Govt of Hongkong vs Judge Olalia

Honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does
not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extradites rights to life, liberty, and due process. Where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party.
We should not deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can
neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extradite from fleeing our jurisdiction.
clear and convincing evidence should be used in granting bail in extradition cases
The potential extradite must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 121917. July 31, 1996
ROBIN CARIO PADILLA, Accused-Appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees.
-->
R ES OLUTIO N
FRANCISCO, J.:
On appellant Robin C. Padilla's application for bail.
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, appellant was charged with violation of
P.D No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion
perpetua. 1 Pending trial, appellant was release on bail. Thereafter, appellant was convicted as charged and
meted an indeterminate penalty of 17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 21 years of reclusion
perpetua. He appealed to public respondent Court of Appeals, but judgment was rendered affirming his

conviction. Respondent court cancelled his bailbond and ordered his arrest for confinement at the New Bilibid
Prison. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Dissatisfied, appellant is now before us by
way of a petition for review on certiorari with an application for bail praying, among others, to be allowed to
post bail for his temporary liberty. In his subsequent pleading, 2 appellant moved for the separate resolution of
his bail application.
The threshold issue is whether or not appellant is entitled to bail.
Bail is either a matter of right, or discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. 3 On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of
discretion. 4 Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more that
twenty (20) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances 5 under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. But when the accused is charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and evidence of guilt is
strong, bail shall be denied, 6 as it is neither a matter of right nor discretion. If the evidence, however, is not
strong bail becomes a matter of right. 7
In People v. Nitcha, 8 the Court, reiterating established jurisprudence, there said:
"x x x if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court
and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of
discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the
evidence of guilt is strong which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction it would have
likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted
to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule
114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October
1991 in People v. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that:
'Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this
Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.'" 9
In this case, appellant was convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Applying the aforequoted
rule, we find appellant not entitled to bail as his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt is
strong. And contrary to appellant's asseveration, a summary hearing for his bail application for the sole purpose
of determining whether or not evidence is strong is unnecessary. Indeed, the extensive trial before the lower
court and the appeal before respondent court are more than sufficient in accomplishing the purpose for which a
summary hearing for bail application is designed.
Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, moreover, is clear. Thus:
"SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."

Administrative Circular No. 2-92, in addition, applies in this case. The circular unequivocably provides that
when an accused is charged with a capital or an offense which under the law at the time of its commission and
at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in
confinement pending resolution of his appeal. Appellant's application must, perforce, fail as he is no longer
entitled to bail.
Be that as it may, we are not unwilling to accommodate his request for an X-ray and Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (MRI) at St. Luke's Hospital as follow-up examinations for his 1994 slipped-disc operation. It has been
said that while justice is the first virtue of the court, yet admittedly, humanity is the second. Hence, petitioner's
request for the badly needed X-ray and MRI examinations for which the New Bilibid Prison Hospital is
inadequately equipped, as certified to by its Chief Officer, deserves attention. We recall that way back in 1946,
we allowed in Dela Rama v. People's Court, 10 a precedent on which appellant now anchors his application, a
prisoner to be released on bail when his continued detention would be injurious to his health. This trend,
however, has changed with the development of times. Besides, appellant's situation is not akin to Dela Rama's
factual milieu. While appellant now shall be denied bail, nevertheless, we cannot be indifferent to his medical
needs. And by granting appellant's request, the Court is merely performing its supervisory powers over
detainees to safeguard, among others, their proper accommodation and health pursuant to Section 25 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
ACCORDINGLY, the cancellation of appellant's bailbond by public respondent court is AFFIRMED and the
instant application for bail is DENIED for lack of merit. Appellant's request for yan X-ray and MRI
examinations at St. Luke's Hospital is GRANTED which should be conducted at the first opportune time to be
arranged by the Director of the New Bilibid Prison with the responsible officers of the hospital, provided that
appellant shall be at all times subject to the security conditions imposed by the prison's director. The
responsibility for the enforcement of the subject request, as well as the security of the appellant, devolves upon
the Director of the New Bilibid Prison. Upon termination of the medical examinations, appellant shall be
recommitted to prison without delay. As much as possible, any unnecessary publicity should be avoided.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995

MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233 on
November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof,
are challenged by petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this appeal by certiorari through a petition which raises
issues centering mainly on said petitioner's right to be admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-conspirator in the
crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro
City for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was
the mayor at the time. The original information, filed on October 6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of
Gingoog City, 1 had initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion,
Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the alleged
conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr.
However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion
later escaped from prison. The others have remained at large up to the present. 2
In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an amended
information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As herein petitioner was his former
employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the
course of the preliminary investigation therein, said accused, in a signed affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but
which he later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as the supposed mastermind behind the
massacre of the Bucag family. 3
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his resolution of July
7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State Prosecutor
Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case No.
86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989, petitioner was finally charged as
a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information dated October 6, 1992. Petitioner
assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this Court in G.R. No. 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel
P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B.
Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained the
filing of the second amended information against him. 4
Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for petitioner's
apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner through counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a
motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set the same for hearing on November 5, 1992. Petitioner
duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court proceeded to
hear the application for bail. Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo
Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's Office appeared for the prosecution. 5
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to "acute
costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of their client to the
local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail
application, he considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the

