*** Sustainability

1NC Unsustainable
Collapse is inevitablea convergence of constraints on the system will force a
transition to a localized economyno policy can solve.
Korowicz 11 [David Korowicz is a physicist and human systems ecologist, the director of The
Risk/Resilience Network in Ireland, a board member of FEASTA - The Foundation for the
Economics of Sustainability, In the world, at the limits to growth, May 14, 2011,
http://www.feasta.org/2011/05/14/in-the-world-at-the-limits-to-growth/]
From the sidelines we hear that a UN Food and Agricultural Organisation index measuring the price of a basket of food commodities
surpassed the 2008 record and oil prices remain well above $100 a barrel. This is in the context of a battered world economy and a
global credit crisis that far from being resolved, has merely been displaced. The United States and Japans credit rating is on negative
watch, and the Euro hangs in balance. And while nobody will shout about it, there

are many global banks who are

only standing because governments and central banks are deploying all their declining
powers to prevent the banks bluff being called and all hell breaking lose. Food and
energy prices are pushing popular revolutions in the Gulf, North Africa, and China which
in turn are pushing up food and energy prices. All of this seems elliptical to our inward
conversations. Yet the real threats to our economy and society over the coming few years
are from these things we have little control over. Even were our economy in the rudest of
health, it could still face ruin. That is because we are dependent upon, and interwoven
with, the globalised economy. And the globalised economy cannot stand the convergence
in real time of constraints in its primary enabling energy resource-oil; its primary human
constraint-food, and loss of trust in the credit that makes economic life possible. This
convergence marks the end of economic growth, and initiates powerful destabilising
shocks and stresses to the globalised economy. Because of this, across the political spectrum, people are
claiming solutions for a predicament that cannot be solved. They are claiming a level of insight and dominion over systems they can
barely intuit and over which they have little and declining control. The

electorate assumes there must be a

solution to get us out of recession, a way to reverse what we have come to call austerity. More than that, we
demand the right to the realisation of their expectations- our pensions and purchasing power, jobs and
savings, health and education services. Through these assumptions we enter the collective delusion
about where weve been, where we are, and where were going. Part of the reason for this omission is
a world-view maladapted to the conditions in which we now find ourselves. World-views comprise the meanings and assumptions
through which our lives are understood; they embody the myths, stories and emotional attachments that frame our place in a complex
world. They are social, and also define how we become socialised. We

share a common world-view formed in

the context of our past experience, and in particular, that of economic growth and the
profound influence it brought to the human experience. We have become accustomed to
the reassuring thought that at the end of every recession, no matter how deep or long, growth and
prosperity will again take off. There is a sense that economic growth, though sometimes wayward, is the natural
order of things. It is a powerful idea both redemptive and optimistic. Growth is part of the glue that holds
together the social contract between the rich and poor, and between citizen and state. It stands behind our expectations of technology,
the rise of China, population growth, and pensions. Growth shaped the specialisation of our occupational roles and the forms of social
relations. It acclimatised us to increasing wealth, both personal and in the goods and services we expect from society and the state. We
are now claiming as rights, services that only fifty years ago would have been considered miracles. It shaped our identity as the
tormented consumer and the anxious lover. Growth

is very recent, two hundred years or so, and

resilient, bouncing back from world wars and a great depression. Its been the driving
dynamic of the integrated, de-localised system that has tied our welfare to trillions of
transactions across the world. It has been so stable, and we have become so habituated to it that we barely notice what
has transpired, the inherent complexity obscured by attenuation in simple things and services-my phone rings, I take a bus, my money
works to buy my bread. Bread was once hard won from our local environs and required a large share of our time or income. Now it is
of slight cost, accessible with trivial effort, but requires the integrated dance of complex transport, IT, banking, electric grid
infrastructure; factories supplying factories, supplying factories; and the economies of scale and supply-chains that depend upon a

globalised world. Not

only have our dependencies become more and more de-localised and
complex, they have also become more dependent on high speed flows of good and
services. The real-time flow of deliveries is an integral part of modern production
processes. If deliveries are halted, for example, by a large-scale systemic banking collapse, the
flow can be arrested, and economic production halted. The longer production is halted,
the deeper the supply-chain failure extends, and the greater the entropic decay, from rust, for
example. And the longer the down time, the harder it would be to re-boot the economy, and
the greater the risk of a terminal systemic collapse in the global economy. Indeed
internationalised production flows are as important for the viability of our complex
economy as energy flows, they are two of a number of co-dependent systems that
integrate the globalised economy. If spare parts for our national grid could not be replaced
due to some supply chain failure, having plenty of fuel may not matter, electricity might
not be delivered. And electricity failure would compromise other critical infrastructure
such as banking infrastructure, IT systems, sewage and water. Our globalised economy is
an emergent property of billions of people, businesses and institutions interacting through physical
and mental worlds. Individuals, companies, and governments may have limited control in time
and space, but the more our intentions and actions interact in the world, the greater the
chance our intentions are lost. There has been no master controller. Like rafters down a
white-water river, we do not set the route or the rate, we are tossed and buffeted. We can
trim the craft, avoid an obstacle, and if wise ensure we do not tip it over. But the driving
dynamic is riding down an energy gradient. Our identification with national or international political economy and the psycho-drama therein obscures our real dependencies.
So while national economies may have an individual character, they have no autonomous
existence in anything like their present form outside the globalised economy, just as an
arm, lung or heart cannot declare independence from the human body. Continuing the analogy,
our global economys metabolism has become increasingly complex and high speed. The
globalised economy is more than the sum of its parts, but without the contributions of
each, the whole would be diminished or fatally compromised. Because of this we might
say that our local welfare is embedded within a high-speed de-localised fabric of
exchange. Misreadings In The Birth of Plenty: How the prosperity of the modern world was created , William Bernstein writes
prosperity is not about physical objects or natural resources. Rather, it is about institutions. He lists four: secure property rights,
the scientific method, capital markets, and communications. While his institutions are certainly important, essential even, they could
not have developed without the energy and other resources that underpin the economy. It is like claiming I live by my wits, charm and
intelligence, while assuming food and water are a trivial side-show. A reasonable assumption in an age of abundance when our basic
needs are met without comment, and what counts in terms of social status are personal and contextual differentiation. In such a way

we privilege human culture, and its sense of ingenuity and control over its own destiny.
Like the God of Genesis, we looked upon our civilisation, its extent and complexity, and saw that it was good and ingenious. We
thought we did this! And if we did this, surely we can do anything we set our minds to. If

there are challenges to our

civilisation, from climate change or resource constraints, they can be surmounted, for we
have faith in our abilities. Our self-reflection through economic growth provided the
super-structure for the humanist idea of progress, which the political philosopher John Gray dubbed the
displaced religious impulse. As our self-regard has grown, our real dependencies-on soil and
bees, forests, natural gas, rivers and rain, worms and sticky hydro-carbons, beasts and
ferrous oxides-have been largely framed as issues of managerial utility. Our welfare is
assumed to depend upon politicians, entrepreneurs, competitiveness, the knowledge
economy, our innate inventiveness, and so on. Outside of utility, the environment has
been sentimentalised or used as a signifier of higher feeling. Yet our feet of clay are that our
economy and civilisation exist only by virtue of resource flows from our environment.

The only laws in economics are the laws of physics, everything else is contingent, supposition
or vanity. An economy, growing in size and complexity, is firstly a thermodynamic system
requiring increasing energy flows to grow and avoid decay. Waste, be it greenhouse gasses or landfill
is also a natural outcome of such a thermodynamic process. News from Elsewhere Its been part
of the background noise for over half a century, warnings about resource scarcity,
biodiversity loss, soil erosion or climate change. But impacts were always on the imaginative horizon.
Sometime, far enough into the future to be re-assuring to a species that evolved with a clear preference for the short-term. Or on the
hinterland between our safe European home and the barbarian other, where starvation, environmental disasters, angry mobs and crazy
despots have always demanded our attention, at least while on TV. Yes we can! Yes we can! - chanted the posse of teenagers
following Al Gore through a pavilion in Poznan, Poland for the annual gathering of climate policy acronyms. When

not
distracted by the ever-present, weve responded to these warnings with treaties and laws,
technology and exhortation. Of course, every ecological indicator kept getting worse. And we
kept on about treaties and laws, and break-through technologies. Our mythic world-views
gave us the shared faith that we may not be there yet, but we could, once a brilliant
scheme is in place, a climate law passed, technologies adopted, evil bankers restrained, or
once people just realised our predicament. Yes We Can! Yes We Can! Indeed, we could transcend our
grubby selfishness and short-termism so we tied together the belief that we could will
ecological sustainability and global equity. Still, our resource and environmental sink
demands keep increasing, ecological indicators decline and inequality rises. The reality is that we
are locked into an economy adapted to growth, and that means rising energy and resource flows and waste. By lock-in, we mean that
our ability to change major systems we depend upon is limited by the complexity of interdependencies, and the risk that the change
will undermine other systems upon which we depend. So we might wish to change the banking or monetary system, but if the real and
dynamic consequences lead to a major bank freeze lasting more than a couple of days we will have major food security risks, massive
drops in economic production, and risks to infrastructure. And if we want to make our food production and distribution more resilient
to such shocks, production will fall and food prices will need to be higher, which will in the short-to-medium term drive up
unemployment, lead to greater poverty, and pose even greater risks to the banking system. It is an oxymoron to say we can do
something unsustainable forever. How

would you know if we were approaching a limit, the end of

growth? By warnings? Listen. By the great and the good, standing shoulder-to-shoulder, saying Ladies & gentleman we have a
really big problem!? Politicians and civil servants, the IMF and the OECD, all missed the credit crisis of 2007, despite having
expertise in the area and an abundant historical literature about asset bubbles. They embody the dogmatism of the age, they are a pivot
point about which are world-views are confirmed. They mirror the authority of the court of Pope Urban VIII, stuffed with astronomerastrologers, the economists of their age, confirming the earth centric universe against Galileo and Copernicus before him. What

the Galileos of today are saying is that we are at or near the peak of global oil production
now. That as affordable oil declines, the global economy must contract. That we do not
have the time, nor resources to keep the economy growing by substituting for oil with
efficiency measures, renewable or nuclear energy, or technology. That talk of an electric
car future, advanced IT-renewable energy convergent infrastructure, and global supergrids is a fancy. The most obvious problem with focusing on this vision at the horizon is
that you dont see that the ground is opening up beneath your feet. We will not get to that
horizon because all the things you need to get there- monetary and financial systems,
purchasing power and economies of scale, production systems, infrastructure and global
trust networks-will be undermined by the convergence of a peak of global oil production,
a peak of food production, and a giant credit bubble. The ground will open up, we will
fall, and our visions will fall further and further from our grasp. They are saying that
global food production is hitting an array of ecological constraints, while population
growth and changing diets are driving up demand. They note that current food production is
massively subsidised through fossil fuel inputs, and that as those inputs become less
available, and people become poorer due to economic contraction, food productivity and
access will be undermined. In totality, we are at the edge of an evolving systemic crisis. Peak
oil and food constraints are likely to undermine the stability of our integrated globalised
economy. The core pillars of that economy: critical infrastructure, production flows,

economies of scale, the financial and monetary system, behavioural adaptation, resource
access and energy flows-are likely to begin forcing contagious failure. The driving force
of this failure is likely to be the fastest and most unstable process-the impact of energy
and food constrained economic growth, and an already vulnerable monetary and financial
system dependent upon continuing growth. Tightening binds Whatever of Irelands economic woes, the real
debt bubble is global. The debt relative to GDP is far greater now in the US, UK, and
much of Europe, than it ever was leading up to the great depression. Like many countries
we responded to our debt bubble with more debt, we just shifted it onto the sovereign or
the printing press. The indebted world, even without oil and food price rises is straining at
the limits of debt servicing and credibility. Yet it is demanding even more credit, while
its ability to service the debt is being undermined by debt deflation, austerity, rising job
losses, and defaults. The bank lenders of that money can only lose so much before they
are too are insolvent. Rising food and energy prices are driving the deflationary forces
even harder. And if central banks misinterpret the cause of food and oil price rises, and
raise interest rates, the deflationary pressures risk becoming cyclonic. The cost of
essentials and debt servicing rise, while income declines. Discretionary spending will
collapse, job losses and defaults rise, income will declines further. This re-enforcing
spiral of decline will increase, and spread to more and more countries. The fear of
contagion from peripheral Eurozone defaults are not merely that they could topple
French, UK, and German banks, but that this could brink down US banks and effectively shut
down the global financial system in very short shift. The destabilising force is not just that
the banks are already in a precarious position, but a monstrous pile of derivative contracts
worth ten to twenty times the global economy that hangs over the financial system. Some
of those contracts are effectively insurance against default. If bank defaults start
spreading, then other banks and the shadow financial system will be forced to cover
obligations on default, or increase premiums on their insurance. This may cause a firesale of assets, whereby the banks bluff is called, and they are shown to have values far
below what is required for solvency. What everybody wants and needs is a sudden and
explosive increase in the production of real goods and services (GDP) to make their continual debt
requirements serviceable. But that, even were it remotely possible, would require a big
increase in oil flows through the global economy, just as global oil production has peaked
and begins its decline. It cannot happen. This means that the global financial system is
essentially insolvent now. The only choice is default or inflation on a global scale. It mean banks are insolvent, because
their assets (loans) cannot be repaid; or they can be solvent (assuming appropriate action taken) but their depositors cannot redeem
their deposits at anything like their real value. It means the vast overhang of stocks and bonds, including pensions, and insurance
cannot be realised in real goods. It

means our monetary systems, dependent on fiat money, fractional

reserve banking, and interest can only collapse. High oil and food prices are essentially
probing the limits of the stability of the globalised economy. They will probe until there
is a major collapse in global economic production. At which point our energy prices may
fall, but our real income and purchasing power will fall faster. And markets will discover
this truth quicker than monetary authorities and governments. Its expression will be in
deeper and deeper economic stresses and major systemic banking collapses. Official
responses will become more and more impotent, as their fundamental economic and
policy tools no longer work, and their patina of control becomes hollow. If and when
banking system contagion spreads to supply-chain contagion we may face existential
challenges. Even were we to have the perfect monetary and financial system, without debt
and well controlled, peak oil and food would present an unprecedented shock. As incomes

shrunk while essentials such as food and energy become more expensive, nondiscretionary spending would be squeezed out. In the developed world, non-discretionary
goods and services are just about all we produce. So the result would still be mass
unemployment. Our critical infrastructure would still be increasingly vulnerable for
various reasons, and monetary instability would still destabilise supply-chains. Facing
Ourselves & Facing Our Future We are at the beginning of a process in which our world-views
crash against a fundamentally unstable financial system and ecological constraints. A time
where we will learn that what was, will never return; and what was expected, can never be. We are facing a time of loss
and uncertainty. A time of bank-runs, lost savings and pensions, of mass unemployment,
electricity and mobile phone black-outs, of hunger and empty super-market shelves. A
localised economy will no longer be something environmentalists aspire to develop;
rather it will be forced upon us as bank failures, monetary uncertainty, and lost
purchasing power sever links in the web of the global economy. But we no longer have indigenous
economies to fall back upon. The gap between expectations and what can be realised is historically a major source of popular anger,
and can ignite a cycle of fear, blame, violence, scape-goating, and authoritarian leadership from either left or right. It can give the
avaricious the power and cover to appropriate wealth that might better be used for collective welfare. Yet who gave us the right to our
expectations? They were built on the semi-blind self-organisation of a complex human society over generations. They were built on
deep threads of human behaviour-competition and cooperation, mating selection and status-that result from our evolution over the
history of life on earth. They were built on the deposits of ancient sunlight hidden below the Earths surface, the minerals in soil, and
the global climate that provided the stability for our species to flourish. As

a species there is no one to blame,

unless we cling to the delusion that we are the displaced God who transcended our own
ecology. Yes, we can and will build a largely local economy out of the ruins of a
collapsed globalised one. It will be a much poorer one and one where we will have lost
much of what we take for granted. It can also provide a good life, where our basic needs
are met, where meaningful lives can be lived, and a rich texture of experience found. But
in the interim we face a huge resilience gap between the basic welfare and social needs
once provided by integration with the globalised growth economy and what is available
without it. We need to prepare for sudden shocks such as freezes in the banking system,
and its effect on food access say, and the more strategic changes we require in
agriculture, monetary systems, employment, and governance. The problem with such preparations is
that in many cases they are likely to be too late. This is because the risk of severe financial shocks is rising all the time, and the issues
are complex and often unclear. In addition real preparation would require a new and wide consensus on the nature of our predicament.
But the emergence of such a consensus would lead to people and institutions taking rational action such as withdrawing deposits from
banks, cashing in financial assets, or the refusing of credit. Such action would begin the re-enforcing process of supply-chain
contagion and a systemic collapse in the globalised economy.

2NC/1NR O/VUnsustainable
And biological laws prove we only need to win one warrant to win the
debateconverging factors prove collapse is inevitable.
Taylor 8 [Graeme Taylor is a social activist committed to constructive global transformation
and the coordinator of BEST Futures, a project supporting sustainable solutions through
researching how societies change and evolve, Evolution's Edge: The Coming Collapse and
Transformation of Our World, Pomegranate Press, 2008, ISBN: 9781550923810, EBrary, pg.
108-9]
It is easier for societies to manage problems that are temporary and/or local in nature than problems that are sustained and/or
generalized. For example, it is easier for a society to manage a single failed harvest than long-term climate change, a work stoppage in
one factory than a national strike, a border dispute than all-out warfare. The work of Jack Goldstone, a sociologist at George Mason
University, indicates that societies

are more likely to break down when they face multiple

converging stresses. He wrote, Massive state breakdown is likely to occur only when there are simultaneously high levels
of distress and conflict at several levels of society in the state, among elites, and in the populace. 6 While converging
stresses can result from disparate developments (e.g. a harvest failure occurring at the same time as invasion),
they are often caused by cascading crises (e.g. a harvest failure causes famine which then triggers a rebellion).
As crises interact with each other the problems multiply and become more difficult to
manage. The large number of interacting problems facing humanity in the coming
decades increases the probability of major crises. Enormous threats are posed by climate
change, energy shortages, water scarcity, food shortages, loss of biodiversity, growing
economic inequality, increasing global financial instability and conflicts over scarce
resources. Other growing threats also exist, such as pandemics and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 7 While any of
these issues will be extremely difficult to manage by itself, in combination they will be
unmanageable. For example, until recently UN food estimates have assumed that both the
weather and energy prices will remain relatively stable for the foreseeable future. 8 But
what will happen to agricultural production if the costs of irrigation, fertilizers and
transportation continue to rise due to declining oil supplies? What will happen if this
problem is compounded by other factors such as climate change? And what will be the
political consequences in China, India and other countries if these interacting crises
produce a deadly combination: a global depression, inflation, increasing food shortages
and growing unemployment? Scenarios such as these are the recipe for the type of perfect
storm that could cause the catastrophic collapse of the world system. 9 Global crises could
start almost anywhere. Since societal systems have complex and chaotic dynamics, 10 it is
not possible to make precise predictions about the future. Nevertheless, it is possible to define
system parameters the operating conditions and resources that a society must have to
survive. The biological Law of the Minimum (Liebigs Law) states that the population of any
species is limited by the necessity (water, food, suitable climate) in least supply. This means that it
will only take a shortage of one irreplaceable global resource to trigger a global crisis.
Although we are not yet in a position to predict which resource will run out when, we do
know that resource shortages are inevitable because the industrial system requires
constantly increasing quantities of energy, water, metals, fiber, grains and other critical
resources in order to function. We also know that the availability of many resources is
declining due to overexploitation, pollution and climate change. Many experts believe that
oil production will peak and begin to decline sometime between 2008 and 2015. 12 While the
first 150 years of industrialization were powered by wood and coal, the rapid expansion of the industrial system after 1900 closely

corresponds with the rapid expansion of oil production. Since

oil is the most important source of energy on

the planet today, when production begins to decline, the global economy is likely to go
into a severe depression. This chart indicates how vulnerable our industrial civilization is to resource shortages. We could
create similar charts to show how rapidly other essential resources such as groundwater, topsoil, wood, fish, natural gas, lead, zinc or

In terms of the long

existence of humans on earth, the Industrial Age is only a brief, passing phenomena. Nonrenewable fossil fuels made mechanization possible. Mechanization has allowed our
species to expand and consume both renewable and non-renewable resources at an
unsustainable rate. Now the resources are almost running out, major ecosystems are
failing, and industrial civilization is about to collapse.
copper are being depleted, and how rapidly the planets air, earth and water are being polluted.

Prefer our evidenceits based on physical capacities of the earth while

theirs is theory
Heinberg 10 [Richard Heinberg, journalist, teaches at the Core Faculty of New College of
California, on the Board of Advisors of the Solar Living Institute and the Post Carbon Institute,
Life After Growth, March 4, 2010, http://www.countercurrents.org/heinberg040310.htm]
In nature, growth

always slams up against non-negotiable constraints sooner or later. If a

species finds that its food source has expanded, its numbers will increase to take
advantage of those surplus caloriesbut then its food source will become depleted as
more mouths consume it, and its predators will likewise become more numerous (more tasty
meals for them!). Population "blooms" (that is, periods of rapid growth) are always followed by crashes
and die-offs. Always.
Here's another real-world example. In recent years China's economy has been growing at eight percent or more per year; that means it
is more than doubling in size every ten years. Indeed, China consumes more than twice as much coal as it did a decade agothe same
with iron ore and oil. The nation now has four times as many highways as it did, and almost five times as many cars. How long can
this go on? How many more doublings can occur before China has used up its key resourcesor has simply decided that enough is
enough and has stopped growing?

It makes sense that economies should follow rules analogous to those that govern
biological systems. Plants and animals tend to grow quickly when they are young, but then they reach a more or less stable
mature size. In organisms, growth rates are largely controlled by genes. In economies, growth seems tied to
factors such as the availability of resourceschiefly energy resources ("food" for the industrial system).
During the 20th century, cheap and abundant fossil fuels enabled rapid economic
expansion; at some point, therefore, fossil fuel depletion could put a brake on growth. It is
also possible that industrial wastes could accumulate to the point that the biological
systems that underpin economic activity (such as forests, crops, and human bodies) begin to fail.
But economists generally don't see things this way. That's probably because most current economic theories were formulated during
an anomalous historical period of sustained growth. Economists

are merely generalizing from their

experience: they can point to decades of steady growth in the recent past, and so they
simply project that experience into the future. Moreover, they have ways to explain why
modern market economies are immune to the kinds of limits that constrain natural
systems; the two main ones concern substitution and efficiency.
If a useful resource becomes scarce, its price will rise, and this creates an incentive for
users of the resource to find a substitute. For example, if oil gets expensive enough, energy
companies might start making liquid fuels from coal. Or they might develop other energy
sources undreamed of today. Economists theorize that this process of substitution can go
on forever. It's part of the magic of the free market.
Increasing efficiency means doing more with less. In the U.S., the number of inflation-adjusted dollars
generated in the economy for every unit of energy consumed has increased steadily over recent decades (the amount of energy, in

British Thermal Units, required to produce a dollar of GDP has been dropping steadily, from close to 20,000 BTU per dollar in 1949
to 8,500 BTU in 2008). That's one kind of economic efficiency. Another has to do with locating the cheapest sources of materials, and
the places where workers will be most productive and work for the lowest wages. As

we increase efficiency, we use

lessof either resources or moneyto do more. That enables more growth.
Finding substitutes for depleting resources and upping efficiency are undeniably effective
adaptive strategies of market economies. Nevertheless, the question remains open as to
how long these strategies can continue to work in the real worldwhich is governed less
by economic theories than by the laws of physics. In the real world, some things don't
have substitutes, or the substitutes are too expensive, or don't work as well, or can't be
produced fast enough. And efficiency follows a law of diminishing returns: the first gains
in efficiency are usually cheap, but every further incremental gain tends to cost more,
until further gains become prohibitively expensive.
Unlike economists, most physical scientists recognize that growth within any functioning,
bounded system has to stop sometime.

2NC/1NR UQBiophysical Limits

Collapse inevitablebiophysical limits
Heinberg 10Richard Heinberg is an American journalist and educator who has written
extensively on energy, economic, and ecological issues, including oil depletion. He is the author
of ten books. He serves as the senior fellow at the Post Carbon Institute. He has addressed the
Trade Committee of the European Parliament and served as an advisor to the National Petroleum
Council in its report to the U.S. Secretary of Energy on Peak Oil. [August 11, 2010, Temporary
Recession or the End of Growth? http://www.postcarbon.org/article/130597-temporaryrecession-or-the-end-of]

problem extends beyond oil and other fossil fuels: the worlds fresh water resources are
strained to the point that billions of people may soon find themselves with only
precarious access to water for drinking and irrigation. Biodiversity is declining rapidly. We
lose 24 billion tons of topsoil each year to erosion. And many economically significant
mineralsfrom antimony to zincare depleting quickly, requiring the mining of ever lowergrade ores in ever more remote locations. Thus the Peak Oil crisis is really just the leading edge of a broader Peak Everything
But the

dilemma.
In essence, humanity

faces an entirely predictable peril: our population has been growing

dramatically for the past 200 years (expanding from under one billion to nearly seven billion today), while our
per-capita consumption of resources has also grown. For any species, this is virtually the definition of
biological success. And yet all of this has taken place in the context of a finite planet with fixed
stores of non-renewable resources (fossil fuels and minerals), a limited ability to regenerate
renewable resources (forests, fish, fresh water, and topsoil), and a limited ability to absorb industrial
wastes (including carbon dioxide). If we step back and look at the industrial period from a broad
historical perspective that is informed by an appreciation of ecological limits, it is hard to
avoid the conclusion that we are today living at the end of a relatively brief pulsea 200-year
rapid expansionary phase enabled by a temporary energy subsidy (in the form of cheap fossil fuels) that will inevitably be
followed by an even more rapid and dramatic contraction as those fuels deplete.
The winding down of this historic growth-contraction pulse doesnt necessarily mean the end of the world, but it does mean
the end of a certain kind of economy. One way or another, humanity must return to a more
normal pattern of existence characterized by reliance on immediate solar income (via crops,
wind, or the direct conversion of sunlight to electricity) rather than stored ancient sunlight.

Growth is unsustainablebiophysical limits prove

Simms and Johnson 10 [Andrew Simms founded the climate change, energy and
interdependence programmes at nef, and is author of Ecological Debt: Global Warming and the
Wealth of Nations. Until the end of 2010, he was Policy Director at nef. Andrew writes regularly
for the national press and is on the boards of Greenpeace UK, the climate campaign 10:10 and
The Energy and Resources Institute Europe. Victoria Johnson is the acting head of the climate
change and energy programme at nef. Victoria has a BSc in Environmental Sciences, a MSc
(awarded with distinction) in Climate Change, both from the University of East Anglia, and a
PhD in Atmospheric Physics at Imperial College. Growth isn't Possible, new economics
foundation, January 25, 2010, pg. 4-7,
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01564/_res/id=sa_File1/Growth_Isnt
_Possible.pdf]

In January 2006, nef (the new economics foundation) published the report Growth isnt working. 9 It highlighted a flaw at the heart of
the economic strategy that relies overwhelmingly upon economic growth to reduce poverty. The

distribution of costs
and benefits from global economic growth, it demonstrated, are highly unbalanced. The share of
benefits reaching those on the lowest incomes was shrinking. In this system, paradoxically, in
order to generate ever smaller benefits for the poorest, it requires those who are already
rich and over-consuming to consume ever more. The unavoidable result, the report points out, is
that, with business as usual in the global economy, long before any general and
meaningful reduction in poverty has been won, the very life-support systems we all rely
on are likely to have been fundamentally compromised. Four years on from Growth isnt working, Growth
isnt possible goes one step further and tests that thesis in detail in the context of climate change and energy. It argues that

indefinite global economic growth is unsustainable. Just as the laws of thermodynamics

constrain the maximum efficiency of a heat engine, economic growth is constrained by
the finite nature of our planets natural resources (biocapacity). As Daly once commented, he would accept
the possibility of infinite growth in the economy on the day that one of his economist colleagues could demonstrate that Earth itself
could grow at a commensurate rate. 10 The

most recent data on human use of biocapacity sends a

number of unfortunate signals for believers in the possibility of unrestrained growth. Our
global ecological footprint is growing, further overshooting what the biosphere can
provide and absorb, and in the process, like two trains heading in opposite directions, we
appear to be actually shrinking the available biocapacity on which we depend. Globally
we are consuming natures servicesusing resources and creating carbon emissions44
per cent faster than nature can regenerate and reabsorb what we consume and the waste
we produce. In other words, it takes the Earth almost 18 months to produce the ecological
services that humanity uses in one year. The UKs footprint has grown such that if the whole world wished to
consume at the same rate it would require 3.4 planets like Earth. 11 Growth forever, as conventionally defined (see Box 1), within
fixed, though flexible, limits isnt possible. Sooner

or later we will hit the biospheres buffers. This happens

for one of two reasons. Either a natural resource becomes over-exploited to the point of
exhaustion, or because more waste is dumped into an ecosystem than can be safely
absorbed, leading to dysfunction or collapse. Science now seems to be telling us that both
are happening, and sooner, rather than later. Yet, for decades, it has been a heresy punishable by career suicide
for economists (or politicians) to question orthodox economic growth. As the British MP Colin Challen quipped in 2006, We are
imprisoned by our political Hippocratic oath: we will deliver unto the electorate more
goodies than anyone else. 12

Prefer our evidencea consensus of studies and experts conclude that growth
is unsustainable and threatens the survival of the planet
Ekins 2k [Paul Ekins is Professor of Energy and Environment Policy at the UCL Energy
Institute, University College London. He is also a Co-Director of the UK Energy Research
Centre, in charge of its Energy Systems theme, and also leads UCLs involvement in large
research consortia on Bioenergy and Hydrogen. Economic Growth Human Welfare and
Environmental Sustainability : The Prospects for Green Growth, London, GBR: Routledge,
ISBN: 9780203011751, 2000, EBrary, p 18-9]
1.2 ENVIRONMENTAL UNSUSTAINABILITY 1.2.1 Unsustainability: some conclusions In the twenty

years 1972 92,

between the UN Conference on the Environment in Stockholm and that on Environment
and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, scientific opinion gradually hardened that the
damage being inflicted by human activities on the natural environment renders those
activities unsustainable. It has become accepted that the activities cannot be projected to

continue into the future either because they will have destroyed the environmental
conditions necessary for that continuation, or because their environmental effects will
cause massive, unacceptable damage to human health and disruption of human ways of
life. This is not the place for a detailed review of the evidence that has led to the scientific consensus, but the now perceived
seriousness of the problem can be illustrated by a number of quotations of the conclusions of bodies which have conducted such a
review. Thus the Business Council for Sustainable Development stated in its report to UNCED: We

cannot continue in
our present methods of using energy, managing forests, farming, protecting plant and
animal species, managing urban growth and producing industrial goods (Schmidheiny 1992:5).
The Brundtland Report, which initiated the process which led to UNCED, had formulated
its perception of unsustainability in terms of a threat to survival: There are thresholds
which cannot be crossed without endangering the basic integrity of the system. Today we
are close to many of these thresholds; we must be ever mindful of the risk of endangering
the survival of life on earth (WCED 1987:32 3). The World Resources Institute (WRI), in
collaboration with both the Development and Environment Programmes of the United Nations, concluded, on the basis of
one of the worlds most extensive environmental databases, that: The world is not now
headed toward a sustainable future, but rather toward a variety of potential human and
environmental disasters (WRI 1992:2). The World Bank, envisaging a 3.5 times increase in world economic output by
2030, acknowledged that: If environmental pollution and degradation were to rise in step with
such a rise in output, the result would be appalling environmental pollution and damage
(World Bank 1992:9). The Fifth Action Programme of the European Community acknowledges that many current forms
of activity and development are not environmentally sustainable (CEC 1992a: 4), as indicated
by a slow but relentless deterioration of the environment of the Community, notwithstanding the
measures taken over the last two decades (CEC 1992b: 3). In its annual State of the World reports, the Worldwatch
Institute has documented current environmental damage, concluding in 1993: The
environmentally destructive activities of recent decades are now showing up in reduced
productivity of croplands, forests, grasslands and fisheries; in the mounting cleanup costs
of toxic waste sites; in rising health care costs for cancer, birth defects, allergies, emphysema, asthma and other
respiratory diseases; and in the spread of hunger. (Brown et al. 1993:4 5) These trends mean: If we fail to
convert our self-destructing economy into one that is environmentally sustainable, future
generations will be overwhelmed by environmental degradation and social disintegration
(ibid.: 21). Little wonder, therefore, that in 1992 two of the worlds most prestigious scientific institutions
saw fit to issue a joint statement of warning: Unrestrained resource consumption for
energy production and other usescould lead to catastrophic outcomes for the global
environment. Some of the environmental changes may produce irreversible damage to the
earths capacity to sustain life. The future of our planet is in the balance. (RS and NAS 1992:2,
4)

2NC/1NR UQDebt/Fiscal Policy

Global recovery is impossibleconverging debt, monetary, and banking
crises.
Roubini 12Nouriel Roubini, a professor at NYUs Stern School of Business and Chairman
of Roubini Global Economics, was one of the few economists to predict the recent global
financial crisis. He previously served in the Clinton administration as Senior Economist for the
Presidents Council of Economic Advisers, and has worked for the International Monetary Fund,
the US Federal Reserve, and the World Bank. [June 15, 2012, A Global Perfect Storm, Project
Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-global-perfect-storm]
NEW YORKDark,

lowering financial and economic clouds are, it seems, rolling in from every

direction: the eurozone, the United States, China, and elsewhere. Indeed, the global economy in 2013 could be a very difficult
environment in which to find shelter.
For starters, the

eurozone crisis is worsening, as the euro remains too strong, front-loaded

fiscal austerity deepens recession in many member countries, and a credit crunch in the
periphery and high oil prices undermine prospects of recovery. The eurozone banking
system is becoming balkanized, as cross-border and interbank credit lines are cut off, and
capital flight could turn into a full run on periphery banks if, as is likely, Greece stages a
disorderly euro exit in the next few months.
Moreover, fiscal and sovereign-debt strains are becoming worse as interest-rate spreads for
Spain and Italy have returned to their unsustainable peak levels. Indeed, the eurozone may require not
just an international bailout of banks (as recently in Spain), but also a full sovereign bailout at a time when eurozone and international
firewalls are insufficient to the task of backstopping both Spain and Italy. As a result, disorderly

breakup of the

eurozone remains possible.

Farther to the west, US economic performance is weakening, with first-quarter growth a miserly
1.9%well below potential. And job creation faltered in April and May, so the US may
reach stall speed by year end. Worse, the risk of a double-dip recession next year is rising:
even if what looks like a looming US fiscal cliff turns out to be only a smaller source of drag, the likely increase in some
taxes and reduction of some transfer payments will reduce growth in disposable income
and consumption.
Moreover, political gridlock over fiscal adjustment is likely to persist, regardless of whether
Barack Obama or Mitt Romney wins Novembers presidential election. Thus, new fights on the debt
ceiling, risks of a government shutdown, and rating downgrades could further depress
consumer and business confidence, reducing spending and accelerating a flight to safety
that would exacerbate the fall in stock markets.
In the east, China, its growth model unsustainable, could be underwater by 2013, as its
investment bust continues and reforms intended to boost consumption are too little too
late. A new Chinese leadership must accelerate structural reforms to reduce national savings and increase consumptions share of
GDP; but divisions within the leadership about the pace of reform, together with the
likelihood of a bumpy political transition, suggest that reform will occur at a pace that
simply is not fast enough.
The economic slowdown in the US, the eurozone, and China already implies a massive
drag on growth in other emerging markets, owing to their trade and financial links with
the US and the European Union (that is, no decoupling has occurred). At the same time, the lack of
structural reforms in emerging markets, together with their move towards greater state
capitalism, is hampering growth and will reduce their resiliency.

Finally, long-simmering tensions in the Middle East between Israel and the US on one side and Iran on the other on the issue of
nuclear proliferation could reach a boil by 2013. The current negotiations are likely to fail, and even tightened sanctions may not stop
Iran from trying to build nuclear weapons. With

the US and Israel unwilling to accept containment of a

nuclear Iran by deterrence, a military confrontation in 2013 would lead to a massive oil
price spike and global recession.
These risks are already exacerbating the economic slowdown: equity markets are falling
everywhere, leading to negative wealth effects on consumption and capital spending.
Borrowing costs are rising for highly indebted sovereigns, credit rationing is undermining
small and medium-size companies, and falling commodity prices are reducing exporting
countries income. Increasing risk aversion is leading economic agents to adopt a waitand-see stance that makes the slowdown partly self-fulfilling.
Compared to 2008-2009, when policymakers had ample space to act, monetary and fiscal
authorities are running out of policy bullets (or, more cynically, policy rabbits to pull out of their hats).
Monetary policy is constrained by the proximity to zero interest rates and repeated rounds
of quantitative easing. Indeed, economies and markets no longer face liquidity problems,
but rather credit and insolvency crises. Meanwhile, unsustainable budget deficits and public
debt in most advanced economies have severely limited the scope for further fiscal
stimulus.
Using exchange rates to boost net exports is a zero-sum game at a time when private and
public deleveraging is suppressing domestic demand in countries that are running
current-account deficits and structural issues are having the same effect in surplus
countries. After all, a weaker currency and better trade balance in some countries necessarily implies a stronger currency and a
weaker trade balance in others.
Meanwhile, the

ability to backstop, ring-fence, and bail out banks and other financial
institutions is constrained by politics and near-insolvent sovereigns inability to absorb
additional losses from their banking systems. As a result, sovereign risk is now becoming
banking risk. Indeed, sovereigns are dumping a larger fraction of their public debt onto
banks balance sheet, especially in the eurozone.
To prevent a disorderly outcome in the eurozone, todays fiscal austerity should be much more gradual, a growth compact should
complement the EUs new fiscal compact, and a fiscal union with debt mutualization (Eurobonds) should be implemented. In
addition, a full banking union, starting with eurozone-wide deposit insurance, should be initiated, and moves toward greater political
integration must be considered, even as Greece leaves the eurozone.
Unfortunately, Germany resists all of these key policy measures, as it is fixated on the credit risk to which its taxpayers would be
exposed with greater economic, fiscal, and banking integration. As a result, the probability of a eurozone disaster is rising.
And, while

the cloud over the eurozone may be the largest to burst, it is not the only one
threatening the global economy. Batten down the hatches.

Economic recovery is impossiblestructural barriers.

Wallerstein 11 Immanuel Wallerstein is a senior research scholar at Yale University
[January/February, 2011, The Global Economy Won't Recover, Now or Ever,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional_wisdom?page=full]

Virtually everyone everywhere-economists, politicians, pundits -- agrees that the world

has been in some kind of economic trouble since at least 2008. And virtually everyone
seems to believe that in the next few years the world will somehow "recover" from these
difficulties. After all, upturns always occur after downturns. The remedies recommended vary
considerably, but the idea that the system shall continue in its essential features is a deeply
rooted faith.

But it

is wrong. All systems have lives. When their processes move too far from
equilibrium, they fluctuate chaotically and bifurcate. Our existing system, what I call a capitalist
world-economy, has been in existence for some 500 years and has for at least a century
encompassed the entire globe. It has functioned remarkably well. But like all systems, it has moved
steadily further and further from equilibrium. For a while now, it has moved too far from
equilibrium, such that it is today in structural crisis.
The problem is that the basic costs of all production have risen remarkably. There are the
personnel expenses of all kinds -- for unskilled workers, for cadres, for top-level management. There are the
costs incurred as producers pass on the costs of their production to the rest of us -- for
detoxification, for renewal of resources, for infrastructure. And the democratization of the
world has led to demands for more and more education, more and more health provisions,
and more and more guarantees of lifetime income. To meet these demands, there has been
a significant increase in taxation of all kinds. Together, these costs have risen beyond the
point that permits serious capital accumulation. Why not then simply raise prices?
Because there are limits beyond which one cannot push their level. It is called the
elasticity of demand. The result is a growing profit squeeze, which is reaching a point
where the game is not worth the candle.
What we are witnessing as a result is chaotic fluctuations of all kinds -- economic, political, sociocultural.
These fluctuations cannot easily be controlled by public policy. The result is ever greater uncertainty about all
kinds of short-term decision-making, as well as frantic realignments of every variety.
Doubt feeds on itself as we search for ways out of the menacing uncertainty posed by
terrorism, climate change, pandemics, and nuclear proliferation.
The only sure thing is that the present system cannot continue. The fundamental political
struggle is over what kind of system will replace capitalism, not whether it should
survive. The choice is between a new system that replicates some of the present system's essential features of hierarchy and
polarization and one that is relatively democratic and egalitarian.

The extraordinary expansion of the world-economy in the postwar years (more or less 1945 to
1970) has been followed by a long period of economic stagnation in which the basic source
of gain has been rank speculation sustained by successive indebtednesses. The latest
financial crisis didn't bring down this system; it merely exposed it as hollow. Our recent
"difficulties" are merely the next-to-last bubble in a process of boom and bust the world-system has been undergoing since around
1970. The

last bubble will be state indebtednesses, including in the so-called emerging

economies, leading to bankruptcies.
Most people do not recognize -- or refuse to recognize -- these realities. It is wrenching to accept that the
historical system in which we are living is in structural crisis and will not survive.

Meanwhile, the system proceeds by its accepted rules. We meet at G-20 sessions and seek a futile
consensus. We speculate on the markets. We "develop" our economies in whatever way we can. All this activity simply
accentuates the structural crisis. The real action, the struggle over what new system will
be created, is elsewhere.

