Sources of the

Modern Self

Concepts of the Self in Modern Philosophy

and Cultural Theory

The Autonomous Self

of the Enlightenment

I think; therefore, I am.

--Rene Descartes

The Autonomous Self of the Enlightenment

The Oath of the Horatii, 1784 Jacques Louis David.

You are unique;you are free; be your

of selfhood that seem natural, incontroverti-

own man; you can do whateveryou want if

ble, fundamentally true. Indeed, we could

you work hard enough; be true to yourself

say that they dont speak to a selfthey

andyour own beliefs; be real; think before

are the self. To possess a "self" involves

you act.

the possession of these qualities and abili-

Chances are, you have heard many

of the above formulations--at least in one
form or another. All of them reflect and require fundamental assumptions about how
to define a "self." In many ways, they are

ties: The self is individual, capable of thinking, free, possesses the capacity for selfcontrol, and remains capable of making
choices beyond the influences of society
and history.

so familiar because they speak to notions

 Moreover, these notions inform the

tities that act in the world). The point here

very assumptions behind educationwhy

is that while the Autonomous Self often ap-

would you attend school at this moment--

pears to be an invisibly presumed founda-

read these words--or generally work hard

tion of how we think of the selfit simply

in school if you didnt to a great degree

is what the self IS the Autonomous Self

subscribe to many of the above state-

is in fact a product of a certain historical

ments? Your very participation in an edu-

period. To think of the self in any other

cational institution presumes on a variety

way may feel oensive, if not downright

of levels that you live as free individuals,

alien: "What? Well, duh--of course we are

capable of using your minds to transform

free-thinking individuals!" And indeed, you

your lives for the better. More broadly, the

are free to feel that waymany would

above ideas are, in fact, assumptions of

agree with you (though perhaps to greater

selfhood built into the very fabric of the

and lesser degrees). The Autonomous Self

U.S. Constitution, to founding notions of

is the self that is presumed in our most fun-

U.S. citizenship, and to the broader mod-

damental institutions and practicesour

ern ideals of Western democracy. All of

legal and educational systems, the world

these terms in fact emerge from a tradition

of business and the marketplace, the pro-

of thinking deeply embedded in a Western

paradigm of subjectivity known in philosophical terms as the Autonomous Self, a
notion of self that, to a great extent, has its
roots in an historical period known as The
Enlightenment.
Generally speaking, most history
books locate The Enlightenment within the
200 years beginning with the life of philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626) to the
French Revolution of 1789. The period saw
the discovery (or recovery) of the truisms of the Autonomous Selfthat we
are fundamentally free in action, totally individual, and free thinking agents (that is, en-

Francis Bacon (156-1626)

3

fessional world, and our social lives all gen-

scheme of things had been distorted by

erally presume, as an unspoken norm, the

the corrupted interests and beliefs of a sys-

participation of individuals who are just

tem that dictated that some humans were

that: Free individuals, in control of their

better than othersan unfortunate situa-

own lives and actions, capable of inde-

tion that resulted in oppressive monarchies

pendent, rational and free thought.

and a terrible class structure, along with

Yet this vision of the self did not always exist. To make things more complicated, Enlightenment thinkers often presented the Autonomous Self as the Natural State of Manimplicitly suggesting, of
course, that any other vision of the self
was and would forever be artificial, unnatural, an unethical violation of the natural

the general devaluation of individual human life. For many, the Enlightenment notion of the Autonomous Self provided a
profoundly necessary critique fundamental
to the liberation of Man from class-based
oppression. The notion of an Autonomous
Self serves as the foundation for the emergence of a modern democratic civilization.

