PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs.

GENEROSO DE JESUS,
represented
by
his
Attorney-in-Fact,
CHRISTIAN
DE
JESUS, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Petitioner Philippine National Bank disputes the decision handed down by

the Court of Appeals promulgated on 23 March 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No.
56001, entitled Generoso De Jesus, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
Christian De Jesus, versus Philippine National Bank. The assailed decision
has affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, of
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, declaring respondent Generoso de Jesus as
being the true and lawful owner of the 124-square-meter portion of the land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-17197 and ordering
petitioner bank to vacate the premises, to deliver possession thereof to
respondent, and to remove the improvement thereon.
It would appear that on 10 June 1995, respondent filed a complaint
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro for
recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, over the questioned
property. In his complaint, respondent stated that he had acquired a parcel of
land situated in Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 1,144 square
meters covered by TCT No. T-17197, and that on 26 March 1993, he had
caused a verification survey of the property and discovered that the northern
portion of the lot was being encroached upon by a building of petitioner to the
extent of 124 square meters. Despite two letters of demand sent by
respondent, petitioner failed and refused to vacate the area.
Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that when it acquired the lot and the
building sometime in 1981 from then Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, the
encroachment already was in existence and to remedy the situation, Mayor
Ignacio offered to sell the area in question (which then also belonged to
Ignacio) to petitioner at P100.00 per square meter which offer the latter
claimed to have accepted. The sale, however, did not materialize when,
without the knowledge and consent of petitioner, Mayor Ignacio later
mortgaged the lot to the Development Bank of the Philippines.
The trial court decided the case in favor of respondent declaring him to be
the rightful owner of the disputed 124-square-meter portion of the lot and
ordering petitioner to surrender possession of the property to respondent and
to cause, at its expense, the removal of any improvement thereon.

The Court of Appeals, on appeal, sustained the trial court but it ordered to
be deleted the award to respondent of attorneys fees, as well as moral and
exemplary damages, and litigation expenses.
Petitioner went to this Court, via a petition for review, after the appellate
court had denied the banks motion for reconsideration, here now contending
that 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN ADJUDGING
PNB A BUILDER IN BAD FAITH OVER THE ENCROACHED PROPERTY IN
QUESTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN NOT APPLYING
IN FAVOR OF PNB THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 448 OF THE CIVIL CODE
AND THE RULING IN TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORP.
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 7.
[1]

The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals have both rejected the
idea that petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith. In the context
that such term is used in particular reference to Article 448, et seq., of the Civil
Code, a builder in good faith is one who, not being the owner of the land,
builds on that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of any defect
in his title or mode of acquisition.
The various provisions of the Civil Code, pertinent to the subject, read:
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing
or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such a case,
he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of
the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Article 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses
what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or
sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or
sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense

of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to
pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
A builder in good faith can, under the foregoing provisions, compel the
landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the
proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The
choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle
of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other
way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. He much choose one. He cannot, for instance,
compel the owner of the building to instead remove it from the land. In order,
however, that the builder can invoke that accruing benefit and enjoy his
corresponding right to demand that a choice be made by the landowner, he
should be able to prove good faith on his part.
[2]

[3]

Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no

technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other
things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to
defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individuals personal
good faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively
be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of
ones right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to
overreach another. Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if
he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it.
[4]

[5]

[6]

Given the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court, it should
be evident enough that petitioner would fall much too short from its claim of
good faith. Evidently, petitioner was quite aware, and indeed advised, prior to
its acquisition of the land and building from Ignacio that a part of the building
sold to it stood on the land not covered by the land conveyed to it.
Equally significant is the fact that the building, constructed on the land by
Ignacio, has in actuality been part of the property transferred to
petitioner. Article 448, of the Civil Code refers to a piece of land whose
ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some
works (or sown or planted something) and not to a case where the owner of
the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership
of the land by sale or otherwise for, elsewise stated, where the true
owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue of good
faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.
[7]

In fine, petitioner is not in a valid position to invoke the provisions of Article

448 of the Civil Code. The Court commiserates with petitioner in its present
predicament; upon the other hand, respondent, too, is entitled to his rights
under the law, particularly after having long been deprived of the enjoyment of
his property. Nevertheless, the Court expresses hope that the parties will still
be able to come up with an arrangement that can be mutually suitable and
acceptable to them.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
56001 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985

FRANCISCO DEPRA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN DUMLAO, defendant-appellant.
Roberto D. Dineros for plaintiff-appellee.
Veil D. Hechanova for defendant-appellant.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Order of the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo to the then Court of
Appeals, which the latter certified to this instance as involving pure questions of law
Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T3087, known as Lot No. 685, situated in the municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo,
with an area of approximately 8,870 square meters. Agustin Dumlao, defendant-appellant, owns an
adjoining lot, designated as Lot No. 683, with an approximate area of 231 sq. ms.
Sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot, the kitchen thereof had
encroached on an area of thirty four (34) square meters of DEPRA's property, After the
encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of DEPRA's lot made on November 2,1972, his
mother, Beatriz Depra after writing a demand letter asking DUMLAO to move back from his
encroachment, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer on February 6,1973 against DUMLAO in the
Municipal Court of of Dumangas, docketed as Civil Case No 1, Said complaint was later amended to
include DEPRA as a party plain. plaintiff.
After trial, the Municipal Court found that DUMLAO was a builder in good faith, and applying Article
448 of the Civil Code, rendered judgment on September 29, 1973, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Ordering that a forced lease is created between the parties with the plaintiffs, as
lessors, and the defendants as lessees, over the disputed portion with an area of
thirty four (34) square meters, the rent to be paid is five (P5.00) pesos a month,
payable by the lessee to the lessors within the first five (5) days of the month the rent
is due; and the lease shall commence on the day that this decision shall have
become final.
From the foregoing judgment, neither party appeal so that, ff it were a valid judgment, it would have
ordinarily lapsed into finality, but even then, DEPRA did not accept payment of rentals so that
DUMLAO deposited such rentals with the Municipal Court.
On July 15,1974, DEPRA filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against DUMLAO before the then
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV (Trial Court), involving the very same 34 square meters,
which was the bone of contention in the Municipal Court. DUMLAO, in his Answer, admitted the
encroachment but alleged, in the main, that the present suit is barred by res judicata by virtue of the
Decision of the Municipal Court, which had become final and executory.

