DRAFT

What holds adivasis back? Examining poverty and exclusion among Juang PVTGs in Orissa

Sajjad Hassan1
Centre for Equity Studies, New Delhi
1.0
Introduction

Gonasika is a village tucked away deep in the forests of the Northern Orissa, some 30 miles
away from the district headquarters of Keonjhar, and as many miles off the block office at
Banspal. Home to the Juang tribe, declared a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group2 (PVTG),
one of seventy five across the country, thirteen in Orissa, and the only one in Keonjhar,
being severely impoverished and vulnerable, who have lived in semi-isolation in the hills and
forests of western Keonjhar. Described as leaf wearing tribes in ethnographic accounts3,
and traditionally practising a shifting form of cultivation, Juangs are today the bottom of the
development pile. Dependent for their livelihood mostly on forests around them access to
which has been problematic and shifting or of late settled but un-remunerative
cultivation, they are increasingly being forced to resort to distress migration to urban
centres, as far away as Chennai, to earn a living for their impoverished families. Poverty,
combines with severe malnutrition4, absence of safe drinking water and sanitary conditions,
and poor access to modern health facilities, to create pathetic health conditions, with
shockingly high infant and maternal mortality rates.5 With a literacy rate of 25.28% (2001
Census)6, the prospects for Juangs changing this state of affairs does not seem particularly
bright. Gonasika is also the home of the Juang Development Agency (JDA), set up in 1978 to
marshal resources and focus efforts towards development of Juangs numbering only
24,000, by last count, almost all in Keonjhar district. That the state of the Juangs is what it is
today, despite over 30 years of supposedly focused attention on the community, is proof, of
the failure of our tribal development policy, not just in Orissa but across the country.

Understanding and learning from this failure is critical, not only for the well being of tribal
individuals and communities (and that itself is a significant constituency, making up 8.2 % of
Indias population, numbering some 85 million, 2011 Census) but also for the country as a
whole, in the context of the real and proverbial wars being fought across large swathes of
Central Indian jungles as well as in national consciousness, with both state and rebel armies
claiming to fight to protect rights of and promote a better future for tribals and the
dispossessed. This examination has wider implications too, given the launch of the 12th Five
year plans, with its renewed thrust on inclusive development, to understand how public

1

This research was made possible by support from Dan Church Aid. I wish to thank Harsh Mander, Director
CES, for encouraging me to undertake this study. Thanks are also due to District Administration, Keonjhar, who
facilitated the research in Gonasika and Keonjhar. I also want to thank Rajkishore Mishra, Orissa State Advisor
to Supreme Court Commissioners (in Right to Food case) for helping with the conduct of the research. As I
explain further on, I have extensively used data from a CES study on hunger among PTGs, led by Sushmita
Guru, to make my points. [All correspondence to: iamsajjadhassan@gmail.com ]
2
Based on a set of backwardness criteria.
3
WW Hunter, in Keonjhar District Gazetteer.
4
Also see Chhotray, GP (2003).
5
132.4 per 1000 live births, and 11.4 per 1000 female population, respectively, in a survey among PTGs in
Orissa, by RMRC Bhubneshwar. Quoted in above.
6
CES (2012: 23). This against a district overall literacy rate of close to 70%, not much below the national 74%.

DRAFT

policy in India engages with the excluded and marginalised, and why we are so unable to
square the circle there?

This paper seeks to engage with the subject of tribal poverty and dispossession, asking
questions about the extent, nature and drivers and sustainers of tribal poverty, particularly
why they seem to be stuck in destitution, despite an array of seemingly impressive policies
and instruments deployed over the years. Obviously there are significant variations across
states and communities, but overall, why is the condition of communities identified
specifically as adivasi7 such that they are unable to exit poverty, make use of economic
opportunities, and participate as equal citizens in the India success story? A subsidiary
objective of the study is also to propose some broad brush suggestions for reforms.

In studying tribal poverty, my attempt has been to study not so much the tribal poor, but
the phenomenon of enduring poverty and exclusion among the poor, based on an
understanding that poverty is multi-dimensional and is a political phenomenon, with power
relations determining the distribution of opportunities and benefits. Central here is
inequality, not just vertical but horizontal. Driving that is social exclusion8 (and unfavourable
inclusion), and the various barriers, including identity based discrimination that tribals face
in non-tribal hands, all of which add up to create the conditions that drive tribals to
enduring poverty and destitution.

Research for this study was conducted in two phases, in 20109 and later in 201210, in
Gonasika and surrounding villages, using mixed method methodology, with a slant towards
participatory tools, to understand tribal destitution on a range of subjects land and forest
rights and livelihood opportunities; access to food and nutrition, and health and education
entitlements; and policy engagement, at local and macro levels, including participation and
voice in programme management. And mindful of the significant difference (on
development outcomes) there is between tribals characterised as adivasi in Central India
and those in North East India, the study also makes side comparisons of adivasi outcomes
with Northeastern tribals, specifically to highlight divergent institutional and policy
pathways and outcomes. These are based on authors past scholarly and administrative
experiences in the North East region. These insights have been combined with survey of
public and private documents on tribal policy and development, as well as secondary
reading of existing literature, to provide a rounded and hopefully more complete picture of
tribal exclusion, in an effort to propose evidence-based solutions.


7

A differentiation must be made between tribals generally, the category Scheduled Tribe (ST), used in
official accounts, and adivasi, or original inhabitants, used specifically for tribals in Central India, as opposed
to those in the North East of the country, who are just called tribal or ST. Our focus is adivasi. The term adivasi
signifies a degree of exclusion and dispossession that perhaps tribal does not. See Guha, further on this
difference. (2007).
8
There is a large body of literature of these themes, representative are Harriss (2006) on the political bases of
poverty and inequality, Sen (2000) and De Haan (2001) on social exclusion, and Stewart et all (2005) on
horizontal inequality.
9
By a team from CES led by Sushmita Guru. This was part of a larger research project, on tribal hunger and
destitution, with select PTG communities Juang and Lodha in Orissa, Saharia and Bhil in Rajasthan and Gond
and Konda Reddy in Andhra Pradesh. (CES:2012)
10
By the author, with help from colleagues in CES Ankita Agarwal, Saba Sharma and Amod Shah.

DRAFT

The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: I first outline the problem at hand: why adivasis
have remained severely poor and destitute, despite many laws and programmes for their
advancement, based on a survey of literature (Sec 2). This is followed by examining the
working of tribal policy, based on presenting the findings of the research among Juang PTG
(Sec. 3). Following that is a discussion on our quite distinct set of outcomes for tribals in
Northeastern India, to understand what historical and institutional factors might explain
that, and what lessons they provide for the rest of the country (sec. 4). In the ultimate part
of the paper (sec. 5) , I try to draw out some lessons for moving forward, based on brief
engagement with conceptual literature on social exclusion, to outline an agenda for
reforms for adivasis in Central India, stopping at proposing broad markers hoping to
develop these ideas further, in a future paper.

2.
Policy for tribals? The chasm between intentions and outcomes!

In a conference of Chief Ministers in 200911, PM Manmohan Singh strikingly confessed,
There has been a systemic failure in giving the tribals a stake in the modern economic
processes that inexorably intrude into their living spaces. He listed particularly livelihood
concerns, lack of quality education and vocational opportunities, losses suffered by tribals
displaced as a result of acquisition of land for various projects, the anti-tribal Forest laws
resulting in tribals harassment, and finally very weak or virtually non-existent
administrative machinery, in tribal areas, blaming weak infrastructure, and notably weak
commitment and competence of officers posted there. He warned: the alienation built over
decades is now taking a dangerous turn in some parts of our country, concluding, the
systematic exploitation and social and economic abuse of our tribal communities can no
longer be tolerated. Singh went on to link development of our tribal areas and
improvement in the economic and social condition of our tribal populations to our concept
of inclusive growth concluding, .. we need to empower our tribal communities with the
means to determine their own destinies, their livelihood, their security and above all their
dignity and self-respect as equal citizens of our country, as equal participants in the
processes of social and economic development.

These are tall ambitions, that echo the promises made by the framers of the Constitution,
more than half a century ago, promising to provide adequate safeguards for...backward
and tribal areas.12 Given our poor track record on keeping that promise, there is little
assurance that renewed promises, or those many claim, made cynically with an eye to
keeping rebellions at bay13, will work better. But the realisation that we have not been able
to keep our promises made to tribal people is not new - although the confession by a
national leader might be a first! A Planning Commission evaluation of Tribal Development
blocks, in 1967, based on field evaluation in Orissa and Tripura, had revealed the wretched
life of tribals poverty, destitutions, use of primitive agricultural technology, all pervasive
role of middle-men in forest produce trade, reliance on money lenders for meeting basic

11

th

PM: 4 Nov. 2009. Conference of CMs, and state Tribal Affairs, Forest and Social Welfare ministers,
organised by union Ministry of Tribal Affairs (MoTA). Accessed from MoTA website.
12
rd
Debate on the Objective Resolutions, Constituent Assembly, 23 Oct 1949.
13
So as to lay the ground for a counter-insurgency offensive, Manmohan Singh admits Indian state has failed
tribal peoples. Kranti Kumara . 27 November 2009

DRAFT

needs, distress sale of land to non-tribals, and the poor prospect of a improvements in
quality of life. The study came particularly hard on tribal development administration,
commenting on poor commitment of the bureaucracy, their poor extension work and very
weak implementation of programmes. Among its recommendations, which appear
lacklustre given the clarity of its findings, the study suggested, greater contact and
communication between block staff and tribals, for creating the necessary climate for
development. (Planning Commission, 1967)

That climate for development, it appears, remains as elusive now, as it was in 1967. A quick
survey of the wellbeing indicators of tribals, reveals they are worst performers for any social
group. Literacy is significantly lower than normal, and so is enrolment in schools and drop
out rate of those enrolled. (Table 1)
Table 1: Education

Literacy
Gross Enrolment Ratio
Out of School children
(Rural)
(07-08)
(6-17 years (%)

Male Female All
Primary UP Secondary Male Female Persons
SC
70.6
49.9
60.5
124.9 76.3
39.0 21.0
25.0
22.8
ST
69.3
47.8
58.8
129.3 74.4
30.8 21.7
28.4
24.8
All
77.0
56.7
67.0
114.6 77.5
45.5 16.9
21.8
19.2
Source: Tabulated by author from India HDR 2011 (p183, 187)

On health, tribals have higher percentage of women with Body Mass Index (BMI) lower than
18.5 (the cut off). More than 50% of ST children are underweight and stunted, and more
than 75 % have anaemia. Representing extend of poverty, Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is a high
3.12 (compared to 2.6 for all India). And less than one fourth ST households have access to
toilets compared to 1/3rd for Scheduled Caste, the other disadvantaged group. Few have
access to safe drinking water. (Planning Commission, 2011: 171)

As it turns out, not only did we deny the adivasis quality education and health care, but, as
the historian Ram Guha says, our policies and practices, in fact actively dispossessed very
many adivasis of their traditional means of life and livelihood. (Guha, 2007) What was their
asset the forests, fast-flowing rivers, and rich mineral resources, providing them the
means for subsistence and survival have, in the context of growth, become their
liability, attracting large factories and dams, forcing adivasi to make way for commercial
forestry, dams and mines, all to feed growth in the cities. He contends, it is the adivasis on
the margins of Indias growth that have borne the brunt of the cost of growth.