order. According to Enlightenment

Yet, you may pick up on the ironic con-

thought, the Autonomous Self was not a

tradiction here (we could say deconstruc-

theory of the self, not a belief, not one vi-

tion): The need to philosophize the Autono-

sion of the self among others. Rather, and

mous Self as Mans Natural State previous

this is key, for Enlightenment thinkers, the

to philosophy only underscores that the

Autonomous Self is the essence of what it

Autonomous Self might not be particularly

means to be human, the defining aspect of

natural. The ironies are also present, as

our nature. For Enlightenment thinkers,

many have pointed out, in the Enlighten-

then, to theorize the Autonomous Self was

ments general tendency to overlook the

not to conceive a philosophy of the

Natural rights of anyone who happened

human. Instead, Enlightenment thinkers

not to be white or, in fact, a "Man. That

sought to return Man from the artificiality

is, while the Autonomous Self is often pre-

of belief itself, back to his rightfully natural

sented as the Natural State of the Human

state. The vision of the Autonomous Self

Individual, many philosophers see it as the

was the vision of truth, free from any dis-

Constructed Product of a certain historical

torted perception of reality. According to

period that also privileged certain Men

this general view, previous to the Enlighten-

over others (like women, non-white peo-

ment, Mans naturally free place in the

The Death of Socrates, 1787 (Below) Jacques Louis Davids painting exemplifies the Enlightenment eras preoccupation
with a classical ideal: The stoic commitment to reason and truth, even the face of death.

ple, and any Man who didnt own a hefty

tract of real estate).
The point here is not to badmouth
the Autonomous Self as merely wrong, outdated, sexist, racist, and contradicted. In
fact, while the Autonomous Self emerges
from an oppressive history, the concepts
and language of autonomous selfhood
have also driven the various cultural movements mobilized to challenge oppression.
Moreover, there is genuine value to the
idea of an autonomous self. I like to be
free and have choices. And I like to be an
individual. I wear red pants. I have the

freedom to wear red pants; I have the reflective, rational capacity to make the choice
to wear red pants, and this choice reflects
my individuality, despite my social or historical moment (what if others in my social/
historical moment find red pants somehow
inappropriate or immoral?). We rehearse
notions of the Autonomous Self in everyday lifeevery time we make claims about
our uniqueness, our capacity for rational
judgment, and even our commitment to
the value of freedom, we owe a deep allegiance to a history of selfhood that goes

back at least 400 years. (I say at least 400

In other words, the American and French

years because the Enlightenment thinkers

Revolutions both emerged in the name of

themselves were building o a history

the Autonomous Self.

rooted in the Classic Philosophy of Ancient

Greece and Rome.) The concept of the
Autonomous Self is the basis of our democracy, the idea that every citizen has
the freedom and rational capacity to vote
and choose a government. Indeed, the
word Autonomous (combing auto
meaning self and nomous meaning
law or order) literally means Self-Law
or Self Ordering. The Autonomous Self
is a self that has the intellectual ability and
freedom to create and live under her or his

Of course, the notion of the Autono-

mous Self can also generate some logical

problems. The very fact that I inherited my
ideas about individuality from a culture arguably belies or exposes my status as a
de-individualized subject of my culture.
(Why do I value individuality in the first
place? Some cultures dont.) In other
words, the very idea of the Autonomous
Self that is free from cultural and social
rules is itself a cultural and social inven-

own laws.

tionthe more we claim our belief in the

This is, certainly, a very optimistic--

strate our immersion in a history of cultural

very Humanist--notion of the self, and very

norms that emphasizes the importance of

liberating. Because humans have the ca-

autonomy (you may have noticed that the

pacity to use reason, they have the capac-

latter argument serves as yet another ex-

ity to make their own choices about how

ample of deconstructive thinking.) On the

to live; the Autonomous Self does not

other hand, we could not explore these

need to be ruled over by a monarch or

ideas here without our mutual capacity for

some privileged aristocracy because hu-

reason, and I could not write these ideas

mans, as rational beings, have the ability

here without my individual freedom to do

to rule themselves. No wonder this idea of

so. We need to reinforce that the notion of

self led to so many revolutions against

the Autonomous Self may not be more

rather oppressive monarchs in the 18th

wrong nor right than any other notion of

centuryboth the American Revolution

self. This is for you to decide. (You have

and the French Revolution were waged in

the Autonomy to reason and decide for

the name of liberating autonomous selves

yourself! Or do you???) My goal is to ar-

autonomous self, the more we demon-

from the oppression of unjust monarchs.

ticulate this model of selfhood as one of

pied with the nature and makeup of the

many sources of the modern self.

self.

