one interprets the Qur#n is far more
indicative of ones true leanings. He does have a point. What makes
a Sunni Sunni is not law, for a Mutazilite, an Asharite, or a
philosopher can be Sunni in his legal affiliation and still not be of
the people of the Sunna according to Ibn Taymiyya. A proper
theological position is the principle of discrimination. The
theological, and hence the hermeneutical, in Ibn Taymiyyas
worldview is thus paramount. It is no wonder that most of his
production was theological or polemical in nature. The man could
hardly muster the composure to write dispassionately.
33
Ibn Taymiyya then states that what has indeed been documented
to be true (m! ya%i$$u) regarding matters of disagreement in tafs"r
which has come down to us from the salaf can be understood as the
result of variations on the same theme rather than real
contradictory disagreements.
34
What Ibn Taymiyya means by
contradictory disagreements is self evident, and he will devote
Chapters Three and Four to these kinds of differences and their
significancea kind of disagreement that was not present in the
Companion-Successor corpus, according to Ibn Taymiyya. It is his
phrase variations on a same theme (ikhtil!f tanawwu) that will be
elaborated in this chapter.
Although Ibn Taymiyya starts by stating that there are two kinds
of disagreement that are the result of variations on a theme, he in
fact gives four kinds.
35
The first is the result of each exegete using
a different expression (ib!ra) to describe different aspects of a term
that is being explained, all of which aspects (or meanings) that the
term can be said to contain. Despite the fact that one is giving two
different words to explain a term, the nature of the thing being
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 133
interpreted is still the same [in the minds of the readers].
36
What
Ibn Taymiyya is saying is that the exegetes are not disputing the
nature of the thing referred to by a word, rather the quality
described by this term. Luckily, he does supply examples of what he
means by this. Ibn Taymiyya uses a philological explanation: it is
like the use of descriptive terms that are neither synonyms nor
antonyms but rather similar. Thus the sword can be called al-%!rim
(the cutter) and al-muhannad (of Indian iron), just as the many
names of God, the names of the Qur#n, or the names of Mu&ammad,
all signify (tadullu) one thing.
37
To use one name of God (out of the
99 names) is not to negate the other terms, for each of the names
of God points to the attribute being described and the essence of
God; thus calling Him Mighty signifies His might and His essence,
calling Him the Merciful signifies His mercy and His essence.
Ibn Taymiyya gives a concrete example from the Qur#n of how
early exegetes (and the term exegete here is used according to this
new theory of Ibn Taymiyyas) differed with the difference in their
interpretations being a variation on a theme. Verse 20:124, and
who ever turns away from my dhikr, raises the question of what
dhikr is here. Some said it is the Qur#n, or other Divine books;
others said it could be the remembrance of God, that is the uttering
of benedictions like Glory to God, God is great, etc, or, that it
might be Gods guidance. Thus, Ibn Taymiyya concludes, dhikr here
can mean all these since it is still referring to the same thing. Ibn
Taymiyya asserts that these are not interpretations that are
contradictory, as some people might think (kam! ya#unnuhu ba( al-
n!s). He then brings along another Qur#nic example, the famous
Straight Path (al-%ir!' al-mustaq"m). Some said it is the Qur#n (that
is following it), others said it is Islam. Ibn Taymiyya then
comments:
These two interpretations are congruent (muttafiq!n) because Islam is
nothing but following the Qur#n, but each interpretation points to a
description (wa%f) that is different from the other. Indeed, the term
%ir!' indicates other meanings, like Sunna and Jam!a (the famous
phrase for Sunnism); it is also the path of servitude, and it is obedience
to God and his Prophet, and many other things. All of these explanations
are pointing to one essence, yet each is using a different attribute out
of the many attributes that the explained term contains.
38
134 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
The second kind of variations on a theme difference is the kind
that results from:
Each exegete naming (for the sake of giving an example) a particular
species as an example for a general term (or, genus); exegetes explain
by examples (tamth"l) [what a term means] in order to alert the reader
to the nature of the genus; and this method is not meant to give the
definition of the term such that it includes all the instances of the term
in general and specific ways.
39
Ibn Taymiyya is using an explanation from logic to argue that the
early exegetes have similar methods. The first Qur#nic example he
gives is of verse 35:32, and he is especially concerned with the terms
#!lim li-nafsihi (sinning against oneself) and muqta%id (follow a
middle road). The term sinning against oneself is a general term
that includes those who disobey religious injunctions and commit
transgressions, while the term following a middle road refers to
those who obey all religious injunctions. Thus when an exegete gives
one instance of sinning against oneself (which we mistakenly have
taken to be the only interpretation), like not praying the five
prayers, while another says the sinner is one who does not pay his
alms, the exegetes are giving examples of such a general term and
they are not giving a full definition of the term in question. This is
so since it is much easier to comprehend the meaning of a term by
way of an example than by way of a dry comprehensive logical
definition (al-$add al-mu'!biq).
40
Ibn Taymiyya also includes in this type the differences that come
from stating the reasons why a verse was revealed (the occasions of
revelation, or what is known in Arabic as asb!b al-nuz&l).
41
This is a
dilemma that has to be faced squarely if one is to claim that there
is no contradiction in the Companions exegetical lore. It is no secret
that many verses in the Qur#n have more than one story as to why
they were revealed. Is that a contradiction (or rather an
inconsistency that borders on the contradictory) ? Before addressing
this issue Ibn Taymiyya sees fit to dispose of the view that since
these verses were revealed regarding a certain individual, the rule
of such a verse should be restricted to this individual. It is not clear
what the importance is of this point for the general argument, given
that Ibn Taymiyya is arguing here for an elementary and
fundamental premise of Sunni jurisprudence. I am of the opinion
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 135
that this is simply a digression meant to state the obvious and hence
solidify the thrust of Ibn Taymiyyas arguments in general. This
digression aside, he then returns to his main argument and offers a
resolution for the co-existence of different reasons for the revelation
of a certain verse: the verse in question might simply have been
revealed many times, in each instance for a different reason!
42
There is a paragraph in the digressive part of this section that is
worth discussing, for it reveals the extent of Ibn Taymiyyas
awareness of what he was attempting to change.
43
This paragraph
addresses the status of the reports about the reasons for revelation.
Scholars, Ibn Taymiyya informs us, are in disagreement as to how
to assess these reports. Some believe they are Hadith, hence part of
the musnad material, that is, inherited knowledge transmitted from
the prophet by reliable chains of authority, while others believe
they are part of the tafs"r, which is not part of the musnad. Ibn
Taymiyya is here admitting that tafs"r, up to his time, was not
considered part of the prophetic lore as such (the musnad material).
This digression demonstrates that Ibn Taymiyya was consciously
attempting to elevate tafs"r to the status of inherited prophetic
knowledge; he was all too aware of the traditional understanding of
the genre.
Ibn Taymiyya then gives a third kind of variation on a theme
differences: differences that are the result of the nature of the term
which can itself accommodate contradictory meanings, terms which
he calls mushtarak in Arabic. He gives the word qaswara of verse
74:51, as an example, which could mean the hunter and the hunted,
and the term asas of verse 81:17, which means the coming and
going of the night.
44
The fourth kind of variation given by Ibn Taymiyya is more or
less the same as the first kind, and it is not clear to me what the
difference is between the two, apart from splitting hairs. Here he
claims that some differences between exegetes are the result of
their giving similar terms (mutaq!riba) as meanings of a certain
word. Thus an example of this kind is to interpret the verb aw$! (to
reveal) in a Qur#nic verse, as anzala (to make come down to
you).
45
Ibn Taymiyya sums up the issue presented in this chapter as
follows: the plurality of phrases and expressions of the salaf in their
interpretation of a certain phrase of the Qur#n is very beneficial,
for the sum total of the different interpretations given to a certain
136 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
verse is more revealing of its meaning than any single one. Ibn
Taymiyya admits all the same that there are mild differences (ikhtil!f
mukhaffaf) between the salaf, just as there are in the juristic
material.
46
This is the extent of what he is willing to concede as to
the existence of any differences among the salaf. Ibn Taymiyya
concludes the passage by giving a host of other reasons for the
existence of differences among the salaf in their interpretation, thus
admitting that his treatment is not exhaustive, but rather
illustrative: what we aim here is to give a general sense of the
matter and not an exhaustive treatment.
47
What he is arguing is
thus not a complete explanation for what appear to be differences
among the salaf but rather an axiomatic new principle: the salaf did
not disagree on the meaning of the Qur#n.
Chapter Three
Having argued against the existence of real or contradictory
differences among the salaf, Ibn Taymiyya turns his attention to the
contradictory differences that do exist in tafs"r (or at least the
differences he is willing to admit to) and to the question of their
origin and significance. Ibn Taymiyya does after all recognize the
existence of contradictory differences in musnad material, which
until now he seemed to have denied, and he will now deal with these
differences and their nature. Although Ibn Taymiyya does not
mention the word contradictory (ta(!dd) here, it is clear that it is
this sort of difference that he has in mind, the kind that he has not
discussed so far.
48
He begins by stating that the (contradictory)
differences in tafs"r are of two kinds: differences that are part of the
transmitted lore, and differences that are not part of the transmitted
lore but come out of human activity.
49
The current chapter is
dedicated to the differences that are part of the transmitted lore,
while the next is devoted to the second type. Ibn Taymiyya repeats
here his definition of knowledge that was given at the beginning of
the treatise, thus leaving no doubt that this definition is his guiding
principle.
Transmitted exegetical lore, whether transmitted from an
infallible or a fallible source, comes in three varieties, according to
Ibn Taymiyya: one that can be verified as truthful, %a$"$ (if we can
prove that it was faithfully transmitted from an infallible source);
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 137
another (a"f (if we can ascertain the invalidity of its transmission);
and a third that cannot be verified and hence of an indeterminate
veracity. Since Ibn Taymiyya groups the first two kinds as one, the
implication is that cases of genuine contradictory differences rather
than merely apparent ones in transmitted lore are to be found in
the third group.
50
This third group of transmitted materialwhich contains all the
contradictory material in the musnad exegetical lore, the one whose
veracity is impossible to verifyis material that does not constitute
an essential part of Islamic knowledge according to Ibn Taymiyya.
To discourse and quibble on these matters is useless and redundant.
Ibn Taymiyya gives us examples of these materials: the color of the
dog which accompanied the Sleepers of Ephesus (different colors
were given by exegetes), the part of the cow which was used in the
ritual mentioned in the second Sura of the Qur#n (different parts
were named), the length of the ark of Noah, and the name of the
child killed by the companion of Moses in Sura 18.
51
The only way
this kind of detail could be known is if it had been transmitted from
a divinely inspired source, and only the details that are verifiable
and certain that were transmitted from the Prophet, like the name
of the companion of Moses in Sura 18, are knowable matters
(mal&m).
Material of this kind that has been transmitted by the Successors
from the People of the Book (ahl al-kit!b) cannot be accepted or
rejected unless we have proof of its veracity. Ibn Taymiyya is raising
the issue of what is known as the isr!"l"y!t, material transmitted
from Jewish converts to Islam (early converts who were themselves
from the Successors generation) and mostly available in tafs"r.
52
Ibn
Taymiyya states that material of this kind transmitted from the
Companions is, however, much more acceptable since the possibility
that they could have heard it from the Prophet is too high to
discount. Ibn Taymiyya sums up his maq%&d, or aim, here:
contradictory differences (like the giving of different colors to the
dog of the Sleepers of Ephesus), whose veracity (%a$"$uhu) cannot
be verified, are like Hadith material that cannot be judged and
therefore inconsequential on the religious plane. God, in his wisdom,
had ensured that the material necessary for salvation could be
verified by the scholars of Islam.
53
Ibn Taymiyya then moves to an important matter in transmitted
tafs"r lore, the issue of reports attributed by a Successor to the
138 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
Prophet directly without the authority of a Companion, what is
known as mar!s"l in the parlance of Hadith science. In the previous
passage he argued that interpretations from the Companions, even
if not attributed directly to Mu&ammad, might as well be, in so far
as Mu&ammad taught his Companions the meaning of the Qur#n in
addition to its wording. He is now tackling the interpretations of
the Successors that are attributed indirectly to Mu&ammad
(omitting the Companion link in the chain of transmission). Ibn
Taymiyya accepts the validity and veracity of such traditions as long
as they come from different transmission lines and a conspiracy of
collusion among the Successors or the transmitters cannot be
proven.
54
Why is Ibn Taymiyya raising this issue here? To defend
this type of Hadith is not only perplexing here but hardly worth the
spilled ink. His position on this matter is neither new nor
controversial among Sunni scholars. However, since most of the
inherited interpretations from the Successors in the tafs"r material
are not attributed to Mu&ammad, I believe the aim is to raise the
whole lore of Successor traditions to the level of prophetic lore. Ibn
Taymiyya effectively implies that the material from the Successors
which is not attributed to Mu&ammad at all is still valid. Ibn
Taymiyya does not state this directly, but it is clearly his aim; for
later he will accord the interpretations from the Successors as a
whole a high rank in the order of knowledge that he considers
worthy of following. What I am saying is that Ibn Taymiyya is
accepting the collective interpretive material from the Successors
as valid by claiming that part of it could be argued to belong to the
Prophetic lore.
55
It is in this chapter that Ibn Taymiyya offers us his first
assessment of the merit of previous exegetes. In the process of
decrying the existence of fabricated Hadith in tafs"r works, especially
those which belong to the Sura-merit traditions (prophetic
traditions that promise rewards for reading different Suras of the
Qur#n), he mentions authors who have included such material in
their works,
56
issuing judgments on al-Thalab$ (d. 427/1035) and his
student al-W#&id$ (d. 468/1076), al-Baghaw$ (d. 516/1122), and al-
Zamakhshar$ (d. 538/1144).
57
Ibn Taymiyya was not without a sense
of humour; he heaps praise only to cut people down. He sums up
al-Thalab$s worth as follows: he was a man of righteous conduct;
unfortunately he collected anything and everything that came his
way in previous tafs"r works, just like a nocturnal wood gatherer
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 139
unable to distinguish between the good and the bad. Ibn Taymiyya
implies that al-Thalab$ inadvertently gathered these fabricated
Hadiths because he did not know better. This is, needless to say, an
unfair evaluation of one of the leading figures of classical tafs"r, but
the last word was indeed Ibn Taymiyyas in this regard.
His assessment of al-W#&id$ is even harsher: Ibn Taymiyya admits
that al-W#&id$ was far more knowledgeable in philology than his
teacher al-Thalab$, but al-W#&id$ was less sound in his theological
outlook and more unlike the salaf. Finally, Ibn Taymiyya offers his
assessment of al-Baghaw$, who, though his tafs"r was a summary and
a reworking of the work of al-Thalab$, was one of the people of
sound religion and theological outlook. By going after al-Thalab$,
al-W#&id$, al-Zamakhshar$, and al-Baghaw$, Ibn Taymiyya was
targeting one of the most important schools in medieval tafs"r. Only
an incisively clever mind like Ibn Taymiyyas could cut through the
mountains of detail and group together the ultra-Sunni al-Baghaw$,
the Mutazilite al-Zamakhshar$, the philologist al-W#&id$, and the
encyclopedic al-Thalab$. Different as they were in their approaches,
they all shared the same Sunni medieval hermeneutical theory: that
the word of God was interpretable by everyone and one did not need
divine knowledge to do exegesis; nor, for that matter, did one need
to be correct in the interpretations offered, since one was indulging
in a quasi-ijtih!d process. Sunni medieval hermeneutics was
premised on the impossibility of ever exhausting the meanings of
the divine word, and contradictory interpretations were not a sign
of religious heresy.
Chapter Four
This chapter is devoted to a discussion of the differences that arise
from using istidl!l or reasoning to interpret the Qur#n, i.e. tafs"r
which is based not on tradition (naql) but on reason, or human
agency.
58
Ibn Taymiyya asserts that these differences appeared only
after the interpretations of the Companions, the Successors and the
successors of the Successors (t!bi al-t!bi"n). The exegetical works
that mention the interpretations of the salaf without editorializing
or comments from later generations (fa-inna al-taf!s"r allat" yudhkar
f"h! kal!m h!ul! %arfan) are the best exegetical works available and
are free of disagreements. Ibn Taymiyya here is rejecting even
140 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
tradition- based commentaries that see fit to add their own
assessment of this material since, Ibn Taymiyya argues, the views
of the early generations are sufficient on their own. Ibn Taymiyya
then offers a list of the authors whom he considers to belong to this
Sunni school of exegesis. He endorses the names of fifteen traditional
Hadith-based exegetes, including Baq$ b. Makhlad (d. 276/889), al-
%abar$ (d. 311/923), Ibn Ab$ "#tim (d. 327/938), and Ibn Mardawayh
(d. 401/1010).
59
Ibn Taymiyya then divides the contradictory differences in this
category into two kinds. The first results from the activities of
exegetes who already have a meaning that they want to impute to
the Qur#n and in order to do that they force the words of the Qur#n
to give that meaning.
60
This group does not take into consideration
what the words of the Qur#n are actually saying. The second results
from the activities of the exegetes who interpret the Qur#n
according to the rules of what the speakers of the Arabic language
would allow, without taking into consideration the speaker of the
Qur#n (i.e. God), the person to whom it was delivered and the
audience to whom it was addressed.
61
This second group will not
be discussed again in this chapter, or for that matter in the rest of
the treatise, and it is not clear who Ibn Taymiyya has in mind when
he speaks of this group. The most probable explanation is that he is
after some pro-philological authors of Sunni and Mutazilite
encyclopaedic tafs"rs, namely al-W#&id$ and al-Zamakhshar$and
possibly also Ab! "ayy#n al-Ghran#'$, his foe, whom he refuses to
mention.
The first kind of this new division of exegetes, the one that
imputes meanings to the Qur#n, is furthermore divided into two
camps, one that robs the words of the Qur#n of the meaning they
have, and another that forces a meaning that the words do not
contain.