trial court that in accordance with the directive of the chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus
Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were
submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge. 6
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving any further
presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated November 5, 1992, the trial court admitted
petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner, apparently
still weak but well enough to travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial
court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also
personally appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case. 7
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later on November 26, 1992
by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition for admission to bail on the day after
the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or
more than six (6) months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals
through a special civil action for certiorari. Thus were the resolution and the order of the trial court granting
bail to petitioner annulled on November 24, 1993, in the decision now under review, on the ground that they
were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 8
Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner's application for bail, he was not yet "in
the custody of the law," apparently because he filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually
arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It further noted that apart from the circumstance that petitioner was
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact
that no bail was recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons it held that the grant of bail was doubly
improvident. Lastly, the prosecution, according to respondent court, was not afforded an opportunity to oppose
petitioner's application for bail contrary to the requirements of due process. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez etc., et al., 9 his filing
of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial court effectively conferred on the latter jurisdiction over his
person. In short, for all intents and purposes, he was in the custody of the law. In petitioner's words, the
"invocation by the accused of the court's jurisdiction by filing a pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court
with jurisdiction over the person of the accused and bring him within the custody of the law."
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the existence of such strong evidence as would
bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the prosecution, by reason of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of
any further presentation of evidence to oppose the application for bail and whose representation in court in
behalf of the prosecution bound the latter, cannot legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural due process.
Finally, petitioner points out that the special civil action for certiorari was filed in respondent court after an
unjustifiable length of time.
On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable and the equities involved in this case, the Court finds
for petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of a person in custody of
the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any court as required under the
conditions specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of

imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. 10 As bail is intended to obtain or
secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the
judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. 11 As this Court has put it in a case "it
would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free." 12
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice whereby
an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court
by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. 13 Thus, in Feliciano vs.
Pasicolan, etc., et al., 14 where the petitioner who had been charged with kidnapping with murder went into
hiding without surrendering himself, and shortly thereafter filed a motion asking the court to fix the amount of
the bail bond for his release pending trial, the Supreme Court categorically pronounced that said petitioner was
not eligible for admission to bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested, detained, or other wise
deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the right to bail.
The person seeking his provisional release under the auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal complaint
or information to be filed against him as it is available to "all persons" 15 where the offense is bailable. The rule
is, of course, subject to the condition or limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law. 16
On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue
of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113
in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. 17 in this light, the
ruling, vis-a-vis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al., 18 should be explained.
In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance
of Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from serious physical
injuries which she sustained in a major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought leave "that she be
considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required
trial and other proceedings." On the basis of said ex-parte motion and the peculiar circumstances obtaining in
that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a cash bail bond for her provisional liberty
without need of her personal appearance in view of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane
consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she question the jurisdiction of that
court over her person in a recourse before this Court, on the ground that "she neither been arrested nor has she
voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally
appeared before said court" In rejecting her arguments, the Court held that she was clearly estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in the urgent ex parte motion for
bail she had earlier recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually posting a cash bail was accepted by
the court, she had effectively submitted to its jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the matter of bail, the
Court took pains to reiterate that the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by
the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail
before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual
ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise
peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the
hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and,
necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is
made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making
the arrest. 19 The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military offenders,
by being "confined to quarters" or restricted to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution
and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he was then confined at
the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain
medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit
knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served
upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the physical custody of the
authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away,
by simply ordering his confinement or placing him under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the
trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never attempted to have him physically restrained.
Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the
application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and,
more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his
knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any intent
to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged
in court, up to the submission application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.
At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital on account of an acute
ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they were easily verifiable. And, as a manifestation of his good
faith and of his actual recognition of the authority of trial court, petitioner's counsel readily informed the court
that they were surrendering custody of petitioner to the president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Misamis Oriental Chapter. 20 In other words, the motion for admission to bail was filed not for the purpose or in
the manner of the former practice which the law proscribes for the being derogatory of the authority and
jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened in Feliciano. There was here no intent or strategy employed to
obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest should the application therefore be denied.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all indictees shall be
allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of
guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in
custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived
considering its personal nature 21 and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the
law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted
incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established
beyond reasonable doubt. 22

Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is
entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances where the
accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment 23
and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the
court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to
specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On
the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the
exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, 24 is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative
of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty
of the applicant. 25 Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the
required quantum. 26
Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be give an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce before the court may resolve the
application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due process. 27 If the prosecution is denied this
opportunity, there would be a denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the court's order in
respect of the motion or petition is void. 28 At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. 29 When, eventually, the
court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. 30 The court, though,
cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay
evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires. 31
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural due process when the
court below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecutor's Office to appear in
behalf of the prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor Henrick P. Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole
government prosecutor expressly authorized to handle the case and who received his copy of the motion only on
the day after the hearing had been conducted. Accordingly, the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo
had no authority at all to waive the presentation of any further evidence in opposition to the application for bail
and to submit the matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that the prosecution
was not afforded "reasonable time" to oppose that application for bail.
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor acted as the collaborating
counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No. 86-39 on the basis of an authority from
then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was sent through radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly
received by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor on the same date. This authorization, which was to be
continuing until and unless it was expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn only on July
12, 1993 by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan
questioned the authority of Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to
enter their appearance as collaborating government prosecutors in said criminal case. 32 It was in fact by virtue
of this arrangement that the same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana entered their
appearance as collaborating prosecutor in the previous hearing in said case. 33 Hence, on the strength of said
authority and of its receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, through
Prosecutor Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing held on November 5, 1992.

Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar with the case, he
nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position of the Regional State Prosecutor's Office on the matter.
Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office received its copy of the motion on the very day when it was sent, that is,
October 28, 1992, duly instructed Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the court that the prosecution was neither
supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the matter to its sound discretion.
Obviously, what this meant was that the prosecution, at that particular posture of the case, was waiving the
presentation of any countervailing evidence. When the court a quo sought to ascertain whether or not that was
the real import of the submission by Prosecutor Abejo, the latter readily answered in the affirmative.
The following exchanges bear this out:
PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:
I was informed to appear in this case just now Your Honor.
COURT:
Where is your Chief of Office? Your office received a copy of the motion as early as October 28. There is an
element of urgency here.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was only informed just now. The one assigned here is State Prosecutor
Perseverando Arena, Jr. who unfortunately is in the hospital attending to his sick son. I do not know about this
but before I came I received an instruction from our Chief to relay to this court the stand of the office regarding
the motion to admit bail. That office is neither supporting nor opposing it and we are submitting to the sound
discretion of the Honorable Court.
COURT:
Place that manifestation on record. For the record, Fiscal Abejo, would you like to formally enter your
appearance in this matter?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office represented by State Prosecutor
Erlindo Abejo.
COURT:
By that manifestation do you want the Court to understand that in effect, at least, the prosecution is dispensing
with the presentation of evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong, the denial . . .
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.

COURT:
Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to submit the incident covered by this particular motion for resolution
by this court?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Without presenting any further evidence?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. 34
It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of Regional State prosecutor
Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the motion for bail and this should be so notwithstanding the
statement that they were "neither supporting nor opposing" the motion. What is of significance is the
manifestation that the prosecution was "submitting (the motion) to the sound discretion of the Honorable
Court." By that, it could not be any clearer. The prosecution was dispensing with the introduction of evidence
en contra and this it did at the proper forum and stage of the proceedings, that is, during the mandatory hearing
for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself that such was the position of the prosecution.
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 35 it was stressed that where the trial court has reasons to believe
that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application for bail is not justified, as when he is evidently
committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must inquire from the
prosecutor concerned as the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. And, in the very
recent administrative matter Re: First Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de Leon, Chief State
Prosecutor, Department of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison,
36
the Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas, etc., 37 held that where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the
motion of the accused, the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there
diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail application.
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed to the trial court here as
regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its
resolution of November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous
adherence to procedural rules. As summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted all means
to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the
omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and
only after sifting through them did the court conclude that petitioner could be provisionally released on bail.
Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up to the present, petitioner has ever committed any
violation of the conditions of his bail.

As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given the opportunity to present its evidence within a
reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate that the Regional State Prosecutor's Office
duly received its copy of the application for bail on the very same day that the it was filed with the trial court on
October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up to the day of the hearing on November 5, 1992, the prosecution
had more than one (1) week to muster such evidence as it would have wanted to adduce in that hearing in
opposition to the motion. Certainly, under the circumstances, that period was more than reasonable. The fact
that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy of the application only on November 6, 1992 is beside the point for,
as already established, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor was authorized to appear for the People.
4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecutor is the indubitably unreasonable period of time that
elapsed before it questioned before the respondent court the resolution and the omnibus order of the trial court
through a special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the delay of more than six (6)
months, or one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable due to the attendant difficulties
which characterized the prosecution of the criminal case against petitioner. But then, the certiorari proceeding
was initiated before the respondent court long after trial on the merits of the case had ensued in the court below
with the active participation of prosecution lawyers, including Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive
rule now in that the special civil action for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of the three
months, 38 the same to be reckoned by taking into account the duration of time that had expired from the
commission of the acts complained to annul the same. 39
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, promulgated on
November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order dated March 29,
1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as well as said respondent court's resolution of April
26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of the Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P.
Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 158763

March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,

vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby
ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October
16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued
by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June
25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal
cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the
apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon
and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later
identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who
is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben
B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused
and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at
that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October
2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession
and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain
Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe,
and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo
Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and
to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued
a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the
resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order
reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest
issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order
dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration
of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22
October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this
Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding
with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21
September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining
order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid
resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for
murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by
O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the
petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge
Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the
Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred
said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondents petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering
the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same
was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order
of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November
14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and
reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the
alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of
the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal
Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial
Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest
against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement
of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the
regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of
arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant
of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only
when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the
court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused
must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot
seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they
filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash
warrants of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction
over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such
jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for bail,
petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:

Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno
(232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the
accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to
hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson
vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the
RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the
above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago
v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing
bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule
the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by
his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the
person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required
for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a
waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 8 Custody of the law is accomplished
either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his
arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his
own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally
custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated
from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of
the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A
person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that
court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed
had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general
rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we

held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being in the
custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure ones release and
it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of law." The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it
discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in
his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein
and compliance with the requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary
appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of
pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a
special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in
criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to
file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a
consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of
the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in
narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there
is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this,
there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point,
where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have
placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for
bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a
warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of
probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest
and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 20 upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in
Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the
Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with
the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.

