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Questions from Prof. Christan Tapp Concerning P.

Raphaels Dissertation Project (October 2014)


Intentions: Deepen mutual understanding and avoid confusion and unproductive discussion.
If possible, please answer the following questions as short and precise as possible. Id prefer an
answer to these questions of about 4 lines each.
Raphael: I find it impossible to limit to 4 lines, since I should therewith defend my position. I take
the sense of this stipulation as Be as short as possible, do not make me read too much. I do it as
short as I can . After much reflection, I have decided to take the accusation of complex language
beautified by many adjectival embellishments if leveled again positively to begin with, as pointing
to the complexity incurred due to my attempt to be systematic and succinct and to pre-empt, from
within each set of statements, any possible opposite arguments. But I promise (later, in the text of the
thesis) to attempt to simplify the sentences after I have written it. This I find easier than formulating
everything in clear and transparent terms at the very time of formulation. I do not think I am
purposefully embellishing my texts for the sake of beauty.
1.) What is a good definition of x is a possible world?
Raphael: First I define possibility: Possibility is the generality of what would / will and would not /
will not be realized, in the past or in the future (assuming that the present can be apportioned to the
past and the future). My definition of a possible world in view of Lewiss work is: An x is a possible
world if x is expressible counterfactually as whatever (consisting of tokens, natural kinds, abstract
objects, presuppositions or objects of statements, etc.) object-set1 or a maximally consistent set of
statements, with implied ontological commitment severally and/or collectively to somethings at
the formative origin of each member of the set, and with possible existence-implication via
ontological commitment to partially or fully referred somethings. Now to define modality: Any
logical quantification over the range of possible worlds as ontologically committed and realizable or
non-realizable instruments or object-sets is modality.
Explanation: There exists a prohibitively intense confusion regarding the semantic, logical and
ontological concepts of possible worlds.2 Since ontological commitment must be to somethings and
not to specific things or essences or worlds, classical substitutivity cannot hold in ontological
commitment. Identity of indiscernibles too cannot hold, since discernibility involves identification of
features. Somethings are things in general, without definition of their features and qualities.
Ontological commitment is not to any specifically defined entity or state of affairs or world as x,
1

This book defends modal realism: the thesis that the world we are part of is but one of a plurality of
worlds, and we who inhabit this world are a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds.
I begin the first chapter by reviewing the many ways in which systematic philosophy goes more easily if we
may presuppose modal realism in our analyses. I take this a good reason to think that modal realism is true,
just as the utility of set theory in mathematics is a good reason to believe that there are sets. Then I state some
tenets of the kind of modal realism I favour. David K. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell,
1986, reissued 2001), p. vii.
2
Today is sunny in Waitarere Beach. The sea is sparkling, the sky is blue, the air is calm and it feels good to
be alive.
(1) But it wasnt sunny yesterday. Yesterday was grey, wet and windy, and we were depressed.
(2) But it didnt have to be sunny today. It might have been grey, wet and windy, and we would have been
depressed.
What have (1) and (2) in common? Begin with (1). Suppose that today is Tuesday, meaning obviously some
particular Tuesday. Then (1) is true on Tuesday because there was rain (and it was grey, windy and so on ) on
Monday. That seems like common sense. It also seems common sense that rain is something that can occur on
one day and fail to occur on another day Tuesday. What then would be said about (2)? We shall assume in
this book that sentences about what is necessary or about what is possible have literal truth values.
Corresponding to the times Monday and Tuesday and so on, at which things happen, philosophers began to
speak of the possible worlds in which they happen so that (2) is true because in some possible but non-actual
world there is rain today (at Waitarere), even though in the actual world it is sunny. Where is this world? Well,
where is yesterdays rain? Now it is nowhere, but yesterday it was here in Waitarere. Similarly, the merely
possible rain would have been here.