Table 2 presents income and livelihood attainments for tribals, showing the severity of the
poverty problem. Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) - a proxy for poor education, hence
reliance on manual labour is highest for tribals. Of their low per capita expenditure, a full
58.9% is spent on food the highest for all groups, further showing how desperate the
situation is.
Table 2: Income and Livelihoods

LFPR Unemployment ratio Mean PK
Incidence of poverty among
09-10
expenditure (RS)
social groups (%, 07-08)

09-10 Rural
Urban
Rural
Urban
Rural
Urban
SC
62.4
1.6
3.2
652
1100
20.6
22.8

DRAFT

ST
All

69.9
60.4

1.4
1.6

4.4
3.4

617
772

1221
1472

25.3
14.9

20.6
14.5

Source: Tabulated by author from India HDR 2011 (p98, 112, 113 and 116)

Among the tools employed by the Government recently, for adivasi uplift, under the much-
mouthed mantra of inclusive development, have been some high profile laws and
programmes, building up on old ones.14 These include a revised Tribal Sub Plan strategy, and
the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights)
Act 2006. The former, is a budgeting strategy, used since 1974, to ensure adequate flow of
public investment in tribal areas for the development of tribals. Realising that the strategy
was not working as most central ministries and State governments did not adhere to the
guidelines - Government announced revised guidelines for TSP, based on recommendations
of a task force (Planning Commission, 2010) , that give the strategy greater teeth, and
require unspent funds to be carried over to future years, to prevent diversion, with the
intention, voiced by the PM, in a national conference in 2005, of bridging the gap in
socio-economic development of STs, within a period of 10 years.15 It is not clear, as Harsh
Mander demonstrates in his study of tribal administration, how these new guidelines will
address the issue of poor accountability towards tribals that let ministries and states get
away with, at best misreporting spending, at worst gross neglect. (Mander, 2004: Ch 3)

And the Forest Rights Act, as the latter initiative is popularly known, aims to recognise
forest rights and occupation in forests lands, for the benefit of forest- residing communities,
most of whom are tribal. This, commentators have noted, has the potential to correct the
historical injustice done to forest dwelling communities through the seizure of their lands
and forests and, thereby, addressing the livelihood insecurity that plagues the daily lives of
forest dwellers.16 But as the Saxena Committee enquiring into transfer of Niyamgiri forest
land in Western Orissa for mining purposes, found in its examination of the competing
claims of traditional tribal communities and big business, FRA implementation is fraught
with serious risks, allowing state agents to favour vested interests at the cost of tribal rights.
(Saxena et al, 2010: 3-4)

An earlier law, the Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, had potentially
more far-reaching consequences for tribals. In aiming to extend the provision of the XIth
Schedule of the Constitution (on self rule) to scheduled (tribal) areas, the law seeks to
enable tribal communities to assume control over their own destiny - to preserve and
conserve their traditional rights over natural resources, and acquire the authority and ability
to make decisions on matters of development affecting their lives. The fact that states have
been dragging their feet to adopt this central legislation, that they are constitutionally
required to, ties in with their wider unwillingness to devolve power to tribal communities,
thereby empower them, and which, as the Ministry of Tribal Affairs Draft National Tribal
Policy candidly notes, .remains one of the most critical factors responsible for the less


14

th

The old ones include provisions under the 5 Schedule of the Constitution, and the many entries in it,
specifically to safeguard rights and advance the interests of STs - Articles 244, 244A, 275(1), 342, 338(A) and

339, being notable.
15
Inaugural speech by PM Manmohan Singh, to National Development Council 2005.
16
nd
Scheduled Tribes Bill 2005. Letters. Economic and Political Weekly, 22 October 2005

DRAFT

than desired outcomes in all the interventions, monetary or otherwise, meant for (tribal)
development. (Ministry of Tribal Affairs, 2006, Sec. 1.13)

The results have been disastrous for tribals. In the words of Guha, ...the tribals of
peninsular India are the unacknowledged victims of six decades of (Indian) democratic
development, in which time they have been exploited and dispossessed by the wider
economy and polity.(Guha, 2007). I will argue, in the sections ahead, that our primal sin, as
it were, in so far as tribals are concerned, was in envisioning a much conservative protective
regime for adivasi (under the Fifth Schedule of Constitution) as opposed to more bold self-
government provisions for tribal communities in North East India (under the Sixth Schedule)
the region with the other large concentration of tribals, and where, given the greater
tribal voice and participation, wellbeing results are more sanguine.

3.
How are the Juang doing? Reporting evidence from Gonasika
3.1
Research

This section presents findings of research, on poverty and destitution among Juangs, in
Gonasika micro-project area of Keonjhar district, in 201017 and again in 2012. The focus of
the first research was hunger and dispossession, and access to social protection
programmes ICDS, PDS, MDM, pension and MG-NREGS18 - in an effort to shed light on the
lived experiences of hunger and access to livelihood opportunities among Juangs, and the
ways in which they cope with stress. The study also examined factors creating the particular
vulnerabilities - issues of land alienation, indebtedness, bondage and distress migration,
particularly. Although employing mixed-method tools, researchers, most of who were
purposely recruited from local Juang communities and put through a crash course in
research methodology, relied for most data collection, on qualitative household surveys, of
100 Juang families, covering 5 Juang-majority villages, with houses selected randomly.
Insights from the survey were shared with local community, through a series of FGDs, to
explore community and group dynamics, including specific disabilities faced by more
vulnerable members among Juangs women, older persons and the disabled.

The same sites were revisited in 201219, to understand in an ethnographically nuanced way,
the drivers of chronic poverty and dispossession among Juangs, and their access to pro-poor
laws and programmes devised to address the very disabilities that excluded communities
such as Juangs faced. This involved understanding the lived experiences of poverty and
exclusion by Juangs, exploring institutional and political-economy factors that created the
conditions for the exclusion, and the opportunities and barriers that public institutions and
programmes created for Juangs, in the process of delivering development. This research
relied almost wholly on qualitative tools interviews, focus groups discussions and
observations.

17

This was part of the larger CES research, conducted by Sushmita Guru, on hunger and access to social
protection programmes by PTGs in Orissa, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh, (CES, 2012)
18
Integrated Child Development Services, Public Distribution System, Mid Day Meal scheme, and National
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, all flagship social protection programmes of the central Government.
19
This time by the author, as part of a CES exploration, on poverty and exclusion among the most marginalised
communities in the country, that also included Musahars in Bihar (Hassan, Forthcoming), adivasis Palamu,
Jharkhand, dalits in Banda, Uttar Pradesh, and Saharia PTG in Baran, Rajasthan.

DRAFT

The report that follows uses material from both the field studies, to catalogue Juang
outcomes on access to livelihoods, the challenges they face in securing that, and how Juangs
cope given the severe vulnerabilities. This is followed by an account of the impact of these
vulnerabilities on access to food and nutrition, the resultant poor health and malnutrition
conditions, and the extent to which food security programmes are able to fill the gap. The
section concludes with examining change among Juangs, and the principal vehicles for that,
looking specifically at the agency of Juang Development Agency (JDA), and the potential role
of education in this.

3.2
Inroduction

Juangs mostly inhabit the upper forest reaches of western part of Keonjhar, where they
number some 25,000 (2001 Census)20. They are dependent on forest and agriculture for
much of their livelihood, and now increasingly on wage labour in neighbouring villages, as
farm hands, or in urban centres, near and far, as labourers. Dependence on forest has
declined, that as wage labourer has increased, but agriculture still acts as the staple source
of sustenance. Technology, however, is ancient, investment low and dependence on
vagaries of nature high forcing Juangs to increasingly look to seasonal migration, at much
cost to themselves and their families left behind, (and hence distress) as a source of
livelihood security.

Livelihood security was a problem in the past too, when forests were under the control of
Keonjhar Rajas. While Juangs were not required to pay any tax to the Raja, they were often
forced to provide free goods and services. This included such minor obligations as supplying
honey, fuel, mahua and broom grass, and assisting the king in hunting expeditions. As
Verrier Elwin observed, often these demands were indefinite and exploitative21. The British
repealed the old system, and introduced fixed rents a small amount, on the village as a
whole, taking account of the vulnerable condition and fragility of the livelihood of the
community. Land rights were given communally to Juang Pidhs, the Juang community
organisation. In any case land in Juang areas was owned communally, and the fruits of
cultivation divided up among the village. Shifting cultivation was widely practised. (CES,
2012:30)

3.3
Land and agriculture: Today, most Juangs own land, most might also have a patch of
irrigated land. Our survey findings - corroborated by Juang Development Agency data -
indicate that 91 percent of villagers possessed some land, and 87.9 percent had records of
those possessions. Most villagers had recently acquired title deeds to forest land, made
possible under FRA, 2006, although in most cases, in the absence of ground mapping, deed
holders are not clear where the particular piece of land might be, and that itself is problem
enough, undermining the benefits of what looks like an otherwise successful FRA
implementation in Gonasika. But most holdings, own as well as those under FRA, are either
too small or non-remunerative - over 58 per cent had less than one acre of land. The small
size of holding, fact that they are mostly rain-fed and being on uplands, of low fertility, close
to forest, hence subject to pillage by wild animals, means the output mostly rice, millet

20

A smaller population also inhabits neighbouring Dhenkanal district

Elwin, V. 1945. Report on the tribals of Ganjam and Koraput Districts, Unpublished Note, in Rath (2005).