3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal
cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in
motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law,
it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to
answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal
of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely
entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest
who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can
easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of
the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in force and
effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night. 22
Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable
cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to
surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than
property rights,23 demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not
after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and
based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a
little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of
arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because
of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the
Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a
decision of this Court in another case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue
a temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant
prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the
warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and
because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in
prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the
petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even
if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the
pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of
arrest.

In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the information
in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ
Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should
not have been quashed as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation
of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional proscription,
which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the abovecited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through
[its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by Judge
Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the resolution
of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his
discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the
face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was based on the
certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally made by the Judge. No
presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based
only on the fiscals certification.28
Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such indication that he relied solely on
the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine the existence
of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was accompanied by supporting documents,
following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting documents are the
following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;

2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;

3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III,
Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the
existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2
Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the custody of the
National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a
fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information;
and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City
voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor
Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other." 32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the findings of probable
cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the province of the
determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands
more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner.
Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.

Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there was a petition for
review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of
Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against
the petitioners on the basis of the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based
from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with him and the other police
officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of
murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the
decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001
statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and
therefore the same is without probable value." This Court agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use
is Maderals statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence presented and adduced in
Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with
the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the
summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People
of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect
disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations
[for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the
discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leao case was
presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the
dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even
more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in
Leao that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused
therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the
situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal.
The accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son, whereas petitioners herein had
been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leao, "it is now beyond doubt
that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without
probable value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leao, an acquittal on the
ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecutions version of the facts therein.
Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two days after we resolved to issue,
upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case.

The bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to
beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after
this Courts resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge
Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified
proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the
warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new
warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so,
without a personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the
reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics,
the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this
case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of
Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan, 37 which issued the warrants of arrest.
Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly,
the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set
aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified;
therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a
determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of the
preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available to this Court,
allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the case and not merely
rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of
Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those
cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal
issued therein had become final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is
NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated
in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by
private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;

2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;

3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal
Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the
Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was
filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we
referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001,
around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order,
however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued
on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21
November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent
Tuliaos petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the 14
November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge
Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had
ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001,
antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001
Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding
with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent
Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of
a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to
be heard on the part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just
and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14
November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double
jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his
express motion that the case was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for
contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of
instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge
Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leao, 41 by transferring the venue of Criminal

Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12
June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 363523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this
connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who
is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this Court
compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days
from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance with the
order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases with reasonable
dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of
petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably
with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against
Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 114350 January 16, 1997

JOSE T. OBOSA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The main issue in this case is whether petitioner Jose T. Obosa, who was charged with two (2) counts of murder
(a capital offense) 1 for the ambush slaying of former Secretary of Interior and Local Governments Jaime N.
Ferrer and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, but who was convicted only of two (2) counts of homicide by the trial
court, may be granted bail after such conviction for homicide, a non-capital offense. The Regional Trial Court
of Makati answered in the affirmative but the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise.
Petitioner thus asks this Court to resolve said issue in this petition under Rule 65 assailing the two Resolutions 2
of the respondent Court 3 promulgated on November 19, 1993 and March 9, 1994, respectively. The first
Resolution 4 of November 19, 1993 disposed as follows: 5
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Solicitor General's motion to cancel accused-appellant Jose T. Obosa's
bailbond. The Court NULLIFIES the lower court's order dated May 31, 1990, granting bail to accused Obosa.
Let warrant issue for the arrest of the accused-appellant Jose T. Obosa.
On the same date, November 19, 1993, an Order of Arrest against petitioner was issued under signature of then
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo. 6
On December 7, 1993, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Set Aside and Reconsider
Resolution of November 19,1993. 7 The second assailed Resolution 8 promulgated on March 9, 1994 denied the
motion as follows:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby DENIES accused Obosa's "Motion to quash warrant of arrest and to set
aside and reconsider the resolution of November 19, 1993" dated December 4, 1993, for lack of merit.
Let a copy of this resolution be given to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Manila, so that he may issue
the appropriate directive to the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, for the rectification
of the prison record of accused Jose T. Obosa.
The Facts
Aside from the disagreement as to the date when notice of appeal was actually filed with the trial court, 9 the
facts precedent to this petition are undisputed as set out in the first assailed Resolution, thus: 10
On December 4, 1987, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe charged the accused Jose T. Obosa and three
others with murder on two counts, by separate amended informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 56, for the ambush-slaying of Secretary of Local Governments Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver
Jesus D. Calderon, which occurred on August 2, 1987, at about 6:30 in the evening, at La Huerta, Para()aque,
Metro Manila, as Secretary Ferrer was riding in his car, going to the St. Andrew Church near the plaza of La
Huerta, to hear Sunday mass.

