SOCIAL COGNITION

Judith A. Howard
Daniel G. Renfrow
DEFINING SOCIAL COGNITION
How social scientists use the concept social cognition reflects the perspectives of their varied,
relevant disciplines. Psychologists Fiske and Taylor (1991) use "social cognition" to refer to the
process whereby "people make sense of other people and themselves," whereas sociologists
move away from individualistic views of cognition and, instead, stress the social aspects of
cognition more explicitly. Howard and Hollander (1997) suggest that cognition goes beyond
intra-individual information processing; it is socially structured and transmitted, mirroring the
values and norms of the relevant society and social groups. Condor and Antaki (1997) reflect an
interdisciplinary orientation in their approach to cognition, moving away from the "mental
processing of information" and toward a definition of cognition as the "social construction of
knowledge." Borrowing from each of these traditions, we use social cognition to refer to
structures of knowledge, the interpersonal processes of knowledge creation and dissemination
(including the encoding, storage, retrieval, and activation of social information), the actual
content of this knowledge, and the shaping of each of these aspects of cognition by social forces.

ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL COGNITION
Cognitive Structures
Social information must be represented in some mental form, whether sensory, verbal, or iconic.
Social cognition emphasizes verbal representations of knowledge; it is these organized
representations that provide the basis for cognitive structures. Early forms of these structures
include beliefs, attitudes, and values. (Chapter 10 discusses these early structures in more detail.)
Contemporary views of cognitive structures follow the cognitive naiser view of the human actor,
suggesting that humans have cognitive limits. Because it is impossible to process all incoming
information in a given situation, we develop systems of categorization. Zerubavel (1996)
describes this categorization as a process of "lumping" and "splitting," where dissimilar
information is split into distinct categories and similar information is lumped together into
mental clusters. This process allows individuals to "sculpt" mental stiuctures and thereby
construct reality. Cognitive structures, thierefore, are categories into wiiich we sort incoming
information. These structures are created through multiple experiences and function as
interpretive frameworks for new information. Individuals create prototypes by synthesizing their
experiences with members of a social category into an averagealbeit abstractaccount of
characteristics associated with that particular group (Cantor & Mischel, 1979). Drawing upon the
example we use to introduce this chapter, accounts of racial profiling show how young men of
apparent Middle-Eastern descent might be considered the prototype for the larger category
"terrorist"particularly in a climate of fear perpetuated by media reports. In short, prototypes
are the central tendency of characteristics associated with members of a social group generated
from experience.
Another cognitive structure, exemplars, refers to actual cases that are representative of others
although not necessarily the perfect form. Understandings about these particular experiences are
then extended to new situations. Fiske and Taylor (1991) suggest that exemplars are better
predictors of attributions than are prototypes or schemas, because exemplars are actual instances,
not averages or ideal types. Schemas, on the other hand, act as everyday theories that shape how
people view and use information. They are both abstract cognitive structures that represent
organized knowledge about a concept or stimulus as well as mechanisms used in information
processing (DiMaggio, 1997). Schemas allow individuals to apply social knowledge and to exert
a degree of control over the social world by guiding our perceptions, memory, and inference
processes. We develop person, role, and event schemas, as well as content-free schemas, which
provide processing rules. Person schemas organize knowledge about particular individuals or
specific types of people, usually emphasizing traits or personality categories. Self-schemas, a
type of person schema garnering considerable attention in recent years, organize knowledge
about one's self. A person might be self-schematic for one trait, nationalism for instance, but
aschematic or lacking such information on another trait. Role schemas are organized knowledge
about the norms and expectations associated with particular social positions. Role schemas are
mechanisms for stereotyping and intergroup prejudice and discrimination. Consequently role
schemas have considerable sociological significance. Event schemas describe expected
sequences in routinized, everyday events such as going to the market. Lindenfield (1994)
illustrates how individuals rely on such sequences through his examination of verbal interactions
at a public market in southern California. The scheme he outlines for a typical exchange entails
three steps: an appeal or offer of service is made by the stand operator, which is followed by an
order from the customer and then compliance on the part of the seller. Event schemas such as
this one provide stage directions by designating who the actors are, what they do and when,
where they stand, and what props they use during the encounter. Like other forms of event
schemas, social scripts are organized into major scenes or subsets of actions. These lines of
action are guided by particular goals -- buying fruit at the market for instanceand thus are keys
to understanding action. Overlap and interaction among schemas are commonplace. The
situation, for example, may influence person schemas. While we may expect our elected officials
to be stubborn and uncompromising in serving their constituencies, we do not generalize these
expectations to other situationsto their intimate relationships for example. Similarly, role
schemas can shape person schemas because people rely on general expectations for particular
social roles in making attributions about particular individuals. Furthermore, correlations
between the content of different types of schemas vary depending, in part, on the salience of role
information. In the context of a predominantly White school, African American and Hispanic
students are much more likely to mention their ethnic group membership when responding to the
question: who am I? than are White students (McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978).