After the case had been set for pre-trial, the parties submitted a Joint Motion for Judgment based on
the Stipulation of Facts attached thereto. Premised thereon, the Trial Court on October 31, 1974,
issued the assailed Order, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that the thirty four (34) square meters
subject of this litigation is part and parcel of Lot 685 of the Cadastral Survey of
Dumangas of which the plaintiff is owner as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 3087 and such plaintiff is entitled to possess the same.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Rebutting the argument of res judicata relied upon by DUMLAO, DEPRA claims that the Decision of
the Municipal Court was null and void ab initio because its jurisdiction is limited to the sole issue of
possession, whereas decisions affecting lease, which is an encumbrance on real property, may only
be rendered by Courts of First Instance.
Addressing out selves to the issue of validity of the Decision of the Municipal Court, we hold the
same to be null and void. The judgment in a detainer case is effective in respect of possession only
(Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court). 1The Municipal Court over-stepped its bounds when it imposed upon
the parties a situation of "forced lease", which like "forced co-ownership" is not favored in law.
Furthermore, a lease is an interest in real property, jurisdiction over which belongs to Courts of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) (Sec. 44(b), Judiciary Act of 1948; 2 Sec. 19 (2) Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129). 3 Since the Municipal Court, acted without jurisdiction, its Decision was null and void and
cannot operate as res judicata to the subject complaint for Queting of Title. Besides, even if the Decision
were valid, the rule on res judicata would not apply due to difference in cause of action. In the Municipal
Court, the cause of action was the deprivation of possession, while in the action to quiet title, the cause of
action was based on ownership. Furthermore, Sec. 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides
that judgment in a detainer case "shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the
land. " 4

Conceded in the Stipulation of Facts between the parties is that DUMLAO was a builder in good
faith. Thus,
8. That the subject matter in the unlawful detainer case, Civil Case No. 1, before the
Municipal Court of Dumangas, Iloilo involves the same subject matter in the present
case, the Thirty-four (34) square meters portion of land and built thereon in good faith
is a portion of defendant's kitchen and has been in the possession of the defendant
since 1952 continuously up to the present; ... (Emphasis ours)
Consistent with the principle that our Court system, like any other, must be a dispute resolving
mechanism, we accord legal effect to the agreement of the parties, within the context of their mutual
concession and stipulation. They have, thereby, chosen a legal formula to resolve their dispute to
appeal ply to DUMLAO the rights of a "builder in good faith" and to DEPRA those of a "landowner in
good faith" as prescribed in Article 448. Hence, we shall refrain from further examining whether the
factual situations of DUMLAO and DEPRA conform to the juridical positions respectively defined by
law, for a "builder in good faith" under Article 448, a "possessor in good faith" under Article 526 and
a "landowner in good faith' under Article 448.
In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right
to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or
to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building
or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease
and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof (Paragraphing
supplied)
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, DEPRA has the option either to pay for the encroaching part of
DUMLAO's kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square meters of his lot to DUMLAO. He cannot
refuse to pay for the encroaching part of the building, and to sell the encroached part of his land, 5 as
he had manifested before the Municipal Court. But that manifestation is not binding because it was made
in a void proceeding.

However, the good faith of DUMLAO is part of the Stipulation of Facts in the Court of First Instance.
It was thus error for the Trial Court to have ruled that DEPRA is "entitled to possession," without
more, of the disputed portion implying thereby that he is entitled to have the kitchen removed. He is
entitled to such removal only when, after having chosen to sell his encroached land, DUMLAO fails
to pay for the same. 6 In this case, DUMLAO had expressed his willingness to pay for the land, but
DEPRA refused to sell.

The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is
entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building,
under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has
the option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the building or to sell
his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot as respondents here did refuse
both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building
to remove it from the land where it erected. He is entitled to such remotion only
when, after having chosen to sell his land. the other party fails to pay for the same
(italics ours).
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendantspetitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents
only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land, is
null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is.
furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now Article 448) and 453 (now Article 546) of
the Civil Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608[1946]).
A word anent the philosophy behind Article 448 of the Civil rode.
The original provision was found in Article 361 of the Spanish Civil Code; which provided:

ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in
good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or
planting, after the payment of the indemnity stated in Articles 453 and 454, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent.
As will be seen, the Article favors the owner of the land, by giving him one of the two options
mentioned in the Article. Some commentators have questioned the preference in favor of the owner
of the land, but Manresa's opinion is that the Article is just and fair.
. . . es justa la facultad que el codigo da al dueno del suelo en el articulo 361, en el
caso de edificacion o plantacion? Algunos comentaristas la conceptuan injusta, y
como un extraordinario privilegio en favor de la propiedad territorial. Entienden que
impone el Codigo una pena al poseedor de buena fe y como advierte uno de los
comentaristas aludidos 'no se ve claro el por que de tal pena . . . al obligar al que
obro de buena fe a quedarse con el edificio o plantacion, previo el pago del terreno
que ocupa, porque si bien es verdad que cuando edifico o planto demostro con este
hecho, que queria para si el edificio o plantio tambien lo es que el que edifico o
planto de buena fe lo hizo en la erronea inteligencia de creerse dueno del terreno
Posible es que, de saber lo contrario, y de tener noticia de que habia que comprar y
pagar el terreno, no se hubiera decidido a plantar ni a edificar. La ley obligandole a
hacerlo fuerza su voluntad, y la fuerza por un hecho inocente de que no debe ser
responsable'. Asi podra suceder pero la realidad es que con ese hecho voluntario,
aunque sea inocente, se ha enriquecido torticeramente con perjuicio de otro a quien
es justo indemnizarle,
En nuestra opinion, el Codigo ha resuelto el conflicto de la manera mas justa y
equitativa y respetando en lo possible el principio que para la accesion se establece
en el art. 358. 7
Our own Code Commission must have taken account of the objections to Article 361 of the Spanish
Civil Code. Hence, the Commission provided a modification thereof, and Article 448 of our Code has
been made to provide:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted
in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case,
he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of
the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Additional benefits were extended to the builder but the landowner retained his options.
The fairness of the rules in Article 448 has also been explained as follows:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises
between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just

solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after
payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land
and the sower to pay for the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is authorized
to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. (3 Manresa 213;
Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 37 Off. Gaz. 1382; Co Tao vs. Chan Chico, G.R. No. 49167,
April 30, 1949; Article applied: see Cabral, et al vs. Ibanez [S.C.] 52 Off. Gaz. 217;
Marfori vs. Velasco, [C.A.] 52 Off. Gaz. 2050). 8
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial Court is hereby set aside, and this case is hereby ordered
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for further proceedings consistent with Articles 448 and
546 of the Civil Code, as follows:
1. The trial Court shall determine
a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34 square meter area of land;
b) the amount of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of the kitchen;
c) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square meters may
have acquired by reason thereof, and
d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than that of the kitchen
built thereon.
2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the Regional, Trial Court
shall render judgment, as follows:
a) The trial Court shall grant DEPRA a period of fifteen (15) days within which to
exercise his option under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to appropriate the
kitchen as his own by paying to DUMLAO either the amount of tile expenses spent
by DUMLAO f or the building of the kitchen, or the increase in value ("plus value")
which the said area of 34 square meters may have acquired by reason thereof, or to
oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of said area. The amounts to be respectively paid
by DUMLAO and DEPRA, in accordance with the option thus exercised by written
notice of the other party and to the Court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen
(15) days from such notice of the option by tendering the amount to the Court in favor
of the party entitled to receive it;
b) The trial Court shall further order that if DEPRA exercises the option to oblige
DUMLAO to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such purchase because,
as found by the trial Court, the value of the land is considerably more than that of the
kitchen, DUMLAO shall give written notice of such rejection to DEPRA and to the
Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of DEPRA's option to sell the land. In that
event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days from such notice of
rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the Court formal
written notice of such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by the
parties, the trial Court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the termination of the
said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the lease, provided that
the monthly rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be less than Ten Pesos (P10.00)
per month, payable within the first five (5) days of each calendar month. The period
for the forced lease shall not be more than two (2) years, counted from the finality of

the judgment, considering the long period of time since 1952 that DUMLAO has
occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixed shall be increased by ten percent
(10%) for the second year of the forced lease. DUMLAO shall not make any further
constructions or improvements on the kitchen. Upon expiration of the two-year
period, or upon default by DUMLAO in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive
months, DEPRA shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover his land,
and to have the kitchen removed by DUMLAO or at the latter's expense. The rentals
herein provided shall be tendered by DUMLAO to the Court for payment to DEPRA,
and such tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not compliance was made
within the period fixed by the Court.
c) In any event, DUMLAO shall pay DEPRA an amount computed at Ten Pesos
(P10.00) per month as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of DEPRA's land
for the period counted from 1952, the year DUMLAO occupied the subject area, up to
the commencement date of the forced lease referred to in the preceding paragraph;
d) The periods to be fixed by the trial Court in its Precision shall be inextendible, and
upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial Court the amount due to the
obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be entitled to an order of execution
for the enforcement of payment of the amount due and for compliance with such
other acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee.
No costs,
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Plana, Relova, De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., * J., took no part.