As we shall explore further, the En-

Moreover, what is known as the En-

lightenment does not refer to a single set

lightenment notion of the Autonomous

of ideas. The Enlightenment was a diverse

Self, despite its persistence and popularity

period, filled with equally diverse, often

in Western culture, has come under vari-

conflicting voices. The Enlightenment idea

ous and complex criticism over the past

of the Autonomous Self also refers to a

200+ years. Nevertheless, the Enlighten-

large range of often-contradictory claims

ment development of the Autonomous Self

about human nature. In the same way that

set the stage for Modern Selfhood. Did

key developments in Enlightenment

the individual Self serve as a reliable site

thought, and early modern thought in gen-

for the ordering of experience and knowl-

eral, first posed the question of the self as

edge through reason? Or is the Self an un-

a free, autonomous and rational being

stable site of disorder, subject to influence

(what we call the individual), we can also

beyond its capacity for rational aware-

find there the seeds of radical attacks on

ness? After the Enlightenment, these two

this model, attacks which have aimed ei-

sides of the individual Modern Self be-

ther to replace it with a dierent model, or

came an unavoidable topic of debate.

to abandon the whole idea of the Autonomous Self altogether. In other words, the
very fact that it became necessary to define subjectivity at a certain moment in
Western thought, that traditional practices
and languages of selfhood were no longer
to be taken for granted, opened up a field
of contention, crisis and perpetual reevaluation of the self. The self became an
issue, a problem and question--a point of
fundamental instability in the world. It was
the Enlightenment that made the modern
era the era of the subject, an era preoccu-

I think; therefore, I am.

Despite their reduction into philosophi-

cal clich, the words I think; therefore, I

am carry profound resonance and importance for our discussion of the Enlightenment model of the Autonomous Self. The
words come from the French Enlightenment Philosopher Rene Descartes (15961650). Descartes originally penned the

I think; therefore, I am.

You may very well have heard these

words floating around: "I think; therefore, I

am." You may even have given some
thought to the meaning of these words. I
remember having heard them in high
school, thinking, I think; therefore, I am?
Oh yeah, makes sense Now wheres the
remote? Seinfeld is on. Of course, I went
to school on the other side of the tracks. I
didnt start thinking until I was 20. Before

phrase in Latin, Cogito ergo sumhence

the tendency to refer to the term as the
"Cartesian Cogito." (Cartesian is the adjective used to describe all things Descartessort of like people using the phrase
Matsonian to refer to debilitatingly awkward self-consciousness), or simply the
Cogito (by the way, this would be a great
name for an egotistical superhero--"I am
the COGITO!" or maybe a pretentious coffee drink--"I'll have a half-ca Cogito with
soy, please." Just saying.)

then, my life was merely a hazy collection

I am tempted to explain the notion of the

of TV shows, flirting, legos, and the perpet-

Cogito to you, but Im done with

ual attempt to avoid getting the crap beat

explaining--I mean, I just wrote a long

of me by big dudes (not always in the afore-

freakn introduction to the Autonomous

mentioned order). You all, however, go to

Self! So you get to close read The Co-

Chadwick, so you have the chance to think

gito for yourselves. The Cogito appears

nowlucky you!