Each information alleged that the killing was with the attendance of the following qualifying/aggravating
circumstances, to wit: treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, nighttime purposely sought,
disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of his rank and age (as to Secretary Ferrer), and by a band.
The Prosecutor recommended no bail, as the evidence of guilt was strong.
During the trial of the two cases, which were consolidated and tried jointly, the accused Obosa was detained at
Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila.
At the time of the commission of the two offenses, the accused Obosa was a virtual "escapee" from the National
Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, particularly, at the Sampaguita Detention Station, where he was
serving a prison term for robbery as a maximum security prisoner.
Indeed, by virtue of a subpoena illegally issued by a judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon,
accused Obosa was escorted out of prison to appear before said judge on the pretext that the judge needed his
presence so that the judge could inquire about the whereabouts of the accused therein. While accused Obosa
was out of prison, he was able to participate in the commission of the double murder now charged against him
as principal for the ambush-slaying of Secretary Ferrer and his driver (Lorenzo vs. Marquez, 162 SCRA 546,
553).
Witnesses positively identified accused Jose T. Obosa as one of three assassins firing at a car near the canteen at
the corner of Victor Medina Street and Quirino Avenue, Para()aque, Metro Manila. It was the car of Secretary
Ferrer. He sustained eight entrance gunshot wounds on the right side of his head, neck and body, while his
driver sustained three entrance wounds on the left temple, right side of the neck, right arm, chest and right hip.
They died on the spot.
In its decision dated May 25, 1990, the lower court found the accused Obosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide
on
two
11
counts. In ruling that the crime committed was homicide, not murder as charged in the informations, the lower
court declared that there was no qualifying circumstance attendant. In fact, however, the lower court itself found
that the accused shot the victims while the latter were inside the car, unwary of any danger to their lives, for
unknown to them, were the assassins lurking in the dark, firing their guns from behind, a circumstance
indubitably showing treachery (People vs. Tachado, 170 SCRA 611, People vs. Juanga, 189 SCRA 226). There
is treachery when the victims were attacked without warning and their backs turned to the assailants, as in this
case (People vs. Tachado, supra). There is treachery when the unarmed and unsuspecting victim was ambushed
in the dark, without any risk to his assailants (People vs. Egaras, 163 SCRA 692). Moreover, the crimes could
be qualified by taking advantage of superior strength and aid of armed men (People vs. Baluyot, 170 SCRA
569). Where the attackers cooperated in such a way to secure advantage of their combined strength, there is
present the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength (People vs. Baluyot, supra; People
vs. Malinao, 184 SCRA 148).
On May 31, 1990, the lower court promulgated its decision and on the same occasion, accused Obosa
manifested his intention to appeal and asked the Court to allow him to post bail for his provisional liberty.
Immediately, the lower court granted accused Obosa's motion and fixed bail at P20,000.00, in each case.
On June 1, 1990, accused Obosa filed a written notice of appeal, dated June 4, 1990, thereby perfecting appeal
from the decision (Alama vs. Abbas, 124 Phil. 1465). By the perfection of the appeal, the lower court thereby

lost jurisdiction over the case and this means both the record and the person of the accused-appellant. The
sentencing court lost jurisdiction or power to do anything or any matter in relation to the person of the accusedappellant (Director of Prisons vs. Teodoro, 97 Phil. 391, 395-396), except to issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties, which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal (People vs.
Aranda, 106 Phil. 1008).
On June 4, 1990, accused Obosa filed a bailbond in the amount of P40,000.00, through Plaridel Surety and
Assurance Company, which the lower court approved. On the same day, June 4, 1990, the lower court issued an
order of release. The prison authorities at the National Penitentiary released accused Obosa also on the same
day notwithstanding that, as hereinabove stated, at the time of the commission of the double murder, accused
Obosa was serving a prison term for robbery.
The respondent Court likewise discoursed on the service of sentence made by the accused. Thus, it extensively
discussed the following computation on the penalties imposed upon the petitioner for his previous offenses,
which all the more convinced respondent Court that petitioner was not entitled to bail on the date he applied
therefor on May 31, 1990 and filed his bailbond on June 4, 1990, as follows: 12
At the time the accused committed the crimes charged, he was an inmate at the National Penitentiary, New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He was in jail, but was able to commit the Ferrer assassination. He
was serving imprisonment by final judgment in each of three (3) cases, namely, (a) theft, for which he was
sentenced to eleven (11) months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional; (b) robbery in band, for which he
was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, and (c)
evasion of service of sentence, for which he was sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor. These sentences
are to be served successively not simultaneously (Article 70, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Reyes, 52 Phil.
538; Gordon vs. Wolfe, 6 Phil. 76; People vs. Medina, 59 Phil. 134; United States vs. Claravall, 31 Phil. 652;
People vs. Olfindo, 47 Phil. 1; People vs. Tan, 50 Phil. 660). In successive service of sentences, the time of the
second sentence did not commence to run until the expiration of the first (Gordon vs. Wolfe, supra).
He commenced service of sentence on October 11,1979 (with credit for preventive imprisonment) and was
admitted to the New Bilibid Prisons on January 5, 1980 (See prison record attached to Supplement, dated
January 31, 1994 of the Solicitor General; Cf. prison record [incomplete] attached to Manifestation dated
February 2, 1994 of the Accused Appellant).
On December 25, 1980, he escaped from detention at Fort Del Pilar, Baguio City, where he was temporarily
working on a prison project (See decision, Grim. Case No. 4159-R, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, People
vs. Jose Obosa y Tutaa). While a fugitive from justice, he committed other crimes, in Quezon City, Makati,
and Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. The cases are pending (See prison record, supra).
He was recaptured on August 27, 1986. Under prison regulations, he forfeited his allowance for good conduct
prescribed by law (Article 97, Revised Penal Code; Act 2489 of the Philippine Legislature). In addition, he must
serve the time spent at large (TSAL) of five (5) years, eight (8) months and two (2) days, and the unserved
portion of his successive sentences for robbery in band, theft and evasion of service of sentence aforementioned.
In sum, he has to serve the balance of his sentence for robbery in band of four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional the sentence for theft of eleven (11) months and fifteen (15) days of prision
correccional; and the sentence for evasion of service of sentence of six (6) months of arresto mayor, reaching a

