Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted
and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's
fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs
awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka
na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano
ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon

ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang
babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to
10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi
ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your
own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply
alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala
mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano
ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo
ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka
puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin,
dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas
ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation
was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October
6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act
No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named
accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record
the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the
said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said
recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court
granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under
R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a
personother than a participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which
forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order
of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In
thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an
offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200
does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the
provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in
the communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be
alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally,
petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and
that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said
act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to
only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties
to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes
no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another
without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in
enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not
appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but
by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but
would cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties
because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act
may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your
Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as
evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken
without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of
one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If
the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors
where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair
that the people whose remarks and observations are being made should know that the observations
are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed
that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand.
Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he
cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and
remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing
that what is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now
worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1?
Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person not between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the
Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to
penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need
not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation
that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before
the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the
nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The
word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act
of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared
between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are
broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts"
which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase
"private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication"
were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being
overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact
that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose.
Freeconversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and
the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to
the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution.
Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature
of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to
be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals free from
every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held
that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did
not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)"
enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a
violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin Saldivar would mean
the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
(GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was
Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts worth thousands
of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The report
dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that
Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A.
Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended
by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for
his own personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The
airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar. 1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company reglations by
involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a
witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of
the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent Salazar under
preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to,
explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private
respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include
illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in
writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and
disprove these findings. 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to reinstate
private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would
have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral
damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned resolution dated December
29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited the
backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral damages. 4

Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two
(2) years' backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his position as
technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee closely, associated with
Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning
unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension
was the proper remedial recourse available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive
suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to
answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending
investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. 5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due process when she was
promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum of
October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly
to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to
evaluate her side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual separation from
employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has not merely lost
her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not to be deprived without due
process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to her during the period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who
is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employments, the employer shall not terminate
the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when
authorized by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has gone further than the
1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor.
Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it
was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other
things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good."8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social

Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and
Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and Human Rights. 9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits is
may be provided by law. 10 (Emphasis supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an Declaration of
Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall ensure the rights of workers to selforganization, collective baegaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
The State may provide for compulsory arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the State is mandated to
protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the present Constitution was to give
primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least greater protection than heretofore
accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of the workers and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially contributed to the
present formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on
Social Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light of the special
importance that we are giving now to social justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social
justice in national development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution and the Labor Code,
it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized cause
provided by law has assumed greater importance under the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor
enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor
Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved
employee, or on the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of
dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find, application. Consonant with this
liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took
effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have
generated which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the
dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full
backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages is, in the
former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the
word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc. from which one had been removed" 15 and in the
latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past,
would perforce make her "whole."

Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not been forthcoming and the
hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts of the
case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time
(22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's
interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the
parties involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will
not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score unjust
or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or
"strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation pay 23 or solely
separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of the Labor Code is
clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . .
and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plainmeaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on
the valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and
preclude the court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words,
to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. 27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does
the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for nonapplication of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be
inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and
confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be
generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where the employee is a
Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is the
Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an organizer of a union who was in a
position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is
a warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts.
by foreign individuals and organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement can
never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation.
That is human nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right; otherwise an employee
who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the
pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that may be
characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations
between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rule mandating
reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.

On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in transactions that may have created
conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its
employees from involving themselves with any company that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently,
when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which
in turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable position as far as
petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not create a conflict of
interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the procurement of
supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis.
In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and
company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we have held
countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an some
basis which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed on mere presumptions and
suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it
"presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's
investigation although unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone
the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from
speculative inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because the bulk of the
findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations'
support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar
might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private
respondent is wanting from the records.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already resigned from GMCR on
May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained
obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged culpability of
Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination
should have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar
answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been
unlawfully dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated December
29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and
to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years only.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., concurs in the result.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994
FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice, respondent.
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which among other
things provides compensation for persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are
acquitted and ordered released.
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of
two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and
his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was
apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to
imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment, however, as the appeal of
the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon
as the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the
appellate court ruled that because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was
insufficient to show conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment
of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by
virtue of a judgment of acquittal." 1 The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but
the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to
find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as
a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that
he was "probably guilty."
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice in his resolution
dated March 11, 1993:
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted and
imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly accused
and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making him "a victim of unjust
imprisonment." In the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim
since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on his
innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.

Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309, however, provides
for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the
question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the
claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court. Through
counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the
claimant was imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he contends.
To deny his claim because he was not declared innocent would be to say that his imprisonment for two years while
his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one requirement for conviction in criminal
cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof, the presumption that
the accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of the
crime before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal he must be
given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is
contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that when the language of the statute is clear it should be
given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the
provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person
who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The fact that his
conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An
accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons,
be set aside. For example, he may be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of
reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to the complainant, because while the evidence
against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to sustain
a civil action for damages. 2 In one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because
of doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the accused was
ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered deported. 3 In such a case to pay the accused
compensation for having been "unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his liability
to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused would be entitled to compensation under sec.
3(a).
The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of innocence of the accused but
only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with guilt," 4 so
is the presumption of innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be innocent
in order to place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is
quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this
Court held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that we
are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of
innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which saved
him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. 5
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his conviction rather than
with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an "unjust conviction." If his
conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That
is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation
depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.

The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" in art. 204 of
the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be
shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the
evidence, and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that although he has acted
without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and
care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and
ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a
manifest injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the
contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the
notorious violation of the legal precept.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned,
but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in consequence of which he
is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of
the accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the
prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on less than the required quantum of proof in
criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is not whether the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt"
is not an unjust accusation and a conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment but
only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the trial court was wrongful
or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason to
believe that petitioner and his co-accused were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo
Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner
and his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their way into it.
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that he did or say anything on
the occasion. Said the appellate court.
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have committed any
act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at all. Both fail to show
Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the
crimes charged against the defendants. It seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to conclude
that conspiracy existed between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to
commit murder and two frustrated murders on that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where
was the coming together of the two defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes of murder
and frustrated murder on two counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the commission of the
said crimes? Basbacio was as the record shows nothing but part of the dark shadows of that
night. . . .