in the second of Descartes Meditations, a

series of reflections in which Descartes en-

one actually exists? And, as I have men-

deavors to establish what he can know

tioned, he had a hard time proving he actu-

with certainty--beyond all doubt. Let me

ally existed. (I have always found this fact

explain. Ever ask yourself if everything

rather hilarious.) So, how do we know we

you know merely exists as just one big illu-

exits? What gives us certainty of our be-

sory dream? Of course you have! I ask

ing in the world? For Descartes, his notion

myself this question all the time--right now,

of the Cogito serves as his conclusion: The

for instance. Where am I? What was I talk-

phrase I think therefore I am represents

ing about again? Am I dreaming? Oh

the only way Descartes can convince him-

yeah Descartes basically wonders if the

self that he actually exists. And then he

world is all one big dream, but he then

died--I mean, not like right away, but even-

works backward and tries to figure out

tually. Poor Descartes! But dont take my

what he actually CAN be sure is not a

word for it; read him yourself.

dream. In other words, Descartes wants

to verify what he can know for certain exists as real. And he's particularly interested in verifying the reality of his existence. Sounds easy--I know. But then,
actually--verifying the reality of your existence gets kind of dicey. (I mean, what if I
gave you an assignment with the prompt:
Prove that you exist. What if you failed
this assessment? Funny, no? No? OK, I
know.) Descartes asks himself how he can
know for sure that he exists, and he has a
wonderfully hard time coming up with a
convincing answer. He really needed to
get out more--maybe go on a date, find
some romance or something, you know?
Apparently, he only left his house to walk
around his garden--fun guy. In any event,
he wanted to prove the reality of his existence. How can one know for sure that
9

Descartes

I imagined that it was something extremely

MEDITATION II

ether, which was spread throughout my

rare and subtle like a wind, a flame, or an

grosser parts. As to body I had no manner

Of the Nature of the Human Mind; and that

of doubt about its nature, but thought I

it is More Easily Known than the Body

had a very clear knowledge of it; and if I

What then did I formerly believe myself to be? Undoubtedly I believed myself
to be a man. But what is a man? Shall I
say a reasonable animal? Certainly not; for
then I should have to inquire what an animal is, and what is reasonable; and thus
from a single question I should insensibly
fall into an infinitude of others more dicult; and I should not wish to waste the little time and leisure remaining to me in trying to unravel subtleties like these. But I
shall rather stop here to consider the
thoughts which of themselves spring up in
my mind, and which were not inspired by
anything beyond my own nature alone
when I applied myself to the consideration
of my being. In the first place, then, I considered myself as having a face, hands,
arms, and all that system of members composed of bones and flesh as seen in a

had desired to explain it according to the

notions that I had then formed of it, I
should have described it thus: By the body
I understand all that which can be defined
by a certain figure: something which can
be confined in a certain place, and which
can fill a given space in such a way that
every other body will be excluded from it;
which can be perceived either by touch, or
by sight, or by hearing, or by taste, or by
smell: which can be moved in many ways
not, in truth, by itself, but by something
which is foreign to it, by which it is
touched [and from which it receives impressions]: for to have the power of selfmovement, as also of feeling or of thinking,
I did not consider to appertain to the nature of body: on the contrary, I was rather
astonished to find that faculties similar to
them existed in some bodies.

corpse which I designated by the name of

But what am I, now that I suppose

body. In addition to this I considered that I

that there is a certain genius which is ex-

was nourished, that I walked, that I felt,

tremely powerful, and, if I may say so, mali-

and that I thought, and I referred all these

cious, who employs all his powers in de-

actions to the soul: but I did not stop to

ceiving me? Can I arm that I possess the

consider what the soul was, or if I did stop,

least of all those things which I have just

10

said pertain to the nature of body? I pause

And what more? I shall exercise my

to consider, I revolve all these things in my

imagination [in order to see if I am not

mind, and I find none of which I can say

some- thing more]. I am not a collection of

that it pertains to me. It would be tedious

members which we call the human body: I

to stop to enumerate them. Let us pass to

am not a subtle air distributed through

the attributes of soul and see if there is any

these members, I am not a wind, a fire, a

one which is in me? What of nutrition or

vapour, a breath, nor anything at all which I

walking [the first mentioned]? But if it is so

can imagine or conceive; because I have

that I have no body it is also true that I can

assumed that all these were nothing. With-

neither walk nor take nourishment. An-

out changing that supposition I find that I

other attribute is sensation. But one can-

only leave myself certain of the fact that I

not feel without body, and besides I have

am somewhat. But perhaps it is true that

thought I perceived many things during

these same things which I supposed were

sleep that I recognized in my waking mo-

non-existent because they are unknown to

ments as not having been experienced at

me, are really not dierent from the self

all. What of thinking? I find here that

which I know. I am not sure about this, I

thought is an attribute that belongs to me;