total of five (5) years, seven (7) months and sixteen (16) days. Since his commitment to jail on October 11,
1979, to the time he escaped on December 25, 1980, he had served one (1) year, two (2) months, and fourteen
(14) days, which, deducted from the totality of his prison term, would leave a balance of four (4) years, five (5)
months and two (2) days. Thus, he must still serve this unserved portion of his sentences in addition to the time
spent at large. Counting the time from his re-arrest on August 27, 1986, and adding thereto five (5) years, eight
(8) months and two (2) days (time spent at large), the result is that he must serve up to April 29, 1992. To this
shall be added the remaining balance of his successive sentences of four (4) years, five (5) months and two (2)
day(s). Consequently, he has to serve sentence and remain in confinement up to October 1, 1996. Of course, he
may be given allowance for good conduct. But good conduct time allowance can not be computed in advance
(Frank vs. Wolfe, 11 Phil. 466). This is counted only during the time an accused actually served with good
conduct and diligence (Frank vs. Wolfe, supra; See Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., pp. 803804). However, accused Obosa can not avail himself of this beneficent provision of the law because, while he
was at large, he committed infraction of prison rules (escaping) and other crimes, including the Ferrer
assassination, and for which he was placed under preventive imprisonment commencing on December 4, 1987,
the date the informations at bar were filed against him. Because he was then under custody, no warrant of arrest
or commitment order need be issued (Asuncion vs. Peralejo, G.R. No. 82915, June 22, 1988, minute resolution;
Cf. People vs. Wilson, 4 Phil. 381; Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311). Allowance for good conduct does not
apply to detention prisoners (Baking vs. Director of Prisons, 28 SCRA 851). Consequently, by all reckoning,
accused Obosa could not be released from prison on June 4, 1990, when he was admitted to bail. His release
was illegal. He still has to serve the balance of his unserved sentences until October 1, 1996.
On September 6, 1993, respondent People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with
respondent Court an urgent motion, 13 praying for cancellation of petitioner's bail bond.
Petitioner promptly filed an opposition, 14 to which respondent People submitted a reply. 15 Thereupon,
respondent Court issued its first questioned Resolution dated November 19, 1993: 16 a) canceling petitioner's
bail bond, b) nullifying the trial court's order of May 31, 1990 which granted bail to petitioner, and c) issuing a
warrant for his immediate arrest.
Petitioner's twin motions for reconsideration 17 and quashal of warrant of arrest proved futile as respondent
Court, on March 9, 1994, after the parties' additional pleadings were submitted and after hearing the parties' oral
arguments, issued its second questioned Resolution denying said motions for lack of merit.
The Issues
The petitioner worded the issue in this case as follows: 18
The principal constitutional and legal issues involved in this petition is (sic) whether petitioner as accusedappellant before the respondent Honorable Court of Appeals is entitled to bail as a matter of right and to enjoy
the bail granted by the Regional Trial Court, in Makati, Metro Manila, pending appeal from the judgment
convicting him of Homicide on two (2) counts though charged with Murder; and assuming that bail is a matter
of discretion, the trial court had already exercised sound discretion in granting bail to accused-appellant, now
petitioner in this case, and respondent Court of Appeals is devoid of jurisdiction in cancelling said bailbond.
The Solicitor General stated the issues more clearly, thus: 19