62
In both cases, the fact is that the meanings these exegetes
are trying to force upon the Qur#n are mostly wrong and thus these
exegetes are doubly wrong: they did not get the meaning right (in
the spirit of the Qur#n), and they are forcing the words to carry a
meaning which they do not have (the method of interpretation is
wrong). Hence, they are wrong about both the language of the
Qur#n (al-dal"l) and its meaning (al-madl&l). This being Ibn Taymiyya,
he does concede the other possibility, namely that sometimes the
meanings these exegetes are trying to foist on the words of the
Qur#n might be a correct interpretation (in the sense of the totality
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 141
of the message of the Qur#n), while the words of the Qur#n to
which they are imputing these correct meanings do not in reality
give such meanings. They might be right about what the Qur#n
could be saying but not right about the meaning of the particular
words they are interpreting.
63
Ibn Taymiyya then gives us examples of these two groups. The
ones who have it both wrong, that is both the meaning of the text
and the interpretation of individual words, include groups like al-
Khaw#rij, al-Raw#fi(, al-Jahmiyya, al-Mutazila, al-Qadariyya and
al-Murjia.
64
He then singles out the Mutazilites and their Qur#n
commentaries, mentioning their leading authorities in the field. The
list is significant since it points to the richness of the Mutazilite
Qur#n commentary literature that was still available at the time.
65

Ibn Taymiyya then groups the late Shii commentators such as al-
%!s$ (d. 460/1067) with the Mutazilites.
66
It is clear that he had read
al-%!s$s work since he offers an assessment of it.
Ibn Taymiyya then offers his summary (maq%&d): These exegetes
had already formed opinions or doctrines and they made the Qur#n
conform to these opinions; they do not have a precedent (salaf) to
support their claims from the Companions and the Successors, nor
from the leading scholars of Islam. They lack support for their
doctrines and for their interpretations.
67
Then he adds one of his
penetrating observations about the influence of Mutazilite tafs"rs
on the Sunni tradition: Some of these exegetes have a nice turn of
phrase, and are possessed of eloquence, and they insinuate their
heretical views in their writing imperceptibly, such that most of the
readers are unaware of this. An example of this is the author of al-
Kashsh!f (al-Zamakhshar$) and people of his ilk.
68
He then adds that
many of those who are of sound belief fall victim to these
commentaries and use them without knowing that they are copying
heretical ideas. It is clear that Ibn Taymiyya was dismayed that the
Sunni scholars were very receptive to al-Zamakhshar$s Qur#n
commentary, and may have even incorporated it into their scholastic
curriculum.
69
Ibn Taymiyya then gives examples of such reprehensible
interpretations. The Shiis (or, as he likes to call them, al-R#fi(a)
interpret verse 111:1 as a curse on Ab! Bakr and Umar. Of the string
of examples that he cites, the most colourful is the interpretation
given to verse 2:67 (God commands you to slaughter a cow);
apparently it meant to slaughter )isha, the wife of Mu&ammad.
142 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
Yet, Ibn Taymiyya is no cheap polemicist, and he takes a swing at
the pietistic Sunni interpretations of the Qur#n that mimic the Shii
method. Thus Sunni interpretations of certain verses as laudatory
tributes to Ab! Bakr, Umar and Uthm#n are all wrong. Ibn
Taymiyya calls them khur!f!t, superstitions or yarn tales.
70
Ibn Taymiyya then returns to discussing exegetical works, and
he mentions the commentary of Ibn A'iyya (d. 542/1148). He
declares him to be a more consistent follower of the Sunna and far
less heretical than al-Zamakhshar$.
71
Ibn Taymiyya then registers a
complaint against the Sunni authors of tafs"r: if only they stuck to
the words of the early generations and did not go beyond them, it
would have been more beneficial (wa-law dhakara kal!m al-salaf al-
mawj&d f" al-taf!s"r al-math&ra anhum al! wajhihi la-k!na a$san wa-
ajmal).
72
Ibn Taymiyya complains that Ibn A'iyya, although claiming
to copy from al-%abar$, leaves out what al-%abari cited of the
statements of the early generations and instead fills his commentary
with what he says are the opinions of the people of scholarship (ahl
al-ta$q"q). Ibn Taymiyya informs his readers who those people of
scholarship really are: Sunni Asharite theologians who used the
same methods as the Mutazilite theologians to argue for the Sunni
viewpointsomething Ibn Taymiyya is not thrilled about.
73
Ibn Taymiyya then states his view that anyone (and he means
here the people who consider themselves part of the Sunni fold)
who diverges from the opinion of the Companions and the
Successors and their interpretation is wrong, an innovator even
(mubtadi), although he might be a mujtahid and if so, his mistake is
forgiven.
74
Ibn Taymiyya then states his maq%&d again: one has to
know the methods of attaining knowledge and how to prove the
validity of our knowledge (bay!n 'uruq al-ilm wa-adillatihi wa-'uruq
al-%aw!b).
75
He states that:
We know that the Qur#n was read by the Companions and the Successors
and their Successors and that they were the most informed about its
meanings and interpretation. They were also fully aware of the truth
that Mu&ammad was given. Whoever disagrees with their views and
contradicts their interpretation is wrong both in his new interpretation
and the meaning he gives to the words themselves (the madl&l and
dal"l).
76
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 143
Ibn Taymiyya has thus made clear his approach to the problem of
interpreting the Qur#n: it is mainly centred on epistemology and
not hermeneutics. The question that Ibn Taymiyya has raised so far
is how we know that tafs"r is part of the knowledge that one can
verifythe corpus of tafs"r is thus already a given, it is already there.
He is raising the possibility that part of the tafs"r lore belongs to the
prophetic lore. Once we realize that Ibn Taymiyya is offering a
method of evaluating the interpretive tradition, rather than a
method of arriving at meanings, it then makes sense that most of
the treatise is a defense of the interpretations of the Companions
and Successors qua interpretations of the Companions and the
Successors. He is hardly concerned with the method by which the
Companions or the Successors arrived at their interpretations. His
main aim is to prove that tafs"r is knowledge, in the sense of
transmitted, valid information, and the first part of the treatise is
an attempt to prove this point. Ibn Taymiyya seems, however, to be
of two minds on how to go about this, hinting on the one hand that
tafs"rs origins are prophetic, while on the other hand arguing that
the salaf were the most knowledgeable and therefore are the only
individuals entitled to give us back the meaning of the Qur#n. In
the final analysis hermeneutics to Ibn Taymiyya is not a repeatable
process or approach; one cannot fathom the method used by the
Companions and the Successors and use the same method to arrive
at the truth again and independently.
This epistemological twist that Ibn Taymiyya employs also helps
to explain why, for example, he does not care to mention or discuss
the word taw"l or tafs"r, the two words that are always discussed
when theorizing about hermeneutics (although he has done so in
other parts of his writings). The complete absence of such a
discussion in what is supposed to be a hermeneutical tractate is
remarkable; it only confirms the intellectual acumen of his polemical
mind. By refusing to engage directly with the usual terminology one
expects to find in any theoretical hermeneutical discussion, he
makes it impossible for his foes to pursue the debate on their own
terms. To mention philology, the foundation of traditional tafs"r, let
alone side with it, is to lose the battle with the Mutazilites and
other Sunnis, including the Asharite theologians. It is better to
disregard philology altogether here.
77
Ibn Taymiyya ends this chapter by stating that his aim was to
draw attention to the reasons behind the contradictory differences
144 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
in tafs"r.
78
The main reason for differences in tafs"r, according to him,
was baseless innovations (al-bida al-b!'ila), which prompted their
advocates to distort and manipulate the word of God and the word
of his Messenger to suit their aims.
79
Thus it is incumbent on the
believers to know what the Qur#n and the Prophet said, and to
know that the interpretation of the salaf was different from the
interpretation of the heretics. One should know, Ibn Taymiyya
asserts, that the interpretations of the ones who disagree with the
interpretation of the salaf are an innovation and a heresy.
80
Almost as an afterthought Ibn Taymiyya gives us an example of
the second group of interpretersthose who make mistakes
regarding the words of the Qur#n (al-dal"l) while giving right
meanings all the same (al-madl&l). These include the Sufis, the
preachers (wu!#) and jurists (fuqah!), and people like them. These
groups impute the Qur#n with interpretations that are in themselves
valid but which have no basis in the wording of the Qur#n that
supposedly supports such interpretations.
81
Ibn Taymiyya mentions
al-Sulam$s (d. 412/1021) )aq!iq al-tafs"r as an example that contains
such interpretations.
This brings the first section of the treatise to an end. The main
aim of this section, as I have stated, was to establish the proposition
that tafs"r is knowledge. Ibn Taymiyyas most important claim is that
Mu&ammad taught the interpretation of the Qur#n to the
Companions and that they taught it to the Successors. Since such
interpretations constitute part of the knowledge that can be traced
back to an infallible source, it has a claim to veracity that is not
accorded to other interpretations. Indeed, the main aim of Ibn
Taymiyya was to indirectly imply that even if the interpretations of
the Companions and more importantly, of the Successors, were not
known to come directly from Mu&ammad, there is enough reason
to think that they might be. This in itself raises the level of these
interpretations to a different order of things, since they could be
theoretically part of prophetic knowledge.
Chapter Five
82
This chapter starts with a hypothetical question: What is the best
way to interpret the Qur#n? To this question Ibn Taymiyya says:
The best way to interpret the Qur#n is by the Qur#n. For what is
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 145
elliptical (ujmila) in one place is explained more fully in another and
what is in summary form in one place is expounded in another. If
one cannot find the interpretation through this method then one
can have recourse to the Sunna, for the Sunna expounds the Qur#n
and clarifies it.
83
Explaining the Qur#n with the Sunna is a common
enough hermeneutical Sunni strategy that is not surprising here. It
is the notion of interpreting the Qur#n with the Qur#n that seems
to be the novelty. This hermeneutical device is not unknown in the
tradition; many examples from the interpretive tradition show that
the exegetes were well aware of this possibility as a method of
interpreting the Qur#n.
84
It is Ibn Taymiyyas placing it at the top
of a hierarchical order of interpretation that is the interesting
development here. One could argue that Ibn Taymiyya was admitting
philology through such a formulation. This is not so. In so far as Ibn
Taymiyya does not give any examples of how one interprets the
Qur#n with the Qur#n this rule is rather ineffectual and vague.
Indeed it should not be confused with our modern notions of textual
criticism where it is the norm to analyze a certain text by using the
text itself to explain its own usage. The rule as given here is rather
a point of departure for construing the hermeneutical exercise as a
juristic exercise. What Ibn Taymiyya was doing was replicating in
the interpretation of the Qur#n the same steps one followed in the
discovery of Gods law, as formulated by the Sunni jurists. According
to Sunni legal theory, the sources of the Shar$a are the Qur#n, the
Sunna, the consensus of the community and juristic analogy; the
first two elements in both theories are thus the same. The brilliant
stroke on the part of Ibn Taymiyya is to draw this parallel between
the two systems. He makes his theory almost impossible to unseat
as long as one also upholds the rules of the Sunni juristic practices
as outlined in u%&l al-fiqh manuals.
85
That Ibn Taymiyya was presenting a reformulation of Qur#nic
tafs"r along the lines of Sunni juristic theory becomes evidently clear
when he goes on to quote from the famous Epistle of al-Sh#fi$, al-
Ris!la. Ibn Taymiyya quotes al-Sh#fi$s understanding of the role of
the Sunna in relationship with the Qur#n, thus summarizing what
is by then the standard position of Sunni u%&l al-fiqh.
86
He then
quotes the prophetic tradition of Mu#dh, who was sent to Yemen
to proselytize for Islam. Mu&ammad is supposed to have asked
Mu#dh how he would make legal rulings. To this question Mu#dh
answered by the Book of God (i.e. the Qur#n). If he could not find
146 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
the ruling there, then he would consult the Sunna of the Messenger
of God, and if not he could not find the ruling there then he would
use ijtih!d.
87
Ibn Taymiyya does not bother to explain how the ijtih!d
used in this Hadith fits with the new hermeneutical theory he is
proposing, especially since he is not advocating the notion of finding
the meaning of the Qur#n through an exercise of ijtih!d. But then
he was not constructing the theory according to this Hadith or, for
that matter, the principles of jurisprudence; rather he was pointing
to a semblance of similarity between the two fields. It is as if tafs"r
had the same rules as fiqh. Ibn Taymiyya devotes only a few lines to
a discussion about the use of the Qur#n and the Sunna in
interpreting the Qur#n. He could afford to do so because he was
relying on an already well formulated theory of hierarchy that was
available in jurisprudence, and thus the reader would be able to
connect the two and assent to the construction of a hermeneutical
theory in the image of the legal one.
The third level of interpreting the Qur#n is through the
interpretations of the Companions. If one fails to find the meaning
of a certain verse in the Qur#n itself or the prophetic Sunna, then
one looks to the interpretations of the Companions. Here Ibn
Taymiyya gives a more elaborate justification for such a path: The
Companions were more knowledgeable about tafs"r, since they
witnessed the revelation of the Qur#n and they were privileged
with their close proximity. They were also more knowledgeable
because they had perfect understanding, and correct knowledge,
especially the scholars among them, like the four Guided Caliphs
and Ibn Mas!d.
88
Ibn Taymiyya then brings testimonies to attest
to the worth of Ibn Mas!d. He then mentions Ibn Abb#s, and we
are treated to long testimonies about his worth as a Qur#n exegete.
Ibn Taymiyya highlights the standard appellation for Ibn Abb#s,
Translator of the Qur#n, turjum!n al-Qur!n.
The fourth and final source for interpretation is the interpretations
of the Successors. If one fails to find the meaning of a certain verse
in the above-mentioned three sources then one looks for it in the
interpretations from the Successors, since many of the scholars
(kath"r min al-aimma) followed the Successors in this matter.
89

Among the Successors Ibn Taymiyya names and praises the
credentials of Muj#hid b. Jabr (d. 104/722). Then he mentions a list
of Successors who were famous exegetes.
90
Again, the fact that these
Successors gave multiple meanings to certain verses does not mean
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 147
that they had contradictory interpretations; only the ignorant, he
believes, would hold such an opinion. But Ibn Taymiyya does admit
the possibility of real differences among the Successors in their
interpretations. To the question of how one can follow their
opinions when it is not a $ujja, a proof, not even in legal matters,
Ibn Taymiyya offers a resolution. If they agree on a meaning then
that meaning is irrefutable. If they are in disagreement then one
cannot use one Successor as an authority against another (all being
equal), and must have recourse to the language of the Qur#n, or the
Sunna, or the usage of the Arabic language or the opinions of the
Companions.
91
This is the only instance where the Arabic language
is allowed a role in the hermeneutical theory of Ibn Taymiyya. But
such is the restriction that it is never conceived of as an independent
authority.
The final part of the treatise is reserved for an attack on what is
known as tafs"r al-Qur!n bi-al-ray or interpretation based on
personal opinion.
92
A string of prophetic traditions that warn
against such a practice are produced, all with the aim of showing
that no one has the right to expound freely on the Qur#n. Indeed,
Ibn Taymiyya is categorically against such a method even if it
reproduces the true and valid meaning of the Qur#n! This is because
the method itself is wrong (fa-law annahu a%!ba al-man! f" nafs al-amr
la-k!na qad akh'aa li-annahu lam yat" al-amra min b!bihi).
93
It is
precisely such statements that suggest that Ibn Taymiyyas method
is a study of the value of inherited interpretations and not of
hermeneutics. Even if one arrives at the true and divine meaning of
the Qur#n, the interpretation is rejected if done through the wrong
method. Yet the correct method is simply impossible to replicate;
one simply conveys the meaning according to the salafone cannot
discover the meaning on ones own. Ibn Taymiyya argues from the
traditions he cites that the salaf did not like to expound on topics
in tafs"r that they did not know about; that in itself is no indication,
Ibn Taymiyya adds, that they did not expound on things they did
know about. On the contrary, we have a large amount of tafs"r
material from them.
94
There is no inconsistency here, since Ibn
Taymiyya was not defending the right of exegetes to interpret so
much as the right of the first three generations to interpret.
Ibn Taymiyya concludes his treatise with a tradition on the
authority of al-%abar$ stating that Ibn Abb#s said: Tafs"r is of four
kinds: a kind that can be known from the language of the Arabs, a
148 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
kind that every Muslim should know, a kind that only the scholars
know, and a kind that only God knows.
95
One should not make
much of the quotation of this Hadith here. Ibn Taymiyya has already
given his theory, and these traditions add little in the way of
clarification.
96
The Significance of Ibn Taymiyyas Treatise
I have already referred to the method resulting from following the
principles put forth by Ibn Taymiyya radical hermeneutics
because it claims to take tafs"r back to its roots in the salaf.
97
Ibn
Taymiyya was effectively binding the divine word with the prophetic
word (newly redefined to encompass early tafs"r material) in ways
that had never been seen before in the Sunni tradition. One
understood the divine only through the prophetic. The binding of
the two kinds of revelation had revolutionary consequences for
Sunni hermeneutics. Implicit in this method was a full capitulation
to the prophetic Hadith and the interpretations of the first
generations as the decipherers of divine speech. Before the advent
of Ibn Taymiyya, the prophetic interpretive methodthat is using
the Hadith and the opinions of early authorities as a commentary
on the Qur#nwas embedded in an encyclopaedic approach that
was guided by philology, and thus was always a controllable method.
The danger posed by Ibn Taymiyyas new hermeneutical approach
was that the exegete was compelled to follow through with the
governing principle of the method: the equating of the meaning of
the Word of God with the prophetic word to the exclusion of any other
possible hermeneutical approach to the Qur!n. Given the continued
growth of prophetic logia across the centuries, it was only a matter
of time before the prophetic inundated the divine word. This
radical hermeneutics approach did not see its full articulation
prior to Ibn Taymiyya.
98
It was definitely Ibn Taymiyya who gave
this method its theoretical foundation. His ability to create a
genealogy of Qur#nic exegetes down from Mu&ammad, passing
through Ibn Ab$ "#tim and Ibn Mardawayh, is testimony to his
polemical ingenuity.
At the heart of this radical hermeneutics is a restriction on the
ability of exegetes to say anything by way of interpreting the Qur#n
that has not been believed to have been said by authorities in the
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 149
first three generations of Islam.