2NC/1NR UQDMR
Collapse is inevitablewe must allow small breakdowns to prevent total
collapseeven tech developments will face diminishing returns.
MacKenzie 8 [Debora MacKenzie is Canadian, did graduate work in electrophysiology in the
US, and since 1980 has lived in Europe. She has been a regular contributor to the British
magazine New Scientist since 1984, in recent years specialising in infectious disease, food
production, arms control, fisheries, and public attitudes to science. Are We Doomed, New
Scientist, April 2, 2008, http://www.planetthoughts.org/?pg=pt/Whole&qid=2737]
DOOMSDAY. The end of civilisation. Literature and film abound with tales of plague, famine and wars which ravage the planet,
leaving a few survivors scratching out a primitive existence amid the ruins. Every

civilisation in history has

collapsed, after all. Why should ours be any different? Doomsday scenarios typically
feature a knockout blow: a massive asteroid, all-out nuclear war or a catastrophic
pandemic (see "The end of civilisation"). Yet there is another chilling possibility: what if the very
nature of civilisation means that ours, like all the others, is destined to collapse sooner or
later? A few researchers have been making such claims for years. Disturbingly, recent insights from fields such as complexity
theory suggest that they are right. It appears that once a society develops beyond a certain level of
complexity it becomes increasingly fragile. Eventually, it reaches a point at which even a
relatively minor disturbance can bring everything crashing down. Some say we have already reached
this point, and that it is time to start thinking about how we might manage collapse. Others insist it is not yet too late, and that we can -

History is not on our side. Think of

Sumeria, of ancient Egypt and of the Maya. In his 2005 best-seller Collapse, Jared Diamond of the
University of California, Los Angeles, blamed environmental mismanagement for the fall of the
Mayan civilisation and others, and warned that we might be heading the same way unless
we choose to stop destroying our environmental support systems. Lester Brown of the Earth
Policy Institute in Washington DC agrees. He has long argued that governments must pay more
attention to vital environmental resources. "It's not about saving the planet. It's about
saving civilisation," he says. Others think our problems run deeper. From the moment our ancestors started to settle down
and build cities, we have had to find solutions to the problems that success brings. " For the past 10,000 years,
problem solving has produced increasing complexity in human societies," says Joseph
Tainter, an archaeologist at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City, and author of the 1988 book The Collapse of Complex
Societies. If crops fail because rain is patchy, build irrigation canals. When they silt up,
organise dredging crews. When the bigger crop yields lead to a bigger population, build
more canals. When there are too many for ad hoc repairs, install a management
bureaucracy, and tax people to pay for it. When they complain, invent tax inspectors and
a system to record the sums paid. That much the Sumerians knew. Diminishing returns There is, however, a
price to be paid. Every extra layer of organisation imposes a cost in terms of energy, the
common currency of all human efforts, from building canals to educating scribes. And
increasing complexity, Tainter realised, produces diminishing returns. The extra food produced
by each extra hour of labour - or joule of energy invested per farmed hectare - diminishes as that
investment mounts. We see the same thing today in a declining number of patents per dollar invested in research as that
research investment mounts. This law of diminishing returns appears everywhere, Tainter says. To
keep growing, societies must keep solving problems as they arise. Yet each problem
solved means more complexity. Success generates a larger population, more kinds of
specialists, more resources to manage, more information to juggle - and, ultimately, less
bang for your buck. Eventually, says Tainter, the point is reached when all the energy and
we must - act now to keep disaster at bay. Environmental mismanagement

resources available to a society are required just to maintain its existing level of
complexity. Then when the climate changes or barbarians invade, overstretched institutions
break down and civil order collapses. What emerges is a less complex society, which is
organised on a smaller scale or has been taken over by another group. Tainter sees
diminishing returns as the underlying reason for the collapse of all ancient civilisations,
from the early Chinese dynasties to the Greek city state of Mycenae. These civilisations relied on the solar
energy that could be harvested from food, fodder and wood, and from wind. When this
had been stretched to its limit, things fell apart. An ineluctable process Western industrial
civilisation has become bigger and more complex than any before it by exploiting new
sources of energy, notably coal and oil, but these are limited. There are increasing signs
of diminishing returns: the energy required to get each new joule of oil is mounting and
although global food production is still increasing, constant innovation is needed to cope
with environmental degradation and evolving pests and diseases - the yield boosts per
unit of investment in innovation are shrinking. "Since problems are inevitable," Tainter warns,
"this process is in part ineluctable." Is Tainter right? An analysis of complex systems has led
Yaneer Bar-Yam, head of the New England Complex Systems Institute in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, to the same conclusion that Tainter reached from studying history. Social
organisations become steadily more complex as they are required to deal both with
environmental problems and with challenges from neighbouring societies that are also
becoming more complex, Bar-Yam says. This eventually leads to a fundamental shift in the
way the society is organised. "To run a hierarchy, managers cannot be less complex than the system they are managing,"
Bar-Yam says. As complexity increases, societies add ever more layers of management but,
ultimately in a hierarchy, one individual has to try and get their head around the whole
thing, and this starts to become impossible. At that point, hierarchies give way to
networks in which decision-making is distributed. We are at this point. This shift to decentralised networks
has led to a widespread belief that modern society is more resilient than the old hierarchical systems. "I don't foresee a collapse in
society because of increased complexity," says futurologist and industry consultant Ray Hammond. "Our strength is in our highly
distributed decision making." This, he says, makes modern western societies more resilient than those like the old Soviet Union, in
which decision making was centralised. Increasing connectedness Things are not that simple, says Thomas Homer-Dixon, a political
scientist at the University of Toronto, Canada, and author of the 2006 book The Upside of Down. "Initially, increasing connectedness

As connections
increase, though, networked systems become increasingly tightly coupled. This means the
impacts of failures can propagate: the more closely those two villages come to depend on
each other, the more both will suffer if either has a problem. "Complexity leads to higher
vulnerability in some ways," says Bar-Yam. "This is not widely understood." The reason is that
as networks become ever tighter, they start to transmit shocks rather than absorb them.
"The intricate networks that tightly connect us together - and move people, materials,
information, money and energy - amplify and transmit any shock," says Homer-Dixon. "A
financial crisis, a terrorist attack or a disease outbreak has almost instant destabilising
effects, from one side of the world to the other." For instance, in 2003 large areas of North America and
and diversity helps: if one village has a crop failure, it can get food from another village that didn't."

Europe suffered blackouts when apparently insignificant nodes of their respective electricity grids failed. And this year China suffered
a similar blackout after heavy snow hit power lines. Tightly

coupled networks like these create the

potential for propagating failure across many critical industries, says Charles Perrow of
Yale University, a leading authority on industrial accidents and disasters. Credit crunch Perrow says
interconnectedness in the global production system has now reached the point where "a
breakdown anywhere increasingly means a breakdown everywhere". This is especially
true of the world's financial systems, where the coupling is very tight. "Now we have a
debt crisis with the biggest player, the US. The consequences could be enormous." "A
networked society behaves like a multicellular organism," says Bar-Yam, "random damage is like lopping a chunk off a sheep."

Whether or not the sheep survives depends on which chunk is lost. And while we are pretty sure which chunks a sheep needs, it isn't
clear - it

may not even be predictable - which chunks of our densely networked civilisation
are critical, until it's too late. "When we do the analysis, almost any part is critical if you
lose enough of it," says Bar-Yam. "Now that we can ask questions of such systems in more
sophisticated ways, we are discovering that they can be very vulnerable. That means
civilisation is very vulnerable." So what can we do? "The key issue is really whether we respond successfully in the
face of the new vulnerabilities we have," Bar-Yam says. That means making sure our "global sheep" does not get injured in the first
place - something that may be hard to guarantee as the climate shifts and the world's fuel and mineral resources dwindle. Tightly
coupled system Scientists in other fields are also warning that complex

systems are prone to collapse. Similar

ideas have emerged from the study of natural cycles in ecosystems, based on the work of
ecologist Buzz Holling, now at the University of Florida, Gainesville. Some ecosystems become steadily
more complex over time: as a patch of new forest grows and matures, specialist species
may replace more generalist species, biomass builds up and the trees, beetles and bacteria
form an increasingly rigid and ever more tightly coupled system. "It becomes an extremely efficient
system for remaining constant in the face of the normal range of conditions," says Homer-Dixon. But unusual conditions - an
insect outbreak, fire or drought - can trigger dramatic changes as the impact cascades through the
system. The end result may be the collapse of the old ecosystem and its replacement by a newer, simpler one. Globalisation
is resulting in the same tight coupling and fine-tuning of our systems to a narrow range of
conditions, he says. Redundancy is being systematically eliminated as companies maximise
profits. Some products are produced by only one factory worldwide. Financially, it makes
sense, as mass production maximises efficiency. Unfortunately, it also minimises
resilience. "We need to be more selective about increasing the connectivity and speed of
our critical systems," says Homer-Dixon. "Sometimes the costs outweigh the benefits." Is there an alternative? Could
we heed these warnings and start carefully climbing back down the complexity ladder?
Tainter knows of only one civilisation that managed to decline but not fall. "After the Byzantine empire lost most of its territory to the
Arabs, they simplified their entire society. Cities

mostly disappeared, literacy and numeracy declined,

their economy became less monetised, and they switched from professional army to
peasant militia." Staving off collapse Pulling off the same trick will be harder for our more
advanced society. Nevertheless, Homer-Dixon thinks we should be taking action now. "First, we need to encourage
distributed and decentralised production of vital goods like energy and food," he says. "Second, we need to remember that slack isn't
always waste. A manufacturing company with a large inventory may lose some money on warehousing, but it can keep running even
if its suppliers are temporarily out of action." The electricity industry in the US has already started identifying hubs in the grid with no
redundancy available and is putting some back in, Homer-Dixon points out. Governments could encourage other sectors to follow suit.

The trouble is that in a world of fierce competition, private companies will always
increase efficiency unless governments subsidise inefficiency in the public interest.
Homer-Dixon doubts we can stave off collapse completely. He points to what he calls
"tectonic" stresses that will shove our rigid, tightly coupled system outside the range of
conditions it is becoming ever more finely tuned to. These include population growth, the
growing divide between the world's rich and poor, financial instability, weapons
proliferation, disappearing forests and fisheries, and climate change. In imposing new
complex solutions we will run into the problem of diminishing returns - just as we are
running out of cheap and plentiful energy. "This is the fundamental challenge humankind faces. We need to
allow for the healthy breakdown in natural function in our societies in a way that doesn't
produce catastrophic collapse, but instead leads to healthy renewal," Homer-Dixon says. This is what
happens in forests, which are a patchy mix of old growth and newer areas created by
disease or fire. If the ecosystem in one patch collapses, it is recolonised and renewed by
younger forest elsewhere. We must allow partial breakdown here and there, followed by
renewal, he says, rather than trying so hard to avert breakdown by increasing complexity that
any resulting crisis is actually worse. Tipping points Lester Brown thinks we are fast running out of time. "The

world can no longer afford to waste a day. We need a Great Mobilisation, as we had in wartime," he says.
"There has been tremendous progress in just the past few years. For the first time, I am
starting to see how an alternative economy might emerge. But it's now a race between
tipping points - which will come first, a switch to sustainable technology, or collapse?" Tainter is not
convinced that even new technology will save civilisation in the long run. "I sometimes
think of this as a 'faith-based' approach to the future," he says. Even a society reinvigorated
by cheap new energy sources will eventually face the problem of diminishing returns
once more. Innovation itself might be subject to diminishing returns, or perhaps absolute
limits. Studies of the way cities grow by Luis Bettencourt of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, support this idea.
His team's work suggests that an ever-faster rate of innovation is required to keep cities growing
and prevent stagnation or collapse, and in the long run this cannot be sustainable.

2NC/1NR UQInterdependency
Globalization means shocks will reverberate across the world we only need
to win one internal link to unsustainability.
Homer-Dixon 6 [Thomas Homer-Dixon is a professor of global systems at the Balsillie
School of International Affairs and the director of the Trudeau Centre for the Study of Peace and
Conflict at the University of Toronto, Upside of Down : Catastrophe, Creativity, and the
Renewal of Civilization, Publisher: Island Press, ISBN: 9781597266307, 2006, pg. 13-16]

Humankind has been crisscrossing the globe for millennia, and weve been trading large quantities of raw
materials and manufactured goods around the world for many centuries. But only in the past hundred years or so,
while our population has quadrupled, have we created tightly interlinked economic,
technological, and social systems from industrial agriculture to financial markets that penetrate
virtually every corner of the planet. The kiwifruit on your breakfast plate comes from New Zealand, the plate itself
comes from Malaysia, while the tantalum metal in the cell phone beside your plate comes from the jungles of eastern Congo. The
globe, says the eminent historian Eric Hobsbawm, is now a single operational unit. 7 And only in the
past few decades has our impact on the natural environment become truly planetary:
were now a physical force on the scale of nature itself, disrupting the deepest processes of
natural systems like Earths climate, and massively changing global cycles of carbon,
nitrogen, phosphorus, and sulfur. This is the real face of globalization a phenomenon that many
people talk about but few really understand. Its not just a process of growing economic interdependence
among countries. Thats something thats been underway for hundreds of years. 8
Globalization is really a much broader and, in many ways, more recent phenomenon: an almost
vertical rise in the scope, connectedness, and speed of all humankinds activities and
impacts. Its as much about the spread of new diseases like AIDS and avian flu from one
continent to another, the infestation of the Great Lakes by foreign mollusks, and the
arrival of shiploads of poor migrants on our shores as it is about trade negotiations, farm
subsidies, and currency convertibility. The change has brought huge benefits. More trade in goods and services
often boosts wealth for all involved: better movement of capital can aid investment and development, and mobilized global opinion
brings attention to distant human-rights and environmental problems. Greater connectivity between people and a higher speed of
interaction caused mainly by lightning-fast information technology let people far and wide combine their ideas, talents, and
resources in ways that may expand everyones prosperity. But globalization

has also created huge challenges.

Greater connectivity and speed, for instance, allow what would once have been merely local
shocks and disruptions to cascade outward as never before, sometimes affecting the whole
planet. Just as the 2003 blackout ramified across eastern North America from its starting
point in Ohio, so, earlier that year, did severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) emerge in southern China
and explode into dozens of countries from Vietnam to Canada. Greater connectivity and
speed are especially worrisome in light of the spread of lethal technologies that have
sharply raised the destructive power of angry and violent people. In a globalized world, an
attack in one place can have instant repercussions everywhere. Lethal technologies dont
have to be exotic or rare, like biochemical, nuclear, or radiological weapons.
Technologies that provide impressive killing power to fanatics, insurgents, and criminal
gangs are already widely available: conventional assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and plastic explosives
staggeringly abundant and traded in vast quantities legally and illegally around the planet are contributing to havoc from Chechnya
to Congo and Iraq. Violent groups have also been learning how to convert civilian technologies into appalling weapons as the Al
Qaeda terrorists did so horrifically when they used passenger airliners as guided missiles. But its the exotic technologies the
weapons of mass destruction that keep experts awake at night. If terrorists obtained barely one hundred kilograms of highly
enriched uranium less than one ten-thousandth of the worlds stockpile, much of which is stored in insecure facilities in the former
Soviet Union they could easily build an atomic bomb that could flatten the core of any of our great cities. 9 London or New York,
Paris or Washington, Moscow or Delhi, Tel Aviv or Riyadh these metropolises are all in countries whose policies evoke hatred

from fanatically violent groups, and any could be obliterated in an instant. Never before has it been possible for small groups to
destroy entire cities, and this one fact by itself will ensure that our future is entirely different from our past.

And we only need to win that one sector economy collapse to win that the
whole system is unsustainable. The interconnectedness of the economy
ensures it will fail.
Korowicz 11 [David Korowicz is a physicist and human systems ecologist, the director of The
Risk/Resilience Network in Ireland, a board member of FEASTA - The Foundation for the
Economics of Sustainability, On The Cusp of Collapse Complexity, Energy and the Globalized
Economy, Editors: Richard Douthwaite is co-founder of Feasta, an Irish economic think tank
focused on the economics of sustainability. He is also a council member of Comhar, the Irish
government's national sustainability council. He acted as economic adviser to the Global
Commons Institute from 1993 to 2005, during which time GCI developed the Contraction and
Convergence approach to dealing with greenhouse gas emissions which has since been backed by
many countries. Gillian Fallon is a writer, journalist, and editor with a particular interest in food
security. Fleeing Vesuvius: Overcoming the Risks of Economic and Environmental Collapse,
New Society Publishers, 2011, ISBN: 0865716994, pg. 6-9]

As the globalizing economy grows, increased population, wealth and in-tegration opens
up the possibility of greater economies of scale and more diverse productive niches.
When new technologies and business models (solutions or sets of solutions) emerge, they co-adapt
and co-evolve with what is already present. Their adoption and spread through wider networks depends on the
efficiencies they provide in terms of lower costs and new market opportunities. One of the principal ways of gaining
overall efficiency is by letting individual parts of the system share the costs of
transactions by sharing common infrastructure platforms (information and transport net-works, electric
grid, water/sewage systems, financial systems), and integrat-ing more. Thus there is a reinforcing trend of benefits for those
who build the platform and the users of the platform, which grows as the number of users grows. In time, the scale of the
system becomes a barrier to a diver-sity of alternative systems as the upfront cost and the
embedded economies of scale become a greater barrier to new entrants, especially where
there is a complex hub infrastructure. The lack of system diversity is not neces-sarily due to corporate monopolies.
There is vigorous competition between mobile phone service providers but they share common information plat- forms and depend on
electricity networks and the monetary system, both of which have little or no system diversity.

Our operational systems are integrated into the wider economy. Expen-sive infrastructure
and continual need for replacement components mean that economics of scale and a large
number of economically connected peo-ple are necessary to make them viable. For example.
the resources required to maintain the IT infrastructure on which we rely for critical
services demand that we also buy games consoles, send superfluous text messages and
watch YouTube. In other words, our non-discretionary needs and the critical systems that
support them are affordable because they are being cross-subsidized by discretionary
spending, which itself depends on further economies of scale being generated by the
globalized economy that pro-vides us with our discretionary income in the first place.
From this perspective, asking about the resource requirements for in-dividual products of
the economy (a computer or my morning coffee, say) is akin to asking about the resource requirements
for your finger; it only makes sense if the rest of the body is properly resourced. Each new
level of infrastructural complexity implies a new fixed cost in terms of energy flows and
resources required for maintenance and opera- lion, and an economy of scale that can
support such flows. It also locks into place codependence amongst components of our

critical infrastructure that integrate the operational fabric. For example, if our IT platform
failed, so too would our financial, knowledge and energy systems, Similarly, if our
financial system collapsed, it would not take long for our IT and supply-chains to
collapse too. The UK-based Institute of Civil Engineers acknowledges that the complex relationships between codependent
critical infrastructures are not understood.7
Finally, as

new infrastructural platforms become established, legacy systems are left to

shrink or decay. Thus, if suddenly we all were to lose the communications infrastructure
introduced over the past ten years, we would not return to the system we had before that
infrastructure was intro-duced. Instead, most of us would be left without any fallback
communica-tion system at all.
The Global Economy has Bounded Resilience
An isolated, poor and self-sufficient community is vulnerable to severe risk of a general failure of food production due to flooding or
pestilence, say. Even comparatively rich France had 18 general famines in the eigh-teenth century and hundreds of local ones.8
Without access to money, weak transport links, markets and communications, surplus production from elsewhere could not relieve
local starvation. The growth in the intercon-nectedness, infrastructure and institutions of the globalizing economy meant local risks
could be shared over wide networks, and this enhanced local resilience.
One of the great virtues of the global economy is that while factories may fail and links in a supply-chain break, the economy can
quickly adapt by fulfilling its needs elsewhere or finding substitutes. This is a measure of the resilience within the globalized economy
and is a natural feature of a de- localized and networked complex adaptive system. But it is true only within a certain context. There
are common platforms or "hub infrastructure" that maintain the operation of the global economy and the operational fabric as a whole,
and the collapse of such hubs is likely to induce systemic failure. Principal among these are the monetary and financial system,
accessible en-ergy flows, transport infrastructure, economies of scale and the integrated infrastructures of information technology and
electricity.
Our Freedom to Change Can Be Limited by Lock-In

Lock-in can be defined broadly as an inability to deal with one problem by changing a
sub-system in the economy without negatively modifying others upon which we depend.
For example, our current just-in-time food sys-tem and agricultural practices are hugely risky.
As the current economic crisis tightens, those involved in food production and
distribution strive for further efficiencies and economies of scale as deflation drives their
prices down. The lower prices help maintain welfare and social peace, and make it easier
for consumers to service their debts, which in turn supports our bat-tered banks, whose
health must be preserved or the bond market might not show up at a government auction.
As a result, it is very hard to do major surgery on our food systems if doing so required
higher food prices, decreased productivity and gave a poor investment return.
However, the

primary lock-in process is the growth economy itself. We are attempting to

solve systemic ecological problems within systems that are themselves dependent upon
increasing resource depletion and waste. We are embedded within economic and social
systems whose operation we require for our immediate welfare. But those systems are too
optimized, in-terconnected and complex to comprehend, control and manage in any systemic way that would allow a controlled contraction while still maintaining our welfare.

2NC/1NR UQLock-In
We are in a state of lock-inevery time we try to manage one problem in the
economy we cause problems elsewherethis ensures collapse will be
inevitable
Korowicz 11 [David Korowicz is a physicist and human systems ecologist, the director of The
Risk/Resilience Network in Ireland, a board member of FEASTA - The Foundation for the
Economics of Sustainability, In the world, at the limits to growth, May 14, 2011,
http://www.feasta.org/2011/05/14/in-the-world-at-the-limits-to-growth/]

The reality is that we are locked into an economy adapted to growth, and that means
rising energy and resource flows and waste. By lock-in, we mean that our ability to change major
systems we depend upon is limited by the complexity of interdependencies, and the risk that the
change will undermine other systems upon which we depend. So we might wish to change the

banking or monetary system, but if the real and dynamic consequences lead to a major
bank freeze lasting more than a couple of days we will have major food security risks,
massive drops in economic production, and risks to infrastructure. And if we want to
make our food production and distribution more resilient to such shocks, production will
fall and food prices will need to be higher, which will in the short-to-medium term drive
up unemployment, lead to greater poverty, and pose even greater risks to the banking
system. It is an oxymoron to say we can do something unsustainable forever.

2NC/1NR UQPeak Oil

Peak oil sets a cap on growtheven if the aff reduces oil dependence, peak oil
will happen too fast to adapt.
Korowicz 11David Korowicz is a physicist and human systems ecologist. He is a member of
Feastas executive committee and works as an independent consultant. He is on the council of
Comhar, Irelands Sustainable Development Council. [June 20, 2011, Energy & Food
Constraints will Collapse Global Economic Recovery, Feasta,
http://www.feasta.org/2011/06/20/energy-food-constraints-will-collapse-global-economicrecovery/]

Recent reports from sources as diverse as Lloyds Insurance and Chatham House, the UK
Peak Oil Task Force, and US and German military think-tanks are the latest in a long list
of warnings that we are at, or close to, a peak in global oil production. Peak oil refers to the time of the
maximum rate of global oil production after which terminal decline sets in.
In a 2005 report for the US Department of Energy, the analyst Robert Hirsch wrote that: The peaking of world oil production presents
the world with an unprecedented risk management problem The economic, social and political costs will be unprecedented
Timely, aggressive risk management will be essential. He suggested we would need at least twenty years pre-peak to manage those
risks, an estimate that some of us who study these risks think optimistic. Hirsch then gave his advice to Forfas for their study on
Irelands oil dependency.
Yet here we are, five years later, with a high probability that we

are around the peak and no attempt at risk

management. Certainly some political and public figures have mentioned peak oil, though clearly with limited understanding
and always as a longer term issue. In its five year strategy, published this year, the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland ignores it
entirely. The ESRI, those cardinals of the status quo, recently published some very limited work on the implications of high oil prices
for the Irish economy, but only when Siemens Ireland prodded them into doing so.
Ireland is not unique in ignoring the subject, though things are changing elsewhere. The UKs Observer reported that government
ministers were far more concerned about peak oil than they had admitted and were involved in secret talks between the The
Department of Energy and Climate Change, The Ministry of Defence, and the Bank of England.

The standard retort to the threat of peak oil is that rising oil prices will encourage
substitutes, new technologies, and conservation. While these are presented as truths, they
are in fact contingent observations born out of the energy surpluses that facilitated
economic growth over the last two centuries. We have neither the time nor resources to
adapt, and economies cannot pay arbitrarily high oil prices.
More particularly, it matters little what technologies are in the pipeline, the potential of wind power in some
choice location, or that the European Commission has a target: if a severe economic and structural collapse
occurs before their enactment, then they may never happen.
Even those who claim to be enacting policy to manage the implications of peak oil are clearly confused. Large-scale grid
upgrades, electrification of transport, smart energy technology, and wave power are
probably a waste of money and effort. The assumptions contained in their planning and
technology are predicated on a globalised growth economy.
So what might peak oil mean? The recently leaked German army report, drawing upon research by The Risk/
Resilience Network and Feasta, argues: Investment will decline and debt service will be challenged,
leading to a crash in financial markets, accompanied by a loss of trust in currencies and a
break-up of value and supply chains-because trade is no longer possible. This would in
turn lead to the collapse of economies, mass unemployment, government defaults and
infrastructure breakdowns, ultimately followed by famines and total system collapse.
They are not referring to what we currently perceive of as fragile states, but to advanced complex societies, finely integrated into the
global economy. Indeed, it

is the de-localisation of our basic welfare and the integration and

complexity of the globalised economy that magnifies our risks. A systemic collapse is
posited that would leave no area of life unaffected and overwhelm the ability of
governments to manage.

So how are we to understand such large impacts from what might seem to be small declines in global oil production? The first thing to
be aware of is that peak

oil is not a simple transport and petrochemical problem, but a systemic

predicament. All systems; life, economies and civilisations require flows of concentrated
energy to maintain their structure and to allow growth. If we do not maintain the flows of
energy through the systems we depend upon, they decay.
As humans, energy in the form of food allows us to live. Our civilisation and the economy that supports it similarly need flows of
energy to function. The crucial difference is that once humans reach maturity their energy intake stabilises, while our

globalising economy has adapted to continuous growth and thus, rising energy flows.
Declining oil production will force a continual economic contraction. That is, unless we could
deploy efficiency measures and substitutes at the correct scale, quality and with appropriate timing to counter the effects of declining
oil production; a very long shot.

Oil also has an impact on the most non-discretionary of purchases, namely food. Food
production is already becoming strained as ecological degradation, water constraints, and
the burgeoning effects of climate change push against a rising population and changing diets. But
the most significant development of the Green Revolution of the 1950s and 1960s was to put
food production on a fossil fuel platform. This expanded food production and drove down
prices. The result was population expansion which drove more ecological degradation
and resource demands. The result is that now even more people are dependent upon an
even less diverse and more fragile resource base. Declines in oil production are likely not
only to reduce global food production, but to undermine the economic systems that made
food accessible and affordable.
While we may directly understand our economic position through our work or shopping, or through the psychodrama of national
economic argument, our actual welfare is maintained through our integration with the globalised economy. The things we rely upon
such as our food, IT systems, banking, monetary stability, transport, electricity services and the viability of our own jobs are
dependent upon trillions of productive efforts and economic transactions which criss-cross the planet.

There are two sides to this myriad network of exchange. The first is the goods and
services produced, which always require energy and resource flows. The second side is
the flow of money and credit that enables the transactions. Money has no intrinsic value,
you cannot eat or wear it, but it makes a claim on real things. And credit, from the Latin root to believe
is indeed also an act of faith.

Credit is at the foundation of our monetary and economic system, and by extension the
complex supply-chains that integrate a globalised economy. People only lend because
they expect that you can service the principal plus interest into the future. While this
makes sense in a growing economy, it becomes untenable in a terminally contracting one.
In other words, reduced energy flows cannot maintain the economic production required to
service debt. Debt outstanding cannot be repaid in real terms, leaving only default and
hyper-inflation.
Of course the debt-burden and deficits of many countries are already unsustainable. Furthermore,
in our integrated globalised economy the profligate and parsimonious are tied together. A contagious default of some
Euro-zone countries could initiate deep trouble for the UK and US economies;
imperilling German banks and Chinese exports. Derivative contracts with notional values
ten to twenty times the global economy add further scope for destabilisation. So the
global economy could begin to topple before we see further spikes in oil prices.
Alternatively, if we can, through faith, even more borrowing and stimulus, hold up the economy just a little
longer, we are going to hit declines in oil production. Oil and food prices may rise further,
contracting the economy and making the un-sustainability of our debt-burden obvious
even to the most clueless. Lets be clear what is being said here, the global financial system is
insolvent, and our paper assets, including pensions, can never be redeemed in real goods
and services.

In either case, many of the economic implications may be similar. The effects of de-leveraging would drive reductions in energy
demand, not constraints on production. Food,

energy, debt servicing and other essentials would take up

more and more of peoples available and declining purchasing power. Businesses will
close and jobs will be lost in the discretionary economy. Already-battered banks will lose
capital, and sky-high interests rates will reflect their negative perception of the future
credit worthiness of the economy. Asset prices will fall, and the cost of debt servicing
will rise relative to the shrinking money supply in the economy. Defaults, bank runs,
mass unemployment and collapses in government finances will ensue. Purchasing power
will drop further, more jobs are lost, and so on. This processes are well-understood debt
deflation dynamics.
Crucially, energy demand could fall dramatically and with that prices. The lack of affordable
credit, low and volatile prices, and an overhang of spare capacity in oil, gas and coal
production will dry up investment in new production including renewable energy. The result
is that if growth were to pick up again some decade hence, it would again be constrained by
reduced purchasing power and much lower energy caps. The latter will be set by natural
decline in established production, lack of investment in new production, and the decay of
energy and other infrastructure through years of non-use and lack of maintenance.
It takes the technical, social, infrastructural, and economic resources of an optimised
globalised economy at its peak to extract and and use our current energy flows, and even
then oil production cannot be maintained. There may indeed be plenty of fossil fuels left
in the ground, but following a major systemic collapse, most may remain there as that
capacity dies away.
Ultimately the deflationary pressures will start to give way to currency re-issues, currency
devaluations, inflation and hyper-inflation. Bank intermediation, credit, and confidence in
money holding value are the foundation of the complex trade networks upon which we
rely. With their failure we could see supply-chain collapse.
The risks extend to the complex infrastructures such as the grid and IT networks,
transport, sewage and water. Their dependence on large economies of scale, the
purchasing power within economies, and continual re-supply through highly complex
resource intensive and specialised supply-chains will be challenged. Furthermore their codependency may mean that failure in one will cause cascading failure.
Finally, the integration and complexity of the globalised economy means that no country
will avoid some level of collapse. The principal risk management challenge is not about how we introduce the energy
infrastructure and conservation measures to maintain the systems we depend upon, but about how we deal with not having the energy
and other resources to maintain those systems.
We are not talking about abstract consequences in an abstract future. They are growing real-time risks that may have a rapid on-set.
This is an urgent societal issue, and although there are many things we can do if we accept the risks, we cannot say we were not
warned.

Collapse inevitablepeak oil

Heinberg 10Richard Heinberg is an American journalist and educator who has written
extensively on energy, economic, and ecological issues, including oil depletion. He is the author
of ten books. He serves as the senior fellow at the Post Carbon Institute. He has addressed the
Trade Committee of the European Parliament and served as an advisor to the National Petroleum
Council in its report to the U.S. Secretary of Energy on Peak Oil. [August 11, 2010, Temporary
Recession or the End of Growth? http://www.postcarbon.org/article/130597-temporaryrecession-or-the-end-of]
Economic Growth, The Financial Crisis, and Peak Oil

For several years, a swelling subculture of commentators (which includes the present author) has been forecasting a financial crash,
basing this prognosis on the assessment that global oil production was about to peak. (2) Our reasoning went like this:

Continual increases in population and consumption cannot continue forever on a finite

planet. This is an axiomatic observation with which everyone familiar with the
mathematics of compounded arithmetic growth must agree, even if they hedge their agreement with
vague references to substitutability and demographic transitions. (3)

This axiomatic limit to growth means that the rapid expansion in both population and percapita consumption of resources that has occurred over the past century or two must cease at some
particular time. But when is this likely to occur?
The unfairly maligned Limits to Growth studies, published first in 1972 with periodic updates since, have attempted to answer the
question with analysis of resource availability and depletion, and multiple scenarios for future population growth and consumption
rates. The most pessimistic scenario in 1972 suggested an end of world economic growth around 2015. (4)
But there

may be a simpler way of forecasting growths demise.

Energy is the ultimate enabler of growth (again, this is axiomatic: physics and biology both
tell us that without energy nothing happenscertainly not growth). Industrial expansion
throughout the past two centuries has in every instance been based on increased energy consumption.
(5) More specifically, industrialism has been inextricably tied to the availability and
consumption of cheap energy from coal and oil (and more recently, natural gas). However, fossil fuels
are by their very nature depleting, non-renewable resources. Therefore (according to the Peak Oil
thesis), the eventual inability to continue increasing supplies of cheap fossil energy will lead
to a cessation of economic growth in general, unless alternative energy sources and efficiency of energy use can be
deployed rapidly and to a sufficient degree. (6)
Of the three conventional fossil fuels, oil

is arguably the most economically vital, since it supplies 95

percent of all transport energy. Further, petroleum is the fuel with which we are likely to
encounter supply problems soonest, because global petroleum discoveries have been
declining for decades, and most oil producing countries are already seeing production
declines. (7)
So, by this logic, the end of economic growth (as conventionally defined) is inevitable, and Peak Oil is
the likely trigger.
Why would Peak Oil lead not just to problems for the transport industry, but a more general economic and financial crisis? During
the past century growth has become institutionalized in the very sinews of our economic
system. Every city and business wants to grow. This is understandable merely in terms of human nature: nearly everyone wants a
competitive advantage over someone else, and growth provides the opportunity to achieve it. But there is also a financial survival
motive at work: without growth, businesses and governments are unable to service their debt. And debt

has become
endemic to the industrial system. During the past couple of decades, the financial services
industry has grown faster than any other sector of the American economy, even outpacing the rise
in health care expenditures, accounting for a third of all growth in the U.S. economy. From 1990 to the present, the ratio of debt-toGDP expanded from 165 percent to over 350 percent. In

essence, the present welfare of the economy rests

on debt, and the collateral for that debt consists of a wager that next years levels of
production and consumption will be higher than this years.
Given that growth cannot continue on a finite planet, this wager, and its embeddedness in
the institutions of finance, can be said to constitute historys greatest Ponzi scheme. We
have justified present borrowing with the irrational belief that perpetual growth is
possible, necessary, and inevitable. In effect we have borrowed from future generations so that we could gamble
away their capital today.
Until recently, the

Peak Oil argument has been framed as a forecast: the inevitable decline in
world petroleum production, whenever it occurs, will kill growth. But here is where
forecast becomes diagnosis: during the period from 2005 to 2008, production stopped
growing and oil prices rose to record levels. By July of 2008, the price of a barrel of oil
was nudging close to $150half again higher than any previous petroleum price in inflation-adjusted termsand the

global economy was beginning to topple. The auto and airline industries shuddered;
ordinary consumers had trouble buying gasoline for their commute to work while still
paying their mortgages. Consumer spending began to decline. By September the
economic crisis was also a financial crisis, as banks trembled and imploded. (8)
Given how much is at stake, it is important to evaluate the two diagnoses (Conventional and Peak Oil) on the basis of facts, not
preconceptions.
It is unnecessary to examine evidence supporting or refuting the Conventional Diagnosis, because its validity is not in doubtas a
partial explanation for what is occurring. The question is whether it is a sufficient explanation, and hence an adequate basis for
designing a successful response.
Whats the evidence favoring the Alternative? A good place to begin is with a recent paper by economist James Hamilton of the
University of California, San Diego, titled Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007-08, which discusses oil prices and
economic impacts, explaining how and why the economic crash is related to the oil price shock of 2008. (9)
Hamilton starts by citing previous

studies showing a tight correlation between oil price spikes and

recessions. On the basis of this correlation, every attentive economist should have
forecast a steep recession for 2008. Indeed, writes Hamilton, the relation could account for the entire downturn of
2007-08. If one could have known in advance what happened to oil prices during 2007-08, and if one had used the historically
estimated relation [between price rise and economic impact] one would have been able to predict the level of real GDP for both of
2008:Q3 and 2008:Q4 quite accurately.
Again, this

is not to ignore the role of the financial and real estate sectors in the ongoing
global economic meltdown. But in the Alternative Diagnosis the collapse of the housing and
derivatives markets is seen as amplifying a signal ultimately emanating from a failure to
increase the rate of supply of depleting resources. Hamilton again: At a minimum it is clear that
something other than housing deteriorated to turn slow growth into a recession. That
something, in my mind, includes the collapse in automobile purchases, slowdown in overall
consumption spending, and deteriorating consumer sentiment, in which the oil shock was
indisputably a contributing factor.

*** Environment Turn

1NC Envt Turn

Growth makes ecological collapse inevitablemultiple reasons
Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 6-9]
The underlying drivers of todays environmental deterioration have been clearly identified. They range from immediate forces like the
enormous growth in human population and the dominant technologies deployed in the economy to deeper ones like the values that
shape our behavior and determine what we consider important in life. Most basically, we

know that environmental

deterioration is driven by the economic activity of human beings. About half of todays world
population lives in abject poverty or close to it, with per capita incomes of less than two dollars a day. The struggle of the
poor to survive creates a range of environmental impacts where the poor themselves are
often the primary victims for example, the deterioration of arid and semiarid lands due to the press of increasing
numbers of people who have no other option. But the much larger and more threatening impacts stem from the
economic activity of those of us participating in the modern, increasingly prosperous world
economy. This activity is consuming vast quantities of resources from the environment
and returning to the environment vast quantities of waste products. The damages are
already huge and are on a path to be ruinous in the future. So, a fundamental question facing societies
today perhaps the fundamental question is how can the operating instructions for the modern world economy be changed so that
economic activity both protects and restores the natural world? With increasingly few exceptions, modern capitalism is the operating
system of the world economy. I use modern capitalism here in a broad sense as an actual, existing system of political economy, not
as an idealized model. Capitalism as we know it today encompasses the core economic concept of private employers hiring workers to
produce products and services that the employers own and then sell with the intention of making a profit. But it also includes
competitive markets, the price mechanism, the modern corporation as its principal institution, the consumer society and the
materialistic values that sustain it, and the administrative state actively promoting economic strength and growth for a variety of
reasons. Inherent

in the dynamics of capitalism is a powerful drive to earn profits, invest

them, innovate, and thus grow the economy, typically at exponential rates, with the result
that the capitalist era has in fact been characterized by a remarkable exponential
expansion of the world economy. The capitalist operating system, whatever its shortcomings, is very good at
generating growth. These features of capitalism, as they are constituted today, work together to
produce an economic and political reality that is highly destructive of the environment. An
unquestioning society-wide commitment to economic growth at almost any cost;
enormous investment in technologies designed with little regard for the environment;
powerful corporate interests whose overriding objective is to grow by generating profit,
including profit from avoiding the environmental costs they create; markets that
systematically fail to recognize environmental costs unless corrected by government;
government that is subservient to corporate interests and the growth imperative; rampant
consumerism spurred by a worshipping of novelty and by sophisticated advertising;
economic activity so large in scale that its impacts alter the fundamental biophysical
operations of the planet all combine to deliver an ever-growing world economy that is
undermining the planets ability to sustain life. The fundamental question thus becomes one of transforming
capitalism as we know it: Can it be done? If so, how? And if not, what then? It is to these questions that this book is addressed. The
larger part of the book proposes a variety of prescriptions to take economy and environment off collision course. Many of these
prescriptions range beyond the traditional environmental agenda. In Part I of the book, Chapters 1 3, I lay the foundation by
elaborating the fundamental challenge just described. Among the key conclusions, summarized here with some oversimplification,

are: The

vast expansion of economic activity that occurred in the twentieth century and
continues today is the predominant (but not sole) cause of the environmental decline that has
occurred to date. Yet the world economy, now increasingly integrated and globalized, is
poised for unprecedented growth. The engine of this growth is modern capitalism or, better, a variety of capitalisms.
A mutually reinforcing set of forces associated with todays capitalism combines to yield
economic activity inimical to environmental sustainability. This result is partly the
consequence of an ongoing political default a failed politics that not only perpetuates
widespread market failure all the nonmarket environmental costs that no one is paying but exacerbates this
market failure with deep and environmentally perverse subsidies. The result is that our
market economy is operating on wildly wrong market signals, lacks other correcting
mechanisms, and is thus out of control environmentally. The upshot is that societies now
face environmental threats of unprecedented scope and severity, with the possibility of
various catastrophes, breakdowns, and collapses looming as distinct possibilities,
especially as environmental issues link with social inequities and tensions, resource
scarcity, and other issues. Todays mainstream environmentalism aptly characterized as incremental and pragmatic
problem solvinghas proven insufficient to deal with current challenges and is not up to coping with the larger challenges ahead.
Yet the approaches of modern-day environmentalism, despite their limitations, remain essential: right now, they are the tools at hand
with which to address many very pressing problems. The

momentum of the current system fifty-five trillion

toward environmental disaster is so great that only
powerful forces will alter the trajectory. Potent measures are needed that address the root causes of todays
dollars in output in 2004, growing fast, and headed

destructive growth and transform economic activity into something environmentally benign and restorative. In short, my conclusion,
after much searching and considerable reluctance, is that most environmental

deterioration is a result of
systemic failures of the capitalism that we have today and that long-term solutions must
seek transformative change in the key features of this contemporary capitalism. In Part II, I
address these basic features of modern capitalism, in each case seeking to identify the transformative changes needed.

Extinction
Taylor 8 [Graeme Taylor is a social activist committed to constructive global transformation
and the coordinator of BEST Futures, a project supporting sustainable solutions through
researching how societies change and evolve, Evolution's Edge: The Coming Collapse and
Transformation of Our World, Pomegranate Press, 2008, ISBN: 9781550923810, EBrary, pg.
120-1]

Biophysical systems are made up of many interacting and interdependent components.

Because ecosystems continually process energy and information from their surrounding environments, they must constantly adjust
(equilibrate) in response to changing conditions. Individual

species risk extinction when they lose critical

habitat and genetic diversity, and with these the ability to adapt to environmental
stressors. Not only are healthy species genetically diverse, but healthy ecosystems are
composed of a wide variety of interdependent species. Diversity increases a systems
resilience, which is its ability to absorb shocks and adapt to changes. Larger and more
complex ecosystems that are not tightly entwined are more resilient than smaller and
simpler systems. If the existence of an entire system is dependent on the health of a few
species, it may easily collapse when those species are stressed. Systemic resilience is lost
with the destruction of ecosystem biodiversity, increasing the likelihood of widespread
biophysical collapse. Human-induced stresses are threatening to degrade many major
ecosystems beyond threshold points the points at which additional degradation will
trigger irreversible collapse. Because the long-term viability of human societies is utterly
dependent on the long-term viability of the biophysical systems that support them, the

long-term sustainability of human systems requires the maintenance and restoration of

ecosystem integrity, biodiversity and resilience.