21

DRAFT

and maize, for own consumption, and linseed, for sale locally - is poor. Combined with this,
is the reluctance to adopt modern farming practices most farmers use seeds saved from
previous years harvest, for example, and only a few interviewed said they used fertilizer,
even though these are provided free by JDA and local development NGOs. These factors
combine to result in low agriculture output, and the inability of most Juangs to meet their
food requirements for the full year. (Ibid:31-32)

3.4
Minor Forest Produce (MFP) such as small timber, bamboo, thatching grass and Non-
timber Forest Produce (NTFP), like mahua, tendu leaves, and sal seed and leaves, have
traditionally been the prime source of livelihood for tribal communities, but our data shows,
their usefulness to Juangs might be diminishing. Only 4.3 per cent of survey households
indicated forest as their prime source of income, for 64.51 per cent it was only the
secondary source. (Ibid, 37). This is explained by the depleting availability of forest produce,
because of reducing forest cover, but mostly due to poor access to Juangs, as other forest
dwellers, due to the pattern of ownership over forest land in Orissa owned partly by
Forest Department and partly by Revenue. This lack of settlement of forest land has led to
the rights of tribals over non-reserve forest areas being wholly undefined, and thus subject
to the vagaries of the Forest bureaucracy. These data are corroborated with our
conversations in Upar Chempai village, for instance, where Bikas Juang and his wife tell us,
they collect fuelwood from forests, for domestic use, and along with sal and tendu leaves,
occasionally travel to Keonjhar, some eight hours on foot, once a week, to sell that at the
weekly haat, for the extra money. 22 A bundle of firewood, that must be carried all the way,
as head load, fetches about Rs. 180. Fact that Forest Department officials frown upon this
collection of forest produce - and actively impede it further removes forests as a source of
livelihood for the old couple.
Combined with this depleting opportunity is the problem about the difficulty with reaching
forest produce at a viable price to markets. The Orissa Forest Development Corporation
(OFDC) and the Tribal Development Cooperative Cooperation (TDCC) do not seem to make
much of a headway in terms of enabling people like Bikas Juang earn a remunerative price,
without reliance on middle men and moneylenders. Middle men have greater market reach
and access, and are closely intertwined with tribal livelihood patterns tribals depending on
them, not vice versa - and have thus subverted attempts to replace them using cooperatives
or public corporations. Together, these factors have ensured that forests, that could have
been a potentially viable source of income and sustenance for Juangs, hold little livelihood
promise. They contribute little to better incomes or improved nutritional status of Juang
communities. An overwhelming majority of Juangs covered in the survey reported total
annual income from sale of MFP as under Rs. 500, with some reporting Rs. 1500 a year.
(Ibid: 41).
3.5
Most Juang families also domesticate animals in the past pigs, but now mostly goat
and poultry. But these are not remunerative, being used mostly for occasional festive and
religious consumption, and only seldom as source of income mostly when their situation
gets dire. Attempts by government agencies JDA in this case to organise villagers in self
help groups, have not been very successful. Villagers we spoke with, put this down to poor

22

st

Author interview. Upar Chempai village, Toda Champhaee Gram Panchayat. 21 Sept. 2012.

DRAFT

management by JDA and other agencies, of the programme. Absence of a clear plan, and
training of self help group members, and no attempt to link up to markets, means that a
potentially useful economic activity goatry villagers informed, if done well could fetch
about 5000 a annually to every family - and a useful way of organising enterprise fails to
take off.23

3.6
Our conversation with Juang villagers on livelihoods and sustenance, revealed that
this combination of food and proceeds from sale of cash crop, forest produce and livestock,
does not generate adequate income, indeed just food, to last for the year. What of public
programmes like MG-NREGS? Is NREGS providing the wage security it is designed for?

In our discussions with a group of youth in Uttar Bhaitarani village, we were informed that
at most, they had been provided work under NREGS for 7 days, on earthwork for a pond,
despite the utter paucity of wage work in the village. The previous year too, total days of
work made available was the same 7 days. In both cases, even this limited opportunity did
not result in immediate payment of the wage wages were paid after a gap of six months.
When we spoke in September 2012, labourers had received only partial payment for work
done in June that year. Enquiries revealed this was the case with most villagers work is just
not made available by the NREGA bureaucracy, and payments for work done are regularly
delayed, in some cases underpaid.24

Thus is not an exceptional story, but one that we hear in every village we visited. While
NREGA might aspire to provide 100 days of work a year to every family that needs it and is
willing to do wage employment, it is woefully failing in that objective. First is the problem of
labourers being registered acquiring a labour card. Many do not have it, and little effort
seems to have been made to create the awareness among villagers and get potential
labourers to register. And those who do have the card do not get work. Only 46 per cent of
the survey respondents who had cards, had managed to obtain any wage work. NREGS is
also designed to provide work opportunities throughout the year, but particularly during
lean seasons, when the poor have little avenue for earning a wage. I practice, that is not
happening. Half the persons spoken to reported work being available only during specific
periods of the year, only some 20 per cent reported work was available for longer durations.
Actual availability, across the five survey sites, ranged from 8-30 days, with most falling in
the lower category. An those who had worked, received payments only after long delays,
many at reduced rates than promised, some from banks and post offices that required them
to travel long distances, thus defeating the purpose of a scheme that was meant to provide
immediate wage relief to those in need as we saw in the case of Juang families in village
after village, that is a sizeable number.

3.7
Food and nutritional security: Poor incomes and an existence constantly on the
edge, means reliance of Juangs on well functioning social protection schemes, especially
food, cannot be stressed enough. How are food security schemes - PDS, ICDS and MDM -
performing to provide that safety net? What impact does this performance have on the
health and nutritional status of Juangs? And does health and nutrition infrastructure

23

nd

FGD, Guptaganga village. Gonasika GP. 22 September 2012

th
FGD, Uttar Bhaitirani Village, Gonasika GP. 20 September 2012.

24

DRAFT

succeed in providing support where it is needed? We will report on these questions in the
survey in the following pages.

The days of suffering silently, in hunger, with just the forest for succour, may be over for
most Junags, but eating rough and inadequate are facts of life for most. While more
pronounced for older persons, widows and single women, and those with disabilities,
hunger appears endemic in the community. For most, pseudo food like mango kernels act as
a convenient escape, but there is little nutritional value ion those foods. Some even resort
to drinking local brew handia to mask hunger.

Given this food and nutritional insecurity, the national flagship food security safety net
scheme - Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS)25, becomes crucial. Our examination
both household survey and community interaction revealed that, on the whole, food was
reaching the beneficiaries. Ration shops run mostly by GP or the local womens SHG - work
effectively. They are open for business on the days of the month, as required. Beneficiaries
get their due quantity of rice, at prescribed rates, although the same cannot, perhaps, be
said about sugar and kerosene, where villagers complained of mismanagement and
corruption. Most Juangs reported that the scheme helped them with food security for 15
days a month.
But there are many who are left out of the scheme. This is the problem of identification
according to JDA data, only 46 percent Juangs have Antodaya Yojna (AAY) card26, while 43
percent have BPL cards, 6 percent had APL, and 5 percent have no card at all (Ibid:61). And
given that most of the administrative attention that has led to the success of the scheme
among Juangs has been on AAY (declaring all PTG as AAY beneficiary), non-AAY card
holders are mostly left high and dry. In Tangarpada village, we noticed among those who
had no cards at all, or faulty cards, were old and infirm, single-woman, or newly set up
families. Enquiries revealed that many old women, some widows, had applied for issue of
appropriate cards, but found the going difficult, and had given up the attempt. Many, forced
by poverty, had used their AAY or BPL card as security for taking out loan from
moneylenders or shop keepers, losing their entitlement temporarily, in some cases
permanently.27
The other national nutrition programme, targeted universally at women and younger
children is the Integrated Child Development Service (ICDS). ICDS is hugely important for a
state like Orissa, with extremely high IMR (71 as against 55 nationally28), and high incidence
of maternal mortality and underweight children. For Juangs with even higher IMR and
MMR29, effective working of ICDS can be the difference between life and death. But survey
data does not provide a very encouraging picture. In contravention of Supreme court
directions to prioritise SC and ST hamlets, and particularly, those of PVTG groups such as

25

Beneficiaries under the scheme are entitled to 25 kg (BPL) or 35 kg (Antodaya) rice, @ Rs. 2 per kilo; 3 kg of
sugar, @ Rs. 15; and 3 litre of kerosene @ Rs. 9.5.
26
In violation of the May 2003 order of the Supreme Court, to cover all PTGs under AAY.
27
st
FGD, Tangarpada village, Gonasika GP, 21 September 2012.
28
RHS Bulletin, March 2008, M/O Health & F.W., GO
29
132.4 per 1000 live births, and 11.4 per 1000 female population, respectively, in a survey among PTGs in
Orissa (Chhotray, GP 2003)

DRAFT

Juangs, in selection of habitations for establishing Anganwadi Centres (AWC) the

institutional vehicle for providing the ICDS basket of services - many Juang villages are
covered only in name, some not at all. Many AWCs did not have adequate human resource
in the form of Anganwadi Workers (AWWs), and relied on helpers for their working. Most
workers in any case are not from the community, with little appreciation, and often
sensitivity, of the particular nutritional challenges faced by Junags. A full 36 percent of
parents we spoke to did not send their children to Anganwadi centres, citing one or more of
the three reasons: AWC being too far away; poor quality and infrequent frequency of
services, especially supplementary nutrition provided, and discrimination by AWC staff.
There was also only limited awareness and use of schemes targeted specifically at
malnourished children Nutrition Rehabilitation Centres (NRC) and Pushtikar Diwas and
Mamta Diwas.30 Supplementary Nutrition (SNP) component of the programme is
problematic, and as if that was not enough, health counselling works even worse, for a
variety of reasons, main ones being high workload of AWC staff, poor management and
technical capacity, almost the complete absence of monitoring and supervision, and little
community oversight of ICDS. (Ibid: 63-66)
Besides infants and children, pregnant and nursing mothers and adolescent girls among
Juangs, suffer severe malnutrition most are anaemic, due to not getting enough nutrition,
especially in proportion to the work they do. While a majority of this cohort who were
interviewed by the survey team claimed to be getting SNP rations, the quantity was lower
than prescribed. And the provision of providing supplementary nutrition - 500 calories and
20-25 grams of protein and iron tablets - to adolescent girls was seen to be observed more
in breach than otherwise. Not many villages have formed Kishori Mandals, where they have
been, no support is provided by AWC, citing supply side problems. In effect, the ability of
ICDS to deliver on its promise of nutrition for those at the edge is compromised.
This is a particularly cavalier manner of working, in a block with highest reported IMR levels
in the country. In the first half of 2012 alone, as many as 12 infant deaths were reported
from the Banspal ICDS project! A check made in Baitarani village in 2010, close to JDA
headquarters at Gonasika, had revealed that out of the 43 children registered with the AWC,
only 10 were recorded normal, 21 suffered grade 1 malnutrition, nine were grade II, two
grade III and one suffered grade 4 level of malnutrition31. 6 deaths had been recorded, of
children in the age group 15 days to 2 years, from 2007 to mid-2009! (Ibid: 67)
Our conversations with the Anganwadi team in Tangarpada village revealed the seriousness
of what must just be one of the contributory factors human resource. The newly
appointed Anganwadi worker seemed innocent of the nutrition situation in the village, and
uninitiated in the controls required to be kept by her through periodically checking, and
measuring child health, growth and weight patterns32. It was evident, as we chatted, that
she had never used the scales and measuring tapes, or plotted graphs on growth charts. Not
maintaining those records central to managing malnutrition on her pathc meant that the
AWW had no way of saying which child was on the brink and needed immediate help. She
had, as the supervisor admitted, received no training at all, before or since having joined her

30

Observance of Health and Sanitation days,

ICDS grades malnutrition in different categories, on severity, as a reporting and management tool.
32
st
FGD, Tangarpada village. Gonasika GP. 21 September 2012.
31