shall not dispute about it now; I can only

it alone cannot be separated from me. I

give judgment on things that are known to

am, I exist, that is certain. But how often?

me. I know that I exist, and I inquire what I

Just when I think; for it might possibly be

am, I whom I know to exist. But it is very

the case if I ceased entirely to think, that I

certain that the knowledge of my existence

should likewise cease altogether to exist. I

taken in its precise significance does not

do not now admit anything which is not

depend on things whose existence is not

necessarily true: to speak accurately I am

yet known to me; consequently it does not

not more than a thing which thinks, that is

depend on those which I can feign in imagi-

to say a mind or a soul, or an understand-

nation. And indeed the very term feign in

ing, or a reason, which are terms whose

imagination1 proves to me my error, for I

significance was formerly unknown to me.

really do this if I image myself a something,

I am, however, a real thing and really exist;

since to imagine is nothing else than to

but what thing? I have answered: a thing

contemplate the figure or image of a corpo-

which thinks.

real thing. But I already know for certain

that I am, and that it may be that all these
images, and, speaking generally, all things
11

that relate to the nature of body are noth-

averse from being deceived, who imagines

ing but dreams [and chimeras]. For this rea-

many things, sometimes indeed despite

son I see clearly that I have as little reason

his will, and who perceives many likewise,

to say, I shall stimulate my imagination in

as by the intervention of the bodily or-

order to know more distinctly what I am,

gans? Is there nothing in all this which is

than if I were to say, I am now awake, and

as true as it is certain that I exist, even

I perceive somewhat that is real and true:

though I should always sleep and though

but because I do not yet perceive it dis-

he who has given me being employed all

tinctly enough, I shall go to sleep of ex-

his ingenuity in deceiving me? Is there like-

press purpose, so that my dreams may

wise any one of these attributes which can

rep- resent the perception with greatest

be distinguished from my thought, or

truth and evidence. And, thus, I know for

which might be said to be separated from

certain that nothing of all that I can under-

myself? For it is so evident of itself that it

stand by means of my imagination belongs

is I who doubts, who understands, and

to this knowledge which I have of myself,

who desires, that there is no reason here

and that it is necessary to recall the mind

to add anything to explain it. And I have

from this mode of thought with the utmost

certainly the power of imagining likewise;

diligence in order that it may be able to

for although it may happen (as I formerly

know its own nature with perfect distinct-

supposed) that none of the things which I

ness.

imagine are true, nevertheless this power

But what then am I? A thing which

thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a
thing which doubts, understands [conceives], arms, denies, wills, refuses,
which also imagines and feels. Certainly it
is no small matter if all these things pertain
to my nature. But why should they not so
pertain? Am I not that being who now
doubts nearly everything, who nevertheless understands certain things, who affirms that one only is true, who denies all
the others, who desires to know more, is

of imagining does not cease to be really in

use, and it forms part of my thought. Finally, I am the same who feels, that is to
say, who perceives certain things, as by
the organs of sense, since in truth I see
light, I hear noise, I feel heat. But it will be
said that these phenomena are false and
that I am dreaming. Let it be so; still it is at
least quite certain that it seems to me that
I see light, that I hear noise and that I feel
heat. That cannot be false; properly speaking it is what is in me called feeling;2 and

12

used in this precise sense that is no other

not indeed bodies in general, for these gen-

thing than thinking.