2NC/1NR O/VEnvt
Ecosystem destruction causes extinction and terminates growth. Collapse
now is our only opportunity to reorient the system.
Taylor 8 [Graeme Taylor is a social activist committed to constructive global transformation
and the coordinator of BEST Futures, a project supporting sustainable solutions through
researching how societies change and evolve, Evolution's Edge: The Coming Collapse and
Transformation of Our World, Pomegranate Press, 2008, ISBN: 9781550923810, EBrary, pg.
110-12]
The consequences of system failure
We dont have to look to the ancient past to see the consequences of societal collapse the world is full of failed and failing states.

In the last few decades many societies have collapsed, with consequences ranging from
war, genocide and ethnic cleansing to civil wars and economic ruin. Some examples are Cambodia,
Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and the Soviet Union. In almost every case government services
such as law and order, public health care and education almost disappeared, living
standards sharply declined, mortality rates rose and criminal gangs took control of entire
regions. While failed states are a major source of conflict, terrorism and drugs, they do not destabilize the global economy. 13
The real danger to the survival of our species does not come from the collapse of
individual nations, but from the collapse of major ecosystems and the global economy as
a whole. The global economy was able to recover from the Great Depression of the 1930s
because major ecosystems were intact and the world was still full of undiscovered
resources. But if the next great depression is caused by a combination of climate change
and resource shortages, the world may not have the ecological or economic resilience to
recover. Attempts may be made to try to avert a global depression through intensifying
the exploitation of already degraded ecosystems. If this is done, a vicious cycle of
environmental, economic and social destruction will ensue. Environmental crises will
rapidly escalate, triggering a cascade of uncontrollable economic and political crises. At
some point interacting crises would converge and create a perfect storm that causes the
catastrophic collapse of the global system. As both international and national institutions
begin to fail, wars will break out over scarce resources. The fall of the Roman Empire
would be repeated on a global scale, but with wars fought with weapons of mass destruction. As
ecosystems, economies and social institutions progressively collapse, human populations
will sharply decline due to starvation, disease and warfare, and cities will be abandoned.
Survivors will have to learn how to use primitive technologies to eke out livings in devastated environments. Social and
biophysical systems may be damaged to the point where it becomes impossible to support
advanced civilizations on Earth. The industrial system, which has been able to manage crises
and changes for over two hundred years, is becoming increasingly unable to cope with
interacting environmental, economic and social crises. As the global economy begins to
fail, it will become more disorganized and dysfunctional. However, at this stage disaster
is not inevitable. Two (but only two) future outcomes are possible: the global system will either
continue to disintegrate to the point where it suffers irreversible damage and collapse, or
it will reorganize itself into a new type of sustainable system. Although most of the human societies and
civilizations that ever existed have disappeared, not everyone has suffered catastrophic collapse. Some met the challenges of changing
conditions by developing new and more environmentally relevant worldviews, technologies and institutions. The

weakening
of the existing system is not only a time of great danger, but a time of great opportunity.
We are now entering a time of increasing global crises that can only result in either the

catastrophic collapse of our unsustainable industrial system or its transformation into a

sustainable planetary civilization. We are already well into the first part of this process
growing global crises. The question is no longer whether our unsustainable system will eventually collapse; the question
now is whether humanity has the time and ability to avert disaster through creating a sustainable planetary civilization.

And we have the shortest time frame for action.

Ulansey 6 [David, Professor of Philosophy and Religion, Ph.D. from Princeton, The
Impending Mass Extinction and How to Stop It, http://www.energybulletin.net/node/23694]
My talk at the Be-In will be about the fact that the

world's biologists and ecologists have reached a

consensus that UNLESS humanity immediately halts its dismantling of the natural world- through habitat destruction, pollution, invasive species, and climate change-- half of all
species of life on earth will be extinct in less than 100 years. In fact, as scientists are learning more about
climate change, the expected time frame of the mass extinction is rapidly shrinking, and
estimates are now coming in that half of all species will be extinct in 35 to 50 years. This
means that WE DON'T HAVE 35 YEARS to solve the problem, since by then it will be
FAR past the point of no return. The reality is that to prevent the looming mass extinction, a
critical mass of humanity must undergo a radical transformation in its behavior within the
next 5 TO 10 YEARS. Of course this sounds impossible-- but so in their time did the fall of the Soviet Union, or the birth
of new religions like Christianity or Buddhism!

2NC/1NRTurns War
And resource shortages turn any war scenario.
Taylor 8 [Graeme Taylor is a social activist committed to constructive global transformation
and the coordinator of BEST Futures, a project supporting sustainable solutions through
researching how societies change and evolve, Evolution's Edge: The Coming Collapse and
Transformation of Our World, Pomegranate Press, 2008, ISBN: 9781550923810, EBrary, pg.
185-6]

The financial and social inequality of the global economy is destabilizing and dangerous.
35 Growing income gaps between rich nations and poor nations and within countries like the United States, China and
India can be managed as long as average incomes keep rising. But if shortages of essential
goods and rising prices lower the standards of living of hundreds of millions of people if
people who are middle class today become poor tomorrow, and people who are poor today become hungry tomorrow then
there will be massive social unrest. In early 2008 rising food prices triggered protests and riots around the world. 36
Most people will tolerate bad government if they have economic security and hope for a
better future. But if they lose that hope, then anger and despair can easily be channelled
into intergroup violence and/or demands for radical political change. 37 While
governments can use economic measures, laws and force to stabilize financial and
political disturbances, there is little that they can do to solve problems caused by
biophysical limits to growth and environmental degradation. Resource shortages restrict the supply of
goods with the consequence that they must be rationed either with higher prices that make them unaffordable for poorer consumers, or
by limiting availability e.g. by turning off the supply of water or electricity for part of each day. Because

resource
shortages and other environmental problems cannot be resolved by the current global
system, they are likely to be the root causes of increasing global economic crises.
Countries are becoming increasingly concerned about their access to water, energy and
mineral resources. For example, both China and India are making major investments in African resources: by 2010 China will
probably be the continents major trading partner. 38 Fears of being excluded from critical supplies are
leading to new strategic alliances and a new arms race in 2007 the US, Japan, India, Australia and
Singapore held joint naval exercises, while Russia and China held joint military exercises that were observed by the leaders of the
Shanghai Cooperative Organization (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). 39 The focus of this
competition is control over the oil and gas resources of the Middle East and Central Asia objectives clearly articulated by the
former US Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski in his book The Grand Chessboard. 40 We

should not forget that

competition over resources helped start two world wars. We are now in a situation that is
similar to the years leading up to the First World War while no country desires war, no
major power believes that it can afford to be denied access to critical resources. This is
the American dilemma in Iraq political leaders do not want to stay and be bogged
down in an unending war, and yet they are afraid that if they withdraw from the region
they could lose access to vital energy supplies. 41 If global resource consumption
continues to expand, competition over increasingly scarce resources will grow. The
competition will initially be primarily political and economic in nature, but as prices rise
and economies are destabilized, there will be more and more willingness to use military
means to guarantee access to strategic resources. The danger is that at some point
competition and confrontation will escalate into a war involving major powers armed
with weapons of mass destruction.

2NC ImxExtinction
And environmental sustainability outweighs everythingits the basis of
human existence
Taylor 8 [Graeme Taylor is a social activist committed to constructive global transformation
and the coordinator of BEST Futures, a project supporting sustainable solutions through
researching how societies change and evolve, Evolution's Edge: The Coming Collapse and
Transformation of Our World, Pomegranate Press, 2008, ISBN: 9781550923810, EBrary, pg.
117-8]

The real bottom line is not financial profits but survival, and our survival is utterly
dependent on our environments. The air we breathe, the water we drink and the food we
eat all come from our environments. The energy and raw materials used by our
economies come from our environments. As a result, the long-term viability of human
societies depends on the long-term viability of the biophysical systems that support them.
We know that the present industrial system is unsustainable because it is progressively
degrading major ecosystems, and history and science tell us that any human society that
destroys its environment cannot survive for long. In 1987, the Brundtland Report defined sustainability as the
ability to meet the present needs of humanity without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 4

Sustainable development has also been defined as improving the quality of human life
while living within the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems. 5 Every living system
(plants, animals and societies) is sustainable to the extent that it is able to meet its essential needs
on an ongoing basis. This is a key concept: in order to function, a living system must be
able to satisfy its essential needs. Once we grasp the relationship between sustainability and needs, we can begin to
clearly understand societal and environmental interrelationships and dynamics. When living biological or social
systems are able to meet their essential needs, they usually have sufficient resilience
(adaptability) to withstand normal environmental stresses and to reorganize in healthy ways in
response to changing conditions. When they cant meet their essential needs, they weaken
and become increasingly dysfunctional and incapable of managing stress.

2NC/1NR TurnEnvironment
Growth is using up finite resourcesa consensus of scientists agree our
current way of life will result in extinction.
Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 39-41]
Implications These eight global-scale

environmental problems, as well as acid deposition and

ozone layer depletion, do not exist in isolation they are constantly interacting with one
another, typically worsening the situation. The loss of forests, for example, contributes to
biodiversity loss, climate change, and desertification. Climate change, acid rain, ozone
depletion, and water reductions can in turn adversely affect world forests. Changing climate will
affect everything. Among other things, it is likely to worsen desertification, lead to both additional flooding and increased droughts,
reduce freshwater supplies, adversely affect biodiversity and forests, and further degrade aquatic ecosystems. What is one to make of
all this? A number of prominent scientists have taken a hand at describing what all these trends mean. In 1998, ecologist Jane
Lubchenco, in her address as president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, drew the following conclusions:
The

conclusions . . . are inescapable: during the last few decades, humans have emerged
as a new force of nature. We are modifying physical, chemical, and biological systems in
new ways, at faster rates, and over larger spatial scales than ever recorded on earth. Humans
have unwittingly embarked upon a grand experiment with our planet. The outcome of this experiment is unknown, but has profound
implications for all of life on Earth.72 In 1994, fifteen

hundred of the worlds top scientists, including a

majority of living Nobel Prize winners, issued a plea for more attention to
environmental problems: The earth is finite, they stated. Its ability to absorb wastes and
destructive effluents is finite. Its ability to provide food and energy is finite. Its ability to provide
for growing numbers of people is finite. Moreover, we are fast approaching many of the earths
limits. Current economic practices that damage the environment, in both developed and
underdeveloped nations, cannot be continued with the risk that vital global systems will be
damaged beyond repair.73 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment was a massive four-year

effort involving 1,360 scientists and other experts worldwide to assess conditions and
trends regarding the worlds ecosystems. At the conclusion of this unprecedented effort in 2005, the board
governing the assessment issued the following statement: Nearly two thirds of the
services provided by nature to humankind are found to be in decline worldwide. In effect,
the benefits reaped from our engineering of the planet have been achieved by running
down natural capital assets. In many cases, it is literally a matter of living on borrowed
time. By using up supplies of fresh groundwater faster than they can be recharged, for
example, we are depleting assets at the expense of our children. . . . Unless we acknowledge the debt and
prevent it from growing, we place in jeopardy the dreams of citizens everywhere to rid
the world of hunger, extreme poverty, and avoidable disease as well as increasing the
risk of sudden changes to the planets life-support systems from which even the
wealthiest may not be shielded. We also move into a world in which the variety of life
becomes ever-more limited. The simpler, more uniform landscapes created by human
activity have put thousands of species under threat of extinction, affecting both the
resilience of natural service and less tangible spiritual or cultural values.74 In 2007, the Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists moved its Doomsday Clock closer to midnight, citing environmental threats.75 The Doomsday Clock reminds us that

todays alarming environmental trends have consequences far beyond the environment.
They can also contribute to conflicts over human access to water, food, land, and energy;
ecological refugees and humanitarian emergencies; failed states; and armed movements
spurred by declining circumstances. They are profound affronts to fundamental fairness
and justice in the world and discriminate against both those too poor and powerless to
hold their own against these tides and voiceless future generations. And they bring large
economic costs. The Stern Review estimated that the total cost of a business-as-usual
approach to climate change could be around a 20% reduction in current per capita
consumption, now and forever. And thats just from climate change.76

Growth destroys global ecosystemsour models account for displacement of

environmental damage to the Third World.
Bagliani et. al 8Marco Bagliani, Giangiacomo Bravo, and Silvana Dalmazzone, Istituto di
Ricerche Economico Sociali, Interdisciplinary Research Institute on Sustainability, Universit di
Torino, Dipartimento di Studi Sociali, Universit di Brescia, Dipartimento di Economia
Universit di Torino. [April 15, 2008, A consumption-based approach to environmental Kuznets
curves using the ecological footprint indicator, Ecological Economics, 65.3, Ebsco]
The analysis proposed in this paper leads to conclude that, when

using the ecological footprint as dependent

variable to investigate the relationship between economic growth and the environment,
one does not find evidence in favour of an inverted-U behaviour. As a whole, rather than the
decoupling of impact from GDP per capita, the scenario supported by our statistical
evidence is one of an unbounded growth of environmental pressure as GDP per capita
rises. In the OLS and WLS regressions on the non-logarithmic models, a cubic functional form is always the one with the best fit.
The only exception is in the OLS analysis of the single EF components, where one case (energy EF) shows evidence of an inverted Ushape. The analysis on the logarithmic specification, where the prevailing model is always linear, reinforces these results. The
nonparametric regression as well shows a monotonically increasing behaviour of environmental degradation vs. GDP per capita. Ours
adds to the large number of recent studies that do not find support for the EKC hypothesis (e.g.
[Azomahou et al., 2006], [Deacon and Norman, 2006] and Richmond and Kaufmann, 2006 A.K. Richmond and R.K. Kaufmann,
Energy prices and turning points: the relationship between income and energy use/carbon emissions, Energy Journal 27 (4) (2006), pp.
157180. View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (2)[Richmond and Kaufmann, 2006]) in contrast with, among many,
Panayotou (1993), Grossman and Krueger (1995), Paudel et al. (2005), Mazzanti et al. (2006). In our results, the

absence of
EKCs may derive from the fact that consumption-based indicators like the ecological
footprint account for the displacement of environmental damage away from high income
countries. It is a hint that the change in the composition of production often advocated as a drive behind the EKC can take place
also through a change in the localization of supply not only through changes in technology and in the composition of demand.

The localization of supply is modified by importing a large share of the goods whose
production employs polluting technologies as well as of the biomass required as nutrition
by human population, and by de-localizing dirty national production processes to low
income countries by foreign direct investments. For instance, Mayer et al. (2005) argued that the forest
protection policies adopted in Finland and other European countries in recent decades, without a simultaneous decrease in the
domestic consumption of wood, resulted in a dramatically increased logging pressure on Russian forests. Similar trends are evidenced
by Berlik et al. (2002) for USA's demand for wood, and Schtz et al. (2004) on the spatial distribution of global consumption and
extraction of natural resources. National

environmental policies may result in a simple export of

environmental pressures with no net gain in the overall conservation of nature. Our concern is
not arguing the superiority of one or the other between consumption and production-based approaches. Production-based and
consumption-based indicators, both useful depending on the aim of the analysis, simply imply a different choice on where to ascribe
the responsibility for the generation of environmental impact. Rather, we aim at drawing the attention to the different conclusions
stemming from the two approaches when applied to testing an EKC hypothesis. The crucial difference between them is the fact that a

consumption-based approach captures the potential delocalisation effects that remain

hidden in production-based analyses. In order to claim that economic growth is the road to a clean environment one
would need empirical evidence on the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between per capita income and consumption-

the
absence of an inversion in trend in ecological footprint when GDP per capita rises
appears to indicate that indefinite economic growth within a clean environment cannot be
achieved simultaneously by the whole planet, since it can only work locally until there
are countries whose environment is allowed to deteriorate.
based environmental indicators, condition that would guarantee an actual reduction in environmental impact. In our study,

2NC/1NR Envt UQ Wall

Uniqueness goes our waygrowth has wrecked every measure of
environmental well being.
Speth 10James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White
House environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council
[May, 2010, Towards a New Economy and a New Politics, Solutions,
http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/619]

The case for fundamental change is underscored especially by the urgency of

environmental conditions.1 Here is one measure of that problem: All that human societies have to do
to destroy the planets climate and biota and leave a ruined world to future generations is to keep doing
exactly what is being done today, with no growth in the human population or the world economy. Just continue
to release greenhouse gases at current rates, just continue to impoverish ecosystems and
release toxic chemicals at current rates, and the world in the latter part of this century
wont be fit to live in. But, of course, human activities are not holding at current levelsthey are
accelerating dramatically. It took all of history to build the $7 trillion world economy of
1950; recently, economic activity has grown by that amount every decade. At typical
rates of growth, the world economy will now double in size in less than 20 years. We are
thus facing the possibility of an enormous increase in environmental deterioration, just when
we need to move strongly in the opposite direction.

Accelerating environmental deterioration is most starkly revealed in the global trends

trends in which the U.S. economy and U.S. politics are deeply complicit. About half the worlds wetlands and a
third of the mangroves are gone. An estimated 90 percent of the large predatory fish are
gone, and 75 percent of marine fisheries are now overfished or fished to capacity. Twenty
percent of the corals are gone, and another 20 percent severely threatened. Half the
worlds temperate and tropical forests are gone. The rate of deforestation in the tropics
continues at about one acre per second. Species are disappearing at rates about 1,000 times faster than normal. The
planet has not seen such a spasm of extinction in 65 million years, since the dinosaurs disappeared. Over half the
agricultural land in drier regions suffers from some degree of deterioration and
desertification. Persistent toxic chemicals can now be found by the dozens in essentially
each and every one of us.
Human impacts are now large relative to natural systems. The Earths stratospheric ozone layer was severely
depleted before the change was discovered. Most importantly, human activities have
pushed up atmospheric carbon dioxide by more than a third and increased other greenhouse
gases as well, with the result that we have started, in earnest, the dangerous process of warming
the planet and disrupting the climate. Everywhere, Earths ice fields are melting. Industrial processes
are fixing nitrogen, making it biologically active, at the same rate that nature is; one
consequence is the development of hundreds of dead zones in the oceans due to overfertilization. Each year, human actions already consume or destroy about 40 percent of
natures photosynthetic output, leaving too little for other species. Freshwater
withdrawals doubled globally between 1960 and 2000 and now represent over half of accessible
runoff. The Colorado, Yellow, Ganges, and Nile Rivers, among others, no longer reach the oceans in the dry season.

To seek something new and better, a good place to begin is to ask why todays system of political economy is failing so broadly.
Environmentally, the answer is that key features of the system work together to produce a reality that is highly destructive. An

unquestioning society-wide commitment to economic growth at almost any cost;

powerful corporate interests whose overriding objective is to grow by generating profit,
including profit from avoiding the environmental costs they create and from replicating
technologies designed with little regard for the environment; markets that systematically
fail to recognize environmental costs unless corrected by government; government that is
subservient to corporate interests and the growth imperative; rampant consumerism
spurred by an addiction to novelty and by sophisticated advertising; economic activity
now so large in scale that its impacts alter the fundamental biophysical operations of the
planetall combine to deliver an ever-growing world economy that is undermining the
ability of the planet to sustain life.1
This environmental reality is linked powerfully with growing social inequality and the erosion of democratic governance and popular
control. Only a powerful democratic reality can guide and regulate the economy for environmental and social ends, and only a society
that is cohesive and fair is likely to rise fully to shared challenges like the environment. Unfortunately, Americans today live and work
in a system of political economy that cares profoundly about profits and growth and that cares about society and the natural world
mainly to the extent it is required to do so. It is thus up to us as citizens to inject values of fairness, solidarity, and sustainability into
this system, and government is the primary vehicle we have for accomplishing this. But typically, we fail at this assignment because
our politics is too enfeebled and government is excessively under the thumb of powerful corporations and concentrations of great
wealth. Consider the similarity between the recent financial collapse and the ongoing environmental deterioration. Both result from a
system in which those with economic power are propelled, and not restrained by government, to take dangerous risks for the sake of
great profit.

The prioritization of economic growth and economic values is at the root of the systemic
failures and resulting crises America is now experiencing. Today, the reigning policy
orientation holds that the path to greater well-being is to grow and expand the economy.
Productivity, wages, profits, the stock market, employment, and consumption must all go
up. This growth imperative trumps all else. It can undermine families, jobs, communities, the environment, and a
sense of place and continuity because it is confidently asserted and widely believed that growth is worth the price that must be paid for
it. Growth is measured by tallying GDP at the national level and sales and profits at the company level, and pursuit of GDP and profit
is the overwhelming priority of national economic and political life.
But an expanding body of evidence is now telling us to think again.8-18 Economic

growth may be the worlds

secular religion, but for much of the world it is a god that is failingunderperforming for
most of the worlds people and, for those in affluent societies, now creating more
problems than it is solving. The never-ending drive to grow the overall U.S. economy
undermines communities and the environment. It fuels a ruthless international search for
energy and other resources; it fails at generating the needed jobs; and it rests on a
manufactured consumerism that is not meeting the deepest human needs. Americans are
substituting growth and consumption for dealing with the real issuesfor doing things
that would truly make the country better off. Psychologists have pointed out, for example, that while economic
output per person in the United States has risen sharply in recent decades, there has been no increase in life satisfaction, and levels of
distrust and depression have increased substantially.1,19,20

Uniqueness provesgrowth is wrecking all parts of the environment.

Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 1-2]

The remarkable charts that introduce this book reveal the story of humanitys impact on the natural earth.1 The pattern is clear: if we
could speed up time, it

would seem as if the global economy is crashing against the earththe Great

Collision. And like the crash of an asteroid, the damage is enormous. For all the material blessings economic progress has
provided, for all the disease and destitution avoided, for all the glories that shine in the best of our civilization, the costs to the natural

Half the worlds

tropical and temperate forests are now gone.2 The rate of deforestation in the tropics
continues at about an acre a second.3 About half the wetlands and a third of the
mangroves are gone.4 An estimated 90 percent of the large predator fish are gone, and 75
percent of marine fisheries are now overfished or fished to capacity.5 Twenty percent of
the corals are gone, and another 20 percent severely threatened. 6 Species are disappearing
at rates about a thousand times faster than normal.7 The planet has not seen such a spasm of extinction in
sixty-five million years, since the dinosaurs disappeared.8 Over half the agricultural land in drier regions
suffers from some degree of deterioration and desertification.9 Persistent toxic chemicals can now be
found by the dozens in essentially each and every one of us.10 Human impacts are now large relative to natural systems. The
earths stratospheric ozone layer was severely depleted before the change was discovered.
Human activities have pushed atmospheric carbon dioxide up by more than a third and
have started in earnest the dangerous process of warming the planet and disrupting
climate. Everywhere earths ice fields are melting.11 Industrial processes are fixing nitrogen, making it
world, the costs to the glories of nature, have been huge and must be counted in the balance as tragic loss.

biologically active, at a rate equal to natures; one result is the development of more than two hundred dead zones in the oceans due to
overfertilization.12 Human

actions already consume or destroy each year about 40 percent of

natures photosynthetic output, leaving too little for other species.13 Freshwater
withdrawals doubled globally between 1960 and 2000, and are now over half of
accessible runoff .14 The following rivers no longer reach the oceans in the dry season: the Colorado, Yellow, Ganges, and
Nile, among others.15 Societies are now traveling together in the midst of this unfolding calamity down a path that links two worlds.
Behind is the world we have lost, ahead the world we are making.

Deforestation is increasing.
Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 30-1]
Losing the Forests
About half

of the worlds temperate and tropical forests have already been lost, mostly to clear land for
agriculture. Deforestation contributes to species loss, climate change, loss of economic
value, landslides, flooding, and soil depletion. Forest loss has been particularly serious in the tropics, home to
about two-thirds of our planets plant and animal species. In recent decades, the rate of deforestation in the tropics
has been about an acre each second, a pattern that continued unabated between 2000 and
2005.32 Meanwhile, the industry-oriented International Tropical Timber Organization reported that only 3 percent of
tropical forests were being sustainably managed even though two-thirds have been
designated as under some type of management regime.33
The causes of deforestation in the developing world are many, including cutting for tropical
timber, fuelwood use, expansion of exportoriented plantations and agriculture, and other
pressures such as mineral development. The tropical forests are also the victims of chronic corruption, cronyism,
and illegal logging.

Deforestation is widespread, but it is especially prevalent in Brazil, Indonesia, and the Congo River basin. Indonesia has lost about 40
percent of its forest in the past fifty years. About nine thousand square miles of rain forest are cleared there each year, and at current
rates of loss, almost all lowland forests on Sumatra and Borneo will be gone in a matter of years, not decades.34 Indonesias
deforestation, forest fires, and peat land degradation have made it the worlds number three greenhouse gas emitter, after the United
States and China.35 Similarly, it is estimated that two-thirds of the Congo basin forests could disappear in fifty years if logging and
mining continue at current rates.36 Forest loss in the Amazon, the highest in the world, may have been severely underestimated
according to new results indicating that as much of the Amazon has been lost to selective logging as to clear-cut type deforestation
typically measured.37 Altogether,

between 2000 and 2005, the world lost forest acreage the size

of Germany.38

Desertification proves.
Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 31-2]
Losing the Land

Desertification involves more than spreading deserts. It includes all the processes that degrade
productive land, eventually turning it into wasteland. Soil erosion, salinization,
devegetation, and soil compaction can all be involved. The process is most prevalent in arid and
semiarid areas, which cover about 40 percent of the planets land surface. These lands account for
about a fifth of the worlds food production. About a fourth of the developing worlds people some 1.3 billion in all live on these
dry and other fragile lands.

The United Nations estimates that an area larger than Canada or China suffers from some
degree of desertification and that each year fifty million acres become too degraded for
crop production or are lost to urban sprawl. Thats an area the size of Nebraska.39 Africa is
particularly affected by desertification, but so are large areas in Asia and the Western
Hemisphere, including the southwestern United States and northern Mexico. Among the
many consequences of desertification are large losses in food production, greater
vulnerability to drought and famine, loss of biodiversity, the creation of ecological
refugees, and social unrest.
Desertification is typically caused by overcultivation, overgrazing, and poor irrigation practices. But behind these
immediate pressures are deeper factors such as population growth, poverty and lack of alternative
livelihoods, and concentrated patterns of land ownership in the developing regions.

Growth is destroying fisheries.

Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 34-5]
Losing Marine Fisheries

The negative impact that human societies are having on the health of marine fisheries and on the worlds oceans and estuaries
generally is difficult to exaggerate. In

1960, 5 percent of marine fisheries were fished to capacity or

overfished. Today that number is 75 percent. The global catch of fish has gone down
steadily since 1988 (taking the highly volatile Peruvian anchoveta catch, the chief supply of fishmeal, out of the calculation).49
In 2003, scientists reported that populations of large predator fishincluding such popularly consumed varieties as
swordfish, marlin, and tuna are down 90 percent over original stocks; only 10 percent remain.50 And in 2006,
fisheries scientists projected that essentially all ocean commercial fisheries would
collapse by 2050 if current patterns persist. This projection is controversial, but it at least suggests the magnitude
of the problem.51

The core problem here is overfishing. It is driven by powerful fishing industry interests and
the deep subsidies they have secured from governments. But the marine environment is
also being affected by destruction of mangroves and coastal wetlands, by pollution and
silt from runoff, and other factors. About 80 percent of marine pollution originates on the
land, and the marine environment is increasingly polluted by sewage, agricultural waste,
and other discharges.52 Particularly hard-hit have been the coral reefs. About 20 percent of coral reefs
worldwide have been lost, and a further 20 percent are severely threatened.53
Like forest loss, overfishing is exacerbated by illegal harvesting and wasteful and destructive
practices (large portions of many catches are unwanted by-catch that are thrown back, typically dead or dying, and deep-sea
trawling is destroying underwater habitats) compounded by weak or nonexistent regulation. In the United States, of sixty-seven
depleted fish stocks identified in the mid-1990s for special care, sixty four remain scarce today, and probably half are still being
overfished.54 Aquaculture (fish farming) is soaring, but much of it depends critically on wild-caught fish made into fishmeal.55

AT: Resilience
Growth has created a monoculture trashing resiliencethis lowers the
threshold for our impacts to escalate.
Taylor 8 [Graeme Taylor is a social activist committed to constructive global transformation
and the coordinator of BEST Futures, a project supporting sustainable solutions through
researching how societies change and evolve, Evolution's Edge: The Coming Collapse and
Transformation of Our World, Pomegranate Press, 2008, ISBN: 9781550923810, EBrary, pg.
106-7]
The loss of resilience The ability of a social system to cope with stresses depends not only on their size and severity, but also on a
societys resilience. Societies

are resilient (able to manage shocks) to the extent that they are internally
functional, externally relevant and rich in both resources and creative diversity (adaptive
capacity). They are vulnerable to collapse to the extent that they are internally dysfunctional,
poorly adapted to their environments, poor in resources and unable to adapt to change. A
growing danger is the global loss of resilience. In the past, collapses were localized since
few goods were traded between civilizations, the disintegration of one society often had
few economic effects on others. In contrast, because every country in the world is now part of
a global economy, every regional crisis sends shock waves around the world. The
increasing vulnerability of the global system is shown by how rapidly financial crises are
now able to spread. In 1997 for example, Western investors lost confidence in the Thai economy and began to withdraw
money. A domino effect rapidly spread currency speculation from Thailand to Indonesia and Korea, and then to Russia and Latin
America. By 1998 one-third of the globe was in recession. 5 While the 1997 crisis was largely confined to weaker economies, a major
shock to the international economy such as a panicked sell-off of US dollars could quickly produce a global depression. The

globalization of consumer society is creating a brittle monoculture that is simultaneously

accelerating unsustainable economic expansion and creating an ever more uniform and
tightly integrated global economy. Industrial civilization globalizes inequality and
concentrates power at the expense of local autonomy, community and diversity. As the
many varieties of human civilizations and societies become undifferentiated parts of an
expanding global monoculture, the system loses checks and balances. The result is an
increasingly closely connected but unstable world system. The danger is that the number
and complexity of large crises is increasing at the same time as the global system is
progressively losing its ecological, economic and social resilience. If existing political
and economic institutions do not have the reserves, flexibility and back-up systems to
enable them to rapidly adapt to resource shortages and failing ecosystems, local crises
may quickly become uncontrollable global crises.

Growth trashes the ecosystemthis subverts all their biodiversity defense

and resiliency argumentsthe impact is extinction.
Booth 98 [Douglas Booth, former Assistant Professor of Economics at Marquette University,
The Environmental Consequences of Growth: Steady-State Economics as an Alternative to
Ecological Decline, 1998, pg. 10]

With its continuous creation of new industries that cause new kinds of environmental
disturbances, the economic growth process can easily disrupt ecosystem services. Global
warming induced by excessive CO2 emissions can cause damage and destruction to both
natural and anthropogenic ecosystems (Abrahamson 1989). Excessive liquid waste emissions

can overload the nutrient recycling capacity of aquatic ecosystems, inhibiting their ability
to function and support a diversity of life (Welch 1992). Acid rain and other forms of air pollution can
harm the health of both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems (Gould 1985). Deforestation and
poor agricultural practices can cause soil erosion in amounts that exceed the capacity of
ecosystems to produce new soils. The conversion of natural to anthropogenic ecosystems
can reduce biodiversity and, as a consequence, the range of chemicals and drugs that can
be potentially extracted from nature. Destruction of wetlands can reduce the supply of
clean water, diminish biodiversity, and increase flooding (Erlich et al. 1977). The reduction of
natural habitat as a consequence of logging or land development can reduce wildlife
populations and cause species extinctions. All such events together reduce tangible and intangible human benefits
that derive from ecosystems. The central argument of this book is that forces leading to economic growth cause
the kinds of environmental disturbances just described. The global economy is prone to
growth while the global ecosystem is stable in terms of gross productivity and its capacity
to provide ecosystem services. While ecosystems individually are subject to disturbance
and change, at a global level there is no known natural growth trend in global ecosystem
productivity or capacity for service provision. Thus, as the global economy expands, it
places increasing demands and stresses on the global ecosystem, reducing its ultimate
capacity to serve the human species.

2NC/1NR BioD Turn

Growth collapses biodiversitythe impact is extinction.
Taylor 8 [Graeme Taylor is a social activist committed to constructive global transformation
and the coordinator of BEST Futures, a project supporting sustainable solutions through
researching how societies change and evolve, Evolution's Edge: The Coming Collapse and
Transformation of Our World, Pomegranate Press, 2008, ISBN: 9781550923810, EBrary, pg. 5255]
Although we dont know the exact rate of extinction, we do know that the rate of loss is accelerating. The evolutionary
process has always meant that on average every year one species in a million disappear, while a slightly higher number of new species
emerge to replace them. The

rate of extinction is now somewhere between 100 and 10,000 times

the normal rate. All the species on the planet have to live on the worlds limited
renewable biological resources. As humans increasingly consume and pollute these
resources, less and less is left over for all other species. Under the pressure of
disappearing habitats, climate change, pollution, invasive species and relentless
overharvesting, their populations are rapidly declining. Between 1970 and 2003 the
populations of terrestrial species declined by an average of 31%, marine species declined
by 23%, and freshwater species declined by 28%. 100 Global warming has already severely damaged and
disrupted ecosystems. 101 An international study has concluded that climate change alone will probably cause
the extinction of between 15% and 35% of all species studied by 2050, if global temperatures rise as
expected by over 3.6F (2C). 102 The United Nations agency responsible for preserving biodiversity warned that Unless action is
taken now, by 2100, two thirds of the Earths remaining species are likely to be extinct. 103 In the less likely but possible event that

Climate change
accelerates species extinction in a number of ways. Up to half the worlds species live in
tropical rainforests, and already more than half the rainforests have been cut down for
timber or to clear land for agriculture. At current rates of deforestation, another 40% of
rainforests in the Amazon alone will disappear by 2050. 104 With global warming many of
the remaining areas will dry out and either become grasslands, or be regularly swept by
forest fires. Not only does climate change accelerate species loss, but deforestation
accelerates climate change. The burning and cutting of forests produce a quarter of all
greenhouse gases. Every 24 hours, deforestation releases as much carbon dioxide into the atmosphere as 8 million people flying
from London to New York. Coral reefs, the home of hundreds of thousands of marine species, are
also in danger since they begin to die when ocean temperatures rise by a few degrees.
When the corals die, the reefs often collapse into rubble, depriving fish of food and
shelter. A combination of rising temperatures, pollution and destructive fishing
techniques (trawling, poisons and dynamiting) has already killed 20% of the worlds coral reefs and
degraded many more. 106 As carbon dioxide levels rise, the oceans are also becoming more
acidic, making it increasingly difficult for corals to build their skeletons and for other
species to build their shells. 107 Almost all coral species will be killed by temperature
increases of above 3.6F (2C), along with krill and other species of zooplankton crucial to the marine food web. Pollution is
another growing problem, not only because the waste from industry, factory farming,
cities and landfills is killing off entire ecosystems forests, fields, lakes, rivers and coastal fisheries but
also because toxic chemicals become more concentrated as they travel up the food chain.
In low concentrations chemicals are affecting the social and mating behaviors of many species,
and in high concentrations they are lowering sperm counts as well as causing birth
defects, reproductive problems and cancers. 108 Health problems due to ingested poisons
temperatures rise as high as 11.5F (6.4C) by the end of the century, up to 90% of species will die off.

and pollutants are increasingly showing up in whales, bears, eagles, dolphins and other
top predators including humans. 109 Apart from the destruction of habitat from deforestation, desertification, pollution and
the spread of farms, cities and roads, the plants and animals of the world face the almost
insurmountable problem of having to migrate to avoid rising temperatures and changing
environments. Studies show that species have been moving towards the poles over the last 50 years at the rate of about 4 miles
(6.4 kilometers) per decade. This is not fast enough, since areas with the same temperatures (isotherms) have been moving towards the
poles at the rate of 35 miles (56 kilometers) per decade and will soon be moving polewards at the rate of 70 miles (112 kilometers) per
decade. Because

interconnected ecosystems of trees, birds, insects and other species cannot

migrate that quickly, many of them will find themselves trapped in strange environments
for which they are not adapted. Mountain species are especially vulnerable to climate change as they have no place to
go. This process will help drive up to 50% of the worlds species to extinction. 110
Scientists are calling this the sixth mass extinction event in the history of our planet.
Although mass extinctions have occurred before (the last great extinction occurred 65 million years ago), this will be the first time that
humans will have caused a disaster of this magnitude. 111 And it will be an unimaginable tragedy after most of the existing
mammals, birds, flowers, fish and other living things have disappeared, it will take tens of millions of years for new species to evolve
and take their place. Life

in its present forms only exists because of the existence of a complex

biophysical equilibrium. 113 Every extinction upsets this equilibrium and weakens the web
of life that supports human societies. If we lose many of the other life forms on Earth, it will
not only be a huge spiritual loss, aesthetic loss and recreational loss, but it will also do irreparable damage to our
economies. We cannot survive without the ecosystem services that other species provide
us: services such as climate regulation, oxygen, clean water, food, waste recycling,
building materials, crop pollination, agricultural nutrients, bioenergy and medicines. 114
Sigmar Gabriel pointed out that biological diversity constitutes the indispensable foundation for our lives
and for global economic development. 115 Not only is 40% of world trade based on biological products or processes without
the countless ecological services of plants, insects, microbes and other species, human
societies cannot exist. To destroy the biodiversity of our planet is to self-destruct.

2NC/1NR Marine BioD Turn

Growth destroys marine bio dEKC doesnt apply.
Clausen and York 8*Rebecca Clausen is a doctoral student studying Environmental
Sociology at the University of Oregon. **Richard York, Ph.D., is associate professor of sociology
and environmental studies, the Richard A. Bray Faculty Fellow, and Graduate Program Director
of sociology. [April, 2008, Economic Growth and Marine Biodiversity: Influence of Human
Social Structure on Decline of Marine Trophic Levels, Conservation Biology, 22.2, Ebsco]
Examining the relationship between social structural factors and marine ecosystem health invites a substantive discussion of how
trends in human organization affect the natural world. Our

results contradicted both the economic and

urbanization EKC hypotheses, indicating that economic development and urbanization
led to marine biodiversity loss. Likewise, population growth clearly led to depletion of
marine fisheries. These factors had both direct and indirect effects on the MTL. Here, the
phrase direct effect describes the variables' relationships in path analysis. In translating this result to a substantive interpretation,
however, one must recognize that a variable's direct effect in a statistical model actually reflects multiple mediating factors on the
ground. There are three possible mediating factors that clarify the mechanisms by which modernization and human population growth
led to declining MTL. First, economic growth and modernization spur investment in new fishing technologies that not only influence
the scale of harvest but qualitatively alter how fish are caught. Enlarged fleets, fish-tracking sonar, and factory ships that can catch and
process the catch in distant waters mean that fish can be targeted with greater accuracy and faster techniques (Warner 1983). These
new technologies surely came about in part due to the increased availability of capital to invest in the fishing fleets. Second,

intensification of production due to economic growth increases extraction from marine

sources and contributes excessive waste to ocean environments. Pollution sources ranging
from plastic debris to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons enter the oceans from industrial
sources and result in persistent alteration of marine food webs. Point-source pollution may be spatially
acute, such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Nevertheless, persistent hydrocarbon contamination continues to affect Alaska's food web 17
years after the accident occurred (Ott 2005). Nonpoint

source pollution, such as excess nitrogen washing

off industrial agriculture fields, can result in nutrification of nearby estuaries and rearing
habitat. One hundred fifty dead zones now occur in the world's oceans because of the
cascade effect of nitrogen pollution. As economic production escalates, so does waste
accumulation, and marine ecosystems bear much of the burden. Finally, societies' trends
toward urbanization have led to intense modification of essential coastline rearing
habitats. The geographic reality is that urbanization is most intense near the world's coastlines. For
example, nearly half of the U.S. population lives within 50 miles of the ocean. Loss of mangroves and wetlands and modification of
estuaries limits habitat availability for juvenile marine fishes. In

addition to effects on habitat, urbanization

may affect the level of fish catch due to changes in consumption patterns. Urbanization,
population growth, and economic growth are the key factors influencing national trends in food consumption (Rosegrant et al. 2001;
York & Gossard 2004). Urbanization

is regarded as a key factor influencing food consumption

patterns because urban centers are more closely tied to world markets, with greater access
to a diversity of food resources. In accordance with previous research and conventional wisdom, our model
demonstrated that an increase in total catch was a direct indicator of MTL decline. Nevertheless, our
results showed that in the early stages of economic development, the total catch increased with growth in GDP per capita. Once GDP
per capita reached the level of US$3000 the catch declined with continued economic growth. These results could be interpreted as
following the logic of the EKC, where increased affluence leads to decreased environmental impact. Alternative biophysical and
cultural factors should be considered, however, given the unique characteristics of a limited resource and the cultural effects on diet.

That total catch peaked at a certain level of economic development may indicate that the
industry reached the biological limits of what the fishery could supply. Similarly, human
consumption of fish as a food source may reach a certain threshold due to the reality that humans can only eat so much. Increasing
affluence stimulates increased consumption of fish and meat to a certain extent; nevertheless, cultural preferences may mitigate these
effects to some degree (York & Gossard 2004). In

addition to changes in cultural preference for fish,

global trade relations may present a structural reason for a change in diet composition. As
a nation continues to pursue economic growth, import and export of food supplies

becomes an important sector in foreign trade relations. Affluent nations can afford to
purchase food from elsewhere, thus drawing on the natural resource base of other parts of
the world and decreasing impacts on their own ecosystems (Rothman 1998). This "distancing"
(Rothman 1998) of environmental impacts through trade can lead to a decrease in fish catch
within the EEZ of some nations even if total fish consumption in those nations grows.
Finally, given the fact that aquaculture is the fastest growing food sector in the world, more affluent nations may become more reliant
on the intensified production of farmed fish (which has its own suite of environmental impacts) rather than wild-capture stocks, given
the right geographic and politicaleconomic conditions (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department 2007). We suggest that the
individual or cumulative effects of these social and ecological conditions provide potential explanations of the relationship between a
nations' GDP per capita and total catch. Our investigation of the social influences on global marine biodiversity decline offers three
key findings. First, an increase in population within nations led to a decline in MTL due to the positive relationship between
population and increased catch. Second, economic

growth had both direct and indirect effects on the

marine trophic structure, and the combined effects indicated that MTL declined with
economic growth. This finding refuted the EKC hypothesis. Similarly, when combining direct and
indirect effects, increased urbanization led to a decline in MTL, refuting the urbanization EKC
hypothesis. Our model suggested that, in addition to the overharvest of marine resources,
continued economic growth, urbanization, and population increase will degrade global
marine biodiversity. As academic societies and the general public begin to understand the ecological crisis on a global scale,
the responsibility to understand the environmental impact of social structural trends over time and across nations lies at least in part
with social science practitioners. Our results suggest that increased

modernization (characterized by
economic growth and urbanization) leads to the deterioration of biodiversity in marine
ecosystems. This finding raises important questions about the nonbiological factors influencing overexploitation and biodiversity
decline. Our conclusions do not directly speak to a specific policy proposal; rather, they address underlying issues that frame much of
the conservation-policy debate. Can

nations "grow their way out" of environmental problems? Is

continued economic growth compatible with conserving biodiversity? Our results suggest
the answer to both these question is no, which echoes the words of Kuznets himself when he cautioned that his
speculative findings should not be seized on as a "starting point for distorted use or for unwarranted dogmatic generalizations"
(Kuznets 1961:13).