99
This was not only a restriction of
options, but a reformulation of what exegesis is and is not. The
exegete was made into a reporter of what has already been said
about the Qur#n, more in the nature of a mu$addith (a transmitter
of traditions or $ad"th). Ibn Taymiyya repeatedly complains in this
treatise that most tafs"r works are not pure, %arfan or al! wajhihi, as
he puts it;
100
they should have simply quoted the interpretations of
the salaf without any commentary or editorial interference.
101
What
he is implying is that the craft of tafs"r should simply be the
recording of the material coming from the early generations without
any additions or commentary. The final aim of these newly
formulated rules of exegesis was to undermine the previous
consensus among Sunni commentators that philology should be the
foundation of the tafs"r enterprise (regardless of what may, in
practice, have been the case). The dismantling of this consensus is
the main achievement of Ibn Taymiyyas treatise, and it was done
in an indirect method. Philology was dethroned not by a direct
attack but by omission. Ibn Taymiyya did not attack the method
itself inasmuch as disregard it. Reading his treatise, one is hardly
aware that by consenting to what appears to be an innocuous, no-
frills approach to the Qur#n, one has discarded philology.
The Qur#n according to Ibn Taymiyya is to be interpreted by the
Qur#n itself. Thus, what is obscure, elliptical, or unclear in one part
of the Qur#n is usually clarified in other parts of the Qur#n. In
cases where one cannot find an interpretation using this method,
then one can move on to the second step: checking the interpretations
of Mu&ammad himself regarding obscure passages that could not be
made clear in the first step. If these two ways fail to offer a meaning
for a difficult passage, then one can move to the third level, the
interpretations offered by the Companions of Mu&ammad; and
finally, failing that, one can move to the interpretations of the
Successors (t!bi&n). The first remark to make is that the first two
steps in this process are rather inconsequential: Ibn Taymiyya does
not tell us how the Qur#n interprets the Qur#n, and he fails to
mention that there is precious little from Mu&ammad in the way of
direct interpretation of the Qur#neven if we include the non-
exegetical Hadith that had been introduced to the Qur#nic
commentary tradition. The second is that this is a hierarchical
method and, as such, an interpretation of the fourth level is less
authoritative than an interpretation coming from the third or the
150 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
second level. But since the first two levels have no practical impact
on the meaning of any verse, then what we have is the privileging
of the interpretations of the Companions and the Successors over
and above any other. This tradition-centered approach to the
exegesis of the Qur#n is deceptively consistent with the Sunni
methodology of formulating the content and the reach of the Shar$a
(the four u%&l of the Sunni school). Moreover, it places Hadith
methodology and mentality at the centre of the task of deciding the
meaning of the Qur#n. What Ibn Taymiyya offers is an epistemological
method to decide what of the tafs"r material was authentic and
hence part of the accepted knowledge for the Muslims; this was a
hermeneutical method by default. One consented to an interpretation,
one did not arrive at it.
But to submit to Ibn Taymiyyas method is to discard not only
the non-Sunni exegetical tradition but most of the Sunni exegetical
tradition as well. Thus, it would be a mistake to think that Ibn
Taymiyya was attempting merely to disprove or dismantle the
foundations of non-Sunni methods of approaching the Qur#n
(although these do get disproved in the process). Rather, he was
going after the most mainstream of the Sunni schools of interpreting
the Qur#n, the encyclopaedic method which has at its basis the
catholic spirit of ijm! theology.
102
I am referring here to what would
become the monumental works of the Sunni traditionworks by
al-Thalab$, al-W#&id$, and Ibn A'iyya, al-R#z$ and even al-%abar$.
Ibn Taymiyya found fault with most of the foundational exegetes of
the medieval Sunni tradition and called into question their relevance
and validity, while constantly drawing attention to other exegetes
who were, though known, not of central significance. Ibn Taymiyya
thus was taking issue with the Sunni hermeneutical formulation
itself and in the process re-evaluating the whole output of tafs"r. In
so doing he attempted to reposition the tradition-based current in
Sunni exegesis, which had been until then on the margins of the
Sunni tradition, and to place it at the centre of this newly redefined
and reformed tradition.
It is impossible to understand the reasons behind such a radical
redefinition of the method of exegesis in Sunnism on the part of Ibn
Taymiyya without taking into consideration several factors that are
not apparent in the Muqaddima. Three factors are at the background
of Ibn Taymiyyas reformulation of Sunni hermeneutics, and also
facilitated the acceptance of his radical hermeneutics by a large
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 151
number of later commentators. The first is the paradoxical nature
of the medieval Sunni hermeneutical enterprise itself. The
encyclopedic Sunni hermeneutics was based on an internal
contradiction: philology was proclaimed the tool needed to
understand the Qur#n, yet philology was not allowed to be the final
arbiter of any interpretation. Sunni hermeneutics, in order to save
its own theological reading of the Qur#n and present a coherent
interpretation, was ultimately willing to discard philology (which it
had always maintained was the way to understand the Qur#n) when
it undermined a Sunni theological reading. To encyclopaedic Sunni
hermeneutics, philology was thus only a tool, and literally so. In the
last resort, what decided the meaning was the Sunni theological
outlook. There lurked, however, within mainstream Sunni
hermeneutics both a paradox and the danger of philology leading
to a theological disaster should an exegete submit fully to the
dictates of this tool. Ibn Taymiyya sought to rid the classical Sunni
hermeneutics of this paradoxical dilemma. Moreover, while the
position of the Sunni hermeneutical methodthat philology was the
handmaid of Sunnismwas superbly suited to counter a Shii b!'in"
(esoteric) reading of the Qur#nic text, it had difficulties withstanding
a Mutazilite challenge. What would Sunnism have to say if a
philological reading of a certain verse in the Qur#n supported a
Mutazilite position and not its own? As philology was not a loyal
servant, Mutazilite hermeneutics must not be given the opportunity
to use philology against Sunni theology. Thus, Ibn Taymiyya was
willing to discard philology altogether in his effort to undermine
any Mutazilite and Shii danger to a proper Sunni explanation of
the Qur#n.
The second factor adding to the necessity of overhauling the
Sunni hermeneutics was the rise of aggressive Shiism. By Ibn
Taymiyyas time, Shii intellectuals were boldly publishing anti-
Sunni polemical tracts that were causing serious consternation in
Sunni intellectual circles. In order to combat this new trend, Ibn
Taymiyya sought to make the Sunni theological outlook immune
from Shii attacks. The main drawback of Sunni encyclopedic
hermeneutics, according to Ibn Taymiyya, was its lax attitude to the
Hadith corpus. It incorporated many pro-Shii materials without any
apparent discomfort. These pro-Shii materials could be accom-
modated as long as they were not part of a polemical tug-of-war.
The moment the Shiis started pointing to this material as a proof
152 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
of the validity of their religious claims, however, the Sunnis were
hard pressed to disavow them altogether. Ibn Taymiyya was willing
to discard the whole encyclopaedic approach if it meant getting rid
of this pro-Shii material.
103
And he did.
The final factor that enabled Ibn Taymiyyas brand of radical
hermeneutics was the growth and consolidation of tradition-based
material. The growth of exegetical material that purported to go
back to the earliest generations was such that one could offer a
continuous running interpretation of the Qur#n without having to
resort to any non-tradition based material. Ibn Taymiyya thus came
at the cusp of a growing movement that was on the margins of the
Sunni encyclopedic tradition. The Muqaddima, which I consider a
manifesto, paved the way for the coming into being of truly
monumental commentaries which were tradition-based and were
capable of vying with encyclopedic commentaries.
The Influence of Ibn Taymiyyas Treatise
104
The influence of Ibn Taymiyyas method in the medieval period was
never sweeping. The medieval exegetical tradition was too
polyphonic, too encyclopedic to allow his theory to triumph. A
devastating response from the camp of traditional Sunni exegetes
came even before the Muqaddima was published, from no less than
Ab! "ayy#n, the exegete whom I mentioned at the beginning of this
article. Ab! "ayy#n had received from Ibn Taymiyya a summary of
his views before the two had their falling-out, and would later
dismiss the foundations and arguments of Ibn Taymiyyas
hermeneutical outlook in less than a page in his monumental al-Ba$r
al-Mu$"'.
105
Indeed, Ibn Taymiyya was most probably responding to
the critique of Ab! "ayy#n when he wrote the first four chapters of
his treatise. Ab! "ayy#n raised the issue of contradictory
interpretations in the corpus of the salaf as a clear proof that they
were not divinely inspired. The medieval exegetical tradition simply
refused to succumb to such a radical restriction on the authority of
the exegete.
Ibn Taymiyya articulated and promoted a marginal, if influential,
current in the medieval exegetical tradition. Only two medieval
authors implemented Ibn Taymiyyas theory in the centuries after
his death, namely his student Ibn Kath$r and the later al-Suy!'$
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 153
(d. 911/1505). The earlier commentaries he has championed, like
those of Baq$ b. Makhlad, Ibn Ab$ "#tim, and Ibn Mardawayh, have
now all been lost. The victory of Ibn Taymiyyas theory was only
assured in the 20th century, and there is a danger of projecting this
state of affairs back onto the medieval period. Since his treatise is
one of the few available articulations of what tafs"r is about, some
scholars have taken it to reflect the status of hermeneutical thinking
prevalent in medieval tradition.
106
Ibn Taymiyyas theory was
anything but representative. It was revolutionary and innovative.
Yet it would also be a misrepresentation to underestimate the
influence of Ibn Taymiyyas theory. His arguments were not so much
new as a forceful restatement of the supremacy of the Sunna in the
hermeneutical realm. The moment a Hadith-centered approach to
tafs"r was articulated theoretically it became impossible to reject out
of hand: one could only submit to the fundamental validity of this
approach, in so far as it places the Hadith (loosely redefined by Ibn
Taymiyya to include all tafs"r material from the salaf generations) at
the centre of how one interprets the Qur#n. The hermeneutical
theory of medieval Islam could choose not to follow this articulation
but it could not dismiss it altogether.
107
The first evidence we have of the influence of the treatise is the
Qur#n commentary of Ibn Kath$r, the student of Ibn Taymiyya. The
incorporation of the second part of Ibn Taymiyyas treatise in the
introduction of Ibn Kath$rs commentary is an indication of how
seriously the student took this new formulation. This is not the
place for a full analysis of Ibn Kath$rs commentary, but suffice it to
say that the implementation of the new theory was incomplete. Ibn
Kath$r was unable to break away fully from the established rules of
the encyclopedic paradigm of tafs"r, and the work can be only
described as a transitional work between the encyclopedic method
and the new radical hermeneutical method. Despite the heavy
emphasis on inherited interpretations Ibn Kath$r was still bound to
the traditional method of philology, relying heavily as he did on
al-%abar$s insights and philological discussions. Ibn Kath$r was thus
turning al-%abar$ into a figure of the salaf, which is hardly what Ibn
Taymiyya would have wanted.
Less than two centuries later Ibn Taymiyyas theory would be
implemented by no less a figure than al-Suy!'$. In his monumental
commentary al-Durr al-Manth&r f" al-tafs"r al-math&r we have the only
surviving articulation of a newly assertive type of commentary, a
154 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
commentary where only inherited interpretations from the salaf are
recorded, with no additions, no editorial comments, and no
philological explanations.
108
This work is radically different from
any other Qur#n commentary (apart from Ibn Ab$ "#tims work).
The tafs"r bi-al-math&r had now produced its classic work.
Daniel Brown has called the modern scriptural exegesis current
in many parts of the Muslim world scripturalism.
109
His analysis is
one of the few that has so far attempted to give us an account of the
radicalization of scriptural exegesis among some modern Muslim
exegetes. Brown, a historian of modern Islamic religious thought, is
unaware that the current has a medieval antecedent in the theory
of Ibn Taymiyya. Indeed, the main point to emphasize about this
kind of scripturalism is that it is heavily indebted to Ibn Taymiyyas
radicalization. The influence of Ibn Taymiyyas articulation of how
to approach the Qur#n is pervasive among modern Muslim exegetes.
Unless the connection is made between Ibn Taymiyya and many
modern Muslim exegetes, we will be missing an important part of
the story.
Notes
* Tafs"r in this article refers both to Qur#nic interpretation as a genre or craft and
to individual Qur#n commentaries, depending on the context. Companions with
capital C refers to the generation of Mu&ammad as understood by the Sunni Hadith
criteria. Successors with capital S refers to the second generation of Muslims, those
who came after the Companions. Salaf is the term used by Ibn Taymiyya to refer
to the first three generations of Muslims.
1. The anecdote is related in Ibn "ajar al-Asqal#n$, al-Durar al-k!mina f" ay!n
al-mia al-th!mina (Cairo, 1966), 1: 162163. Professor Donald Little drew my
attention to this anecdote.
2. For Ibn Taymiyyas life see Donald P. Little, The Historical and Historiographical
Significance of the Detention of Ibn Taymiyya, International Journal of Middle
East Studies 4 (1973): 311327; idem, Did Ibn Taymiyya Have a Screw Loose?
Studia Islamica 41 (1975): 93111; idem, Religion under the Mamluks, The
Muslim World LXXIII (1983): 165181. For an analysis of the historical sources
on Ibn Taymiyya see the little used M.A. dissertation of "asan Q#sim Mur#d,
Mi$an of Ibn Taymiyya: A Narrative Account based on a Comparative Analysis of the
Sources (Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill, 1968). For a narrative of
the trials of Ibn Taymiyya see idem., Ibn Taymiya on Trial: A Narrative
Account of His Mi&an Islamic Studies (Islamabad) 18 (1979): 132. For primary
sources on the life of Ibn Taymiyya see Ibn Abd al-H#d$ (d. 744/1344), al-Uq&d
al-durriyya min man!qib Shaykh al-isl!m Ibn Taymiyya, ed. M. ". Fiq$ (Beirut: D#r
al-Kit#b al-Arab$, 1970, reprint of Cairo 1938 edition); see also the new edition
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 155
of al-Uq&d by %alat al-"alaw#n$ (Cairo: al-F#r!q al-Haditha, 2001). References
in this article to al-Uq&d are to the 1938 Cairo edition.
3. See Ibn Kath$r, Tafs"r al-Qur!n al-a#"m, ed. M. Mu&ammad et al. (Cairo: Maktabat
Awl#d al-Shaykh li-al-Tur#th, 2000), 1: 619. See also the Ph.D. dissertation of
Roy Young Mu&ammad Mukhtar Curtis, Authentic Interpretation of Classical
Islamic Texts: An Analysis of the Introduction of Ibn Kath"rs Tafs"r al-Qur!n
al-A#"m (The University of Michigan, 1989). On Ibn Kath$rs use of Ibn
Taymiyya see later in this article.
4. I am discounting here two Qur#n commentaries, the partially preserved work
of Ibn Ab$ "#tim (d. 327/938), and the lost work of Ibn Mardawayh
(d. 410/1019)extensive quotations of which survive in al-Suy!'$s Na#m
al-Durar. Although these two commentaries follow the method prescribed by
Ibn Taymiyya, they were not written as counterpoints to the traditional
exegetical tradition but as part of it. They did not aim to replace tafs"r or
redefine it in so much as to emphasize a certain aspect of it.
5. One might argue that it is precisely because he did not leave a complete,
continuous Qur#n commentary that his theory was to have such influence.
When Ibn Taymiyya wrote tafs"r, he wrote it more in the manner of Fakhr al-D$n
al-R#z$ and not in the manner he was preaching. In recent decades two
compilations of Qur#nic exegesis from Ibn Taymiyya have been publishedone
under the title al-Tafs"r al-kab"r, ed. Abd al-Ra&m#n Umayra (Beirut: D#r
al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1988), the second under the title Daq!iq al-tafs"r (Jedda,
1986). It is not clear to what degree the two new collections are any different
from what has been available in his other writings which dealt with certain
aspects of the Qur#n (see his Tafs"r S&rat al-N&r [Beirut, 1983] as an example of
his exegetical writings). These two collections simply gather Ibn Taymiyyas
different pronouncements on the Qur#n from his already published works,
which are then presented as interpretation. The present article is not a study
of such material. There is, however, some confusion in the biographical
dictionaries as to whether Ibn Taymiyya wrote a Qur#n commentary or not.
Ibn Abd al-H#d$, on the one hand, mentions that Ibn Taymiyya left a Qur#n
commentary in thirty volumes, which was never published in full during his
lifetime. A closer look at Ibn Abd al-H#d$s statement reveals that Ibn Taymiyya
did not write a commentary but gathered all the isn!d material on the Qur#n
into a collection (al-Uq&d, 42). Other evidence, however, makes it most unlikely
that he wrote a full Qur#n commentary. According to some accounts, towards
the end of his life he regretted not writing one, although these should be taken
with a grain of salt since they conform to a topos in the literature of Qur#nic
lore. For all the references to Ibn Taymiyyas exegetical activities see al-Uq&d,
pp. 19, 21, 26, 28, 29, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 377. The clearest statement that he
refused to write a Qur#n commentary is found on page 43; the clearest
statement that he wished he had written one is found on page 44. Ibn Ba''!'a
states in his Ri$la that while in jail Ibn Taymiyya wrote a book of Qur#n
commentary which he entitled al-Ba$r al-Mu$"' in almost forty volumes (see
Little, Screw loose, 96). Ibrah$m Baraka, the author of an extensive study of
Ibn Taymiyyas exegetical activities, is clear about the matter: Ibn Taymiyya
wrote no complete Qur#n commentary. See his Ibn Taymiyya wa-juh&duhu f"
al-tafs"r (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-Isl#miyya, 1984), 7176.
6. The current state of tafs"r studies does not allow for certainty when making
generalizations such as this, but I am not aware of any comparable treatise
156 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
prior to Ibn Taymiyya. For a possible connection, though remote, with
Avicennas philosophy and his theory of hermeneutics (q!n&n al-taw"l) see
Yahya J. Michot A Maml!k Theologians Commentary on Avicennas Ris!la
A($awiyya: Being a Translation of a Part of Dar al-ta!ru( of Ibn Taymiyya, with
Introduction, Annotation, and Appendices, Journal of Islamic Studies 14 (2003):
149203, 309363. It is possible that Ibn Taymiyya wanted, among other things,
to clarify what is the Sunni, or better, Salafi way of hermeneutics and he wrote
this treatise as an indirect response to the hermeneutical paradigm of the
philosophers and the Asharites. Ibn Taymiyya could also be responding to
al-Ghaz#l$s formulation of hermeneutics in his Q!n&n al-taw"l (Cairo, 1940).