G.R. No. 82220 July 14, 1995

PABLITO MENESES and LORENZO MENESES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTO
QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO QUISUMBING (Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all surnamed
Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO QUISUMBING (Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato,
Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL QUISUMBING, SR.
(Petrona, Natividad, Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia, all surnamed Quisumbing) and HEIRS OF
FRANCISCO QUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny, Ma. Luisa, Norberto, Jimmy, Ma. Victoria, Elsa and
Oscar, all surnamed Quisumbing), all represented by Atty. Galileo Brion, respondents.
G.R. No. 82251 July 14, 1995
CESAR ALMENDRAL, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO QUISUMBING, respondent.
G.R. No. 83059 July 14, 1995
EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTO QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO QUISUMBING
(Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO QUISUMBING,
(Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing),
HEIRS OF MANUEL QUISUMBING, SR. (Petrona, Natividad, Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia, all
surnamed Quisumbing) and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO QUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny, Ma. Victoria,
Elsa and Oscar, all surnamed Quisumbing), petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PABLITO MENESES, LORENZO MENESES and BRAULIO C.
DARUM,respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
For review in these consolidated petitions is the Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07049 affirming the Decision dated March 26, 1984 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 37, Calamba, Laguna, in Civil Case No. 474-83-C which declared as null and void the
original certificates of title and free patents issued to Pablito Meneses over lots found by the court to
be accretion lands forming parts of the bigger accretion land owned by Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de
Quisumbing.
I
On March 1, 1977, Braulio C. Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los Baos, Laguna, issued to
Pablito Meneses Free Patent No. (IV-5) P-12807 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1268
covering Lot 1585 with an area of 417 square meters, and Free Patent No (IV-5) 12808 and Original
Certificate of Title No P-1269 for Lot 190 with an area of 515 square meters. Both lots are located in
Los Baos, Laguna.
Pablito Meneses acquired said property from Silverio Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and
Transfer of Rights executed on May 5, 1975 in consideration of Bautista's "love and affection" for

and "some monetary obligations" in favor of Pablito Meneses (Rollo, p. 45). After the execution of
said document, Pablito Meneses took possession of the land, introduced improvements thereon,
declared the land as his own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding realty taxes. In turn,
Bautista acquired the 900-square-meter land from his aunt, Sergia (Gliceria) M. Almeda. He had
been occupying the land since 1956.
On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of the land as far back as September 6,
1919 when their matriarch, Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing was issued Original Certificate of
Title No. 989 covering a lot with an area of 859 square meters located in Los Baos, Laguna with the
Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land was registered on August 14,
1973 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33393 in the names of Ciriaca's heirs: Emilio, Manuel,
Eduardo, Norberto, Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed
Quisumbing.
In 1962, the Quisumbing instituted and accion publiciana in the then Court of First Instance of Bian,
Laguna to recover possession over a portion of the property from Dominga Villamor and Lorenzo
Lanuzo docketed as Civil Case No. B-350. On January 3, 1966, the case was decided in favor of the
Quisumbings. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the Quisumbings' right over the property.
In LRC Case No. B-327, the Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of title over an
additional area of 2,387 square meters which had gradually accrued to their property by the natural
action of the waters of Laguna de Bay. In its Decision of September 28, 1978, the Court of First
Instance of Bian confirmed the Quisumbings' title thereto which, after it was duly surveyed, was
identified as Psu-208327. The additional area was divided into two lots in the survey plan approved
by the Director of Lands on November 16, 1964. In ordering the confirmation and registration of title
on favor of the Quisumbings, the land registration court said:
. . . There is no doubt that the applicants' right to the property was bolstered by the
unappealed decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350 of this Court
when the properties applied for were classified as accretions made by the waters of
the Laguna Lake. . . . (G.R. No. 82229, Rollo, p. 20).
On April 17, 1979, the Quisumbings filed Civil Case No. 07049 before the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, Branch VI, Calamba against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Braulio C. Darum and Cesar B.
Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles issued to Pablito Meneses. They alleged that
Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los Baos, using his brother Pablito as a "tool and dummy,"
illegally occupied their "private accretion land" an August 6, 1976, and, confederating with District
Land Officer Darum and Land Inspector Cesar Almendral, obtained free patents and original
certificates of title to the land.
On March 26, 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that the lands registered by the
Meneses brothers are accretion lands to which the Quisumbings have a valid right as owners of the
riparian land to which nature had gradually deposited the disputed lots. In so holding, the trial court
relied heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350, and quoted the
following portions of the appellate court's decision:
Plaintiffs-appellees are titled owners of a (sic) 859 square meters of land under TCT
No. 25978 of the Laguna Land Registry, the northwest boundary of which is the
Laguna de Bay.
It is ascertained that the northwest portion of Quisumbing's lot is bounded by the
Laguna de Bay. The nature of the Laguna de Bay has long been settled in the case

of Government of the Philippines v. Colegio de San Jose (55 Phil. 423) when it held
that:
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depression of the earth; it
contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks and springs, and
is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. According to the
definition first quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake.
Consequently, since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the authorities cited by the appellants
referring to seashore would not apply. The provision of the law on waters will govern
in determining the natural bed or basin of the lake. And accordingly, to Art. 84 of the
Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:
Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers and lakesby accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Since the title indicate(s) that the northwest portion of the property is bounded by
Laguna de Bay, which is a lake, even if the area where Lanuza's house and
Villamor's house for that matter is located is not included within the title, it must
necessarily be an accretion upon appellees' land by accessions or sediments from
the waters thereof which should belong to the owner of the adjacent land. The
authorities cited by the appellants treat of the ownership of accretions by water of the
sea under Title I. Lakewaters being terrestrial waters, their ownership is governed by
Title II of the Law of Waters. As held in the Colegio de San Jose case, the provisions
of the Law of Waters regulating the ownership and use of sea water are not
applicable to the ownership and use of lakes which are governed by different
provisions. As pointed out by the lower court, no act of appropriation is necessary in
order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation as the law does not require the
same (Ignacio Grande, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17652,
June 30, 1962 citing Roxas vs. Tuazon, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez vs. City of Manila, 10
Phil. 567 and 3 Manresa, C.C. pp. 321-326, pp. 4-5) (Records, pp. 80-84).
The trial court also found that the free patents issued to Pablito Meneses had been procured through
fraud, deceit and bad faith, citing the following facts as bases for its conclusion: (1) The Deed of
Waiver and Transfer of Rights allegedly executed by Silverio Bautista in favor of Pablito Meneses
was a simulated contract for lack of consideration; (2) The said instrument was sworn to before
Mayor Lorenzo Meneses who had no authority to notarize deeds of conveyances; (3) Although the
lots subject of the deed of conveyance were placed in his brother's name, Mayor Meneses actually
exercised rights of ownership thereto; (4) Land Inspector Cesar Almendral admitted having
anomalously prepared the documents to support the free patent applications of Pablito Meneses
and, having personally filled up the blank forms, signed them in the absence of the persons
concerned; (5) Almendral kept the documents in his possession from 1979 to 1980 despite orders
from the Director of Lands to produce and surrender the same; (6) District Land Officer Braulio
Darum approved the free patent applications and issued the questioned titles without the required
cadastral survey duly approved by the Director of Lands and despite the pendency of LRC Case No.
B-327 involving the contested lots; (7) Darum represented the Bureau of Lands in LRC Case No. B327 without authority from the Director of Lands and after he had withdrawn his appearance in said
case, persisted in filing a motion to set aside the order for the issuance of a decree in favor of the
Quisumbings; (8) Darum and Almendral in bad faith, refused to produce the missing original records
of the free patent applications and their supporting documents; and (9) When Darum was not yet an
oppositor in LRC Case No. B-327, he admitted in his letter to the Land Registration Commission that

