DOCTRINES

JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA

G.R. No. 124293, November 20, 2000
The law that states that a shipyard is a public utility still stands.
National Development Company v. Court of Appeals
164 SCRA 593
The rule was specifically laid down that for cargoes transported from Japan to the Philippines,
the liability of the carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code and in all matters not regulated
by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of
Commerce and by especial laws (Article 1766, Civil Code). Hence, the carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, a special law, is merely suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code.
Tatad v. Garcia
G.R. No. 114222
The Court held that there is a distinction in the operation of a public utility and ownership in
the facilities and equipment to serve the public.
British Airways v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 121824
Well-settled rule that an agent is also responsible for any negligence in the performance of its
function and is liable for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its negligent act.
Pedro de Guzman v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-47822
The general rule is established by the article that common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:
a.
Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disasters;
b.
Act of the public enemy, whether international or civil;
c.
Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
d.
Character of the goods or defects in the packing;
e.
Order or act of competent public authority.
First Philippine Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125948
The court enunciated the (4) tests in determining whether the carrier is that of a common
carrier:
a.
must be engaged int eh business of carrying goods for other as a public employment
and must hold itself out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods generally as a
business and not a casual occupation
b.
it must undertake to carry goods of the kind which its business is confined;

c.
it must undertake the method by which his business is conducted and over its
established roads;
d.
the transportation must be for hire.
FGU INSURANCE CORP. VS. G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORP.
G.R. No. 141910. August 6, 2002
A common carrier is one which offers its services whether to the public in general or to a
limited clientele in particular but never on an exclusive basis.
DANTE CRUZ and LEONORA CRUZ vs. SUN HOLIDAYS, INC.
G.R. No. 186312 June 29, 2010
Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on
an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a
carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population,
and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
population.
Lita Enterprises, Inc. v. IAC
G.R. No. L-64693
Under the arrangement of kabit system, whereby a person who has been granted a certificate
of convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such for a
fee. The Kabit System has been identifies as one of the root causes of prevalence of graft and
corruption in the government transportation offices. It is void being contrary to public policy.
And the parties have no right of action against each other because they are in pari delicto, the
court will leave them both where it finds them.
Teja Marketing vs. IAC
148 SCRA 347
Both parties have entered into an illegal contract, thus no action arises out from any illicit
transaction. The parties operated under an agreement known as the Kabit System. It is a
fundamental principle that the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract and
will leave both where it finds them. The defects of the contract are permanent and cannot be
ratified.
Santos v. Sibug
G.R. No. L-26815
The Court held that the agreement entered into by Santos and Vivad is a Kabit System, which
is prohibited by law. Such system was not approved by the Public Service Commission (PSC)
therefore Vivad is the owner of the jeep in legal contemplation. Since Vivad is the owner of the
jeep according to law, then it cannot be said that the Sheriff seized the property belonging to a
stranger.
F.C. Fisher v. Yangco Steamship Company

G.R. No. L-8095

Common carrier in the jurisdiction cannot lawfully decline to accept a particular class of goods,
unless it appears that for some sufficient reason the discrimination is reasonable and necessary.
Sarkies Tours Philipines, Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No. 108897
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound
to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. This
liability lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and
received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the person who has a right to receive them.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. IAC
150 SCRA 463
Fire may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity, as it arises almost invariably from
some act of man or by human means. It does not fall within the category of an act of God
unless caused by lightning or by other natural disaster or calamity. It may even be caused by
the actual fault or privity of the carrier.
Pedro de Guzman v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-47822
Article 1732 of the New Civil Code does not distinguish between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an
ancillary activity.
Bascos v. CA
The presumption of negligence was raised against petitioner. It was petitioner's burden to
overcome it. Thus, contrary to her assertion, private respondent need not introduce any
evidence to prove her negligence. Her own failure to adduce sufficient proof of extraordinary
diligence made the presumption conclusive against her.
Ganzon v. Court of Appeals
161 SCRA 646
Upon the receipt of the scraps by the carrier in order transport the same, the contract of
carriage was perfected. Upon perfection of the contract, the exercise of extraordinary diligence
in caring for the goods shall also commence to begin.
Macam v. Court of Appeals
313 SCRA 77
The extraordinary responsibility of common carriers last until actual or constructive delivery of
the cargo to the consignee or his agent.
Saludo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals
207 SCRA 498

Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the extraordinary responsibility of
the common carrier begins from the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. This
responsibility remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or
stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in transitu, and
terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time for the acceptance, of the goods by the
consignee or such other person entitled to receive them. And, there is delivery to the carrier
when the goods are ready for and have been placed in the exclusive possession, custody and
control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate transportation and the carrier has
accepted them.
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
188 SCRA 387
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of the carrier and passenger does not cease
the moment the passenger alights from the carriers vehicle, but continues until the passenger
has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers premises. A
reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
circumstances. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as
will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioners vessel.
La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals
17 SCRA 739
It is a recognized rule that the relation between carrier and passengers does not cease at the
moment the passenger alights from the carriers premises, to be determined from the
circumstances. In this case, there was no utmost diligence
Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals
GR. No. 118864
When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the general rule is that
he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. Common carriers are not insurer of
all risks. Airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. However, JAL is
not completely absolved from liability. It has the obligation to make the necessary
arrangements to transport private respondents on its first available flight to Manila.
Philippine Airlines vs. Court of Appeals
185 SCRA 110
The award of damages for death is computed on the life expectancy of the deceased and not of
the beneficiary. Article 1764 of the Civil Code provides that article 2206 shall also apply to
death of passenger caused by the breach of contract by the common carrier.
Necesito v. Paras
104 PHIL 75
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passenger, it should nevertheless be held
to answer for the flaws of its equipment it such defects were discoverable.

Maranan v. Perez
20 SCRA 412
Under Art. 1739 of the Civil Code, a common carrier are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such
employees may have ached beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the order of
the common carrier.
De Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co.
G.R. No. L-8034
While the passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents
or employees, the responsibility of the carrier extends to those acts that the carrier could
foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care or diligence required of it.
Marchan vs. Mendoza
G.R. No. L-24471
Philippine Rabbit is also liable because common carriers cannot escape liability for the death or
injuries to passengers through the negligence and willful acts of the former's employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of
the orders.
Bachelor Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 85691
The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the
context of force majeure. However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from
liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force
majeure. The common carrier must still proves that it was not negligent in causing the injuries
resulting from such accident.
Fortune Express vs. Court of Appeals
305 SCRA 14
Art. 1763 of the New Civil Code provides that the common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of willful acts of other passengers, if the employees of the
common carrier could have prevented the act through proper diligence.
Erezo v Jepte
One of the principal purposes of motor vehicles legislation is identification of the vehicle and of
the operator, in case of accident; and another is that the knowledge that means of detection
are always available may act as a deterrent from lax observance of the law and of the rules of
conservative and safe operation.
Lim v CA
The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of
public convenience allows other persons who own motor vehicles to operate them under his
license, sometimes for a fee or percentage of the earnings.[9] Although the parties to such an

agreement are not outrightly penalized by law, the kabit system is invariably recognized as
being contrary to public policy and therefore void and inexistent under Art. 1409 of the Civil
Code.
Servando v Philippine Steam Navigator
In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which
happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the
event
Edgar Cokaliong Shippineg Lines v Philippine Steam Navigator
Calvo v UCPB General Insurance Co.
For 1734(4) to apply, the rule is that if the improper packaging or, in this case, the defects in the
container, is/are known to the carrier or his employees or apparent upon ordinary observation
he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition,
he is not relieved of liability for damage resulting therefrom.
Belgian Overseas Chartering v Philippine First Insurance
Mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in
bad order at their destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against the
carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration, the loss or the
destruction of the goods happened, the transporter shall be held responsible.
Samar Mining Co v Nordeutscher Lloyd
The delivery of the goods to AMCYL was part of appellants' duty to transship (meaning to
transfer for further transportation from one ship or conveyance to another) the goods from
Manila to their port of destination-Davao.
Dangwa Transportation v CA
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers to stop their conveyances a reasonable length
of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for
injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of
their conveyances while they are doing so.
Vda. De Nueca vs Manila Railroad Company
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that
prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
specific proof of negligence.
Tiu v Arriesgado
Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arises, and it
becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers.