7. The study of the introductions of Qur#n commentaries has barely begun. The
natural dependence and interplay between these introductions has not been
studied yet. See Walid Saleh, The Formation of Classical Tafs"r Tradition: The Qur!n
Commentary of al-Thalab" (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 78, for bibliography on studies of
the introductions of Qur#n commentaries.
8. See Saleh, Formation, 215221. I will discuss the term radical hermeneutics
later in this article.
9. It is not clear who gave the current title, Muqaddima f" u%&l al-tafs"r, to this
treatise. Zarz!r thinks that it was given by the first editor, the Grand Muft$ of
the "anbal$s in Damascus. The manuscript title as shown in Zarz!rs edition
simply paraphrases the beginning statement of the treatise and gives it as a
title: Q!ida a#"mat al-qadr shar"fatun f" taby"n m! yu"n al! fahm al-Qur!n
wa-tafs"rihi wa-marifat ma!n"hi. There is something to be said for the insight of
the Grand Muft$ which, by giving it this title, summed up the significance of
this document. It draws an unavoidable parallel with u%&l treatises on
jurisprudence, an association to which I shall return later. See Muqaddima, 22
(note 13).
10. Muqaddima f" u%&l al-tafs"r, Ibn Taymiyya, ed. Adn#n Zarz!r (Kuwait: D#r
al-Qur#n al-Kar$m, 1971). I will refer to this edition simply as Muqaddima in
this article. For the information on manuscripts used and a brief history of the
publication history of this treatise see pages 2124 of this edition. I have also
consulted the second Salaf$ edition of Mu&ibb al-D$n al-Kha'$b (Cairo: al-Ma'baa
al-Salafiyya, 1385/1965). I did not consult the 1936 edition. To the list of
corrections given by Zarz!r for his edition add this: p. 47 line 2 insert the word
dh!lika after the second word (correction from the 1965 edition). The text of
the treatise is also included in Majm& fat!w! shaykh al-Isl!m A$mad b. Taymiyya,
ed. Abd al-Ra&m#n b. Mu&ammad b. Q#sim and Mu&ammad b. Abd al-Ra&m#n
b. Mu&ammad (Riyadh, 1964), 13: 329375.
11. For an example of other editions see the one published by Faww#z Zaml$ (Cairo:
D#r Ibn "azm, 1997) and the one by Ma&m!d Na**#r (Cairo: Maktabat al-Tur#th
al-Isl#m$, 1988). There is a Salafi English translation by Mu&ammad Abdul Haq
Ansari (Birmingham: Al-Hidaayah Publishing, 1993). Excerpts of the treatise
have been translated by Jane McAullife in Windows on the House of Islam: Muslim
Sources on Spirituality and Religious Life, ed. John Renard (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1998), 3543.
12. Muqaddima, 33.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 34.
16. Ibid., 35.
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 157
17. Zarz!r only claims that the Muqaddima has five chapters; see his remarks,
Muqaddima, 15.
18. The first to overlook them was of course the student of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn
Kath$r.
19. Ibid., 35. Ibn Taymiyya is rather categorical in the way he expresses this idea:
It should be known (yajibu an yulam) that the Prophet.
20. Cf. his statements in his treatise Tafs"r S&rat al-Ikhl!% (Beirut: D#r al-Kit#b
al-Arab$, 1993), 107: fa-inna al-ras&l lamm! kh!'abahum bi-al-kit!b wa-al-sunna
arrafahum m! ar!da bi-tilka al-alf!#, wa-k!nat marifat al-%a$!bah li-ma!n"
al-Qur!n akmal min $uf#ihim li-$ur&fihi. Wa-qad ballagh& tilka al-ma!n" il! al-t!bi"n
a#am mimm! ballagh& $ur&fahu. Fa-inna al-ma!n" al-!mah allat" ya$t!j ilayh!
um&m al-muslim"n, mithl man! al-taw$"d wa-man! al-w!$id wa-al-a$ad wa-al-"m!n
wa-al-isl!m wa-na$w dh!lika k!na jam" al-%a$!ba yarif&n m! a$abba ras&l All!h
min marifatihi, wa-l! ya$fa# al-Qur!n kullahu ill! qal"lun minhum. This is typical
of Ibn Taymiyya: Having made a point he pushes it to its natural conclusion:
the Companions knew what Mu&ammad meant by his religion more than they
could be expected to have memorized the Qur#n.
21. For an introduction to the science of Hadith see John Burton, An Introduction to
the Hadith (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994).
22. Muqaddima, 3536. This tradition is an old one, cited by al-%abar$ and al-Thalab$
in the introductions to their Qur#n commentaries. The tradition as cited by
these two commentators is not used to argue the same point as that made by
Ibn Taymiyya, but to argue for the necessity of interpreting and the merit of
doing so. The wording of the tradition does not clearly support the contention
that it was Mu&ammad who taught them the interpretation. Both early
commentators, al-%abar$ and al-Thalab$, understood the tradition to mean that
the Companions of Mu&ammad were the ones doing the interpretation and not
Mu&ammad himself. See al-%abar$, J!mi al-bay!n an tafs"r al-Qur!n, ed. Ma&m!d
Sh#kir (Cairo, 1961), 1:80; and al-Thalab$, al-Kashf wa-al-bay!n an tafs"r al-Qur!n,
Veliyuddin Efendi ms. 130, f. 8b.
23. Muqaddima, 36.
24. There seems to be evidence to indicate that Ibn Taymiyya viewed interpretation
as an intuitive act, or at least manifestly accessible to everyone. At the end of
his life when he was asked to write a continuous running commentary on the
Qur#n he answered by saying: Parts of the Qur#n are self-evidently clear,
and others have been explained by the commentators in their commentaries.
A few verses (ba( al-!y!t), however, have appeared problematic to some
scholars. Perhaps one would read many a book searching for a solution for the
meaning to no avail. An exegete might even write a whole book on one verse.
So I tried to interpret these verses with demonstrative proof (the Arabic is
bi-al-dal"l), since addressing these verses is far more urgent than attending to
the others. Al-Uq&d, 43.
25. Muqaddima, 37: wa-aql al-kal!m muta(ammin li-fahmihi
26. Ibid., 37.
27. Ibid. The form of the verb yastashri$ implies that one has to go to the source
of knowledge and demand an interpretation in addition to transmission.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 3738: What I mean (wa-al-maq%&d) is that the Successors received tafs"r
from the Companions, just as they received from them the Sunna (more exact:
158 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
the knowledge of the Sunna); granted they did discuss [the tafs"r] when drawing
deductions and proofs, just as they discussed the Sunna.
30. The old view that tafs"r was not prophetic per se does actually make an
appearance in the Muqaddima. See below where I discuss this paragraph, which
appears on p. 48 of the Muqaddima.
31. Ibid., 38.
32. See Mu&ammad Ab! Zahra, Ibn Taymiyya: )ay!tuhu wa-a%ruhu!r!uhu
wa-fiqhuhu (Cairo: D#r al-Fikr al-Arab$, 2000), 334336, for an example of legal
ruling that agrees with the Shii legal tradition.
33. Cf. Thomas F. Michels remark in his A Muslim Theologians Response to Christianity
(Delmar: Caravan Books, 1985), vii: Ibn Taymiyya was essentially a dialogical
type of thinker; among his voluminous writings there exists hardly any
extended work in which the polemical element is missing. He seemed best able
to say what Islam is (or should be) by pointing up its contradistinction to what
Islam is not (or must not become).
34. Muqaddima, 38. The Arabic phrase for what I translate as variations on the
same theme is ikhtil!f tanawwu, literally disagreement of varieties. The
Arabic for contradictory disagreement is ikhtil!f ta(!dd. See Henri Laoust,
Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Ta*"-d-D"n A$mad b. Taim"ya, canoniste
$anbalite n )arr!n en 661/1262, mort Damas en 728/1328 (Cairo: Imprimerie de
linstitut franais darchologie orientale, 1939), 231, where he gives an
example of Ibn Taymiyya using the two terms in a different context. Laoust
translates ikhtil!f ta(!dd as divergences contradictoires while he gives
diffrenciations logiques for ikhtil!f tanawwu. I of course do not agree with
his translation of the second term.
35. The editor, Zarz!r, points out the remaining two in the footnotes, see, p. 49
note 4, and p. 51 note 2.
36. Muqaddima, 38: an yuabbira kull w!$id minhum! an al-mur!d bi-ib!ratin ghayr
ib!rat %!$ibihi, tadullu al! man!n f" al-musamm! ghayr al-man! al-!khar, maa
itti$!d al-musamm!.
37. What Ibn Taymiyya is implying is that if one were to explain the word sword
(sayf) by the two terms quoted above, one is not giving contradictory
explanations of the term, but rather similar variants.
38. Ibid., 42.
39. Ibid., 43.
40. Ibid., 44. He does give an example from logic. If a non-Arab were to ask what
the word bread means, and someone pointed to a particular loaf of bread, it
should not be understood that the interpreter is defining bread-ness in
general terms but rather giving a particular example to illustrate a point.
41. On asb!b al-nuz&l literature see Andrew Rippin, The Function of asb#b al-nuz!l
in Qur#nic Exegesis, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 51
(1988): 120.
42. Muqaddima, 49.
43. Ibid., 48: wa-qad tan!zaa al-ulam! f" qawl al-%!$ib nazalat h!dhihi al-!ya f" kadh!
hal yajr" majr! al-musnadka-m! yudhkar al-sabab alladh" unzila li-ajlihi aw yajr"
majr! al-tafs"r minhu alladh" laysa bi-musnad? Fa-al-Bukh!r" yudkhiluhu f" al-musnad
wa-ghayruhu l! yudkhiluhu f" al-musnad. Wa-akthar al-mas!n"d al! h!dh! al-i%'il!$,
ka-musnad A$mad wa-ghayrihi, bi-khil!f m! idh! dhukira sababan nazalat aqbahu,
fa-innahum kulluhum yudkhil&n h!dh! f" al-musnad.
44. Ibid., 4950.
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 159
45. Ibid., 51.
46. Ibid., 54. The editor is not happy with the word mukhaffaf, and he suggests an
emendation in a footnote. His first instinct to leave the term as it is in the
manuscript is right. There is no need to emend the term here. Ibn Taymiyya
himself was on thin icehence the almost comical oxymoron. See Muqaddima,
p. 54 note 1.
47. Ibid., 55: al-maq%&d hun! al-tar"f bi-mujmal al-amr d&na taf!%"lihi
48. The structure of the treatise is not fully articulated by Ibn Taymiyya. Zarz!r,
the editor, has made it much more accessible by his editorial divisions, which
are supplied with titles, although these are not part of the original text.
49. There is rather an impossible infelicity with the Arabic here, and one could
only guess at what Ibn Taymiyya is aiming at after reading these chapters as a
whole, and bringing their content to bear on the incomprehensible Arabic of
this first paragraph of the chapter. This is another indication that he may not
have had a chance to polish this treatise. There are reports in his biography
that he was forced to smuggle his writings from jail without being able to revise
them. I will transliterate here the Arabic for the benefit of the reader:
al-ikhtil!f f" al-tafs"r al! nawayn: minhu m! mustanaduhu al-naql faqa' wa-minhu
m! yulam bi-ghayr dh!lika, idh al-ilm imm! naql mu%addaq wa-imm! istidl!l
mu$aqqaq. Wa-al-manq&l imm! an ma%&m wa-imm! an ghayr ma%&m. (Ibid.,
55).
50. Ibid., 55.
51. Ibid., 56.
52. Ibid., 5657. For the debate on the isr!"l"y!t see Roberto Tottoli, Origin and
Use of the Term Isr#$liyy#t in Muslim Literature, Arabica XLVI (1999): 193210,
esp. 201202.
53. Muqaddima, 58.
54. Ibid., 5874.
55. For a different understanding of the significance of Ibn Taymiyyas arguments
here see Shahab Ahmed, Ibn Taymiyyah and the Satanic Verses, Studia
Islamica 87 (1998), 7886.
56. For a discussion of this type of material see Saleh, Formation, 103108. A Hadith
of this sort usually states that reading Sura x from the Qur#n will bring such
and such benefits to the reader.
57. Muqaddima, 76. He fails to mention Ibn Mardawayh who reported the same
traditions; I have already discussed the reasons behind this leniency (Saleh,
Formation, 218).
58. Muqaddima, 79. I have taken Ibn Taymiyya to say that ikhtil!f (contradictory
differences) are the result of interpretations that are based on opinion (or
istidl!l, or reasoning) and not naql (transmission). The grammatical structure
of the sentence suggests a different reading, which is that some differences can
be detected by istidl!l and not by naql. However, such a reading does not make
sense either with what follows or with the whole drift of the treatise. The
Arabic reads: amm! al-naw al-th!n" min sababay al-ikhtil!f wa-huwa m! yulam
bi-al-istidl!l l! bi-al-naql.
59. Ibid., 7980. Most of these works are lost. The authors mentioned are: Abd
al-Razz#q al-+an#n$, Wak$ b. al-Jarr#&, Abd b. "am$d, Abd al-Ra&m#n
b. Ibr#h$m Du&aym, A&mad b. "anbal, Is&#q b. R#hawayh, Baqq$ b. Makhlad,
Ab$ Bakr b. al-Mundhir, Sufy#n b. Uyaynah, Sunayd (al-"usayn b. D#w!d), Ibn
160 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
Jar$r al-%abar$, Ibn Ab$ "#tim, Ab! Sa$d al-Ashaj, Ab! Abd All#h b. M#jah, and
Ibn Mardawayh.
60. Ibid., 81: qawm itaqad& ma!niya thumma ar!d& $aml alf!# al-Qur!n alayh!.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., 82.
63. Ibn Taymiyya is envisioning here a scenario where the meaning an exegete
ascribes to a given verse is in agreement with the spirit of the Qur#n (hence
a right meaning, in so far as it can be defended by the Qur#n), but this
particular meaning is not precisely the meaning of the verse in question.
Hence, the exegete is misconstruing the words of the verse to mean something
right (in a religious sense), but the words themselves cannot entertain such a
meaning.
64. Ibid., 82.
65. Ibid., 82. Ibn Taymiyya mentions the great Qur#n commentary of al-Q#($ Abd
al-Jabb#r (d. 415/1025), among others, and of course, al-Zamakhshar$.
66. Ibid., 84.
67. Ibid., 8586.
68. Ibid., 86.
69. The presence of $aw!sh" commentary on al-Kashsh#f is my only evidence so far
that it was part of the curriculum in the Mamluk era.
70. Ibid., 88.
71. Ibid., 90.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., 91.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. For a detailed discussion of Ibn Taymiyyas theory of interpretation as offered
in his other writings see Mohamed Mohamed Yunis Ali, Medieval Islamic
Pragmatics: Sunni Legal Theorists Models of Textual Communication (Surrey: Curzon,
2000), 87140. Since it was his Muqaddima that ended up influencing scriptural
exegesis and not his other writings, it is not necessary here to summarize Alis
analysis.
78. Muqaddima, 91.
79. Ibid., 91.
80. Ibid., 9192.
81. Ibid., 92.
82. Jane Dammen McAuliffe has already analyzed this chapter of the Muqaddima as
part of her study of Ibn Kath$rs introduction to his Qur#n commentary. See
her Qur#nic Hermeneutics: The Views of al-%abar$ and Ibn Kath$r, in Andrew
Rippin (ed.), Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Qur!n, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1988), 4662, esp. 5662. See also the analysis by Mu&ammad
Ab! Zahra, Ibn Taymiyya, 178190.
83. Muqaddima, 93.
84. Al-W#&id$ for example gives a new meaning to the word al-ghayb of verse 2:3
which is different from the traditional interpretations given by previous
exegetes. This new meaning is based on an examination of the use of the root
gh-y-b in the Qur#n. See al-Bas"', Nurosmaniye 236 tafs"r, ff. 38 a-b.
85. For u%&l al-fiqh see Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction
to Sunn" u%&l al-fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
IBN TAYMIYYA AND THE RISE OF RADICAL HERMENEUTICS 161
86. Muqaddima, 9394. See editors footnotes for reference to Sh#fi$s Ris!la.
87. Ibid., 94.
88. Ibid., 95.
89. Ibid., 102.
90. The list includes: Sa$d b. Jubayr, Ikrima, A'# b. Ab$ Rab#&, al-"asan al-Ba*r$,
Masr!q b. al-Ajda, Sa$d b. al-Musayyab, Ab! )liyah, al-Rab$ b. Anas, Qat#da,
and al-,a&&#k b. Muz#&im. See Ibid., 104.
91. Ibid., 105.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., 108.
94. Ibid., 114.
95. Ibid., 115.
96. The edition of the Muqaddima by al-Kha'$b appends a fatw! from Ibn Taymiyya
in response to this question: Which of these Qur#n commentaries is more in
accordance with the Book of God and the Sunna of his Prophet: al-Zamakhshar$s,
al-Qur'ub$s, al-Baghaw$s, or some other? Ibn Taymiyya states that the best
of commentaries is the one by al-%abar$; though he recommends the work of
al-Baghaw$, he does point out that it is a summary of the work al-Thalab$, a
work he is not too pleased with. He is not happy either with al-W#&id$, and
seems to offer the same opinion about him that he gives in the Muqaddima.
Al-Zamakhshar$ gets the harshest criticism. Ibn A'iyya gets hesitant praise, at
first preferring him to al-%abar$, only to reaffirm the opposite. Ibn Taymiyya
finally mentions the works of Ibn al-Jawz$ and al-M#ward$, but he fails to issue
a verdict on either. See Muqaddima (Damascus, 1965), 5658. This fatw# is
included in Majm& Fat!w!, 13:3858.
97. Also because it was a break with the traditional exegetical tradition and a
repudiation of its foundations.