but to somethings objectual, i.e., to the possibly real (anything pertaining to existent processes, or
any real and existent process, or anything quantitatively and/or qualitatively true other than absolute
impossibility and nullity) counterpart of the formative moment and/or proper referents of the
statements of the set. This is more than ontological commitment to the essences implied therein or
to the truths of the statements. Thus, appeal is not only to the quantification-range of the
statements if modal logic validly quantifies but to those realities that have given rise to any
counterfactuals, which in turn give rise to the conception of a possible world. The x is not the same as
the set of statements, nor does it belong to the set of statements. (If it had been, one could
interchange the subject and object of is for each other without incurring extensional inaccuracies;
and lack of extensional accuracy is not intensionality.) If some x is capable of being realized (in some
future) or having been realized (in the past) as real worlds, the maximal set of statements cannot be
equal to a possible world/s.
Possible realization of worlds points to the need of tensing possible worlds, some of which might
or may be real. (This necessitates analysis of temporal intensionality and the extent of extensionality
in intensional possible worlds.3) In this sense, some of Lewis possible worlds could be real, causal
and existent either from a past or in a future with respect to now.4 But his absolute distinction of
the actual world (the totality of all that are actual) from possible worlds (that are also for him causal
and actual) does not sound reasonable. This absolute distinction seems to stem from the lack of
theoretical continuity between actual and possible worlds.
2.) What makes a possible world real in your sense / in Lewis sense?
Raphael: In modal semantics, possible worlds may be a supposed object and serve to stand in lieu of
existence of objects or of truth of statements.5 In Lewis, possible worlds may be real in a wide sense
when an x can be defined as a maximally consistent set of statements or semantic objects. For him
these are causal but not causally related to the actual world. He finds no way of showing at least
some of the extensional objects (possible worlds that have been or will be actualized) as real, for if
they are just extensional instruments in modal logic, how to turn them into real? I find ontological
and logical contradiction in this. These xs he terms irreducibly causal, which perhaps are causal only
within themselves! This too is for me ontologically and logically inconsistent. Essentialism might save
the situation, but essences too must be based in their formation in the actual world. Thus the same
question of causal connection is repeated.
Explanation: In my opinion they are spectrally ranging from fully real to partially real, only if it
is admitted that they (2) belong to, or (2) are such as, or (3) at least are capable of being causally
related at their formative base to, the actual physical world of ours. This is the merit of the toolnature of possible worlds in modal ontology, semantics and logic. But ontologically speaking, the tool
can come closer to real-causal. The formative base is the causal origin of the ideas in consciousness
with some ontological connection to the way things are. The extent of bare correspondence
achievable in theory based semantically logically on such minimum instrumental-nature of possible
worlds could yield ontologically some causal reality to some versions of these possible worlds in a
3

If allowed to work a bit in this direction to evaluate Lewis, I shall use books like G. E. M. Anscombe,
Causality and Extensionality; Giere Ronald, Intensional Logic and Extensional Language etc., without pursuing
modal logic much.
4
I take exist as primary; and to be as anything pertaining to exist or be given (es gibt), or both the
terms together.
5
Specifically, in possible worlds semantics, the modal operators are interpreted as quantifiers over
possible worlds, as expressed informally in the following two general principles:
Nec
A sentence of the form Necessarily, ( ) is true if and only if is true in every possible world.
Poss
A sentence of the form Possibly, ( ) is true if and only if is true in every possible world.
Given this, the failures of the classical substitutivity principles can be traced to the fact that modal operators,
so interpreted, introduce contexts that require subtler notions of meanings for sentences and their component
parts than are provided in classical logic; in particular, a subtler notion is required for predicates than that of
the set of things they happen to apply to. Christopher Mentzel, Possible Worlds, Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/#pagetopright (Accessed on 23 Oct 2014)

past or future with respect to the realization of events related to the formation of the related
counterfactuals.
3.) What is defective in defining a possible world as a maximally consistent set of statements?
