Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167952

February 1, 2012

GONZALO PUYAT & SONS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
RUBEN ALCAIDE (deceased), substituted by GLORIA ALCAIDE,
representative of the Farmer-Beneficiaries, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision1 dated February 1, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 86069, and the Resolution2 dated April 25, 2005
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The procedural and factual antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Gonzalo Puyat and Sons, Inc. is the registered owner of 14
parcels of land with an aggregate area of 43.7225 hectares located at
Barangays Langkiwa and Timbao, Bian, Laguna, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-19884, T-19855, T-19856, T-19857, T-19858, T19859, T-201524, T-202285, T-207476, T-207477, T-207478, T-207479, T207481, T-208151.3
On April 14, 1998, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) issued
a Notice of Coverage over the subject landholding informing petitioner
that the subject properties were being considered for distribution under
the governments agrarian reform program.4 Thereafter, on November
15, 1998, the corresponding Notice of Valuation and Acquisition5 was
issued informing petitioner that a 37.7353-hectare portion of its property
is subject to immediate acquisition and distribution to qualified agrarian
reform beneficiaries and that the government is offering P7,071,988.80
as compensation for the said property.
Petitioner then filed a Petition6 before the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), wherein it argued that the properties were bought from
their previous owners in good faith; that the same remains uncultivated,
unoccupied, and untenanted up to the present; and, that the subject
landholdings were classified as industrial, thus, exempt from the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner prayed, among other things, that the Notice of Coverage and
Notice of Acquisition be lifted and that the properties be declared
exempt from the coverage of CARP.7
Respondents8 on their part countered, among other things, that the

classification of the land as industrial did not exempt it from the

coverage of the CARP considering that it was made only in 1997; the
HLURB9 certification that the Municipality of Bian, Laguna does not
have any approved plan/zoning ordinance to date; that they are not
among those farmer-beneficiaries who executed the waivers or
voluntary surrender; and, that the subject landholdings were planted
with palay.10
On June 8, 2001, then DAR Secretary Hernani A. Braganza, issued an
Order11 in favor of the respondent declaring that the subject properties
are agricultural land; thus, falling within the coverage of the CARP, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued dismissing
the petition. The MARO/PARO concerned is directed to immediately
proceed with the acquisition of subject landholdings under CARP,
identify the farmer-beneficiaries and generate/issue the corresponding
Certificates of Land Ownership Awards pursuant to Section 16 of RA
6657.
SO ORDERED.12
On July 24, 2001, respondents filed a Motion for the Issuance of an
Order of Finality of Judgment13 praying that an Order of Finality be
issued for petitioners failure to interpose a motion for reconsideration
or an appeal from the order of the DAR Secretary.
On August 3, 2001, the DAR issued an Order14 granting the motion and
directing that an Order of Finality be issued. Consequently, on August 6,
2001, an Order of Finality15 quoting the dispositive portion of the June
8, 2001 Order of the DAR Secretary was issued.
On August 17, 2001, petitioner received a copy of the Orders dated
August 3 and 6, 2001. Thereafter, on August 20, 2001, petitioner filed a
Motion to Lift Order of Finality.16
On August 28, 2001, petitioners counsel filed a Manifestation with
Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Early Resolution17informing the DAR of his
new office address and praying that the petition be resolved at the
earliest convenient time and that he be furnished copies of dispositions
and notices at his new and present address.
In a Letter18 sent to the new address of petitioners counsel, dated
September 4, 2001, Director Delfin B. Samson of the DAR informed
petitioners counsel that the case has been decided and an order of
finality has already been issued, copies of which were forwarded to his
last known address. Nevertheless, Director Samson attached copies of
the Order dated June 8, 2001 and the Order of Finality dated August 6,
2001 for his reference.