(*MTL = mean trophic level, measure of marine biodiversity, *EKC = Environmental Kuznets
Curve)

Marine biodiversity loss causes extinction.

Craig 3Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, author of The Clean Water Act
and the Constitution [Robin Kundis Craig, Winter, 2003, Taking Steps Toward Marine
Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii, 34
McGeorge L. Rev. 155, Lexis]
Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems,
but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most
economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other
environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another
significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "ocean

ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that
represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur,
as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human
degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining
biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current
evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance
is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are
more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [*265] Most ecologists agree that
the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other
marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex

and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. n860 Thus,

maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining

and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems
have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive
preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even
primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the
forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human
activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to
detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure
about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and
policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving
marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems
that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if

kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us.

we kill the ocean we

*** Warming Turn

1NC Warming Turn

Growth spurs rapid climate changethe impact is extinction.
Taylor 8 [Graeme Taylor is a social activist committed to constructive global transformation
and the coordinator of BEST Futures, a project supporting sustainable solutions through
researching how societies change and evolve, Evolution's Edge: The Coming Collapse and
Transformation of Our World, Pomegranate Press, 2008, ISBN: 9781550923810, EBrary, pg. 359]
Increasing climate change Human

economic activities are raising global temperatures through

adding greenhouse gases that trap heat from the sun in the atmosphere. 20 These pollutants are primarily
carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide. Concentrations of carbon dioxide, which are higher than
they have been for 650,000 years, are rising faster each year. This means that the rate of global
warming is accelerating. When climate scientists predict rising temperatures they are talking about longterm global trends.
In the short term, weather cycles and regional variations can produce colder or hotter temperatures than average for example the La
Nia effect produced unusually cold weather in the Northern Hemisphere in the winter of 2007/8. 21 The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) forecasts that if current trends continue, average global temperatures will probably rise between 3.2F-7.2F
(1.8C - 4C ) by the end of the century. However, it is possible that temperatures will increase as little as 2F (1.1C) or as much as
11.5F (6.4C). The implications of increasing temperatures can be seen in Figure 5. Global

warming adds energy to

the atmosphere, causing weather patterns to change and extreme events to occur more
frequently. Over the last 100 years, average global temperatures have risen by 1.4F (0.8C).
Although this appears to be only a small increase, it has been enough to provoke major shifts in the Earths climate. Glaciers are
retreating, coral reefs are bleaching, deserts are advancing, storms are strengthening,
rainforests are burning and polar ice is melting. It is easy to see that if an increase of less than 1.8F (1C) is
already having serious impacts, then further increases are likely to have disastrous consequences. The
IPCC estimates that if average global temperatures rise by more than 3.6F (2C), it will probably
trigger rapid, major, and irreversible impacts, including the extinction of hundreds of
thousands of species, the conversion of rainforests to dry savannah, the spread of deserts,
increasing drought in dry areas of the planet, increasing precipitation and floods in wet
areas, falling crop yields and rising sea levels. 26 The impacts of rising temperatures are explained in detail by
Mark Lynas in his award-winning book Six Degrees. 27 It is not possible to accurately calculate the impacts or costs of climate
change since, for example, we cant put a value on the hundreds of thousands of species that will go extinct if temperatures rise by

rising temperatures create

risks of major disruption to economic and social activity, on a scale similar to those
associated with the great wars and the economic depression of the first half of the 20th
century. 29 At higher temperatures the consequences will be catastrophic. Much of the
planet will become uninhabitable, and most of the species alive today will go extinct. It will
be almost impossible to maintain advanced civilizations in these conditions. The threat of runaway global warming
is worrying an increasing number of scientists. 30 If the natural processes that keep the
Earths climate in equilibrium are seriously damaged, it may become impossible to
prevent global temperatures from getting hotter year after year even if all further greenhouse gas
even a few degrees. The Stern Review on the economics of climate change concluded that

emissions are stopped. Some climate change tipping points have already been passed: for example, the Earths ability to reflect
sunlight is declining as the massive ice sheets that air-condition our planet melt, and the ability of oceans and soils to absorb carbon
dioxide has been sharply reduced. Global warming will not only have to be stopped, but also reversed to reduce temperatures back to a
level at which biophysical processes can maintain an equilibrium an equilibrium which was lost in the 1980s when average global
temperatures rose higher than 0.9F (0.5C) above pre-industrial levels. If this isnt done quickly, global

warming will
trigger an irreversible destructive cycle in which a warming atmosphere and warming
oceans will destroy the rainforests, ocean algae and other vital ecosystems that remove
carbon from the air. This danger is explained in David Spratts and Philip Suttons book Climate Code Red: the case for
emergency action. An indication that we have already passed a dangerous tipping point is that the permafrost in Artic

regions has already begun to thaw and release increasing quantities of methane, a
greenhouse gas that is more than 20 times stronger than carbon dioxide. 32 It is estimated that up
to 10,000 billion tons (9071 billion tonnes) of carbon exists as frozen gas hydrates (methane plus water) in permafrost and under the
worlds oceans. 33 David Viner, a senior scientist at the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia, said When

you
start messing around with these natural systems, you can end up in situations where its
unstoppable. There are no brakes you can apply. This is a big deal because you cant put
the permafrost back once its gone. 34 Research on ocean sediments indicates that dramatic climate
change can occur very quickly. Audrey Dallimore, a scientist with Natural Resources Canada, said that Neolithic
Chinese culture collapsed 4,000 years ago because the climate changed so fast the culture couldnt sustain itself. With natural climate
change cycles, it appears there is no warning; there is no lead-up. Change was profound and happened in less than a decade .
Modern day atmospheric and ocean patterns suggest the same magnitude of climate change seen in the 4,000-year-old geologic
evidence is happening now. It really is a sit up and listen change. Something very different is happening. 35 Catastrophic

global warming is not an imaginary scenario. Of the five mass extinctions of life that
have occurred in the history of our planet, four were caused by climate change. According to
Gregory Ryskin, a professor of chemical engineering at Northwestern University, explosive clouds of methane gas,
initially trapped in stagnant bodies of water and suddenly released, could have killed off
the majority of marine life and land animals and plants at the end of the Permian era a
great extinction that wiped out 95% of the marine species and 70% of the land species that existed 250 million years ago. 36 In 2006,
the Stern Review estimated that emissions

of carbon dioxide would need to drop more than 80% by

2050 to keep the increase in global temperatures under 3.6F (2C). In order to meet these targets many
experts believe that industrialized nations will have to reduce emissions by up to 90% from
present levels and developing nations such as China, India and Brazil will also have to
make major reductions. 37 In their 2007 forecast, the International Energy Agency pointed out that, Even if governments
actually implement, as we assume, all the policies they are considering to curb energy imports and emissions, both would still rise
through to 2030. In their best scenario, these additional atmospheric pollutants will increase average global temperatures by 5.4F
(3C). 38 The report fails to mention that the current best case scenario will be enough to destroy one third of all the species on Earth
as well as trigger runaway global warming. The UNs Human Development Report 2007/2008 was blunter: There is now
overwhelming scientific evidence that the world is moving towards the point at which irreversible ecological catastrophe becomes
unavoidable . There

is a window of opportunity for avoiding the most damaging climate

change impacts, but that window is closing: the world has less than a decade to change
course. 39 In reality we probably do not have even 10 years to stop catastrophic global
warming recent authoritative studies indicate that global warming is accelerating three
times faster than the worst forecasts of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 40 For example,
American studies indicate that rather than sea levels rising by around 15.75 (40 cm) by
2100 as predicted by the IPCC, the true rise may be as much as 78 (2 meters) an amount
that will inundate islands and major coastal cities around the world. Dr. James Hansen, the director of NASAs Goddard Institute for
Space Studies said, [T]he Earth is getting perilously close to climate changes that could run out of control. 41 This

is serious
stuff. The evidence not only indicates that climate change will do massive environmental
and economic damage in the coming decades, but that the survival of most life on Earth
is threatened by runaway global warming. So why have governments not declared climate change to be a global
emergency?

2NC/1NROutweighs Nuke War

And climate change outweighs nuclear war.
The New York End Times 6 [The New York End Times is a non-partisan, non-religious,
non-ideological, free news filter. We monitor world trends and events as they pertain to two vital
threats - war and extinction. We use a proprietary methodology to quantify movements between
the extremes of war and peace, harmony and extinction.
http://newyorkendtimes.com/extinctionscale.asp]

We rate Global Climate Change as a greater threat for human extinction in this century.
Most scientists forecast disruptions and dislocations, if current trends persist. The extinction danger is more likely
if we alter an environmental process that causes harmful effects and leads to conditions
that make the planet uninhabitable to humans. Considering that there is so much that is
unknown about global systems, we consider climate change to be the greatest danger to
human extinction. However, there is no evidence of imminent danger. Nuclear war at some point in this
century might happen. It is unlikely to cause human extinction though. While several
countries have nuclear weapons, there are few with the firepower to annihilate the world.
For those nations it would be suicidal to exercise that option. The pattern is that the more destructive
technology a nation has, the more it tends towards rational behavior. Sophisticated
precision weapons then become better tactical options. The bigger danger comes from
nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists with the help of a rogue state, such as North
Korea. The size of such an explosion would not be sufficient to threaten humanity as a
whole. Instead it could trigger a major war or even world war. Under this scenario human extinction would only be
possible if other threats were present, such as disease and climate change. We monitor war separately.
However we also need to incorporate the dangers here.

2NC/1NRTurns Economy
And growth causes runaway warmingturns the economy and causes
extinction.
Homer-Dixon 11 Thomas Homer-Dixon is the CIGI chair of global systems at the Balsillie
School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada. [January/February, 2011, Economies Can't
Just Keep on Growing,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional_wisdom?page=full]

Humanity has made great strides over the past 2,000 years, and we often assume that our
path, notwithstanding a few bumps along the way, goes ever upward. But we are wrong: Within this
century, environmental and resource constraints will likely bring global economic growth
to a halt.
Limits on available resources already restrict economic activity in many sectors, though their
impact usually goes unacknowledged. Take rare-earth elements -- minerals and oxides essential to the manufacture of
many technologies. When China recently stopped exporting them, sudden shortages threatened
to crimp a wide range of industries. Most commentators believed that the supply crunch would ease once new (or
mothballed) rare-earth mines are opened. But such optimism overlooks a fundamental physical reality. As
the best bodies of ore are exhausted, miners move on to less concentrated deposits in
more difficult natural circumstances. These mines cause more pollution and require more
energy. In other words, opening new rare-earth mines outside China will result in staggering
environmental impact.
Or consider petroleum, which provides about 40 percent of the world's commercial energy and more than 95 percent of its
transportation energy. Oil

companies generally have to work harder to get each new barrel of oil.
The amount of energy they receive for each unit of energy they invest in drilling has
dropped from 100 to 1 in Texas in the 1930s to about 15 to 1 in the continental United
States today. The oil sands in Alberta, Canada, yield a return of only 4 to 1.
Coal and natural gas still have high energy yields. So, as oil becomes harder to get in coming decades, these
energy sources will become increasingly vital to the global economy. But they're fossil fuels, and burning them
generates climate-changing carbon dioxide. If the World Bank's projected rates for global
economic growth hold steady, global output will have risen almost tenfold by 2100, to
more than $600 trillion in today's dollars. So even if countries make dramatic reductions
in carbon emissions per dollar of GDP, global carbon dioxide emissions will triple from
today's level to more than 90 billion metric tons a year. Scientists tell us that tripling
carbon emissions would cause such extreme heat waves, droughts, and storms that
farmers would likely find they couldn't produce the food needed for the world's projected
population of 9 billion people. Indeed, the economic damage caused by such climate change
would probably, by itself, halt growth.
Humankind is in a box. For the 2.7 billion people now living on less than $2 a day,
economic growth is essential to satisfying the most basic requirements of human dignity.
And in much wealthier societies, people need growth to pay off their debts, support
liberty, and maintain civil peace. To produce and sustain this growth, they must expend
vast amounts of energy. Yet our best energy source -- fossil fuel -- is the main thing
contributing to climate change, and climate change, if unchecked, will halt growth.

We can't live with growth, and we can't live without it. This contradiction is humankind's biggest challenge this century, but as

long as conventional wisdom holds that growth can continue forever, it's a challenge we
can't possibly address.

2NC/1NR Warming Turn

Human development is causing rapid warmingthe impact is self-reinforcing
climate change resulting in extinction. Only drastically reducing our
emissions now can prevent the positive feedback.
Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 19-27]
Climate Disruption Of

all the issues, global warming is the most threatening. The possibilities here are so
disturbing that some like Sir David King, the chief scientist in the British government believe that climate change is
the most severe problem the world faces, bar none.5 Scientists know that the greenhouse
effect is a reality: without the naturally occurring heat-trapping gases in the earths
atmosphere, the planet would be about 30C cooler on average an ice ball rather than a life-support
system. The problem arises because human activities have now sharply increased the
presence of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. These gases prevent the escape of earths
infrared radiation into space. In general, the more gases that accumulate, the more heat the
atmosphere traps. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, the principal greenhouse gas
contributed by human actions, has increased by more than a third over the preindustrial level due
mainly to the use of fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas) and to large-scale deforestation. Carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere is now at its highest level in at least 650,000 years. The
concentration of methane, another greenhouse gas, is about 150 percent above
preindustrial levels. Methane accumulates from the use of fossil fuels, cattle raising, rice growing,
and landfill emissions. Atmospheric concentrations of still another gas, nitrous oxide, are also up due to fertilizer use, cattle
feedlots, and the chemical industry, and it is also an infrared trapping gas. A number of specialty chemicals in the
halocarbon family, including the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) of ozone-depletion notoriety, are also potent
greenhouse gases. The major international scientific effort to understand climate change and what can be done about it is the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The fourth of its periodic reports, released in 2007, underscores the reality that

human activities are already changing the planet in major ways: Warming of the climate
system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average
air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level. Eleven of the
last twelve years (1995 2006) rank among the 12 warmest years in the instrumental record of global surface temperature (since
1850). Most

of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-twentieth century
is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.
Discernible human influences now extend to other aspects of climate, including ocean warming, continental-average temperatures,
temperature extremes and wind patterns. Mountain glaciers and snow cover have declined on average in both hemispheres.

Widespread decreases in glaciers and ice caps have contributed to sea level rise. New data . . .
now show that losses from the ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica have very likely contributed to sea level rise over 1993 to
2003. More intense and longer droughts have been observed over wider areas since the 1970s, particularly in the tropics and
subtropics. Increased drying linked with higher temperatures and decreased precipitation has contributed to changes in drought. The
frequency of heavy precipitation events has increased over most land areas, consistent with warming and observed increases of
atmospheric water vapor.6 The

IPCCs Fourth Assessment also identifies the likely future

impacts of climate change in a variety of contexts the larger the buildup of greenhouse
gases, the more severe these impacts will become. Here are some of the IPCCs projections:7 The

availability of fresh water will shift. Some areas will get much wetter, others much dryer. Both drought and
flooding will likely increase. Water stored in glaciers and snowpack will decline,
reducing water supplies to more than a billion people. The health of ecosystems will be
damaged by an unprecedented combination of climate change and other drivers of global
change such as land use change, pollution, and overexploitation of resources. About 20 to
30 percent of the plant and animal species studied so far will be at increased risk of
extinction. As the oceans take up more carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, shellfish and
corals will be harmed. The oceans absorb a large portion of all carbon dioxide emitted, and as the resulting carbonic acid
increases in the seawater, the extra acidity hurts the ability of marine organisms to form shells.
The impacts could eventually be devastating. On top of that, ocean warming will lead to more frequent coral
bleaching and mortality. Coastal and low-lying areas are expected to be hard-hit. Rising sea levels will increase
coastal erosion, flooding, and wetland loss. The IPCC report concludes that many millions more people are
projected to be flooded every year due to sea-level rise by the 2080s. Those densely-populated and low-lying areas where adaptive
capacity is relatively low, and which already face other challenges such as tropical storms or local coastal subsidence, are especially at
risk. The numbers affected will be largest in the mega-deltas of Asia and Africa while small islands are especially vulnerable.8 The
IPCC ominously notes that the last time the polar regions were significantly warmer than present for an extended period (about
125,000 years ago), reductions in polar ice volume led to 4 to 6 meters of sea level rise.9 Human health will also suffer in various
ways. As the IPCC concludes: Projected climate change-related exposures are likely to affect the health status of millions of people,
particularly those with low adaptive capacity, through: increases in malnutrition and consequent disorders, with implications for
child growth and development; increased deaths, disease and injury due to heat waves, floods, storms, fires and droughts; the
increased burden of diarrheal disease; the increased frequency of cardio-respiratory diseases due to higher concentrations of ground
level ozone related to climate change; and, the altered spatial distribution of some infectious disease vectors.10 Other reports besides
that of the IPCC have drawn special attention to particular risks. The Arctic is warming at nearly twice the rate as the rest of the globe.
Projections see the Arctic icecap continuing to diminish and eventually disappearing altogether in the summer, perhaps as early as
2020.11 Governments of the circumpolar north have begun positioning themselves strategically to claim sovereign control over new
shipping lanes opened up by the disappearing ice. In an ironic twist, they all seek also to exploit the regions large fossil fuel
resources. The loss of ice on Greenland more than doubled in the last decade of the twentieth century and may have doubled again by
2005.12 On human health, the World Health Organization estimated in 2004 the loss of 150,000 lives each year due to climate change.
Its most recent report projects that loss of life caused by climate change could double by 2030 due largely to diarrhea-related disease,
malaria, and malnutrition. Most of the casualties would fall in the developing world.13 A major area of ongoing climate change
impact is in the North American West, where tens of millions of acres of forest are being devastated by bark beetles and other
infestations. The pests which have attacked pine, fir, and spruce trees in the western United States, British Columbia, and Alaska
are normally contained by severe winters. The milder winters in the region have increased their reproduction, abundance, and
geographic range.14 Natural areas in the United States could be hit hard. Assuming business as usual in greenhouse gas emissions
throughout this century, the maple-beech-birch forests in New England could simply disappear, while much of the Southeast could
become a vast grassland savanna, too hot and dry to support trees.15 Meanwhile, other studies project that human-caused climate
change is likely to lead to extreme drought throughout the Southwest, starting soon.16 The Great Lakes also appear to be undergoing
disruptive changes due to climate change. Not only are the lakes warming, but water levels are declining and fish disease is
increasing.17 A major concern is sea level rise, and the greatest fear is a catastrophic rise caused by movement into the oceans of
landed ice on Greenland and Antarctica. Disturbing and unpredicted movements of ice have occurred in both places. Ten thousand
years ago, when the continental ice sheets melted, sea levels rose more than twenty yards in five hundred years. While the IPCC is
projecting somewhat less than a three-foot sea level rise in this century, some scientists believe that a

continuation of
greenhouse gas emission growth could lead to yards of sea level rise per century.18 Even with
modest sea level rise, we could see the displacement of large numbers of people from small
island nations and the low-lying delta areas of Egypt, Bangladesh, Louisiana, and elsewhere. Today, as Alaskan permafrost melts,
Inuit villages are being moved inland. Beaches, coastal marshes, and near-coast development in the United States and elsewhere could
also be severely affected. Related to this, evidence is accumulating that ocean

warming and increased evaporation

are contributing to stronger hurricanes.19 Sea level rise is only one of the consequences of climate change that
could contribute to the forced migrations of large numbers of people. Depletion of water in regions supplied by
glacial melt, changes in monsoon patterns, and spreading drought could combine to cause
many refugees from climate change. One study has estimated that as many as 850 million
people could be displaced in these ways later in this century.20 Prospects such as these are a reminder
that climate change is not only an environmental and economic issue. It is also a profoundly moral and human
issue with major implications for social justice and international peace and security.21
Although many people assume that the impacts of climate change will unfold gradually,
as the earths temperature slowly rises, the buildup of greenhouse gases may in fact lead to
abrupt and sudden, not gradual, changes. A National Academy of Sciences report in 2002

concluded that global climate change could have rapid impacts: Recent scientific
evidence shows that major and widespread climate changes have occurred with startling
speed. . . . [G]reenhouse warming and other human alterations of the earth system may
increase the possibility of large, abrupt, and unwelcome regional or global climatic
events.22 The possibility of abrupt climate change is linked to what may be the most
problematic possibility of allpositive feedback effects where the initial warming has
effects that generate more warming. Several of these feedbacks are possible. First, the lands ability to
store carbon could weaken. Soils and forests can dry out or burn and release carbon; less
plant growth can occur, thus reducing natures ability to remove carbon from the air.
Second, carbon sinks in the oceans could also be reduced due to ocean warming and other factors.
Third, the potent greenhouse gas methane could be released from peat bogs, wetlands, and
thawing permafrost, and even from the methane hydrates in the oceans, as the planet
warms and changes. Finally, the earths albedo, the reflectivity of the earths surface, is
slated to be reduced as large areas now covered by ice and snow diminish or are covered by
meltwater. All these effects would tend to make warming self-reinforcing, possibly leading to
a greatly amplified greenhouse effect. The real possibility of these amplifying feedbacks has alarmed some of our
top scientists. James Hansen, the courageous NASA climate scientist, is becoming increasingly outspoken as his investigations lead
him to more and more disturbing conclusions. He offered the following assessment in 2007: Our

home planet is now

dangerously near a tipping point. Human-made greenhouse gases are near a level such
that important climate changes may proceed mostly under the climate systems own
momentum. Impacts would include extermination of a large fraction of species on the
planet, shifting of climatic zones due to an intensified hydrologic cycle with effects on
freshwater availability and human health, and repeated worldwide coastal tragedies
associated with storms and a continuously rising sea level. . . . Civilization developed during the
Holocene, a period of relatively tranquil climate now almost 12,000 years in duration. The planet has been warm enough to keep ice
sheets off North America and Europe, but cool enough for ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica to be stable. Now, with

rapid
warming of 0.6C in the past 30 years, global temperature is at its warmest level in the Holocene.
This warming has brought us to the precipice of a great tipping point. If we go over the
edge, it will be a transition to a different planet, an environment far outside the range
that has been experienced by humanity. There will be no return within the lifetime of any
generation that can be imagined, and the trip will exterminate a large fraction of species
on the planet. The crystallizing scientific story reveals an imminent planetary emergency. We are at a planetary
tipping point. We must move onto a new energy direction within a decade to have a good
chance to avoid setting in motion unstoppable climate change with irreversible effects.

Warming is inevitable without degrowthits try or die.

Siegel 9 Lee Siegel is the author of four books and a winner of the National Magazine Award.
He has published over 600 articles, essays, and reviews in numerous publications, including the
Atlantic Monthly, Time, The New Yorker, The Economist, The Guardian, the New York Times
and The Wall Street Journal. [November 22, 2009, Is Global Warming Unstoppable?
http://www.unews.utah.edu/old/p/112009-1.html]
Nov. 22, 2009 - In a provocative new study, a University of Utah scientist argues that rising

carbon dioxide emissions

- the major cause of global warming - cannot be stabilized unless the world's economy
collapses or society builds the equivalent of one new nuclear power plant each day.

"It

looks unlikely that there will be any substantial near-term departure from recently
observed acceleration in carbon dioxide emission rates," says the new paper by Tim Garrett, an
associate professor of atmospheric sciences.
Garrett's study was panned by some economists and rejected by several journals before acceptance by Climatic Change, a journal
edited by renowned Stanford University climate scientist Stephen Schneider. The study will be published online this week.
The study - which is based on the concept that physics can be used to characterize the evolution of civilization - indicates:

Energy conservation or efficiency doesn't really save energy, but instead spurs economic
growth and accelerated energy consumption.
Throughout history, a simple physical "constant" - an unchanging mathematical value - links global
energy use to the world's accumulated economic productivity, adjusted for inflation. So it isn't
necessary to consider population growth and standard of living in predicting society's
future energy consumption and resulting carbon dioxide emissions.
"Stabilization of carbon dioxide emissions at current rates will require approximately 300
gigawatts of new non-carbon-dioxide-emitting power production capacity annually approximately one new nuclear power plant (or equivalent) per day," Garrett says. "Physically, there are
no other options without killing the economy."
Getting Heat for Viewing Civilization as a "Heat Engine"
Garrett says colleagues generally support his theory, while some economists are critical. One economist, who reviewed the study,
wrote: "I am afraid the author will need to study harder before he can contribute."
"I'm not an economist, and I am approaching the economy as a physics problem," Garrett says. "I end up with a global economic
growth model different than they have."
Garrett treats civilization like a "heat engine" that "consumes energy and does 'work' in the form of economic production, which then
spurs it to consume more energy," he says.
"If society consumed no energy, civilization would be worthless," he adds. "It is only by consuming energy that civilization is able to
maintain the activities that give it economic value. This means that if we ever start to run out of energy, then the value of civilization
is going to fall and even collapse absent discovery of new energy sources."
Garrett says his study's key finding "is that accumulated

economic production over the course of history

has been tied to the rate of energy consumption at a global level through a constant
factor."
That "constant" is 9.7 (plus or minus 0.3) milliwatts per inflation-adjusted 1990 dollar. So if you look at economic and energy
production at any specific time in history, "each inflation-adjusted 1990 dollar would be supported by 9.7 milliwatts of primary energy
consumption," Garrett says.
Garrett tested his theory and found this constant relationship between energy use and economic production at any given time by using
United Nations statistics for global GDP (gross domestic product), U.S. Department of Energy data on global energy consumption
during1970-2005, and previous studies that estimated global economic production as long as 2,000 years ago. Then he investigated the
implications for carbon dioxide emissions.
"Economists think you need population and standard of living to estimate productivity," he says. "In my model, all you need to know
is how fast energy consumption is rising. The reason why is because there is this link between the economy and rates of energy
consumption, and it's just a constant factor."

There
is no need to consider population growth and changes in standard of living because they
are marching to the tune of the availability of energy supplies."
To Garrett, that means the acceleration of carbon dioxide emissions is unlikely to change soon
because our energy use today is tied to society's past economic productivity.
"Viewed from this perspective, civilization evolves in a spontaneous feedback loop maintained only
by energy consumption and incorporation of environmental matter," Garrett says. It is like a
child that "grows by consuming food, and when the child grows, it is able to consume
more food, which enables it to grow more."
Garrett adds: "By finding this constant factor, the problem of [forecasting] global economic growth is dramatically simpler.

Is Meaningful Energy Conservation Impossible?

Perhaps the most provocative implication of Garrett's theory is that conserving energy doesn't reduce energy use, but spurs economic
growth and more energy use.
"Making

civilization more energy efficient simply allows it to grow faster and consume
more energy," says Garrett.
He says the idea that resource conservation accelerates resource consumption - known as Jevons paradox - was proposed in the 1865
book "The Coal Question" by William Stanley Jevons, who noted that coal prices fell and coal consumption soared after
improvements in steam engine efficiency.

So is Garrett arguing that conserving energy doesn't matter?

"I'm just saying it's

not really possible to conserve energy in a meaningful way because the

current rate of energy consumption is determined by the unchangeable past of economic
production. If it feels good to conserve energy, that is fine, but there shouldn't be any pretense
that it will make a difference."
Yet, Garrett says his findings contradict his own previously held beliefs about conservation, and he continues to ride a bike or bus to
work, line dry family clothing and use a push lawnmower.
An Inevitable Future for Carbon Dioxide Emissions?
Garrett says often-discussed strategies for slowing carbon dioxide emissions and global warming include mention increased energy
efficiency, reduced population growth and a switch to power sources that don't emit carbon dioxide, including nuclear, wind and solar
energy and underground storage of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel burning. Another strategy is rarely mentioned: a decreased standard
of living, which would occur if energy supplies ran short and the economy collapsed, he adds.
"Fundamentally, I believe the

system is deterministic," says Garrett. "Changes in population and

standard of living are only a function of the current energy efficiency. That leaves only
switching to a non-carbon-dioxide-emitting power source as an available option."
"The problem is that, in order to stabilize emissions, not even reduce them, we have to
switch to non-carbonized energy sources at a rate about 2.1 percent per year. That comes
out to almost one new nuclear power plant per day."
"If society invests sufficient resources into alternative and new, non-carbon energy supplies, then perhaps it can continue growing
without increasing global warming," Garrett says.
Does Garrett fear global warming deniers will use his work to justify inaction?
"No," he says. "Ultimately, it's

not clear that policy decisions have the capacity to change the
future course of civilization."

CO2 tipping points make our impacts sudden and catastrophicgradual

attempts to solve will fail
Simms and Johnson, 10 [Andrew Simms founded the climate change, energy and
interdependence programmes at nef, and is author of Ecological Debt: Global Warming and the
Wealth of Nations. Until the end of 2010, he was Policy Director at nef. Andrew writes regularly
for the national press and is on the boards of Greenpeace UK, the climate campaign 10:10 and
The Energy and Resources Institute Europe. Victoria Johnson is the acting head of the climate
change and energy programme at nef. Victoria has a BSc in Environmental Sciences, a MSc
(awarded with distinction) in Climate Change, both from the University of East Anglia, and a
PhD in Atmospheric Physics at Imperial College. Growth isn't Possible, new economics
foundation, January 25, 2010, pg. 31-2,
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01564/_res/id=sa_File1/Growth_Isnt
_Possible.pdf]

The Earths geological history is full of examples of abrupt climate change, when the
climate system has undergone upheaval, shifting from one relatively stable state to
another. Transition to a new state is triggered when a critical threshold is crossed. When
this happens, the rate of change becomes determined by the climate system itself,
occurring at faster rate than the original forcing. For example, until 6000 years ago the Sahara Desert was a
covered by vegetation and wetlands. While the transition was driven by subtle and smooth changes in incoming solar radiation, at a
critical point there was a regime shift in the rainfall patterns causing the landscape to switch from lush vegetation to desert, at a rate
far greater than the original solar forcing. 104 In 2008, Tim Lenton, Professor of Earth System Science and a team of researchers at
the University of East Anglia, concluded

that because of these critical thresholds in the climate

system society may have been lulled into a false sense of security by the projections of
apparently smooth climate change. 105 The research suggested that that a variety of tipping
elements of the climate system, such as the melting of ice sheets or permafrost could
reach their critical point (tipping point) within this century under current emission trajectories.

A tipping element describes subsystems of the Earths system that are at least subcontinental in scale and can be switchedunder certain circumstancesinto a qualitatively
different state by small perturbations. The tipping point is the corresponding critical
point. Tipping elements identified by the study include: collapse of the Greenland ice sheet; drying of the Amazon rainforest;
collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet; dieback of Boreal forests; greening of the Sahara/Sahel due to a shift in the West African
monsoon regime; collapse of the North Atlantic ocean circulation; and changes to the El Nio-Southern Oscillation amplitude.
Whether or not these highly unpredictable factors are made part of decision-making is a political choice. But, given

the
existence of tipping points in the climate system, it is hard to reconcile the assumption
that we may be able to stabilise the climate or even CO 2 concentrations once a certain
level of threshold of temperature or concentration of CO 2 is reached. But, the authors of the
assessment identified a significant gap in research into the potential of tipping elements in human socio-economic systems, especially

If the impacts of climate

change are non-linear then our response both in mitigating against and adapting to
climate change also has to be non-linear.
into whether and how a rapid societal transition towards sustainability could be triggered. 106

*** AT: ______

AT: Kuznets Curve (EKC)

Kuznets curve is false and fails to apply to climate change
Simms and Johnson 10 [Andrew Simms founded the climate change, energy and
interdependence programmes at nef, and is author of Ecological Debt: Global Warming and the
Wealth of Nations. Until the end of 2010, he was Policy Director at nef. Andrew writes regularly
for the national press and is on the boards of Greenpeace UK, the climate campaign 10:10 and
The Energy and Resources Institute Europe. Victoria Johnson is the acting head of the climate
change and energy programme at nef. Victoria has a BSc in Environmental Sciences, a MSc
(awarded with distinction) in Climate Change, both from the University of East Anglia, and a
PhD in Atmospheric Physics at Imperial College. Growth isn't Possible, new economics
foundation, January 25, 2010, pg. 43-4,
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01564/_res/id=sa_File1/Growth_Isnt
_Possible.pdf]
There was a time when the relationship between carbon emissions and economic growth seemed so simple. Until recently, it was often
argued that the relationship between income and CO 2 emissions followed the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) model. The EKC
evolved from Simon Kuznetss original thesis on economic growth and income inequality. 156 Kuznets postulated that with economic
growth, income inequality first increases over time, and then at a certain point begins to reverse. In theory, then, the relationship
between economic growth and income inequality placed on a graph takes on the shape of an inverted-U. In

environmental
economics, the EKC proposes a relationship between environmental pollution and
economic activity. 157 The theory again suggests an early rise in pollution that later
reverses its relationship with growth. Several attempts have been made to determine whether the EKC paradigm can
be applied to per capita emissions of CO 2 in the form of a Carbon Kuznets Curve. 158 Some early literature on the subject does
suggest that there is a relationship between per capita income in a country and the per capita or gross emissions in the country. 159,
160 There

is now unequivocal evidence, however, that in the case of carbon emissions, the
EKC simply represents idiosyncratic correlations and holds no predictive power. 161 For
example a recent study published in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences found that income was the biggest driver of ever increasing emissions. 162 Of
nine regions, which included developed regions such as the USA, Europe, Japan, and developing regions such as China, India,
all showed a strong correlation of increasing emissions and income. The problems of
directly applying the EKC paradigm to greenhouse gases are twofold. First, key
greenhouse gases have a long atmospheric lifetime 163 compared to other environmental
pollutants, such as particulates. Their long atmospheric lifetime means that their environmental
impact is transboundary, i.e., their effect on the climate is not restricted to the region within which they
are produced. Given the asymmetries of the stages of economic development between nations, in principle the EKC model for
global climate change cannot work, and the connection between control of domestic emissions in higher-income countries and the
benefits to their citizens is very weak. Calculations

based on direct national emissions are also

misleading because they fail to account for the embedded carbon of goods manufacture
abroad and consumed domestically. For example, the effect of much of Britains heavy
industry and manufacturing having been outsourced to less wealthy countries creates
the impression that Britain pollutes less, now that it is richer. In fact, the pollution has
largely been outsourced too. It still exists, but not on Britains official inventory of
emissions (see Box 12). Second, we are constrained by the arrow of time. There is clear
evidence to suggest that both developed and developing economies would begin the
decline on the inverted-U curve well beyond concentrations of greenhouse gases that are
classed as safe. 164 In other words, by the time we got to the less polluting slope of the curve,
we would already have gone over the cliff of irreversible global warming; it would be too
late to be green.

Rich countries export waste to poor countriesgrowth increases impacts on

the environment.
Korten 95David Korten, BA in psychology from Stanford University, MBA and Ph.D.
degrees from the Stanford Business School, former Associate Professor of the Harvard University
Graduate School of Business [1995, When Corporations Rule the World, p. 30-31]
Just as wealthy

countries import resources when their demands exceed their own limits, they export their surplus
wastes. Indeed, waste-disposal practices reveal with particular clarity the relationship between power and the allocation of
environmental costs. Pollution factories and waste-disposal sites are so consistently located in
poor and minority neighborhoods or communities that we might use them as proxy indicators of the geographical distribution
of political power. Adding insult to injury, the rich commonly point to the miserable environmental
conditions in which the poor sometimes live as proof that the poor are less
environmentally responsible than themselves. Such claims draw attention away from two important realities. First,
most environmental stress is a direct function of human consumption, and rich people
unquestionably consume far more than do poor people. Second, although it is true that poor
people are far more likely to be found living next to waste dumps, polluting factories and other scenes of
environmental devastation than are wealthy people, this doesnt mean that it is their wastes filling those dumps or
that they are major consumers of the products produced in these factories. Nor does it mean that they wouldnt prefer
to live in more environmentally pristine settings. It simply means that wealthy people
have the economic and political power to make sure that pollutants and wastes are
dumped somewhere other than in their neighborhoods and to ensure that their neighborhoods are not
stripped bare of trees to become the sites of polluting factories. Poor people do not. What we are seeing is purely a
consequence of income inequality, not a difference in environmental awareness and
concern. It can be corrected only by equalizing power.

AT: EKC (BioD)

EKC only applies to a subset of pollution but not to overall environmental
damage and biodiversityonly our evidence speaks to broader trends
Majumder 6Professors at the University of New Mexico Robert Berrens, and Alok
Bohara [Pallab, Is There an Environmental Kuznets Curve for the Risk of Biodiversity Loss?,
The Journal of Developing Areas, Volume 39, Number 2, Spring 2006, pp. 175-190, muse]
The empirical robustness of the inverted U-shape relationship remains a debatable issue (Dasgupta et al. 2002; Grossman and Krueger,
1996). Stern (1998) argues that the evidence for the inverted

U-shape relationship applies only to a subset of

environmental measures. Such arguments require investigating the EKC relationship for as broad an array of possible
types of pollutants. Whether the EKC relationship holds for biodiversity loss or the risk of biodiversity loss, remains an open issue.
While there are several recent studies (McPherson and Nieswiadomy 2000; Dietz and Adger 2001; and Naidoo and Adamowicz
2001) investigating the EKC relationship for

biodiversity, they are subject to various limitations.

into the diversity of a particular species or
a number of species rather than a broader measure or index of overall biodiversity. In addition, these studies do
not account for variations in ecosystems that directly affect species diversity. We investigate the EKC
hypothesis for the overall risk of biodiversity loss by using the multivariate National Biodiversity Risk Assessment Index
Specifically, all the prior EKC studies for biodiversity looked

(NABRAI; Ryers et al. 1998, 1999) and several variants, which include genetic, species, and ecosystem diversity.1 Analyzing crosscountry data, our findings suggest that there is no EKC relationship for the risk of biodiversity loss. The EKC
relationship has generated extensive debate and empirical investigation. Various empirical EKC studies have employed different
methods, and evaluated different environmental indicators resulting in a broad spectrum of findings. Based on a number of empirical
findings supporting the EKC, some analysts (e.g., Beckerman 1992) argue that there exists a general inverted U-shape relationship
between economic growth and the environment. They tend to draw the broad policy conclusion that economic growth in a society will
somehow automatically take care of most environmental problems. On the contrary, others argue that there is no blanket inverted Ushape relationship between income and overall environmental quality (e.g., Stern 1998; Stern and Common 2001; Harbaugh et al.
2002).2 Further, even

if the EKC relationship holds over some historical range, it may not hold in the
future due to ecological thresholds and carrying capacities (e.g. Arrow et al. 1995). Since the EKC results
are usually estimated from a reduced form equation, a variety of conflicting theoretical explanations may be consistent with the EKC.
Suggested reasons for observed EKC results are: shiftable externalities (Arrow et al. 1995), industry composition (Grossman and
Krueger 1996), environmental regulation [End Page 176] (Grossman and Krueger 1996), technology (Grossman and Krueger 1996),
net migration (Berrens et al. 1997) and differences in trade policy regimes (Copeland and Taylor 2003). In a recent meta-analysis
synthesizing the results of numerous EKC studies, Cavlovic et al. (2000) show that EKC relationships and their corresponding income
turning points depend on the scale of analysis and the type of pollutants. The view that the EKC relationship holds

only for
a subset of environmental pollutants or disamenities is supported by a number of different perspectives. From the
consumption-side view, it is simply easier to live with some pollutants than others, or it is easier to shift the externality effect for some
types of pollutants than others.3 As income rises,

households are more likely to spend to have access to safe

drinking water, but not necessarily to spend for less directly visible measures, such as biodiversity
protection, with the same urgency. On the other hand, production-side EKC theories imply that with higher per capita income,
countries will be able to substitute environmental-friendly production technology. However, there

may be some
environmental damages that cannot be continuously substituted with better production technology due to
ecological thresholds (Dasgupta, 2000) and the unique nature of the damage (e.g., loss of critical habitat and
keystone species). From a broad perspective, biodiversity refers to the variety of life on earth, and includes genetics, species,
ecosystems and the ecological processes of which they are a part (Ecosystem Health 2001). As is common, Turner et al. (1993) divide
the notion of biodiversity into three different categories: (1) genetic diversity, (2) species diversity and (3) ecosystem diversity. The
richness and diversity of genetic information stored in the genes of plants, animal and microorganisms is referred as genetic diversity.
The richness and variety of different species is referred as species diversity, where species variety is most commonly used to proxy
biodiversity. The richness and variety of ecological process is referred to as ecosystem diversity. Recently, some biologists measure
biodiversity as an index that incorporates all three aspects (Ryers et al. 1998). Ryers et al. (1998, 1999) developed the National
Biodiversity Risk Assessment Index (NABRAI), which attempts to account for all three aspects of biodiversity and is potentially more
accurate than simpler measures of biodiversity (i.e., counts of species, or types of species). There are several recent EKC studies for
biodiversity that use these simpler measures. McPherson and Nieswiadomy (2000) examined the EKC relationship for threatened
birds and mammals and found an N-shape relation for threatened birds; the implication is that biodiversity loss ultimately increases
with higher level of income. They found no evidence of an EKC relationship for threatened mammals. Naidoo and Adamowicz (2001)
examined the EKC relationship for birds and mammals as well as for amphibians, reptiles, fishes, invertebrates and found a general Ushape relationship for amphibians, reptiles, fishes, and invertebrates. However, they find an inverted U-shape relationship for birds

and mammals. Dietz and Adger (2001) examined the EKC hypothesis using species area-relationship in a number of tropical
countries. They found no EKC relationship between income and biodiversity loss, but did find that conservation effort increases with
income. These studies focused on the diversity of particular species rather [End Page 177] than some overall biodiversity stock or
index. More preferably, a proper measure of biodiversity should include other factors that directly affect
species diversity. Land exposed to high disturbance levels, human population density, other endemic species, genetically invented new
species etc. can be the examples of such factors. None

of the earlier studies took these factors into

account in exploring EKC relationship for biodiversity. To fill this gap, we investigate the EKC relationship using crosssectional (country-level) data and the recently introduced NABRAI, which measures the overall biodiversity risk considering species
diversity, genetic diversity and ecosystem diversity.4

Kuznets curve doesnt apply to biodiversityour models have stronger

correlations by evaluating multivariate biodiversity indices instead of single
species.
Mozumder et. al 8*Pallab Mozumder is assistant Professor Department of Environmental
Studies Florida International University (FIU), **Robert Berrens is associate professor of
Economics, University of New Mexico, ***Alok K. Bohara professor of Economics at the
University of New Mexico [2006, Is There an Environmental Kuznets Curve for the Risk of
Biodiversity Loss? The Journal of Developing Areas, 39.2, Project Muse]

A variety of evidence indicates that we are losing our biodiversity stock much faster than
ever before, and this has generated worldwide concern for biodiversity loss. It is argued that the global extinction spasm is
resulting in the extermination of species at a rate 100 to 1000 times greater than in pre-human times (e.g., see Pimm et al. 1995).