the contested lots are portions of the land being claimed by the Quisumbings contrary to his later
representation in the joint answer to the petition that the subject lots are not portions of Lots 1 and 2,
Psu-208327 owned by the Quisumbings. Accordingly, the trial court disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that the lands covered by Pablito Meneses' Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1268/Free Patent No. 12807 (Exh. "J"), covering Lot No. 1585, consisting of
417 square meters and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1269/Free Patent No.
12808 (Exh. "H"), covering Lot No. 190, consisting of 515 square meters, both
located at Los Baos, Laguna, as accretion lands forming parts of a bigger accretion
land owned by plaintiffs as declared in a final judgment (Exh. "A"), rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Bian, Laguna, in LRC Case No. B-327, which bigger
accretion land is directly adjacent to or at the back of plaintiffs' riparian land, and
consequently, declaring as null and void and cancelled Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1268/Free Patent No. 12807 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1269/Free
Patent No. 12808;
2. Directing that the Register of Deeds of Laguna or his Deputy at Calamba, Laguna,
to make the corresponding entries of cancellation in his Registry of the above
mentioned Original Certificate of Titles/Free Patents;
3. Directing defendants Lorenzo Meneses and Pablito Meneses and all persons
acting in their behalves to vacate the subject lands and surrender the possession
thereof to the plaintiffs immediately; and
4. Directing the defendants to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the sums of:
a) P20,000.00, plus P500.00 per month from January, 1977, until the
subject property is completely vacated, as actual and compensatory
damages;
b) P350,000.00, as moral damages;
c) P70,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d) P40,000.00, as attorney's fees; and
e) the costs (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
Thereafter, the Quisumbings filed a motion for execution pending appeal which the trial court
granted in its Order of September 7, 1984 subject to the posting by the Quisumbings of a bond in the
amount of P500,000.00. The defendants unsuccessfully moved for the reconsideration of said order.
The Quisumbings also filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Pablito Meneses, Silverio
Bautista, Pablo Silva, Virgilio Cruz and Cesar Almendral for violation of paragraphs (e) and (j),
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, for conspiring in the approval and grant of the free patents over
portions of Lots 1 & 2 of Psu-208327 owned by the heirs of Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing.
In due course, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the defendants guilty as charged. The
case was elevated to this Court but on August 27, 1987, the judgment of conviction was affirmed
(Meneses v. People, 153 SCRA 303 [1987]).

Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the decision in Civil Case No. 07049 to the
Court of Appeals. On August 31, 1987, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit
and affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.
The defendants-appellants filed two motions for the reconsideration of the appellate court's decision
but it was denied in the Resolution of February 23, 1988 which in pertinent part stated:
However, for humanitarian considerations, and considering the appeal of the
defendants-appellants for a reduction of the moral and exemplary damages, We
favor the reduction of the moral damages from P350,000.00 to P50,000.00 and the
exemplary damages from P70,000.00 to P5,000.00. In all other respects, We find no
justification for modifying the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court
(G.R. No. 82220, Rollo, p. 67).
Pablito and Lorenzo Meneses filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, which was docketed
as G.R. No. 82220. Cesar Almendral filed a motion in G.R. No. 82251 for a 45-day extension within
which to file a petition for review on certiorari. After this Court had granted them a 30-day extension,
Almendral still failed to file any petition. The Quisumbings also filed a petition for review on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 83059, solely on the issue of the propriety of the reduction of the amount of
damages in the Court of Appeals' Resolution of February 23, 1988. Upon motion of petitioners in
G.R. No. 83059, the three petitions were consolidated in the Resolution of August 1, 1988.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 retell the same errors they had raised before the Court of Appeals,
contending in the main: (1) that the lands in question were not accretion lands but lands of the public
domain; (2) that no conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith attended the issuance of the
free patent and titles to Pablito Meneses; and (3) that the Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights
was founded on a valid consideration.
As regards the issue of whether the lands in question are accretion lands, petitioners relied on the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in Republic of the Philippines v. Braga, CA-G.R. No. 55390-R,
October 23, 1980, holding that the property involved therein was part of the natural bed of the
Laguna de Bay and therefore what had to be determined was whether said property was covered by
water when the lake was at its highest depth.
Petitioners' assigned errors in G.R. No. 82220 are evidently factual issues which have been
thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings
of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court (Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 533 [1994]) and they carry even more
weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court (Binalay v. Manalo,
195 SCRA 374 [1991]). The jurisdiction of this Court is thus limited to reviewing errors of law unless
there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that
they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion (BA Finance Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 566 [1941]). We find no such showing in this case.
Petitioners' protestations notwithstanding the final decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No.
B-350 has a bearing in the resolution of this case for while the lots occupied by Villamor and Lanuzo
may not be the very same lots petitioners are claiming here, the two cases refer to the same
accretion lands northwest of the original land owned by the Quisumbings.
In the same vein, the decision of the land registration court in LRC Case No. B-327 ordering the
confirmation and registration of title in favor of the Quisumbings over 2,387 square meters of
accretion land is binding on petitioners in G.R. No. 82220. As correctly pointed out by the Court of