eral ideas are usually a little more con-

From this time I begin to know what I

am with a little more clearness and distinctness than before; but nevertheless it still
seems to me, and I cannot prevent myself
from thinking, that corporeal things, whose
images are framed by thought, which are
tested by the senses, are much more distinctly known than that obscure part of me
which does not come under the imagination. Although really it is very strange to
say that I know and understand more distinctly these things whose existence
seems to me dubious, which are unknown
to me, and which do not belong to me,
than others of the truth of which I am convinced, which are known to me and which
pertain to my real nature, in a word, than
myself. But I see clearly how the case
stands: my mind loves to wander, and cannot yet suer itself to be retained within
the just limits of truth. Very good, let us
once more give it the freest rein, so that,
when afterwards we seize the proper occasion for pulling up, it may the more easily
be regulated and controlled.
Let us begin by considering the commonest matters, those which we believe to
be the most distinctly comprehended, to
wit, the bodies which we touch and see;

fused, but let us consider one body in particular. Let us take, for example, this piece
of wax: it has been taken quite freshly from
the hive, and it has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey which it contains; it still
retains somewhat of the odor of the flowers from which it has been culled; its color,
its figure, its size are apparent; it is hard,
cold, easily handled, and if you strike it
with the finger, it will emit a sound. Finally
all the things which are requisite to cause
us distinctly to recognize a body, are met
with in it. But notice that while I speak and
approach the fire what remained of the
taste is exhaled, the smell evaporates, the
color alters, the figure is destroyed, the
size increases, it becomes liquid, it heats,
scarcely can one handle it, and when one
strikes it, no sound is emitted. Does the
same wax remain after this change? We
must confess that it remains; none would
judge otherwise. What then did I know so
distinctly in this piece of wax? It could certainly be nothing of all that the senses
brought to my notice, since all these things
which fall under taste, smell, sight, touch,
and hearing, are found to be changed, and
yet the same wax remains.
Perhaps it was what I now think, viz.
that this wax was not that sweetness of

13

honey, nor that agreeable scent of flowers,

must then grant that I could not even un-

nor that particular whiteness, nor that fig-

derstand through the imagination what this

ure, nor that sound, but simply a body

piece of wax is, and that it is my mind

which a little while before appeared to me

alone which perceives it. I say this piece of

as perceptible under these forms, and

wax in particular, for as to wax in general it

which is now perceptible under others. But

is yet clearer. But what is this piece of wax

what, precisely, is it that I imagine when I

which cannot be understood excepting by

form such conceptions? Let us attentively

the [understanding or] mind? It is certainly

consider this, and, abstracting from all that

the same that I see, touch, imagine, and fi-

does not belong to the wax, let us see

nally it is the same which I have always be-

what remains. Certainly nothing remains ex-

lieved it to be from the beginning. But what

cepting a certain extended thing which is

must particularly be observed is that its

flexible and movable. But what is the mean-

perception is neither an act of vision, nor

ing of flexible and movable? Is it not that I

of touch, nor of imagination, and has never

imagine that this piece of wax being round

been such although it may have appeared

is capable of becoming square and of

formerly to be so, but only an intuition of

passing from a square to a tri- angular fig-

the mind, which may be imperfect and con-

ure? No, certainly it is not that, since I

fused as it was formerly, or clear and dis-

imagine it admits of an infinitude of similar

tinct as it is at present, according as my at-

changes, and I nevertheless do not know

tention is more or less directed to the ele-

how to compass the infinitude by my imagi-

ments which are found in it, and of which it

nation, and consequently this conception

is composed.

which I have of the wax is not brought

about by the faculty of imagination. What
now is this extension? Is it not also unknown? For it becomes greater when the
wax is melted, greater when it is boiled,
and greater still when the heat increases;
and I should not conceive [clearly] according to truth what wax is, if I did not think
that even this piece that we are considering is capable of receiving more variations
in extension than I have ever imagined. We