Juntilla v Fontanar
Common carriers should teach drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and
legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring
the safety of passengers at all times.
LRT v Navidad
The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of a common carrier.
Gacal v PAL
The source of a common carriers legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into
said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide. Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident
which could have been avoided had there been a more thorough frisking of passengers and
inspection of baggage as authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But the incident in question occurred
during Martial Law where there was a military take-over of airport security including the
frisking of passengers and the inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and
international flights.
Pilapil v CA
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of
the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Mapa v CA
Warsaw convention was not applicable because the contract does not involve an
INTERANTIONALTRANPORTATION base on the two categories.
China Airlines v Daniel Chiok
The Decision followed our ruling in Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, in which we
had held that the obligation of the ticket-issuing airline remained and did not cease, regardless
of the fact that another airline had undertaken to carry the passengers to one of their
destinations.
American Airlines v CA
The Supreme Court ruled that the case was properly filed in the Philippines. It held that the
petitioner acted as an agent of the Singapore Airlines under IATA rules and as an agent of the
principal carrier the petitioner may be held liable under contract of carriage in Manila.
Cervantes v CA
Article 1898 11 of the New Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do
not bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly.

In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton and
deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith.
Philippine Natural Railways v CA
Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was
negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage.
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that
the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Such contributory negligence, while
not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount
adjudicated as moral damages. By the same token, the award of exemplary damages must be
set aside.
Mecenas v CA
In the total set of circumstances which existed in the instant case, the "Don Juan," had it taken
seriously its duty of extraordinary diligence, could have easily avoided the collision with the
"Tacloban City," Indeed, the "Don Juan" might well have avoided the collision even if it had
exercised ordinary diligence merely.
Vda. De Abeto v PAL
In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault
or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages
sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express
obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary
diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by
the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Art. 1756, New
Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved.
Nocum v Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.
It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and
limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. He cannot be subjected to any unusual
search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the
contrary, as in the case at bar.
Batangas Transportation v Caguimbal
The driver could have and should have seen to it had he exercised "extraordinary diligence"
that his bus was completely outside the asphalted portion of the road, and fully within the
shoulder thereof, the width of which being more than sufficient to accommodate the bus.
Mallari v CA
The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking
another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to
proceed if he cannot do so in safety. Article 2185 of the NCC, there is a presumption of
negligence on the part of a person driving a motor vehicle if at the time of the mishap he was
violating a traffic regulation.

PAL v CA
This claim of the plaintiff for loss and impairment of earning capacity is based on the provision
of Art. 2205, NCC. Even from the standpoint of the petitioner that there is employer-employee
relationship between it and private respondent arising from the contract of employment,
private respondent is still entitled to moral damages in view of the finding of bad faith or
malice, applying the provisions of Art. 2220 of the NCC.
Magellan Manufacturing v CA
The fact of transshipment is not dependent upon the ownership of the transporting ships or
conveyances or in the change of carriers, as the petitioner seems to suggest, but rather on the
fact of actual physical transfer of cargo from one vessel to another
UCPB General Insurance v Aboitiz Shipping
Philippine Charter Insurance v Chemoil Ligterage
Article 366 of the Code of Commerce has profound application in the case at bar, which
provides that; Within twenty-four hours following the receipt of the merchandise a claim may
be made against the carrier on account of damage or average found upon opening the
packages, provided that the indications of the damage or average giving rise to the claim
cannot be ascertained from the exterior of said packages, in which case said claim shall only be
admitted at the time of the receipt of the packages. After the periods mentioned have
elapsed, or after the transportation charges have been paid, no claim whatsoever shall be
admitted against the carrier with regard to the condition in which the goods transported were
delivered.
Aboitiz Shipping v Insurance Co. of North America
Only when that foreign corporation is "transacting" or "doing business" in the country will a
license be necessary before it can institute suits. It may, however, bring suits on isolated
business transactions, which is not prohibited under Philippine law
Mitsui v CA
In the case at bar, there is neither deterioration nor disappearance nor Precisely, the question
before the trial court is not the particular sense of "damages" as it refers to the physical loss or
damage of a shipper's goods as specifically covered by COGSA but Mitsui's potential liability for
the damages it has caused in the general sense and, as such, the matter is governed by the Civil
Code, the Code of Commerce and COGSA, for the breach of its contract of carriage with Lavine.
Fil-Merchants v Alejandro
The coverage of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act includes the insurer of the goods. Otherwise,
what the Act intends to prohibit after the lapse of the one year prescriptive period can be done
indirectly by the shipper or owner of the goods by simply filing a claim against the insurer even
after the lapse of one year.

Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation v CA

Section 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act states that the carrier and the ship shall be
discharged from all liability for loss or damage to the goods if no suit is filed within one year
after delivery of the goods or the date when they should have been delivered. Under this
provision, only the carriers liability is extinguished if no suit is brought within one year. But the
liability of the insurer is not extinguished because the insurers liability is based not on the
contract of carriage but on the contract of insurance
Belgian Overseas Chartering v Phil. Insurance Co.
Mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in
bad order at their destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against the
carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration, the loss or the
destruction of the goods happened, the transporter shall be held responsible.
Lhuillier v British Airways
It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. The
Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government
and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.
Federal Express Corp. v American Home Assurance
In this jurisdiction, the filing of a claim with the carrier within the time limitation therefor
actually constitutes a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a carrier for
loss of or damage to the goods. The shipper or consignee must allege and prove the fulfillment
of the condition. If it fails to do so, no right of action against the carrier can accrue in favor of
the former.
Philippine Airlines v Savillo
In the Petition at bar, Savillos Complaint alleged that both PAL and Singapore Airlines were
guilty of gross negligence, which resulted in his being subjected to humiliation,
embarrassment, mental anguish, serious anxiety, fear and distress therefore this case is not
covered by the Warsaw Convention but it cannot be dismissed based on the Statue of
Limitations provided under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention. The Civil Code is applicable.
Therefore the action has not yet prescribed for the prescription period is 4 years.
Lufthansa German Airlines v CA
We, therefore, reject Lufthansa's theory that from the time another carrier was engaged to
transport Antiporda on another segment of his trip, it merely acted as a ticket-issuing agent in
behalf of said carrier. I nthe very nature of their contract, Lufthansa is clearly the principal in
the contract of carriage with Antiporda and remains to be so, regardless of those instances
when actual carriage was to be performed by various carriers.
Cathay Pacific Airways v CA

Warsaw Convention declares the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated cases and under
certain limitations. However, it must not be construed to preclude the operation of the Civil
Code and other pertinent laws.
Aboitiz Shipping v General Accident Fire and Life Assurance
The real and hypothecary nature of maritime law simply means that the liability of the carrier in
connection with losses related to maritime contracts is confined to the vessel, which is
hypothecated for such obligations or which stands as the guaranty for their settlement. Thus,
the liability of the vessel owner and agent arising from the operation of such vessel were
confined to the vessel itself, its equipment, freight, and insurance, if any, which limitation
served to induce capitalists into effectively wagering their resources against the consideration
of the large profits attainable in the trade. The Limited Liability Rule in the Philippines is taken
up in Book III of the Code of Commerce, particularly in Articles 587,590, and 837. The only time
the Limited Liability Rule does not apply is when there is an actual finding of negligence on the
part of the vessel owner or agent
Chua Yek Hong v IAC
The shipowners or agents liability is merely co-extensive with his interests in the vessel such
that the total loss thereof results in its extinction. The total destruction of the vessel
extinguishes maritime liens as there is no longer any res to which it can attach.
Litonjua Shipping v National Seamen Board
It is well settled that in a demise or bare boat charter, the charterer is treated as owner pro hac
vice of the vessel, the charterer assuming in large measure the customary rights and liabilities
of the shipowner in relation to third persons who have dealt with him or with the vessel. In
such case, the Master of the vessel is the agent of the charterer and not of the shipowner. The
charterer or owner pro hac vice, and not the general owner of the vessel, is held liable for the
expenses of the voyage including the wages of the seamen
PNB v CA
With respect to the warranty on the back of the check, it should be noted that the PCIB thereby
guaranteed all prior indorsements, not the authenticity of the signatures of the officers of the
GSIS who signed on its behalf, because the GSIS is not an indorser of the check, but its drawer.
Poland Industrial Ltd. V National Development
Monarch Insurance Co. v CA
The petitioners assert in common that the vessel M/V P. Aboitiz did not sink by reason of force
majeure but because of its unseaworthiness and the concurrent fault and/or negligence of
Aboitiz, the captain and its crew, thereby barring Aboitiz from availing of the benefit of the
limited liability rule.
Fernandez v Thompson

Standard Oil Co. v Manuel Lopez