United States v.

Ang Tang Ho
Facts:

Issue:

Held:

The Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act
Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn that authorizes the Governor General (GG),
during extraordinary circumstances, to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products.
Pursuant to this Act, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 that fixed the price at which rice should be
sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of
eighty centavos that was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. He was charged for violation of the
said EO.
He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine.
He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor
General.

Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of
all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the
exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not
possibly be put in use.

The law did not provide the parameters of extraordinary circumstances that will be determined by the
Governor General and the necessary rules and regulations that will be issued.

The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of
the legislature.

Hirabayashi v United States

Facts:
The petitioner challenged the regulation establishing curfew hours for Niseis (American Citizens of
Japanese ancestry), during World War I. He claimed that the rule was invalidly delegated legislative
power, there being no sufficient standard mentioned in the pertinent law to limit the delegates
discretion.
Held:
The U.S Supreme Court held that national security served as the sufficient standard of the assailed rule.
The proclamations themselves followed a standard authorized by the Executive Order for the necessity of
protecting military resources in the designated areas against espionage and sabotage.

People v. Vera
FACTS

Supreme Court found the old Probation Act unconstitutional being violative of the equal protection clause
and an invalid delegation of legislative power for lack of sufficient standard because it was made to
depend upon an act to be done by the provincial board of the provinces to appropriate funds for the
salary of a probation officer.

If the provincial board makes the appropriation, the Probation Act is applicable in that province and if it
does not, the law is not applicable therein. For purposes of the Probation Act, the provincial boards may
thus be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act shall take
effect in their respective provinces.

However the law does not lay down any rule or standard to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of
their discretionary power. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the
hands of the provincial boards with no standard or rule to guide them. This is virtual surrender of
legislative power to them.

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate court

Facts:

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626) and to strengthen
the law, President Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from
province to province but the movement of carabeef as well
Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo and was then charged in violation of EO
626-A. He argued that the authority provided by EO 626-A to confiscate carabaos even without being
heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police
power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

Held (in connection with sufficient standard):

The law provides that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit (Emphasis
supplied).

The phrase may see fit can result to ambiguity and can be seen as an opportunity for partiality, abuse,
and even corruption.

The reasonable guidelines and limitations of the officers are not specified and their options are apparently
boundless. Then who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall
they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the
grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.

THE PELAEZ CASE (EMMANUEL PELAEZ V. AUDITOR GENERAL)

Facts:

In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this was
purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary xxx of any xxx municipality xxx and
may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public
welfare may require xxx

The then Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor
general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities claiming that the EOs were
unconstitutional because Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370
which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed
except by Act of Congress.

Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being
created by the President and municipalities are exempted from the inhibition and therefore the President
can create a municipality and furthermore, it was maintained Congress has delegated such power to
create municipalities to the President through Sec. 68 of the RAC.

Issue:

Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68
of the RAC.

Held:

No, the Congress did not delegate the power to create municipalities to the President by virtue of Sec.
68 of the RAC. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation
of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and
(b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
- In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, and
without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which
would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require is present,
such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power.

In the first place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require is properly interpreted as the
President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public
welfare may require. Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare
so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is legislative in character not
administrative and not executive.

Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves

These tests were fully satisfied by R.A. No. 9335 (An Act To Improve The Revenue Collection Performance
Of The Bureau Of Internal Revenue (BIR) And The Bureau Of Customs (BOC) Through The Creation Of A
Rewards And Incentives Fund And Of A Revenue Performance Evaluation Board And For Other Purposes) as
evident in Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof.
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of
encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to
be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the
Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages xxx
Section 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. the Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) To prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the fund due to the agency as provided for in
Sections 4 and 5 of this Act: Provided, that the rewards under this Act may also take the form of nonmonetary benefits;
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the
target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as
provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to

Case # G-16
Gerochi v DOE (2007)
Facts:

RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), sought to impose a
universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCORs projects. Petitioners
contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA on the following grounds:
1

1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA.

- The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as the delegation of said power to any
2
executive or administrative agency like the Energy Regulatory Commission is unconstitutional for
giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge
is to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete
discretionary legislative authority.
2) The ERC was also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected should be used.
Issue:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.
Held
There is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC. A logical corollary to the doctrine of
separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas
3
delegata non delegari potest . All that is required for the valid exercise of the power of subordinate legislation is
that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are
4
5
denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test .
The Court finds that the EPIRA, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and
conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.
1st test - Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA only provided that within one (1) year from effectivity thereof, a
Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users
and did not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount is nevertheless made certain by
the legislative parameters provided in the law itself.
2nd test - Provisions of the EPIRA such as, to ensure the total electrification of the country; and the
quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power and watershed rehabilitation and
management meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to
formulate the Implementing Rules and Regulations.

A tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self- generating entities
A government agency that enforces power regulation promotes long-term consumer interests in terms of quality and reasonable pricing of a
sustainable supply of electricity.
3
What has been delegated cannot be delegated
2

Sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate.

It is intended to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority by (1) defining the legislative policy; (2) indicating circumstance under
which it is to be pursued and effected and; (3) specifies the public agency to apply.

Case # G-17
Abakada Guro Party List, et al vs. Exec. Sec. Ermita (2005)
Facts:

The President signed Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took effect the Court
issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response to petitions for certiorari and
prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an
abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28
(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to
how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.

Issue:
Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate constitutes
undue delegation of legislative power?
Held:
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and
6
exclusively, legislative. In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of
facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No
discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word
SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connote a mandatory order. Its use in a statute
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of
any of the conditions specified by Congress. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified
conditions are present. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event
upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which
legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and
information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the
scope of his authority.
There was no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law
and this is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation
of the law.

The exceptions are: (a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution; (b) delegation of emergency powers to President under

Constitution; (c) delegation to the people at large ; (d) delegation to local governments ; (e) delegation to administrative bodies

Case # G-18
ABAKADA GURO vs. PURISIMA (2008)
FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). It provides a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOC officials and employees if they exceed their revenue targets. It
covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. One of their contention is that the law unduly delegates the power to fix
revenue targets to the President as it lacks sufficient standard on that matter.

Issue
Whether or not RA. 9335 unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President
Held
Yes. RA. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing the revenue
7
8
targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law through Sec. 2 and Sec. 4 of the
law.
Supreme Court also recognized the following as sufficient standards: (a) public interest; (b) justice and
equity; (c) public convenience and welfare; and (d) simplicity, economy and welfare

Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of
encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets .
8

. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be
sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the
Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC).

Case # G-19
Dagan vs PRC (2009)
Facts:

Philippine Racing Commission issued a directive requiring Manila Jockey Club and Philippine Racing Club,
9
Inc to come up with their Clubs House Rule to address the Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA) problem and
to rid their facilities of horses infected it.

Said directive was issued pursuant to Administrative Order by the Department of Agriculture declaring it
unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to ship, drive, or transport horses from any locality or place
except when accompanied by a certificate issued by the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry (BAI).

Thus, MJCI and PRCI ordered the owners of racehorses stable in their establishments to submit the horses
to blood sampling and administration of the Coggins Test to determine if they are infected. Subsequently,
Philracom issued copies of the guidelines for the monitoring and eradication of EIA. Despite resistance
from petitioners, the blood testing proceeded. The horses, whose owners refused to comply were banned
from the races, were removed from the actual day of race, prohibited from renewing their licenses or
evicted from their stables.

Issue:
Whether or not Philracom had unconstitutionally delegated its rule-making power to PRCI and MJCI in
issuing the directive for them to come up with club rules.
Held:
The court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Philracom in issuing the contested guidelines
and on the part MJCI and PRCI in complying with Philracoms directive. Philracoms authority is drawn from P.D.
No. 420. The delegation made in the presidential decree is valid.
It is valid only if the law is complete in itself and fixes a standard to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. Philracom was created for the purpose of carrying out the declared policy in
10
Section 1 of said law. Furthermore, Philracom was granted exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of
the conduct of horse racing, including the framing and scheduling of races, the construction and safety of race
tracks, and the security of racing.
11

Section 9 of the law fixes the standards and limitations to which Philracom must conform in the
performance of its functions. As to the supposed delegation by Philracom of its rule-making powers to MJCI and
PRCI, there is no delegation of power to speak of between Philracom, as the delegator and MJCI and PRCI as
delegates. The Philracom directive is merely instructive in character. PRCI and MJCI followed-up when they
ordered the racehorse owners to submit blood samples and subject their race horses to blood testing. Compliance
with the Philracoms directive is part of the mandate of PRCI and MJCI. As proffered by MJCI, its duty is not derived
from the delegated authority of Philracom but arises from the franchise granted to them by Congress.

Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA) is an infectious and potentially fatal viral disease of members of the horse family. The equine infectious
anemia virus (EIAV) is categorized as a lentivirus: it contains genetic RNA material, which it uses to produce DNA.
10
Declaration of Policy. It is the declared policy to promote and direct the accelerated development and continued growth of horse-racing not
only in pursuance of the sports development program but also in order to insure the full exploitation of the sport as a source of revenue and
employment.
11
Specific Powers.