(Or as something expressed/described/.. by such a set?)
Raphael: In the first definition the verb is equates possible worlds with a maximally consistent set
of statements by disregarding the implicit grade of ontological commitment. A set of statements is
of the linguistically now given (es gibt) but capable of directing to the objects of ontological
commitment (that can exist, or could have existed and continue to elicit their causal influence in the
future).
Explanation: Such possible worlds, including both the less ontologically committed and more
committed ones, can only be expressed linguistically in terms of a set of statements. These
statements do not exist as beings, nor are all the real possible worlds presented in the set as such. In
the sense of linguistically expressing the totality of the so-called modal logical instruments / modal
ontological essences / or the worlds that possible worlds would have been or would be, the set of
statements is an instrument. But the set of their ontological counterparts as the totality of the modal
logical extensional instruments and ontological essences and possible worlds taken together is
referentially different from the set of statements.
4.) A multiverse theory is an answer to the question why our universe has certain features it in
fact has. The answer is that all kinds of (gradually) different features are in a sense real as
well namely in the sense that there is another universe which has the different features. Do
you agree? (If not, why?)
Raphael: The Dewitt- or other QM concepts of the multiverse, topologically though originating
severally from spatiotemporally prior ones (surely not from simultaneous ones or future ones), are at
the same time also considered (topologically) spatiotemporally mutually truncated, if they really
exist. (This, I believe, has to do with the unmanageable involvement of operations by infinities and
zeros in the spacetime topology of coordinates of the four or many dimensions assumed.) Hence, the
gradual difference indicates no causal continuity between universes in QM and in Lewis. For this
reason, the multiverse theory need not be an answer to the question why our universe has the
features it has. This universe has some features, some other has others, and there is no way of
comparing or connecting these features trans-world, but only of merely claiming so, as in Lewis.
Explanation: The QM multiverse may have been a (at least a later) support for Lewis to insist on
the reality and mutual truncation of possible worlds. (Even when not the inspiration behind, QM
multiverse makes a valid comparison to Lewiss real possible worlds.) Mutually truncated universes
need not have onological graduality in all or any features, but merely conceptually, in some respects,
some graduality may be imagined, perhaps since we are capable of reasoning or so it may be
argued. This is what I find in Lewis and the like.
QM multiverse theories were perhaps also inspired by the question of features encountered in
our universe. I think they, just like cosmological multiverse theories, have to do more with operations
by infinities and zeros (e.g., singularities) in their respective spacetime topology. Such cosmological
and QM theories must be refashioned as the realizations of the ontologically committed objects of
some counterfactuals. Since operations with infinities and zeros are not real, the QM and
cosmological multiverses cannot be real. Ontological commitment has to operate on them in other
ways. The cosmological multiverse I would suggest is real and circumvents the above-said operations.
5.) A possible world is independently of how exactly it is defined a maximal entity in the
sense that two distinct physical universes can well be part of one possible world. Do you
agree? (If not, why?)
Raphael: I agree, if some possible worlds, by reason of their ontologically variously partially or fully
committed definition, are realizable as causally real entities. The acausally (not committed to
causality) ontologically committed portion of the totality of possible worlds will then be the nonrealized but counterfactually expressible possibilities. Assumed, that universals and abstract objects

without regard to objects and processes, and truths as such without reference to what is true, belong
to non-realized possible worlds.
Explanation: If I can do the cosmological Part in the dissertation, I will argue that the realized
portion of possible worlds finitely neighbor with many others. I can then show cosmologically how
the maximality of mutual relatedness of any real group of existing universes is constantly
relativizable in temporal progression, at their broader measurementally spatiotemporal (but
ontologically moving-extended) mutual boundaries, i.e., in the passage of measurable spacetime
every realized possible world assumes an ever broader and inclusiver stature in relation to other
worlds. This makes them increasingly inclusive in time. They are not motive-extensionally
minimizable in the future.