Appeals, said decision, being the result of a proceedingin rem, binds the whole world, more so
because it became final and executory upon the Bureau of Lands' failure to interpose an appeal.
Since petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 claim that "the foreshore land known as Lots 190 and 1585 are
part of Laguna de Bay" and therefore the Quisumbings "have no legal right to claim the same as
accretion land," we quote the following pertinent portions of the decision in Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 131 SCRA 532 (1984) which, although the case deals with the registration of a reclaimed
land along the Laguna de Bay, is nonetheless enlightening:
Laguna de Bay is a lake. While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same
gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides in seas and oceans, this
phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. Thus, the
alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could hardly
account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed four to five
months a year during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which bring about the
inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in the water level which
causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period (four to five months
a year) than the level of the water at which the land is completely dry, the latter
should be considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay. Therefore,
the land sought to be registered is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay.
Neither can it be considered as foreshore land. The Brief for the Petitioner Director of
Lands cites an accurate definition of a foreshore land, to wit:
. . . . that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and
left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides.
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and
that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land in
question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from
different sources." Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and
reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning of the
authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered not
being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by
the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as
private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title (at
pp. 538-539).
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the
land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). While the trial
court mainly relied on the findings in Civil Case No. B-350 that the lands in controversy are accretion
lands and it has not determined on its own the presence of said requisites, it is too late now for
petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 to claim otherwise. Consequently, the lands held to be accretion lands
could only benefit the Quisumbings, who own the property adjacent to the lands in controversy (Cruz
v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 350 [1992]).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 also assert that the principle of indefeasibility of title should favor them
as the one-year period provided for by law to impugn their title had elapsed. They also urged that,
having been granted by the state, their title is superior to that of the Quisumbings. We hold,

however, that in the light of the fraud attending the issuance of the free patents and titles of Pablito
Meneses, said assertions crumble. Such fraud was confirmed by this Court in Meneses v. People,
153 SCRA 303 (1987) which held the petitioners therein liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act in the issuance of the same free patents and titles.
Unlike the petition in G.R. No. 82220, the petition in G.R. No. 83059 (questioning the reduction of the
damages awarded to the Quisumbings by the Court of Appeals in the Resolution of February 23,
1988) is meritorious. The task of fixing the amount of damages is primarily with the trial court (Air
France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966]). While it is the appellate court's duty to review the
same, a reduction of the award of damages must pass the test of reasonableness. The Court of
Appeals can only modify or change the amount awarded as damages when they are palpably or
scandalously and reasonably excessive (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 423
[1993]; Prudenciano v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440 [1987]).
There is no justification for the radical reduction by the Court of Appeals of the damages awarded by
the trial court. Its action was premise merely on "humanitarian considerations" and the plea of the
defendants-appellants. We may agree with the Court of Appeals in reducing the award after
scrutinizing its factual findings only if such findings are diametrically opposed to that of the trial court
(Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra). But as it is, the Court of Appeals affirmed
point by point the factual findings if the lower court upon which the award of damages had been
based.
We, therefore, see no reason to modify the award of damages made by the trial court. Respondent
Braulio C. Darum in G.R. No. 83059 must also be solidarily liable for said damages in his capacity as
a public officer. A public official is by law not immune from damages in his personal capacity for acts
done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the
mantle of immunity for official actions (Vidad v. RTC of Negros, Br. 42, 227 SCRA 271 [1993]).
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82220 is DENIED while the petition in G.R. No. 83059 is
GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED while its
Resolution of February 23, 1988 insofar as it reduces the amount of damages awarded to the
Quisumbing family is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 and respondent
Braulio Darum in G.R. No. 83059.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 98045 June 26, 1996

DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAYA,
AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA
and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official and/or private capacities, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:p
Petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia challenge the decision of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' complaint by the Regional Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 22. The complaint was for annulment of the verification, report
and recommendation, decision and order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a parcel of public land.
The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not petitioners exhausted administrative
remedies before having recourse to the courts.
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro
City. Said land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and
along the banks of the Cagayan river.
Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on
which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In the
latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio
Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 4. A decision was rendered against private respondents, which decision was affirmed
by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20.
The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the same
became final and executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment before the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 which dismissed the same. Antonio Nazareno
and petitioners again moved for execution of judgment but private respondents filed another case
for certiorari with prayer for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 which was likewise dismissed. The decision of the lower
court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots
they occupied..
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan
designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being
claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was
protested by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands.
In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer Alberto M. Gillera, respondent Land
Investigator Avelino G. Labis conducted an investigation and rendered a report to the Regional
Director recommending that Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-D (equivalent to Lot No. 36302,
Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and that private respondents be directed
to file appropriate public land applications.

Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto Hilario rendered
a decision ordering the amendment of the survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno by
segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private respondents who, if qualified, may file
public land applications covering their respective portions.
Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio, Undersecretary
of the Department of Natural Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands who denied
the motion. Respondent Director of Lands Abelardo Palad then ordered him to vacate the portions
adjudicated to private respondents and remove whatever improvements they have introduced
thereon. He also ordered that private respondents be placed in possession thereof.
Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado
Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC, Branch 22 for
annulment of the following: order of investigation by respondent Gillera, report and recommendation
by respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio affirming the
decision of respondent Hilario and order of execution by respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the
complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in the finality of the
administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint. Applying
Section 4 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, it contended that the approval of the survey plan belongs
exclusively to the Director of Lands. Hence, factual findings made by the Metropolitan Trial Court
respecting the subject land cannot be held to be controlling as the preparation and approval of said
survey plans belong to the Director of Lands and the same shall be conclusive when approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources. 1
Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for reconsideration filed by Antonio
Nazareno cannot be considered as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, as mandated by C.A. No. 141 inasmuch as the same had been acted upon by
respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as Officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Lands and
not as Undersecretary acting for the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. For the failure
of Antonio Nazareno to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present
case does not fall within the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It
also held that there was no showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the orders were
issued and executed..
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER
COURT WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PREVAILING FACTS AND THE LAW ON
THE MATTER;
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER
COURT DISMISSING THE ORIGINAL CASE WHICH FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT
THE EXECUTION ORDER OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ABELARDO G. PALAD,
JR., DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MANILA, PRACTICALLY CHANGED THE DECISION
OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ROBERTO HILARIO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,

BUREAU OF LANDS, REGION 10, THUS MAKING THE CASE PROPER SUBJECT
FOR ANNULMENT WELL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT.
The resolution of the above issues, however, hinges on the question of whether or not the subject
land is public land. Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his
titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
In the case of Meneses v. CA, 2 this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under
Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites : (1) that the deposition of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or
sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea
coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of
waters.

For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the abovementioned requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed by the
dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the
Cagayan River bounding their land. 3 It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such
boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the
waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of Manila, 4 this
Court held that the word "current" indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of
waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not having met the first and second requirements
of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.

In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that petitioners are estopped from denying
the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands when the
late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA (G-6) 571. 5 The mere filing of
said Application constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public land, having been the
subject of Survey Plan No. MSi-10-06-000571-D (Equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad-237) which was
conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said land
was described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio Nazareno was, however, controverted by
respondent Labis in his investigation report to respondent Hilario based on the findings of his ocular
inspection that said land actually covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of
Cagayan River. The investigation report also states that, except for the swampy portion which is fully
planted to nipa palms, the whole area is fully occupied by a part of a big concrete bodega of petitioners
and several residential houses made of light materials, including those of private respondents which were
erected by themselves sometime in the early part of 1978. 6

Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed
by deposits of sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular
inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands. 7 This Court has often enough held that findings of
administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. 8 Again, when said factual findings are
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this
Court. 9

It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or artificial.
In Republic v. CA, 10this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of
the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused

by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus,
in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., 11 where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the
water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate
intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain.

In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley
Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill
operations. 12 Even if this Court were to take into consideration petitioners' submission that the accretion
site was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and
other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, 13 the same would
still be part of the public domain.