98. A possible earlier candidate might well be Ibn Ab$ "#tim, although the evidence
we have is incomplete. On Ibn Ab$ "#tim Qur#ns commentary see Eerik
Dickinson, The Development of Early Sunnite Hadith Criticism: The Taqdima of Ibn
Ab" )!tim al-R!z" (240/854327/938) (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 3637. Yet, not even
Ibn Ab$ "#tim was calling for other ways of doing tafs"r to be discarded. He was
simply offering the Hadiths without the other forms of interpretations. In this
sense, Ibn Taymiyya was radicalizing a marginal current in tafs"r tradition.
99. Ibn Taymiyya is scandalized by the assertion of many exegetes that a latter
commentator can come up with a new meaning for a verse if there were
disagreements as to the meaning of the verse among the early generations.
This implies, Ibn Taymiyya points out, that God has revealed verses whose
meanings were not apparent to the early generation, which is blasphemy. See
Majm& fat!w!, 13: 59. Ibn Taymiyya discounts the possibility of finding a new
meaning to a verse, a meaning that was not transmitted by the first generations
of Muslims.
100. Muqaddima, 79 (for %arfan), 90 (for al! wajhihi). Cf. Ibn Ab$ "#tims remarks in
his Tafs"r Ibn Ab" )!tim, ed. A&mad al-Zahr#n$ (Medina: Maktabat al-D#r, 1408
AH), 1: 9. The program of interpretation as offered in Ibn Ab$ "#tims
introduction could have been the starting point of Ibn Taymiyyas theory.
101. From the little that survives of his exegetical works one could hardly guess that
this is his position. Ibn Taymiyyas approach can only be compared to the
master whom he rarely mentions, al-R#z$. A fuller study of Ibn Taymiyyas
exegetical works is needed to clarify the relationship between his conceptual
162 IBN TAYMIYYA AND HIS TIMES
understanding of exegesis and his real practice. For a cautionary advice about
taking the theoretical pronouncement alone without concrete examples of
interpretation, see my remarks, Formation, 101.
102. Saleh, Formation, 1722.
103. For the details of Ibn Taymiyyas attempt to purge the tafs"r of pro-Shii
material see Saleh, Formation, 215222.
104. Henri Laoust, LInfluence dIbn Taymiyya, in Alford T. Welch and Pierre
Cachia (eds.) Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1979), 1533. See also the assessment of Ibr#h$m Baraka in his
Ibn Taymiyya wa-juh&duhu f" al-tafs"r, 181184.
105. Ab! "ayy#n al-Andalus$, al-Ba$r al-Mu$"', ed. )dil A&mad Abd al-Mawj!d et
al. (Beirut: D#r al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1993), 1: 104. Ab! "ayy#n does not name
Ibn Taymiyya but refers to him as one of our contemporaries. There is no
doubt, however, that he means Ibn Taymiyya, since he gives a summary of his
views as later formulated in the Muqaddima. Moreover, Ab! "ayy#n raises the
issue of ikhtil!f between the interpretations of the salaf as a sure sign of their
human origins.
106. Mustansir Mir remarks that: The Muqaddima f" U%&l at-Tafs"r of Taq$ ad-D$n
A&mad ibn Abd al-"al$m ibn Taymiyyah (662728/12621327) is a
representative work in the field of Qur#nic exegetical theory in his Coherence
in the Qur!n: A Study of I%l!$"s Concept of Na#m in Tadabbur-i Qur!n (Indianapolis:
American Trust Publication, 1986), 28.
107. Despite the fact that we do not have a complete picture of the hermeneutical
literature of the medieval period, we can still gather much from two medieval
summations of Qur#nic hermeneutical studies. These are al-Zarkash$, al-Burh!n
f" ul&m al-Qur!n, ed. M. Ibr#h$m (Beirut: D#r al-Marifa, reprint of 1972 Cairo
edition) and al-Suy!'$, al-Itq!n f" ul&m al-Qur!n, ed. Mu&ammad Ab! al-Fa(l
Ibr#h$m (Beirut: D#r al-Tur#th, reprint of 1967 Cairo edition). Both make clear
that they knew about Ibn Taymiyyas theory and both quote it extensively, yet
subsume Ibn Taymiyyas theory under the philological medieval paradigm. For
details, see the index of both editions for references to Ibn Taymiyya.
108. Al-Suy!'$, al-Durr al-Manth&r f" al-tafs"r al-math&r (Beirut: D#r al-Kutub
al-Ilmiyya, 1990), 7 vols.
109. Daniel Brown, The Triumph of Scripturalism: The Doctrine of Naskh and Its
Modern Critics, in Earle H. Waugh (ed.), The Shaping of an American Islamic
Discourse: A Memorial to Fazlur Rahman (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 51.
The Sufah
9
in Qur'n Literature: A Problem in Semiosis
Ebrahim Moosa (Cape Town)
The linguists, whom one meets everywhere these days, explain that every
transaction in our culture - our money and mathematics, our games and gar-
dens, our diet and our sexuality - is a language; this, of course, is why one
meets so many linguists these days. And languages, too, are simply invented
systems of exchange, attempts to turn the word into the world, sign into value,
script into currency, code into reality. Of course, everywhere,... there are the
politicians and the priests, the ayatollahs and the economists, who will try to
explain the reality is what they say it is. Never trust them; trust only the nov-
elists, those deeper bankers who spend their time trying to turn pieces of
printed paper into value, but never pretend that the result is anything more
than a useful fiction. Of course we need them: for what, after all, is our life
but a great dance in which we are all trying to fix the best going rate of ex-
change ...' Malcolm Bradbury, Rates of Exchange (London: Arena, 1983), 8.
the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God, and the
Word was God... But now we see through a glass darkly, and the truth, be-
fore it is revealed to all, face to face, we see in fragments (alas, how illegible)
in the error of the world, so we must spell out its faithful signals even when
they seem obscure to us and as if amalgamated with a will wholly bent on
evil/ Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose (London: Picador, 1983), 11.
Introduction
WHEN reading classical Muslim exegetes such as Ibn JaiTr al-Tabari
(224/838-310/923) or Pakhr al-Dm al-Razi (544/1150-606/1209), it is diffi-
cult not to notice what Clifford Geertz had described as the 'refiguration of
social thought.'*) This phenomenon noted by Geertz is something that per-
l
) CLIFFORD GEERTZ, 'Blurred Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought' in
Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic
Books, 1983), 19.
Der Islam Bd. 75, S. l - 27
Walter de Gruyter 1998
ISSN 0021-1818
2 Ebrahim Moosa
sists and vigorously confronts the modern scholar of the Qur'n. Not only is
the cultural map in terms of which we understand the revealed scripture re-
drawn (thanks to spectacular advances in social-scientific thought espe-
cially linguistics and psychology), but there is an entire 'alteration of the
principles of mapping/
2
) 'Something is happening to the way we think
about the way we think/ says Geertz.
3
) A generation earlier, a similar point
stated somewhat differently, was made by the Soviet language-philosopher
and critic, Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1895-1975). Bakhtin who made a
major impact on modern language studies observed that in language the
forces of dialogue struggle against the forces of monologue.
4
) The lastmen-
tioned try to fix meaning and close the text. Intertexuality, where a chain of
meanings extend well beyond the limits of a single text or a corpus of word-
ings, allows for the articulation of other suppressed dimensions of the text.
It is along these lines, that Fisher and Abedi asks: 'Can the poly semi c and
nomadic meanings of a text such as the Qur'an overcome the unbewised
efforts to reduce it to a monologic decree?
55
)
French thinkers, like Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan, following the
Swiss linguist de Saussure, gave a new impetus to our understanding of the
workings of language. Language is not only a set of arbitrary and conven-
tional signs but we cannot seem to "know anything outside the endless chain
of substitutions that are signs.'
6
) In Derrida's words: 'from the moment that
there is meaning there is nothing but signs. We think only in signs.'
1
) The end
of the transcendental signifier threatens some of the most hallowed as-
sumptions of logocentric modes of thinking.
8
) Logocentrism, that which
is centered on the logos (speech, logic, reason, the Word of God), is any sig-
2
) GEERTZ, op. cit., 20.
3
) Ibid.
4
) M. M. BAKHTIN, 'The Dialogic Imagination' in The Bakhtin Reader: Selected
Writings of Bakhtin, Medvedev, Voloshinow, ed. Pain Norris (London: Edward Ar-
nold, 1994), 75.
5
) MICHAEL M. J. FISCHER & MEHDI ABEDI, Debating Muslims: Cultural Dia-
logues in Postmodernity and Tradition, 148; see also ANDY RIPPIN, 'Reading the
Qur'an with Richard Bell/ Journal of the American Oriental Society, 112 (4), 1992,
639-647,esp. 637.
6
) G. DOUGLAS ATKINS, ReadingDecoristruction, Deconstructive Reading (Lexing-
ton, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 46; CARL RASCHKE, 'The
Deconstruction of God/ Deconstruction and Theology, Thomas J. J. Altizer et al.
(eds.) (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 7-8.
7
) JACQUES DERRIDA, Of Grammatology, (trans.) Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak
(Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 50.
8
) ATKINS, op. cit., 40.
The Sufah* 3
nifiying system governed by the notion of self-presence of meaning; i.e., any
system structured by a valorization of speech writing, immediacy over dis-
tance, identity over difference, and (self-)presence over all forms of absence,
ambiguity, simulation, substitution, or negativity
9
)
Recent studies on the intellectual history of Islamic discourses show
that there was a growing propensity towards logocentrism betweeen the
first and fifth Islamic centuries.
10
) This was the result of a shift in the reli-
gious paradigm, where Islam graduated from being a minoritarian keryg-
matic faith at first, into a triumphalist ethos of empire. The cultural pro-
duction of Muslim intellectuals of that period was the main repository
which reflected these socio-cultural changes. Since then logocentrism has
dominated Islamic thought with very little challenge.
11
) As a matter of
course, logocentrism reduces the political, anthropological, cultural deter-
minants of language to a secondary importance in the general approach.
Islamic discourses exhibit a longing for presence, for a constitutive reason
(logos) and for an order of concepts claimed to exist in themselves, com-
9
) Barbara Johnson, translator's note 1, in JACQUES DERRIDA'S, Dissemination
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 4.
10
) A KEVIN REINHART, Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral
Thought (Albany: State University of New York, 1995), 178. Reinhart only illus-
trates a scenario in intellectual history, but it is my interpretation that it was a
move towards logocentrism.
11
) For some works that challenge logocentrism see MOHAMMAD ARKOUN, Pour
une critique de la raison islamique (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1984) and Essais
sur lapensee islamique (Paris: Masonneuve et Larose, 1984); also see RICHARD MAR-
TIN, 'Islamic Textuality in Light of Poststructuralist Criticism/ in A Way Prepared:
Essays on Islamic Culture in Honor of Richard Bayly Winder (New York & London:
New York University Press, 1988); "DIL FAKHRI, TZra al-Dilalah
e
inda *l-Arab: Di-
rsah Muqaranah ma
9
l-simya al-hadltha (Beirut: Dar al-Taliah li *l-Tiba'ah wa al-
Nashr, 1985). It is interesting to note that the Japenese scholar of Islam, Toshihiko
Izutsu, favoured aspects of Derridian deconstruction, but pointed out that as long as
we used language we cannot get out of logocentric methaphysics. [T. IZUTSU and H.
LANDOLT, 'Sufism, Mysticism, Structuralism: A Dialogue', in Religious Traditions,
79 (198486), 6.] Norris also admits that deconstruction cannot hope to break
with the philosophical discourse of modernity, namely logocentric reason, or a
metaphysics of presence. Only by working within that logocentric discourse, its con-
stitutive aporias and blindspots can deconstruction effectively reveal what has been
suppressed. [CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, Reconstruction, post-modernism & the visual
arts/ in What is Deconstruction (New York/London: Academy Edition & St. Mar-
tin's Press, 1988); also see G. DOUGL.AS ATKINS, 'The Sign as a Structure of Difference:
Derridean Deconstruction and Some of its Implications,' in Semiotic Themes, Ri-
chard T. de George (ed.) (Lawrence: University of Kansas Publications, 1981)].
4 Ebrahim Moosa
plete, self-referring and proper which regularly return to an origin or to a
'priority
3
. One of the unaccomplished tasks of scholarship is to provide
an adequate account of the cultural imaginaire within which these ideas
were constructed.
In a critical 'close reading' of selective texts of Qur'an exegesis I wish to
demonstrate that meanings of words change with the reconfiguration of so-
cial thought. For a genre of Qur'anic exegetical literature such as tafsir, it is
important that we be in a position to map out and find out 'how' subtle
shifts took place in the interpretive modes. To put it differently, we need
know 'how' they mean.
12
)
In order to demonstrate the process through which something functions
as a sign to a perceptor-semiosis -
13
) I have examined selective exegetical
passages where the word al-sufaha
l4:
) and its derivatives occurred in the
Qur'an. Translators and commentators of the Qur'an have not accounted
for the play of meaning of this word and its transmission from one anthro-
pological context to another. This word had a particular meaning and role
in the early Arab humanist milieu where gender, age and status played a de-
termining role. How this word was subsequently refigured in the social im-
agination of successive contexts in a subtle manner needs to be explained.
The value of post-structuralist theories is that it enables one to demon-
strate how character, community, motive, value, reason, social structure, in
short everything that makes culture, is defined and made real performances
of language. The search for meaning resides not so much in our knowledge of
literary texts themselves, as in the way they are read and interpreted. As
Foucault put it: 'To know must therefore be to interpret.'
15
)
Semiotics and deconstruction allows one to view the interplay of signs
and clusters of signs.
16
) In other words, semiotics asserts its controversial
12
) RICHARD C. MARTIN, 'Structural Analysis and the Quran/ in Studies in
Quran and Tafsir, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Thematic Issue, De-
cember 1979, XLVII/4 S, Alford T. Welch (ed.), 669.
13
) JASPAL SINGH, 'Problematics and Perspectives,' in Semiosis and Semiotics:
Explorations in the Theory of Signs, Jaspal Singh (ed.) (Chandigarh: Lokayat Praka-
shan, 1982), 12-28.
14
) See SYED MUHAMMAD NAQUIB AL-ATTAS, A Commentary on Hujjat al-Siddlq of
Nur al-Dln al-Ranlrl (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, 1986),
200-203 for a discussion on sufaha B.ndjahl.
15
) MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage, 1973), 32.
16
) ARTHUR ASA BERGER, 'Sign, Self and Society/ in The Semiotic Bridge: Trends
from California, Irmengard Rauch & Gerald E Carr (eds.) (Berlin & New York. Mou-
ton de Gruyter, 1989), 19; see Mohammed Arkoun, 'Current Islam Faces its Tradi-
tion,' in Space for Freedom: The Search for Architectural Excellence in Muslim Socie-
The Sufah* 5
claim to be a meta-language, that allows the discussion of language, exege-
sis, religious thought, philosophy and anthropology to take place in a single
system. It attempts to overcome the fragmentation between these various
analytical actors and reassembles them under the rubric of the quest for
meaning. The work of a semiotician thus, is to build models which may be
capable of giving an account of the conditions in which meaning is pro-
duced. By authorizing meaning, itself a problem for deconstructionists, hu-
man beings express a will to power in an attempt to effect transformation.
17
)
From being purely a system of referential tags, language becomes a type of
social action when we superimpose hermeneutics on semiotics. The herme-
neutic code reformulates new questions and answers. It poses an enigma
to the narrative and then teases through the narrative actions until the
enigma is resolved, in the structuralist sense, or decentered in the post-
structualist sense.
From a semiotic approach religious texts are taken as an amalgam of
discourses, institutions and concrete social practices. Here the concern is
an analysis of their signification. In the words of Eco:
Texts generate or are capable of generating multiple (and ultimately infinite)
readings and interpretations. It was agreed, for instance, by the later Barthes,
by the recent Derrida, and by Kristeva, that signification is to be located ex-
clusively in the text. The text is the locus where meaning is produced ... A
text is not simply a communicational apparatus. It is a device which questions
the previous signifying systems, often renews, and sometimes destroys them.
18
)
Religious texts, such as the Qur'n, are at the same time the locus of a
diversity of social speech types. These texts also contain languages that
serve specific sociopolitical purposes when one looks closer at their internal
ties, Ismail Serageldin (ed.) (London: Butterworth Architecture, 1989), 241246 esp.
242 for what Arkoun calls the 'priority of the semiotic approach.'
17
) See JAROSLAV STETKEVYCH, 'Arabic Hermeneutical Terminology: Paradox
and the Production of Meaning/ in Journal of Near Estern Studies, 48, 2 (1989),
81-96, where the author employs a deconstructionist appraoch to the analyses of
hermeneutical terminology in Arab-Islamic thougth.
18
) UMBERTO Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language (London: Macmil-
lan, 1984), 24-25; al-'Imad al-Asfaham (1125-1201) said something similar:
have yet to complete a book and to reopen it the following day without finding I
might have included this, deleted that. Or, I might have polished this statement,
modified the next, transposed the third. In short, man's [a person's] work, his think-
ing, his revisions, are never complete nor perfected. Such is man [human being]' (pa-
renthesis mine). (From Abdul Malik A. al-Sayed, in Social Ethics of Islam (New York:
Vantage Presse, 1982).
6 Ebrahim Moosa
stratification.
19
) 'At any given time and place there will be a set of condi-
tions social, historical, meteorological, physiological that will insure
that a word uttered in that place and that time will have a meaning different
than it would have under any other conditions/
20
) These are the circum-
stances that enable a multiplicity of social voices, heteroglossia, to enter
the text. In that sense all utterances, according to Bakhtin, are heteroglot
in that they are
functions of a matrix offerees practically impossible to recoup, and therefore
impossible to resolve. Heteroglossia is as close a conceptualization as is possi-
ble ofthat locus where centripetal and centrifugal forces collide.< .
21
)
Logocentrism must therefore suppress the diversity of voices and socio-
ideological coiitraditions inherent in speech.