DRAFT

work. As to the supervisor herself a middle aged non-tribal woman from Mayurbhanj
district, she neither had the thick understanding of local conditions that come in the way of
women adopting modern child-rearing practices, nor the access and trust in the community
to leverage to deliver awareness and capacity building programme with the credibility to
encourage people to adopt the changes.
According to the supervisor, the main challenges to fighting malnutrition among Juangs
were poor awareness among people about hygiene, healthy food and child rearing
practices, and benefits of institutional deliveries; prevalence of superstition among people,
besides remoteness of villages that came in the way of speedy referrals to Primary Health
Centres or Nutrition Rehabilitation Centres (NRC), and the poor working of Gaon Kalyan
Samiti the village level body meant to provide guidance and oversight. As a result, most
deliveries are conducted at home thus putting new-borns, mothers, or both, to serious
risk, in cases of complicated deliveries. The supervisor claims she and her team motivate
ASHAs (village level health para-workers) to persuade women to travel to hospitals for the
delivery, linking up to the Janani Suraksha Yojana33 support (of Rs. 1400 for transport
subsidy), but the attempts fails mostly, as transport costs in these remote villages
Keonjhar tertiary hospital being 20 Km away are high. The PHC at Gunasika is closer at
hand and many women would be willing to travel there, but the PHC neither has the
facilities nor does it work effectively.
What have provision for community participation and governance in the working of ICDS
done to its performance? Guidelines talk of a village level monitoring committee, made up
of 7 members, drawn from different walks of life. Our questioning revealed, villagers were
unaware of such a committee, and that meetings of the committee had never been held, in
the open transparent manner required. ICDS guidelines also require a Mothers Committee,
made up of a selection of mothers of children attending Anganwadi centres. In the ICDS
scheme of things, a great deal of the oversight of the working is left to these two village
level oversight bodies. But discussions in the village, with both the providers and the
beneficiaries of the service proved that there was little realisation of the intention. 34Clearly,
multiple governance fora, with unclear roles, resources and responsibilities, and members
not fully on board, along with little awareness among the local community about the
programme and, meant the defeat of what is conceptually a sound idea peoples
participation but that requires a great deal of ground work, to get going.

And while the survey revealed that Mid Day Meal (MDM) scheme35 was functioning
satisfactorily in most villages - hot meals were being provided daily to children that
attended school. And parents responses demonstrated that the support was helpful in
enhancing nutritional status of their children, the problem in Gonasika, with providing
nutritional support through schools was the poor enrolment in schools. Of the five Juanga
villages surveyed, only three had any schools (Saria, Talapanasa, Tangarpada), the other two
(Upar chempai and Baitarani) were outside of the education dept footprint, thus depriving
children from the village. And in the village covered, there was additional problem of poor

33

A national scheme to attract women to hospital delivery, through a package of incentives and services.
FGD, Tangarpada village. Ibid.
35
The calorie norm prescribed by the Supreme Court is a minimum of 300 calories and 8 to 12 grams of
proteins each day for a minimum of 200 days.
34

DRAFT

enrolment - of the 83 Juang households covered, comprising of 153 children eligible for
MDM benefits, only 67.33 percent were enrolled in schools. (Ibid: 68) The findings
confirmed that that though MDM programme was working satisfactorily, the objective of a
hunger free childhood is far from being realized.
3.8 Shortage, and in some cases prolonged unavailability of adequate and nutritious
food, combines with poor health and sanitation conditions and practices, to create severe
health and nutrition challenges for Juangs. Isolated and remote habitations far away from
nearest health facilities - belief in superstitions and reluctance to adopt modern health and
sanitary practices, play their part. Doctors at the Gunasika PHC inform us36, impatiently, how
mothers are reluctant to breastfeed their children, relying rather, on the unhelpful
traditional practice of feeding with a mix of mahua leaves. And their bathing newborns right
after birth, makes them vulnerable to diarrhoea and respiratory diseases. Villagers later
explained to us the particular feeding practice, on account of the mothers preoccupation
with daily chores, and also because of their lack of awareness about the benefits of
breastfeeding, for which little effort has been made by the very PHC doctors. In any case,
the tropical forest tracks that Juangs inhabit, are festering grounds for diseases such as
Malaria the biggest concern for the doctors, who claim 50 per cent of all cases that visit
the PHC are Malaria cases, and because they come in such advanced stages, must be
referred to the district hospital in Keonjhar, reducing their survival chance.
Poverty, and the absence of safety nets, means that household expenditure on health is
very low, most people relying rather on quacks and the village medicine-man for cure. When
faced with severe crisis and forced to spend - to undergo a major surgery for instance - the
cost is devastating. In the remote Baragarh village, we met Ramesh Juang, whose wife was
taken severely ill last year, and had to be carried, on foot in a stretcher, all the way to the
district hospital at Keonjhar half a day away. While she survived still anaemic and not
fully recovered - the family had to spend Rs 4000 on her treatment, raised through selling
off their livestock, and borrowing money from the sahukar, at a usurious 50 per cent rate of
interest.37 Its a difficult choice people have to make between spending on health and living
in bondage for a long time.
These factors have implications for health outcomes for Juangs. Only 52 per cent of the
respondents in the household survey were found to be in the normal BMI range, rest
belonged variously to severely thin, moderately thin, mildly thin or had pre-obese
conditions. This was not surprising considering that the National Nutrition Monitoring
Bureau (2000-2001) had declared Orissa as having the second highest level of under-
nutrition in the country. Our survey revealed that Juanga suffer disproportionately from
malaria, tuberculosis, sexually transmitted diseases, anaemia and other diseases caused by
nutritional deficiencies. These have resulted in very high mortality amongst them. In the five
villages covered in the survey, a total of 50 persons were reported dead prematurely, during
the previous five years. According to relatives a large proportion of these were hunger-
related. (Ibid: 79)

36

nd

Author interview,Gonasika PHC. 22 September 2012.

rd
Author Interview, Baragarh village, Baragarh GP. 23 September 2012.

37

DRAFT

Is the public health system equal to the task? Gonasika has a PHC, established recently,
upgraded from a sub-Centre. Today, both the PHC and the PHSC, surprisingly, work from the
same compound. Two doctors are posted, one allopathic, another, a homeopathic doctor,
appointed through the Ayush route38, with, as the Ayush doctors informs us, similar work
profile but on a very different term of engagement, including a much reduced wage rate.
The morale among both is low, reflected in our experience that, at any given time during
our fiend research in Gonasika, only one doctor was available to see patients. Apparently,
many reports have to be filed and issues chased up with higher authorities at district offices
in Keonjhar, and which keeps one or the other doctor away. The PHC has only basic
consulting and surgery facilities most complicated cases of delivery, for instances, or those
requiring caesarean operations, must be referred to Keonjhar district hospital. The doctors
claim they see some 50-60 patients a month, most relating to malaria, diarrhohea and
scabies. Half of these are children from the government residential schools in Gunasika,
where the doctors inform, teachers are very alert to diseases.39
The PHC has a mobile health vehicle too, to provide doorstep service to patients that are
unable to travel to Gonasika. But this has been reduced to making rounds of villages, twice a
month, to hold camps and distribute the odd medicine. A janani express too is allotted, to
transport pregnant women from their villages to the PHC, at no cost, but absence of
telephone network in Gonasika, means villagers are unable to make use of the facility. The
ones that get through to the service, travel to Keonjhar hospital rather than come to
Gonasika. In any case, remoteness of villages means patients approach the PHC only when a
problem is compounded by when it is probably too late, anyway. ASHAs and ICDS
Anganwadi Workers are available in each village, but are not used effectively or
imaginatively to fill the gap in local provision of health service. They are neither resourced
well in terms of medicines and kits nor trained adequately, to identify problems and
report them in time for useful intervention.
3.9
Debt: Marginal incomes, and poor working of public food, nutrition and employment
programmes, means Juangs are left wholly income vulnerable, unable to bear shocks such
as crop failure, natural calamity, or a health emergency - forcing them to seek alternative
support, when they need large infusions of cash. There is wide body of literature reporting
the large presence of moneylenders among tribal settlements, and the high incidence of
borrowing at usurious rates of interest leading to tribal indebtedness40. Our surveys in
Gonasika corroborate this understanding.

Debt is widespread among Juangs. 68 per cent of families the survey covered, had taken out
one or another form of loan, most being small-scale, typically under Rs. 2000, mostly for
meeting household expenditure and that for social obligations birth and death feasts, and
wedding ceremonies. Across the families interviewed, liquor acted as a source of much
wasteful expenditure, and a route into the debt trap. Only a little money borrowed went
into more productive forms of expenditure health, land development and purchase of
agricultural inputs, for example. (Ibid: 52 )

38

Ayush, short for Ayurved, Unani, and Siddhi systems of medicine, that together make the Governments
thrust for using indigenous systems of medicine to supplement modern allopathic.
39
nd
Author interview, Gonasika PHC. 22 September 2012.
40
Indebtedness.

DRAFT

Source of credit, surprisingly, varied - both institutional and non-institutional sources were
used, ranging from agricultural banks, self help groups, family members and relatives, and
moneylenders. Moneylenders, seemed very popular (despite presence of a formal source in
the form of the Baitarani Grameen Bank, 26 per cent of respondents relied on
moneylenders for credit). This, we realised later was presumably due to the fewer
conditions and simple procedures no paperwork needed - used by moneylenders, which
made that source very attractive to those in urgent need of cash (Ibid:53).41 The rub,
however, is in the usurious rate of interest charged by moneylenders ranging from 5 to 20
per cent, per month and which ensures that people are trapped in indebtedness. Illiteracy
among Juangs and absence of any written agreement between the parties, works to the
advantage of moneylenders. Repayment is usually in kind oil seed and crop, that sells at a
premium, further benefiting the moneylender. All this goes on, alongside laws such as the
Orissa Scheduled Areas Moneylenders Regulation, 1967 (Regulation 2 of 1968), meant for
regulating money lending in Scheduled Areas, and the Orissa (Scheduled Areas) Debt Relief
Regulation, 1967 (Regulation 1 of 1968), for providing relief to tribals from indebtedness.
3.10 Land Alienation. Indebtedness, it turns out, is also behind Juangs gradually losing
their land, mostly to non-tribals the phenomenon of land alienation. Historically, land
transfers in Junag areas, from tribal to non-tribals, have happened most to Gaudas,
traditional milkmen, classified Other Backward Class in Orissa. Discussions with the
community reveal the emergence of Gaudas in Juanga dominated region in the last century,
who came in search of pasture for their cattle, but switched over gradually to agriculture, by
taking over land from Juangs, in transfers behind which were informal mortagages of land
for money loaned to Juangs. Villagers in Upar Chempai told us wistfully, how, according to
their forefathers, Gaudas asked Juang elders then dependent wholly on the plentiful
forests, and with limited farming practice - to let them use flat lands, lower down the valley,
for cultivation. As a sign of goodwill, and given the limited use then that those lower
footholds held for Juangs, their forefathers wrote away vast tracts of fertile, and now
irrigated, lands to Gaudas. When settlement operations came to Gonasika, those lands, in
occupation of Gaudas, were recorded in Gauda name while Junags little realised the
import of the development. Villagers informed us, it was on those same ancestral lands,
now owned by Gaudas, that Juang youth now labour during harvest time, to eke out a living.
42

It seems outsider creep into Gonasika and subsequent Juang land alienation became
alarming enough for the Keonjhar State authority to pass an act, the Bhuiyan and Juanga
Pirh Immigration Act, in 1947, in an attempt to control immigration of non-tribals. Non-
tribals already residing on lands were given titles and exempted from this control. 43
Subsequent attempts by the State Government to control land alienation - the Orissa
Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (by STs) Regulation, 1956, have only been
partially successful in averting the problem.