Having determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as well as the
Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have jurisdiction over the same in
accordance with the Public Land Law. Accordingly, the court a quo dismissed petitioners' complaint
for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies which ruling the Court of Appeals affirmed.
However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative remedies have been exhausted.
Petitioners could not have intended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as an Officer-In-Charge of the
Bureau of Lands. The decision being appealed from was the decision of respondent Hilario who was
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands. Said decision was made "for and by authority of the
Director of Lands". 14 It would be incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Lands acting for the Director of the Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of
Lands.

In any case, respondent Rolleo Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of the Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge" of the Bureau of Lands.
When he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration by affirming or adopting
respondent Hilario's decision, he was acting on said motion as an Undersecretary on behalf of the
Secretary of the Department. In the case of Hamoy v.Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 15 this Court held that the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may modify,
adopt, or set aside the orders or decisions of the Director of Lands with respect to questions involving
public lands under the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot, therefore, be said to have acted beyond the bounds of his
jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 16

As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is public land, being an artificial
accretion of sawdust. As such, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and control over the
same, as mandated under Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141) which states,
thus:
Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the exclusive
officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of
Lands who shall act under his immediate control.
Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive
control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or
disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as
to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
In connection with the second issue, petitioners ascribe whim, arbitrariness or capriciousness in the
execution order of public respondent Abelardo G. Palad, the Director of Lands. This Court finds

otherwise since said decision was based on the conclusive finding that the subject land was public
land. Thus, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Director of Lands acted within his
rights when he issued the assailed execution order, as mandated by the aforecited provisions.
Petitioners' allegation that respondent Palad's execution order directing them to vacate the subject
land practically changed respondent Hilario's decision is baseless. It is incorrect for petitioners to
assume that respondent Palad awarded portions of the subject land to private respondents
Salasalans and Rabayas as they had not yet been issued patents or titles over the subject land. The
execution order merely directed the segregation of petitioners' titled lot from the subject land which
was actually being occupied by private respondents before they were ejected from it. Based on the
finding that private respondents were actually in possession or were actually occupying the subject
land instead of petitioners, respondent Palad, being the Director of Lands and in the exercise of his
administrative discretion, directed petitioners to vacate the subject land on the ground that private
respondents have a preferential right, being the occupants thereof.
While private respondents may not have filed their application over the land occupied by them, they
nevertheless filed their protest or opposition to petitioners' Miscellaneous Sales Application, the
same being preparatory to the filing of an application as they were in fact directed to do so. In any
case, respondent Palad's execution order merely implements respondent Hilario's order. It should be
noted that petitioners' own application still has to be given due course. 17
As Director of Lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over any form of
concession, disposition and management of the lands of the public domain. 18 He may issue decisions
and orders as he may see fit under the circumstances as long as they are based on the findings of fact.

In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros, 19 this Court held that where, in the disposition of public lands, the
Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus presented, he clearly acts within his
jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is one of judgment, but not an act of grave
abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari. Thus, except for the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, this Court finds no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 3788, Roxas v. Tuason,

Municipality of San Pedro Macati and
Spouses Aguirre, 9 Phil. 408
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
December 21, 1907
G.R. No. 3788
PEDRO P. ROXAS, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
JULIA TUASON, THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN PEDRO MACATI, AND
ALEJANDRO AND CONSOLACION AGUIRRE, respondents-appellants.
Ledesma & Sumulong and Ramon Fernandez, for appellant Julia Tuason.
Jose Santiago, for the municipality of San Pedro Macati.
Ariston Estrada, for appellants Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre.
Rosado, Sanz and Opisso, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On February 19, 1906, attorneys Rosado, Sanz & Opisso, on behalf of Pedro P.
Roxas, applied for the registration of the estate owned by the said Roxas, known as
the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati, in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Registration Act; said hacienda was acquired by the petitioner by inheritance under
the will of his late father, Jose Bonifacio Roxas, y Ubaldo. The property consists of
four different parcels of land, irregular shape, designated on the accompanying plan
under the letters "A", "B", "C", and "D", containing a total area of 1,761 hectares 51
ares and 5 centares, equivalent to 17,615,105 square meters, and according to the last
assessment for the purpose of taxation assessed at P415,221.34, of which P59,904
corresponded to the portion of said hacienda included within the limits of the city of

Manila and P256,769 corresponded to that portion situated in the Province of Rozal.
The building constructed of strong materials, called the "Casa-Quinta" or "Casa de
Ingenieros," belonging also to said Roxas, is erected within parcel "C," occupying,
together with its appurtenances, an area of 8,430 square meters, and was assessed at
P98,557.34. It does not appear that said hacienda is mortgaged nor that any person has
any right to or any interest therein; and it is almost wholly occupied at the present
time, under lease, by about 429 tenants whose names, residences, and postal
addresses, as well as the residence of the owner of the property and of his attorney in
fact, are stated in the application.
In his writing of April 24 the petitioner requested the summoning of the persons
therein named, and stated in addition that the total area of the hacienda is
17,613,595.91 square meters, as specified in the corrections made to the technical
description.
In another writing dated July 24, 1906, amending his former application, the petitioner
gives the postal address and names of several occupants of the property; and by other
amendments to his original petition dated August 30 and September 25, 1906,
rectifications are made in the boundaries of the hacienda, the last of which represents
a decrease of 1,446.70 square meters, or 14 ares and 46.70 centares which must be
deducted from the original description.
The owners of the adjoining properties having been summoned and notified by means
of subpoenas and notices published in the daily papers, one of them, Julia Tuason,
appeared and by a document dated September 10, 1906, set forth her opposition to the
registration and authentication of the title of the petitioner, Roxas, as regards the
parcel marked "C," for the reason that two old monuments which had separated their
respective properties had been pulled down and new ones erected without her consent,
and in her opinion the latter included a considerable portion of the land owned by her,
as may be seen on page 122, part IV, of the record.
The municipality of San Pedro Macati also filed opposition to the requested
registration, alleging that the land occupied by the municipal building and the public
school had been in the possession of the town from time immemorial, and that all the

land occupied by roads, highways, lanes, and public landing places belonged to the
public domain and should be excluded from registration in favor of the petitioner.
Under date of the 18th of September, 1906, the attorney for Alejandro Aguirre and
Consolacion Aguirre also filed opposition to said application for registration alleging
that the two parcels of land owned by them had been improperly included within the
bounds of said hacienda in the parcel marked "C," the second said parcels, which is
the only subject of the respective bill of exceptions and appeal interposed by them,
consists of a building lot situated in Calle San Pedro, opposite the first parcel of land,
which was the subject of another bill of exceptions and appeal by the petitioner; said
second parcels measures 10 meters and 87 centimeters on its front and rear, and 9
meters and 20 centimeters along each of its sides, its boundaries being stated.
Evidence consisting of both oral testimony and documents, which appear in the
record, having been adduced by both parties in the suit, the judge, after a notation of
default having been entered against all the respondents, rendered his decision on the
17th of October, 1906, overruling the opposition made by Julia Tuason, by the
municipality of San Pedro Macati, and by Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre as to
the second parcel, and ordered the registration of the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati in
favor of Pedro Roxas, the petitioner herein, excluding the parcel of land with a
frontage of 23 Spanish yards and a depth of 24 Spanish yards occupied by the
municipal building, which the government has the right to use without the payment of
rent therefor, so long as the same is occupied by the said building or by another in
substitution thereof and used for the public good and for official purposes. The
respondents, Julia Tuason, the municipality of San Pedro Macati, and Alejandro and
Consolacion Aguirre, excepted to said judgment and moved for a new trial on the
ground that the same was contrary to law and to the weight of the evidence; said
motion was overruled, the respondents again excepting. The respective bills of
exceptions having been presented, the same were forwarded in the ordinary manner.
The only subject of controversy between the petitioner, owner of the Hacienda of San
Pedro Macati, and the respondent Julia Tuason is the question of the boundary line,
between their respective contiguous premises.