Texts and their authors
In this essay the term sufaha is examined from the exegetical perspec-
tives of two leading commentators of classical Islam. They sire Ibn Jarlr al-
Taban (d. 310/923) author of the famous commentary, Jami* al-Bayan *an
Tawll yi al-Qurn (Collection of Explanations for the Interpretation of
the verses of the Qur'an) and Fakhr al-Din al-RazI (d. 606/1209) author of
Mafatlh al-Ghayb (The Keys to the Hidden), also called al-Tafslr al-Kabw
(The Great Commentary). Both al-Razi and al-Tabari are reputed original
thinkers (mujtahids) and have widely influenced the tradition of Qur'nic
commentary Al-Tabari hailed, as his name indicates, from the one-time
Sassanian province of Tabaristn, a region behind the southern coast of
the Caspian Sea. After extensive travels in the Muslim lands, he spent
some time in Rayy south of modern Tehran, but eventually settled in
Baghdad, the centre of the Abbasid universe. His fame is attributed to
two encyclopedic treatises, one on world history titled, Tarlkh al-rusul
wa al-muluk (A History of Prophets and Kings), and the other the afore-
mentioned treatise on exegesis. His biographers are unanimously im-
pressed by the depth of his erudition. A statement by the eleventh-centuiy
historian and jurist, al-Khatlb al-Baghdadl (d. 463/1071) would suffice as
19
) M. M. BAKTHJN, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, Michael Holquist
(ed.) Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist (trans.) (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1981), 263.
20
) BAKHTIN, Dialogic Imagination, 428.
21
) BAKHTIN, Dialogic Imagination, 428.
The Sufaha 7
an index of his reputation:
c
He had a degree of erudition shared by no one
of his era.'
22
)
By all accounts al-RazT is perhaps the most outstanding advocate of
Asha'ri theology and &faqlh of repute, perhaps second to Abu Hmid al-
Ghazali (d. 505/1111) in the Shafil" legal tradition. Although he was born
around Rayy in what is today Iran, his intellectual activities took him to
the various centres of learning of his time, like Marw, Nishbr, Hamadn,
QazwTn and Hart where he died. At various stages he came into close con-
tact with various rulers which indicated that for some time at least, he pur-
sued a political career of some sort.
There are two reasons why the work of these exegetes were selected.
Fristly, apart from their great and exhaustive intellectual merit, between
them they span a gap of roughly over 200 years. The timespan should pro-
vide us with a timeframe to examine how the refiguration and struggle be-
tween dialogue and monologue took place within the textual sources of Mus-
lim exegesis. It will also enable us to view the coexistence of socio-ideological
contradictions between the present and the past, between differing epochs,
tendencies, circles and schools. Secondly, both commentators rely on trans-
mitted (naql) sources and rational (*aql) sources oftafslr literature. Al-TabarT
draws largely, though not exclusively, on traditional interpretations, while
al-RazT more readily employs the rational method of exegetical discourse.
Together they constitute a representative genre oftafslr literature.
The lexicon
A discussion about the lexical and philological components of the term
s-f-h is necessary. According to the authoritative Arabic lexicographers, s-f-
h signifies khiffal al-hilm, lightness in forebearance and understanding'.
23
)
In other words, safah is the antonym of hilm, provisionally translated as
'the exercise of self-control and forebearance.
3
It is at this stage that the
word safah is more visibly caught in a web of multiple significations. Clearly
an understanding of safah is predicated upon the signification of hilm.
Hilm, says Charles Pellat, is
22
) JANE DMMEN MCAULIFFE, 'Qur'anic Hermeneutics: The Views of al-Taban
and Ibn Kathir,' in Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Quran (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press: 1988), p. 47 citing Muhammad al-Sabbagh, Lamat 'ulm
al-Qurn wa ittijht al-tafslr (Beirut, 1974), 185.
23
) IBN QUTAYBAH AL-TNAWARI, *Uyun al-Akhbr, Ysuf TawTl (ed.) (Beirut:
Dar al-Kutub al-llmiyyah, n.d.), i, 396-397.
8 Ebrahim Moosa
a complex and delicate notion which includes a certain number of qualities of
character or moral attitudes, ranging from serene justice and moderation, to
forebearance and leniency, with self-mastery and dignity of bearing standing
between these extremes.
24
)
The term nevertheless does convey a sense of firmness, strength, physical
integrity and health, as well as moral integrity, the solidity of moral charac-
ter, unemotional, calm deliberation, mildness of manner, freedom from
blind passion, patience and clemency. The pagan Arabs on many an occasion
accused the Prophet Muhammad of being the cause of 'the most level-
headed among us losing their temper' yusaffihu ahlmana, for introducing
an alien and unwelcome religion to their environment.
25
) According to Gold-
ziher, traces of a shift in signification ofhilm can be established from the his-
torical record. The Prophet Muhammad's teachings, he says, gave a new set
of meanings to hilm, being 'higher in nature than taught by the code of vir-
tues of"pagan days.'
26
) Muhammad called the one who showed leniency and
forgiveness a hallm. Allah was also identified as halim in the Qur'an, where
the Prophet Ibrahim was also addressed by the same epithet.
27
) Other an-
tonyms ofhilm are terms such as khiffah (lightness), *ajal (hastiness), while
another synonym for hilm, is also thiql (weightiness).
28
) All these are var-
iants of subtle, but an endless process of signification.
Jahl, provisionally translated as 'ignorance,' is another term that is asso-
ciated with an understanding of safah. Two lexical senses are produced in
this association ofjahl with safah. In the first sense, jahl is often contrasted
with hilm. This follows Goldziher's pioneering work and conclusion that the
word jahl has two uses or levels of meaning a primary and secondary mean-
ing. In the primary sense jahl means 'barbarity' and 'ferocity' and its oppo-
site would he hilm. In a secondary sense it means 'ignorance' and the oppo-
24
) CHARLES PELLAT, EP, art 'hilm'; Pellat, 'Concept ofhilm in Islamic Ethics/
in the Bulletin of the Institute of Islamic Studies, vi & vii (1962-63), 1-12, Calcutta,
Aligarh Muslim University.
**) Abu Muhammad 'Abd al-Malik b. HISHM AL-MA'AFIRT, Slrah Ibn Hisham
9
Th'Abd al-Raf Sa'd (ed.) (Beirut: Dar al-J (1407/1987), i, 295.
26
) IGNAZ GOLDZIHER, Muslim Studies (London: Allen & Unwin, 1967), i, 207.
27
) See also ABU 'L-FARAJ AL-ASBIHNI, Kitb al^Aghanl (Cairo: Mu'assasah
al-Dln, n.d.), xviii, 30, line 12, where j-h-l and h-l-m are posed as opposites:
lakinnahu hadldjhil wa ana asfah wa ahlam - 'he is all iron and curel, whereas I
am most forgiving and civilized.'
28
) WILLIAM EDWARD LANE, Arabic-English Lexicon (London: Williams & Nor-
gate, 1863-93), book 1, part 4, 1376-1377.
The Sufah' 9
site of *ilm, 'knowledge.'
29
) By examining pre-Islamic poetry, Goldziher
found the word to be most commonly used in the primary sense. An example
is
c
Amr b. Kulthm's line which reads: ala la yajhalanna ahad* *alayna, fa
najhalufawqajahl
ll
jahillna, 'May no one dare be vicious against us, for we
may ex cell the ferocity of the ferocious/ The nomen agentis (jahil), accord-
ing to Goldziher, is in one word "a barbarian/ while a halim is
c
a civilized per-
son/ Safah, as a synonym for the word jahl, says Goldziher, 'belongs to that
group of words which, like kesil and sakhal (in Hebrew), describe not only
fools, but also cruel and unjust men/
30
) Izutsu in his major study of Qur'an
ethics also concurs with Goldziher's conclusions, th&tjahl is the opposite of
hilm, and not VZra.
31
) What we have is a,jahl-hilm/*ilm/safah complex.
In the second lexical sense, jahl is only equated with safah and not asso-
ciated with hilm. Edward Lane, citing the Sunnite exegete, al-Baydawi (d.
685/1286), explains the term s-f-h as 'ignorance' (jahl), or 'silliness or fool-
ishness. . . a deficiency in intellect or understanding/
32
) Ibn Manzr (d.
711/1311), the author of the authoritative Lisan al-Arab, and al-Firzbdl
(d. 817/1415), in his Qms, both support Lane's description.
33
) By now it
should be obvious that the word safah is incomprehensible without under-
standing the significance of jahl in so far as both words are crucial signifiers
in the semiotic process. In other words, changes in the signification ofj-h-l,
or its antonym h-l-m, will inevitably affect the meaning of s-f-h, a chain of
consequences that extends well beyond the limits of a single text or corpus
of wording. This illustrates the effect of intertextuality. What also becomes
apparent is that for some time the discriptions of safah was semiotically re-
29
) 1 am uncomfortable with Goldziher's rigid distinction between primary and
secondary uses of the word *Hm. Meaning is more the product of context and sense of
the user. A multi-valenced word like jahl proves the point. In which sense does safa-
hah occur in Zuhayr ibn AbT AslainT's line in the Mu'allaqah when he says: wa inna
safhat al-sJiaykh la hilm badahu, wa inna al fata bada al-safahah yahlumu ('An
old man's ignorance/barbarity cannot be cured, while an ignorant/untamed youth
can be educated/civilized').
30
) GOLDZIHER, op. cit.
31
) TOSHIHIKO IZUTSU, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Koran (Montreal: McGill
University Press, 1966), 28. Izutsu makes an interesting observation when he says
that hilm is the moral reasonableness of a civilized man. Add power to this definition
and it suggests 'the subject's clear consciousness of power and superiority.'
32
) LANE, 1:1377.
33
) Abu Thir Muhammad ibn YA'QB AL-FlRzBDi, Al-Qms al-Muhit, (Da-
mascus: Maktabah al-Nriyyah, n. d.), iv, 285; Abu VFadl Muhammad ibn Mukar-
ram al-IfriqT, Lisan al-Arab, (Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, n. d.) iii, 2032-2034; Murtad
al-Zabidi, Tj al-Arus (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr, n. d.), ix, 390-91.
10 Ebrahim Moosa
lated to jahl and its antonym hilm. But we notice that the link between jahl
and hilm was severed in the later descriptions or heteroglossia of the word.
This semiotic suppression in the meaning of jahl resulted in it being used
more frequently in Goldziher's secondary sense, as meaning the opposite
of'ilm. These unmistakeable semiotic processes in the heteroglossia of the
jahl-hum film/safah complex shows that the pre-Islamic ethical quality of
hilm is gradually sanitized from the semiotic complex. There is an uncanny
serendipity in the refiguration ofthejahl-hilm/'ilm complex, that coincides
with the observed refiguration of safah. In Bakhtin's terms it means that
the dialogue had been reduced to a linguistic monologue.
The semiotics of al-Tabari and al-Razi
In their respective commentaries, al-Taban and al-RzT take refuge in
lexical, semantic and philological arguments in order to support their re-
spective hermeneutical positions.
34
) First they provide a standard lexical
definition of the word safah, as al-jahil al-dcftf al-ray, 'the ignorant and
weak in opinion.
5
The thrust of this meaning is that a safth is one who has
insufficient knowledge to distinguish between what is harmful and benefi-
cial. Al-Taban adds that it was for
this reason that Allah, mighty and sublime be He, called women and children
sufaha ... The majority of interpreters say they [the sufah
9
] are women and
children... because they cannot distinguish between the opportunities of
profit and loss in the management of wealth.
35
)
Both authors make subtle alterations to the standard lexical definition
of safah when the word requires explanation in the commentary of the
Qur'an in order to realise the desired sense of differentiation at the various
instances. Al-Razi routinely describes safah as al-khiffah or khiffa
t
al-aql,
'lightness' or lightness in mind/ implying intellectual paucity
36
) They
34
) Al-Taban was probably the first commentator
c
to make extensive use of phil-
ological means for consolidating Qur'anic exegesis, nevertheless restricted the appli-
cation of this method by the principle that the results thus obtained should not con-
tradict authoritative traditional interpretations.' (L. KOPF, "Religious Influences on
Medieval Arabic Philology', in Studio,Islamica, 5 (1956), 37.)
35
) Abu Ja'far Muhammad IBN JARIR AL-TABARI, Jamial-Bayan (Beirut: Dar al-
Fikr, 1405/1984, i/1, 128.
36
) FAKHR AL-DlN AL-RAzT, Tafslr al-Kablr (Beirut: Dar Ihy* al-Turth al-
!ArabT, n. d.), (3rd ed), i/2, 68. He cites several verses by Dh '1-Rummah and Abu
Tammm al-TT where safah is used in the senseofkhiffah.
The Sufah' 11
also frequently use other terms such as nags *uqul, 'deficiency in intellect'
and da'f ahlm, 'weakness in forebearance' interchangeably to describe
safah, without consciously drawing our attention to the significant play
and variation in meaning. In a nuanced explanation al-Razi explains safah
as tasaffahu al-haqq, 'they treated the truth lightly/ jahila nafsahu,
c
he was
ignorant of the self/ and khasira nafsahu, 'he destroyed himself/
37
) Al-Ta-
barT concurred with al-RazT adding that it also meant dallah, 'deviance'.
One of the difficulties the text in question poses is the ambiguity sur-
rounding the word jahL Does al-Tabarl and al-Razi use the word jahl in
Goldziher's primary or secondary sense? Or, do they exploit the play of sig-
nification and therefore attempt to draw a reader-response? One of the key
signifiers of safah as we already know is jahl, which is the antonym oihilm.
And under more frequent Islamic use safah is the antonym of
e
ilm. In the
polysemy of jahl there are several significations. When^aAZ signifies 'feroc-
ity/ it can erase its other signification, namely 'ignorance.
5
And when the
same word signifies 'ignorance' it can suppress the meaning of 'ferocity/
Our commentators employ stylistic synonyms for emphasis and rely on cir-
cumstantial textual evidence (quarain) in their interpretation of safah in
order to effect textual closure. It is a Ibid to give prominence to jahl as being
the opposite of'Urn and in so doing give prominence to its Islamic significa-
tion, and suppress or erase the signification of the pre-Islamic hilm.
In summarising the discussion thus far, it becomes evident that safah is a
'problematic' or 'defective' sign, meaning among other things: cruelty, lack
of sophistication, lack of civility and ignorance. There is a constant sliding
of the signified under the signifier.
38
) Therefore, no constant or instant ref-
erent can be found for the word safah without carefully examining the con-
text of signification and semiosis.
39
)
37
) AL-RAZI, ii/4, 70.
38
) ROSALIND COWARD & JOHN ELLIS, Language and Materialism (New York:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), 98-99.
39
) Rippin says that the word sah is multivocal which includes the sense of 'un-
lettered, a child, women and children, or squanderers of money and corrupters of
religion', see ANDY RIPPIN, 'Ibn "Abbas's Al-Lughat fi al-Qur'an', in Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies (BSOAS), xliv/1 (1981), 23; Ibn al-'Arabi, Ah-
kam al-Qurn, Muhammad (ed.) (Cairo: Haiabi, 1968/1387), i, 249.
At this point it will be appropriate to dispense with an interesting morphological de-
bate which features in the analysis of both al-TabraT and al-Razi. Lexical and mor-
phological differences in themselves produce variant meanings. For instance it is de-
bated among Arabic grammarians whether the plural of sah, namely, sufaha is an
exclusively feminine plural, or whether the word denotes both genders.
12 Ebrahim Moosa
Who are the sufahal
The word safah and its derivatives appear eleven times in ten verses of
the Qur an. They are 2: 13, 130, 142, 282; 4: 5, 6: 140, 7:66, 67, 155 and
72 : 4. Several translators of the Qur'an have provided a uniform translation
of this word, without taking into account the polysemantic and mtiltiva-
lency of the word. It seems that the root s-f-h and its variants can for heur-
istic purposes be categorised into three broad semiotic types:
1.) to define a social and legal status;
2.) a polemical marker between believers and unbelievers;
3.) an index of a state of mind.
While these are not watertight divisions, these categories are helpful
only in so far as they are heuristic, since the various permutations of mean-
ing overlap. Perhaps the most interesting and complex interpretation of the
term sufaha
9
occurs in the exegesis of Q. 4: 5 which raises the fundamental
issues that are encountered in the uses of the word. Briefly stated, the verse
deals with the question of wealth. It reads:
And do not entrust to those who are sufaha the possessions which Allah has
placed in your charge for their support; but let them have their sustenance
therefrom, and clothe them, and speak unto them in a kindly way.
Al-Taban acknowledges that 'the interpreters differ as to who the sufa-
are, whom Allah sublime be His praise have interdicted from being
Al-Taban argues that sufaha\ is inclusive of denoting both genders. To argue to the
contrary, he believes, would be tantamount to displacing the lexical meaning. In sup-
port of his view, he states that the morphological formfuala (sing, fail), like sufah
9
,
denotes both men and women. If the word was to denote women exclusively, the
plural should have been on the form,fa*llat or, on the form/a with the s-f-h equiva-
lent being sahat or safaih. Analogous to this is the feminine singular noun gharibah,
whose plural is gharlbat or gharaib, and where the masculine singular is gharib and
the plural is the gender inclusive ghurdba, which is similar to sufaha. Another anal-
ogy to prove the case of the gender inelusiveness of saflh I sufaha, is the form *&Ziw/
'ulama, where the referent is both learned men and women.
Al-RazT disputes the claim that the plural saflhat or safaih is gender specific, espe-
cially in this case where the feminine form is used. He cites the Baghdad! grammar-
ian, Abu Ishq Ibrahim b. al-Sn al-Zujjaj (d. 311/924), who maintains that it is
grammatically correct for sufaha to be the plural ofsahah, analagous tofuqara,
as the plural offaqlrah, which means many poor women. Accordingly, al-Razi be-
lieves, that from a lexical point of view at least, sufaha
9
can mean women exclusively,
disagreeing with al-Taban.