Secondly, this kind of constant mutual maximal inclusion relativizes the possible origins of each
of the existing (actual) and the future (possible-to-actualize) universes the infinite number of
future-unactualized ones having been impossible worlds. Thus, Lewiss real-causal possible worlds
have somehow been possible-to-actualize worlds formulated in counterfactual expression. This
second kind of relativization yields continuous creation, since (1) each maximally inclusive real world
is only finitely maximal at any given time since the maximal velocity of communication in any set of
real worlds is limited, however highly real-valued superluminal velocity it be, (2) this yields
variegation of temporality and origin of each set of maximally inclusive actualized worlds, and thus
(3) each such coalescence considered to be actualized in the past should have its own separate
origin in the past, not in the present or future. (I attempted this cosmologically in my presentation
last semester.)
Hence, after establishing somewhat well (granting all odds and still finding a fine measure of
truth probability to the claim of continuous creation) that there are realizing worlds (for which too
any theological or cosmological counterfactuals may be set), we need not assume If God exists, If
God creates, If He is almighty, etc. in order to get an ontological foundation for Gods creation.
Instead, we have rational grounds to conclude to a continuously creating God whose process of
continuous creation is the object of myriad counterfactuals on our part. This is possible only if I write
the cosmological part. If not, I will have to first presume the existence, and then the attributes, like
almighty nature and continuously creating nature, etc. of God, and then proceed to form
counterfactuals regarding creation.
((The argument if you so argue that you are not a cosmologist (even less am I) does not
appeal. If you do not want me to write such a part, well I shall accept it. Even that will only work
out to my good in ways unknown today, as my past experiences teach.))
6.) How would you define Lewis position of modal realism?
Raphael: This has been answered in (1) to (5) together. It is clear in footnote 1.
7.) What are, in your view, the major advantages and disadvantages of Ls modal realism?
(a) Advantage: It unconsciously facilitates but not attempts to free modal logic from its merely
semantic and logical existence-incapable ontologies if we can go by any realistic shade of meaning
of real, causal, etc. in his works.
(b) Disadvantage: Lewiss ontology has become extremely volatile in its intended and unintended
meanings of possible worlds, (1) since he does not provide for anything of what he unconsciously
facilitates perhaps due to the uncertainty and fluency of ontological, possible-existential (possible
to exist: this term is important for me) meaning of possible worlds, and (2) surely (for me) due to
the absence of ontological commitment to there being something at the counterfactual formative
origins and reference-range of possible worlds. This makes discerning the meaning and
implications of possible worlds difficult.
8.) How far do you leave Lewisian modal realism in your approach?
Raphael: To follow from the lead in the answer to Q. 7, the extent of departure from Lewisian
realism is defined by my existence-possibilizing interpretation of some (most probably an infinite
number of) possible worlds, using ontological commitment at the sources of definition of infinite

counterfactual possible worlds and at their reference-range. A further departure least anticipated
by Lewis is my attempt to formulate counterfactuals regarding creation: to formulate them either
(1) against the backdrop of what may possibly be concluded from arguments after showing the nonsimultaneity of existent (realized) possible worlds in their coalescence-tendency, or (2) against the
backdrop of assuming the existence of God, His attributes, continuous creation by Him, etc.
9.) Please give a short characterization of the theological term creation.
Raphael: I reflect on the concept of causal continuous creation of real worlds. Continuous creation is
causation in which, given any finite temporal duration of measurable motion, finite or infinite
amounts of severally finite, actual, causal matter or real worlds of some spatiotemporal
configuration appear anew in the conglomeration of the already existing multiverse, each of which
traces only a finite past as worlds or physical matter. This is already a philosophy, cosmology and
theology of creation. (I can write any number of pages towards such a study. The gist of it follows.)