On September 14, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration

with Manifestation,19 questioning the Orders dated June 8, 2001 and
August 6, 2001 and praying that the said Orders be set aside and a new
one issued granting the petition.
On September 21, 2001, the DAR issued an Order20 directing the parties
to submit their respective memoranda.
On November 5, 2001, the DAR issued an Order21 denying the motion
for reconsideration, which was received by petitioners counsel on
November 15, 2001.22
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Office of the President
which was received by the latter on November 21, 2001.23 The case was
docketed as O.P. Case No. 01-K-184.
On August 8, 2003, the Office of the President rendered a Decision24 in
favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Orders dated 08 June 2001 and
05 November 2001 of the DAR Secretary are hereby SET ASIDE and the
Notice of Coverage dated April 14, 1998 and Notice of Acquisition dated
November 15, 1998 issued over the subject land LIFTED, without
prejudice to the conduct of an ocular inspection to determine the
classification of the land.
Parties are to INFORM this Office, within five (5) days from notice, of the
dates of their receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.25
On March 24, 2004, there being no appeal or motion for reconsideration
interposed despite clear showing that both parties had received their
copies of the August 8, 2003 Decision, the Office of the President issued
an Order26 declaring that the decision has become final and executory.
Subsequently, respondents27 filed a Petition for Relief28 seeking that
the above Decision and Order of the Office of the President be set aside
and the Orders of the DAR Secretary reinstated.
On July 2, 2004, the Office of the President, treating the Petition for
Relief as a motion for reconsideration, issued an Order dismissing the
same, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the "Petition for Relief" dated 3
May 2004, which is treated herein as a motion for reconsideration, filed
by Ruben Alcaide is hereby DISMISSED. No further motions for
reconsideration or other pleadings of similar import shall be
entertained.
SO ORDERED.29
Respondents then sought recourse before the CA assailing the Decision

dated August 8, 2003 and Order dated July 2, 2004 of the Office of the
President.30 In support of the petition, respondents raised the following
errors:
I. the honorable office of the president committed a reversible
error when it reversed and/or set aside the orders dated june 8,
and November 5, 2001 of the dar secretary despite the finality of
the said orders;
II. the honorable office of the president erred when it ruled that the
subject property is not agricultural.31
On February 1, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision32 granting the petition
in favor of the respondents, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is hereby
GRANTED. The decision dated August 8, 2003 and the order dated July
2, 2004 of the Office of the President in O.P. CASE No. 01-K-184 are SET
ASIDE for being null and void. The orders dated June 8 2001 and August
6, 2001 of the DAR Secretary are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.33
Ruling in favor of the respondents, the CA opined that the Order of the
DAR Secretary dated June 8, 2001 has become final and executory by
petitioners failure to timely interpose his motion for reconsideration.
Consequently, when petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on
September 14, 2001, the order sought to be reconsidered has attained
finality. Thus, the Office of the President had no jurisdiction to reevaluate, more so, reverse the findings of the DAR Secretary in its Order
dated June 8, 2001.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
I
The court of appeals erred in giving due course to the petition as it
is basic in law that no appeal may be taken from the denial of a
petition for relief.
II
The court of appeals erred in holding that the order dated 8 june
2001 issued by the DAR secretary in ADM case no. a-9999-04-e-01
is already final and executory.
Petitioner argues that respondents availed of the wrong mode of
recourse to the CA. Petitioner maintains that under Section 1 (b), Rule
41 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, no appeal may be taken from
an order denying a petition for relief. The only remedy available to a
party aggrieved by the denial of a petition for relief is a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. Thus, when respondents

appealed the denial by way of a petition for review to the appellate

court, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright.
More importantly, petitioner contends that the CA erred when it reversed
the findings of the Office of the President and concluded that the Order
dated June 8, 2001 has become final and executory thereby rendering
the Office of the President without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal
filed by the petitioner. Petitioner insists that based on the sequence of
events, the Order dated June 8, 2001 never attained finality, since it was
only on September 7, 2001 that its counsel received a copy of the said
order. Thus, when it filed its motion for reconsideration on September
14, 2001, it was well within the reglementary period to file the same.
Hence, petitioners consequent appeal to the Office of the President
upon denial of its motion for reconsideration was also timely filed.
Moreover, petitioner posits that it is the Decision of the Office of the
President that has become final and executory by reason of
respondents failure to file any motion for reconsideration or to perfect
an appeal after receiving a copy of the Decision.
On their part, respondents maintain that the Order dated June 8, 2001
has become final and executory thereby binding the petitioner, and that
the CA did not err in reversing the Decision of the Office of the
President.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies are now required to be brought to the CA, under the
requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43. Under the rule,
appeals from their judgments and final orders are now brought to the
CA on a verified petition for review. This Rule was adopted precisely to
provide a uniform rule of appellate procedure from quasi-judicial
agencies.34
In the case at bar, the petition for relief filed by the respondents was
treated by the Office of the President as a motion for reconsideration.
However, the Office of the President dismissed the petition based on the
premise that respondents failed to file a motion for reconsideration or
an appeal within the 15-day reglementary period, thereby rendering the
August 8, 2003 Decision final and executory. Thus, respondents availed
of the proper remedy when it sought recourse to the CA via a petition
for review.
Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural
right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege and may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with
the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is