Yet in the meantime I am greatly astonished when I consider [the great feebleness of mind] and its proneness to fall [insensibly] into error; for although without
giving expression to my thoughts I consider all this in my own mind, words often
impede me and I am almost deceived by
the terms of ordinary language. For we say
that we see the same wax, if it is present,
and not that we simply judge that it is the

14

same from its having the same color and

tinct? What was there which might not as

figure. From this I should conclude that I

well have been perceived by any of the ani-

knew the wax by means of vision and not

mals? But when I distinguish the wax from

simply by the intuition of the mind; unless

its external forms, and when, just as if I

by chance I remember that, when looking

had taken from it its vestments, I consider

from a window and saying I see men who

it quite naked, it is certain that although

pass in the street, I really do not see them,

some error may still be found in my judg-

but infer that what I see is men, just as I

ment, I can nevertheless not perceive it

say that I see wax. And yet what do I see

thus without a human mind.

from the window but hats and coats which

may cover automatic machines? Yet I
judge these to be men. And similarly solely
by the faculty of judgment which rests in
my mind, I comprehend that which I be-

But finally what shall I say of this

mind, that is, of myself, for up to this point
I do not admit in myself anything but
mind? What then, I who seem to perceive

lieved I saw with my eyes.

this piece of wax so distinctly, do I not

A man who makes it his aim to raise

truth and certainty, but also with much

his knowledge above the common should

more distinctness and clearness? For if I

be ashamed to derive the occasion for

judge that the wax is or exists from the

doubting from the forms of speech in-

fact that I see it, it certainly follows much

vented by the vulgar; I prefer to pass on

more clearly that I am or that I exist myself

and consider whether I had a more evident

from the fact that I see it. For it may be

and perfect conception of what the wax

that what I see is not really wax, it may

was when I first perceived it, and when I

also be that I do not possess eyes with

believed I knew it by means of the external

which to see anything; but it cannot be

senses or at least by the common sense

that when I see, or (for I no longer take ac-

as it is called, that is to say by the imagina-

count of the distinction) when I think I see,

tive faculty, or whether my present concep-

that I myself who think am nought. So if I

tion is clearer now that I have most care-

judge that the wax exists from the fact that

fully examined what it is, and in what way

I touch it, the same thing will follow, to wit,

it can be known. It would certainly be ab-

that I am; and if I judge that my imagina-

surd to doubt as to this. For what was

tion, or some other cause, whatever it is,

there in this first perception which was dis-

persuades me that the wax exists, I shall

know myself, not only with much more

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still conclude the same. And what I have

which one was accustomed for so long, it

here remarked of wax may be applied to

will be well that I should halt a little at this

all other things which are external to me

point, so that by the length of my medita-

[and which are met with outside of me].

tion I may more deeply imprint on my mem-

And further, if the [notion or] perception of

ory this new knowledge.

wax has seemed to me clearer and more

distinct, not only after the sight or the
touch, but also after many other causes
have rendered it quite manifest to me, with
how much more [evidence] and distinctness must it be said that I now know myself, since all the reasons which contribute
to the knowledge of wax, or any other
body whatever, are yet better proofs of the
nature of my mind! And there are so many
other things in the mind itself which may
contribute to the elucidation of its nature,
that those which depend on body such as
these just mentioned, hardly merit being
taken into account.
But finally here I am, having insensibly reverted to the point I desired, for, since it is
now manifest to me that even bodies are
not properly speaking known by the
senses or by the faculty of imagination, but
by the understanding only, and since they
are not known from the fact that they are
seen or touched, but only because they
are understood, I see clearly that there is
nothing which is easier for me to know
than my mind. But because it is dicult to
rid oneself so promptly of an opinion to

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Lets Discuss!
1. What problem does Descartess notion of the Cogito try to solve?Do you agree
or disagree with Descartes conclusion? Why or why not?

2. In what ways does the Cogito correspond to what we are calling the Autonomous Self?

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3. What is the potential good or bad of the Cogito?

4. Is anything missing from the Cogito?

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5. Develop your own discussion question.

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