Ecological economists argue that even from a utilitarian point of view, continuing to
drive vast numbers of species to extinction may be an unwise course of action (Costanza et al.
1997; Daily et al. 1997). Nevertheless, various sources debate the need to restrict economic
growth (Beckerman 1992; Sisk et al. 1994; Mangel 1996). Thus, precise empirical evidence regarding the
biodiversity-growth linkage (the EKC relationship) can provide helpful insights to this policy debate. We
contribute to the existing EKC literature on biodiversity in a number of ways: (1) We
consider a set of multivariate biodiversity indices that are composed of stock, pressure and response variables,
as supported in the conservation biology literature (Reyers et al.1998); (2) In addition, these indices account for
species, genetic and ecosystem diversity, rather than relying on simple counts of selected
species; (3) These indices are all risk-based measures; (4) Finally, unlike previous EKC
studies based on single or selected species, we demonstrate that our key result is robust to
a variety of specifications (e.g., inclusion of additional control variables that may impact the income-biodiversity risk
relationship). Since the stock of biodiversity is unevenly distributed across the world (Mittermeier 1988),
EKC studies considering mere stock variables (e.g. counts of endangered species) do not provide a
complete and reliable investigation of biodiversity risk. The existing status of biodiversity risk is largely dependent
on the interplay of stock, pressure and response variables. Other common exercises to treat one or more species counts as a measure of
overall biodiversity also give a very limited picture of a complex risk. Biodiversity, a joint outcome of species, genetic and ecosystem
diversity provides society with important benefits, including: economic benefits, (both direct and indirect); aesthetic benefits;
scientific and ethical knowledge; as well as insurance against future uncertainties in natural and human systems. While there are
numerous examples of known economic and aesthetic benefits of biodiversity, ecologists and bio-scientists fre-quently make the
argument that more is unknown than known. While the true composite value of biodiversity may be uncertain, a risk-based measure is
preferred for economic policy design compared to the absolute counts of animals or species. Given that at both the global and national
levels protective resources may be insufficient (Lake 1996), then setting preservation priorities for biodiversity conservation must be

biodiversity loss is
widely considered as a critical global environmental issue for the twenty-first century. A
primary concern, by ecologists and others, is that [End Page 185] biodiversity losses may be irreversible
after crossing critical thresholds (irreparable damage to ecosystem functioning, or complete extinction of collections
of species can be the examples), thus restricting the ability to mitigate or substitute. If true, then the
irreversible, non-shiftable negative externality caused by human activity to this complex
based on the exposed risk (Reyers et al.1998), not on the simple counts of animals or species. In closing,

global public good leaves very limited room to yield an EKC relationship. In consonance with
such arguments, and using several multivariate cross-country indices that represent the most
comprehensive and precise measure of biodiversity risk, we find no evidence for an EKC
relationship for biodiversity risk. Rather than passively relying on simple economic growth to somehow protect
biodiversity, it seems clear that national and international interests will have to take direct policy actions (e.g., international treaties
and protocols). But, that is not to say that economic incentives cannot play a crucial role in the design of such institutions and actually
achieving such development protections. (*EKC = Environmental Kuznets Curve)

AT: Globalization Solves

Globalization destroys the environment
Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 172]
The

first tenet of the globalization design is to give primary importance to the

achievement of ever-more rapid, never-ending corporate economic growth hypergrowth
fueled by the constant search for access to new resources, new and cheaper labor sources,
and new markets . . . To achieve hypergrowth, the emphasis is on the ideological heart of the model free trade
accompanied by deregulation of corporate activity. The idea is to remove as many impediments as possible to expanded corporate
activity.14 Environmental

deterioration is placed unambiguously at the doorstep of these

forces: Economic globalization is intrinsically harmful to the environment because it is
based on ever-increasing consumption, exploitation of resources, and waste disposal
problems. One of its primary features, export-oriented production, is especially damaging
because it is responsible for increasing global transport activity . . . while requiring very
costly and ecologically damaging new infrastructures such as ports, airports, dams,
canals, and so on.

Globalization exacerbates political failure spurring the growth mentality

Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 54-55]
This problem of political

failure is exacerbated in our era of globalization and international

competition. One of globalizations foremost analysts, Thomas Friedman, has described what he calls the golden straitjacket.
When your country . . . recognizes the rules of the free market in todays global economy,
and decides to abide by them, it puts on what I call the Golden Straitjacket. . . . As your
country puts on the Golden Straitjacket, two things tend to happen: your economy grows
and your politics shrinks. That is, on the economic front the Golden Straitjacket usually
fosters more growth and higher average incomes through more trade, foreign investment, privatization and
more effi cient use of resources under the pressure of global competition. But on the political front, the Golden
Straitjacket narrows the political and economic policy choices of those in power to
relatively tight parameters.17 Business Week struck a similar theme in a cover story in 2006, Can Anyone Steer This
Economy? Its conclusion? Global forces have taken control of the economy. And government,
regardless of party, will have less influence than ever. . . . Globalization has overwhelmed

Washingtons ability to control the economy.18 If Washington has trouble controlling the
economy for economic ends like job creation and wage growth, imagine the difficulty of
controlling it to benefit the environment.

AT: Relations/Multilateral Groups/Treaties Solve

Economic interests ensure multilateral efforts will fail
Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 71-73]
The Results Mainstream

environmentalism has moved forward in the swirling, swift currents

of American politics for almost four decades. How has the environment fared? There are two
big stories to tell here. I relate one in Red Sky at Morning. It is the story of the international communitys record in addressing the
most serious environmental issues globalscale environmental concerns and Americas role in the process.7 Although

there
has been strong progress in protecting the ozone layer and some improvement on acid
rain, most of the threatening environmental trends highlighted a quarter century ago have
worsened. As we saw in Chapter 1, global-scale problems are now deeper and more urgent than
ever. It would be nice to think that the international treaties and action plans, the main
focus of efforts to date, have given us the policies and programs we need, so that we
could at last get on with it. But that is not the case. Despite all the conferences and
negotiations, the international community has not laid the foundation for rapid and effective
action. The results of two decades of international environmental negotiations are deeply

disappointing. The bottom line is that todays treaties and their associated agreements and
protocols cannot drive the changes needed. In general, the issue with the major treaties is not
weak enforcement or weak compliance; the issue is weak treaties. Typically, these agreements
are easy for governments to slight because the treaties impressive but nonbinding
goals are not followed by clear requirements, targets, and timetables. And even when
there are targets and timetables, the targets are often inadequate and means of
enforcement are lacking. As a result, the climate convention is not protecting climate, the biodiversity convention is not
protecting biodiversity, the desertification convention is not preventing desertification, and even the older and stronger Convention on
the Law of the Sea is not protecting fisheries. The same can be said for the extensive international discussions on world forests, which
never have reached the point of a convention. In sum, global

environmental problems have gone from bad

to worse, governments are not yet prepared to deal with them, and at present, many
governments, including some of the most important, lack the leadership to get prepared.
How can one explain this failure of green governance at the international level? Powerful
underlying forces drive deterioration including the forces examined in Chapter 2. In response, complex and
far-reaching multilateral action is required, yet the political base, the constituency, for
international action is inherently weak. It can be easily overrun by economic opposition and
claims of sovereignty, and typically is. The United States has stymied effective action on climate, tropical timber
countries on forests, major fishing nations on fisheries. In all these cases and many others, governments have been far more effective
representatives of their countries business interests than of their citizens environmental interests. Here and more broadly, the
findings of political analysts David Levy and Peter Newell are pertinent: Government negotiating positions in Europe and the United
States have tended to track the stances of major industries active on key issues, such that the achievement of global environmental
accords is impossible if important economic sectors are unified in opposition.8 In response, the

international
community has mounted a flawed effort: the root causes of deterioration have not been
addressed seriously; intentionally weak multilateral institutions have been created, none,
for example, rivaling the clout of the World Trade Organization; debilitating, consensus-

based negotiating procedures have been left in place; and the economic and political
context in which treaties must be prepared and implemented has been largely ignored.
Legislating effectively at the international level in a world of almost two hundred
sovereign nations is fiercely difficult, but little has been done to make it easier. These
unsatisfactory results can be attributed in part to miscalculations, but as I describe in Red Sky at Morning, the lions share of the
blame must go to the wealthy, industrial countries and especially to the United States, the principal footdragger. If the United States
and other major governments had wanted a strong, effective international process, they could have created one. If they had wanted
treaties with real teeth, they could have shepherded them into being. That

a tougher approach has not been used

to protect the global environment reflects conscious decisions by the United States and
others to stick with a weak and largely ineffectual approach, decisions made primarily at
the behest of economic interests. Undoubtedly, an ideological opposition has been present, too: those who want to shrink
national government to the point that it can be drowned in a bathtub are even more against international action. But the
example of the powerful World Trade Organization and U.S. support for it certainly
prove that economic interests drive the process.

AT: Market Solves Envt

Markets fail to protect scarce resourcesthey externalize costs
Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 52-53]
There are many good reasons for concern that future

growth could easily continue its environmentally

destructive ways. First, economic activity and its enormous forward momentum can be accurately
characterized as out of control environmentally, and this is true in even the advanced
industrial economies that have modern environmental programs in place. Basically, the
economic system does not work when it comes to protecting environmental resources,
and the political system does not work when it comes to correcting the economic system.
Economist Wallace Oates has provided a clear description of market failure, one reason the market does not work for the
environment: Markets

generate and make use of a set of prices that serve as signals to

indicate the value (or cost) of resources to potential users. Any activity that imposes a cost on
society by using up some of its scarce resources must come with a price, where that price
equals the social cost. For most goods and services (private goods as economists call them), the market forces of
supply and demand generate a market price that directs the use of resources into their
most highly valued employment. There are, however, circumstances where a market price
may not emerge to guide individual decisions. This is often the case for various forms of
environmentally damaging activities.... The basic idea is straightforward and compelling: the absence of an
appropriate price for certain scarce resources (such as clean air and water) leads to their excessive
use and results in what is called market failure. The source of this failure is what economists term an
externality. A good example is the classic case of the producer whose factory spreads smoke
over an adjacent neighborhood. The producer imposes a real cost in the form of dirty air,
but this cost is external to the firm. The producer does not bear the cost of the pollution
it creates as it does for the labor, capital, and raw materials that it employs. The price of
labor and such materials induces the firm to economize on their use, but there is no such
incentive to control smoke emissions and thereby conserve clean air. The point is simply that
whenever a scarce resource comes free of charge (as is typically the case with our limited stocks of clean air
and water), it is virtually certain to be used to excess. Many of our environmental resources
are unprotected by the appropriate prices that would constrain their use. From this perspective, it
is hardly surprising to find that the environment is overused and abused. A market system
simply doesnt allocate the use of these resources properly.15

The markets only prerogative is growththe impact is extinction

Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching

environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 60-61]
Third, as Karl Polanyi described long ago in The Great Transformation, the

spread of the market into new areas,

with its emphasis on efficiency and ever-expanding commodification, can be very costly
environmentally and socially. It is a pleasure to read Polanyi. He saw so clearly in 1944 the costs of unbridled capitalism, yet
he believed this 19th century system, as he called it, was collapsing. He saw the self-adjusting market as a stark utopia.
Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and
natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his
surroundings into a wilderness. . . . To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of
the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and
use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society. . . . Nature would be
reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety
jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. . . . [T]he commodity fiction
disregarded the fact that leaving the fate of soil and people to the market would be
tantamount to annihilating them.27 Of course, the ever-expanding, self-adjusting market that Polanyi feared did not
collapse. It took off again after World War II, became more fearsome and expansive, and the consequences that Polanyi
warned against came to pass. Landscapes are defiled, rivers polluted. Polanyi would, I suspect, be
both surprised and appalled by the ascendancy of the ruthless capitalism of the Anglo-American variety and by the erosion of social
democracy of the European variety. The

dynamics of todays financial marketplace enhance the

pressure on corporate managers to achieve high profit growth. The prime measure of
corporate success to investors is growth in market capitalization and stock price. Market value
responds to a number of factors, but one of the most influential is the expected rate of profit growth. When earnings growth fails to
meet expectations, even for one quarter, stock prices can plummet. Differences of pennies per share can drive financial analysts
recommendations to buy or sell. The

message to managers is clear: expand markets, contain costs,

and increase profitability. Grow.

Markets failpricing mechanisms.

Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 54]
We live in a market economy where prices

are a principal signal for guiding economic activity. When

prices reflect environmental values as poorly as todays prices do, the system is running
without essential controls. And there are other problems too, discussed shortly. Todays market is a strange place indeed.
At the core of the economy is a mechanism that does not recognize the most fundamental
thing of all, the living, evolving, sustaining natural world in which the economy is
operating. Unaided, the market lacks the sensory organs that would allow it to understand
and adjust to this natural world. Its flying blind.

AT: Sustainable Development Solves

The industrial system is obsolete and cant transitionextinction is inevitable
in their mindset.
Taylor 8 [Graeme Taylor is a social activist committed to constructive global transformation
and the coordinator of BEST Futures, a project supporting sustainable solutions through
researching how societies change and evolve, Evolution's Edge: The Coming Collapse and
Transformation of Our World, Pomegranate Press, 2008, ISBN: 9781550923810, EBrary, pg. 98101]
Designed for constant growth The

industrial system is ecologically unsustainable because it is

designed for continuous and limitless growth. This design reflects its worldview, which
can be described as both rationalist (its philosophical methodology) and expansionist (its economic and
political values). Industrial societies are much more dynamic and creative than their agrarian predecessors
because they encourage constant economic development. Agrarian kingdoms believed in
order and cyclical continuity unchanging divine commandments, the divine mandate of kings and inherited and
unchangeable social status. Life revolved around the unchanging cycles of agricultural production. In contrast, industrial
societies believe in the concept of progress: people should try to improve their lives through hard work and
creativity, and companies and countries need to constantly grow and innovate in order to
survive. In agrarian societies the economy was primarily regulated by social relationships by a persons rights and obligations
to others as determined by their social position. Markets were secondary and existed essentially to facilitate the exchange of goods. In
a world where faith and duty were the highest values, commerce had low status; many Christian and Islamic societies believed that it
was immoral to charge interest on loans. In contrast, because the

core value of the modern consumer society

is getting rich, capitalist economies are regulated through financial transactions made by
individuals and corporations based on their access to financial capital (their wealth). Because the
primary purpose of markets is not to exchange goods, but to increase capital, 13 the global economy has evolved
into a financial system designed to support constant capital expansion. Capital expands
through people borrowing and investing money. The money is created by banks in the
form of interest-bearing debts. Loans are predicated on the assumption that the borrowers
will be able to pay back the original loan with interest because they have or will be able
to generate more wealth than they have borrowed. This process creates the financial need
for constant economic expansion. 14 An obsolete model The worldview and design of the
industrial system creates problems that it cant fix. Not only is the worldview
expansionist, but it is also rationalist and reductionist: it views reality as being made up of
discrete objects rather than interrelated systems. This has created a world system that is
made up of independent individuals, corporations and nations, each of whom acts in their own
self-interest with little regard and no responsibility for the common good. As a result local and
global economies convert natural capital into manufactured and financial capital without
taking into account environmental or social costs. The consequences can be seen
everywhere: because individuals and corporations are more interested in short-term
profits than long-term social benefits, productive farmland is sold to commercial developers, ancient forests are
clear-cut and skilled jobs outsourced overseas. These failures are structural: they are the result of a nation-state system that makes
governments accountable only to their own citizens, and of a corporate system that makes executives accountable only to their
shareholders. This

creates what is called the tragedy of the commons: because no government

or corporation is responsible for common resources or collective problems: the air is
polluted, stocks of wild fish are destroyed and millions of refugees left stateless.
Governments of the world find it difficult to take action on global warming, global

poverty or world peace because national interests often conflict with global interests, and
no one is responsible for the planet. The only organization with global responsibility is the United Nations, but it has
no independent authority all the UNs funds come from national governments. Corporations are even more restricted than
governments in their ability to act in the common interest. By law they must take whatever actions most
benefit the financial interests of their shareholders. Law professor Joel Bakan pointed out that their
relentless pursuit of economic self-interest so often disregards the social, economic and
environmental interests of others that it can be described as psychopathic. For example, General
Electric, one of the worlds most respected corporations, was found in major breaches of the law 42 times between 1990 and 2001 for
fraud, deception and violations of pollution and safety regulations. 16 We

live in an increasingly interconnected

world. The carbon dioxide emissions of one country affect every other country. Economic
crises in one country immediately affect global stock markets. Wars in one region affect
the security of countries on the other side of the globe. However, although we have a global system, it is
not responsible or accountable to the people of the world. Its worldview, values and social structures are not
designed to ensure the welfare of either the environment or the majority of the worlds
population. These failures are reflected in the lack of confidence most people have in global political leadership. 17 The
industrial system is incapable of solving problems of war, poverty and environmental
destruction because its competitive views, values and structures support the domination
of nature by humans as well as humans by other humans. Jeff Vail has commented, The process
of evolution within a system dominated by competing hierarchies demands that one set of
goals consume all others: continuous growth, expansion, and increased domination. Any
corporation or nation that pursues a more human-oriented goal will soon find itself
squeezed out of existence for not following the simple rules of natural selection. 18 The
expansionist worldview and institutions of the Industrial Age were designed for the
loosely connected local and national economies of a world with few people and many
resources, not for the interconnected global economy of a world with many people and
scarce resources. Constant, unregulated expansion is viable in an empty world, but dysfunctional and destructive in a full
world. Because the global economy is no longer environmentally sustainable, and because
corporations and national governments cannot manage a global system, the industrial
model is now obsolete.

AT: Society Will Adapt And Change

History proves otherwisethere is no negative feedback mechanism that will
prevent growth from spurring catastrophe.
Gowdy 98 [John M. Gowdy, Professor of Economics at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1998,
"Biophysical Limits to Industrialization: Prospects for the Twenty-first Century," The Coming
Age of Scarcity: Preventing Mass Death and Genocide in the Twenty-first Century, edited by
Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann, Published by Syracuse University Press, ISBN
0815627440, p. 74]

One lesson to be learned from the history of past civilizations is that political pressure
from elites bent on preserving their power at all cost will inevitably result in perpetuating
unsustainable systems until it is too late, that is, until environmental degradation leads to
social disintegration. Easter Island society collapsed even though there were no outside
forces such as military threats, colonization, or social disruption through trade. The society used only local natural
resources whose limits should have been obvious, although the evidence indicates that
they acted as if they were oblivious to the impending resource exhaustion. Large stone
heads were started in quarries but were left unfinished because there were no trees left to
move them. If such obvious self-inflicted environmental collapse could happen in
isolated island societies where environmental damage is immediate and obvious, this is
certainly an indication that there are no natural mechanisms present in post-huntergatherer societies to ensure even short-run ecological sustainability. There is evidently no
negative feedback mechanism in complex societies that limits environmental destruction
even when that destruction threatens social stability.

Probability is on our sidechanges are more likely to be bad than good.

Cobb 98 [John B. Cobb, Jr., Professor Emeritus of Theology and Director of the Center for
Process Studies at Claremont College, 1998, "The Threat to the Underclass," The Coming Age of
Scarcity: Preventing Mass Death and Genocide in the Twenty-first Century, edited by Michael N.
Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann, Published by Syracuse University Press, ISBN 0815627440, p.
26]

The surprises in store for us may not be of this sort. They may instead be crises that strike
us much sooner than we expect. Changes in weather may appear more abruptly than now
anticipated, and they may prove more disruptive of agricultural production globally than
now projected. These changes might lead to mass migrations to places where there is
food, migrations that will be violently resisted. Bacteria and viruses may evolve faster
than our devices for protecting ourselves from them, leading to population reduction
through massive epidemics. People oppressed by the continual expansion of the present
system may revolt in much larger numbers than in the past and may cause social chaos.
The psychological stresses associated with the present system may overwhelm it as it
continues to assault human community and demand the abandonment of all security.
Fanatic political or religious movements may gain such power as fundamentally to
disrupt the economic system.

AT: Political Forces Solve

There is no political will to save the environment
Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 53-54]

Political failure perpetuates, indeed magnifies, this market failure. Government policies could be
implemented to correct market failure and make the market work for the environment
rather than against it. But powerful economic and political interests typically stand to
gain by not making those corrections, so they are not made or the correction is only
partial. Water could be conserved and used more efficiently if it were sold at its full cost, including the
estimated cost of the environmental damage of overusing it, but both politicians and farmers have a stake in
keeping water prices low. Polluters could be made to pay the full costs of their actions, in terms of both damages and
cleanup, but typically they do not. Natural ecosystems give societies economic services of tremendous value. A developers actions
can reduce these services to society, but rarely does the developer pay fully for those lost services. Governments

not only
tend to shy away from correcting market failure but exacerbate the problem by creating
subsidies and other practices that make a bad situation worse. In Perverse Subsidies, Norman Myers and
Jennifer Kent estimate that governments worldwide have established environmentally damaging
subsidies that amount to about $850 billion annually. They conclude that the impact of these
subsidies on the environment is widespread and profound. They note: Subsidies for
agriculture can foster overloading of croplands, leading to erosion and compaction of
topsoil, pollution from synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, denitrification of soils, and
release of greenhouse gases, among other adverse effects. Subsidies for fossil fuels
aggravate pollution effects such as acid rain, urban smog, and global warming, while
subsidies for nuclear energy generate exceptionally toxic waste with an exceptionally
long half-life. Subsidies for road transportation lead to overloading of road networks, a
problem that is aggravated as much as relieved by the building of new roads when further
subsidies promote overuse of cars; the sector also generates severe pollution of several
sorts. Subsidies for water encourage misuse and overuse of water supplies that are
increasingly scarce. Subsidies for fisheries foster overharvesting of already depleted fish
stocks. Subsidies for forestry encourage overexploitation at a time when many forests
have been reduced by excessive logging, acid rain, and agricultural encroachment.16

Corporations make political solutions impossible

Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,

The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 61-62]
But the system that drives todays unsustainable growth includes other powerful elements beyond these. First, there is what the
modern corporation has become. The

corporation, the most important institution and agent of modern capitalism, has
become both huge and hugely powerful. There are today more than sixty-three thousand
multinational corporations. As recently as 1990, there were fewer than half that. Of the
one hundred largest economies in the world, fifty-three are corporations. Exxon Mobil is
larger than 180 nations.28 Corporations are required by law and driven by self-interest to
increase their monetary value for the benefit of their owners, the shareholders, and
pressures to show quick results in this regard have grown steadily. The corporate sector
wields great political and economic power and has routinely used that power to restrain
ameliorative governmental action.29 And it has driven the rise of transnational capital as the

basis for economic globalization. The international system of investing, buying, and selling is becoming a single
global economy. Unfortunately, what we have today is the globalization of market failure.

AT: Reforms Solve

Working within the system only focuses on symptoms prompting short term
solutions desensitizing people to the need for system-wide change. Only
reforming the system itself will solve.
Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 85-86]
Fourth, there

are the limits that stem from the pragmatic, compromising, deal-with-theeffects approach of modern environmentalism. That approach often leads to quick fixes
and to picking the low-hanging fruit. Quick fixes address symptoms, not the underlying
causes.42 They dont get at the problem and can thus mask what needs to be done.
Building codes can make homes more efficient, but what if consumers and builders want
ever-larger homes? Auto efficiency standards can be tightened, but what if consumers drive more and more miles in part
because good rapid transit options do not exist? Picking the low-hanging fruit can yield gains that are
politically easy and economically attractive, but as the situation looks improved and
becomes more tolerable like the U.S. environment today and as the costs of further improvement
mount, support can melt away, and environmental leaders can find themselves trapped
and unable to move forward with the job half done. And given the tendency of
environmentalists and almost all other communities of interest to work mainly with themselves,
when one does get trapped, there are few friends to help out. Modern environmentalism endeavors to
make the system work for the environment, but many observers, like longtime Washington Post reporter William Greider, are deeply
skeptical. The

regulatory state has become a deeply flawed governing mess, he writes in The Soul
of Capitalism. Many of the enforcement agencies are securely captured by the industries they
regulate, others are blocked from effective action by industrys endless litigation and
political counterattacks. Stronger laws are tortuously difficult to enact and invariably
studded with purposeful loopholes designed to delay effective enforcement for years,
even decades.43 In sum, the full burden of managing accumulating environmental threats,
and the powerful forces of modern capitalism driving those threats, have fallen to the
environmental community, both those in government and those outside. But the burden is
too great. The system of modern capitalism as it operates today will generate ever-larger
environmental consequences, outstripping efforts to manage them. Indeed, the system will
seek to undermine those efforts and constrain them within narrow limits. The main body
of environmental action is carried out within the system as currently designed, but
working within the system puts off-limits major efforts to correct many underlying
drivers of deterioration, including most of the avenues of change discussed in the pages
that follow. Working only within the system will, in the end, not succeed when what is
needed is transformative change in the system itself.

AT: Envtl Groups Solve

The profit motive overrides other social concerns
Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 82-3]
Fundamentals These patterns

could change. The right could lose its grip on things, as it may be doing. The media could
environmental groups could engage more with their
critics and with politics, as they are beginning to do. But there are other limits on todays
environmentalism that are more permanent and more severe. Here are the major ones. First, todays
capitalist world serves up an ever-increasing volume of environmental insults. That is its
nature, born of powerful technology in the hands of powerful corporations with little
transparency, weak oversight, and overriding commitments to profits and growth. As a result,
established concerns persist and new issues proliferate, such as genetic engineering and nanotech.39
wake up, as it is doing at least on climate change. The

America had just begun to address the local and national Earth Day agenda when the global agenda became visible. And once-dead
issues come back, such as nuclear power and strip-mining, now called mountaintop removal, and mineral developments in pristine
areas. The list of concerns is now dauntingly long. Meanwhile, the

world also serves up a steady stream of

competing threats most recently the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq. These seemingly more urgent
threats can and do frequently occupy the available political space, eclipsing the
environment and much else. The drive for profits and growth keeps the environmental problem
spigot fully open. Mark Hertsgaard in Earth Odyssey addresses this issue well: The profit motive is what
makes capitalism go, but it is so basic to the working of the system that it tends to
override other social goals. . . . In theory, governments are supposed to police corporate greed, channeling it . . . away from
the corner-cutting that threatens public health and safety. But regulation is an iffy thing. Corporations

are constantly
pressuring governments to relax environmental regulations if not eliminate them
altogether. This pressure is often supplemented by bribery most commonly, the legal
bribery known as campaign contributions, which has turned so many politicians in the
United States into spineless corporate supplicants unwilling to bite the hands that feed
them. . . . Capitalism needs and promotes ceaseless expansion, yet the evidence that human
activity is already overwhelming the earths ecosystems is all around us.40 Also
overwhelmed is the capacity of environmental efforts to cope.

AT: Growth Will Slow

This is impossible to predictdont count on the pace of growth slowing.
Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 123-4]
It seems possible that slower labor force growth and greater preferences for leisure could lead to slower growth, initially in the richer
countries. Some analysts argue against this conclusion. There

are numerous examples of countries with

slow or no population growth achieving moderate to high rates of economic growth. And
there are rich countries where fertility rates first declined and then recovered.28 Also, if
labor markets do tighten in economies with aging populations, that could lead to a further
shift in investments to regions where labor is plentiful and wages are low, and it could
also lead to demands for increased immigration and guest worker programs. How all this will
play out is difficult to predict, but it

would surely be a leap of misplaced faith to count on slow economic

growth in the affluent countries.

AT: History Proves Growth Is Sustainable

History is on our sidethis time the collapse will be global.
Gowdy 98 [John M. Gowdy, Professor of Economics at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1998,
"Biophysical Limits to Industrialization: Prospects for the Twenty-first Century," The Coming
Age of Scarcity: Preventing Mass Death and Genocide in the Twenty-first Century, edited by
Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann, Published by Syracuse University Press, ISBN
0815627440, p. 74-75]

In these past examples (except that of Easter Island), when a particular society disintegrated, the
survivors could migrate to other areas and repeat the rapid expansion and collapse. Today
the same thing is happening on a global scale and there will be no place to go when the
current system repeats this well-established pattern. A comprehensive study led by Homer-Dixon, Boutwell,
and Rathjens (1993, 38) involving a team of thirty researchers concluded that scarcities of renewable resources are already
contributing to violent conflicts in many parts of the developing world. The results of this study confirm the theoretical
(thermodynamic) analysis discussed above, and show that the

recurring pattern of expansion, resource

exhaustion, and collapse of human societies during the past millennia is now repeating
itself on a global scale. Homer-Dixon and others (1993, 38) conclude that (1) increasing resource [end page 74] scarcity
can strengthen the hand of the social elite and exacerbate an unequal distribution of resources, (2) the parameters of the resource base,
such as the depth of upland soil in the tropics, are a physical given not a product of human institutions, and (3) environmental
degradation may have passed, in much of the developing world, a threshold of irreversibility. Dasgupta (1995), drawing on empirical
studies from a number of disciplines, comes to a similar conclusion. There are self-reinforcing links between population, poverty and
the degradation of local environments. Dasgupta also points out that power is shared unequally among classes and gender and those
who make decisions about resource use and income distribution typically do not pay the environmental and social costs of their
decisions. For example, in the decision to have more children, men in developing countries have more power, yet it is the women who
bear the costs. Dasgupta (1995) found an unmistakable relationship between poverty, female illiteracy, and population growth. Data
on the status of women from seventy-nine so- called Third World countries display an unmistakable pattern: high fertility, high rates
of illiteracy, low share of paid employment, and a high percentage working at home for no paythey all hang together.

*** Technology

2NC/1NR WallAT: Tech Solves

Tech cant solve
1.) We need to get rid of the growth mindset to solve
Taylor 8 [Graeme Taylor is a social activist committed to constructive global transformation
and the coordinator of BEST Futures, a project supporting sustainable solutions through
researching how societies change and evolve, Evolution's Edge: The Coming Collapse and
Transformation of Our World, Pomegranate Press, 2008, ISBN: 9781550923810, EBrary, pg. 845]

We will not be able to avoid the environmental collapse of our world and the economic
collapse of our civilization by technological means alone. As long as the world system is
organized by values that promote materialism and violence, global consumption will continue to
increase and the environment will continue to degrade. In order to preserve the
environment we need not only better technologies but also better values. Satish Kumar, the editor
of Resurgence magazine, says that in addition to efficiency we need sufficiency. 81 Sufficiency is
learning to be satisfied with enough; it is taking care of real needs rather than false
greeds. The consumer culture has no concept of enough: millionaires want to be
billionaires, and billionaires want to own even more. In reality no one needs to be a millionaire in order to be happy. In fact
consuming more than we need is not only immoral in a hungry world, but it is also the
road to environmental destruction, emotional and spiritual poverty, war and economic
ruin. We would all be far happier living in a peaceful world without poverty, pollution, disease, crime and war. But a peaceful
and sustainable world will only be possible if we learn about limits if we learn to live
within the planets biophysical limits; if we learn to share the planets limited resources;
if we learn to give more and take less and if we learn to be satisfied with enough.

2.) There is no incentive to develop sustainable techpolitical institutions are

too slow
Speth 8 [James Gustave Speth, law professor, Served as President Jimmy Carters White House
environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations largest agency for international
development Prof at Vermont law school, former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching
environmental and constitutional law, former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
in the Executive Office of the President, co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to
Sustainability, ISBN: 9780300145304, EBrary, pg. 114-5]

The needed rates of technological improvement are thus high, and they must be
continuously sustained. And there are many, many areas where such technological
changes must occur, beyond those affecting carbon dioxide emissions in agriculture,
construction, manufacturing, transportation, and elsewhere. In the carbon dioxide example, almost half
the required rate of change is needed simply to compensate for the effects of economic growth. It is like running up a
down escalator a very fast down escalator. Perhaps it can be done. I am doubtful,10 but here
is a key point: it is not being done today, and no government that I know of is

systematically, adequately promoting the universal, rapid, and sustained penetration of

green technology, at home and abroad, on the scale required. Governments are, however,
profoundly committed to promoting growth. Real speed is required for technological
change to stay well ahead of growth, but the social and political institutions that can
create the incentives for rapid technological change can be slow to respond, as can the
needed science and technology. The development of international environmental law and
regulation is painfully slow, for example. But the world economy and urbanization surge
ahead, faster than societies can respond. Chlorofluorocarbons were produced for decades
before scientists raised concerns. Then it took a decade to agree on a phaseout, which
took another decade. Yet the problem was relatively simple compared to most, and the
response was fast by international standards. Our capacity to anticipate and respond
effectively today has not greatly improved. Yet by the time todays university students
reach leadership positions, the world economy will likely be twice its current size.

3.) Tech cant solve all environmental problems and masks the true problem
of consumption
Godhaven 9 [Merrick Godhaven is an environmental writer and activist. He co-authored the
Corporate Watch report Technofixes: A Critical Guide to Climate Change Technologies. The
Guardian, Swapping technologies fails to address the root causes of climate change, July 15,
2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2009/jul/15/technofix-climate-change]
Technology is part of the solution to climate change. But only part. Techno-fixes like some of those in the Guardian's
Manchester Report simply cannot

deliver the carbon cuts science demands of us without being

accompanied by drastic reductions in our consumption. That means radical economic and
social transformation. Merely swapping technologies fails to address the root causes of
climate change. We need to choose the solutions that are the cheapest, the swiftest, the most effective and least likely to incur
dire side effects. On all counts, there's a simple answerstop burning the stuff in the first place. Consume less. There is a
certain level of resources we need to survive, and beyond that there is a level we need in
order to have lives that are comfortable and meaningful. It is far below what we presently
consume. Americans consume twice as much oil as Europeans. Are they twice as happy?
Are Europeans half as free? Economic growth itself is not a measure of human wellbeing, it only measures things with an assessed monetary value. It values wants at the same level as needs
and, while it purports to bring prosperity to the masses, its tendency to concentrate profit
in fewer and fewer hands leaves billions without the necessities of a decent life. Technofixation masks the incompatibility of solving climate change with unlimited economic
growth. Even if energy consumption can be reduced for an activity, ongoing economic
growth eats up the improvement and overall energy consumption still rises. We continue
destructive consumption in the expectation that new miracle technologies will come and
save us. The hope of a future techno-fix feeds into the pass-it-forward, do-nothing-now
culture typified by targets for 2050. Tough targets for 2050 are not tough at all, they are a
decoy. Where are the techno-fix plans for the peak in global emissions by 2015 that the
IPCC says we need? Even within the limited sphere of technology, we have to separate the solutions
from the primacy of profit. We need to choose what's the most effective, not the most
lucrative. Investors will want the maximum return for their money, and so the benefits of any climate technologies will, in all
likelihood, be sold as carbon credits to the polluter industries and nations. It would not be done in tandem with emissions cuts but
instead of them, making it not a tool of mitigation but of exacerbation.

Climate change is not the only crisis

currently facing humanity. Peak oil is likely to become a major issue within the coming
decade. Competition for land and water, soil fertility depletion and collapse of fisheries
are already posing increasing problems for food supply and survival in many parts of the
world. Technological solutions to climate change fail to address most of these issues. Yet
even without climate change, this systemic environmental and social crisis threatens
society, and requires deeper solutions than new technology alone can provide. Around a
fifth of emissions come from deforestation, more than for all transport emissions
combined. There is no technological fix for that. We simply need to consume less of the
forest, that is to say, less meat, less agrofuel and less wood. Our level of consumption is inequitable.
Making it universal is simply impossible. The scientist Jared Diamond calculates that if the
whole world were to have our level of consumption, it would be the equivalent of having
72 billion people on earth. With ravenous economic growth still prized as the main
objective of society by all political leaders the world over, that 72 billion would be just
the beginning. At 3% annual growth, 25 years later it would be the equivalent of 150
billion people. A century later it would be over a trillion. Something's got to give. And indeed,
it already is. It's time for us to call it a crisis and respond with the proportionate radical action that is needed. We need
profound changenot only government measures and targets but financial systems, the operation of corporations, and
people's own expectations of progress and success. Building a new economic democracy based on meeting human needs equitably and
sustainably is at least as big a challenge as climate change itself, but if human society is to succeed the two are inseparable.

Instead of asking how to continue to grow the economy while attempting to cut carbon,
we should be asking why economic growth is seen as more important than survival.

4.) The belief in technology spurs inaction

Cohen 10 [Dave Cohen is a freelance writer with interest in energy, the economy, and climate,
Economic Growth And Climate Change No Way Out? February 2, 2010,
http://peakwatch.typepad.com/peak_watch/2010/02/economy-and-climate-no-way-out.html]
3. The Technology Paradox It

is not surprising that the Assumption of Technological Progress

gives rise to a paradox: if technological progress is guaranteed (i.e. comes "for free"), we need
not try very hard to make technological progress happen! This completes the circle of
inaction that we witnessed most recently at Copenhagen, where no binding CO2
reduction targets were specified. So, while the assumption of technological progress (and
concomitant economic growth) has fueled hope among those who believe climate mitigation is
possible, it has also retarded efforts to actually make progress in addressing the problem.

5.) Tech will be too slow to save us

Orlov 11 [Dmitry Orlov is the author of the award-winning book Reinventing Collapse: The
Soviet Example and American Prospects. Born in Russia, he moved to the US while a teenager,
and has traveled back repeatedly to observe the Soviet collapse during the late eighties and midnineties. He is an engineer who has worked in many fields, including high-energy physics
research, e-commerce and internet security. Definancialization, Deglobalization and
Relocalization, Editors: Richard Douthwaite is co-founder of Feasta, an Irish economic think
tank focused on the economics of sustainability. He is also a council member of Comhar, the Irish
government's national sustainability council. He acted as economic adviser to the Global
Commons Institute from 1993 to 2005, during which time GCI developed the Contraction and
Convergence approach to dealing with greenhouse gas emissions which has since been backed by
many countries. Gillian Fallon is a writer, journalist, and editor with a particular interest in food

security. Fleeing Vesuvius: Overcoming the Risks of Economic and Environmental Collapse,
New Society Publishers, 2011, ISBN: 0865716994, pg. 173-174]

One accusation I often hear is that I fail to grasp the power of technological innovation
and the free-market system. If I did, apparently I would have more faith in a technologically advanced future where all of
our current dilemmas are swept away by a new wave of eco-friendly sustainability. My problem is that I am not an economist or a

am an engineer with a background in science. The fact that Ive worked in

several technology start-up companies doesnt help either. I know roughly how long it
takes to innovate: come up with the idea, convince people that it is worth trying, try it,
fail a few times, eventually succeed and then phase it in to real use. It takes decades. We
do not have decades. We have already failed to innovate our way out of this. Not only
that, but in many ways technological innovation has done us a tremendous disservice. A
good example is innovation in agriculture. The so-called green revolution has boosted
crop yields using fossil-fuel inputs, creating generations of agro-addicts dependent on just
one or two crops. In North America, human hair samples3 have been used to determine that fully
69% of all the carbon came from just one plant: maize. So, what piece of technological
innovation do we imagine will enable this maize-dependent population to diversify their
food sources and learn to feed themselves without the use of fossil-fuel inputs? We think that
businessman: I

technology will save us because we are addled by it. Efforts at creating intelligent machines have failed, because computers are far too
difficult to program, but humans turn out to be easy for computers to program. Everywhere I go I see people poking away at their little
mental-support units. Many of them can no longer function without them: they wouldnt know where to go, who to talk to, or even
where to get lunch without a little electronic box telling them what to do. These are all big successes for maize plants and for iPhones,
but are they successes for humanity? Somehow I doubt it. Do we really want to eat nothing but maize and look at nothing but pixels,
or should there be more to life? There are people who believe in the emergent intelligence of the networked realm a sort of artificial
intelligence utopia, where networked machines become hyperintelligent and solve all of our problems. And so our best hope is that in
our hour of need machines will be nice to us and show us kindness? If thats the case, what reason would they find to respect us? Why
wouldnt they just kill us instead? Or enslave us. Oh, wait, maybe they already have!

Ext. Tech Cant Solve

Tech alone will be inadequate to solvewe must reduce consumption
Jackson 8 [Tim Jackson is professor of sustainable development at the University of Surrey,
UK. His research focuses on understanding the social, psychological and structural dimensions of
sustainable living. He is also a member of the Sustainable Development Commission, which
advises the UK government. What politicians are afraid to say, Opinion Special: Beyond
Growth, October 18, 2008, New Scientist, pg. 42-43, Lexis]

The message from all this is clear: any alternative to growth remains unthinkable, even
40 years after the American ecologists Paul Ehrlich and John Holdren made some blindingly obvious points about the arithmetic
of relentless consumption. The Ehrlich equation, I = PAT , says simply that the impact (I ) of
human activity on the planet is the product of three factors: the size of the population (P ),
its level of affluence (A ) expressed as income per person, and a technology factor (T ),
which is a measure of the impact on the planet associated with each dollar we spend. Take
climate change, for example. The global population is just under 7 billion and the average level of affluence is around $8000 per
person. The T factor is just over 0.5 tonnes of carbon dioxide per thousand dollars of GDP - in other words, every $1000 worth of
goods and services produced using today's technology releases 0.5 tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere. So today's global CO2

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC) has stated that to stabilise greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere at a
reasonably safe 450 parts per million, we need to reduce annual global CO2 emissions to
less than 5 billion tonnes by 2050. With a global population of 9 billion thought inevitable
by the middle of this century, that works out at an average carbon footprint of less than
0.6 tonnes per person - considerably lower than in India today. The conventional view is
that we will achieve this by increasing energy efficiency and developing green
technology without economic growth taking a serious hit. Can this really work? With today's
emissions work out at 7 billion 8 0.5 = 28 billion tonnes per year.

global income, achieving the necessary carbon footprint would mean getting the T factor for CO2 down to 0.1 tonnes of CO2 per
thousand US dollars - a fivefold improvement. While

that is no walk in the park, it is probably doable

with state-of-the-art technology and a robust policy commitment. There is one big thing
missing from this picture, however: economic growth. Factor it in, and the idea that
technological ingenuity can save us from climate disaster looks an awful lot more
challenging. First, let us suppose that the world economy carries on as usual. GDP per
capita will grow at a steady 2 or 3 per cent per year in developed countries, while the rest
of the world tries to catch up - China and India leaping ahead at 5 to 10 per cent per year, at least for a while, with
Africa languishing in the doldrums for decades to come. In this (deeply inequitable) world, to meet the IPCC target
we would have to push the carbon content of consumption down to less than 0.03 tonnes
for every thousand US dollars spent - a daunting 11-fold reduction on the current western
European average. Now, let's suppose we are serious about eradicating global poverty. Imagine a world whose 9 billion
people can all aspire to a level of income compatible with a 2.5 per cent growth in European income between now and 2050. In this
scenario, the carbon content of economic output must be reduced to just 2 per cent of the best currently achieved anywhere in the
European Union. In short, if

we insist on growing the economy endlessly, then we will have to

reduce the carbon intensity of our spending to a tiny fraction of what it is now. If growth
is to continue beyond 2050, so must improvements in efficiency. Growth at 2.5 per cent
per year from 2050 to the end of the century would more than triple the global economy
beyond the 2050 level, requiring almost complete decarbonisation of every last dollar.
The potential for technological improvements, renewable energy, carbon sequestration
and, ultimately perhaps, a hydrogen-based economy has not been exhausted. But what
politicians will not admit is that we have no idea if such a radical transformation is even

possible, or if so what it would look like. Where will the investment and resources come from? Where will the
wastes and the emissions go? What might it feel like to live in a world with 10 times as much economic activity as we have today?