lost.35
Anent, the main controversy. Simply put, the resolution of the issues
advanced by the parties hinges on whether or not the Order dated June
8, 2001 of the DAR Secretary has become final and executory. A perusal
of the pertinent pleadings and documents would reveal that indeed,
petitioner was not properly served with a copy of the Order dated June
8, 2001.
Respondents buttressed their claim that petitioner belatedly filed its
motion for reconsideration within the period allowed by the Rules on
the strength of petitioners declaration in its Motion to Lift Order of
Finality,36 particularly on the following admission:
5. That the undersigned only received said Orders on 17 August 2001.37
However, analyzing the subject of the said motion, it is clear that
petitioner was referring only to the receipt of the Order of Finality dated
August 6, 200138 and not the Order dated June 8, 2001. Although
petitioner cited the dispositive portion of the June 8, 2001 Order, it is
apparent that petitioner merely quoted the same from the body of the
Order of Finality. Petitioner even erroneously dated the Order to June 2,
2001 instead of June 8, 2001.39
Moreover, confirming petitioners allegation that it did not receive a
copy of the June 8, 2001 Order, the DAR Secretary in his Order denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration dated November 5, 2001,
categorically stated that petitioner was not furnished a copy of the June
8, 2001 Order, the pertinent part of which reads:
This Office notes of the Certification of B. De Paz, Officer-in-Charge of
this Departments Records Management Division stating that petitionermovants counsel was not served a copy of the disputed 8 June 2001
Order due to change in address. In any case, this matter has been
addressed with the service of said Order upon petitioner-movants
counsel at his new address.40
Based on the foregoing, it was clearly admitted that petitioner was not
properly served a copy of the disputed Order and this oversight by the
DAR was rectified by subsequently serving a copy of the Order upon
petitioners counsel at his new address. This belated service to
petitioners counsel was coursed through a Letter41 dated September 4,
2001, from Director Delfin B. Samson of the DAR informing him that the
case has already been decided and an order of finality issued. Worthy of
note is the statement, "[a]ttached, for reference, are copies thereof
being transmitted at your new given address," which, taken together
with the statements made by the DAR Secretary in his November 5, 2001
Order, was a manifest indication that petitioner was being served a copy
of the June 8, 2001 Order for the first time.

Contrary to petitioners contention, however, that it received a copy of

the June 8, 2001 Order only on September 7, 2001 when it received the
letter of Director Delfin B. Samson, it appears that the date stamped on
the face of the said letter indicates that it was received on September
10, 2001 and not September 7, 2001. Thus, when petitioner filed its
motion for reconsideration on September 14, 2001, it was well within the
reglementary period to file the motion.
Hence, contrary to the conclusion of the CA, the June 8, 2001 Order of
the DAR Secretary has not attained finality. The Office of the President,
therefore, validly entertained petitioners appeal when the DAR
Secretary denied its motion for reconsideration. With the foregoing
disquisition, the CA erred in setting aside the decision of the Office of
the President on the mistaken conclusion that the DAR Secretarys
Orders had attained finality.
Consequently, the determination of whether or not petitioners
landholdings are agricultural land is yet to be determined. As found by
the Office of the President in its August 8, 2003 Decision, before the
DAR could place a piece of land under CARP coverage, there must first
be a showing that it is an agricultural land, i.e., devoted or suitable for
agricultural purposes.
DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 2003, or the 2003 Rules
Governing Issuance of Notice of Coverage and Acquisition of
Agricultural Lands Under RA 6657,42 provides:
1. Commencement
1.1 Commencement by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
After determining that a landholding is coverable under the CARP, and
upon accomplishment of the Pre-Ocular Inspection Report, the MARO
shall prepare the NOC43 (CARP Form No. 5-1).44
Corolarilly, Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1998,45 which
outlines the steps in the acquisition of lands, details that in the 3rd step,
the Department of Agrarian Reform Municipal Office (DARMO) should
conduct a "preliminary ocular inspection to determine initially whether
or not the property maybe covered under the CARP," which findings will
be contained in CARP Form No. 3.a, or the Preliminary Ocular
Inspection Report.
From the foregoing, a preliminary ocular inspection is necessary to
determine whether or not a subject landholding may be considered
under the coverage of the CARP even before a Notice of Coverage is
prepared by the MARO.
However, a perusal of the undated CARP Form No. 3.a46 covering the
subject properties would reveal that the appropriate check boxes for
"Land Condition/Suitability to Agriculture" on whether the subject