I
Whether or not the trial court still have (sic) jurisdiction over the case when it approved petitioner's bail bond on
June 4, 1990.
II
Considering that the murder charge against petitioner still stands pending his appeal and strong evidence of guilt
actually exists based on respondent Court of Appeals' own preliminary determination and the lower court's
initial finding as well, is petitioner entitled to bail as a matter of right pending review of his conviction for
homicide?
III
How does petitioner's prison record affect his alleged right to bail?
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Trial Court's Jurisdiction
To decide the issue of whether the cancellation of bail bond by the respondent Court was correct, we deem it
necessary to determine first whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant bail under the circumstances of this
case.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in allowing him "to post bail for his provisional liberty on the
same day, May 31, 1990 when the judgment of conviction of (sic) homicide was promulgated and the accusedappellant (petitioner) manifested his intention to appeal the judgment of conviction. At the time, the lower court
still had jurisdiction over the case as to empower it to issue the order granting bail pending appeal. Appellant
filed his notice of appeal only on June 4, 1990, on which date his appeal was deemed perfected and the lower
court lost jurisdiction over the case. Hence, the grant of bail on May 31, 1990 cannot be validly attacked on
jurisdictional grounds." 20
Through its counsel, the Solicitor General, respondent People admits that petitioner manifested his intention to
appeal on May 31, 1990 and filed his written notice of appeal on June 1, 1990. But the Solicitor General
nevertheless contends that ". . . it was only on June 4, 1990, or three (3) days after perfecting his appeal that
petitioner posted his bail bond in the amount of P40,000.00 through Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company.
Clearly, when the lower court approved the bail bond on the same day June 4, 1990), it no longer had
Jurisdiction over the case." 21
The respondent Court found that "(o)n June 1, 1990, accused Obosa filed a written notice of appeal, dated June
4, 1990, thereby perfecting appeal from the decision . . ." 22
We reviewed the page 23 cited by respondent Court, and found that indeed, the written notice of appeal, although
dated June 4, 1990, was made and actually served upon the trial court on June 1, 1990. Such being the case, did
the trial court correctly approve the bail bond on June 4,1990? To answer this, there is a need to revisit Section
3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or order appealed from, and by serving a copy thereof upon
the adverse party.
xxx xxx xxx
Since petitioner did file the written notice of appeal on June 1, 1990, petitioner's appeal was, perforce,
perfected, without need of any further or other act, and consequently and ineluctably, the trial court lost
jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and over the subject of the case. 24 As has been ruled: 25
The question presented for our resolution is: Did the Court of First Instance that convicted respondent Lacson
have the power and authority to issue the writ of preliminary injunction, prohibiting the transfer of said Lacson
from the provincial hospital of Occidental Negros to the Insular Penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal? While there
is no express provision on this point, it is contrary to the generally accepted principles of procedure for said
court to be invested with said power or authority. A necessary regard for orderly procedure demands that once a
case, whether civil or criminal, has been appealed from a trial court to an appellate (sic) court and the appeal
therefrom perfected, the court a quo loses jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and over the subject of
the case. Thus in civil cases the rule is that after the appeal has been perfected from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance, the trial court losses (sic) jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal (Rule 41, Sec.
9). The jurisdiction of the court over the matters involved in the case is lost by the perfected appeal, save in
those cases which the rules expressly except therefrom. (Emphasis supplied).
But it should be noted that the bail was granted on May 31, 1990 by the trial Court. 26 The validity and
effectivity of the subsequent approval of the bail bond by the trial court on June 4, 1990 is therefore the matter
at issue. We agree with respondent Court and respondent People that, while bail was granted by the trial court
when it had jurisdiction, the approval of the bail bond was done without authority, because by then, the appeal
had already been perfected and the trial court had lost jurisdiction. Needless to say, the situation would have
been different had bail been granted and approval thereof given before the notice of appeal was filed.
As the approval was decreed by the trial court in excess of jurisdiction, then the bailbond was never validly
approved. On this basis alone, regardless of the outcome of the other issues, it is indisputable that the instant
petition should be dismissed.
Second Issue: Is Petitioner Entitled To Bail
As A Matter of Right?
The second issue, while no longer critical to the disposition of this case, will nevertheless be tackled, in view of
its importance. The Solicitor General argues that "(f)or while petitioner was convicted of the lesser offense of
homicide, the fact that he has appealed resultantly throws the whole case open for review and reverts him back
to his original situation as a person charged with the capital offense of murder on two (2) counts against whom a
strong evidence of guilt exists as initially found by the trial court during the bail proceedings a quo." 27
Petitioner answers by saying that "once the accused who is charged with a capital offense is convicted not of the
offense for which he is charged but for a lesser one which is not capital or punished with reclusion perpetua, he

is entitled to bail as a matter of right because the fact that the evidence of his guilt of a capital offense is not
strong is necessarily to be inferred from his conviction of the lesser offense." 28
On this point, respondent Court ratiocinated: 29
In this case, although the accused is charged with murder on two counts, and evidence of guilt is strong, the
lower court found him guilty of homicide also on two (2) counts. He has appealed. An appeal by the accused
throws the whole case open for review and this includes the penalty, the indemnity and the damages awarded by
the trial court which may be increased (Quemuel vs. Court of Appeals, 130 Phil. 33). The appellate court may
find the accused guilty of the original crime charged and impose on him the proper penalty therefor (Linatoc vs.
People, 74 Phil. 586). By virtue of the appeal, the conviction for the lesser offense of homicide is stayed in the
meantime. Hence, the accused is back to the original situation as he was before judgment (Cf . Peo vs. Bocar, 97
Phil. 398), that is, one charged with capital offenses where evidence of guilt is strong. Bail must be denied.
To resolve this issue, we refer to Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
In the case of De la Camara vs. Enage, 30 we analyzed the purpose of bail and why it should be denied to one
charge with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong:
. . . Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the evidence of
guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not
be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is
not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his
defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is
intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a "mode short of
confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused" for the subsequent
trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when
evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him
with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be
resisted. (Emphasis supplied).
The aforequoted rationale applies with equal force to an appellant who, though convicted of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged with a capital
offense. Such appellant can hardly be unmindful of the fact that, in the ordinary course of things, there is a
substantial likelihood of his conviction (and the corresponding penalty) being affirmed on appeal, or worse, the
not insignificant possibility and infinitely more unpleasant prospect of instead being found guilty of the capital
offense originally charged. In such an instance, the appellant cannot but be sorely tempted to flee.
Our Rules of Court, following the mandate of our fundamental law, set the standard to be observed in
applications for bail. Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal procedure, 31 as amended, provides:

Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail
as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of
guilt is strong. (Emphasis supplied).
In Borinaga vs. Tamin, 32 which was promulgated in 1993, this Court laid down the guidelines for the grant of
bail:
The 1987 Constitution provides that all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. Corollarily, the Rules of Court, under Section 3, Rule 114
thereof, provides that all persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right,
except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and
at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
As now revised in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure and provided in Rule 114 thereof, the rules on
availability of bail to an accused may be restated as follows:
1. Admission to bail is a matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge is not for a capital offense or
is not punishable by reclusion perpetua; [Sec. 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Crim. Procedure].
2. Regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, no bail shall be allowed if the accused is charged with a
capital offense or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong; [Idem].
3. Even if a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, the accused may still be admitted to
bail in the discretion of the court if there are strong grounds to apprehend that his continued confinement will
endanger his life or result in permanent impairment of health, [De la Rama vs. People's Court, 43 O.G. No. 10,
4107 (1947)] but only before judgment in the regional trial court; and
4. No bail shall be allowed after final judgment, unless the accused has applied for probation and has not
commenced to serve sentence, [Section 21, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Court] the penalty and offense being within
the purview of the probation law.
However, the above guidelines, along with Rule 114 itself, have since been modified by Administrative Circular
No. 12-94, which was issued by this Court and which came into effect on October 1, 1994. Verily, had herein
petitioner made application for bail after the effectivity of said circular, this case would have been readily and
promptly resolved against petitioner. For, quite recently, in Robin Cario Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 33
we held, making reference to said administrative circular:
Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of
discretion. Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than
twenty (20) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. But when the accused is charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and evidence of guilt is

strong, bail shall be denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor a discretion. If the evidence, however, is not
strong bail becomes a matter of right. (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied).
And, as above adverted to, the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1994
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure the presence of any of which could preclude the grant of bail are as
follows:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.
It will be readily noted that, pursuant to the foregoing amendments, not only does the conviction of petitioner
for two counts of homicide disqualify him from being admitted to bail as a matter of right and subject his bail
application to the sound discretion of the court, but more significantly, the circumstances enumerated in
paragraphs a, b, d and e above, which are present in petitioner's situation, would have justified and warranted
the denial of bail, except that a retroactive application of the said circular in the instant case is barred as it
would obviously be unfavorable to petitioner.
But be that as it may, the rules on bail at the time of petitioner's conviction (i.e., prior to their amendment by
Adm. Circular 12-94) do not favor petitioner's cause either. In Quemuel vs. CA, et al., 34 this Court held that the
appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the penalty, which may be increased.
Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is submitted for review, even factual questions may be increased. Thus, on
appeal, as the entire case is submitted for review, even factual questions may once more be weighed and
evaluated. That being the situation, the possibility of conviction upon the original charge is ever present.
Likewise, if the prosecution had previously demonstrated that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong, as it had
done so in this case, such determination subsists even on appeal, despite conviction for a lesser offense, since
such determination is for the purpose of resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does not have any bearing
on whether petitioner will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of the charge.
We have previously held that, while the accused, after conviction, may upon application be bailed at the
discretion of the court, that discretion particularly with respect to extending the bail should be exercised
not with laxity, but with caution and only for strong reasons, with the end in view of upholding the majesty of
the law and the administration of justice. 35
And the grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused
is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5 which
now specifically provides that, although the grant of bail is discretionary in non-capital offenses, nevertheless,
when imprisonment has been imposed on the convicted accused in excess of six (6) year and circumstances

exist (inter alia, where the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement or evaded
sentence, or there is an undue risk that the accused may commit another crime while his appeal is pending) that
point to a considerable likelihood that the accused may flee if released on bail, then the accused must be denied
bail, or his bail previously granted should be cancelled.
But the same rationale obtained even under the old rules on bail (i.e., prior to their amendment by Adm.
Circular 12-94). Senator Vicente J. Francisco's 36 eloquent explanation on why bail should be denied as a matter
of wise discretion after judgment of conviction reflects that thinking, which remains valid up to now:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where
it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by
conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted
the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon
the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the
probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to
attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. . . .
Third Issue: Petitioner's Record
Petitioner claims that respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding "that at the time the bail was granted and
approved by His Honor of the trial court, he has still to serve sentence and remain in confinement up to October
1, 1996" and hence was not entitled to bail. 37 Petitioner, citing Luis B. Reyes, 38 maintains that the Bureau of
Corrections properly released him from prison on July 18, 1990.
We find it unnecessary to address this issue in the resolution of the instant petition. Having already determined
that the bail bond was approved without jurisdiction and that the Court of Appeals was correct in issuing the
two questioned Resolutions, we thus hold that, petitioner cannot be released from confinement. The
determination of whether or not petitioner should still be imprisoned up to October 1, 1996, and only thereafter
may possibly be released on bail is no longer material for the disposition of this case. Thus, we shall longer
burden ourselves with the resolution of this academic issue.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an accused, who is charged with a
capital offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts must exercise utmost caution in deciding
applications for bail considering that the accused on appeal may still be convicted of the original capital offense
charged and that thus the risk attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be well advised
to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged, to the
appellate court's sound discretion.
We also hold that the trial court had failed to exercise the degree of discretion and caution required under and
mandated by our statutes and rules, for, aside from being too hasty in granting bail immediately after
promulgation of judgment, and acting without jurisdiction in approving the bailbond, it inexplicably ignored the
undeniable fact of petitioner's previous escape from legal confinement as well as his prior convictions.

Upon the other hand, the respondent Court should be commended for its vigilance, discretion and steadfastness.
In ruling against bail, it even scoured the records and found that treachery attended the killing thereby justifying
its action. The trial court's literal interpretation of the law on bail was forcefully debunked by the appellate
courts' excellent disquisition on the rationale of the applicable rules. Truly, law must be understood not by "the
letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life." Law should not be read and interpreted in isolated academic
abstraction nor even for the sake of logical symmetry but always in context of pulsating social realities and
specific environmental facts. Truly, "the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over
patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a
brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice." 39
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the two assailed Resolutions
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.