One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concert of action and other
circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And what about the
fact that there was bad blood between petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be
passed upon in view of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had been
unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was released because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that
in view of these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did not commit a grave
abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan,
JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration on the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond. 1
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing that:
In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company
duly accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:
Sec. 6. Bond In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions
rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas
employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay
a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000. It shall also post
a cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding company acceptable to the
Administration and duly accredited by the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer for all
valid and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license,
and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance
with the provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment
and placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of the Department and all
liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include the condition that
the notice to the principal is notice to the surety and that any judgment against the principal in
connection with matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the
surety. The surety bonds shall be co-terminus with the validity period of license. (Emphasis
supplied)

In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in
compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of
recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that the rules cited by
the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from decisions of
the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary
period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the
required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule;
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and
the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the
appellant received the appealed decision and/or award and proof of service on the other party of
such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the
running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of P200,000 as required
by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of
the POEA to the NLRC?
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the
escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from
a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award
in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the payment of
all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees
whose contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by the
recruiter of the conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247
(reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be used only
as a last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers that may be
adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be enough to cover such claims and, even if it could
initially, may eventually be exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to the dismissed
employee, the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if
this award were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow money, making
them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other obligations the recruiter may incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000, which is
the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.

It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner observes, but there is a
simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement because of the
special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against whom there is usually no
direct or effective recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the
escrow money are intended to insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to
whom our overseas workers are to be sent.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be
taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a
hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the
appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier
bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do
not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The
rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4,
Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to
post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting
an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to the mandate of the
Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee,
this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J, is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991
RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-in-insolvency VICENTE J.
CUNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City, Branch No. LVI, EMILIO C. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS and
TERESITA GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF ANGELES CITY, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY,
SANYO MARKETING CORPORATION, S & T ENTERPRISES INC., REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES
INC., and DELTA MOTOR CORPORATION, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court * in A.CG.R. SP No. 04160 entitled "Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the
petition for certiorari and mandamus; and its Resolution of July 1, 1986 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate Court, are as follows:
On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary insolvency of Carlos
Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein, the case docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 1548 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga
and Angeles City.
On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking cognizance of the said petition and
stating inter alia that:
. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the delivery of any property
owing and belonging to said respondents-debtors from other persons, or, to any
other persons for the use and benefit of the same respondents-debtors and/or the
transfer of any property by and for the said respondents-debtors to another, upon
petitioners' putting up a bond by way of certified and reputable sureties. (Annex
1, Comment).
Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City of the aforesaid
order (Annex 2, Ibid) and on March 26, 1981, also communicated with counsel for the petitioner
herein regarding same order, apprising the latter that "the personal and real property which have
been levied upon and/or attached should be preserved till the final determination of the petition
aforementioned." (Annex 3, Ibid).
On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion for issuance of insolvency
order and resolution of the case, alleging among other things, that in November, 1982, they filed
an urgent motion to issue insolvency order; on December 2, 1982, they presented a motion to

prohibit the city sheriff of Angeles City from disposing the personal and real properties of the
insolvent debtors, Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983, they (sic)
appealed in the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news item to the effect that Radiola-Toshiba
Phil. Inc. has already shut down its factory, sometime in March 1983, through their representative,
they caused to be investigated the real properties in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan and they were surprised to find out that some of the aforesaid properties were already
transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.; and that in view of such development, it is their
submission that without an insolvency order and a resolution of the case which was ripe for
resolution as early as March 3, 1982, the rights and interest of petitioners-creditors would be
injured and jeopardized. (Annex "C").
On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion vis-a-vis the prayer that the
insolvency order (which has not been rendered yet by the court) be annotated on the transfer
certificates of title already issued in its name (Annex "D").
On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency of respondents-debtors Carlos
Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan.
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the same second urgent motion
and motion to direct respondent sheriff to issue a final certificate of sale for the properties covered
by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its favor (Annex "E").
On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that ownership of certain real
properties of the insolvents had passed to it by virtue of foreclosure proceedings conducted in
Civil Case No. 35946 of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro
Manila, which properties were not redeemed within the period of redemption, respondent court
issued an order disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of Mr. Emilio C. Patino,
as assignee of all the registered claimants in this case, and, in consequence
thereof, the said assignee is hereby directed to post a bond in the amount of
P30,000.00 and to take his oath thereafter so as to be able to perform his duties
and discharge his functions, as such.
The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors with the attendance, of
course, of the assignee, on March 9, 1984, at 8:30., as by that time the proposals,
which the respective representatives of the parties-claimants desire to clear with
their principals, shall have already been reported.
The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the insolvents which are now in
the actual or constructive custody and management of the receiver previously
appointed by the Court on petitioners' and claimants' proposals be placed under
this actual or constructive custody and management, such as he is able to do so,
as the Court hereby dissolves the receivership previously authorized, it having
become a superfluity. (Annex "F").
On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No.
35946, issued an order directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or whoever is acting in his
behalf, to issue within seven (7) days from notice thereof a final deed of sale over the two (2)
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430 in favor of
petitioner. (Annex "G").

In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money covering the proceeds of
television sets and other appliances, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig,
Metro Manila, issued a writ of preliminary attachment on February 15, 1980 upon application of
the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a bond of P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M.,
levy on attachment was done in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in the names of
spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the
Registry of Deeds of Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles. (Annex "A" and "B").
On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, ordering private
respondents and their co-defendant Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay petitioner, jointly and
severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus interest thereon of 14% per annum from October 12, 1979
until fully paid; P20,000.00, for and attorney's fees; and the costs of suit (Annex "5", Comment).
After the said decision in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became final and executory, a
writ of execution for the satisfaction thereof issued on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981,
respondent sheriff of Angeles City sold at auction sale the attached properties covered by TCT
Nos. 18905 and 40430, to petitioner as the highest bidder, and the certificate of sale was
accordingly issued in its favor.
On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said
properties; but respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final certificate of sale in
favor of petitioner.
On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition, stating among other things,
that subject motion is improper and premature because it treats of matters foreign to the
insolvency proceedings; and premature, for the reason that the properties covered by TCT Nos.
18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought to the jurisdiction of the insolvency court for the
determination of the assets of the insolvents available for distribution to the approved
credits/liabilities of the insolvents. Petitioners-creditors theorized that the insolvency court is
devoid of jurisdiction to grant the motion referring to matters involved in a case pending before a
coordinate court in another jurisdiction (Annex "l").
Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court came out with its assailed
extended order with the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the aforequoted order issued in
pursuance of a similar motion of the movant, the Court denies, as it is hereby
denied the motion of Radiola-Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs the latter
to participate in the supposed meeting of all the creditors/claimants presided by
the duly elected assignee. (Annex "J").
On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. (RTPI, for short) filed a petition
forcertiorari and mandamus with respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March 31, 1986, denied petitioner's aforesaid
petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated July 1, 1986.
Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues
1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS
OF JURISDICTION ONLY; and