The representative of the petitioner affirms that the real boundary of the hacienda on
the side that adjoins the land of Tuason was and still is a creek or sapa separating both
properties, and that in former years said creek was wider that at the present time.
The respondent, however, maintains that the boundary between the sitio called
Suavoy, formerly an island of that name, and the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati is
determined by straight lines drawn between some old monuments distant a few yards
from the bank of the said creek.
The record does not show that the boundary of the land of Julia Tuason was inclosed
by monuments belonging to her or that the creek which divides the sitio or Island of
Suavoy from the land of the said hacienda is included within the respondent's land,
since in the bill of sale executed by the procurador general of the Augustinian friars
on March 28, 1893, to Julia Tuason, no mention is made of monuments erected
thereon nor of any creek existing in the large tract of land purchased by her, except
that the land is situated in the barrio of Suavoy and that it is bounded on two sides by
the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati.
Nor does the record show that there was more land on the side of the hacienda,
forming part of the barrio or sitio of Suavoy, not included in the tract acquired by
Tuason from the Augustinian Fathers, and that said creek traversed said barrio from
one end to the other, or the respondent's land, in order to affirm on good grounds that
her land extended to the opposite bank of the aforesaid creek.
From the fact that the land of Julia Tuason was bounded on two sides by the Hacienda
of San Pedro Macati it does not follow that the strip of a few meters in width on the
bank of the creek above referred to belonged to her, there being no evidence in
support thereof, and if her statement were true, she would have applied for a survey
and demarcation of her property in accordance with the area of the same stated in her
title deed; and if she did not do so it must be because she renounces its verification in
this manner or for some other reason.
Further than this, it is impossible to draw the above conclusion, inasmuch as the strip
of land, irregular in shape, running parallel to the creek and forming a portion of its

bank, has always up to the present time been occupied by tenants of said hacienda as
being an integral portion thereof, even at the time when the land now owned by Julia
Tuason belonged to the Augustinian Fathers, the original owners thereof.
It is so affirmed by Rafael Rivera, the collector of rents of the hacienda, and by two
tenants thereof, Tomas Medina and Santos Tenorio; the two last named were lessees
for about thirty years and twenty-seven years, respectively, of certain portions of the
hacienda with their respective part of said strip, as a prolongation and integral part of
the lands of the hacienda, and they were never molested or interfered with by the
Augustinian Fathers or their tenants, nor later by Julia Tuason, who later acquired the
adjoining land on the other side of the creek, or by her tenants; these latter when
cultivating the land did not cross the creek, it being recognized as the boundary line
between both properties; that in 1871 the said creek was wider than at present, having
then a width of about 4 Spanish yards, small bancas plying on it around the Island of
Suavoy,. and some of the monuments of the hacienda were 4 meters distant from the
bank, others 2 meters, and some 1 meter; that the witness Santos Tenorio was present
at an interview held between an Augustinian priest named Martinez, in charge of the
land at the time, and the owner of the hacienda, Bonifacio Roxas, in connection with
the boundary line of the two adjoining estates, and after some explanations the said
creek was settled as the limit in spite of the fact that the old monuments were already
in existence at some distance from the bank in the direction of the hacienda; and that
in 1882, when the first-named witness, Rafael Rivera, took charge of his office of
collector, the owner of the hacienda pointed out to him the said creek as the limit of
his property, everybody asserting that Suavoy was at that time an island, although two
of the witnesses of the respondent stated that said creek was only a canal.
The proven fact that said creek was wider in 1871, when it had a width of about 4
Spanish yards, is the best explanation as to why some of the monuments of the
Hacienda of San Pedro Macati are now at some distance from the bank of the same,
and no legal reason whatever exists why the slow increase which has taken place on
the hacienda's side should be considered as belonging to the respondent, inasmuch as
the latter does not own the bed of the creek and because it may be assumed that the

slow decrease in the width thereof benefited both properties equally since the
respondent has not been able to show or prove that her land has been thereby reduced.
Article 366 of the Civil Code in dealing with the right of accession to real property
reads:
The accretions which banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of
the currents belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.
The provision in this article is perfectly applicable to the strip of land, which, on
account of the accretion, has come to be undeniable increase in the land of the
hacienda inasmuch as it has increased all along the bank of the creek, the gradual
effect of the currents; and even though the law does not require an express act of
possession of the accretion which has enlarged the estate, it is certain that the owner
of the hacienda has possessed it for more than thirty years through his tenants, who
have been cultivating their respective parcels of land together with the corresponding
portion of the said strip down to the bank of said creek.
For these considerations the question of the situation of the old monuments and the
placing of new ones in the intervening space is of no importance, inasmuch as it has
already been shown that the respondent has no title to the accretion which by
spontaneous increase formed the strip of land between the creek and the monuments,
and no proof is offered in the record that the land of Julia Tuason reached the other
side of the creek toward the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati.
In conclusion: The result of the evidence, as stated in the judgment appealed from,
does not maintain the claim of the respondent; on the contrary, it has been shown in a
convincing manner that the present natural limit of both properties is the aforesaid
creek; therefore, the opposition filed by Julia Tuason is untenable.
As to the opposition filed by the municipality to the registration applied for, the
judgment appealed from is held to be in accordance with the law and the merits of the
case because, as is therein set forth, the petitioner, Pedro Roxas, is the owner of the
building lots and portions of land to which the said opposition refers; the municipality

of San Pedro Macati has only the usufruct of the plot occupied by the municipal
building as long as the same or any other building of a public and official nature is
erected thereon; the municipality can not dispose of it as a property of its own
because, according to the documents offered in evidence by the petitioner, the Spanish
Government had recognized the dominion of the petitioner's predecessor over the land
occupied by said municipal building and by the town cemetery, and the grant made by
the owner was ever understood to be only of the usufruct thereof so long as used for
public purposes, the same being returnable to him upon ceasing to be used for such
purpose.
In connection with the land occupied by the public school of said town, no opposition
based on ordinary or on extraordinary prescription may be made by the municipality
because the plot was granted only for the purpose of erecting thereon a public school,
and the possession thereof, on the part of the municipality, was simply usufructuary,
the government of the Province of Manila having recognized the title thereto which
pertained to the petitioner, owner of the said hacienda, whereof the said plot forms a
part; moreover, the possession thereof by the municipality has been but for a few
years only. The school building having been destroyed, the land was abandoned many
years ago, and for this reason prescription can not be invoked because the possession
thereof was interrupted and ceased many years since; in view thereof, the decision of
the lower court respecting the petition of the municipality is held to be in accordance
with the law and the merits of the case.
The attorney for Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre excepted to the decision of the
17th of October, 1906, whereby their claim to the second parcel of land, as stated in
their petition, was dismissed; their bill of exceptions, entered in the general register
under No 3788, was duly forwarded, but notwithstanding the fact that the time
prescribed has been exceeded, the appellants have not filed their brief nor notified the
appellee regarding the same; therefore, the latter by a petition dated June 26, 1907,
requested that their appeal be considered as having been abandoned; this request is
held to be well based and in accordance with the law.