Explanation: To do theology here, I suggest that this originative or originary causation is neither
self-transformation from God (i.e., by and not from God), nor spatiotemporal self-transformation of
parts of the multiverse due or not due to the action of God. (1) Cosmologically and theologically
speaking, no self-transformation by God into this world is possible, since self-transformation by God
into this world will beg the question of creation of these self-transformed parts that are finitely in
motion and finitely static. (2) After creation of each element in the multiverse God does not cease to
be infinitely active in that universe or matter, since He is infinite activity everywhere and always. (3)
The cosmological argument for continuous creation is such that infinite number of universes arise
out of nothing. These three reasons circumvent the Hindu Aha Brahmsmi type of non-dualistic
(Advaita-vda) theology-cum-mysticism, pantheism, deism and demiurge-ism / artefact-designer-ism
(These are self-evident in the cosmological Part that I could write.)
Members of the multiverse are physical: each element of it is partially moving and partially static
(i.e., not infinitely motive and static). God is no absolute vacuum, which is non-existent. Thus, God
can only be an entity that is infinitely motive (active), and infinitely static (absolute) in its state of
continuance in infinite activity. (This God is thus different from Whiteheadian God who is just
changing infinite motion / change is not mentioned anywhere in process books and not
absolute) His absoluteness is not the absence of finite physical changes (which Western and Eastern
philosophies with Parmenides and the Vedas so far generalized as change and made it absent in
God), but the presence of infinite activity (or motion).
He is infinite activity a notion to be found in Christian philosophy at its available best in any
finite physical duration. He is infinitely, infinitely infinite times active within the totality of Himself
and the infinite multiverse. As infinite, His activity is not only within Him but also outward Him. His
infinite motion in finite and infinite spatiotemporal durations shows that He is thus infinitely
spatiotemporal within Himself and in each finite spatiotemporal chunk in the multiverse. Thus, He is
not non-temporal and non-spatial, but infinitely bodily; and the world is finitely bodily. (This is not
clearly spelt out in Whitehead.) This is the meaning of Gods eternality and ubiquity. He is absolutely
distinct from this multiverse in His infinitely active absoluteness (this being His transcendence), and
at the same time infinitely active in and into this same multiverse (making Him immanent). Hence,
He cannot transform Himself into this multiverse. Hence the futility of pantheism. The infinite
multiverse is acted upon by Him and active in Him. This is panentheism.
God is Absolute means not that God is absolutely changeless or non-moving, but instead, that
he is absolutely changeless from His state of infinite activity. Omnipotence is thus His infinite activity
not the freedom to do what I project onto Him in linguistic formulations in my imagination (e.g.,
Does He know that the counterfactually formulated unicorn or circular triangle is possible?). His
infinite Love and Providence are His infinite activity in every pore (and the relative vacuum) in the
multiverse and within Himself. Omniscience is His infinite experience of all that He is and the
multiverse is in all its processual detail, due to His infinite activity / love. His infinite activity is already
in the universe which capacitates Him to experience everything in its process. This experience is not
of the infinite possibilities of unrealizable counterfactual suppositions (If were / have been , then
would have been .) about the whole or parts of the multiverse. His omniscience is of the infinite

real past and future possibilities that ensue the causal processes within Himself (that results in
continuous introduction of new causal universes into the multiverse) and thus also of the happenings
in the universe.
In a similar vein, this cosmology could define and explain Trinity, omnipotence vs. human free
will, evil in the universe, Gods grace, Gods intervention, Gods free will, causation in and by God,
effects of Gods action in the multiverse, human freedom vs. freedom in the beings, human soul (as
against physicalist brain science) etc. in a somewhat satisfactory manner, if sufficient time is had. I
leave the discussion at this grandiose-looking claim, since these are not part of the thesis.
10.) If you must decide for one of the two alternatives: Does to create the world mean to
actualize one possible world or to actualize several possible worlds?
Raphael: Both could be meant by the term. But the latter seems more acceptable, due to the
aforesaid reasons that, arguably, go well with the nature of God and that of co-existent universes.