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE THE LIEN OF PETITIONER
ARISING FROM A LEVY OF ATTACHMENT NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the
insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.
On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended), provides:
Sec. 32 As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the clerk of the court shall,
by an instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all the
real and personal property, estate, and effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books, and papers
relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded, and by operation
of law shall vest the title to all such property, estate, and effects in the assignee, although the same
is then attached on mesne process, as the property of the debtor. Such assignment shall operate to
vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. It
shall dissolve any attachment levied within one month next preceding the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any action commenced
within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set
aside any judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately
prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are undisputed that the levy on attachment
against the subject properties of the Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case
No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980 while the insolvency proceeding in the then Court of First Instance of Angeles
City, Special Proceeding No. 1548, was commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more than four (4) months after the
issuance of the said attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner contends that its lien on the subject properties
overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.
Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law, which reads:
Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the commencement of
proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim
upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the
plaintiff may prove the legal costs and disbursements of the suit, and of the keeping of the
property, and the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.
and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the proceedings in the insolvent case, argue that
the subsequent Certificate of Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject properties, was
issued in bad faith, in violation of the law and is not equitable for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and pursuant
to the above quoted Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer of the subject properties in its name.
Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of the above-quoted Section 32, of the Insolvency
Law is very clear that attachments dissolved are those levied within one (1) month next preceding the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated and set aside are judgments entered in any
action, including judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor, where the action was filed within thirty (30)
days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut off period
one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the
insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand, relied upon by private respondents, provides for the right of
the plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is
dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was commenced is
proved against the estate of the debtor. Therefore, there is no conflict between the two provisions.

But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a
construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut
maqis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its
every word. Hence, where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such
reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious
with each other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, p. 182).
Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the petitioner be considered as a fraudulent
transfer or preference by the insolvent debtors, which constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency Law. In the
case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines (100 Phil. 187, [1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70
contemplate only acts and transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside of the 30-day period cannot possibly be considered as coming
within the orbit of their operation.
Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never placed under the jurisdiction of
respondent insolvency court so as to be made available for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in the
insolvency proceedings.
Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the attachment and execution of Civil Case
No. 35946 of the CFI of Rizal constitutes a freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the former which
were not within its jurisdiction; undeniably, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction,
correctable by certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and SET
ASIDE. The attachment and execution sale in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given due course
and petitioner's ownership of subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered consolidated.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 104712 May 6, 1992
MANUEL T. DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the enforcement by respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) of its RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by
district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1)
legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the
Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars (Annex "A",
Petition), RESOLUTION NO. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to
Resolution No. 2313 (Annex "B", Petition), and RESOLUTION UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and
the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections (Annex "C", Petition).
Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, having been elected in the January 1988 local elections. He prays, more particularly, for reversal of
the position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of Paraaque and all the other municipalities in the
Metro Manila Area. He claims that the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which requires the
apportionment into districts of said municipalities does not specify when the members of their Sangguniang Bayan
will be elected by district. He would consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which immediately succeeds par. (c), to
support his view that the elected members of these municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be elected
at large in the May 11, 1992 elections.
Paragraph (d) states that "[F]or purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlunsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws.
However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district." Petitioner therefore insists
that the elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque fall under this category so that they should
continue to be elected at large until the 1995 regular elections.
Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court observes that petitioner does not allege that he is running
for reelection, much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by district, in Paraaque. As such, he does
not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, personal or substantial interest. 1 He does not also allege any
legal right that has been violated by respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to have any cause of
action.
However, considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified
voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by
respondent, We resolve to brush aside the question of procedural infirmity, even as We perceive the petition to be
one of declaratory relief. We so held similarly through Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmea v. Commission on
Elections. 2
Now on the meat of the dispute.

On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is
"An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes." At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of Sec. 3 thereof
which provides:
Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and
Sangguniang Bayan. The elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected as follows:
(a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the elective members
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be elected by legislative districts . . .
(b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the Commission shall
divide them into two (2) districts for purposes of electing the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan . . .
(c) The number and election of elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu,
City of Davao and any other city with two (2) or more legislative districts shall
continue to be governed by the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act
No. 6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the Commission shall divide each of the
municipalities in Metro Manila Area into two (2) districts by barangay for
purposes of representation in the Sangguniang Bayan
. . . . and,
(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in
accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in
1995, they shall be elected by district . . . .
On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking authority of the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code, R.A. 6636, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 7166, 3 issued Resolution No. 2313 and the subsequent resolutions in
question.
On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived ambiguity in the meaning of par. (d), particularly in relation to par.
(c), Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, petitioner filed with COMELEC a Motion for Clarification of its Resolution No. 2313
inquiring whether the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque and the other municipalities of Metro
Manila enumerated therein, which are all single-district municipalities, would be elected by district in May 11, 1992
or in the 1995 regular elections.
Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379 approving the guidelines submitted by the
Provincial Election Supervisors and Municipal Election Registrars concerned pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and
stating therein its purpose in recommending to Congress the districting/apportionment of Sangguniang Panlungsod
and Sangguniang Bayan seats, i.e., to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992
synchronized elections. In this Project of Apportionment, Paraaque together with the other twelve (12)
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area was divided into two (2) districts with six (6) elective councilors for each
district.
On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion for Clarification by interpreting Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, to
mean that the election of elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by district, of the thirteen (13) municipalities
in the Metro Manila Area shall apply in the May 11, 1992 elections (Resolution UND. 92-010, prom. March 10,
1992). Petitioner says that he received copy of Resolution UND. 92-010 on March 13, 1992.

On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third Resolution of COMELEC, petitioner filed the instant
petition asserting that under par. (d), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 the elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
the Sangguniang Bayan, for purposes of the May 11, 1992 regular elections, shall be elected at large in accordance
with existing laws. He would include in this class of sanggunian members to be elected at large those of the
municipality of Paraaque.
Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating Resolution No. 2313,
Resolution No. 2379 and Resolution UND. 92-010 which clarifies, contrary to his view, that the district
apportionment of the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area is applicable to the May 11, 1992 regular elections.
We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, and its precursor bills on synchronized
elections, Senate Bill No. 1861 and House Bill No. 34811, and We realize the web of confusion generated by the
seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. Some framers of the law were even fazed at the empirical
implications of some of its provisions, particularly Sec. 3 thereof, and they admitted in fact that said provisions were
susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne by the sponsorship and explanatory speeches now spread in the
Journals of Congress. Hence, We can understand why petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as he would. But if we
pursue his course, we may conclude in absurdity because then there would have been no reason for R.A. 7166 to
single out the single-district provinces referred to in par. (b), and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area
mentioned in the second proviso of par. (c), to be apportioned at once into two (2) districts each if the members of
their respective sanggunian after all would still be elected at large as they were in the 1988 elections.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we can,
divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the
legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which
induced it to enact the statute. If the statute needs construction, as it does in the present case, the most dominant in
that process is the purpose of the act. 4 Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the
evil or mischief to be suppressed, 5 and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress
the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 6 A construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in
a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to defeat
the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment. 7
The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861 which states
in part:
This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11, 1992, and provide for the
necessary implementing details. It also endorses reforms and measures to ensure the conduct of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Specifically, it seeks to: (1) Reduce the
number of positions to be voted for by providing therein that the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large, but by
district . . . .
That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R.A. 7166 is reflected in the "WHEREAS"
clauses constituting the preamble to Resolution No. 2379. Thus
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce the number of candidates to be
voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections recommended, among others, to the
Congress of the Philippines, the districting/apportionment of sangguniang panlungsod and
sangguniang bayan seats;
WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 7166, and approved by the
President of the Philippines on November 26, 1991, adopting among others, the recommendation
of the Commission on Elections aforestated;

WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic Act 7166, particularly Section 3
thereof, the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 2313, directing the Provincial Election
Supervisors and Election Registrars concerned to submit, after consultation, public hearings, and
consensus-taking with the different sectors in the community, the Project of District
Apportionment of single legislative-district provinces and municipalities in the Metro Manila area;
WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the determination of the district apportionment
are as follows: a. compactness, contiguity and adjacentness of territory; b. apportionment shall be
based on the 1990 census of population; c. no municipality, in the case of provinces, and no
barangay, in the case of cities and municipalities, shall be fragmented or apportioned into different
districts.
This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also manifest from the four corners of Sec.
3 of R.A. 7166. 8 Thus, a careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows that the purpose of
districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to reduce the number of positions to be voted for in the May 11,
1992, synchronized elections and ensure the efficiency of electoral process. Considering that the single-district
provinces and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which are all single-districts, and under pars. (b) and (c)
have already been apportioned into two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the members of their
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming May 11, 1992, elections, although
under par. (d), the single-district cities and all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all
likewise single-districts, will have to continue electing at large the members of their Sangguniang Panlungsod and
Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned. But beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will all
have to be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to apportion the single-district
cities and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area.
As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local government units for purposes of election
under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it is clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts contemplated in
par. (a), they shall continue to be elected by district; (2) for provinces with single legislative districts, as they have
already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under par. (b), they shall henceforth be elected likewise by
district; (3) for cities with two (2) or more legislative districts, e.g., the cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao, they shall
also continue to be elected by district under the first part of par. (c); and (4) for the thirteen (13) municipalities in the
Metro Manila Area, which have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under the second proviso of par.
(c), they shall likewise be elected by district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992.
Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of
the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remain single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under
Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although
starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A.
7166. That is the true import of par. (d). Consequently, as We view it, where he stands, petitioner must fall.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, on the part of respondent, and for lack of merit, the
instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989
ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM GUERRA, respondents.
Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.
Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 dismissing the petition for certiorari against Judge Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Norte and the private respondent, William Guerra, involves a pure question of law i.e., the coverage and
application of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known otherwise as the Public Land Act.
The facts are undisputed.
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248, issued by
virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso.
The said original certificate of title was inscribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Camarines Norte on
December 10, 1961. On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the
property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of
P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the aforementioned sale, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the name of the
Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the
property now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently
released on November 22, 1973 after the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975,
the petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet,
Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00.
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to Act No. 3135, was
instituted by the Philippine National Bank against the mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction held on
February 27, 1981. The private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said public auction
and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to him by the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of Camarines
Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final Deed" was executed in favor of the private respondent.
On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte at Daet, a
motion for a writ of possession. The public respondent, Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the
motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an order for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private
respondent. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the
property in the possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the possession of
the same and instead offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984,
another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was filed by the private respondent with the
trial court.

The petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed the private respondents' motion and instead made a formal offer to
repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition and formal offer, the trial court judge on
October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of possession prayed for the private respondent. The petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied.
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for certiorari claiming that the respondent trial court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the order dated October 12, 1984 granting the writ of possession, and the order dated October 22, 1984, denying
their motion for reconsider consideration.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave due course to the petition; required the
parties to submit simultaneous memoranda in support to their respective positions; and restrained the trial court and
the private respondent from executing, implementing or otherwise giving effect to the assailed writ of possession
until further orders from the court. 3 However, in a decision promulgated on September 17, 1986, the respondent
Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to the appellate court:
It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT No. P-1248,
was issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute sale on February 28, 1970 of the
property covered by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, the five year
period to repurchase the property provided for in Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended could have already started. Prom this fact alone, the petition should have been dismissed.
However, granting that the transfer from parent to child for a nominal sum may not be the
"conveyance" contemplated by the law. We will rule on the issue raised by the petitioners. 4
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 5 the appellate court went on to hold that the five-year period
of the petitioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act had already prescribed. The point of
reckoning, ruled the respondent court in consonance with Monge is from the date the petitioners mortgaged the
property on December 4, 1973. Thus, when the petitioners made their formal offer to repurchase on August 31,
1984, the period had clearly expired.
In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for reconsideration. Their motion apparently went for
naught because on May 7, 1987, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the same. Hence, this petition.
Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts below, their right to repurchase within
five years under Section 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet prescribed. To support their contention, the
petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. Court of Appeals 6 and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al. 7
On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's decision, states that the sale of the
contested property by the patentees to the petitioners disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said
property. As such, they (the petitioners) no longer enjoy the right granted to heirs under the provisions of Section
119 of the Public Land Act. 8
In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the petitioners have the right to repurchase
the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the
affirmative, whether or not their right to repurchase had already prescribed.
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their property and their right to do so
subsists.
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:

Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper,
shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from the
date of the conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase the
applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the
respondent appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they acquired the
property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the
Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal
heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section
119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos.
Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate court would be to contravene the very
purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself
and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating
it. 9 Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no
gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the
law. We have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law
should prevail.
Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue here raised, we rule that the five-year period for the
petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.
The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 10 cited as authority by the respondent Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the present
controversy. The facts obtaining there are substantially different from those in this case. In Monge the conveyance involved was
a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question raised there was whether the five-year period
provided for in Section 119 "should be counted from the date of the sale even if the same is with an option to repurchase or from
the date the ownership of the land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of the homesteader's failure to
redeem it. 11 It is therefore understandable why the Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de retro immediately vests title,
ownership, and, generally possession over the property on the vendee a retro, subject only to the right of the vendor a retro to
repurchase within the stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a resolutory condition.
The cases 12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other hand, present facts that are quite identical to
those in the case at bar. Both cases involved properties the titles over which were obtained either through homestead or free
patent. These properties were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of the owners to pay their
indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed. In both instances, the Court ruled that the five-year period to. repurchase a
homestead sold at public auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the period of
redemption when the deed of absolute sale is executed thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not
otherwise. Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the
private respondent on February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two offers of the petitioners
to repurchase the first on November 17, 1983, and the second, formally, on August 31, 1984 were both made within the
prescribed five-year period.
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioners should
reimburse the private respondent the amount of the purchase price at the public auction plus interest at the rate of one per centum
per month up to November 17, 1983, together with the amounts of assessments and taxes on the property that the private
respondent might have paid after purchase and interest on the last named amount at the same rate as that on the purchase price. 13
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17, 1986, and the Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the
Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated September 22, 1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court
of Daet, Camarines Norte, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one ENTERED directing the private respondent
to reconvey the subject property and to execute the corresponding deed of reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon
the return to him by the latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any, of assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one
(1%) per centum per month on both amounts up to November 17, 1983.