The Sufah' 13
entrusted their property/
40
) Not surprisingly, both he and al-Razi agree
that the earliest authorities oftafslr differed widely in their interpretation
of this word. The recorded opinions surveyed by our two comentators say
the sufaha were:
1.) women exclusively
2.) children
3.) women and children
4.) anyone who lacked discretion (ag/)
1) The authorities who believed that sufaha meant women exclusively,
included the leading scholars of early Islam, such as the famous commen-
tator of the Qur'an in the first generation Ibn "Abbas (d. 68/687), the lead-
ing Companion, 'Abdullah b.
e
Umar (d. c. 73/693), the famous Basran au-
thority, al-Hasan al-Basrl (d. 110/728), the Khursiu exegete, al-Dahhak
b. Muzahim (d. 105/723) and Mujhid b. Jabr (d. 104/722), the student of
'Abdullah b. 'Abbas.
41
) Two of these, al-BasrT and al-Dahhak, are reported
to have said that women demonstrate the extreme case of safah, al-marah
asfah al-sufaha, 'the woman is the most foolish of fools/
42
) Al-Razi adds,
that the sufaha are women, irrespective whether they are spouses, mothers
or daughters, an opinion also attributed to Mujhid.
43
) Ibn TJmar was said
to have reacted very negatively when passing by a vivacious woman and
immediately expressed his disgust towards her by reciting the verse Q
4:5. This implies that the epithet sufaha
9
was a criticism of her vivacious-
ness. This view finds its origins in a hadlth (tradition) narrated by Abu
Ummah, that the Prophet was reported to have said: 'Be warned that
the fire has been created for the al-sufaha (which he repeated three times).
And beware that the sufaha are the women, except the woman who obeys
her maintainer (qayyim).'
4
*) In most cases qayyim means a husband or a
male guardian.
2) Sa'Td b. Jubayr (d. 95/713), the Kfan scholar killed by al-Hajjaj b.
Yusuf al-Thaqafi (d. 96/714), and another view attributed to al-Hasan
al-BasrT, suggest that children are the sufaha'. Apparently Ibn Jubayr
stressed that the term specifically meant orphans al-yatama. Al-Razi at-
tributes this view to Ibn Shihb al-Zuhrl (d. 124/742) and Ibn Zayd (d. c.
145/762). The assumption Underlying this view is that entrusting wealth
(qiyam) required for the maintenance of the household to a child could
40
) AL-TABARI, iii/4, 245.
41
) AL-TABARI, iii/4, 246.
42
) A.-TABARI, iii/4, 246.
43
) See AL-TABARI, iii/4, 247 for the view of MUJHID.
**) AL-RAZI, v/9, 175.
14 Ebrahim Moosa
only spell disaster, since in all probabilities the wealth would be squan-
dered.
3) That the word sufaha refer to both women and children are views at-
tributed again to Sa"Td b. Jubayr, al-Hasan al-BasrT, as well as the Kufan ex-
egete al-Suddl (d. 128/745), and Muj hid. Qat dah b. Diamah (d. 117/735)
believes that sufaha refers to a woman or a youth (al-ghulam al-saflh) "the
weakminded youth/ Al-RazT concurs, adding that if a man knows his wife or
child is a safth, he should under no circumstances entrust them with his
wealth. The inference to be drawn is that theoretically it is possible to
find a woman and child who is not a sa h. The commentators probably
wished to exclude certain prominent women, possibly the Prophet's wives
and his grandchildren from the general domain safah. In a slightly differ-
ent view of Abu Malik,
45
) Ibn "Abbas, Abu Musa al-Asharl (d. 42/662) and
Ibn Zayd are reported to be of the opinion that sufaha
9
refers to the son
of a man walad al-rajuL A report from al-Dahh k says that a woman
and a boy are as extreme a case ofsafah one can find and they would dom-
inate men if entrusted with wealth.
46
)
4) Without citing any ancient authorities, al-RazI cites a view which sug-
gests that sufaha refers to anyone who lacks the intelligence, *aql, to protect
and manage property. This may apply to women, children, orphans and all
other persons who fit the description ofsafah. The most glaring ommission
on the part of al-Razi is his failure to explicitly state that male believers
could also be among the sufaha'.
Interpreting the traditional views
The divergent opinions regarding a single word leaves very little room
for doubt that safah had a series of significations. Al-Tabarl meticulously
recorded the variant and contradictory opinions of the word safah and
with greater detail than al-Razi. Nevertheless, we will soon note how al-Ta-
barl forcefully and systematically refutes each variant meaning in order to
45
) It is difficult to identify this Abu Malik. Al-Dhahabi in his Siyar alwm al-Nu-
bala, Shuayb al-Arna* t (ed.) (Beirut: Mu'assasah al-Risalah, 1990/1410), vi, 184,
identifies the older figure as Abu Malik al-AshjaX whose proper name is Sa
e
d b. T riq
b. Ashyam without providing a date of death. Sufy n al-Thawn is said to have re-
ported hadith from him. The other Abu Malik al-AshjaX also identified by al-Dha-
habi, is identified as Hamm d bin Malik (Siyar x, 416). He is described as the
'aged traditionist' who died in 228/842.
46
) -, iii/4, 245, 247.
The Sufah* 15
eliminate the dialogue of discourses into a monologue of stabilized mean-
ing. He does so on the grounds of the accepted canons of Quran interpre-
tation, usul al-tafslr, as well as linguistic opinions. He first gives the im-
pression that he will retain semiotic variety by stating that God did not
specify some categories of safah to the exclusion of other types. But that
statement is only useful to the extent that it refutes the claim that safah
is age and gender specific. Al-RazT also turns to the rules of interpretation
and asserts that his preferred (awla) view was that anyone who lacked
discretion was a saflh. His tour de force is the principle which says, that
'specification without a proof is not permissible,' al-takhsls bi-ghayr
dalll la yajuz.
47
)
Al-Razi recognizes that the sign sufaha is used variously, referring to
what can be called an 'insider
5
and 'outsider.
5
The 'insider' can be believ-
ers/males and the Outsiders' can be unbelievers/females. While applies to
both the word insiders and outsiders, it is never wholly present in one cate-
gory and continues to shift along the two semiotic bridges. On the one
hand, it separates believers from sinners, hypocrites, unbelievers, polythe-
ists, Jews and Christians. On the other hand, it also serves as a polemical
marker to differentiate gender (men and women), age (adults and children),
mental disability, (retarded or weak persons) status (orphans and non-or-
phans). Given this semiotic instability or polysemy, al-Razi generates a
core exegetical and referential meaning for safah to which he constantly re-
fers in order to overcome the problem of shifting referents. In his view safah
is the lexical equivalent to khiffah^ meaning 'lightness' and 'insignifi-
cance.'
48
) One diminishes in stature to that of&safih when unable to distin-
guish between the beneficial and harmful.
49
) Al-Razi illustrates his point
further, adding that Arabs consider a foul-mouthed person also to be a
saflh. This is because such a speaker lacks dignified poise and self-compo-
sure.
50
) He cites a statement by the Prophet who is reported to have said:
47
) AL-RAZI, v/9, 185. From the point of view of law (fiqh), our commentators be-
lieve safah is an attribute (was/) and thus contingent and not gender specific. In
terms offiqh guardians are not allowed to transfer wealth to persons who deserve
to be legally interdicted, mustahaqq al^hajar, be they male or female, since they
lack the discretion to manage money. However, al-TabarT reaches a conclusion simi-
lar to the Kufan jurist, Abu Hamfah (d. 150/767) that it is not possible to interdict a
person who had reached puberty (bulugh) or the age of discretion (rushd) (see al-Ta-
barT iii/4, 247 and al-Razi, v/9, 183, ii/3, 248).
48
) AL-RAZI, i/2, 68.
49
) AL-RAZT, ii/4, 91.
50
) AL-RAZI, i/2, 68.
16 Ebrahim Moosa
'the one who drinks wine is a sah.'
51
) Again the point is made that such a
person is 'weak' and 'light' in mind by succumbing to a moral failing result-
ing in a temporary mental lapse. Having stabilised the meaning of the term
around 'weakness' and 'lightness
5
, al-RazI believes he had fulfilled his func-
tion as a mufassir.
Take the case of Q 2 : 13 and Q 2 : 142 where the word sufaha is used as a
polemical marker between two hostile groups: the believers and their oppo-
nents. In 2: 13 the Qur'an records the mocking remarks made by the
Prophet's opponents, the hypocrites, munafiqn, who said:
And when they (the unbelievers and hypocrites) are told: "Believe as other peo-
ple believe!" They answer: "Shall we believe as the sufah
9
believe?"
To which Allah replied:
Oh, verily, it is they, they who are the sufah
9
, but they know it not.
Al-RazT explains that the polemic at 2 : 13 is underpinned by a difference
in social status between hypocrites and believers. The hypocrites looked
down upon the believers as sufaha
9
, because they viewed themselves as 'peo-
ple of leadership and consequence,' ahl al-khatar wa
9
l-ri
9
asah. The reality
was that the majority of believers were materially poor (fuqar
9
), and nu-
merically few. The hypocrites in comparing their good fortune to the rela-
tive poverty of the believers, were in no doubt that Muhammad's faith
(din) was void and baseless (batil), and only s,sah could take it seriously.
Here the elliptical signifier of wealth and social status seems to inform
the semantic and symbolic use ofsafah.
According to al-RazT there is a rational reason for the inversion of the
sign sufaha
9
, from the believers to the unbelievers in the second part of
2 : 13. Whoever ignored rational proof (dalll) in the pursuit of truth (i.e. Is-
lam) is incontrovertibly a sah. And, if the latter acused an adherent of ra-
tional proof (a believer) ofsafhah, then such a person is even more deserv-
ing of being called a sahl Elaborating his argument, al-RazI says, that a
person who trades the hereafter for the gain of the temporal world and dis-
plays enmity towards Muhammad is beyond doubt a sah.
52
) A close read-
51
) Sah is also used to describe someone who drinks wine, a sinner or a foul-
mouthed person. These are not obscure uses that are hidden in ancient tafslr texts.
See FISCHER & ABEDI Debating Muslims, 146, who discuss the writings of the modern
Iranian marja-e taqlld, Gholzadeh GhafurT, who uses the word sah to describe
opponents of the Islamic revolution and plays 'rhetorical games with terms used to
identify the Shah and his supporters/
52
) AL-RAZI, i/2, 68.
The Sufah' 17
ing of al-Rzi's interpretation of the term safah reveals another exegetical
shift. It will be noted that earlier he said an inability to administer material
wealth constituted safahah. But now the word also includes a metaphysical
and spiritual sense. He goes on to explain that the real distinction between a
saflh and a non-saflh is actually those who follow rational proof (by impli-
cation belief in the eternity of the hereafter and a search for truth) and
those who oppose all such values. Al-Razi arrives at this conclusion by draw-
ing a direct analogy between 'insiders' and 'outsiders
5
and privileging the
'insiders.' Safah when used with reference to believers denotes a state of
mind, but when used with reference to unbelievers it denotes spiritual igno-
rance an inferior status. He transposes this meaning without the media-
tion of any other visible signifier. So while additional signifiers may not
have been present as a lexical item, their effects can be traced through
what Derrida would call the logic of displacement or supplementr!ty
that everywhere governs the text.
53
) For this to happen we have to suspend
those structured oppositions of (inside/outside, present/absent) which de-
fine or delimit the operations of textual commentary. Only by suspending
these oppositions can al-Razi's interpretive switch in meaning be ade-
quately explained in terms of the logic of supplementarity The logic of sup-
plementation reveals an inherent lack in the believer which must be com-
pleted - supplemented by spiritual perfection if he/she is to be truly him-
self/herself.
At 2 : 142 the Qur'an anticipates criticism from the Prophet's adversar-
ies for changing the direction of prayer (qiblah) from Jerusalem to Makkah.
Taking the initiative to denounce the adversaries, Q. 2 : 142 reads:
The sufaha among the people will say: "What has turned them away from the
direction of prayer which they have hitherto observed? . .
Here the Qur'n describes the Madman adversaries of the Prophet, the
munafiqun and Jews in particular, as sufaha,
9
.
5
*) In this instance sufaha
9
does
53
) CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, Derrida (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
1987), 43.
54
) According to the earliest exegetical authorities sufaha
9
in Q. 2 : 142 was used
to denote several types of people. It meant 1) the Jews, in an opinion attributed to
Ibn 'Abbas and Mujhid; 2) the Arab polytheists, in another view of Ibn 'Abbas,
which is also attributed to al-Barra' bin zib (d. 72/691), the one-time Mu'tazilite,
Abu Bakr !Abd al-Rahman al-Asamm (d. circa 200-201/815-817) and al-Hasan al-
BasrT; 3) the hypocrites, says al-SuddT; 4) according to an anonymous view, most
likely to be al-RazT's personal view, the word includes everyone who rejects the truth
(al-kuffar). According to al-RazT, there is sufficient evidence of a rational (*aql) and
18 Ebrahim Moosa
not mean 'foolish/ but in terms of the chain of significations it resonates
spiritual ignorance and moral bankruptcy. Again the meaning shifts. It is
not the improper management of health that renders one a safih, but adult
male actors are also identified in the polemic, namely Jews and hypocrites.
So the signifier substitutes itself, to also signify spirituality. This is best il-
lustrated in al-Rzf s own words, when he privileges the notion of spiritual
bankruptcy above the other meanings he previously claimed safah had
meant.
Error in matters of faith (din), is much more harmful than when it occurs in
temporal affairs. Thus, if someone deviates from clear arid obvious perspec-
tive in worldly matters, such a person would be called a saflh. Hence, one who
errs in matters of faith is aposteori (awla) deserving of this term. Every denier
of the truth^ kfir is also a safih.
55
)
The above reading of al-Razi is the product of what Norris terms a 'sup-
plementary' order of necessity which requires that one looks beyond the lex-
ical system to the various sub-units that enter the chain of substitutions.
For al-Tabarl, the preponderant meaning at 2 : 142 is 'ignorance
5
, al-juhhat
min -ns. God called them by that name because their 'judgement of the
truth is safah,' i.e. 'deviant
3
as a result of their 'ignorance of the truth
5
(sa-
fah al-haqq).
56
)
A similar polemical exchange takes place between the Prophet Hud and
his opponents where safah is used pejoratively in order to discredit the Mes-
senger of God, but is simultaneously also used in the counter-ideological dis-
course of God and the good people the Prophet Hd and his followers.
Thus 7 : 66-67 reads:
Said the great ones among his people, who refused to acknowledge the truth:
"Verily we see you [Hud] to be affected by safahah\ and verily, we think that
you are a liar!" Said [Hd]: "Oh my people! I am not afflicted by safhah,
[as you allege] to the contrary, I am an apostle from the Sustainer of the
worlds..."
textual (nass) nature available to support the lastmentioned viewpoint since the
verse in question is general (omw). He makes this point by approving the view of
al-Qdi !Abd al-Jabbr (d. 415/1024), the famous Mu'tazili thinker and qadi al-qudat
of Rayy. (Also see J. JOMIER^ "The Quranic Commentary of Imam Fakhr al-Dm al-
RazT: Its Sources and Originality," in International Congress for the Study of the
Quran, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1980), 103.)
55
) AL-RAZI, ii/4, 91.
56
) AL-TABARI, ii/2, 1.
The Sufah' 19
Al-TabarT interprets safha here as 'deviancy' (dalalah). The opponents
of Hud accused him of deviating from their truth, the faith of their ances-
tors and community. Hud's reply recognizes the signification of safahah,
as deviancy when he responds: Oh my people: I am not deviant, laysa bl sa-
fhah [to the contrary] I am a apostle the Sustainer of all the worlds/ At this
point al-RazTis brief in suggesting that by now the meaning oisafah is fairly
obvious, a type of vraisemblable, provided one employs the interpretive key
in contrasting safhah with *ilm.
57
)
The verse 2 : 130 seems to fit my description of where safah implies a
state of mind or consciousness. The context is where those who 'ignored/
'deviated' or 'failed to understand' the creed of Abraham are accused of sa-
fah. Al-RazT says the verb s-f-h, normally considered to be intransitive, can
be used as transitive according to the Basran grammarian, al-Mubarrad (d.
286/899) in order to express more functions. Given this view, the words
saflha nafsahu, means to 'despise and revile the self signifying, khiffah,
'lightness.'
58
) He supports his case from a hadlth usage in which arrogance
al-kibr is explained, as tasaffaha al-haqq 'treated the truth lightly.'
59
) An
intelligent person (al-aqil) will not treat the truth lightly, says al-RazT.
He adds the view of al-Hasan al-BasrT who says the safiha nafsahu, means
jahila nafsahu, 'self-ignorance,' and khasira nafsahu, 'self-destruction'.
60
)
Two other levels of meaning suggest it means to 'ruin the self and 'misguide
the self.'
Al-TabarT remains committed to his core meaning of equating safah with
jahl, commenting that only a saflh can forego good fortune by not recogniz-
ing what is beneficial and harmful and making a poor judgement. According
to this interpreation, all those who have not accepted the Abrahamic creed
are sufaha. Since the Jews and Christians have partly deviated from the
Abrahamic creed and the pagan Arabs had totally strayed, the implication
is that all Other', except Muslims (males?) are afflicted with safah to some
degree. In other words it implies spiritual inferiority
The practice of female infanticide in pre-Islamic times is described in the
Qur'n as safah*
n
at Q. 6 : 140. Al-RazT believes that only the word safah can
adequately describe the type of mind which could contemplate such an hei-
nous deed.
61
) Only an impulse based on a fancy (mawhum) and an erroneous
belief can justify the killing of new-born children believing that an increase
57
) AL-RAZT, vii/14, 155-156.
58
) AL-RZI, ii/4, 70.
59
) AL-RAzT, ii/4, 70.
60
) AL-RAZI, ii/4, 70.
61
) AL-RAzT, vii/13, 209.
20 Ebrahim Moosa
in dependants, especially female children, would aggravate existing condi-
tions of poverty. This type of speculation is a reflex of safah equal only to
jahl, which indicates a state of mind. Al-TabarT, in turn, describes killing
children as being in a state of safah, an act of 'ignorance and a defective in-
tellect
3
(naqs 'uqul) and a 'weakness of forebearance,' (dafahlam).^
2
) Here
the term Mlm is still employed but slides under the signifier, 'intellect.
5
In Q. 7 : 155, Moses invokes God's mercy not to punish the Israelites for
the crimes committed by the sufaha among them for engaging in calf-wor-
ship.