Instead, they bombard us with adverts cajoling us to insulate our homes, turn down our
thermostats, drive a little less, walk a little more. The one piece of advice you will not see
on a government list is "buy less stuff". Buying an energy-efficient TV is to be
applauded; not buying one at all is a crime against society. Agreeing reluctantly to advertising standards
is the sign of a mature society; banning advertising altogether (even to children) is condemned as "culture jamming". Consuming
less may be the single biggest thing you can do to save carbon emissions, and yet no one
dares to mention it. Because if we did, it would threaten economic growth, the very thing
that is causing the problem in the first place. Visceral fear is not without foundation. If we do not go out
shopping, then factories stop producing, and if factories stop producing then people get laid off. If people get laid off, then they do not
have any money. And if they don't have any money they cannot go shopping. A falling economy has no money in the public purse and
no way to service public debt. It struggles to maintain competitiveness and it puts people's jobs at risk. A government that fails to
respond appropriately will soon find itself out of office. This is the logic of free-market capitalism: the economy must grow
continuously or face an unpalatable collapse. With

the environmental situation reaching crisis point,

however, it is time to stop pretending that mindlessly chasing economic growth is
compatible with sustainability. We need something more robust than a comfort blanket to
protect us from the damage we are wreaking on the planet. Figuring out an alternative to this doomed
model is now a priority before a global recession, an unstable climate, or a combination of the two forces itself upon us.

Tech cant solvemultiple reasons.

Hueting 8 [Roefie Hueting, a Dutch economist, pianist and leader of the Down Town Jazz
Band, Why environmental sustainability can most probably not be attained with growing
production, paper prepared for the conference: Economic de-growth for ecological
sustainability and social equity, Paris, 18-19 April 2008, http://events.itsudparis.eu/degrowthconference/appel/Degrowth%20Conference%20-%20Proceedings.pdf]
4. Arguments why environmental sustainability can most probably not be attained with growing production and without broad
acceptance of de-growth The

official policy of all countries in the world is that standard NI, that is:
production, must increase in order to create scope for financing environmental
conservation and thus attain a sustainable situation. The theoretical mistake of this reasoning is shown by
Hueting, 1996. Of course, the future cannot be predicted. But the plausibility of whether (a) the actual
production level and (b) environmental sustainability will develop in the same direction
can be examined. This is a minimum prerequisite for assuming a causal relation. On the
grounds of the data discussed below such development is extremely unlikely. We feel the
opposite is more plausible for the following seven reasons.
(1) Theoretically, the possibility that growth of production and consumption can be
combined with restoration and maintenance of environmental quality cannot be excluded.
However, such combination is highly uncertain and scarcely plausible. It would require
technologies that:
(i) are sufficiently clean,
(ii) do not deplete renewable natural resources,
(iii) find substitutes for non-renewable resources,
(iv) leave the soil intact,
(v) leave sufficient space for the survival of plant and animal species and
(vi) are cheaper in real terms than current available technologies, because if they are more expensive
in real terms growth will be reduced.

Meeting all these six conditions is hardly conceivable for the whole spectrum of human activities.
Especially simultaneously realising both (i) through (v) and (vi), which is a prerequisite for

combining production growth and conservation of the environment, is extremely difficult. To give
one example: as a rule, renewable energy is currently much more expensive than energy
generated using fossil fuels. The costs of implementing renewable energy throughout
society are high, and this substantially lowers production growth. Internalising the costs
of eliminating the emissions of burning fossil fuels will reduce the production level
considerably. Anyhow, technologies necessary for the combination of production growth and
full conservation of the functions of the environment are not yet available. Anticipating
on their future availability conflicts with the precautionary principle, and consequently
with sustainability. As explained above, in this application of the precautionary principle no future technological progress is
anticipated.

AT: Sustainable Dev

True sustainability is only possible in a world of degrowththeir evidence is
rhetoric.
Rull 11Valent Rull is head of the Laboratory of Palynology and Paleoecology at the Botanic
Institute of Barcelona, Spain. [January 14, 2011, Sustainability, capitalism and evolution,
EMBO Reports, (2011) 12, 103 - 106]

Humans are exploiting the Earth in an unsustainable manner, which is accelerating both
environmental degradation and loss of biodiversity. Moreover, owing to global climate
change, the rates of deterioration and extinction will probably increase in the near future.
The scientific community has been highly sensitive to this alarming development and increased the number of baseline and ecological
studies on the impact of humans on the biosphere and proposed various strategies to alleviate the environmental and biotic crisis. This
has triggered vivid discussions about the potential risks and benefits of measures such as adaptation and/or mitigation actions,
ecosystem restoration, the assisted migration of species or triage conservation (Mooney, 2010).

One constant in these proposals is a sense of urgency, as the pace of change seems to
outstrip our capacity to react to it. There are various crucial issues that limit said capacity:
the incomplete inventory of biodiversitywe still do not know how many and which species live on Earth; our
deficiency in understanding the relationships between biodiversity and ecosystem
functioning; and the inertia of the planet itselfeven if we immediately stopped using
fossil fuels and reduced CO2 emissions, global climate change would continue for
decades or even centuries (Matthews & Weaver, 2010). Finally, but maybe most damaging, our social and
economic systems are too recalcitrant to even acknowledge, let alone abandon or reduce
their destructive practices.
A popular remedy for the deterioration of nature is sustainabilitycommonly defined as meeting
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCDE, 1987)which
would harmonize human development and the conservation of nature. This classical
notion of sustainable development argues inexplicitly for caring for our natural
environment, because it is the primary provider of resources to sustain human life. Elkington
(2002) introduced a social element to this by recognizing that sustainable development involves the
simultaneous pursuit of economic prosperity, environmental quality and social equity.
Baumgrtner & Quaas (2010) define sustainability as a matter of justice at three levels: between humans of the same generation,
between humans of different generations, and between humans and nature. Many other forms, definitions and interpretations of
sustainability existstrong, weak, technological, economical, social, environmental, ecological, and so onbut, in

all cases,
the ultimate objective of sustainability is to preserve biodiversity and ecological functions
for the benefit of present and future human generations. In short, our concern for nature is
essentially anthropocentric (Rull, 2010a).
The concept of sustainability has become the paradigm for conservation and
environmental studies, to the extent that many consumer products, technologies and
developments now claim to be sustainable, whatever that means. The same happens at the
popular level, as the term sustainable is often considered a synonym of good whereas
unsustainable is used in a pejorative sense for what is considered intrinsically bad.
Curiously, these notions are widespread in different societal sectorspoliticians, economists, scientists, journalists, the general
publicindependent of their social condition and political and economic orientation. The

terms sustainable and

sustainability are in danger of losing their original meaning to become merely rhetorical
elements or advertising slogans.
Our understanding and definition of nature conservation is largely guided by our concept of
naturalness. But nature has always been in flux; after billions of years of biological

evolution and ecological changewith and without human involvementit is impossible to define the
natural state of the environment. In addition, human actions have an impact on ecosystems;
thus, the maintenance of a pristine state of the Earthhowever one would define thisdoes not seem
to be compatible with basic human needs. A more practical approach to sustainability and the preservation of a
natural state would be to require that any modifications of nature leave ecosystems as diverse and healthy as possible. More
pragmatically, the best we could hope to achieve, even from an ecocentric point of view,
is to stop further spoiling of nature and preserve the current unnatural state.
Given this inherent conflict between conservation and human needs, conservation
organizations struggle to propose practices that balance the needs of people with the needs of the
planet that supports us (IUCN, http://www.iucn.org), or protect Earth's most important natural places for you and future
generations (The Nature Conservancy, http://www.nature.org.proxy.library.emory.edu), in order to build a future where people live
in harmony with nature (WWF, http://www.wwf.org). In other words, conservationists

advocate sustainable
development of human societies, but their activities can only be palliative. Sustainability
will only be attained after drastic reorientation towards steady-state or de-growth
economic models (Lawn, 2010; Schneider et al, 2010), which would involve profound changes not
only for societies, but also for every individual.

Sustainability and development are incompatibleanthropocentrism limits

the scope of change.
Rull 11Valent Rull is head of the Laboratory of Palynology and Paleoecology at the Botanic
Institute of Barcelona, Spain. [January 14, 2011, Sustainability, capitalism and evolution,
EMBO Reports, (2011) 12, 103 - 106]

The main obstacles to such broad socioeconomic change towards sustainable

development are the high number of environmental problems that clamour for attention
(seeing trees but not the forest) and the intransigence of social and economic systems. It is
naive to pretend that representatives of the dominant economic and political systems will
renounce capitalism; this has been repeatedly demonstrated at Kyoto or Copenhagen,
where the international community was unable to agree on even small changes to slow
global climate change.
Even worse, scientists and conservationists could become trapped in the very system that
they are trying to change. A good example of this risk comes from attempts to assign
monetary value to biodiversity and ecosystem services and use market rules to manage
them (Rull, 2010a). A simple economic analysis is enough to demonstrate the fallacy of this economic approach to sustainability,
even from a pragmatic perspective.

The appeal of this concept is that any ecosystem service could be submitted to a cost
benefit analysis, that would incorporate natural capital into current economic models. It also
makes possible a general definition of comprehensive wealth, which includes not only reproducible capital such as buildings,
machinery, roads and so on, but also natural capital. In this context, sustainable

development has been redefined

as the accumulation of comprehensive wealth, which requires that each generation
should bequeath the next one at least as large a productive base, including both
reproducible and natural capital, as it has inherited (Dasgupta, 2010).
However, submitting natural resources to economic analysis does not guarantee
sustainable practices. The first thing to bear in mind is that comprehensive wealth is finite and limited
by the carrying capacity of the Earth. If certain planetary systemssuch as climate, ocean
acidity, freshwater and biodiversitychange beyond a certain limit, it could trigger
nonlinear and catastrophic consequences on a global scale (Rokstrm et al, 2009). Second, the

components of comprehensive wealth depend on each other: for example, building a road
through a forest is done at the expense of the forest, that is, natural capital. Building the road
might increase comprehensive wealth but it has a price: natural degradation, including
resource exhaustion, loss of biodiversity and increased pollution. If human growth
continues, these costs could become so high that systemsboth ecological and economiccollapse.
Sustainable practices could therefore aim to minimize the loss of natural capital, but if
human development continues unabated, the carrying capacity of the Earth will
nonetheless be reached sooner or later.
Rockstrm et al (2009) argue that humanity has already transgressed three of nine critical planetary
boundaries, namely climate change, biodiversity loss and interference with the nitrogen
cycle through industrial and agricultural fixation of atmospheric nitrogen, the combustion
of fossil fuels and biomass and the pollution of waterways and coastal zones. This means that
nature is subsidizing the capitalist mode of development. For a quantitative estimate of natural costs, the
LPI (Living Planet Index) of global diversity has declined by nearly 35% in the past 30 years (WWF, 2008); hence, the cost during
this period has been about 1.2% of species per year.

Even if capitalism, as the dominant economic model, incorporates natural capital into its
costbenefit analysis, nature still loses out; unlimited human growththe central tenet of
capitalismand sustainable development are incompatible (Rull, 2010b). Some alternative modes of
human development exist (Costanza, 2009; Schneider et al, 2010), but these also rely on sustainability.
How then would nature benefit from sustainability? In other words, how

would sustainability guarantee nature

conservation? To answer this question, we must realize what nature is, beyond its role in fulfilling human needs. Our
planet has mostly existed without humans since the first forms of life appeared around
3.8 billion years ago. Homo sapiens appeared around 200,000 years ago (Tattersall & Schwartz,
2009), but it was only during the past 10,000 years that humans began to change their
environment on an increasing scale. Before this time, biodiversity gains and losses were
the results of natural evolution; extinction patterns were more stochastic and were not determined by the needs of one
species. The key question is whether humankind will endure, or be just another chapter in the history of the Earth.

Despite claims that cultural evolution has replaced biological evolution in humans,
natural selection is still shaping our biology in response to environmental change.
Humans in their current form are therefore not necessarily the last word in evolutionary
terms, nor is there a guarantee that Homo will be around in the future (Rull, 2009). If we take a strictly
anthropocentric view and only worry for future humans, the preservation of the planet
beyond the next few generations should not be a matter of concern. However, if we worry for
the fate of the biosphere in general, nature conservation would imply not only the
preservation of the current status, but also its safe evolutionary continuity.
From an evolutionary perspective, sustainability is therefore not enough, given its intrinsic
anthropocentric focus. Still, it would be a significant improvement on the unfettered exploitation of natural resources. To
progress from sustainability to nature conservation would require a less anthropocentric and more evolutionary perspective. This
might look like renouncing our status as the assumedly superior species on Earth but, as intelligent creatures, we should be able to
embrace conservation of nature. So far, we

have used our intelligence to try to understand our own

existence, prolong our lives and develop new technologies to rule the Earth. When it
comes to environmental issues, however, we are just stupid (Meffe, 2009). We must realize that the real
world is not the transitory socioeconomic scenario in which we live, but the Earth that is evolving at a pace and magnitude that
exceeds our capacity to understand and appreciate it. So far, proponents

of sustainability have emphasized

social equity and justice for future generations, whereas nature is still viewed as a service
provider that should be maintained for practical reasons.

AT: Green Tech

Green tech cant solvenarrow focus
Korowicz 11 [David Korowicz is a physicist and human systems ecologist, the director of The
Risk/Resilience Network in Ireland, a board member of FEASTA - The Foundation for the
Economics of Sustainability, On The Cusp of Collapse Complexity, Energy and the Globalized
Economy, Editors: Richard Douthwaite is co-founder of Feasta, an Irish economic think tank
focused on the economics of sustainability. He is also a council member of Comhar, the Irish
government's national sustainability council. He acted as economic adviser to the Global
Commons Institute from 1993 to 2005, during which time GCI developed the Contraction and
Convergence approach to dealing with greenhouse gas emissions which has since been backed by
many countries. Gillian Fallon is a writer, journalist, and editor with a particular interest in food
security. Fleeing Vesuvius: Overcoming the Risks of Economic and Environmental Collapse,
New Society Publishers, 2011, ISBN: 0865716994, pg. 9]

Peak oil is expected to be the first ecological constraint to impact signifi-cantly on the
advanced infrastructure of the globalized economy. However, it is only one part of an
increasingly integrated web of constraints includ-ing fresh-water shortages, biodiversity
loss, soil erosion and reduced soil fertility, shortages of key minerals and climate change.
As a result, it makes little sense to compartmentalize our focus as we do through the UN Frame- work
Convention on Climate Change, for example. The interwoven nature of our predicament is clearly shown
by the Green Revolution of the 19605 that supposedly "solved" the increasing pressure on
food production from a growing population. Technology was marshalled to put food
production onto a fossil-fuel platform, which allowed further population overshoot and
thus a more general growth in resource and sink demands. The result is that even more
people are more vulnerable as their increased welfare demands are dependent upon a less
diverse and more fragile resource base. As limits tighten, we are responding to stress on
one key resource (by, say, reducing greenhouse gas emissions or getting around fuel constraints by using bio-fuels) by
placing stresses on other key resources that are themselves already under strain (food, water).
That we have to do so demonstrates how little adaptive capacity we have left.

AT: Green Revolution

A green revolution is insufficient to solve. Technology cant solve
unsustainable consumption patterns.
Barry 8Dr. Glen Barry, President and Founder of Ecological Internet, an online portal for the
global environmental movement, Ph.D. in Land Resources from the University of WisconsinMadison, M.S. in Conservation Biology and Sustainable Development from the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, and B.A. in Political Science from Marquette University [January 4, 2008,
Time to Stop the Greenwashing, http://climateandcapitalism.com/2008/01/04/time-to-stop-thegreenwashing/]
Global ecological sustainability depends upon identifying and acting upon ambitious, sufficient eco-policies now; and rejecting
misleading, exploitative and inadequate reformist pandering

The Earth and all species including humans are threatened with imminent ecological ruin.
You should be afraid, very afraid. Yet real hope remains that fundamental social change can avert looming failure of global
ecosystems. The

biggest current obstacle to such change is that now that everyone, every product
and every business claims to be green; we have been diverted from urgent, adequate
ecological change required to secure being.
Many mainstream (and some radical) environmentalists, most businesses and essentially all
governments are greenwashing misleading the public regarding the environmental
benefits of their practices, policies and products. Certified FSC logging destroys ancient
forests, climate and water. Coal is unlikely to ever be clean as existing plants emit into
the atmosphere, and sequestration is unproven. Biofuels hurt the environment, geoengineering will destroy remaining natural processes, and buying more stuff is rarely
good for the environment.
It is time to stop the greenwashing. After two decades of successfully raising awareness regarding climate change, forest protection
and other challenges to global ecological sustainability; increasingly my

time is spent reacting to dangerous,

insufficient responses that fail to address root causes of ecological decline, provide a false
sense of action, and frequently consolidate and do more environmental harm.
Many greenwash to make money, some to be perceived as effective advocates, while
others believe incremental progress without changing the system is the best that can be
done. Yet all are delaying policies necessary simply to survive. The greatest obstacle to
identifying, refining, espousing and implementing policies required to maintain a
habitable Earth may come from environmentalists proposing inadequate half-measures
that delay and undermine the rigorous work that must be done to bring humanity back
into natures fold.
Sufficient policies required to save the Earth are massive in scope and ambition. Deep-seated change is required in how we house,
feed and clothe ourselves; in our understanding of acceptable livelihoods and happy lives; and in our relationship with the biosphere
and each other. To

maintain a livable Earth there is no alternative to less people and

consumption, a smaller and restorative economy, and an end to cutting natural vegetation and burning fossil
fuels.
Systematic failure of global ecosystems and social systems must be addressed in more
than a token manner. A whole series of policy actions exist that we know are needed, would work, are sufficient, and could
start immediately. These include massive investments into subsidizing renewable energy, implementing population controls, banning
coal, ending old-growth logging and financing carbon emission reductions.
Given the Earth has already exceeded what can be sustained in these regards, not only must the destruction stop, but massive regional
scale ecological restoration must commence to establish rewilded and connected ecological reserves. Economic

growth

beyond steady-state use of natural capital must be stopped, and sustainable relocalized communities built around bioregions.
Certainly ecologically positive technology has a role to play. Living in the country and needing a vehicle I recently chose the best
transportation option society offers me and bought a Toyota Prius. But

leading environmentalists touting

technology as the primary emphasis to save our environment are dreadfully misinformed,
and are obviously unaware of the ecological nature of being. They seem to have forgotten about the
primacy of maintaining and restoring ecosystems.
Even as we personally strive to live frugal, rich lives; necessary consumption should focus upon durable items that will last. Strong
tools are required to grow food, make a living, and otherwise practice ecological living. Excessive consumption is a poor substitute for
a truthful, fully aware, knowledge filled and experience rich life. All can enjoy some luxuries, rather than some enjoying all.

Global ecological threats are intensifying oceans lifeless, forests tattered, water scarce,
and the atmosphere perhaps irreparably damaged. This occurs even as a climate change
backlash builds, largely as a result of truthful apocalyptic warnings without adequate policies that go beyond greenwash
responses and actually promise a hope filled solution.

Given this increased urgency and public awareness, the environmental community must
espouse rigorous, sufficient polices while the iron is hot; and demand real actions that
are sufficient to solve global ecological crises. And greenwashers beware: if you stand in the way of sufficient
ecological responses to the greatest emergency of all times, you will be exposed as Earth destroying charlatans and resisted.

AT: Renewable Energy

Renewable energy cant solve our consumption problemits inadequate3
reasons
Simms and Johnson 10 [Andrew Simms founded the climate change, energy and
interdependence programmes at nef, and is author of Ecological Debt: Global Warming and the
Wealth of Nations. Until the end of 2010, he was Policy Director at nef. Andrew writes regularly
for the national press and is on the boards of Greenpeace UK, the climate campaign 10:10 and
The Energy and Resources Institute Europe. Victoria Johnson is the acting head of the climate
change and energy programme at nef. Victoria has a BSc in Environmental Sciences, a MSc
(awarded with distinction) in Climate Change, both from the University of East Anglia, and a
PhD in Atmospheric Physics at Imperial College. Growth isn't Possible, new economics
foundation, January 25, 2010, pg. 110-113,
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01564/_res/id=sa_File1/Growth_Isnt
_Possible.pdf]
The limits to a renewable energy fix There

are numerous reasons to implement the most rapid shift

possible to a global energy system based on technologies that tap into renewable energy
sources: wind, water and solar. These reasons include climate change, energy security in the face of Peak Oil, cost-effective
conversion and flexible and secure supply. Several studies have shown that, although not without a few difficulties to overcome, it is
both practical and possible to meet the global demand for energy from these sources. 375 One recent study published in Scientific
American in late 2009 outlined a plan to achieve just this by the year 2030. 376 Based only on existing technology that can already be
applied on a large scale, it called for the building of 3.8 million large wind turbines, 90,000 solar plants and a combination of
geothermal, tidal and rooftop solar-PV installations globally. The authors point out that while this is undeniably a bold scheme, the
world already produces 73 million cars and light trucks every year. And, for comparison, starting in 1956 the US Interstate Highway
System managed to build 47,000 miles of highway in just over three decades, changing commerce and society. But, even

plentiful supplies of renewable energy are not a get out of jail free card for economic
growth. The reasons are few and straightforward. First, growth has a natural resource footprint that goes
far beyond energy and we have to learn to live within the waste-absorbing and
regenerative capacity of the whole biosphere. Secondly, even under the most ambitious
programme of substituting new renewable energy for old fossil fuel systems, it will take
time and, in climate terms, we are, according at least to James Hansen, already beyond safe limits of
greenhouse gas concentrations. 377 More global growth will take us even further beyond,
with few guarantees that in the space of a few short years the chances of avoiding
runaway climate change become unacceptably small. Thirdly, we also have to take into
account the fact that, at least until renewable energy achieves a scale whereby its own
generated energy becomes self-reproducing in terms of the energy needed for
manufacture, even renewable energy systems have a resource footprint to account for. For
example, recent research by the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research suggests that
embodied energy in new energy infrastructure means that it would be approximately
eight years before a decarbonisation plan would have a meaningful impact on emissions.
378 Renewable technologies are rightly regarded as a potential source of future employment and have a large economic contribution
to make, and tend to be seen as carbon neutral or potentially negative. 379 Despite this, their

overall environmental
impact is not entirely benign, and this is particularly evident when renewable
technologies are considered on a large-scale, something that is regularly assumed in
future emission/ economic growth scenarios. Renewable energy supply is still constrained
by the laws of thermodynamics, since energy is being removed from a system; the natural
system of the Earth. Whilst this refers to the theoretical limits of energy from renewable
sources, there are also practical limits; for example, large enough interventions in [these]

natural energy flows and stocks can have immediate and adverse effects on
environmental services essential to human well-being. 380 This is most obviously the case where biomass
(e.g. biofuels) are concerned. It has been suggested that given that 3040 per cent of the terrestrial primary productivity is already
appropriated by humans; any major increase could cause the collapse of critical ecosystems. 381 In
the IEA AP scenario, it is assumed that biofuels, such as biodiesel and bioethanol will replace mineral oil for use in transport. Without
encouraging more land-use change, a major anthropogenic contributor to CO 2 emissions, relying on energy biomass to provide a
natural replacement to gasoline (petrol) would mean competition of agricultural land for food and fuel. Yet, with increasing population
and increasing energy requirements is this physically possible without causing widespread ecosystem collapse? This is one of the key
reasons why Jacobsen and Delucchi, authors of the study published in Scientific American, do not rely on biofuels in their plan. 382
Not all biofuels, though, are reliant on a primary resource feedstock, such as sugarcane and corn (bioethanol) or rapeseed and soya
(biodiesel). Cellulosic ethanol can potentially be produced from agricultural plant wastes, such as corn stover, cereal straws, sugarcane
bagasse, paper, etc. The technology, however, requires aggressive research and development as it is not yet commercially viable. At
present the energy intensity of this type of ethanol production means that the overall energy value of the product is negative, or only
marginally positive, although it is hoped that this will improve as technology develops. 383 However, a number of experts feel less
positive. 384 For example: according to Eric Holt-Gimnez, the executive director of FoodFirst/Institute for Food and Development
Policy: The fact is that with cellulosic ethanol, we dont have the technology yet. We need major breakthroughs in plant physiology.
We might wait for cellulosic for a long time. 385 Elsewhere, approximately one-half of the global available hydro power has already
been harnessed. Little efficiency improvement, also, can be expected from wind turbines, which are at about 80 per cent of the
maximum theoretical efficiency. 386 The efficiency of solar PV cells could, however, increase from the present 15 per cent to
between 20 per cent and 28 per cent in unconcentrated sunlight. 387 To be unequivocal, renewable energy is a very good thing and
has enormous potential to expand. Something like the Jacobson and Delucchi plan for 2030 is an urgent necessity at a global level if
we are to avoid catastrophic global warming. 388 The

widespread uptake of renewable energy from water,

wind and solar power does not rescue the notion of infinite economic growth. Zerocarbon or low carbon energy sources are also not an excuse to avoid addressing the waste
of energy.

AT: Efficiency Improvements

Turnthe rebound effect means increases in efficiency cause increases in
consumption
Simms and Johnson 10 [Andrew Simms founded the climate change, energy and
interdependence programmes at nef, and is author of Ecological Debt: Global Warming and the
Wealth of Nations. Until the end of 2010, he was Policy Director at nef. Andrew writes regularly
for the national press and is on the boards of Greenpeace UK, the climate campaign 10:10 and
The Energy and Resources Institute Europe. Victoria Johnson is the acting head of the climate
change and energy programme at nef. Victoria has a BSc in Environmental Sciences, a MSc
(awarded with distinction) in Climate Change, both from the University of East Anglia, and a
PhD in Atmospheric Physics at Imperial College. Growth isn't Possible, new economics
foundation, January 25, 2010, pg. 36-7,
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01564/_res/id=sa_File1/Growth_Isnt
_Possible.pdf]
Despite the recognition that consumption levels need to decline in developed nations, governments and businesses are reluctant to
address the restriction of consumption. Yet, without

limits to consumption, improvements in efficiency

are often offset by the rebound effect. 125 For example, a recent report published by the European
Commissions Joint Research Centre (JRC) showed an increase in energy use across all sectorsresidential,
service and industryin recent years, despite improvement in energy efficiency. 126 For example, in the
domestic sector while new measures have led to some improvements, particularly in the case of white goods (e.g. refrigerators,
washing machines, dishwashers), the increasing use of these products and other household appliances, such as tumble driers, air
conditioning and personal computers, has more than offset savings. The rebound effect was an observation made by William Stanley
Jevons in his book The Coal Question, published in 1865. 127 Here, Jevons

contended that although

technological advancement improves the overall efficiency (E) with which a resource is
used, efficiency gains rebound or even backfire, causing higher production and
consumption rather than stabilisation or reduction. Since improvements generally reduce
the cost of energy per unit, economic theory predicts that this has the effect of triggering
an overall increase in consumption. If a car, for instance, can drive more kilometres on a litre of petrol, the fuel costs
per kilometre fall, and so will the total costs per kilometre. The price signal acts to increase consumption and, thus, part of the
efficiency gains is lost. One area where the rebound effect is prominent is domestic energy consumption. An

analysis of
energy consumption before and after installation of energy savings measures found that
only half of the efficiency gains translate into actual reductions in carbon emissions. 128
This is supported by more recent analysis of the effectiveness of Englands Home Energy Efficiency Scheme (Warm Front). While
there are appreciable benefits in terms of use of living space, comfort, quality of life, physical and mental well-being, the analysis
found that there was little evidence of lower heating bills. 129 This has also been observed in Northern Ireland. 130 In other words,

improvements in energy efficiency are offset by increased levels of thermal comfort. An

more in-depth economy-wide assessment of the rebound effect carried out on behalf of the UK Energy Research Council in 2007
found that rebound effects are not exclusive to domestic energy consumption. 131 They can be both direct (e.g., driving further in a
fuel-efficient car) and indirect (e.g., spending the money saved on heating on an overseas holiday). Findings from the research suggest
that while direct rebound effects may be smallless than 30 per cent for households for example, much less is known about indirect
effects. Additionally, the study suggests that in some cases, particularly where energy efficiency significantly decreases the cost of

further rebound effect is caused by timesaving devices. 132 With the current work-and-spend-lifestyle implicit to industrialised
societies, there is an increase in the demand for time-saving products. Although these
devices save time, they also tend to require more energy, for example, faster modes of
transport
production of energy intensive goods, rebounds may be larger. A

Tech efficiency improvements are only a stop-gap measure which will back
fire to cause more consumption
Simms and Johnson, 10 [Andrew Simms founded the climate change, energy and
interdependence programmes at nef, and is author of Ecological Debt: Global Warming and the
Wealth of Nations. Until the end of 2010, he was Policy Director at nef. Andrew writes regularly
for the national press and is on the boards of Greenpeace UK, the climate campaign 10:10 and
The Energy and Resources Institute Europe. Victoria Johnson is the acting head of the climate
change and energy programme at nef. Victoria has a BSc in Environmental Sciences, a MSc
(awarded with distinction) in Climate Change, both from the University of East Anglia, and a
PhD in Atmospheric Physics at Imperial College. Growth isn't Possible, new economics
foundation, January 25, 2010, pg. 34-5,
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01564/_res/id=sa_File1/Growth_Isnt
_Possible.pdf]
Questioning climate policy assumptions Certain

assumptions underlie scenarios for the future

stabilisation of greenhouse gas emissions and of their accumulation in the atmosphere.
These include that historical rates for both energy efficiency improvements and declining
energy intensity will continue and accelerate into the future. In turn it is assumed that these
will result in an absolute decrease in energy consumption. Yet, these assumptions are
hugely dependent on three questions that are not so much unanswered, as barely even asked.
1. Is the stabilisation of greenhouse gases through long-term targets the most effective
response to climate change?
2. What are the theoretical and practical limits to energy efficiency of the economy? and
3. Do increases in energy efficiency actually result in decreases in the demand for energy
services?
Under this questioning, current climate change policies appear seriously flawed, worsening the
prognosis for future climate change and our ability to deal with it. For example, there are
theoretical limits to efficiency governed by the laws of thermodynamics. There are
practical limits to efficiency, relating to economic, social and political barriers, and the
speed at which we can replace current energy systems. Observations in the real world suggest that
increases in energy efficiency can have perverse consequences, resulting in rises in the
demand for energy servicesthe so called rebound effect (see Box 8). Technological
optimists believe that technical innovations will reduce the demand for energy. 117 But, in
fact, technological improvements have tended to push demand for high levels of service
use and greater consumption. The history of fuel efficiency in cars is one such example
(see Box 8). 118,119 Before these questions are addressed, it is necessary to be clear about what is meant by energy efficiency, energy
intensity and carbon intensity. All three terms are described in more detail below, but fundamentally, they all represent ratios. This
means they place more emphasis on outputs, rather than inputs. And, as long as the growth rate in consumption of the input increases
at a greater rate than efficiency (intensity) increases (decreases) any improvements to the system are effectively eaten up. In other
words, no absolute reduction to energy consumption or carbon (in the case of carbon intensity) would be observed. For example, at
the global level, even

if technological energy efficiency and the uptake of new, more efficient

devices increased by 50 per cent over the next 2030 years with GDP rising at a
conservative 2.5 per cent, within 25 years, wed be back where we are now. 120,121,122

AT: CCS
Carbon sequestration fails and entrenches our reliance on fossil fuels
Simms and Johnson 10 [Andrew Simms founded the climate change, energy and
interdependence programmes at nef, and is author of Ecological Debt: Global Warming and the
Wealth of Nations. Until the end of 2010, he was Policy Director at nef. Andrew writes regularly
for the national press and is on the boards of Greenpeace UK, the climate campaign 10:10 and
The Energy and Resources Institute Europe. Victoria Johnson is the acting head of the climate
change and energy programme at nef. Victoria has a BSc in Environmental Sciences, a MSc
(awarded with distinction) in Climate Change, both from the University of East Anglia, and a
PhD in Atmospheric Physics at Imperial College. Growth isn't Possible, new economics
foundation, January 25, 2010, pg. 89-90,
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01564/_res/id=sa_File1/Growth_Isnt
_Possible.pdf]
As Jeff Goodell writes in his book Big Coal, tens of thousands of people may be destined to live above a giant bubble of CO 2 and
since CO

2 is buoyant underground it can migrate through cracks and faults in the earth,
pooling in unexpected places. 300 A sudden release of large amounts of CO 2 due to, for
example, an earthquake resulting in the fracturing or pipeline failure could result in the
immediate death of both people and animals, since asphyxiation can result from inhalation of CO 2 at just a 20
per cent concentration. CO 2 is a colourless, odourless and tasteless gas; a large leak would be undetected. A natural limnic eruption
of CO 2 in 1986 from Lake Nyos in Cameroon resulted in the asphyxiation of around 1,700 people and 3,500 livestock. If

this
rules out the storage of CO 2 in land-based geological sites, let us consider sequestration
in ocean saline aquifers, such as Sleipner. Slow, gradual leakage of CO 2 could result in the
dissolution of CO 2 in shallow aquifers, causing the acidification of groundwater and
undesirable change in geochemistry (i.e., mobilisation of toxic metals), water quality (leaching of nutrients)
and ecosystem health (e.g., pH impacts on organisms). 301 Transportation of captured carbon could
also be problematic. CCS involves a process of either converting CO 2 or methane to something else, or moving it
somewhere else. Taking the transport of natural gas as an example, we can estimate how secure
CO 2 transportation might be. The worlds largest gas transport system, 2,400km long running
through Russia (the Russian gas transport system), is estimated to lose around 1.4 per cent (a range of 1.0
2.5 per cent). 302 This is comparable to the amount of methane lost from US pipelines (1.5 0.5 per
cent). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that CO 2 leakage from transport through pipelines
could be in the order of 1.5 per cent. Furthermore, as already mentioned in this report, around
9 per cent of all natural gas extracted is lost in the process of extraction, distribution and
storage. Therefore a 1 per cent leakage rate appears to be conservative. Storage capacity A detailed
analysis (rather than an estimate) of known US geological sequestration sites undertaken by the US Department of Energy revealed
that only 3GtC could be stored in abandoned oil and gas fields. 303 This estimate, however, does exclude saline aquifers (very little is
known about potential US saline aquifers). Assuming

that the USA took responsibility for carbon

emissions that were was directly proportional to its share of global emissions, the USAs
capacity to store its own carbon in known geological sequestration sites would be
exhausted in 12 years. Similarly, a recent analysis explored the potential storage capacity in Europe. The study found that
based on Europes current annual emission rate of 4.1 GtCO 2 per year in the EU 25, the medium-range estimate of storage capacity is
only 20 times this. 304 In other words, CCS

is clearly not a long-term solution. Further sequestration

would require expensive and potentially unsafe pipelines directing CO 2 to sequestration
sites further a field. This would be an energy-intensive process which is why CCS not
only poses significant future risks in terms of leakage, but also reduces the net energy
gained from a particular fuelthe energy penalty. 305 Given these problems, to put such faith in

schemes which are operationally immature, instead of decreasing our carbon emissions,
seems outrageously risky. Surely it would be better not to produce the emissions in the
first place? Additionally, only one-third of emissions in industrialised countries are actually produced in fossil-fuelled power
stations. A significant proportion comes from the transport sector (around 30 per cent), and as yet CCS has only been developed for
static CO 2 sources. Could CCS be another just around the corner technology like nuclear fusion? Will small-scale pilot projects
ever realistically be scaled up to make a significant impact on ever growing global emissions? For over 50 years, physicists have been
promising that power from nuclear fusion is on the horizon. While fusion has been achieved, in the JET (Joint European Torus)
reactor, the experimental rector did not break even, i.e., it consumed more energy that it generated, but managed to produce 16MW of
energy for a few seconds. In a Nature news feature, science journalist Geoff Brumfiel commented that the nonappearance should
give us some insight into how attempts to predict the future can go wrong. 306 By

pursuing a CCS pathway, we are

encouraging our continued reliance on fossil fuels delivering energy through a centralised
system. Should CCS become economically viable, it could act to undermine initiatives to
move towards a more efficient distributed energy system with diverse arrays of low
carbon energy sources.

AT: Hydrogen Econ

The hydrogen economy cant solve emissions and is infeasible
Simms and Johnson 10 [Andrew Simms founded the climate change, energy and
interdependence programmes at nef, and is author of Ecological Debt: Global Warming and the
Wealth of Nations. Until the end of 2010, he was Policy Director at nef. Andrew writes regularly
for the national press and is on the boards of Greenpeace UK, the climate campaign 10:10 and
The Energy and Resources Institute Europe. Victoria Johnson is the acting head of the climate
change and energy programme at nef. Victoria has a BSc in Environmental Sciences, a MSc
(awarded with distinction) in Climate Change, both from the University of East Anglia, and a
PhD in Atmospheric Physics at Imperial College. Growth isn't Possible, new economics
foundation, January 25, 2010, pg. 93,
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01564/_res/id=sa_File1/Growth_Isnt
_Possible.pdf]

It is often argued that the next evolutionary step in the global energy system is the
substitution of natural gas with hydrogenoften assumed to be a zero-carbon fuel. Whilst this is true at the point
of end use, it ignores carbon embedded within the fuel. Hydrogen itself is not a source of
energy, but a carrier. Because of this, hydrogen first has to be produced from the reaction
between carbon monoxide (CO) and methanol, through steam reactions (steam reformation) with
natural gas, oil or even coal or by the electrolysis of water (efficiencies of fuel cells and hydrogen
production are discussed later). But there are two problems here. Hydrogen will only be truly zero carbon if it
is produced through zero-carbon electricity generation. A life-cycle assessment by the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory estimates the carbon emissions associated with
hydrogen production from the steam reformation of natural gas without CCS, would
equal just under 12kg of CO 2 e for every kg of H 2one kg of H 2 has a similar energy content to 3m3 of natural gas,
or the same amount of energy required to drive a 2003 Golf Edition approximately 30km. 310 A hydrogen economy,
promoted as a zero-carbon energy source, based on the energy system we have at present
(i.e., dominance of fossil fuels) relies heavily on the assumption that CCS is a safe and secure. We
have already argued that CCS is by no means guaranteed to work. Other alternatives to
steam reforming include the electrolysis of water into hydrogen by using a renewable
energy source, such as wind. Yet the process of electrolysing water to hydrogen, and then
burning it as a clean fuel to use in a fuel cell to produce electricity introduces two
additional inefficiencies. Why introduce these inefficiencies if there is zero-carbon
electricity generation in the first place? The advantage of a fuel cell is that electricity is generated through a
chemical rather than thermal process and is therefore not subjected to the Carnot efficiencies which limit the maximum efficiency of
thermal electricity generation. 311 Secondly

transportation of hydrogen is expensive (both cost and energy).

Whilst hydrogen may become an effective way of storing energy from renewables to
cope with intermittency of electricity supply from renewables, such as wave, solar and
wind (an issue often raised by those not in favour of renewable energy), it doesnt seem likely that well be
driving around in cars with steam exhausts any time soon.

AT: Nuclear energy

Nuke energy wont solve our emissions problem
Simms and Johnson 10 [Andrew Simms founded the climate change, energy and
interdependence programmes at nef, and is author of Ecological Debt: Global Warming and the
Wealth of Nations. Until the end of 2010, he was Policy Director at nef. Andrew writes regularly
for the national press and is on the boards of Greenpeace UK, the climate campaign 10:10 and
The Energy and Resources Institute Europe. Victoria Johnson is the acting head of the climate
change and energy programme at nef. Victoria has a BSc in Environmental Sciences, a MSc
(awarded with distinction) in Climate Change, both from the University of East Anglia, and a
PhD in Atmospheric Physics at Imperial College. Growth isn't Possible, new economics
foundation, January 25, 2010, pg. 91,
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01564/_res/id=sa_File1/Growth_Isnt
_Possible.pdf]
nefs 2005 report Mirage and Oasis, made the case that nuclear

power faced insurmountable problems in

living up to expectations placed upon the sector to help deliver both energy security and
an answer to climate change. 308 The report made the case that, if anything, an expanding nuclear
programme would increase insecurity and, by distracting skills and other resources, delay
more effective solutions. In his bookThe lean guide to nuclear energy: a life-cycle in troubleDavid Fleming
introduces the term energy bankruptcy, referring to a point in the nuclear energy life
cycle where more energy is used in the life cycle than can be supplied as electricity. 309
Fleming illustrates that whilst emissions of CO 2 from nuclear energy superficially look
rather good at approximately 60g/kWh (cf. 190g/kWh for natural gas), scratch the surface and it becomes
very clear that this comparison is very misleading. Fleming identifies that the long-term
disposal solution for nuclear waste has been deferred, resulting in a back log of
emissions neither realised nor accounted for yet. Not only will we eventually have to face
the challenge of a long-term storage solution of nuclear waste, which will be a very
energy-intensive process due to the necessary overengineering to safeguard future
generations from the hazardous waste, but emissions from nuclear energy will grow
relentlessly as uranium ores used progressively turn to low-grade.