No costs.
SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT.
MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC.
RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT
LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA, MAJ.
LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM,
CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL
COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX
V. BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14
COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B.
YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT.
FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.
No. 95020 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL.
WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO
LIGOT PA., respondents.

No. 96948 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL
ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC.
TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN
BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA
PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON
PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL.
WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND
MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.

No. 97454 August 2, 1991

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT.
COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN
REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1
LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT
JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and
2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.

Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio,
Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza.
Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:p
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues arising
from the same incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d'
etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(Murder).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning the conduct of
the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against them and the creation of the
General Court Martial GCM convened to try them.

In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling
denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed
oncertiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling
denying bail to the private respondents.
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a
petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise
raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
I
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been constituted pursuant
to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI
Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating
Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to
submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial
investigation of the charge/charges against you for violence of AWs _______________. DO NOT
SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be
deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses,
and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI
Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing This was done through a Motion for
Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from notice
to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave
them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March 14,1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71,
which provides:
Art. 71. Charges Action upon. Charges and specifications must be signed by a person subject to
military law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the
matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial
investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth
of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be
made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full opportunity shall be given
to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present
anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating
officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded

after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the
testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no prosecution
witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary dismissal was denied, the
motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were exercising their right to
raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com.
Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under
P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM
No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After
considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM No.14, Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to declare in
contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He later also complained that
Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this
Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc
Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc
Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all
persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial
proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to
petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to military men
facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside and
declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct
proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as well
include other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this
Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as
intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition for habeas
corpuson the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after
hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial
court ordered their release.

II
The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to present their side at
the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their
motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that
date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. This
they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the
charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation was resolved
against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been expressly warned In the
subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be
deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As their
motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting
for the petitioners to submit their defense.
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is
deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled
that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction." We
so held in Arula v. Espino, 1 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of
jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in
no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed
986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The
Philippine counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can
properly be construed as an indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of the
Army General court martial jurisdiction.. The Article does serve important
functions in the administration of court-martial procedures and does provide
safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could
object to trial in the absence of the required investigation. In that event the
court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the investigation. And the
military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a
court- martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has
substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress
intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void because
pre-trial investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That
Congress has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial
is an indication that the investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the
jurisdictional level.
xxx xxx xxx

Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the
Army did hold that where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial
proceedings were void ab initio. But this holding has been expressly repudiated
in later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later interpretation has
been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory,
and in no way effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's
interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947 after
which Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged the language here under
consideration. compensable pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general courtmartial jurisdiction
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article of
war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless have
jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil
courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the
court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved more than two
years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa, 2 where we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial compliance
with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by
P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-respondents with
mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to
military law, after he had investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent records,
including the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the
testimonies on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance
with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No.
77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets
were not certified in the manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the
oath has personally examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial
investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit.
However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges
against them. That petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses against them was their own
doing, for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they may be
made to answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.
911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of
War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa
as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the
President, the commanding officer of a major command or task force, the commanding officer of a
division, the commanding officer of a military area, the superintendent of the Military Academy,
the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint general courtsmartial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to
be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior competent authority. ...

While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he authorized it
because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has not been shown to be
spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief
of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is significant that
General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as he would certainly have
done if his authority had been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177,
he sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the Solicitor
General.
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for under Article 18 of
Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:
Art. 18. Challenges. Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by the
accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine the
relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than one member at a
time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided before those
by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory challenge, but the law
member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro, 3 thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful of
Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval academies who
were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of officers learned in military
law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was numerically made
equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense program. Because of
these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be
permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of
the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of
the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by either the
trial judge advocate of a court- martial or by the accused. After December 17,1958, when the
Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's
Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and
education in military law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program
was pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the
formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a great many of the officers had been
indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article of War 18
was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole
proviso that "the law member of court shall not be challenged except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be
referred to them.
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure,
and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure
impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a majority
of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the challenged
member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately replaced.

On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code, which was a
compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing threats to
the existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied
in this decree.
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law
throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the
military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned therein. With the
termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the
existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.Cessante
ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is
its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became
ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a
result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the
right to peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn
under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January
17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having been cast out
under the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime.
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious that the present
government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a
court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is hoped that the accused officers
in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present
circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and
apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only the political
departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for certiorari and mandamus and
the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is
argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of
War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested with "exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the
case of Yang v. Court of Appeals 4 where this Court held that "appeals from the Professional Regulation
Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not to the remedies
employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts.

In Martelino, we observed as follows:

It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to
consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the exercise
of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion what in
the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" as to give rise to a defect in
their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its nature as one
for certiorari and prohibition ... .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions forhabeas
corpus and quo warranto. 5 In the absence of a law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial
or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we
hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.
This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the
military where the right to bail does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for
the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the
people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing
political system.
xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on
bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists
roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order were sustained,
on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting
thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the
overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same
with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not
acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply
where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they
are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against
because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged after more than one
year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and
the right to a speedy trial.

The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was referred to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the
respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the charge memorandum and specifications against the private
respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was
created and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private
respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required to submit their
counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than one year in the investigation
and preparation of the charges against the private respondents. However, this was explained by the Solicitor General
thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge investigation only
after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the
failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or investigated, and
these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge investigation was rendered doubly difficult
by the fact that those involved were dispersed and scattered throughout the Philippines. In some
cases, command units, such as the Scout Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the charges
were completed, the same still had to pass review and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the participation of
petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge
Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed against him or the existence of a prima
facie case warranting trial before a military commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then
Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release petitioner. Respondents must also be
reminded that even if a military officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War,
indefinite confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must
be taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is
responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may
even be punished as a court martial may direct. 6
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26, 1991, the
government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the latter was ultimately denied,
after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did
not run until after notice of such denial was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private
respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and executory when the special civil action
in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.
III
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations of the Court in Arula:
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW
71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because,
as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise
thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or
corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the
issuance of a writ ofcertiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or
without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of
by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory
challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not
have been ordered released.