Therefore, by virtue of the considerations above set forth, it is our opinion that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed as regards the respondents who have
appealed, Julia Tuason and the municipality of San Pedro Macati; the appeal of
Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre is hereby declared to be abandoned, each of the
appellants to pay their respective share of the costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-17652

June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance
of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo
and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied
by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of
land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly
Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who
inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears
registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property
is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration
sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in
the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side
took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof
had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964
square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela
against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion,
alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-ininterest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when
respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages
corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their
answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they
have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year
1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the
ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises
and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and
costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual
deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We
are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in
1931, because the surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed
by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact
that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman,
defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the

plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in
1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his
witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion
since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but
could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more
or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that same year for
taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered
upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257
(Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under
this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for
taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by
mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of
land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question
being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to
the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that
the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment,
because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of the owner of the
riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil.
408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the
reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the
law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have
been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by
prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that
the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the
land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription
(Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel
of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered property, within the
meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession by another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14,
1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which
started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties.
By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the
riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of
the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership
through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The Court a quo, has
resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in
question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is
registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496,
which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of
the defendant began only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period
required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An
accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong

to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to
the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act.
Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To
hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the
technical description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the
identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a
negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the
erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream
(Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him
to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion
is concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the
Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition
area by another person through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case
of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the
length of time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that
he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the
plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he
declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in
1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was
changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two
witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was
Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his
own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful
possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he
said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he
said, was then less than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence
than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first
stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the
latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that
they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958, because it was only
then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan;
and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes
thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April,
1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his
co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title.
This last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession
to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.
1wph1.t

The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession from 1933
to 1958 is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is
they and not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the
additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were
deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to recover the same. The
excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the
certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor
Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the
surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it
was not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the
land which was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been

illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence,
that the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion
started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their copy of
the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor of the
defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property
in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old,
petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the
land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land
just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial
property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered
land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso
facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens
system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land
adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give
title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner,
making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be
placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been
provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial
property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the
Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered
property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by
registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription?
This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration
of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondentsappellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and
adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the
existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence
presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of
the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old
Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by
acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.

G.R. Nos. L-66075-76 July 5, 1990

EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO BALISI & JUAN
LANGCAY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD, PABLO BINAYUG &
GERONIMA UBINA, respondents.
Antonio N. Laggui for petitioners.
Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for private respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the
province of Cagayan. According to the unrebutted testimony of Romeo Rigor, Geodetic Engineer of
the Bureau of Lands, in 1919 the lands east of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre.
In 1925, Original Certificate of Title No. 5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned
by defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin (Exh. 2-Agustin).
As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the western
bank. The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968.
In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying
lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents, namely, Pablo Binayug,
who has been in possession of Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884,
7885, 7891 and 7892, and Maria Melad, who owns Lot 3351 (Exh. 3-Binayug; Exh. B-Melad). Pablo
Binayug began his possession in 1947. An area of eight (8) hectares was planted to tobacco and
corn while 12 hectares were overgrown with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.) Binayug's Homestead
Application No. W-79055 over this land was approved in 1959 (Exh. B-Binayug). Binayug's
possession was recognized in the decision in Civil Case No. 101 (Exh. F-Binayug). On the other
hand, as a result of Civil Case No. 343-T, Macario Melad, the predecessor-in-interest of Maria Melad
and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-5026 for Lot 3351 of Cad. 293 on
June 1, 1956.
Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank
among which was defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457 (Exh. E-Melad), depositing the
alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Pablo Binayug on the western bank.
However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed,
and, in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the spouses Pablo
Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of
the river. To cultivate those lots they had to cross the river.
In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their lots
located on the eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners, accompanied by the mayor and
some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the private
respondents from the premises.

On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil Case
No. 343-T) to recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6-hectare accretion. On April
24, 1970, private respondent Pablo Binayug filed a separate complaint (Civil Case No. 344-T) to
recover his lots and their accretions.
On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby made:
In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto
Buquel and Octavio Bancud, or anybody acting as their representative[s] or agents to
vacate Lot No. 3351 of Solana Cadastre together with its accretion consisting of
portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of Tuguegarao Cadastre and for these
defendants to restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who are
the only interested heirs of Macario Melad.
In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding defendants Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor,
Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo
Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad, Titong Macababbad, Arturo Balisi, Jose
Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan Langoay, or any
of their agents or representatives to vacate the Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879,
7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, together with its accretion and
to restore possession to plaintiffs Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina. Without
pronouncement as to damages which were not properly proven and to costs.
SO ORDERED. (As amended by the order dated August 15, 1975.) (pp. 2425, Rollo.)
Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil Case No. 343-T, while in Civil Case No.
344-T, only defendants-petitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by his heir),
Arturo Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed. But upon motion of plaintiffs-private respondents, the trial
court ordered the execution pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 344-T against
Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay on the ground that their appeal was dilatory as they had not
presented evidence at the trial (Order dated August 15, 1975).
On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the
judgment of the trial court, with costs against the defendants-appellants.
In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. in declaring that the land in question had become part of private respondents'
estate as a result of accretion;
2. in declaring that the accretion to private respondents' estate which used to pertain
to petitioners' estate cannot preclude the private respondents from being the owners
thereof; and
3. in declaring that the ownership of private respondents over the accretion is not
affected by the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when
it reverted to its old bed

The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.

The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the private
respondents who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated from
the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is conclusive
on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. (366)
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA
514).
All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found:
. . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49
years. Within this period, the alluvium (sic) deposited on the other side has become
greater in area than the original lands of the plaintiffs in both cases. Still the addition
in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not discern it but can be measured
after the lapse of a certain time. The testimonial evidence in these cases that said
Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is overwhelming as against the denial
of defendant Eulogio Agustin alone. Cesar Caronan, one time mayor of Solana,
Cagayan, said so. Arturo Taguian said so. Timoteo Melad said so. Francisco Ubina
said so. Geodetic Engineer Rigor impliedly said so when he testified that when
Solana Cadastre was executed in 1950 it overlapped portions of Tuguegarao
Cadastre executed in 1919. This could not have happened if that part of Tuguegarao
Cadastre was not eroded by the overflow of the Cagayan River. These testimonies
cannot be destroyed by the denials of Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo Agustin and Eulogio
Agustin alone . . . . (p. 27,Rollo.)
The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had
been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and imperceptible.
Only when Lot No. 3351, with an original area of 5 hectares described in the free patent that was
issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6
hectares had been added to it. Lot No. 3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in June, 1950
to Pablo Binayug, grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through
alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. These accretions belong to riparian
owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director
of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The reason for this principle is because, if lands bordering on
streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by
virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that
such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by
the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).
itc-asl

The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden and
abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919
bed, and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river.
Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation.

Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate
on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of
the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it,
provided that he removes the same within two years.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece
of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also
retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current. (Emphasis
supplied).
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong
typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be "separated
from the estate by the current." The private respondents have retained the ownership of the
portion that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals, is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.