Social context can be tied to role salience, which in turn shapes social cognition. Out of critiques
portraying schemas as "asocial" and "decontextualized" snapshots missing historical and cultural
contexts (Augustinos & Inness, 1990), scholars have identified other more fully social cognitive
structures, such as Serge Moscovici's (1981) concept of social representations. These
representations are not just opinions or attitudes, but commonsense theories about how the world
works (Augustinos & Inness, 1990). Social representations are more social than schemas in that
they are consensual and shared, created through interaction and communication (Augustinos &
Inness, 1990), and because their contents are representations of the social world (Huguet &
Latane, 1996). Although social representations are structural elements in the cognitive systems of
individuals, the generation and communication of social representations are collective processes.
Social representations are more dynamic than schemata, being created and recreated through
social interaction. This construct blurs the division between structure and process;
representations are structures in the sense of being organized knowledge, but they are structures
in process, continually transforming some forms of information into others. Through social
representations, we make sense of the social world and communicate that sense to others. Social
representations situate individuals in material space and provide codes allowing for
communication and mastery of the social world. Unlike the more static concept schema,
representations are dynamic and gain a "life force" of their own; on occasion, however, some
representations may become reified (Augustinos & Inness, 1990). A review by Wagner et al.
(1999) illustrates how abstract processes such as conception are objectified though the use of
metaphors about gender, where sperms are personified in masculine terms (i.e., active, fast, and
dominant) and the egg in feminine terms (i.e., passive, slow, and submissive). Conception itself
remains intangible because it eludes observation, but through the use of gender stereotypes that
connect the phenomenon with preexisting cultural "knowledge," the process becomes concrete
and understandable. Martin (1991) details the use of similar metaphors about conception in
scientific texts. Her feminist critique challenges such "scientific fairy tales," pointing to the egg's
active role in conception, as well as emphasizing how naturalizing gender expectations and
imagery at the cell level can have larger social implications.
Despite increased interest in this line of research in recent yearsamong European sociologists
in particularMoscovici's theory has come under attack (Potter & Litton, 1985). Some scholars
question the concept of social representations itself, claiming it is far too vague to be useful.
Augustinos and Inness (1990) suggest positivists also question Moscovici's laissez faire attitude
toward research methodologies. Other criticisms concern the idea of consensus: How much
variation is allowed, and how are groups distinguished from one another? Recent work by
Huguet and Latane (1996) uses dynamic social impact theory to address these criticisms by
specifying a mechanism for the spread and endurance of representations. They outline criteria for
deciding whether or not a representation is shared, specifying when a group exists and indicating
how disagreement and variation can fit into the social representation model. Nevertheless, the
insistence of this concept on the significance of social interaction for the creation and
transmission of cultural concepts is a major contribution to a sociological understanding of
cognition.


Cognitive Processes
Cognitive processes rely upon organized knowledge, in the form of cognitive structures.
Contemporary social psychologists' focus on cognitive processes, in part, has been due to
technological advancements, which allow scientists to use computer simulations as a means of
manipulating and understanding thought processes within the laboratory (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).