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition
is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory
challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED,
and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, GrioAquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as he would deny bail
to accused military personnel.
The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the only exception of
"those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong." 1 The Charter also
states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended." 2 To deny the
military officers here concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all persons" the
coverage of the right.
I believe that military officers fall within "persons".
The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the
Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer number
alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous
activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable
Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice." 3 But
would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the
right to bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000 "equally
dangerous" elements of society?
We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should not be granted the
same right.
The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny bail. I submit, however,
that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it. Second, we are a government of laws, not
tradition.
If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as he would deny bail
to accused military personnel.

The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the only exception of
"those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong." 1 The Charter also
states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended." 2 To deny the
military officers here concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all persons" the
coverage of the right.
I believe that military officers fall within "persons".
The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the
Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer number
alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous
activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable
Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice." 3 But
would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the
right to bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000 "equally
dangerous" elements of society?
We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should not be granted the
same right.
The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny bail. I submit, however,
that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it. Second, we are a government of laws, not
tradition.
If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992
LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2
December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as
well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those
enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:
Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as
well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall
apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of
separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the
PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on
30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same;
instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service
commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her
letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:
xxx xxx xxx
With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does not
conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a government
employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of
government service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement.
Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to the budget needed,
the law provides that the Department of Budget and Management will shoulder a certain portion of
the benefits to be allotted to government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these NIA special
projects art entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like.
There is no reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.
xxx xxx xxx 2
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:
xxx xxx xxx

We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of Section 3.1 of Joint
DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant to have two years of
satisfactory service on the date of separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on
a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2, 1988, the date of
enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate contractual employees in the coverage.
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation from the
service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature, this Commission shall
sustain its original decision.
xxx xxx xxx 3
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari, insisting that she
is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:
It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No.
89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status.
Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1,
implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides:
"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:
a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform
specific activities or services with a definite expected output: i.e. membership in
Task Force, Part-Time, Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those
of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated from
the service for optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or
with pension under R.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No.
1146, an amended, or vice- versa.
d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of this
law and have received the corresponding benefits of that retirement/separation.
e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory
separation from the service under existing civil service laws, rules and
regulations; provided that if such officials and employees apply in writing
within the prescriptive period for the availment of the benefits herein authorized,
shall be allowed only if acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application
accepted and approved by the head of office concerned."
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is
a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the Civil Service
Commission. She held a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to
the Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and emergency employees were given the benefit of
R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner who was holding a permanent status as Personnel
Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the government
should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law. 4

The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of
Republic Act No. 6683, because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the Administrative
Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed Management and Erosion Control
Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31
December 1988, after which petitioner's position became functus officio.
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA her position is not included in its regular plantilla. She
belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on
the other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can
expect upon the expiration of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under
the GSIS law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is available only for the term of
office (i.e., duration of project).
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits but
reorganization5 to streamline government functions. The application of the law must be made consistent with the
purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it will
not have any application to special projects such as the WMECP which exists only for a short and definite period.
This being the nature of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early retirement benefits just
to induce voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing the WMECP
considering its short and limited life-span. 6
5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters and local government units.
Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is called upon to
define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an employment regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October
1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683)
merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is
employed in the public sector.
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as follows:
1. permanent one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which appointment is made,
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof; 7
2. temporary In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a
vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary
appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service
eligible becomes available. 8
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate
examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the
faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions
in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief
of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President.
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the
President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate
merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental
or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 9
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:
. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the
career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is
coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to
the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.
Included in the non-career service are:
1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the
President and their personal confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their
personal or confidential staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a
special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not
available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case
shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10
There is another type of non-career employee:

Casual where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic
and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil.
945)
Consider petitioner's record of service:
Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a laborer
holdingemergency status with the NIA Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R
Division. 11 From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide
with temporary status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was
with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA
UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she
went to NIA W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management & Erosion Control Project) retaining the
status of temporary employee. While with this project, her designation was changed to personnel
assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the status became permanent until the
completion of the project on 31 December 1988. The appointment paper 12 attached to the OSG's
comment lists her status as co-terminus with the Project.
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign assisted projects is considered co-terminous, that is, they
are considered employees for the duration of the project or until the completion or cessation of said project (CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service
Commission is charged with the function of determining creditable services for retiring officers
and employees of the national government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all previous services
by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a position in the Civil Service
are considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services rendered
oncontractual, emergency or casual status are non-creditable services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some contractual,
emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or appointments duly approved by the
Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual, emergency or
casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall be considered as
creditable for retirement purposes subject to the following conditions: (emphasis provided)
1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official records
and/or other competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the
necessary proof of said services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the
effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and
3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are continuous
and fulfill the service requirement for retirement.

What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual
personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter
of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's employment as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn
was contractual in nature. The OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee
(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is characterized
by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent
with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:
a) co-terminous with the project When the appointment is co-existent with
the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or
subject to the availability of funds for the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing authority when appointment is coexistent with the tenure of the appointing authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent when appointment is co-existent with the
appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services
of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3
years" the appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof,
the position is deemed abolished.
It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is termed co-terminous
is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of tenure of the
appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific
period.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid
reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted
that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary,
casual andemergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP
including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not
have made a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms
and benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est A person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 15 Yet adherence to these legal
maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work pool, hired and rehired continuously from one project to another were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of fifteen (15) years.
Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies
only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the

subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial

distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who
belong to the same class. 17
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause were we to
sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who
are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be
the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is
always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of
enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding
events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of
statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine
states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every
statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction
which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or
privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the
greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus. 18
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response to Congressman
Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university employees who are extended appointments for one (1)
year, renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, 19 he explained:
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary separation. It is
irrespective of the actual status or nature of the appointment one received, but if he opts to retire
under this, then he is covered.
It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to extend the scope of the
Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified
group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of early retirement, would provide:
Sec. 3. Coverage. It will cover all employees of the national government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all local government
units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total
of two (2) consecutive years government service as of the date of separation. The term
"contractual employees" as used in this Act does not include experts and consultants hired by
agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or services with definite expected
output.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the PC-INP are
excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated
positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of coterminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and
separation of the project personnel from the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the officefunctus
officio. Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to establish
two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that co-terminous or