Only if I write the cosmological Part can I cosmologically expound it.
(You can congratulate me that I wrote just a little to answer this question! Thanks.)
11.) What is an impossible possible world?
Raphael: If the notion of counterfactually accepted possible worlds is a tool for modal thinking, and if
at least some of these possible world would have been or will be real worlds, then all the rest are
impossible possible worlds but yet good instruments for extensionalization of intensional talk.
12.) Is the notion of an impossible possible world inconsistent (i.e. does it imply a
contradiction)?
Raphael: The term possible here denotes in general those possibilia that are modal extensional
instruments. Against the backdrop of Lewis claim that possible worlds are real and causal, either (1)
possible should mean only the purely instrumental function of possible worlds, or (2) it should
mean the instrumental function and the possibly real causal ones. In my use of impossible possible
world I meant specifically possible worlds that possess the first sense.
13.) Please describe shortly, but a little longer than in the other cases (say 6-8 lines) the main
thesis of your dissertation as your plans are right now.
Raphael: Lewis has possible but disconnected real worlds. Real about possible worlds might for him
mean capable of being existent (in the past or future) and/or pertaining to what are existent (in
the past or future). In both the cases, possible worlds has some ontological commitment at the
sources of formulation of the pertinent counterfactuals and at the reference/object-range of
possible worlds. If possible worlds have some counterfactual basis on our real world (which they do
have since we formulate them in respect of processes existing or existed), they together have not
remained and do not remain possibilia forever. At least the objects as such of some counterfactuals,
or the pertaining-to-the-existent objects from the reference-range of possible worlds (but partially),
will have been or will be realized. If not, they were all impossibilia at Lewis telescope. Possible
worlds realized and capable of realization cannot be simultaneous in their origin: since each such real
world has conglomeration-capacity with other worlds, these conglomerations can only have finite
volume at any time; these genetically isolate conglomerations need their past traced within
themselves, and not from outside worlds; but their spacetimes are thus absolutely truncated (as
Lewis has unconsciously posited for his widely different possible worlds); and hence creatio ex nihilo
by God is the only solution. This and Gods given nature call for continuous creation.
Explanation: Bringing essentialism6 into counterfactual realism and quantified modal logic, I
would say, with the conceptual but formatively physical counterparts of essences (classified
variously) may give a good additional platform. Modal logic functions even without commitment to
essences, but modal ontology will not. Hence, my concern is with modal ontology, not with modal
6

See: Terence Parsons, Essentialism and Quantified Modal Logic, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 78, No. 1
(Jan., 1969), pp. 35-58.

logic. If rigid and non-/less-rigid designators do not dispense with their though-semantic reference to
actualities, then essences must have a conceptually formative reality-basis via possible states of
affairs and worlds.
A dissertation without the cosmological Part will deal with counterfactual creation questions: If
God exists, is infinitely in motion and extension (i.e., not non-temporal and non-spatial) and is
almighty also in creation, then counterfactuals may be projected about his infinite activity of creation
too, e.g., If God had created at past time t-1 with respect to my present time t0, then the newly
created world/s would (would not) have been. Such counterfactuals about creation at times t-2, t-3,
etc. have a significance if at least some possible worlds can be realized into concrete existence. If so
much is granted, then moving into continuous creation looks easier.
I need not say more to show that the work would look very good if the cosmological Part is
allowed. I have many more arguments in the cosmological Part, but each has to be brought in
consonance with counterfactual thinking.
14.) Why do you think it necessary to refer to Lewis at all? (please, be short again 4 lines!)
Raphael: Why do I need Lewis works to bring about a theory of realizable and realizing possible
worlds? At least one analytical thinker of the counterfactual possible worlds theory has to be
consulted for my work. I find Lewis handier than most others. He has some ontology of possibility,
necessity and reality. Bringing the touch of reality to some portion of Lewiss possible worlds
enthuses me.