63
) Both exegetes are extremely brief here. Al-Tabari finds sufficient ar-
guments in the opinions of the early exegetes to identify the sufaha with the
calf-worshippers. Al-RazT comments that only an imperfect mind can en-
gage in calf-worship.
64
)
The same is the case with 72 : 4.
65
) Here the jinn acknowledge that the
sah among them said Outrageous things about God/ Al-Tabari cites the
traditional opinion of Mujhid and Qatdah which assert that the sah is
the Iblls (Satan). Qatdah adds an interesting note to his interpretation.
Just as Satan (sah al-jinn) refused to bow to Adam in disobedience to
God, so did Adam (sah al-jinn) also disobey God by eating of the forbidden
tree. The implication of this interpretation is that, even Adam the first hu-
man prototype and Prophet in Muslim belief, was thus a sah. Adam ex-
perienced temporary safah since he returned to obedience after repentance.
It is clear that the thrust of the meaning of sh in this instance is one of
'deviance' or 'spiritual depravity' since Iblis is the archetype of deviance
and depravity.
Al-RazT opines that the outrageous statements, shatat, made by the jinn
(sah) means 'to transgrees or go beyond the limits,' committing injustice
(zulm).^
6
) Here again the recurring theme is that the quality of safah by its
very nature is prone to immoderation and excess (fart) according to al-
RazT.
67
) While on the theme of transgression and injustice, al-RazI points
out that a major sinner (fsiq) is also called a sah, because of his spiritual
and moral fickleness or lightness. There is a semiotic relation between the
denotation and the sign. It means that a sinner 'does not carry any weight
in the eyes of people of faith and knowledge'.
68
) This explanation fits with
62
) AL-TABARI, v/8, 51.
63
) AL-TABARI, v/9, 76.
*) AL-RAZI, viii/15, 17-18.
65
) AL-TABART, xiv/29, 107-108.
66
) AL-RAZI, xv/30, 155.
6T
) AL-RAZI, xv/30, 155.
68
) AL-RAZT, v/9, 185.
The Sufah' 21
the first part of the hadtth narrated by Abu Umarnah which states that hell-
fire will be filled with sufah
9
. Here safah is deemed to be a state of sin or de-
viancy, where sufah
9
is the equivalent of 'sinners
5
.
69
) It is interesting to note
how the use of the term progresses from originally being used to denote a
meaning of a conventional type, the fickleness of women, then it is used
to describe a biological state of mental incapacity in the legal sense, and fur-
ther employed to describe a spiritual state of affairs.
Re-Reading the Texts
It is just not sufficient to deconstruct the text without positing another
reading. In order to achieve this, genealogical social analysis is a useful
method to uncover the social processes concealed by hegemonic essentialist
discourses and to implicate these discourses in those formative social pro-
cesses.
70
) The word sufaha
9
as we observed occupies a position of tactical
polyvalence and refuses to adhere to a one-to-one (isomorphic) correspond-
ence to reality. Despite the claim by our commentators to return the term
s-f-h to an 'original or 'prior' meaning, ranging from ignorance to deviance,
we find that on closer examination the word declines to be subjected to fixed
referential value. Sufah
9
do not pertain to a world of things, but to that of
an idea, a concept. As signs they are complex enough in the sense that they
need not designate one meaning only, but that it equally signifies larger re-
alities outside its ostensible content. In other words, when the word sufah
9
or its derivatives are used, a iterability the readiness to be grafted into new
and unforeseeable contexts is an important feature. Each repetition occurs
in a new context. No meaning is ever the same and no sign is identically re-
peated.
Two motifs constantly recur in our analysis of sufah
9
: wealth and the
trait of femininity. We are indeed indebted to the commentators of Qur'an
literature for reproducing their archival sources in the commentaries which
make it possible for later readers to construct new readings. Al-Razi, for ex-
ample, is the only one who constructs a hermeneutic that relates the concept
of safah with wealth and material exchange. He does so when he meditates
69
) Al-Razi's discussion is also edifying in so far that he enlightens us about an-
other term nqis al-aql, which is synonymous to safth and often employed to refer to
women in hadlth literature.
70
) STEVEN SEIDMAN, 'Theory as Narrative with Moral Intent/ in Postmodernism
and Social Theory, Steven Seidman & David G. Wagner (eds.) (Cambridge, Mass &
Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 70.
22 Ebrahim Moosa
on Q. 4: 5 and 2 : 282 and shares his philosophical insights on these verses.
71
)
It relates to the way Islam had moderated the unbounded and excessive
generosity of thejhifyyah.
72
) In terms of the Quran, neither thoughtless
generosity nor debilitating niggardliness was acceptable. In the new urban
context of Makkah, and later in Madmahj wealth became an important sta-
tus symbol within the mercantile community. This can be gleaned from the
Qur'n where the re-distribution of wealth as a form of self-sacrifice is end-
lessly encouraged. The shift is towards moderate financial behaviour in-
stead of the extravagant generosity of pre-Islamic times.
73
)
The literary record of jahiliyyah poetry informs us that the excessive,
and at times, thoughtless generosity of pre-Islamic Arab men was the sub-
ject of criticism and chastizement by their wives. Al-Hufi's collection of pre-
Islamic poetry depicting the image of women during pre-Islamie times di-
rects us to another important insight in our reading ofsufaha
9
.
7
*) It appears
71
) This verse prescribes the rules for commercial transactions and reads: 'And if
he who contracts the debt is a safih or dalf, and is not able to dictate himself, then let
him who watches over his interests dictate equitably' (Q. 2 : 282). Al-Tabari says it
means the person is capable of verbally dictating the terms of a future credit con-
tract, excluding thereby mute or illiterate person. But the person in question re-
mains incapable of making a mental distinction between a correct dictation and
an incorrect one. The general tenor of the verse suggests that it includes anyone
who is incapable of dictating a contract properly, .al-jhil bi
9
l-iml
9
, irrespective
whether such a person is a minor or major, male or female (al-Tabari, iii/3, 122).
Al-RazT explains scuflh here to mean a lack of intelligence (*aql) that would in common
parlance be known as a lack of common sense, despite having reached the legal age of
puberty (al-Razi, vii, 112).
72
) IZUTSU, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Quran, 80-81.
73
) Al-Razfs parenthetic explanation of wealth is a valuable insight into the
moral-economic elan of the Qur'an, which has gained very little attention of scholars.
The need for wealth, he argues, is imperative. He believes that as long as an individ-
ual does not have leisure and self-sufficiency (farigh al-bal), it is not possible to attain
the ends of moral good in this world and felicity in the hereafter. Self-sufficiency can-
not be attained without wealth which enables one to derive benefit from what is good
and avoid that which is harmful. Whoever, approaches the world as a means to an
end, would find happiness in the afterlife. If the world is approached as an end in it-
self, it becomes the greatest obstacle to success in the afterlife. Al-Razfs under-
standing of wealth and material gains and its relationship to salvation underscores
the new social and economic patterning which was operative in Makkah and MadT-
nah during nascent Islam.
74
) AHMAD MUHAMMAD AL-HuFf, al-Hayat al-Arabiyyah min *l-Shi
e
r al-Jahili,
(Cairo: Maktabah Nahdat Misr, 1962/1382), 322-238; also see AHMAD MUHAMMAD
AL-HFT, al-Mardh
9
Shi*r al-Jahiti (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 1382/1963),
The Sufah' 23
that the wives were frustrated with their spouses' indiscriminate spending
habits and excessive acts of generosity. It is in that context that the 'nagging
wives' accused their husbands of being safahl Many a husband, like the leg-
endary figure of Arab generosity and hospitality in the second half of the
sixth century, Htim al-TX was said to have divorced his wife for her criti-
cism of his extravagant habits of generosity and hospitality
75
) What is not
mentioned in the tafslr literature is that pre-Islamic women thought that
their spendthrift husbands were unable to manage wealth properly sufa-
ha. In turn, the husbands projected the charge on women accusing them
of being niggardly and extremely uncharitable. The men at the time
made the point by saying that women lacked the intelligence to comprehend
(nqisat al-aql) the social rewards and status associated with their acts of
indulgent generosity. From the male view, women were afflicted by safah
and were found to be lacking the standard of civility (hilm), the highest
moral value in pre-Islamic ethics. In one semiotic shift, the blame originally
placed on men is metamorphosed into blame on the women.
76
)
With the arrival of Islam, socio-economic reforms were gradual but with
a far-reaching impact on society. The prophetic reforms with regard to wo-
men were calculated and cautiously given effect. Despite the limitations of
the prophetic reforms affecting women, by today's standards, the pervasive
male chauvinism (muruwwah) of Arabia even had difficulty in coming to
terms with these minor reforms which awarded women new powers at a so-
cial and cultural level. It is also plausible, that since the male was conven-
tionally privileged to be the 'breadwinner' (qawwm/qawwamun) the oppo-
site sex was deprived of managing wealth, not by divine decree, but by social
custom. And, since male society took a dim view of womens' financial man-
agement skills, they invariably expressed their prejudice in terms of the no-
tion of safah. Thus, when the word safah was used in the Qur'an, it is not at
all surprising that the social memory of its Arab male readers denoted it as a
feminine and negative trait.
363-368; Muhammad Nabil TarTfi, "al*shi
e
r al-jahili wa qadaya al-mujtama
e
al-arabi
al-qadim" al-Turath al-Arabl, 25 & 26 (1989), 53-61.
75
) AHMAD MUHAMMAD AL-HuFi, al-Marahfl al-Shi*r al-Jahill, 363-368. Also see
C. van Arendonk, EP art. 'Hatim al-TaV for his mother Ghunayyah's extreme gen-
erosity which led to her brothers obtaining a declaring that she was incapable of
managing her affairs.
76
) See FEDWA MALTI-DOUGLAS, Woman's Body, Woman's Word: Gender and Dis-
course in Arabo-Islamic Writing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 48
53; also see FATIMA MERNISSI, Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological En-
quiry, Mary Jo Lakeland (trans.) (London: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 125-129.
24 Ebrahim Moosa
It becomes clear that the narrative language of the Qur'an relates to
some aspect of the imaginary social consciousness (cultural imaginaire) of
the Arabs. Embedded within the cultural imaginaire of the narrative are
the hidden signifiers of chauvinism, economic power and sexuality which
characterizes the discourse both metaphorically and metonymically.
77
) Un-
der the new reformist conditions of Islam, the female threat of castrating
the male was objectified as the radical Other
3
(safah). This guaranteed
and ensured her exclusion from the economic and social order by invoking
the memory of safah. With this threat in mind, one discovers in the tafslr lit-
erature examined above, that all the signifiers for safah were switched with
the view to coalesce on metaphors which were suggestive of castrating the
female intellect. Male potency, the phallic signifier, had the exclusive right
to activate meaning without threat. The female 'will to power
5
at the eco-
nomic level, whether by criticizing male extravagance in pre-Islamic times
or managing wealth according to the newly acquired rights of women in Is-
lam, generates the necessary contradiction which is essential for social ac-
tion and transformation. It is within language that these power relations
were constructed. This discourse prevails into the formative Islamic text
where it was emphasized that women were defective in intellect and discre-
tion (nqist al-aql), as reported in a statement attributed to the Prophet.
78
)
77
) COWARD & ELLIS, op. cit. 99.
78
) Some scholars argue that this hadith is fabricated, see FAZLUR RAHMAN,
c
The
Status of Women in Islam: A Modernist Interpretation/ in Separate Worlds, Hanna
Papanek & Gail Minault (eds.) (New Delhi: South Asia Books, 1982), 292. Other
scholars do not deny the veracity of this hadith but construe a different meaning
for it. See
e
ABD AL-HALIM ABU SHUQQAH, Tahrir al-Marahfl *Asr al-Risalah (Kuwayt:
Dar al-
e
llm, 1990/1410), 24-25. Given the endless polemic that this hadith generates,
I prefer to treat it as a 'text' which forms part of a larger socio-cultural tabloid of
Arab thought.
Al-RazT goes to extreme apologetics to overcome the problem of women and safah,
which seems to be embarrassing by his standards. Safah in women and children,
or even in men is not a quality of censure or derogation (dmm) he says, nor does
it imply disobedience to Allah. Such persons are called sufaha because of a natural
shallowness of intellect and an inability to discern harm from injury which render
them unfit to manage property. In other words the characterizations is not an inher-
ent feature of women. He goes on to argue that the Qur'an encouraged the protection
of property in a variety of ways, Q. 17 :27, 29; Q. 25 : 67. Al-Qadilbn al-!Arabi to the
contrary argues that safah is an attribute of derogation since the Prophet has been
reported to say that women are deficient in intellect and religion - nqist fi *aql,
nqist fi 7 din. See Muhammad b. 'Abdullah ibn aKArabl, Ahkm al-Qur'n, ! 1 Mu-
hammad al-BajawT (ed.) (Cairo: HalabT, 1968/1387), 1:318.
The Sufaha 25
Conclusion
The tafslr literature of al-Tabari and al-RazT dealing with the notion of
safah show that between the third and sixth Islamic centuries a reconfigura-
tion of social thought had occurred. The causes and the range of social forces
responsible for this change cannot be traced to micro events and are only
identifiable in broad generalisations. One of the explanations is that the Is-
lamic 'text' which was originally cast in the discourse of an Arab humanist
ethics was being reconfigured in a logocentric Islamic environment which
reached its apogee in the fifth Islamic century. Early Muslim intellectual
history was mainly cast in terms of an Arab ontology. Later a thought gravi-
tated around a triumphalist and majoritarian Muslim discourse. The under-
standings and meanings of the Qur'an gradually became sanitized of the
pre-Islamic ethos to be replaced by knowledge and epistemes framed in Is-
lamic terms.
The first and second generation Qur'an authorities made the contextual
meaning of the Arabic language the basis of understandig safah, and for
them it meant 'women.
3
In other words, the dominant contextual meaning
prevailed in the interpretation of the Qur'an. However, another shift is de-
tected, the emergence of a new 'textual
5
meaning of the Qur'n. The latter
meaning which attempted to subvert the dominant 'contextual' meaning
was not always given adequate prominence. It was commentators like al-
RazI and al-TabarT gave that prominence to the textual meaning. In terms
of the demands of their own peculiar context they suppressed certain re-
ported interpretations in order to stabilize meaning. This makes the sugges-
tion even more compelling that exegetes over the centuries suppressed or
erased various levels of signification of words and concepts. It confirms
the point made by Arkoun that in various stages of history the Qur'n was
used as & pretext and not as a text, according to our modern linguistic and his-
torical definitions. This means that the original Qur'anic text is rewritten, re-
produced within the historical development of a given community. Revelation
is represented as a substantial, unchangeable, divine reality but, at the same
time, is manipulated according to the immediate, concrete needs of the social
actors.
79
)
At the very heart of this description lies the figurative expression of fem-
ininity In chauvinistic Arabia femininity was not only abjured and rejected
79
) ARKOUN, op. cit., pp. 7778; ARKOUN,

Logocentrisme et verite religieuse
dans la pensee islamique' in Essais sur la pensee islamique (Maisonneueve & Larose,
1984), 188.
26 Ebrahim Moosa
but constituted a negative polarity in the social imaginaire. Calling women
sufaha informs us of a cultural model of behaviour which existed at the
time. We can only grasp the genesis and archaeology of this cultural behav-
iour in a partial manner s we examine the literary ruins of fading traces.
In dealing with these socio-linguistic structures the classical commenta-
tors had at least two discernable attitudes, either to remain silent or provide
a plethora of comments which render the meaning ambiguous, if not obscur-
ing it totally.
80
) When the commentators do pause to make some definitive
comment on the sufaha they often contradict each other as al-Tabarl and
al-RazT did on the strength of different philological and lexical opinions.
What this identifies is the predominant role of grammatical and semantical
explanations, which supercede the anthropological and cultural discourses
prevailing in the exegetical texts.
Our authors were fully aware of the tensions generated by conflicting
historical reports and linguistic usuages related to sufaha. By resorting
to certain principles of interpretation and axioms they believed they could
have unmediated access to truth and knowledge. Simultaneously, they
could not ignore the fact that sufaha was reported as meaning women, chil-
dren or both, and a plethora of other meanings. Despite their attempts to
re-interpret meanings they were unable to resolve the contradictions inher-
ent in their methodology. This methodology required that at least theoreti-
cally, there should be an equal commitment to transmitted knowledge
(naql) and discursive (*aql) knowledge. The episteme underpinning their
methodological grid was to generate logical consistency and epistemological
stability
81
)
But such stability is false since the semiotic process allows for the con-
tinuous desymbolization and resymbolization of signs and symbols.
82
)
The sign/symbol ofsafah is desymbolized from its original nexus and then
resymbolized into several frames of meaning. This was a practice under-
taken by the exegetes of old and will continue to be the case as long as hu-
80
) See WADAD AL-KADI, 'The Term 'Khalifa'in Early Exegetical Literature/ in
Gegenwart Als Geschichte, Axel Havemann & Baber Johansen (eds.) (Leiden: EL J.
Brill, 1988), 392-411, where early commentators are silent on key terminology.
81
) See FAZLUR RAHMAN, Islamic Methodology in History (1st edition, Islamabad:
Islamic Research Institute, 1965), 24. The thrust of Rahman's argument is that
scholars in classical Islam recognised the need for stability in the socio-religious fab-
ric and thus theorized law and its accompanying disciplines in such a manner that it
hampered creativity and originality in Muslim intellectual life.
82
) See MOHAMMED ARKOUN, 'Rethinking Islam Today, Positivism and Tradition
in an Islamic Perspective/ Diogenes, 127 (Fall 1984), 82-100.
Tin Sulahu' 27
man I MMI I U wi l l want to know. For to know i to interpret. IVrhaps Arkoun
ha.x a point when he MIVS that the reveuletl text
('imiionly anil regularly tw<l a* an i nfi ni te *;< fur the m<*ntal prnjtM-tion
all t h \ > of i M' ri i M-t exi.nl
83
) MOHAMMED ARKOUN, 'The Notion of Revelation: From AM al-Kitab to the So-
cieties of the Book/ in Gegenwart Als Geschichte, Axel Havemann & Baber Johansen
(eds.) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988)
5
77.