AT: Biofuels
Biofuels produce more emissions than petrol and cause food insecurity
Simms and Johnson 10 [Andrew Simms founded the climate change, energy and
interdependence programmes at nef, and is author of Ecological Debt: Global Warming and the
Wealth of Nations. Until the end of 2010, he was Policy Director at nef. Andrew writes regularly
for the national press and is on the boards of Greenpeace UK, the climate campaign 10:10 and
The Energy and Resources Institute Europe. Victoria Johnson is the acting head of the climate
change and energy programme at nef. Victoria has a BSc in Environmental Sciences, a MSc
(awarded with distinction) in Climate Change, both from the University of East Anglia, and a
PhD in Atmospheric Physics at Imperial College. Growth isn't Possible, new economics
foundation, January 25, 2010, pg. 95-7,
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01564/_res/id=sa_File1/Growth_Isnt
_Possible.pdf]

Concern for climate change and the rising price of oil has resulted in new policies that
aim to substitute biofuels for petrol and diesel. 314 There are, however, a number of
unintended consequences of the agro-industrial scaling out biofuels. Last year the impact of
the USs significant drive for increasing production of bioethanol was felt on the food
market because of the diversion of cereals, specifically Maize away from animal feed. 315 For example, in its
2008 World Development Report, The World Bank stated: Biofuel production has pushed up feedstock
prices. The clearest example is maize, whose price rose by over 60 per cent from 2005 to
2007, largely because of the US ethanol program [sic] combined with reduced stocks in
major exporting countries. Feedstock supplies are likely to remain constrained in the near term. 316 The report then goes
on to state: The grain required to fill the tank of a sports utility vehicle with ethanol could
feed one person for a year; this shows how food and fuel compete. Rising prices of staple
crops can cause significant welfare losses for the poor, most of whom are net buyers of
staple crops For example, the rise in popularity of biofuels is creating competition for land
and water between crops grown for food and those grown to make biofuels. The Tortilla Riots
in Mexico in 2007 followed the dramatic rise in price of corn (a staple food for poor households) as more land was given over for

In terms of
climate change, new calculations looking at the full lifecycle of palm oil production
concluded that under a range of fairly typical circumstances vastly more carbon was
released into the atmosphere as a result of growing palm oil, than results from burning
fossil fuels. 317 In the context of bioethanol, research has also shown that biofuels produced from corn, wheat
or barley all contain less energy than the energy required to produce them. 318 Research
biofuel production. The impact of biofuel production on food security is discussed in more detail in the next section.

published earlier in 2007 showed that the growth of palm oil for biodiesel for the European market is now the main cause of
deforestation in Indonesia. 319 It is likely soon also to be responsible for the extinction of the orang-utan in the wild. Because

of
deforestation and drainage of peat-lands necessary to grow the crop, every tonne of palm
oil created in South East Asia resulted in up to 33 tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions
ten times as much as conventional petroleum. In 2006, the UK imported 1.6 million tonnes of palm oil and palm
kernel oil, 676,972 tonnes of which was imported from South East Asia. Separately, an estimate by a coalition of aid and environment
groups including Greenpeace, Oxfam, the RSPB, WWF and Friends of the Earth, suggests that soya grown for biodiesel grown on
deforested land would take 200 years before it could be considered carbon neutral. 320 The Gallagher review commissioned by the
UK in 2008 examined the indirect impact of biofuels on climate change and food security. 321 The

review confirmed
growing concerns of the negative impacts of UK and EU biofuels policy on land use,
greenhouse gas emissions and food security. In light of the review, the UK government has agreed to reconsider
its policy on biofuels.

AT: GeoengineeringSRM
SRM techniques would result in rapid warming
Simms and Johnson 10 [Andrew Simms founded the climate change, energy and
interdependence programmes at nef, and is author of Ecological Debt: Global Warming and the
Wealth of Nations. Until the end of 2010, he was Policy Director at nef. Andrew writes regularly
for the national press and is on the boards of Greenpeace UK, the climate campaign 10:10 and
The Energy and Resources Institute Europe. Victoria Johnson is the acting head of the climate
change and energy programme at nef. Victoria has a BSc in Environmental Sciences, a MSc
(awarded with distinction) in Climate Change, both from the University of East Anglia, and a
PhD in Atmospheric Physics at Imperial College. Growth isn't Possible, new economics
foundation, January 25, 2010, pg. 99-100,
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01564/_res/id=sa_File1/Growth_Isnt
_Possible.pdf]
Of the two techniques, The Royal Society report found SRM to have the least potential. This is due to high levels of uncertainty
associated with large-scale modification of the climate. Climate scientists have raised concerns about the potential impact SRM may
have on rainfall patterns. 331 For example, while temperatures may return to those of the pre-industrial era, rainfall patterns would
not. 332 There is also particular concern about the impact of SRM interventions on the Asian and African summer monsoons on which
billions depend. 333 Furthermore, beyond non-invasive laboratory/computer modelling and analogue case studiesthe first phase of
research and development of SRM technologiesresearch would necessarily involve intentional interventions with the climate
system. Because it is a technology with many uncertainties, field experiments beyond limited duration, magnitude and spatial-scale
could involve some risk of unintended climate consequences. Yet, the collection of direct empirical evidence from large-scale field
experiments would be a necessary part of any research programme. 334 Researchers have also highlighted that should

any
SRM intervention stop abruptly or fail, global temperatures could rise rapidly. 335 As the
concentration of CO 2 in the atmosphere increases, carbon sinks would be weakened with
possible carbon cycle feedbacks accelerating the increase in CO 2 concentration in the
atmosphere. Termination of the climate modulation provided by a geoengineering
scheme, could result in a temperature change of 24 o C per decade (there is no evidence that global
temperature changes have approached this rate at any time over the last several glacial cycles). 336 This rate of
temperature change is 20 times faster than the rate predicted under a business-as-usual
scenario. Clearly such a rapid change in climate would have devastating impacts on
humans and the environment.

*** War Turn

1NC War Turn

Growth makes war and conflict inevitable.
Trainer 98 [Ted Trainer, Lecturer in Sociology at the University of New South Wales, 1998,
"Our Unsustainable Society: Basic Causes, Interconnections, and Solutions," The Coming Age of
Scarcity: Preventing Mass Death and Genocide in the Twenty-first Century, edited by Michael N.
Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann, Published by Syracuse University Press, ISBN 0815627440, p.
91-92]
Some of the most disturbing implications of the limits-to-growth analysis of the global situation arise regarding the problems of peace
and conflict. The foregoing argument has been that only

a few can have the life-styles that we in rich

countries have, and we can have them only for a historically short period, because there
are not enough resources for all to rise to anything like the living standards we take for
granted. But we who have per capita incomes averaging sixty times those of the poorest
half of the worlds people are obsessed with getting richer as fast as possible and without
end. Now, if we and all others continue to pursue that goal, as population doubles, and
resources become scarcer, there can be no other conceivable outcome than increasing
levels of conflict in the world. Much of the foregoing argument has been that we have an empire, a sphere of influence,
without which our living standards could not be as high as they are. We have to be extensively involved in military activity to secure
our lines of supply from the empire. We could not be sure of getting all that oil from the Middle East if we did not have aircraft
carriers in the Mediterranean, rapid deployment forces specially trained and ready to fly into trouble spots, minesweepers able to clear
vital shipping lanes, the military presence that stands as a warning to others that they had better not interfere with our oil fields, and
the contingency plans for dealing with any rebel tribesmen or any sectional uprising that might cut the pipelines. We must be able to
protect our allies, interests, trading arrangements, and clients. United States Army Gen. M. D. Taylor said that U.S. military
priorities must be shifted. . . towards insuring a steady flow of resources from the Third World. He referred to a fierce competition
among industrial powers for the same raw materials markets sought by the United States and growing hostility displayed by havenot nations towards their affluent counterparts (Cypher 1981). Speaking to American soldiers at Camp Stanly, Korea, President
Johnson said, Dont forget, there are two hundred million of us in a world of three billion. They want what weve gotand were not
going to give it to them! Ashley says that expansion

is a prime source of conflict. War is mainly

explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed
resources (1980, 3, 126). Nettleship makes the same point: War is an inevitable result of the struggle
between [end page 91] economies for expansion (1975, 497). Chase-Dunn says that warfare appears as a
normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist world economy... . World
wars regularly occur during a period of economic expansion (1989, 108, 163). In other words, the
main source of conflict and war in the world is the ceaseless quest for greater wealth and
power. We have no chance of achieving a peaceful world until nations stop being greedy
and work out how to live without constantly striving to grow richer. Yet, the supreme
commitment in our economy is to rapid and ceaseless growth!

2NC/1NR War Turn

Growth makes conflict escalation more likelyincreases resolve of leaders.
Prefer empirical support and peer-reviewed studies.
Boehmer 10Charles R. Boehmer is professor of political science at the University of Texas,
El Paso and Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University [Economic Growth
and Violent International Conflict: 18751999, Defence and Peace Economics, 2010, Vol.
21(3), June, pp. 249268, EBSCO]
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The theory set forth earlier theorizes that economic

growth increases perceptions of state strength,

increasing the likelihood of violent interstate conflicts. Economic growth appears to
increase the resolve of leaders to stand against challenges and the willingness to escalate
disputes. A non-random pattern exists where higher rates of GDP growth over multiple years are
positively and significantly related to the most severe international conflicts , whereas this is not
true for overall conflict initiations. Moreover, growth of military expenditures, as a measure of the war chest proposition, does not
offer any explanation for violent interstate conflicts. This is not to say that growth of military expenditures never has any effect on the
occurrence of war, although such a link is not generally true in the aggregate using a large sample of states. In comparison, higher

rates of economic growth are significantly related to violent interstate conflicts in the
aggregate. States with growing economies are more apt to reciprocate military challenges
by other states and become involved in violent interstate conflicts.
The results also show that theories from the Crisis-Scarcity perspective lack explanatory power
linking GDP growth rates to war at the state level of analysis. This is not to say that such theories completely lack
explanatory power in general, but more particularly that they cannot directly link economic growth rates to state behavior in violent
interstate conflicts. In contrast, theories of diversionary conflict may well hold some explanatory power, although not regarding GDP
growth in a general test of states from all regions of the world across time. Perhaps diversionary

theory better
explains state behaviors short of war, where the costs of externalizing domestic tensions
do not become too costly, or in relation to the foreign policies of particular countries. In many circumstances,
engaging in a war to divert attention away from domestic conditions would seemingly
exacerbate domestic crisis conditions unless the chances of victory were practically
assured. Nonetheless, this study does show that domestic conflict is associated with interstate conflict. If diversionary conflict
theory has any traction as an economic explanation of violent interstate conflicts, it may require the study of other explanatory
variables besides overall GDP growth rates, such as unemployment or inflation rates.
The contribution of this article has been to examine propositions about economic growth in a global study. Most

existing
studies on this topic focus on only the United States, samples of countries that are more developed on average
(due to data availability in the past), or are based on historical information and not economic GDP
data. While I have shown that there is no strong evidence linking military expenditures to violent interstate conflicts at the state level
of analysis, much of the remaining Growth-as-Catalyst perspective is grounded in propositions that are not directly germane to
questions about state conflict behavior, such as those linking state behavior to long-cycles, or those that remain at the systemic level.
What answer remains linking economic growth to war once we eliminate military expenditures as an explanation? Considering that
the concept of foreign policy mood is difficult to identify and measure, and that the bulk of the literature relies solely on the American
historical experience, I do not rely on that concept. It is still possible that such moods affect some decision-makers. Instead, similar to
Blainey, I

find that economic growth, when sustained over a stretch of years, has its
strongest effect on states once they find themselves in an international crisis. The results
of this study suggest that states such as China, which have a higher level of opportunity
to become involved in violent interstate conflicts due to their capabilities, geographic
location, history of conflict, and so on, should also have a higher willingness to fight after
enjoying multiple years of recent economic growth. One does not have to assume that an aggressive China will emerge
from growth. If conflicts do present themselves, then China may be more likely to escalate a
war given its recent national performance.

This study shows

that sustained economic growth is generally related to state participation in war and other
violent disputes. Evidence here also supports the proposition that economic growth
increases the resolve of states to reciprocate threats and uses of force. The next steps in this project
Future research is necessary on the relationship between economic growth and violent interstate conflicts.

will examine whether economic growth affects strategic behavior between states, which necessitates an extension on the theory
presented here. In addition, the results of this study suggest that regions containing numerous growing states may be at more risk of
experiencing conflict and war. This is also a relevant issue for future research.

Growth makes conflict inevitablethe drive to increase living standards is

the root cause of war.
Trainer 2 [Ted Trainer, Visiting Fellow in the Faculty of Arts at the University of New South
Wales, 2002, If You Want Affluence, Prepare For War, Democracy & Nature, Volume 8,
Number 2, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Complete, p. 294295]
As is the case with the other major problems confronting the planet, such as environmental destruction, it

is essential to
understand the problem of global peace and conflict from the limits to growth
perspective. This analysis focuses on the fact that the present living standards of the rich countries
involve levels of production and consumption that are grossly unsustainable. Just to note a few
of the lines of argument documented in the large literature from the limits perspective, first, if all 9 billion people likely to live on
Earth by 2070 were to have the present rich world lifestyle and footprint we would need about 12 times the area of productive land
that exists on the entire planet. Second, if we were to cut greenhouse gas emissions sufficiently to prevent the carbon content of the
atmosphere from increasing any more, world per capita energy consumption would have to be cut to about one-eighteenth of its
present amount. If all 9 billion people likely by 2070 were to have the present rich world per capita resource consumption, resource
production would have to be about eight times the present rate. [end page 294] These multiples underline the magnitude of the
overshoot. Sustainability

will require enormous reductions in the volume of rich world

production and consumption. Yet its supreme goal is economic growth, i.e. to increase the levels of
production and consumption and GDP, constantly, rapidly and without any limit. That the absurdity of this is never recognised in
conventional economic and political circles defies understanding. If we in rich countries average 3% economic growth to 2070 and by
then all the worlds people had risen to the living standards we would have by then, the total world economic output would be 60
times as great as the present grossly unsustainable level. If this limits-to-growth analysis is at all valid, the

implications for
the problem of global peace and conflict and security are clear and savage. If we all
remain determined to increase our living standards, our level of production and
consumption, in a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have
affluent living standards but another 8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we,
the rich, are determined to get richer without any limit, then nothing is more guaranteed
than that there will be increasing levels of conflict and violence. To put it another way, if we insist on
remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed. Increased conflict in at least the following categories can be expected.
First, the

present conflict over resources between the rich elites and the poor majority in the
Third World must increase, for example, as development under globalisation takes more land, water and forests into
export markets. Second, there are conflicts between the Third World and the rich world, the major
recent examples being the war between the US and Iraq over control of oil. Iraq invaded Kuwait
and the US intervened, accompanied by much high-sounding rhetoric (having found nothing unacceptable about Israels invasions of
Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of East Timor). As has often been noted, had Kuwait been one of the worlds leading exporters of
broccoli, rather than oil, it is doubtful whether the US would have been so eager to come to its defence. At the time of writing, the US
is at war in Central Asia over terrorism. Few would doubt that a collateral outcome will be the establishment of regimes that will
give the West access to the oil wealth of Central Asia.

Growth increases probability and magnitude of inter-state conflictmultiple

studies prove.
Boehmer 10Charles R. Boehmer is professor of political science at the University of Texas,
El Paso and Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University [Economic Growth
and Violent International Conflict: 18751999, Defence and Peace Economics, 2010, Vol.
21(3), June, pp. 249268, EBSCO]
Growth-as-Catalyst for Violent Conflict
The earliest literature predicting that economic growth leads to war dates back nearly a century. The basic theme advanced is that

economic growth expands war-making capability. This is known as the war-chest proposition. Nikolai
Kondratieff (1926) associated the frequency of war and other social upheavals to long-cycles in the global economy of roughly 25
year phases of economic growth followed by contractions of similar length. Scholars

in economics and political

science have theorized that the power capabilities of states, particularly the major powers,
also follow cycles (but not necessarily Kondratieff cycles) (Doran, 1983, 1985; Doran and Parsons, 1980), result in
power transitions as states growing in power surpass states that had been at the top of the
international power hierarchy (Organski and Kugler, 1980), or more generally relate to economic
expansion (Kuznets, 1966; Choucri and North, 1975). Some scholars have provided evidence supporting Kondratieffs claim that
expansions in the global economy increase the frequency or severity of international conflicts (Hansen, 1932; Vyrynen, 1983;
Goldstein, 1988; Mansfield, 1988; Pollins, 1996; Pollins and Murrin, 1999). However, studies that argue long cycles affect the
behavior of individual states without direct observation of state behavior commit an ecological fallacy. It is possible that the foreign
policies of most states could be unaffected by periodicities or patterns at the systemic level of analysis. This study, in contrast, studies
the effect of economic growth at the state (monadic) level of analysis. Blaineys (1988) analysis

suggests that the

war chest theme can be generalized to the state level of analysis. Kennedy (1987) also offers a
historical discussion of the war chest theme to explain the rise and fall of major powers.

Some studies argue that it is not increases in military capabilities from economic growth
alone that raise the risk of conflict but also a higher willingness to use such capabilities
by directly affecting the decision-making process. Some scholars argue that growth leads to
optimism or bellicose foreign policy moods (Kondratieff, 1926; MacFie, 1938; Klingberg, 1952, 1983;
Kuznets, 1966; Vyrynen, 1983; Holmes, 1985; Elder and Holmes, 1985; Blainey, 1988; Holmes and Keck, 1999; Pollins and
Schweller, 1999). The studies by Klingberg, Holmes and his associates, and Pollins

and Schweller (1999), investigate

that war and other disputes are more likely to occur
when the American economy is in growth phases. Two studies avoid the ecological fallacy mentioned above
foreign policy moods in the American case and find

by linking American foreign policy to Kondratieff cycles (Pollins and Schweller, 1999; Holmes and Keck, 1999). To directly test this
proposition cross-nationally is difficult given that public opinion data are limited, especially for non-democratic regimes, which could
lead to sample bias.
However, Blaineys

theory can in part be generalized to the state level of analysis and is hence
argues that economic growth perverts perceptions of power,
leading states to be more optimistic about their chances of victory in international
contests. While there may be no clear pattern to war, one clue we have is that optimism abounds at their onset (Blainey, 1988:
41). Economic growth increases optimism that states will triumph in international crises,
leading to a heightened risk of war. Blainey attempted to be systematic in his review of history using informal case
most relevant to this study. Blainey

studies or examples to support his hypothesis, although few studies have undertaken a similar test using quantitative data. Hence, this
study seeks to test Blaineys proposition, which is most appropriate at the monadic level of analysis.

Growth increase the propensity and intensity of conflictmultiple empirics

and studies prove.
Boehmer 10Charles R. Boehmer is professor of political science at the University of Texas,
El Paso and Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University [Economic Growth
and Violent International Conflict: 18751999, Defence and Peace Economics, 2010, Vol.
21(3), June, pp. 249268, EBSCO]

GROWTH AS A CATALYST OF VIOLENCE

The theory of economic growth and conflict presented here rests on the basic assumption that growth is indicative, or perceived to be a
sign, of successful state performance. Blainey (1988) states that economic

growth is a source of national

optimism, although optimism is a difficult concept to measure across states without using standardized opinion data (across time
and space) and I hence do not adopt it here. In comparison, GDP growth is a measure of national
performance. Leaders of states are evaluated on the domestic conditions of their state by
those that keep them in power, no matter how large that group may be. States that are
growing may be perceived to be performing well, possibly even becoming more powerful
or prosperous than in the past.
Still, states often experience economic growth, whereas violent interstate conflicts are rare events. I do not argue that
economic growth is a general and direct source of conflict between states. I contend
instead that growth acts as a catalyst, pouring fuel on fires where conflicts have already
commenced. Economic growth should influence the perceptions state leaders have about their states performance. I argue that
economic growth acts as a catalyst for violent interstate conflicts by increasing the
willingness of states to use military force in foreign policy, particularly to reciprocate
militarized threats and uses of force or to escalate conflicts in a violent manner. Most and Starr
(1989: 22) define willingness as the willingness to choose (even if the choice is no action), and to employ available capabilities to
further some policy option over others. Most

and Starr situate willingness against a background of

opportunity. Naturally, not all states have the same opportunity to realistically choose
policies that lead to interstate violence or war, at least with an equal chance of victory.
Hence, the opportunity for war varies for states. Later I will present control variables for conflict opportunities
but for now will note that some factors increase or decrease opportunity, and are important here. Our goal must be to isolate and
control for opportunity variables. First, states

that are major powers will have a higher capability of

sustaining war and foreign policies that increase the chance of international conflict
globally. Second, states with fewer neighbors are less likely to be involved in conflicts compared to those with many neighbors.
In summary, economic growth is not a simple and direct cause of war or lesser conflicts
because it affects the willingness of leaders in certain contexts that change from state to
state and over time.
Economic growth is an indicator to leaders that their state may be strong and may win
international conflicts, although this may be more perception than fact. Iraqs GDP growth averaged 16% between 1974
and 1979 before Saddam Husseins regime initiated the IraqIran War in 1980, although the war became an eight-year struggle of
attrition nonetheless. Turning back to the Chinese example, policy-makers may view Chinese growth through different lenses. Those
that are Realists, pessimistic, or generally fearful of Chinese power may see such growth in GDP and military expenditures as a threat,
whereas others that are Liberal may see the creation of an economy of scale and increasing economic interaction with the West that
has resulted in a booming economy. Predictions of future bellicose Chinese foreign policy must be evaluated against a background of
opportunity. As China develops, it may face fewer severe conflicts, which threaten war with its main trading partners, and also with its
bordering states with whom there may be competing territorial claims, although as a major power it faces a higher potential for
conflict compared with a state such as Slovakia or Costa Rica. In addition, its proximity to numerous other states means there are more
potential rivals or enemies compared with what New Zealand, for example, faces in its neighborhood. The point here is to make it
clear that war

need not be a result of economic growth but that when growth does contribute
to interstate violence it does so by serving as a catalyst of willingness against a backdrop
of opportunities. Chinese leaders may be less likely to back away from violent interstate conflict if a crisis occurs during a
period of economic growth than they would before economic growth, and this risk is higher for China because its major power status
and region provide more opportunities relative to most other states.
Based on the rationale above, I

do not predict that economic growth makes it more likely that states
will initiate militarized conflicts with other states, or that it increases their overall conflict propensity.
Economic growth appears dangerous in those situations where states are already involved
in a conflict by making it more likely that a state will reciprocate or escalate conflicts.
Considering that war is a suboptimal outcome (Gartzke, 1999), states would not risk escalating
conflicts to violence or war if they have reason to believe that they may lose. Hubris may
lead states into conflicts that turn deadly by providing an increased willingness to fight or

even distorting and inflating leaders perception of state strength. States often march off
to war thinking that the war will be short and that their side will prevail (Blainey, 1988); I suspect
economic growth increases this resolve to stand against challenges from other states and
to escalate crises.
Finland went to war with the USSR because of its refusal to acquiesce to territorial
demands made by the Soviets. The Soviets initiated war in 1939 after their GDP grew by
8.9% in the prior five years. The Finnish economy had grown by 6.6% over the same
period. Hungary stood its ground by reciprocating Soviet threats that escalated to war in
1956. Hungarian growth had been 5.5% over the prior five years and Soviet GDP growth
was just short of 5% over the same period. Similarly, Ethiopia was willing to reciprocate
hostilities initiated by Eritrea, resulting in war, after experiencing 6.6% growth in the five
years prior to 1988. The Football War between El Salvador and Honduras may not have
occurred if the GDP growth rates of both states had not each grown on average by 6% in
the five years prior to 1969. Of course, economic growth may not necessarily be a good
indicator of state strength or the prospects of victory in any given case; there may be a
distinct gap in the actual probability of victory in a crisis relative to the perceived
probability, for which economic growth may serve as one indicator prone to error.
Leaders may nonetheless use GDP growth as an indicator and be more resolved to stand
their ground and thus escalate a crisis. 2

ProdictBoehmer
Prefer our evidencebest data set.
Boehmer 10Charles R. Boehmer is professor of political science at the University of Texas,
El Paso and Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University [Economic Growth
and Violent International Conflict: 18751999, Defence and Peace Economics, 2010, Vol.
21(3), June, pp. 249268, EBSCO]
RESEARCH DESIGN

The hypotheses are tested with a pooled cross-sectional research design utilizing the
state-year unit of analysis. Each state in the international system is observed for each year
of the data set from 18751999. Naturally though, due to missing data and list-wise deletion, some observations are
dropped from the statistical models. The sample employed here includes economic growth rate data
on 171 states, which is the broadest (number of states) and deepest (across time) data set
employed to date to study the effects of economic growth on conflict. The study of state monads is
a suitable research design to study the general effects of state attributes on conflict but this does not preclude analyzing this topic with
other units of analysis. 4

Prefer our studyothers are not empirical, lack coherent definitions, and
dont specify duration of growth.
Boehmer 10Charles R. Boehmer is professor of political science at the University of Texas,
El Paso and Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University [Economic Growth
and Violent International Conflict: 18751999, Defence and Peace Economics, 2010, Vol.
21(3), June, pp. 249268, EBSCO]
The literature cited above is quite diverse concerning units of analysis, theories, research methods, and data. One study such as this
cannot re-examine all the potential hypotheses therein. However, this paper offers some general critiques across the literature. First,

most of the studies at the systemic level of analysis are either difficult to substantiate
empirically, such as providing evidence thai long cycles are actually 'cycles' endogenous to the global economy and not simply
statistical random walks (Beck, 1991), or are theoretically imprecise concerning mechanisms and
processes. Some work in this area lacks agency, linking periodicities of economic cycles to
individual states. Second, most of the studies that focus on foreign policy moods lack a welldeveloped conception of 'mood'. How could we best identify such a variable and does it extend equally to leaders and
those in society? Third, most of these studies from both perspectives are unspecific about ihe
duration of growth and its effects on conflict. Shorter-term growth rates are often
undifferentiated from longer-term economic development. Some studies simply use oneyear lags of economic growth while others measure growth over several years using moving
averages, whereas others focus on long waves or cycles of more than a decade. There are important
theoretical distinctions in such choices.

2NC/1NR Resource Wars Turn

Growth will cause resource shortages, collapse the economy, and risk
escalating competition and nuclear war.
Taylor 8 [Graeme Taylor is a social activist committed to constructive global transformation
and the coordinator of BEST Futures, a project supporting sustainable solutions through
researching how societies change and evolve, Evolution's Edge: The Coming Collapse and
Transformation of Our World, Pomegranate Press, 2008, ISBN: 9781550923810, EBrary, pg.
185-6]

The financial and social inequality of the global economy is destabilizing and dangerous.
35 Growing income gaps between rich nations and poor nations and within countries like the United States, China and
India can be managed as long as average incomes keep rising. But if shortages of essential
goods and rising prices lower the standards of living of hundreds of millions of people if
people who are middle class today become poor tomorrow, and people who are poor today become hungry tomorrow then
there will be massive social unrest. In early 2008 rising food prices triggered protests and riots around the world. 36
Most people will tolerate bad government if they have economic security and hope for a
better future. But if they lose that hope, then anger and despair can easily be channelled
into intergroup violence and/or demands for radical political change. 37 While
governments can use economic measures, laws and force to stabilize financial and
political disturbances, there is little that they can do to solve problems caused by
biophysical limits to growth and environmental degradation. Resource shortages restrict the supply of
goods with the consequence that they must be rationed either with higher prices that make them unaffordable for poorer consumers, or
by limiting availability e.g. by turning off the supply of water or electricity for part of each day. Because

resource
shortages and other environmental problems cannot be resolved by the current global
system, they are likely to be the root causes of increasing global economic crises.
Countries are becoming increasingly concerned about their access to water, energy and
mineral resources. For example, both China and India are making major investments in African resources: by 2010 China will
probably be the continents major trading partner. 38 Fears of being excluded from critical supplies are
leading to new strategic alliances and a new arms race in 2007 the US, Japan, India, Australia and
Singapore held joint naval exercises, while Russia and China held joint military exercises that were observed by the leaders of the
Shanghai Cooperative Organization (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). 39 The focus of this
competition is control over the oil and gas resources of the Middle East and Central Asia objectives clearly articulated by the
former US Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski in his book The Grand Chessboard. 40 We

should not forget that

competition over resources helped start two world wars. We are now in a situation that is
similar to the years leading up to the First World War while no country desires war, no
major power believes that it can afford to be denied access to critical resources. This is
the American dilemma in Iraq political leaders do not want to stay and be bogged
down in an unending war, and yet they are afraid that if they withdraw from the region
they could lose access to vital energy supplies. 41 If global resource consumption
continues to expand, competition over increasingly scarce resources will grow. The
competition will initially be primarily political and economic in nature, but as prices rise
and economies are destabilized, there will be more and more willingness to use military
means to guarantee access to strategic resources. The danger is that at some point
competition and confrontation will escalate into a war involving major powers armed
with weapons of mass destruction.

AT: Econ Decline Causes War

1. Empirics prove no warprefer the largest data set.
Miller 1Morris Miller is an adjunct economics professor at the University of Ottawa [Jan.Mar, 2001, Poverty: A Cause of War? Peace Magazine,
http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v17n1p08.htm]
Economic Crises?

Some scholars have argued that it is not poverty, as such, that contributes to the support for armed
conflict, but rather some catalyst, such as an economic crisis. However, a study by Minxin Pei and Ariel
Adesnik shows that this hypothesis lacks merit. After studying 93 episodes of economic
crisis in 22 countries in Latin American and Asia since World War II, they concluded that much of
the conventional thinking about the political impact of economic crisis is wrong:
"The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no
relationship to the collapse of regimes ... or (in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence...
In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing
repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another)."

2. There is no causal relationship between the economy and conflictthe

best study proves.
Brandt and Ulfelder 11*Patrick T. Brandt, Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana
University, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of Social Science at the
University of Texas at Dallas. **Jay Ulfelder, Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University,
is an American political scientist whose research interests include democratization, civil unrest,
and violent conflict. [April, 2011, Economic Growth and Political Instability, Social Science
Research Network]
These statements

anticipating political fallout from the global economic crisis of 20082010

reflect a widely held view that economic growth has rapid and profound effects on
countries political stability. When economies grow at a healthy clip, citizens are presumed to be too busy and too
content to engage in protest or rebellion, and governments are thought to be flush with revenues they can use to enhance their own
stability by producing public goods or rewarding cronies, depending on the type of regime they inhabit. When growth slows,
however, citizens and cronies alike are presumed to grow frustrated with their governments, and the leaders at the receiving end of
that frustration are thought to lack the financial resources to respond effectively. The

expected result is an increase

in the risks of social unrest, civil war, coup attempts, and regime breakdown.
Although it is pervasive, the assumption that countries economic growth rates strongly
affect their political stability has not been subjected to a great deal of careful empirical
analysis, and evidence from social science research to date does not unambiguously
support it. Theoretical models of civil wars, coups detat, and transitions to and from democracy often specify
slow economic growth as an important cause or catalyst of those events, but empirical studies on the
effects of economic growth on these phenomena have produced mixed results. Meanwhile,
the effects of economic growth on the occurrence or incidence of social unrest seem to
have hardly been studied in recent years , as empirical analysis of contentious collective action has
concentrated on political opportunity structures and dynamics of protest and repression.

This paper helps fill that gap by rigorously re-examining the effects of short-term
variations in economic growth on the occurrence of several forms of political instability
in countries worldwide over the past few decades. In this paper, we do not seek to develop and test new

theories of political instability. Instead, we aim to subject a hypothesis common to many prior theories of political instability to more
careful empirical scrutiny. The goal is to provide a detailed empirical characterization of the relationship between economic growth
and political instability in a broad sense. In effect, we describe the conventional wisdom as seen in the data. We do so with statistical
models that use smoothing splines and multiple lags to allow for nonlinear and dynamic effects from economic growth on political
stability. We also do so with an instrumented measure of growth that explicitly accounts for endogeneity in the relationship between
political instability and economic growth. To our knowledge, ours

is the first statistical study of this

relationship to simultaneously address the possibility of nonlinearity and problems of endogeneity. As such, we believe this
paper offers what is probably the most rigorous general evaluation of this argument to
date.
As the results show, some of our findings are surprising. Consistent with conventional assumptions, we find that social unrest and civil
violence are more likely to occur and democratic regimes are more susceptible to coup attempts around periods of slow economic
growth. At the same time, our analysis shows no significant relationship between variation in growth and the risk of civil-war onset,
and results from our analysis of regime changes contradict the widely accepted claim that economic crises cause transitions from
autocracy to democracy. While we would hardly pretend to have the last word on any of these relationships, our findings do suggest
that the

relationship between economic growth and political stability is neither as uniform

nor as strong as the conventional wisdom(s) presume(s). We think these findings also help
explain why the global recession of 20082010 has failed thus far to produce the wave of
coups and regime failures that some observers had anticipated, in spite of the expected
and apparent uptick in social unrest associated with the crisis.

3. Even if decline causes war, these wars are goodthey wont cause
extinction but they will ensure the economy collapses.
Lewis 98 [Chris H. Lewis, Instructor in the Sewall American Studies Program at the University
of Colorado, 1998, "The Paradox of Global Development and the Necessary Collapse of Modern
Industrial Civilization," The Coming Age of Scarcity: Preventing Mass Death and Genocide in
the Twenty-first Century, edited by Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann, Published by
Syracuse University Press, ISBN 0815627440, p. 56]

Most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries
to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed
world, the United States, Europe, and Japan and others will fight neocolonial wars to
force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. These neocolonial
wars will result in mass death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars. If First World
countries choose military confrontation and political repression to maintain the global
economy, then we may see mass death and genocide on a global scale that will make the
deaths of World War II pale in comparison. However, these neocolonial wars, fought to
maintain the developed nations economic and political hegemony, will cause the final
collapse of our global industrial civilization. These wars will so damage the complex
economic and trading networks and squander material, biological, and energy resources
that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the earths 6 to 8
billion people. This would be the worst-case scenario for the collapse of global
civilization.

Ext. No Impact
Depressions force focus on internal problemsprevents military conflict.
Deudney 91Daniel Deudney is Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society at the
Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton [April, 1991, Environment and
Security: Muddled Thinking, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47.3, Proquest]
Poverty Wars. In a second scenario, declining living standards first cause internal turmoil. then war. If groups at all levels of
affluence protect their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups class war and revolutionary upheavals could result.
Faced with these pressures, liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems
capable of maintaining minimum order.9 If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because they lack democratic control, and if
revolutionary regimes are warprone because of their ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent.

The record of previous depressions supports the proposition that widespread economic
stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to international conflict. Although
initially compelling, this scenario has major flaws. One is that it is arguably based on
unsound economic theory. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural
resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production. Many
resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more
extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of
raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and services. In addition, economic
decline does not necessarily produce conflict . How societies respond to economic
decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And as people get
poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces. As
Bernard Brodie observed about the modein era, The predisposing factors to military aggression are
full bellies, not empty ones. The experience of economic depressions over the last two
centuries may be irrelevant, because such depressions were characterized by underutilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930 increased military
spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military
spending will exacerbate the problem. Power Wars. A third scenario is that environmental degradation might cause
war by altering the relative power of states; that is, newly stronger states may be tempted to prey upon the newly weaker ones, or
weakened states may attack and lock in their positions before their power ebbs firther. But such alterations might not lead to war as
readily as the lessons of history suggest, because

economic power and military power are not as tightly

coupled as in the past. The economic power positions of Germany and Japan have changed greatly since World War 11,
but these changes have not been accompanied by war or threat of war. In the contemporary world, whole
industries rise, fall, and relocate, causing substantial fluctuations in the economic wellbeing of regions and peoples without producing wars. There is no reason to believe that
changes in relative wealth and power caused by the uneven impact of environmental degradation would
inevitably lead to war. Even if environmental degradation were to destroy the basic social and
economic fabric of a country or region, the impact on international order may not be very
great. Among the first casualties in such country would be the capacity to wage war. The
poor and wretched of the earth may be able to deny an outside aggressor an easy conquest, but they are themselves a
minimal threat to other states. Contemporary offensive military operations require
complex organizational skills, specialized industrial products and surplus wealth.

The recession disproves war predictions.

Zakaria 9Fareed Zakaria is editor of Newsweek. He writes a regular column for Newsweek.
He also hosts an international affairs program, which airs Sundays worldwide on CNN. Zakaria

was the managing editor of Foreign Affairs. He serves on the board of Yale University, The
Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. He
received a B.A. from Yale and a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard. [December 11, 2009,
The Secrets of Stability, The Daily Beast,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/12/11/the-secrets-of-stability.html]
One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The

global financial system, which had fueled a great

expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalizationabout the
virtues of free markets, trade, and technologywere being called into question. Faith in the American model had
collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like
China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not
seen since the 1930s.
Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector
after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson,

former

chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the
current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be
worse than the Great Depression."
Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and
violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national
intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global
recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations
over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone.
Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets.
Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization.

One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer
investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in
Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high
unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the
crisissoaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did
in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at
all.

Economic decline does not spark warpast recession proves resiliency.

Barnett 9Thomas P.M. Barnett, Ph.D. in Political Science, Harvard University, is a
contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine. Barnett is a strategic planner who has
worked in national security affairs since the end of the Cold War. Since 2005, Tom has served as
Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions, LLC, a strategic advisory and technology firm.
New York Times-bestselling author, Barnett was a Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in
the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War
College. [August 25, 2009, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,
http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398bl.aspx]

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze
with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the
Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery - surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over

the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no
impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.
None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly
attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the
Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last
century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006).
Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing
Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost twodecade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.

Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of
civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent RussiaGeorgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied
to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global
economic trends.
And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-intoPakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the
economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up
with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the
Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and
training local forces.
So, to

sum up:
No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places
like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?);
The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places);

Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered);
No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new
nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy);

A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power
(inevitable given the strain); and
No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its
role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak
efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and
investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.)

AT: WWII
World War II isnt an exampleno statistical evidence.
Ferguson 6 [Niall Ferguson, MA, D.Phil., Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard
University, resident faculty member of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies,
Senior Research Fellow at the Jesus College at Oxford University, and Senior Fellow at the
Hoover Institution at Stanford University, 2006, The Next War of the World, Foreign Affairs,
Volume 85, Number 5, September-October, Available Online via Lexis-Nexis]

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal
chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the
outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out . Nazi Germany
started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries
affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such
regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics
and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of
growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe,
and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

World War II is a neg example.

Trainer 8Ted Trainer is an academic in the Department of Social Work, Social Policy and
Sociology, University of New South Wales and the author of numerous books on the environment
and population issues [January 7, 2008, WAR; ALL JAMIE NEEDS TO KNOW, (This
account overlaps with Our Empire; Its Nature and Maintenance.)
http://ssis.arts.unsw.edu.au/tsw/war.html]

If we take a look at the past we see a close connections between war and the quest for
resources, markets and territory. Some wars have been due to other causes, including religious and ethnic
antagonisms, but most has been contests over access to resource wealth. Consider World War II. It
is tempting to say it was clearly a morally open and shut case. "We British didn't start it. It was those Germans and Japanese." But they
were only doing what Britain had done previousy. Over

a 200 year period Britain conquered the biggest

empire ever, fighting more than 70 wars and slaughtering who knows how many thousands of people in the
process, then shipping out their wealth. Yet when the Germans and Japanese tried to get into
the same game and started taking Britain's "possessions" the British reacted in outrage to "defend their interests".
They had not the slightest doubt that their position was morally pure while the Germans and Japanese were diabolically evil. World
Wars I and II can be seen as attempts by Germany to challenge British global domination,
to get into the business of conquering territory and controlling markets, in order to become a "great imperial
power" too. The last 500 years has been largely about the struggle between Portugal, Spain, Holland,
France, Germany, Britain and the US to dominate the world. Dominate means impose the rules and
arrangements that ensure you get most of the wealth on terms that favour you. But what about Hitler? Aren't
there cases where there is no doubt we have to fight against an unambiguously evil villain? But you shouldn't have let it come to that,
and it would not have had you been sensible long before. The

time to stop a war is many years before it

breaks out, and the way to stop it usually involves you refusing to take part in the
grabbing that leads to it. World War I was largely about imperial grabbing. After it was over the
victors carved up for themselves what had been the Turkish empire, ignoring the needs and the rights of the people in those regions.
They punished Germany severely at Versailles, helping to set up World War II.

If you had really wanted to avoid

World War II you should have started working seriously on the problem no later than perhaps
1880 before the imperial scramble to carve up Africa began and that would have got you nowhere if you were not prepared to
relinquish the underlying drive to get more and more of the world's wealth. What a totally
different world it would be, and how completely different history would have been, had relations between
nations not been primarily about the effort to dominate, conquer and take the wealth and
territory of others that is if nations had been prepared to live within their means. The last
several thousand years of human history can mostly be put in terms of people trying to
grab more than their fair share of the available wealth and power. States constantly jockey diplomatically
and from time to time resort to aggression. Why? Simply because they are never content to live with what they have or content to
organise satisfactory lifestyles for themselves within their own borders. There are always energetic "entrepreneurs" who are not happy
just to be very wealthy, so they go out looking for even more resources and markets, and try to outmanoeuvre and bully their rivals.
States try to increase their wealth, territory, status and power, usually via normal economic strategies, but often it eventually comes to
blows. This is largely what history has been about.