More recent work on cognitive processes also relies on alternative methods such as motivated
ethnography, interviews, focus groups, content analysis, and questionnaires to specify how social
information is cognitively processed in real-world contexts (Wagner et al., 1999). Information
processing begins when some object, whether from the environment or the contents of our mind,
becomes the focus of our attention. At this point, we select, identify, categorize, and assign
meaning to the stimulus. While some object may capture our attention, the intensity of this focus
varies across situations. Numerous stimuli compete for our attention at all times. We consciously
decide what to attend to in some situations, but usually this occurs without conscious control on
our part. Here, the pivotal issue becomes how we select what to attend to and what to ignore.
Contextual conditions may influence what we attend to. Salient stimulithat is, those that stand
out vis-i-vis othersare more likely to capture our attention. Visual characteristics, for example,
may enhance the salience of a stimulus. A single white cloud in an otherwise empty, blue sky is
likely to capture and hold our attention. Salience within social interactions, however, tends to
depend on the social meaning attached to a particular trait. For instance. Secretary of State Colin
Powell has garnered national attention because he is the first African American to be appointed
to such an office in U.S. government. Salience, as this example shows, may be achieved by
contrasting group membershipsthat is, being African American in a predominantly White
polity. Similarly, actions that contradict those we expect tend to be more salient than more
normative actions. Charges that former President Clinton engaged in extra-marital relations with
a White House intern caused a media sensation and non-partisan outrage, prompting much public
discussion on the moral responsibilities of the Commander in Chief. When our expectations for
actors in particular social roles are not met, such instances attract and hold our attention.
Accessibility of cognitive structures, the potential of available knowledge to be activated
(Higgins, 2000), also influences our attention. Knowledge we engage with frequently is more
accessible and thus more likely to be brought to our attention. Recently activated ideas show
similar patterns. Through priming, socially significant categories influence social inferences.
Using two similar studies. Levy (1996) primed negative and positive stereotypes about aging in
an elderly sample. Those exposed to positive stereotypes performed better during memory
exercises and displayed more positive views about aging and about self-efficacy compared to
those primed with more negative attitudes. A follow-up study using a younger sample did not
find similar patterns, suggesting that for this effect to hold, ideas about aging must be important
to the individual's self-concept. Similarly, Gorham (1999) examines the influence of priming on
racial stereotypes, finding that the process of priming makes the content of stereotypes available
for future processing, which influences cognitive processes whether or not we believe the
preconception. The effects of priming, therefore, may have real-world consequences.
Information about the social world is stored in memory and is available to be retrieved and used
for future cognitive inferences. When we recall this information, we activate knowledge stored in
our long-term memory and bring it into short-term memory, where we consciously attend to it.
Mental schemas are relevant to memory in various ways: individuals recall information encoded
into schemata quickly and accurately; information is recalled better when it is relevant to
preexisting theories; and people may also falsely remember information relevant to schemas
(DiMaggio, 1997). Because of this tendency to recall inaccurate information, assessing cognitive
accuracy remains a major preoccupation of memory researchers. Information recall, however,
improves when the reason for encoding and retrieving the information is more engaging and
significant, when one empathizes with another and when one anticipates future interaction with
others, pointing both to the importance of affect for understanding memory and to social
influences on memory. As with attention, studies illustrate how social context shapes human
memory and how cognitive structures influence this process. C. Cohen (1981), for example,
exposed subjects to a short video of a woman having a birthday dinner with her husband. When
asked questions about the tape, subjects who thought the woman was a waitress remembered
details consistent with her being a waitress, whereas subjects who were told she was a librarian
later recalled details more consistent with stereotypes about librarians. Memory was
supplemented by role schemas in both cases; even though details were not shown in the
videotape, absent information was created and then "remembered" in light of existing schemas,
suggesting how cognitive structures may influence recall. Similarly, social roles influence
memory. Memory models, for the most part, focus on intra-individual storage of information.
Wegner (1986), however, outlines how members of social groups divide cognitive labor,
allocating information among members of a social group. Taken together, these studies point to
how cognitive structures influence the encoding of social information and the retrieval of this
information from memory, as individuals or as groups.