41

th

This supports the national trends According to the All India Debt and Investment Survey, (NSS, 59 round,
2002), the share of moneylenders in the rural household increased from 17.5 % in 1991 to 29.6 % in 2002.
Reserve Bank of India (2007).
42
st
FGD, Upar Chapmai village, 21 September 2012.
43
Rath (2005:51), quoted in CES (2012:57).

DRAFT

3.11
Mounting debt and the hopelessness that it brings to the poor, also results in
the other pathology affecting tribal communities bondage. Unable to repay their debt, and
with little asset to mortgage, many families are forced to render labour, without payment,
to repay debt, under a system locally called Goti. (Kulkarni, 2004) The survey identified a
number of boded labourers in the villages it covered, in the age range 9-65 years. While the
adults among them (called Bagadias) are employed for agricultural and household chores,
children (chelias) help with grazing cattle. Discreet conversations with bagadias revealed
they had been forced into the system due to their (or parents) inability to repay loans from
moneylenders or richer persons in the village, itself taken because of destitution and hunger
facing them. (Ibid:58)

The terms of the recruitment vary mostly an oral contract is established, renewed on a
yearly basis. Details of wage and the length of the arrangement are neither demanded by
the illiterate and desperate bagadia, nor provided by the employer. Working conditions are
harsh, with no leave or respite given. In our survey we came across an old man who said he
had been working in a household for many years, and believed that his son would have to
take on the responsibility of repayment of the left over loan, by rendering service himself.
All this goes on, despite the presence of national and state laws specifically to abolish the
practice - the Orissa Debt Bondage (Abolition and Regulation) Act, 1948 and the Central
Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. As is the case elsewhere, while those affected
know little about these legislations, those responsible for implementing the law, deny the
existence of the practice at all.

3.12 Migration:
Given this combination of poor opportunity and poorer access,
resulting in extreme vulnerability and risk, options close at hand available to villagers, for
just eking out a living, survival in fact, are limited. Juangs, we were informed, are
increasingly being compelled to seek livelihoods away from home. Occasional work is
available, during harvest time particularly, on fields of non-tribal (mostly Gauda) farmers in
nearby villages, at wage rate of between Rs. 100 130, a day. This is a huge step up from
the normal wage rate in village of Rs. 40-80 a day, women typically being paid even less. But
this work is very limited lasting on an average, ten days a year. Given the absence of
alternate wage opportunities for the rest of the year, and the promise of higher wages, the
trend now is increasingly for Juang youth, to migrate outside the security of the village,
mostly to far-flung and unfamiliar cities and metropolises - Cuttack and Balasore, as well as
further afield, to Chennia and Mumbai for agricultural and non-agricultural work. These
involve labour intermediaries, locally called sardars, and payment of advances by them to
potential labourers, a new characteristic of migration in these remote villages. The giving of
advance, with is the starting point of a long and often exploitative journey for the labourer,
ironically also acts as an immediate safety net, in the absence of any other, for the
desperately impoverished youth and his family, with nothing to look forward to44.

Ramesh Juang and his wife, from Upar Champai, inform us of their elder son who has been
travelling to Chennai, in the south, for a few years, to work as labour hand, in one of the
citys many factories. The son is able to save a total of Rs. 5000 for the six months of work
there (July to January) that is his contribution to family kitty; this the outcome of cash

44

st

Author interview, Upar Champai, 21 September 2012.

DRAFT

advance he took from the Gauda sardar, from the lower Baitharani village. But conditions
are harsh at work, risks high, and back home the family has to make do with what is
available until the son returns with his little saving. We hear similar stories in the remote
Baragarh village, where in the just passed harvest season, 12 youth travelled out to Andhpur
block, in the plains, to work on rice fields of land owners, helping harvest the crop.

Government does not recognise distress migration, preferring to call the annual cycle of
labour movements, economic migration, just as any professional would move home for
better working conditions for himself and family. Official statistics also do not acknowledge
temporary migration for under two months - especially rural to rural migration. According
to the survey data, that found 22 per cent households had one or more members resorting
to migration to cope, all migration was for under 3 months in a year. Inter-state migration
was also seasonal, most happening during mid-October to mid-January, and mostly for
agricultural work. As to the reasons, villagers reported chronic hunger and insufficient food;
indebtedness and the urgency to pay off loans taken for health reasons or for meeting social
obligations; and search for better wages, as the most common reasons. (Ibid:43).

It is a measure of the hopeless of the situation, and the breakdown of community and public
safety nets among Juangs, that seasonal migration, in desperate search for livelihood,
already common among other destitute communities, has become a preferred coping
mechanism also for the otherwise isolated and mostly self-sufficient Juang tribe. But
migration, and the opportunity for earning a decent wage, comes at extremely high cost,
both for those who migrate out, having to suffer harsh working and living conditions,
besides indignities, and for their families left behind, with little support in the intervening
months, until return of the breadwinner. The long term implications of this absence of
heads of household, on single-parent raised children, is also devastating.

3.13 Modernity and change among Juangs
What does this picture of all-round dismay and desperation among Juangs tell us about
mobility and change in the community and the role of change agents? No leadership has
emerged among the Juangs. There are no Juang youth, cultural or political organisations to
speak on their behalf. Our effort to enquire about traditional bodies Junaga pidh or the
like too, brought little success. We had heard of a Juang Yuva Morcha, set up in the past,
through the effort of donor agencies, working with a rights based approach. But it turned
out that our interlocutor Srikant, the headteacher of the residential girls school, was its
chief organiser. Enquiries with him revealed the Morcha, never even got on to a start. The
absence of a middle class, even in its most primitive form, among the Juangs makes the
emergence of leadership all the more difficult.

Reservation in panchayats have ensured that there are a handful of Juang men and women
elected to positions of authority in village level panchayats. But meetings with them and
discussions in FGDs revealed that they were not ready to take up the leadership role. Most
were uneducated in the finer details of development schemes, and were too disinterested
and hardly resourceful to be of much help to their constituents. A lady Gram Panchayat
sarpanch we met, initially mouthed the usual rhetoric about juangs being lazy and
interested in an easy life, to explain away the harsh situations, but later confided to us her

DRAFT

own weaknesses before the bureaucracy and powerful elements, when pushing Juang
agenda45. And a Ward member we interacted with said he was helpless to do much about
grievances of people, and could not represent the voice of his people before the panchayat,
because no one took him seriously46.

There are the odd non-governmental development agencies working in the Gonasika region,
but none target the Juangs or work specifically with them. The oldest NGO in the block, and
by far the one with the most impact, the Belgian-funded Village Resource Organisation
(VRO), works with youth, to empower them with skills and abilities for the jobs market,
through a training school for boys in Gonasika, and another for girls in Biakamutai village,
both residential and set up in 1979. But again, only a handful of Juangs, and none among
girls, have been able to make use of this opportunity. Other NGOs of note, in the region, are
Pradhan (working on education and forest rights), World Lutheran Federation (working on
health), and Kalinga Education Advancement Trust (KEATS), on education and youth
empowerment, but again, none work directly with Juangs. Most, in cases where their work
takes them to Juang villages, have a paternalistic attitude to help Juangs with some
services, rather than educate, organise and capacity build them in other words, empower -
to demand and obtain their rights, a strategy increasingly commonplace now, in
developmental practice.

Key agents of change, in Gonasika and among the Juang, have been government agencies
principally the Juang Development Agency (JDA), and the Gonasika Higher secondary school,
the latter, set up in 1972, has enabled other communities tribal as well and non-tribal - to
acquire education, and resultant mobility, but seems to have affected Juangs only
marginally. Recently, in 2009, a residential school was set up in Gonasika, under the
auspices of the JDA, specifically for Juang girls, with the hope that this will set in motion
definite change.

Change among Juangs then, is down to the working of the JDA. The agency was set up, in
1978, under the micro-project approach for development of PTGs, introduced in the 5th Five
Year Plan. It caters to 35 Juang villages in Keonjhar, of the total 132 Juang villages. By latest
reckoning, the 35 villages are made up of 2000 households, evidence how conservative an
ambition JDA has set for itself. According to the head of JDA, the main developmental
challenges before Juangs is health Tuberculosis and Malaria incidence is very high, and the
high infant and child mortality, are a matter of concern - and education, with very low
literacy and education attainments. Livelihood is another major concern, with poor wage
and employment opportunities, and low productivity on land people till. Equally worrisome
for the head is the rampant drinking among Juangs, one that according to him, is killing
them.
Given this clear statement of purpose, it is surprising that health does not figure at all in the
annual work plan of JDA. All heath and related efforts, informs the JDA chief, are the
responsibility of the Health Department. But we saw little evidence of any coordination
between JDA and health department, on fighting the common cause, in JDA areas. On
education, the principal programme is the Gonasika girls residential school, something like

45

rd

Author interview, Gonasika GP office, 23 September 2012.

st
FGD, Tangarpada village, 21 September 2012.

46

DRAFT

the flagship education programme of JDA. The rest of the work plan is all about
infrastructure building roads, check dams, buildings, electrifications, water supply, canal
systems, compound walls, toilet complexes as well as staff quarters for the school.47 While
all these are important projects for advancing welfare and development, the absence of
activities on creating livelihood opportunities48, or those to directly address the specific
problems faced by Juangs, rather than implementing set projects picked off the shelf, is
remarkable.

The findings of an evaluation of JDA micro-project, conducted in 2010 by Orissa SC-ST
Research and Training Institute (RTI), are revealing in that they echo these observations49.
Since its inception in 1978, JDA has been provided a total resource of Rs. 9.5 crores, of
which it has spent only Rs. 7 crores on various programme. These, the evaluation found, had
resulted in some gains. Housing had been provided, roads had helped with improve
connectivity, and girls school had helped improve reach of education among the
community. Additionally JDAs efforts towards mobilising applications for award of record of
right over forest land under FRA had been quite successful, leading to decrease in the
number of landless families. The programme to get youth involved in SHGs and running of
ration shops too had been helpful.

But the evaluation reported some serious lapses too. Most money had been spent on
infrastructure projects, that are easy to envisage and push through, even though they did
not address the specific challenges faced by Juangs. Livelihood efforts, the evaluation found,
had been too scanty, and even those had totally failed, due to poor institutional and
managerial attention. Poverty levels, as a result, decreased only marginally. These findings
echo our own assessment that most JDA work planning, specially for complex development
outcomes such as livelihoods or food and health security, is not based on any need analysis
and business planning, to identify gaps and devise strategies to overcome those in a time
bound manner. Rather much of the work planning is top-down, based on ready-to-use tools
and shelf of projects, pushed through on technical considerations, with little citizen input,
and implemented in an even more centralised and unprofessional manner. We noticed
some effort by the district authorities to identify community needs50, but our fear is that too
technical a need-assessment and planning, without much peoples involvement, might
defeat the very intent to understand inclusively, why people remain where they are, and
how to enable them to climb out of poverty.