properties are "presently being cultivated/suitable to agriculture" or are

"presently idle/vacant" were not marked. Also, the MARO failed to mark
any of the check boxes for "Land Use" to indicate whether the subject
properties were sugarland, cornland, un-irrigated riceland, irrigated
riceland, or any other classification of agricultural land.
As aptly found by the Office of the President, the importance of
conducting an ocular inspection cannot be understated, since it is one
of the steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative
due process. The Office of the President stressed this in its Decision, to
wit:
In other words, before the MARO sends a Notice of Coverage to the
landowner concerned, he must first conduct a preliminary ocular
inspection to determine whether or not the property may be covered
under CARP. The foregoing undertaking is reiterated in the latest DAR
AO No. 01, s. of 2003, entitled "2003 Rules Governing Issuance of Notice
of Coverage and Acquisition of Agricultural Lands Under RA 6657."
Section 1 [1.1] thereof provides that:
"1.1 Commencement by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
After determining that a landholding is coverable under the CARP, and
upon accomplishment of the Pre-Ocular Inspection Report, the MARO
shall prepare the NOC (CARP Form No. 5-1)." (NOC stands for Notice of
Coverage)
Found on the records of this case is a ready-made form Preliminary
Ocular Inspection Report (undated) signed by the concerned MARO.
Interestingly, however, the check box allotted for the all-important items
"Land Condition/Suitability to Agriculture" and "Land Use was not filled
up. There is no separate report on the record detailing the result of the
ocular inspection conducted. These circumstances cast serious doubts
on whether the MARO actually conducted an on-site ocular inspection
of the subject land. Without an ocular inspection, there is no factual
basis for the MARO to declare that the subject land is devoted to or
suitable for agricultural purposes, more so, issue Notice of Coverage
and Notice of Acquisition.
The importance of conducting an ocular inspection cannot be
understated. In the event that a piece of land sought to be placed from
CARP coverage is later found unsuitable for agricultural purposes, the
landowner concerned is entitled to, and the DAR is duty bound to issue,
a certificate of exemption pursuant to DAR Memorandum Circular No.
34, s. of 1997, entitled "Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for Lands
Subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition
(CA) Found Unsuitable for Agricultural Purposes."
More importantly, the need to conduct ocular inspection to determine
initially whether or not the property may be covered under the CARP is

one of the steps designed to comply with the requirements of

administrative due process. The CARP was not intended to take away
property without due process of law (Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 245. [1996]). The exercise of
the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in
the taking of private property. In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
321 SCRA 106 [1999], the Supreme Court nullified the CARP acquisition
proceedings because of the DARs failure to comply with administrative
due process of sending Notice of Coverage and Notice of Acquisition of
the landowner concerned.
Considering the claim of appellant that the subject land is not
agricultural because it is unoccupied and uncultivated, and no
agricultural activity is being undertaken thereon, there is a need for the
DAR to ascertain whether or not the same may be placed under CARP
coverage.47
Thus, the question of whether or not petitioners properties could be
covered by the CARP has not yet been resolved.1wphi1 Until such
determination, it follows that petitioners landholdings cannot be the
proper subject of acquisition and eventual distribution to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries. However, these involve factual controversies,
which are clearly beyond the ambit of this Court. Verily, the review of
factual matters is not the province of this Court. The Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts, and is not the proper forum for the ventilation and
substantiation of factual issues.48
Under the circumstances, the directive of the Office of the President for
the DAR to ascertain whether or not petitioners landholdings may be
placed under CARP was proper. To be sure, it is the DAR that is
procedurally prepared to handle such controversies and is better suited
to resolve such factual issues in the exercise of its mandate to
implement the CARP and its vested quasi-judicial powers to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters.49
Consequently, the other issues raised by the parties need not be
discussed further.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
86069 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 8,
2003 and the Order dated July 2, 2004 of the Office of the President are
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.