15.) Why do you think it necessary to integrate speculative cosmology into your dissertation?
(Please be as specific as possible, e.g. do not simply say otherwise I would have no base to
argue from)
Raphael: I have dealt with it in more than one place above.
16.) With which theological concepts of creation are you most comfortable?
Raphael: With the traditional creatio ex nihilo, sure; but in a very different manner. This may be
embarrassing, but I do not find anything problematic in it, provided God is infinitely active, absolute
in the sense of possessing absolute stability in His infinitely active state, and if all that I explained
above about God are good enough. Towards the end of the work I shall try and alter the unchanging
God and one-time creatio ex nihilo into a Christianity- and Cosmology-compatible processual God
and continuous creation. Continuous creation will then be unproblematic, and theism can be
integrated to panentheism. I do not find any particular theologian or philosopher of God and creation
except Whitehead suited to this synthesis through continuous creation. Augustine, Thomas,
Molina, Swinburne, Peacocke, Polkinghorne, etc. are not attractive enough for this project. I am
willing to produce a completely Catholic philosophy of creation, and when necessary cite from
various theologians and philosophers. This is easier than effecting the transition from instrumental
Lewisian possible worlds to some causally realizing actual worlds.
17.) Which philosophical resources do you think are needed in order to conceptually work out
this concept(s) of creation?
Raphael: Already mentioned in the answer to No. 16.
18.) What was, in your personal view, the main point in your presentation in the Oberseminar last
week?
Raphael: That it is possible to systematize Lewiss ontology of counterfactual possible worlds and
create a creation ontology and cosmology based on the possibility that a portion of his possible
worlds do some time get realized into real causal worlds.
19.) What was the main point in your presentation in WS 2013/14?
Raphael: It was the cosmology of continuous creation (discussed much above) fruit of 29 years of
my critiquing my own arguments intuited in 1985 April.

After the WS 2013/14 presentation I sent it for publication in a good journal (whose name is withheld
for the following reason). After reading it the Editor promised to publish it provided his name will
appear as the principal author. I disagreed because this can take away my right to develop it later. (I
have preserved at home the whole communication in printouts.) I then published it in a simple Indian
journal.
20.) What is the main difference between your PhD thesis and the doctoral dissertation you are
working on? (Please be specific again, e.g. do not simply answer that I embed philosophical
cosmology in a theological context)
Raphael: The Ph.D. thesis (The Possibility of Causal Ubiquity in Quantum Physics) in India
attempted to make causation reign also in the traditionally so-called probabilistic gaps of causality
in QM: The Uncertainty Principle, the Double Slit Experiment and the experiments that attempt to
prove or disprove the EPR Paradox. [This will be published soon from Peter Lang as Causal Ubiquity in
Quantum Physics: A Superluminal, Local-Causal Physical Ontology (358 pp.).]
The Dr.Phil. thesis is much different: There (1) David Lewiss concept of causality will be
broadened into the Universal Law of Causality, (2) his notions of counterfactual possibility,
counterfactual necessity and reality will be analyzed, (3) the meaning of possible worlds will be fixed
as the ontological primitive representing everything capable of being real-existent or pertain to
anything real-existent, (4) possible worlds capable of being real-existent will be delineated and made
to bear the characteristics of the existent and existence-capable multiverse, (5) an ontology of
originative causality (continuous creation by God) derived preferably from General Gravitational
Coalescence Cosmology, or from mere assumptions of Gods existence and his nature, will be
attempted which exemplifies the Law of Causality, and (6) the relevant derivations from and critiques
of Lewis, along with derivations from the Law of Causality, will be made to show that Lewiss
ontological system can be made more adequate if the Law of Causality, a real-existent and existencecapable multiverse, and continuous creation of infinite matter by (not from) God are compatible with
the said derivations and critiques.
These two descriptions show the difference between the Ph.D. work done in India and the
Dr.Phil. to be done here.