The RTI report further revealed that governance of JDA itself was poorly managed - JDA
board meetings were held only once a year instead of the required four times, and even
these were held at a distance, in district headquarters, rather than in Gonasika. Connecting
to this arms-length dealing of the development administration with its subjects, was the
more damning criticism that there was little involvement of Juangs in the entire
developmental effort of JDA, and that they were more the objects of development rather
than participants in it.

47

ITDA Keonjhar, Annual Work Plan 2012-13. 23-9-12

In violation of micro-project guidelines to spend 75% of budget on income generating activities
49
Abstract findings of CCD Plan review 2010 on JDA Gonasika Micro project (SC-ST RTI, Bhubneshwar)
50
We were presented the initial findings of a need assessment survey being conducted by the District Admn.,
th
that had tried to map all the various. Keonjhar, 24 September 2012.
48

DRAFT

RTI study made some very pointed suggestions for action. It asked for greater thrust on
livelihood promotion work, and JDA to connect with health department to ensure that
adequate supply of medicine was available to ANMs in villages. But the really insightful
directions to JDA were to involve Juangs in the development process, as partners, while also
enlisting local NGOs in the effort. The report also asked for JDA to create better awareness
about its programmes and developmental issues, among the community. Finally the report
recommended posting to JDA, only officers willing to serve in the area. Lets pick up these
two strands of posting of willing officers and involvement of Juangs themselves in the
development process for further examination.

JDA, in the way it is staffed today, is an unlikely change agent. It is an agency of the
Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe Development Department of the Orissa Government. It
is led typically by Orissa Welfare Service officers, and officers from the department are
seconded to it in various capacities. Most officers, from the top to the bottom, are non-
tribal, certainly most are non-Juang, with implications for how they connect to the people or
the place. The tough living conditions at Gonasika do not help. The patch is forested, malaria
and TB are rampant, housing is poor, power is erratic, there are only two shops selling basic
provisions, and mobiles do not work, even though the distance from Keonjhar is only 30 KM
and roads are surprisingly good. We were told how most officers took their posting with JDA
as punishment. We heard how the head of the agency, was forced against his wishes to
operate out of Gonasika rather than commute from Keonjhar. His deputy still commutes
everyday, and thus has little connecting him to Gonasika. And there are few Juangs qualified
to fill the gap. Since its inception in 1978, there have been only two Juang staff a peon,
and a recently appointed Field Assistant, both from nearby villages.

This combination of low morale and dissatisfaction with working conditions among staff, is
toxic for how JDA delivers to its constituents whose evidence we saw in operation every
day of our research, in the officials interactions with Juang villagers. Officers routinely
called Juangs lazy, and liars who could not be trusted with their words. They blamed the
stark poverty and destitution all around, on Juang propensity for easy life, drinking and
making merry, and their being guided by blind faith, rather than reason. Poor participation
of Juangs in NREGS works was blamed on their laziness, no effort made to introspect if
there might be weaknesses in the working of the programme itself, and how it might
exclude the poor. It is not surprising then, these unhelpful attitudes only push Juangs, still
uneasy with an unequal interaction with the outside world, further into the protective
security of their tradition, away from modernity and change, coming as it is through the
unlikely agents.

We put this question to the Juang Field Assistant (FA), one of the two Juang staff members
of JDA. What, would you say, has been the impact of JDA in your community? What change
has come about?
Only marginal, he replied. Very few jobs have been created, in JDA or in other
institutions for Juangs. Ten Juang language teachers have been appointed. Apart
from that nothing else.

According to him the main hindrance towards change had been poor education.

DRAFT

There are very few Juangs who can claim to be educated. Most children drop out by the
time they reach class 6-7, at most class 10. Very few are able to continue beyond
matriculation to higher secondary and only a handful aspire to a college education. He
recounts his own experience, how his parents worked as a helper in a non-tribal household,
and where his parents learned the value of education, and drove them to put him and his
siblings into the local school. The resolve of his mother, more than the father, worked to see
that he completed his schooling, right up to Class 10, a surprising feat, some 30 years ago. In
1978, when JDA was established, he was among the few Juangs who had any education, and
easily landed a job. So what is the way out of the poverty trap, we ask him.
We need to get youth and parents to take education seriously. If our children are
educated, they will have a better life than the wretched one we live every day.

But what incentives are there for education? The FA admits there are poor drivers within
the community for education. Children and their parents, live for the day. Most boys, 12 yrs
onward, work in fields or elsewhere with parents, while girls help take care of younger
siblings while parents are toiling in the fields or forest. Thinking is, if we spend a day in the
jungle, we will collect enough produce to sell in the market for a few rupees. Then why
waste time going to school, since there are no immediate benefits to education anyway.
Unlike Dalits, FA claimed, who have been able to use reservation to their advantage to land
jobs, in our case that stage is still a long way off. As a result there are very few success
stories and role models within the community for youth to look up to and follow. Clearly the
critical mass to break out of the trap, has still not been attained. And for families living hand
to mouth, even the little investment in education, especially post-matriculation, when
children must step out of their villages and move to urban centres, with its additional costs
of rent and food besides books and tuition, is a disincentive strong enough to outweigh any
long term benefits of education, that is never assured. In any case, the fear of discrimination
by teachers and other staff members in school, is turn off enough.

Availability of schools too is a problem. Of the five villages we covered, two had no school at
all, excluding little children from education. At higher levels this problems becomes more
common, requiring children to walk or cycle long distances. This is specially problematic for
girls. And even if schools are located within the village, teacher absence is typically a major
problem. In Upper Champee village, the primary school, with 50 students enrolled, had no
language teacher, and the other teacher shared his time with another school down in the
plains. And where teachers are posted, as the survey team discovered in Tangarpada and
Ghodabandha villages, they might attend to their work erratically, escaping away to their
homes with regularity, depriving students of the opportunity they need.
All these translate into some very disturbing education outcomes for Juangs. While 55.55
per cent of Juangs had received primary education, that figure for secondary schooling was
merely 11.11 percent, signifying the sharp drop. Drop out happens most at primary level
(45.4 percent), followed by middle school level (36.36 percent) and 18.18 percent at
Secondary. All these translate into dismal literacy figures for Juangs as a whole (24.12%,
according to JDA data). Of the 200 households covered in the survey, a full were totally
illiterate unable to write or read. (CES, 2012:48-50)

DRAFT

If education is the route to empowerment, which it must be, where is the evidence that it is
getting the eyeball it deserves? There seems only weak hearted attempt, either by
government or NGOs to have children seen through to college. The Gonasika Government
High School, established in 1972 as an aided school and upgraded to High School in 1984
was the first and early attempt in that direction. As we sit down for a post-dinner chat with
the boys from the school hostel, we are informed that 17 of the 30 present in the room, are
Juangs, a big enough moral boost. And just like the rest of the students, they too have
aspirations of becoming doctors and policemen and teachers, even a scientist. The
headmaster explains, what they lack is perhaps the ability, in a comparative sense, to
translate those dreams into reality, and this is where consistency and a long enough stay in
a residential environment is helping students. Results are showing of those present, 7
have siblings who were past students of the school. 2 have become teachers, one is a mason
and the rest are all going through college all have, thus, broken through!51

The Gonasika residential girls school, set up in 2009, is the latest attempt to address the
education problem among Juangs. But the effort is probably a case of too little too late.
While we must wait to see the impact it makes on Juang youth and society, it is important to
recognise the bigger problem, as our Field Assistant reminds, of the very high incidence of
children dropping out of schools, due mostly to economic reasons back at home. Residential
schools, for a limited number of students might be helpful short-term measure, to, in a
figure of speaking, jump-start the education process, but they need to be scaled up to cover
many more children. And the question, what happens after girls have completed class 8, still
remaisn to be answered. Experience of similar mainstream residential schools for weaker
sections show that drop out, after graduating from such schools can be quite high. Further,
a way has to be found to mainstream education, so Juang youth grow up, not in a mono-
cultural Juang environment, but with skills to make the best of all that society has to offer.

4.
Divergent institutional design for tribals: Fifth vs. Sixth Schedule of Constitution

What explains durable poverty among Juangs, and the dismal performance of programmes
meant for their uplift? I argue that the basic flaw is our inability to give adivasis their due
share of authority and control over resources affecting their lives. A cynical reading might
blame economics for this failure fact that tribal areas are also repositories powering our
engines of growth forest and timber, coal, bauxite, iron and manganese, and the rivers
and stream that help generate power. While economic considerations cannot be denied, for
they play an important part in our continued refusal to allow local communities Gram
Sabhas and village panchayats control over how those resources will be used, the roots of
the problem lie perhaps in the way in which history of state formation has panned, from
colonial to present times.

This argument is best made, by comparing trends for adivasis against those for tribals in
North East India the other region with a large concentration of ST population, but with
very different development outcomes. Varying institutional arrangements, for governance
of tribal areas, embodied in Fifth Schedule and Sixth Schedule arrangements of the
Constitution, former for Central India and latter for the North East, are central to explaining

51

st

Author interview, Gonasika Government High School, 21 September, 2012.

DRAFT

this difference. This discussion, I argue, also provides pathways to reforms required for
enabling change in the lives of adivasis in Central India.

We will start with a survey of wellbeing attainments in the North East region, to
demonstrate how dissimilar they are to Central India. According to latest human
development calculations, Northeastern states (except Assam), covering pretty much the
entire tribal population of the region, ranked 6th in HDI for all Indian states, sandwiched
between such rich states as Maharashtra and Punjab. HDI was also improving between 2000
and 2008, with specially significant change in health situation. (Planning Commission, 2011:
24, 28). Health indicators for all states - Life expectancy at birth, and Infant as well as under
five mortality rates and sex ratio were well above national trends (DoNER, 2011: 40, 46).
So is nutritional status (Ibid. :45) resulting in low incidence of underweight children, and low
percentage of women with low BMI. Literacy is high for all states, and education
attainments - enrolment rates and children out of school, are positive. (Ibid.: 19, 24).

Sound development indicators for the northeast region as a whole can be explained based
on a combination of historical reasons and the play of institutions. Observers have noted the
role of Christian missionaries in introducing to tribes in the region, modern education, and
how that, besides improving literacy levels, set in motion dynamics that enabled social
mobilisation and development. (Xaxa, 2001: 2772; Hassan, 2008:64). This itself lends the
region and its people great advantage in awareness, association, and participation, all
resulting in better development outcomes. But education and awareness is not all.