project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient, whereas, retirement presupposes employment
for a long period. Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring because casuals
are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early retirement. How can the objective of
the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement benefits to a group
of employees (casual) without plantilla positions? There would, in such a case, be no abolition of permanent
positions or streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the positions remain,
and future appointments can be made thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous service should be
included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of
their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection,
Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a
condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which
need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency,
seasonal, contractual or co-terminous including military and police service, as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil
Service Commission. 21 A similar regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of coterminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all social
legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental well-being of public servants" 22 After all, co-terminous
personnel, are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with the
general disadvantage of transience.
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application
for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had
filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law.
While the application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally
filed the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her
application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years the minimum
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's application for early retirement
benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37251 August 31, 1981
CITY OF MANILA and CITY TREASURER, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ of the Court of First Instance of Manila and ESSO PHILIPPINES,
INC.,respondents-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the legality of the additional one-half percent (%) realty tax imposed by the City of Manila.
Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which took effect on June 18, 1949, fixes the
annual realty tax at one and one-half percent (1- %).
On the other hand, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447, which took effect on
January 1, 1969, imposed "an annual additional tax of one per centum on the assessed value of real property in
addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon under existing laws" but "the total real property tax shall
not exceed a maximum of three per centrum.
That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea of fixing the realty tax at three percent. So, by
means of Ordinance No. 7125, approved by the city mayor on December 26, 1971 and effective beginning the third
quarter of 1972, the board imposed an additional one-half percent realty tax. The ordinance reads:
SECTION 1. An additional annual realty tax of one-half percent (1/2%), or in short a total of three
percent (3%) realty tax (1-% pursuant to the Revised Charter of Manila; 1% per Republic Act
No. 5447; and % per this Ordinance) on the assessed value ... is hereby levied and imposed.
Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest the sum of P16,092.69 as additional one-half percent realty tax for the third
quarter of 1972 on its land and machineries located in Manila.
On November 9, 1972, Esso filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of the said
amount. It contended that the additional one-half percent tax is void because it is not authorized by the city charter
nor by any law (Civil Case No. 88827).
After hearing, the trial court declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the city treasurer of Manila to refund to
Esso the said tax. The City of Manila and its treasurer appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440 (which
superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court).
The only issue is the validity of the tax ordinance or the legality of the additional one-half percent realty tax.
The petitioners in their manifestation of March 17, 1981 averred that the said tax ordinance is still in force; that
Ordinance No. 7566, which was enacted on September 10, 1974, imposed a two percent tax on commercial real
properties (like the real properties of Esso and that that two percent tax plus the one percent tax under the Special
Education Fund Law gives a total of three percent realty tax on commercial properties.

Esso Philippines, Inc., now Petrophil Corporation, in its manifestation of March 2, 1981, revealed that up to this time it has been
paying the additional one-half percent tax and that from 1975 to 1980 it paid the total sum of P4,206,240.71 as three percent tax
on its real properties.
In this connection, it is relevant to note that section 39(2) of the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 464, which
took effect on June 1, 1974, provides that a city council may, by ordinance, impose a realty tax "of not less than one half of one
percent but not more than two percent of the assessed value of real property".
Section 41 of the said Code reaffirms the one percent tax on real property for the Special Education Fund in addition to the basic
two percent realty tax.
So, there is no question now that the additional one-half percent realty tax is valid under the Real Property Tax Code. What is in
controversy is the legality of the additional one-half percent realty tax for the two-year period from the third quarter of 1972 up to
the second quarter of 1974.
We hold that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction sustains the City of Manila's contention that the additional onehalf percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision in section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law that "the total real property
tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum.
The doctrine of implications means that "that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that
which is expressed" (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 45, 90; 82 C.J.S. 632, 73 Am Jur 2nd 404).
While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and a half percent, on the other hand, the 1968 Special
Education Fund Law definitively fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax of which one percent would accrue to the
Special Education Fund.
The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that
law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to a city or municipality.
And the fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specifically fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior
intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That was also the avowed intention of the questioned
ordinance.
In invalidating the ordinance, the trial court upheld the view of Esso Philippines, Inc, that the Special Education Fund Law refers
to a contingency where the application of the additional one percent realty tax would have the effect of raising the total realty tax
to more than three percent and that it cannot be construed as an authority to impose an additional realty tax beyond the one
percent fixed by the said law.
At first glance, that appears to be a specious or reasonable contention. But the fact remains that the city charter fixed the realty
tax at 1-% and the later law, the Special Education Fund Law, provides for three percent as the maximum realty tax of which
one percent would be earmarked for the education fund.
The unavoidable inference is that the later law authorized the imposition of an additional one-half percent realty tax since the
contingency referred to by the complaining taxpayer would not arise in the City of Manila.
It is true, as contended by the taxpayer, that the power of a municipal corporation to levy a tax should be expressly granted and
should not be merely inferred. But in this case, the power to impose a realty tax is not controverted. What is disputed is
the amount thereof, whether one and one-half percent only or two percent. (See sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 2264.)
As repeatedly observed, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as confirmed by the Real Property Tax Code, in
prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly authorizes the augmentation by one-half percent of the pre-existing one
and one- half percent realty tax.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed and set aside. The complaint of Esso Philippines, Inc. for recovery of
the realty tax paid under protest is dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED. Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 14129

July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the
information against the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in the brief of plaintiff-appellant, is
complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted, to wit:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of that
Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding a probable cause that the
crime charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty,
the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one
of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion
to dismiss holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54. A second motion was filed
by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs.
Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the peace
is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on this second motion
to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution,
the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case
cited by the defense.
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is a justice the peace
included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no
member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service
officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part
therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers enumerated in Section
54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which provided the following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First Instance, justice of the
peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine

Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert
influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace," the omission
revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First instance", while under
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other words, justices of the peace were
expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were
specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity
therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more
generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to
comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian
Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because
a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with
judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public
officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term
includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the
peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the above conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907, and which
was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act No. 1709
has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4
amendments were later on incorporated Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature,
several amendments were made through the passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3
amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the
Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth
Act No. 357, which was the law enforced until June 1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved. Included
as its basic provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code
was further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of Congress in 1960,
amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our election law, the following should be noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible during the time
that he holds said public office to election at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for
reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace,
provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall
aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly
election under the penalty of being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office
whatsoever for a term of 5 year: Provide, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to
deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took
effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer or employee of the
Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner to
take part in any municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any person violating the provisions of this

section shall be deprived of his office or employment and shall be disqualified to hold any public office or
employment whatever for a term of 5 years, Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions shall not be
construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted on August
31, 1907; Took effect on September 15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March 10, 1917, the
provisions in question read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First Instance, justice of the
peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert
influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
(Emphasis supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:
SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. Any judge of the First Instance, justice
of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any officer or employee of any Bureau of the
classified civil service, who aids any candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of this section or
takes part in any election otherwise by exercising the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less
than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2
years, and in all cases by disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for a
period of 5 years. (Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This law provided in Section
48:
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or
assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the Constabulary of the national, provincial,
municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, nor
exert influence in any manner in any election nor take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to
preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or history of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however,
that in the two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No.
180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In
other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice of the
peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion that when the
legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer
from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records which might have
offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as indicated above, has
eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been completely destroyed, all efforts to seek
deeper and additional clarifications from these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the
historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.

Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as under
that said section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any province." The last mentioned
phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace since the latter is not an officer of a province
but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any province" necessarily
removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that they are municipal and not provincial
officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals. They
are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are
not included in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies
fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said
rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that
rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and
deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when
the omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the
legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in
partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee cites authorities to the
effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more particular application to statutes that should be strictly
construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed against the government since proceedings
under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted against
the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts that the spirit of
fair play and due process demand such strict construction in order to give "fair warning of what the law intends to
do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v.
U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature,
but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has
only been a substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such
laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the
meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and again by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the
legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be
permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may
consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of
Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the U.S. has well said:
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to deprive it of the
meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense which best harmonizes with their intent
and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)

As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal statutes, frequently, has been
narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See
also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the statute is to enlarge the
officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the
judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in
the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the
legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully explained in
the brief of the Solicitor General, to wit:
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and justice of the
peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the
obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just one class of judges but all judges, whether
of first Instance justices of the peace or special courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. .
...
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so construe the law as to
allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities would weaken rather than strengthen the
judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself why
justices of the peace should be prohibited from electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate courts
and judges of the Court of First Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction over certain election
cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion and
exclusion cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office the impartiality
of their decisions in election cases would be open to serious doubt. We do not believe that the legislature
had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, intended to create such an unfortunate situation. (pp. 708,
Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the administrative or executive
department has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this Court
did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
respondents, for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31, 1957, of the
President of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note
that one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in engaging in
electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on January 25, 1955. In
that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the peace are already expressly included among the officers
enjoined from active political participation. The argument is that with the filing of the said House Bill, Congress
impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed amendment to Rep. Act No. 180
as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a
proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment,
until it has become a law, cannot be considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions,
and the reasons expressed by the individual members of the legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken
into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375376), a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.
On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the
injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically
laid down by the legislature.

Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating in partisan politics. They
were prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so
enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another which expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387,
and later, Com. Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of "expressio unius, est
exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Said the
Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known as expressio unius est exclusion
alterius, it would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace
from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of
Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there
appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been
erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by
enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have
been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio unius est
exclusion alterius, should not be invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case is
remanded for trial on the merits.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Take Note that this is the revision of the court version 2014
G.R. No. L-14129

August 30, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.
RESOLUTION
REGALA, J.:
This resolution refers to a motion for reconsideration filed by the counsel for defendant-appellee, Guillermo
Manantan.
Defendant-appellee does not dispute the correctness of this Court's ruling in the main case. He concedes that a
justice of the peace is covered by the prohibition of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, he takes exception
to the dispositive portion of this Court's ruling promulgated on July 31, 1962, which reads:
For the above reasons, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case is
remanded for trial on the merits.
It is now urged by the defendant-appellee that the ultimate effect of remanding the case to the lower court for trial on
the merits is to place him twice in jeopardy of being tried for the same offense. He calls the attention of this Court to
the fact that when the charge against him was dismissed by the lower court, jeopardy had already attached to his
person. To support his claim, he cites the case of People vs. Labatete, G.R. No. L-12917, April 27, 1960.
Defendant-appellee's plea of double jeopardy should be rejected. The accused cannot now invoke the defense of
double jeopardy. When the government appealed to this Court the order of dismissal, defendant Manantan could
have raised that issue by way of resisting the appeal of the state. Then again, when defendant-appellee filed his brief,
he could have argued therein his present plea of double jeopardy. Yet, on neither occasion did he do so. He must,
therefore, be deemed to have waived his constitutional right thereunder. This is in accord with this Court's ruling in
the cases of People vs. Rosalina Casiano, G.R. No. L-15309, February 16, 1961 and People vs. Pinuila, G.R. No. L11374, May 30, 1958, hereunder quoted:
. . . defendant herein has filed a brief in which she limited herself to a discussion of the merits of the appeal.
Thus, she not only failed to question, in her brief, either expressly or impliedly, the right of the prosecution
to interpose the present appeal, but also, conceded in effect the existence of such right. She should be
deemed, therefore, to have waived her aforementioned constitutional immunity.1wph1.t
It is true that in People vs. Hernandez (49 O.G. 5342), People vs. Ferrer, L-9072 (October 23,
1956),People vs. Bao, L-12102 (September 29, 1959) and People vs. Golez, L-14160, we dismissed the
appeal taken by the Government from a decision or order of a lower court, despite defendant's failure to
object thereto. However, the defendants in those cases, unlike the defendant herein, did not file any brief.

Hence, they had performed no affirmative act from which a waiver could be implied. (People vs.
Casiano, supra).
In his appeal brief, appellant's counsel does not raise this question of double jeopardy, confining himself as
he does, to the discussion of the evidence in the record, contending that the guilt of the appellant has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. One aspect of this case as regards double jeopardy is that defense
may be waived, and, that failure to urge it in the appeal may be regarded as a waiver of said defense of
double jeopardy.(People vs. Pinuila, supra).
There are other grounds raised by the defendant-appellee in this motion for reconsideration. The Court, however,
does not believe that they were well taken.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the motion for reconsideration filed in this case, is, as it is hereby, denied.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON, CELSO S.
TUASON and SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal MANUELA
AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C. CORDOVA, respondents.
Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.
Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.
AQUINO, J.:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of Title No. 735
covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625
hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra).
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located at
Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land
of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has an
area of three hundred eighty-three quiones was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a Spanish title issued
to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).
They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they
discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
and that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed
Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to defendants J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa)
which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain
irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages.
Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue,
prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds
of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses.
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares of
the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.

On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title derived from that first or
basic title. Later, the court required the production in court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No. 735
allegedly for the purpose of determining whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included
therein.
On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding
in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued.
Respondents Aquial and Cordova answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of
oral argument.
The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by
respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding, which led to the
issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621,
3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating OCT
No. 735, is annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their support their action and it
might have encouraged them to ventilate their action in court.
On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom
was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129,
all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).
The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511, July 25, 1975, 65
SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the following cases directly or
incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acua, 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil.
447;Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre,
117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal,
114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031.
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb
what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil
Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open
to attack.
It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the
court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc.
vs. Navarro, supra).
Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to dismiss Civil Case
No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J, took no part.