Improved development indicators have been further explained by the fact that STs are the
majority in these states, and thus the mainstream there, unlike those in other parts of the
country. This leads to development programmes benefiting tribals in the region, in ways
that tribals in other parts of India do not. (Planning Commission, 2011:31). This
inclusiveness of the development process, benefiting tribals, is demonstrated for example
in the case of Nagaland in its strong push for communitising of public services, including
education, public health and livelihood programmes, that essentially marshal community
dynamics at the grassroots for effective performance. Similar trends can be observed in
Meghalaya and Mizoram, and to a lesser extent in Manipur, all with high literacy rates,
strong community norms among tribals, both enabling high degree of public participation.
Inclusion, as I demonstrate elsewhere, in the form of strong state-society links in Mizoram,
also enables greater effort and success on delivery of public services education, access to
food and other entitlements, and particularly, through the medium of Autonomous District
Councils and Development Councils, access to minority tribal groups in the state to
development, resources and power. (Hassan, 2008:75). Inclusion, participation and public
service delivery through strong state-society links in the region, undoubtedly have multiple
roots and pathways. A strong, rather critical one, is the adoption of the Sixth Schedule
provisions of the constitution, and the self-rule dynamic that it set in motion, a dynamic
central to which is tribal autonomy - that has developed over the years.

Sixth Schedule of the Constitution applies to states of Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya and
tribal districts of Assam. It divides tribes in the region into autonomous districts and regions,
for specific tribes, with members elected directly. As the name would imply, the elected
councils have considerable autonomy, (i) to make laws with respect to a variety of subjects

DRAFT

(ranging from prevention of alienation of land, to allotment, occupation and use of land for
agricultural and other purposes; regulation of money-lending, and social customs -
inheritance of property and appointment of village chiefs, among others); (ii) exercise
judicial authority (constitute village councils and courts to try suits and cases involving
tribals within the area, and for which the courts exercise powers under CPC and CrPC); and
carry out a range of executive functions from establishing and managing primary schools
to waterways and roads. Further, (iv) to enable district councils to exercise this authority
and carry out these functions, the Sixth Schedule creates District Fund, to keep councils
financial free from the control of State Governments. To this is credited levies on land,
buildings, professions, vehicles, passengers and goods, and, importantly, the rights to
sharing royalty from licenses or leases for the purpose of prospecting for or extraction of
minerals granted by the State Government. The Sixth Schedule thus embodies a concept of
autonomy that includes constitutionally specified legislative and judicial subjects exclusively
the domain of the (tribal) local government, the limitation of the states executive authority,
and financial independence of local governments.

How does autonomy contribute to better wellbeing? Central to Sixth Schedule then, is
property rights for tribals in scheduled areas and the limited authority of the state there.
(For a survey, see Hassan, 2006) This allows for land, for instance, to be owned by local
communities, rather than the state, and District Councils to have the authority to decide
how forests (with the exception of reserved forest) will be used, to what purposes. As Kurup
notes, while this substitution of legal rights to property right elsewhere, with fundamental
right for tribal communities in Sixth Schedule areas, still allows the state to acquire tribal
land and property, and pay just compensation, it significantly alters the balance of power
between state and tribal local communities resulting in police powers of the state being
severely curtailed. (Kurup, 2008: 117). Seen in the context of the role of land alienation, and
especially development induced displacement and their impact on tribals in Fifth Schedule
areas, this is significant gain for tribals in North East region.

Sixth Schedule provisions enable District Councils, and tribal communities through them, to
undo the other banes of tribal society indebtedness, and the noxious role of
moneylenders. Along with allowing District Councils the upper hand in regulation of tribal
social customs and dispute resolution mechanisms, this vision of the balance of power,
helps manage another a balance that between the assimilation of tribal peoples and their
independent identity. The fact that Sixth Schedule goes further beyond, to also enable
District Councils to exercise executive authority with implications for socio-economic
rights of their constituents, while ring fencing resources for the Councils to carry out these
functions helps establish mechanism for tribals to preserve their way of life without
compromising on development.

Fifth Schedule of Constitutions is a very conservative piece of law making, in comparison. It
substitutes the autonomy enjoyed by district and regional councils with the almost absolute
authority of the provincial Governor, as the benevolent protector of tribal interests in
scheduled areas in the particular State. Fifth Schedule gives the Governor the
unprecedented power to limit or modify the application of any national or state law in
scheduled areas; and regulate peace and good government there. It specifically empowers
them to act to prevent tribal land alienation, and regulate money-lending. The only

DRAFT

limitation to this wide authority Governors enjoy, is the requirement for them to consult the
Tribal Advisory Council before making such regulations - a body only indirectly
representative of tribal interest, with 3/4ths of members being tribal members of the state
legislative assembly, and whose authority is compromised given it can only take up issues
referred to it by the Governor. All regulations so made, also need the Presidents assent.

The primacy of the Governor, and through him the Central Government, in the lives of
tribals in Fifth Schedule areas is further underlined by the fact that the Governor reports to
the Union, through annual reports, on administration of those areas, and the Union has
powers to direct states on the matter. Completing this picture of a (top down) centralised
bureaucratic structure of tribal administration is the extension of states executive powers
in scheduled areas. This is a far cry from the self rule provisions of Sixth Schedule, and
explains the dramatically divergent outcomes for tribals in the two pockets of tribal
habitation in the country of maintaining tribal way of life without compromising
development in Sixth Schedule areas as against being culturally deprived and economically
robbed52 in Sixth Schedule. How squarely the top-down bureaucratic design has failed to
deliver is demonstrated by a recent article titled Governors failure spans 60 years53 that
brings to light the fact that Governors power under Fifth Schedule has been used only once,
and the suggestion that part of this massive failure of Governors, to rise to the expectations
of framers of the constitution to act the benevolent patriarch of tribal interests, might be
unnecessary confusion among Governors, as well as the Union Government, on the
discretionary powers Governors enjoy with regards tribal welfare, unencumbered by
ministerial advice, so clearly spelt out in the Fifth Schedule. Despite the ritual of Union
Government giving annual talks to Governors on how important their role is in the tribal
schemes of things, and exhorting them to act, little has been forthcoming.54

Panchayati Raj (Extension in Scheduled Areas) Act, 2006 was the first attempt at
decentralisation in Fifth Schedule areas. It mandated devolution of certain political,
administrative and fiscal powers to local governments elected by local communities, while
attempting to protect tribal social customs and common property management practices. It
has therefore been billed the logical extension to Fifth Schedule. (Planning Commission
2006: 84). But a closer look at the law, and its implementation proves, it is really half-
hearted decentralisation. Rather than putting tribal communities in the drivers seats, so to
speak, to negotiate issues affecting their life and wellbeing, PESA only asks State
Government to consult, involve and obtain recommendations, as the case may be, from
local communities, rather than empower the communities themselves to take decisions.
While, the less contentious issues of developmental planning and scheme implementation,
and managing water bodies are fully entrusted to Gram Sabhas to control, land acquisition
and resettling displaced persons only require States to consult Gram Sabhas, or indeed

52

HJ Harit (1996), quoted in Kurup (2008:97).

.

53

54

In his speech to the annual Conference of Governors (30th Oct. 2011), the Union Minister for Tribal
Affairs, and in the context of the glaring gaps in development indices of tribals, underlined the vital
role of Governors, in an attempt to urge them to action: The Governors have been endowed with
certain special powers with regard the Fifth Scheduled Areas. The judicious use of the provisions enshrined in
the Fifth Schedule of our Constitution, will certainly make a very positive impact on the tribals living in these
regions. Accessed from MoTA website.

DRAFT

Gram Panchayats at appropriate level. And State authorities need only obtain
recommendation from Gram Sabhas or Gram Panchayats, for granting prospecting licenses
and concessions for exploitation of minerals.

The fact that PESA defines village very loosely55 with little attempt to empower voices of
tribal communities in Gram Sabhas - in a context where Fifth Scheduled areas have, over the
years, been inundated with non-tribal settlers - further erodes any empowering potential
that PESA might have had.56 Driving a nail in PESAs coffin is the reliance in the act, on States
to empower Gram Sabhas, as effective tribal self governance institutions to take greater
control over economic opportunities such as minor forest produce and developmental
planning processes, as well as to regulate and contain destructive trends enforcing
prohibition, preventing land alienation and controlling money-lending.

Observers have noted how after a decade, it is apparent that PESA is not clearly achieving
(that) objective. On the contrary blatant violation of tribal interests and the reluctance (in
some cases sheer procrastination) of State Administrations to cede authority have often
compelled tribes in the Fifth Schedule areas to reassert their identity and rights violently.
(Kurup, 2008:91)57. This scholarly assessment of the drivers of violence in 5th Schedule areas
finds surprising echo in the Union Ministers of Tribal Affairs own description of the
problem, when expressing frustration with the poor implementation of PESA to the
aforementioned conference of Governors.
The alienation of the tribal population has been growing rapidly mainly because
they are being dispossessed of all their livelihood resources. The diversion of forests
and common property resources for the use of non-forest purposes has resulted in
the displacement of tribals from their homeland.
He held this trend, along with other failures of tribal development, responsible for the
growing unrest amongst this most oppressed and depressed class of people58.

Clearly, the general exhortation in the act, to state legislatures, to follow the pattern of the
Sixth Schedule to the Constitution while designing the administrative arrangements in the
Panchayats at district levels in (Fifth) Scheduled Areas, (to promote self governance in order
to address the problem of exploitation) has been wholly unmet.

Lets remind ourselves why farmers of the constitution used two different instruments to
address a single problem of reaching the balance between tribal self identify and
development. This had antecedents in colonial policy. Kurup demonstrates how the British
relied on two considerations for determining the degree of self-government tribes would
exercise: (i) ability of tribes to manage their own affairs, and (ii) pattern of habitation of the
tracts. (2008:90). Excluded Areas were those with single tribal population, Partially Excluded
Areas being the ones also with minority non-tribal habitations. Both were excluded from the

55

As habitations or hamlets or a combination therefore. PESA, 2006.

Notwithstanding the 50% reservations of STs in Gram Panchayats and reserving the lead role for them.
57
The draft National tribal policy supports this view of states sabotaging implementation of PESA, when it
says, While PESA remains unimplemented, the tribal areas are increasingly being opened up by the State
Governments for commercial exploitation by national and multi-national corporate bodies. Draft National
Tribal Policy. Para 14.3.
58
Minister MoTA address to Governors conference, 2011. MoTA website.
56

DRAFT

competence of provincial and federal legislatures, the Governor assuming that role, but
administration of Partially Excluded Areas allowed some degree of popular control, through
Council of Ministers.

In proposing special administrative arrangement for tribes, the Constituent Assembly used
this basic framework, but adapted it to its own objectives. While continuing in the colonial
typecast of seeing tribes as being incapable of self government, the practical realities of the
unfolding upheavals in Assam and neighbouring hills - different tribes jostling for
recognition, the declaration of revolt by the Nagas being only the major probably pushed
them into offering, to the tribal groups in the region, arrangements quite advanced for the
age, in the form of the self-government provisions under Sixth Schedule.

There were no such pressing matters in Central India no political movements among the
tribes powerful enough to push the national leadership to concede power and authority to
tribal communities. The upshot was falling back to bureaucratic paternalism for
experienced and sympathetic handling, and protection from economic subjugation in
place of rapid political advance for Sixth Schedule areas. Fact that many tribal communities
coexisted with minority non-tribal populations in central India, provided helpful justification
to claim impracticability of the self-rule idea there.

The Indian Constitution has been called the greatest experiment in social engineering by
inventing India as a "modern" country, styling itself as a secular, federal, democratic
Republic committed to an ideology of development (Corbridge and Harris, 2000). The Idea
of India that the framers of the Constitution envisioned - modern, technocratic, egalitarian,
and secular - was in marked contrast to the India that existed then. (Khilnani: 1998). In
taking this big leap forward, national leaders were challenging the colonial typecast about
India and Indians, as incapable of managing their affairs.59 It is surprising, rather tragic, then,
that the same leaders wished a different set of aspirations for the tribal population of the
country. Indeed, as the national experience with democracy tells us, it is through democratic
principles and practices, and the spaces those create for participation of hitherto
unrepresented sections, that political representation and development is best achieved. In
denying the tribals of central India that participation for so many years, their development
too might have been set back to the extent.

5.
Conclusion and way forward

This paper began with the question: why have Juang PTGs, and like them, tribals in central
India, remained stuck in poverty and destitution, despite an array of impressive policies and
instruments deployed over the years for their uplift. Explaining the severe and durable
disparity between social groups in Orissa, that affects adivasi in particular, Arjan De Haan,
blames the lack of performance of those very pro-poor programmes on ..a lack of

59

By the likes of Winston Churchill, who in his defence of denying self-rule to India, was commenting: ..here
you have nearly three hundred and fifty million people lifted to a civilisation and to a level of peace, order,
sanitation and progress, far beyond anything they could possibly have achieved themselves or could maintain
.going on to warn, in the event of self rule, that India will fall back quite rapidly through the centuries into
barbarism and the privations of middle ages. Our Duty in India. Albert Hall, March 18, 1931. Accessed at
www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/105-our-duty-in-india

DRAFT

accountability within the administrative system, and that the very disparities that the
policies try to address, permeate the system of delivery responsible for these. (Haan,
2004:1). He shows how a narrow (political and administrative) elite in Orissa, with little
incentive to open up its social base to the poor, implementing a slew of social programmes,
all top down with little tribal (or indeed subaltern) participation, both within administrative
systems and civil society, in a context where civil society generally, and adivasi association
and voice particularly, is very weak, results in rendering many of the potentially-progressive
programmes and institutions, ineffective at best and exploitative at worst.

As we saw in our own examination of the evidence from Gonasika, rather than addressing
the unequal power imbalance that sustains the disparity and destitution, norms, practices
and interests of key change agents like JDA, combine with poor control of Juangs over
resources and opportunities that determine their lives, in the context of weak pro-poor
policy commitment and weaker tribal voice, to reinforce the exploitative system - leading
to exclusion from forest resources, poor access to land and other productive assets, and
denial of access to services and entitlements. De Haan reminds us, at the heart of this is the
unrepresentative power structure in the state, that among other things, drives the push for
industrialisation, focuses on investment in mineral sector to the exclusion of agriculture,
and performance for adivasis and dalits - and can afford to deny the incidence of acute
malnutrition and hunger, and starvation deaths. (2004: 19-20) For the adivasis of Fifth
Schedule areas, the power structure is unrepresentative throughout. This applies as much to
Madhya Pradesh as Maharashtra and Rajastan. Observers have also noted, how even in the
exceptional cases of Jharkhand and Chattisgarh, carved out as tribal states from Bihar and
Madhya Pradesh respectively, separate state status has not led to any significant transfer of
power to tribal hands. (Krishna, 2000, Yadav., Corbridge.)

Any solution then must be built around challenging the political and socio-cultural
domination of the elite, mobilising the poor and adivasis and creating voice among them,
and reforming institutions and their governance, to enable better access of tribals to
livelihoods and opportunities. This is a lot like how PM Singh described the aim of the
national tribal policy: .to empower our tribal communities, with the means to determine
their own destinies, their livelihood, their security and above all their dignity and self-
respect as equal citizens of our country. 60

Given how squarely and frequently we have failed in our past attempts, any serious shot at
this task must employ new, even radical tools, but definitely innovative ones, rather than
relying on tired and unsuccessful instruments and strategies. Business as usual approaches,
that only tinker with existing models will be a waste. Regrettably, most current solutions on
the table, notably the draft National Tribal Policy (Ministry of Tribal Affairs: 2006)61, or
debates around implementation of FRA 2006 and PESA 1996, and fine tuning of TSP
indicate, are just that. The draft NTP, drawn up, with the lofty intention to facilitate
translation of the Constitutional safeguards (for tribals) into reality, with simultaneous
socio-economic development, engages with some very conservative strategies

60
Address to conference of CMs et al, organised by union Ministry of Tribal Affairs. 4th Nov. 2009.
61

Placed before the Union Cabinet for approval on 31 Oct 2007. Since referred to the Group of Ministers for
harmonisation with National Rehabilitation Policy.

DRAFT

strengthening administration in tribal areas, constructing Tribal Development Index,

enabling tribal-focused planning in each sector, implementing TSP in letter and spirit,
devising appropriate personnel policy to ensure all position are filled, encouraging voluntary
action, and so forth. There seems little recognition in the document, from its reading, of the
severity of the problem, and how far bad the situation has become. As we saw in our
examination of the evidence, it is not just on account of poor implementation of laws and
schemes that tribals suffer rather, the bigger problem is the law and programmes
themselves, that perpetuate tribal disempowerment. It is reforming those laws that most
effort should be going into, besides improving implementation.

In these concluding paragraphs, I will try to draw the outlines of a reform agenda for tribals,
focusing on changes in Fifth Schedule areas limiting myself to identifying the markers of
such an agenda, to be further development subsequently into concrete ideas. Some of these
reforms have already been proposed earlier, and in those cases, besides acknowledging the
source, I develop the ideas further.

Central here is the need to replace the decentralising ethos of Fifth Schedule provisions,
including of the changes proposed under PESA 2006, with real self-rule for tribals. This
would require amending the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. What is to be put in its
place, is moot. One option is to replace that with Sixth Schedule. Opponents of the idea
would point to existence now, of many and varied communities, including non-tribal, in
scheduled areas. But Sixth Schedule itself provides solutions to that practical problem, in the
Regional Councils it envisions, to protect interests of minority communities. As for non-
tribals, it should be possible to give authority to tribal councils while ensuring that power is
exercised without prejudice to the rights of non-tribals living there, and that they continue
to enjoy their rights and privileges as equal citizens.

The alternative would be to amend PESA 2006, and require states to work from the bottom,
taking the tribal hamlet as the unit of habitation, empowering them with real judicial and
executive powers, over social customs, plans and budgets, land use and allotment, and
management of forest and exploitation of mineral and other resources. These tribal villages
should link up to District Tribal Councils, which, as with Sixth Schedule provisions, would
have legislative authority over land and forest, customary laws and a range of cultural and
developmental issues. Alongside, and borrowing from the Manipur Legislative Assembly (Hill
Areas Committee) Order 1972, a Tribal (or Scheduled) Areas Committee at state level ought
to be created, made up of tribal members of state assemblies, with powers to advise the
state legislature over all matters pertaining to scheduled areas of the state including
economic planning and development, allotment and management of land and forests,
constitution and powers of District Councils and Gram Panchayats, social customs and
public health, among others. Unlike the Tribal Advisory Councils under the Fifth Schedule,
these Committees would not be creatures of Governors, rather it would exercise statutory
authority, to safeguard the interests of tribals.

Together, these reforms will create, at the critical district and hamlet/village levels, enabling
and popularly elected institutions of tribal self-government, that when tied in with the state
level tribal advisory committee, should enable traction within government, at all levels,
around tribal issues and agenda. Greater autonomy, will, besides ensuring greater local

DRAFT

control over resources and opportunities, as against consultation or recommendation under

PESA, also transform the political landscape in current Fifth Schedule areas, through
creating a cadre of tribal leaders at state and district levels, with ownership of issues critical
to tribals giving a fillip to tribal organisation and voice.
Alongside, what is required is a reform of institutions and their governance, to enable
greater access of tribals to livelihoods and opportunities. Key here will be securing property
rights for tribals to undo the disadvantages faced by them in forest laws, and land use and
land acquisition laws. The Saxena committee report on bauxite mining in Niyamgiri forest in
Orissa, shows how this could be affected. (Saxena et al, 2010: 86). Findings of the report
demonstrate how, in the competing claims between forest-dwellers and big business, it is
the latter that the state mostly favours, in violation of all due process. In this case, Orissa
state government and relevant district authorities discouraged and denied the claims of
Kondh PTG villagers, in clear violation of the provisions of FRA 2006, to divert forest land for
non-forest purposes, in order to favour the Vedanta-owned Orissa Mining Company. The
Committee asked for three conditions to be met before allowing transfer of the forest land:
(i) completion of the process of recognition of rights under the FRA, 2006 (ii) consent of the
Kondhs to the diversion, (iii) and Gram Sabha of the area concerned (of the particular Kondh
hamlet) certifying both above.

Kurup argues how substituting consent for consultation, changes the power equation
between tribals and the state, without coming in the way of development. (2008: 117).
State will still be able to acquire private land for public purpose, but to be able to do that, it
would need to negotiate and get the owner of the land who would have fundamental, not
mere legal right to the property - to agree to a just compensation, rather than be able to
fudge the consultation, or force it down. While FRA 2006 provides the framework to undo
past mistakes, and give tribals their due rights over resources, our own exploration of the
material and the findings of the Saxena Committee show how much of the ambitions
embedded in the act rely on impartial and sympathetic handling by state officials.

The third element of the reform agenda is strengthening civil society among tribals, and a
push to social mobilisation, to create tribal agency and voice. In the absence of tribals as
agents of their own change, all the various opportunities social, economic and political -
already in place or those proposed, will remain largely unrealised. We saw how in the case
of the Juangs, absence of voice and organisation means public institutions have little
incentive to be accountable, and Juangs themselves have little role in planning and
managing programmes for their uplift. There are various experiments underway on this I
will conclude with one in Palamu district of Jharkhand, where national and state agencies
are supporting District Administration to work with community based organisation of tribals
(Pahari Khestra Uthan Samiti) and local pro-poor NGOs (Vikas Sahyog Kendra) to improve
their capacity and commitment to deliver pro-poor results for excluded adivasi and PTG
communities. Through facilitating local state and social actors to work together, focused on
planning and managing delivery of programmes for poor adivasis, it is expected that hands
of civil society actors will be strengthened to ask questions, make demands and force
accountability of state actors, while also enabling collaborative working with state agents to
build the latters pro-poor capacity, for better results for adivasis.62

62

Through a joint project of Supreme Court Commissioners (in Right to Food case) and Action Aid India.

DRAFT

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