AT: Diversionary War

No evidence backs diversionary theory.
Reiter 9Dan Reiter is professor and chair of political science at Emory University [Aug 17,
2009, How Wars End, ch. 2, Bargaining, Information, and Ending Wars, pg. 9-10, Princeton
University Press]
Irnportantly, the assumption that Wars are always on balance costly for each side is not uncontroversial. Some feminist approaches
contend that states may fight for the sake of lighting, as wars serve patriarchy by reinforcing gender identity.3 A more

mainstream critique is that leaders go to war for domestic political reasons, such that a
war-avoiding bargain might not be reachable even when both sides knew who would win,
as lighting itself provides domestic political benefits from a war to both win- ner and loser.4 Under some conditions,
especially if a state is undergoing democratization or if a national leader is experiencing domestic political
problems such as unrest or economic downturn, a state may see war as a way to rally the
public around the leader and stave off domestic political challenges.5 The proposition that
leaders go to war when facing domestic difficulties is often called the "diversionary"
hypothesis.
However, the evidence that leaders choose war to solve internal political problems is thin . The underlying
assumption is that going to war en- genders a rally round the flag effect that boosts the
popularity of leaders, but leaders reap this benefit only under very narrow conditions (which
often cannot be controlled by the attacking state), and even the biggest rallies are short-lived .6 Importantly,
there is almost no smoking gun historical evidence of a leader launching a war
primarily as a means of solving domestic political problems. At most, politicians have occasionally
speculated about diversionary action, such as Secretary of State William Seward's (ignored) April 1861 suggestion to President
Abraham Lincoln that the United States provoke crises with European powers as a means of staving off civil war between the Union
and the seceding southern states.7 A Russian minister is famously thought to have declared just after the outbreak ofthe 1904-O5
Russo-japanese War that, "We need a little, victorious war to stem the tide of revolution," but the story is likely too good to be true.8
Leaders sometimes see indirect relationships between starting war and reaping domestic political benefits, such as the possibility that
Lyndon Johnson escalated the Vietnam War in 1965 to protect his Great Society program from domestic political attack.9 Some

quantitative studies have found that the presence of internal problems like declining
economic growth, rising inflation, partial democratization, or declining leader popularity
are correlated with an (often slightly) increased likelihood in the use of force. However, these
relationships are often limited in scope, occurring only under certain economic or
political conditions.10 Any possible diversionary effects might in turn be moderated by the
tendency of states to avoid provoking other states that might have diversionary
incentives.11

No empirical support for diversionary war.

Boehmer 10Charles R. Boehmer is professor of political science at the University of Texas,
El Paso and Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University [Economic Growth
and Violent International Conflict: 18751999, Defence and Peace Economics, 2010, Vol.
21(3), June, pp. 249268, EBSCO]
In contrast, studies of diversionary theory make state-level (monadic) or dyadic arguments. Most studies to date have been monadic
and only a few have examined strategic diversionary behavior from a dyadic perspective. Of central importance to this study are those
theories of diversionary conflict arguing that economic crisis induces foreign conflicts. However, while

diversionary
theory has been popular, the bulk of extant research examines the foreign policy of the

United States (Ostrom and Job, 1986; James and Oneal, 1991; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; DeRouen, 1995; Hess and
Orphanides, 1995; Wang, 1996; Fordham, 1998; Mitchell and Moore, 2002; Foster, 2006). Meernik (1994) and Meernik and
Waterman (1996) find no evidence of diversionary behavior.

Prefer our evbest data set.

Boehmer 7Charles R. Boehmer received his Ph.D. from The Pennsylvania State University
in 2002 and is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at The University of Texas at El Paso.
[December, 2007, The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the
Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict, Politics & Policy, Volume 35, Issue 4, pages 774809,
accessed online through Wiley]

Studies of diversionary conflict typically claim that lower rates of economic growth and
domestic unrest increase the risk of militarized interstate conflict. Research shows that these factors
are also related to regime changes. Lower rates of economic growth and domestic conflict should increase the risk that governments
are overthrown. This

article investigates the comparative risk of economic growth and

domestic turmoil on militarized interstate conflict and regime changes on a sample of
over 100 countries from 1920-92. I find that higher rates of economic growth are related
to violent militarized interstate conflicts and reduce the risk of regime changes. Democracy and economic
development likewise provide internal stability and interstate peace. Yet the risk of regime change increases rapidly relative to
involvement in an interstate conflict for states affected by high levels of domestic conflict, suggesting that any

diversionary

strategies are a risky gambit that have a high chance of failure.

Diversionary thesis falseits too difficult to distract the public from the
economyempirically forces leaders to decrease militarized disputes.
Baker 4William D. Baker is a Professor of American Studies, American Government,
Comparative Politics at the Arkansas School for Mathematics, Sciences, and the Arts. [May 2004,
The Dog That Won't Wag: Presidential Uses of Force and the Diversionary Theory of War,
Strategic Insights, 3.5, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/may/bakerMay04.asp]

The diversionary theory of war, the widely held belief that presidents will be predisposed
toward uses of force in militarized interstate disputes as a means of boosting their own public approval ratings,
diverting public attention from domestic political or economic troubles, or to influence impending elections,
assumes, of course, that the rally effect is in fact real, or at least that presidents believe that it
is. However, key elements of the diversionary theory of war have been brought into
question as a result of this research. Despite popular presumptions to the contrary, presidents are in fact
not more likely to become involved in crises when their popularity is low, and actually
are more likely to enjoy higher than average public approval levels prior to becoming involved
in militarized disputes. The economic data presented also suggest that presidents are not more
inclined to seek out foreign military diversions when the consumer confidence in the
health of the economy is low, but that in fact consumer confidence and expectations tend
to be higher than average prior to a dispute. Similarly, the proximity of elections does not appear to be a factor in
the onset of militarized interstate disputes either.

*** Transition/Alternative

1NC Transition (Delay DA)

Collapse now is best, growth guarantees extinction.
Barry 8 [Dr. Glen Barry, President and Founder of Ecological Internet, an online portal for the
global environmental movement, Ph.D. in Land Resources from the University of WisconsinMadison, M.S. in Conservation Biology and Sustainable Development from the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, and B.A. in Political Science from Marquette University, 2008, Economic
Collapse And Global Ecology, Earth Meanders, January 14th, Available Online at
http://www.countercurrents.org/barry140108.htm, Accessed 09-09-2008]
Humanity and the Earth are faced with an enormous conundrumsufficient climate policies enjoy political support only in times of
rapid economic growth. Yet this growth

is the primary factor driving greenhouse gas emissions and

other environmental ills. The growth machine has pushed the planet well beyond its
ecological carrying capacity, and unless constrained, can only lead to human extinction
and an end to complex life. With every economic downturn, like the one now looming in the United
States, it becomes more difficult and less likely that policy sufficient to ensure global
ecological sustainability will be embraced. This essay explores the possibility that from a biocentric
viewpoint of needs for long-term global ecological, economic and social sustainability; it
would be better for the economic collapse to come now rather than later. Economic
growth is a deadly disease upon the Earth, with capitalism as its most virulent strain.
Throw-away consumption and explosive population growth are made possible by using
up fossil fuels and destroying ecosystems. Holiday shopping numbers are covered by
media in the same breath as Arctic ice melt, ignoring their deep connection. Exponential
economic growth destroys ecosystems and pushes the biosphere closer to failure.
Humanity has proven itself unwilling and unable to address climate change and other
environmental threats with necessary haste and ambition. Action on coal, forests, population, renewable
energy and emission reductions could be taken now at net benefit to the economy. Yet, the losersprimarily fossil fuel
industries and their bought oligarchysuccessfully resist futures not dependent upon their
deadly products. Perpetual economic growth, and necessary climate and other ecological
policies, are fundamentally incompatible. Global ecological sustainability depends
critically upon establishing a steady state economy, whereby production is right-sized to
not diminish natural capital. Whole industries like coal and natural forest logging will be
eliminated even as new opportunities emerge in solar energy and environmental
restoration. This critical transition to both economic and ecological sustainability is
simply not happening on any scale. The challenge is how to carry out necessary
environmental policies even as economic growth ends and consumption plunges. The
natural response is going to be liquidation of even more life-giving ecosystems, and
jettisoning of climate policies, to vainly try to maintain high growth and personal
consumption. We know that humanity must reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% over coming decades. How will
this and other necessary climate mitigation strategies be maintained during years of economic downturns, resource wars, reasonable
demands for equitable consumption, and frankly, the weather being more pleasant in some places? If efforts to reduce emissions and
move to a steady state economy fail; the collapse of ecological, economic and social systems is assured. Bright greens take the
continued existence of a habitable Earth with viable, sustainable populations of all species including humans as the ultimate truth and
the meaning of life. Whether this is possible in a time of economic collapse is crucially dependent upon whether enough ecosystems

It may be
better for the Earth and humanity's future that economic collapse comes sooner rather
than later, while more ecosystems and opportunities to return to nature's fold exist.
Economic collapse will be deeply wrenchingpart Great Depression, part African famine. There will be
and resources remain post collapse to allow humanity to recover and reconstitute sustainable, relocalized societies.

starvation and civil strife, and a long period of suffering and turmoil.

Many will be killed as balance

returns to the Earth. Most people have forgotten how to grow food and that their identity is more than what they own. Yet there is
some justice, in that those who have lived most lightly upon the land will have an easier time of it, even as those super-consumers
living in massive cities finally learn where their food comes from and that ecology is the meaning of life. Economic

collapse

now means humanity and the Earth ultimately survive to prosper again. Human
sufferingalready the norm for many, but hitting the currently materially affluentis
inevitable given the degree to which the planet's carrying capacity has been exceeded. We
are a couple decades at most away from societal strife of a much greater magnitude as the
Earth's biosphere fails. Humanity can take the bitter medicine now, and recover while
emerging better for it; or our total collapse can be a final, fatal death swoon. A successful
revolutionary response to imminent global ecosystem collapse would focus upon bringing
down the Earth's industrial economy now. As society continues to fail miserably to
implement necessary changes to allow creation to continue, maybe the best strategy to
achieve global ecological sustainability is economic sabotage to hasten the day. It is more
fragile than it looks. Humanity is a marvelous creation. Yet her current dilemma is
unprecedented. It is not yet known whether she is able to adapt, at some expense to her
comfort and short-term well-being, to ensure survival. If she can, all futures of economic,
social and ecological collapse can be avoided. If not it is better from a long-term
biocentric viewpoint that the economic growth machine collapse now, bringing forth the
necessary change, and offering hope for a planetary and human revival.

2NC/1NRYes Transition
More evidencecollapse spurs a transition to sustainable societies.
Lewis 98 [Chris H. Lewis, Instructor in the Sewall American Studies Program at the University
of Colorado, 1998, "The Paradox of Global Development and the Necessary Collapse of Modern
Industrial Civilization," The Coming Age of Scarcity: Preventing Mass Death and Genocide in
the Twenty-first Century, edited by Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann, Published by
Syracuse University Press, ISBN 0815627440, p. 44-45]
I will argue that we

are witnessing the collapse of global industrial civilization. Driven by

individualism, materialism, and the endless pursuit of wealth and power, the modern
industrialized worlds efforts to modernize and integrate the world politically,
economically, and culturally since World War II are only accelerating this global
collapse. In the late-twentieth century, global development leaves 80 percent of the worlds
population outside the industrialized nations progress and affluence (Wallimann 1994). When
the modern industrialized world collapses, people in the underdeveloped world will
continue their daily struggle for dignity and survival at the margins of a moribund global
industrial civilization. With the collapse of the modern world, smaller, autonomous, local
and regional civilizations, cultures, and polities will emerge. We can reduce the threat of
mass death and genocide that will surely accompany this collapse by encouraging the
creation and growth of sustainable, self-sufficient regional polities. John Cobb has already made a
case for how this may work in the United States and how it is working in Kerala, India. After the collapse of global
civilization, modern peoples will not have the material resources, biological capital, and
energy to reestablish global civilization. Forced by economic necessity to become
dependent on local resources and ecosystems for their survival, peoples throughout the
world will work to conserve and restore their [end page 44] environments. For the societies
that destroy their local environments and economies, as modern people so often do, will
themselves face collapse and ruin.

Growth is unsustainable and will cause agricultural collapse, nuclear war and
environmental destruction culminating in extinction only economic collapse
causes cultural shift that solves.
Johnny Djordjevic, March 1998. BA Global Economics, Paper in Global Sustainability at UC,
Irvine. Sustainability, Senior Seminar for Instructor: Peter A. Bowler,
http://www.dbc.uci.edu/~sustain/global/sensem/djordj98.html.
Max Weber believed in the power of an idea. This political theorist discussed how Calvinism was one idea that perpetuated the rise of
capitalism. Few people ever examine the power of an idea, but if one examines and contemplates this theory, a realization comes
across: that ideas drive society. The key premise is that some values of our society must be altered in order

to avert catastrophic consequences. The way of life in developed countries is "the origin of many of our most serious
problems"(Trainer, 1985). Because developed countries have high material living standards and consume massive quantities of all
resources, "hundreds of millions of people in desperate need must go without the materials and energy that could improve their
conditions while these resources flow into developed countries, often to produce frivolous luxuries"(Trainer, 1985). People's way

of life seems to be a glaring example of values leading to high rates of personal consumption of
resources and the waste of these same materials. In addition to overconsumption, the services used to supply our society with
goods, (examples of these goods would be food, water, energy, and sewage services.) tends to be wasteful and expensive. Production
is organized in such a way, (usually highly centralized) that travel becomes an enormous burden. Another consideration is that our
population is expected to increase to rise to eleven billion within the next half century. Considering the mineral and

energy resources needed in the future, these estimates must also include the consumption of a
population almost doubled from its current status and these same figures must include an
expected increase in the affluence of developed countries. "If we are willing to endorse an already affluent
society in which there is continued growth on this scale,(american resource use increasing 2% each year), then we are assuming that
after 2050 something like 40 times as many resources can be provided each year as were provided in the 1970's, and that it is in order
for people in a few rich countries to live in this superaffluent way while the other 9.5 billion in the world do not"(Trainer, 1985). The

environment is in danger from our pursuit of affluence. Serious worries come from predictions about the
atmosphere. The burning of fossil fuels will raise temperatures and result in climatic effects. Rising
temperatures could have horrific effects. First of all, food production could seriously be imperiled
even by increases of only one degree celcius. If the temperature should increase by five degrees
scientists predict the coastal island nations would be submerged and possibly trigger the next ice
age. Another environmental concern deals with the soil. Our agricultural practices disregard the value of recycling food waste. Also,
the use of pesticides and chemicals in agriculture lead to the poisoning of the soil and topsoil loss
through erosion. Yields per acre for grain are falling and "we do not produce food in ways that
can be continued for centuries"(Trainer, 1985). Even more disturbing is the deforestation of rainforests. This
results in the extinction of many species, concentration of carbon dioxide, the loss of many
potential medical breakthroughs, and possibly the disruption of rainfall. Opponents of the deforestation fail
to realize that our expensive way of life and greedy economic system are the driving forces . "Nothing can
be achieved by fighting to save this forest or that species if in the long term we do not change the economic system which demands
ever-increasing production and consumption of non-necessities"(Trainer, 1985). There also lies a problem in the Third World.

Developed countries high living standards and quest for an ever-increasing quality of life lead to
Third World poverty and the deprivation of the Third World's access to its own resources. As
Third World countries get deprived of materials, the developed world consumes and imports over
half of their resources. A few developed countries seem to be consuming the globe's resources and this consumption
rate is always increasing. "The rich must live more simply that the poor may simply live"(Trainer, 1985). The Third World is
exploited in many ways. One way is that the best land in a developing country is used for crops exported to developed countries, while
citizens of the Third World starve and suffer. Another way is the poor working conditions of the Third World. A third exploitation can
be overlooked but no less disgusting; "The world's greatest health problem could be simply by providing water for the perhaps 2.000
million people who now have to drink form rivers and wells contained by human and animal wastes. Technically it is a simple matter
to set up plants for producing iron and plastic pipes. But most of the world's iron and plastic goes into the production of luxurious cars,
soft-drink containers, office blocks and similar things in rich countries"(Trainer, 1985). The threat of nuclear war and

international conflict rises with countries of all kinds entranced with the logic and idea of
materialism. Perhaps the most dangerous and likely chances for a nuclear conflict arise from the
competition for dwindling resources by developed countries. Similar events can be seen all across the globe.
Major superpowers get themselves involved in domestic matters not concerning them, providing
arms and advice to try and obtain the inside track on possible resources. International tension will
rise in the competition for resources and so will the "ever-increasing probability of nuclear
war"(Trainer, 1985). As developed countries pursue affluence they fail to see the inherent contradiction in this idea; as growth is the
quest, the quality of life will decrease. For a healthy community, there exists a list of non-material conditions which must be present,
"a sense of purpose, fulfilling work and leisure, supportive social relations, peace of mind, security from theft and violence, and caring
and co-operative neighborhoods"(Trainer, 1985). And as developed countries think their citizens are the happiest in the world, "In
most affluent societies rates of divorce, drug-taking, crime, mental breakdown, child abuse, alcoholism, vandalism, suicide, stress,
depression, and anxiety are increasing"(Trainer, 1985). Despite all the gloomy facts and sad stories, there is a solution, to

create a sustainable society. Rather than being greedy and only thinking about the self, each individual must
realize the impacts of his/her selfish tendencies, and disregard their former view of the world. One must come
into harmony with what is really needed to survive, and drawn a strict distinction between what is necessity and
what is luxury. Not every family needs three cars, or five meals a day or four telephones and two refrigerators. Countries do not need
to strive for increasing growth, less materials could be imported/exported and international tension could be greatly reduced. The
major problems seem not to step from the determination of what a sustainable society is, but on how to get people to change their
values. This task is not an easy one. People must be forced to realize the harmful and catastrophic

consequences lie in their meaningless wants and greed. The problem of cognitive dissonance is
hard to overcome, but it is not impossible. The solution to this dilemma lies in castastrophe. The only
event that changes people's minds is social trauma or harm. The analogy is that a person who refuses to wear a
seat belt and one day gets thrown through his/her windshield will remember to wear the seat belt after the accident. The logic behind
this argument is both simple and feasible. So the question of dissonance is answered in part, but to change a whole society

obviously takes a bigger and more traumatic event to occur. An economic collapse or ice age would
trigger a new consciousness leading to a sustainable society. The power of an idea should never be
underestimated. Hitler's idea of the Aryan race lead to the Holocaust, Marx's idea of socialism lead to Stalin's reign and the deaths of
over 50 million people. But ideas change be changed, disregarded and adopted. As developed countries find themselves engaging in a
greedy philosophy, once that realization is made, the first step to a better society is taken. Our current path will lead to
massive suffering all across the world, with extinction a distinct possibility. Global
every person on the planet, (starting in the developed world), otherwise

sustainability must be adopted by

the world will cease to support life.

2NC/1NR Nuke Malthus Transition

Transition wars are goodthey wont cause extinction but will ensure that
the economy collapses.
Lewis 98 [Chris H. Lewis, Instructor in the Sewall American Studies Program at the University
of Colorado, 1998, "The Paradox of Global Development and the Necessary Collapse of Modern
Industrial Civilization," The Coming Age of Scarcity: Preventing Mass Death and Genocide in
the Twenty-first Century, edited by Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann, Published by
Syracuse University Press, ISBN 0815627440, p. 56]

Most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries
to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed
world, the United States, Europe, and Japan and others will fight neocolonial wars to
force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. These neocolonial
wars will result in mass death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars. If First World
countries choose military confrontation and political repression to maintain the global
economy, then we may see mass death and genocide on a global scale that will make the
deaths of World War II pale in comparison. However, these neocolonial wars, fought to
maintain the developed nations economic and political hegemony, will cause the final
collapse of our global industrial civilization. These wars will so damage the complex
economic and trading networks and squander material, biological, and energy resources
that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the earths 6 to 8
billion people. This would be the worst-case scenario for the collapse of global
civilization.

Nuclear war wouldnt cause extinctiontheir claims are exaggerations and

ignore 90% of the world.
Martin 82Brian Martin is an associate professor of Science, Technology, and Society at
University of Wollongong [Critique of nuclear extinction, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 19,
No. 4, 1982, pp. 287-300, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/82jpr.html]
To summarise the above points, a

major global nuclear war in which population centres in the US, Soviet Union, Europe
no effective civil defence measures taken, could kill directly
perhaps 400 to 450 million people. Induced effects, in particular starvation or epidemics following
agricultural failure or economic breakdown, might add up to several hundred million deaths to the total,
though this is most uncertain.
Such an eventuality would be a catastrophe of enormous proportions, but it is far from extinction. Even in
the most extreme case there would remain alive some 4000 million people, about ninetenths of the world's population, most of them unaffected physically by the nuclear war.
The following areas would be relatively unscathed, unless nuclear attacks were made in
these regions: South and Central America, Africa, the Middle East, the Indian
subcontinent, Southeast Asia, Australasia, Oceania and large parts of China. Even in the midlatitudes of the northern hemisphere where most of the nuclear weapons would be exploded, areas upwind of nuclear
attacks would remain free of heavy radioactive contamination, such as Portugal, Ireland and British
and China ware targeted, with

Columbia.

Many people, perhaps especially in the peace movement, believe that global nuclear war will lead to the
death of most or all of the world's population.[12] Yet the available scientific evidence
provides no basis for this belief. Furthermore, there seem to be no convincing scientific
arguments that nuclear war could cause human extinction.[13] In particular, the idea of 'overkill', if taken
to imply the capacity to kill everyone on earth, is highly misleading.[14]
In the absence of any positive evidence, statements

that nuclear war will lead to the death of all or most

people on earth should be considered exaggerations. In most cases the exaggeration is unintended, since
people holding or stating a belief in nuclear extinction are quite sincere.[15]
Another major point to be made in relation to statements about nuclear war is that almost

exclusive attention has

been focussed on the 'worst case' of a major global nuclear war, as indeed has been done
in the previous paragraphs. A major global nuclear war is a possibility, but not the only
one. In the case of 'limited' nuclear war, anywhere from hundreds of people to many tens
of millions of people might die.[16] This is a real possibility, but peace movement theory and practice have developed
almost as if this possibility does not exist.

No escalation
Quinlan 9 [Michael, Former Permanent Under-Sec. StateUK Ministry of Defense, Thinking
about Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects, p. 63-69]

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable
momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid
confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the
decisionmakers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be
appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other
was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which
modem delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant
forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as
noted earlier, whether newer nuclear weapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial
state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result,

neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful
risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And
none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted
rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider
the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial
nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression
could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be
doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgement that the
possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacked possessor used
nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor's own first use, this
judgement would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a
substantial possibility of the aggressor leaders' concluding that their initial judgement had
been mistakenthat the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been
seeking, and that for their own countrys, survival they must call off the aggression.
Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it
were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for
granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance
of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know.
It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure
gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesi, makes

them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternativeit can only be surrender. But a more positive and
hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context.

2NC/1NR Collapse Key to Solve

Collapse is the only chance we haveextinction is inevitable in the status
quoits try or die.
McPherson 10 [Guy McPherson is professor emeritus of natural resources and the
environment at the University of Arizona, where he taught and conducted research for 20 years.
His scholarly efforts have produced nine books and well over 100 articles, and have focused for
many years on conservation of biological diversity, The road to nowhere, December 1, 2010,
http://transitionvoice.com/2010/12/the-road-to-nowhere/]
When I wrote about the topic of global climate change in this space a mere two months ago, the situation was dire. Each of a

series
of assessments indicated an increasingly disturbing outcome for global average
temperature. The latest of those assessments, based on more data and more sophisticated
models than prior efforts, suggest we have passed tipping points that may lead to the
extinction of our own species, along with many others. A global average increase of two degrees
Celsius likely leads to runaway greenhouse. This means destruction of most human
habitat on Earth. About six weeks after my brief review graced Transition Voice, the situation took a turn for the worse. The
International Energy Agencys World Energy Outlook was released in early November. It contains a shocking assessment: Were
headed for a global average temperature increase of 3.5 C by 2035. If an increase of two
degrees spells runaway greenhouse, you can bet the consequences of a 3.5 degree
increase within 25 years is catastrophic. The upside On the other hand, I also pointed out unexpectedly
good news in my previous essay. Completion of the ongoing collapse of the worlds industrial
economy might prove sufficient to save the planet and us. Although climate-change assessments fail to
incorporate positive geo-physical feedbacks such as the release of methane hydrates and decreased albedo, they also leave out the

appears a single path collapse of the worlds

industrial economy allows us to avoid runaway greenhouse and the associated
extinction of Homo Sapiens. Fortunately for us, were inadvertently following that path. Assuming we
transition from economic collapse to economic growth or to a steady-state economy,
what are the likely outcomes? If we could wrest control of policy from the corporations who currently run the
negative feedback of world economic collapse. Yet it

government, what choices would be wisest? What are the costs and consequences of choosing to pursue action on the climate-change
front? Two roads diverged First, lets consider two simple outcomes associated with the no-action alternative to which federal and
state governments are firmly committed: (1) runaway climate change and (2) no significant change in climate. If

climate
change turns out to be as dire as predicted, then pursuing the current no-action path leads
to probable extinction of human life on Earth. First, though, we will cause mass human
suffering by destroying our ability to grow food. Well also continue to cause the
extinction of several hundred species daily. But never mind the non-human species were
driving to extinction. After all, weve never expressed serious interest in them in the past. Instead lets focus on the ability to
produce food for our large and growing human population. Gleaning the truth Many people assume food-producing
regions will change locations as the planet heats up. If we can no longer produce grains in
the Midwestern US, these folks believe, well simply move the great American
breadbasket further north. This would turn Canada into a food-producing superpower. Unfortunately, however,
thats an unlikely outcome. Canadian soils are no match for the deep, organic-rich soils of
the American Midwest. Climate might be favorable for crop production as Canada
warms, but grossly inadequate soil isnt. If climate chaos turns out to be a false alarm then the path of non action
appears to be the correct one. We dont have to make big economic sacrifices on behalf of an ambiguous future if Earth can tolerate
infinite carbon emissions. This tidbit of good news comes with a warning, however. At

some point, the thousands of

species were driving to extinction catches up with us. At some point, wiping out the

pollinators, decomposers, and direct sources of our food turns out badly. We depend on
other species for our own survival in ways we barely understand. Ill not make the ethical
case for saving non-human species because I dont know a dozen people in the
industrialized world who care about them. But Ill make a selfish one: we need those
species for our own survival. As with the no-action alternative, simplistically I will address two outcomes associated
with the take-action side of the climate-change issue. If we take significant action which at this point probably entails allowing
complete collapse of the worlds industrial economy and climate change turns out to have been a hoax, then weve obviously made
a horrible mistake by terminating the dream of never-ending economic growth. We will have destroyed the potential for every high
school student in the US to spend a summer in Europe for immersion in another culture (sic). We will have caused economic hardship
that will lead to destruction of the social safety net upon which weve come to depend. We will have caused people in industrialized
countries to forgo fuel at gas stations, food at grocery stores, and water coming out of the municipal taps. This scenario sounds
horrific. But in fact, its nirvna. Pull

the plug, save the patient Only by terminating the worlds

industrial economy is there any hope for the thousands of species we drive to extinction
every year. Only by terminating the worlds industrial economy is there any hope for the
people in non-industrialized countries we oppress to prop up economic growth in the
developed world. As a consequence, only by terminating the worlds industrial economy is
there any hope for the future of our own species to squeeze through the Sixth Great
Extinction. The second outcome, if we take action, is the potential for averting runaway greenhouse. Please read the prior
paragraph again. All the benefits listed there are realized anew in light of the ongoing and accelerating climate-change apocalypse.
Further, averting

climate chaos, if its possible at this late date, spares us environmental catastrophe in
the near term. Averting climate chaos, if its possible at this late date, spares us catastrophic
hurricanes, wildfires, floods, dust bowls, famines, epidemics, and climate refugees.
Averting climate chaos, if its possible at this late date, spares us miserable lives and
untimely deaths for the 205,000 new people we add each day to an overshot planet.
Resistance against the imperialism of never-ending economic growth is imperative, and
not merely for our privileges. Our very survival as a species hangs in the balance. For
those of us young enough to anticipate being alive in 2035, our survival as individuals is
at stake.

Collapse is the only way to prevent extinction

McPherson 11 [Guy McPherson is professor emeritus of natural resources and the
environment at the University of Arizona, where he taught and conducted research for 20 years.
His scholarly efforts have produced nine books and well over 100 articles, and have focused for
many years on conservation of biological diversity, Two roads diverged in a wood, February 3,
2011, http://transitionvoice.com/2011/02/two-roads-diverged/]

If we continue to burn
fossil fuels, we face imminent environmental collapse. If we cease burning fossil fuels,
the industrial economy will collapse. Industrial society expresses these futures as a choice between your money or
your life. It tells you that without money life isnt worth living. As should be clear by now, industrial society or at least our
industrial leaders have not chosen door number one: environmental collapse; and not door number two: economic collapse.
But both. At the same time! Compassionately selfish If you believe your life depends upon water
coming out of the taps and food showing up at the grocery store, youll defend to the
death the system that keeps water coming out the taps and food showing up at the grocery
story. But news flash: If you think your life depends on that system, youre a very unusual person,
especially historically. And you support an unusual culture marked by overwhelming collateral
damage to simultaneously existing non-industrial cultures and non-human species. And
youre sorely mistaken, besides. The problem is environmental overshoot, as a handful of ecologists have been
saying for decades, echoing Malthus. Weve far exceeded the human carrying capacity of the planet.
At this late juncture in the era of industry, it seems safe to assume we face one of two futures.

As a result, we

threaten most of the species on Earth, including our own, with extinction by
the end of this century. Currently, theres not nearly enough food to feed every human on the
planet, even at the expense of nearly every non-human species. Actually, tens of thousands of
people have been starving to death every day for a few decades, but theyve been beyond
our imperial television screens. And even more industrialized societies are falling to
escalating food prices and shocking food shortages. A toxic brew The root cause of the problem is complex,
but it can be reduced to a few primary factors: agriculture and industrialization, the epitome of every civilization in the last thousand
years, and their contribution to human population growth. The genus Homo persisted on the planet some 2 million years, and our own
species had been around for at least 250,000 years, without exceeding carrying capacity. We actually lived without posing a threat to
the persistence of other species. During those years two million of them, in fact humans had abundant spare time for socializing
and art, and spent only a few hours each week hunting, gathering, and otherwise preparing to feed themselves (i.e., working).
Contrast those conditions with people today and how much time we spend working (and rarely enjoying that work, if talk around the
water cooler is any indication). Agriculture

leads to food storage, which leads to empire, which

produces slavery, oppression, and mass murder (all of which were essentially absent for the first couple million
years of the human experience). Lives were relatively short, but happy by every measure we can
find. In short, without agriculture theres no environmental overshoot. The human
population explosion is effect, not cause. The industrial revolution exacerbated the
problem to such an extent well never be able to recover without historic human
suffering. Were only beginning to witness the impacts of reduced energy supplies on the
industrial economy, and on this kind of trajectory, unimpeded by some change, well be
squarely in the Stone Age, fully unprepared, within two decades at most. At this point, our
commitment to western culture (i.e., civilization) is so great that any attempt to power down
will result in suffering and death of millions, probably billions. Nonetheless, its tragically the
only way to allow our own species, and millions of others, to persist beyond centurys
end and squeeze through the global-change bottleneck resulting from industrialization.
Every day in overshoot is another day to be reckoned with later, and therefore another few thousand people who must live and die in

are no decent solutions. A date with destiny A collapse in the worlds

industrial economy is producing the expected results, finally. Sadly, its too late to save
thousands of species weve sent into the abyss. But perhaps theres barely time to save a
few remaining species, including our own. If you care about other species and cultures, or
even the continued persistence of our own species, then an impressive body of evidence
suggests you support our imminent transition to the post-industrial Stone Age. Or whatever it
looks like. Such a trip saves the maximum number of human lives, over the long term. When
you realize the (eco)systems in the real world actually produce your food and water,
youll defend to the death the systems that produces your food and water. Im in that camp. How
Hobbesian fashion. There

about you? What do you support? The industrial culture of death, which sanctions murderous actions every day? Or the culture of life?

2NC/1NRYes Mindset Shift

Collapse is vital to spur a transitionit would catalyze a social learning
process that makes new social arrangements possible.
Milbrath 3 [Lester W. Milbrath, Director Emeritus of the Research Program in Environment
and Society at the State University of New York at Buffalo, 2003, "Envisioning a Sustainable
Society," Explorations in Environmental Political Theory: Thinking About What We Value,
edited by Joel Jay Kassiola, Published by M.E. Sharpe, ISBN 0765610523, p. 48-51]

Learning our way to a new society not only is the preferred way; it is the only wayin my
judgment; there is no shortcut. No individual has the power and the trust of the people to
order new ways of thinking, new ways of perceiving, new architecture for institutions,
new laws, new norms, new ways of making and doing things. We get those new ways of
thinking and doing only by learningit must be the learning of the entire society.
Fundamental relearning cannot occur, however, until people become aware of the need for
change. So long as contemporary society is working reasonably well and its leaders keep
reaffirming that society is on the right track, the mass of people will not listen to a
message urging change. For that reason, life systems on our planet probably must get
worse before they can get better. Nature will turn out to be our most powerful teacher.
We probably will not be able to listen until biospheric [end page 48] systems no longer work
the way they used to and people are shocked into realizing how much their lives
depended on the continued good functioning of those systems. After a severe shock to
wake us up, in times of great systemic turbulence, social learning can be extraordinarily
swift. Regretfully, injuries to life systems already may be very great by that time. Life
probably will not cease, but many will die and others will be gravely injured. Why cant we
learn at less cost? Even if I know they will be difficult to achieve, here are some specific recommendations about next steps to be
taken to bring about a sustainable society. If we could wave a magic wand to obtain the cooperation of people and their governments,
the following actions would be effective: Change the way we think as swiftly as possible. We need to clarify our values and adopt
new priorities. In the process we should define our responsibilities so that people see what their part of the overall task is and the
necessity to do their share. All of us must learn to think systemically, holistically, integratively, and in a futures mode. Renewed
reflection on the true meaning of quality of living should be part of this relearning effort. Control and gradually eliminate weapons of
mass destruction. Stop population growth as quickly as possible. With heroic efforts, population rise might be leveled off at 8 or 9
billion. Reduce material consumption in the more developed countries and use that reserve capacity to help the less developed
countries meet their subsistence needs. Cut back as much as possible on use of fossil energy; develop and adopt more energy efficient
technology; cut out energy waste wherever found; stop using fossil energy simply for thrills, fun, ease, or comfort; convert to use of
solar energy. Aggressively reduce economic throughput so as to preserve more resources for future generations and to reduce
discharge of wastes into the biosphere. Failure to do so will seriously reduce the carrying capacity (or how much life the ecosystem
can biologically support) of life systems. Find ways to share employment so we do not need to make unneeded goods just to provide
jobs for people. Work should be redefined to become a means of self-realization, not merely a pawn in economic competition. [end
page 49] Emphasize making quality products that can last lifetimesbeautiful things to be cherished and preserved. Products should
be designed to be easily repaired and for safe eventual disposal. They should be marketed with as little packaging as possible.
Diligently reuse, restore, and recycle materials that we now throw away. Carefully dispose of the remainder of the wastes. Eliminate
use of chiorofluorocarbons (CFC5) to allow the stratosopheric ozone layer to restore itself (agreed to in a United Nations treaty but
must be implemented fully). Recapture CFCs from current uses and destroy them (break them down into original constituents). Stop
the release of toxic environmental chemicals into the environment. Protect and enhance biodiversity; revitalize ecosystems that have
been injured by human actions; husband nature and resources so that future generations and other creatures can enjoy a life of decent
quality. Plant billions more trees. Phase out energy and chemical intensive agriculture so as to develop methods of tillage that are
sustainable. Restore degraded ecosystems to flourishing health wherever possible. Develop an ethic that constantly alerts people that
their actions should impact Earth systems as lightly as possible. Affirm love (caring for others) as a primary value; it should be
extended not only to those near and dear, but to future generations, other species, and people in other lands. Diminish rewards for
power, competitiveness, and domination over others. A sustainable society emphasizes partnership rather than domination,
cooperation more than competition, justice more than power. Develop a procedure for careful review and forethought regarding the
long-term impact of a proposed technology. Bad consequences of new technology are easier to avoid or manage if they can be
anticipated from the start. Redesign government to maximize its ability to learn; then use the government learning process to promote
social learning. Develop a new government institution to better anticipate future consequences of proposed policies, laws, and
technologies. [end page 50] Societal learning of environmental thinking should become a national project. Require that every child
receive environmental education (it is just as basic as history); institute environmental education programs for adults; make a special

effort to educate media employees about environmental concepts and thinking. Do not merely work for a living but work for
something that is truly important. Keep a sense of humor; sing, dance, affirm, love, be joyous in your oneness with the earth. Our
common journey promises to be challenging and exciting, even though difficult. It will be much easier, and more likely to be
successful, if we face it optimistically with a deep understanding of the pace and character of social transformation. We humans are
special. Not because of our reasonother species can reasonrather it is our ability to recall the past and foresee the future. We

are the only creatures that can imagine our extinction. That special gift of understanding
places a unique moral responsibility on humans. Once we have contemplated the future,
every decision that could affect that future becomes a moral decision. Even the decision
not to act, or to decide not to decide, becomes a moral judgment. We humans, given the
ability to anticipate the consequences of our actions, will become the conscious mind of
the biocommunity, a global mind that will guide and hasten social transformation. Those
who understand what is happening to our world are not free to shrink from this
responsibility.

2NC/1NRNow Key
Its linearthe longer we wait, the worse it will be
Barry 10 [Glen Barry, President and Founder of Ecological Internet, Ph.D. in "Land
Resources" from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, a Masters of Science in "Conservation
Biology and Sustainable Development" also from Madison, and a Bachelor of Arts in "Political
Science" from Marquette University, Resisting Global Ecological Change, January 5, 2010,
http://www.ecoearth.info/blog/2010/01/earth_meanders_resisting_globa.asp]

The human family faces imminent and (Copenhagen would suggest) inevitable collapse of the
biospherethe thin layer of life upon an otherwise lifeless planetthat makes Earth
habitable. Marshes and rivers and forests and fish are far more than resourcesthey and
all natural ecosystems are a necessity for humanitys existence upon Earth. A few
centuries of historically unprecedented explosion in human numbers and surging, albeit
inequitable, consumption and resultant resource use, ecosystem destruction and pollution; is
needlessly destroying being for all living things. Revolutionary action such as ending coal
use, reforming industrial agriculture and protecting and restoring old forests and other
natural ecosystems, is a requirement for the continuation of shared human being. Earth is
threatened by far more than a changing atmosphere causing climate change. Cumulative
ecosystem destructionnot only in climate, but also water, forests, oceans, farmland,
soils and toxics -- in the name of progress and development -- threatens each of us, our
families and communities, as well as the Earth System in total and all her creatures. Any chance of
achieving global ecological sustainability depends urgently upon shifting concerns
regarding climate change to more sufficiently transform ourselves and society to more
broadly resist global ecological change. Global ecological, social and economic collapse
may be inevitable, but its severity, duration and likelihood of recovery are being
determined by us now. It does not look good as the environmental movement has been lacking in its overall vision,
ambition and implementation. The growing numbers of ecologically literate global citizens must come forward to together start
considering ecologically sufficient emergency measures to protect and restore global ecosystems. We

need a plan that

allows humans and as many other species as possible to survive the coming great
ecological collapse, even as we work to soften the collapse, and to restore to the extent
practicable the Earths ecosystems. This mandates full protection for all remaining large natural ecosystems and
working to reconnect and enlarge biologically rich smaller remnants that still exist. It is time for a hard radical turn
back to a fully functioning and restored natural Earth which will require again regaining
our bond with land (and air, water and oceans), powering down our energy profligacy, and taking
whatever measures are necessary to once again bring society into balance with
ecosystems. This may mean taking all measures necessary to stop those known to be
destroying ecosystems for profit. As governments dither and the elite profit, it has
become dreadfully apparent that the political, economic and social structures necessary to
stop human ecocide of our and all lifes habitats does not yet exist. The three hundred
year old hyper-capitalistic and nationalistic growth machine eating ecosystems is not
going to willingly stop growing. But unless it does, human and most or all other life will
suffer a slow and excruciating apocalyptic death. Actions can be taken now to soften
ecological collapse while maximizing the likelihood that a humane and ecologically
whole Earth remains to be renewed.

We must collapse the economy now before its too latefailure to do so

guarantees extinction
McPherson 10 [Guy McPherson is professor emeritus of natural resources and the
environment at the University of Arizona, where he taught and conducted research for 20 years.
His scholarly efforts have produced nine books and well over 100 articles, and have focused for
many years on conservation of biological diversity, A review before the exam, August 16,
2010, http://guymcpherson.com/2010/08/a-review-before-the-exam/]
Actually, this

review is too late for the many people who have already endured economic
collapse. As any of those folks can tell the rest of us, we do not want to receive the lesson
after the exam. Ive written all this before, but I have not recently provided a concise summary. This essay provides a brief
overview of the dire nature of our predicaments with respect to fossil fuels. The primary consequences of our
fossil-fuel addiction stem from two primary phenomena: peak oil and global climate
change. The former spells the end of western civilization, which might come in time to
prevent the extinction of our species at the hand of the latter. Global climate change
threatens our species with extinction by mid-century is we do not terminate the industrial
economy soon. Increasingly dire forecasts from extremely conservative sources keep
stacking up. Governments refuse to act because they know growth of the industrial
economy depends (almost solely) on consumption of fossil fuels. Global climate change and
energy decline are similar in this respect: neither is characterized by a politically viable
solution. There simply is no comprehensive substitute for crude oil. It is the
overwhelming fuel of choice for transportation, and there is no way out of the crude trap
at this late juncture in the industrial era. We passed the world oil peak in 2005, which led
to near-collapse of the worlds industrial economy several times between September
2008 and May 2010. And were certainly not out of the economic woods yet. Crude oil is
the master material on which all other depend. Without abundant supplies of inexpensive crude oil,
we cannot produce uranium (which peaked in 1980), coal (which peaks within a decade or so), solar panels,
wind turbines, wave power, ethanol, biodiesel, or hydroelectric power. Without abundant
supplies of inexpensive crude oil, we cannot maintain the electric grid. Without abundant supplies
of inexpensive crude oil, we cannot maintain the industrial economy for an extended period of
time. Simply put, abundant supplies of inexpensive crude oil are fundamental to growth of the
industrial economy and therefore to western civilization. Civilizations grow or die.
Western civilization is done growing. Not only is there no comprehensive substitute for
crude oil, but partial substitutes simply do not scale. Solar panels on every roof? Its too
late for that. Electric cars in every garage? Its too late for that. We simply do not have the
cheap energy requisite to propping up an empire in precipitous decline. Energy efficiency
and conservation will not save us, either, as demonstrated by the updated version of Jevons paradox, the KhazzoomBrookes postulate. Unchecked, western civilization drives us to one of two outcomes, and perhaps
both: (1) Destruction of the living planet on which we depend for our survival, and/or (2)
Runaway greenhouse and therefore the near-term extinction of our species. Why would
we want to sustain such a system? It is immoral and omnicidal. The industrial economy
enslaves us, drives us insane, and kills us in myriad ways. We need a living planet.
Everything else is less important than the living planet on which we depend for our very
lives. We act as if non-industrial cultures do not matter. We act as if non-human species
do not matter. But they do matter, on many levels, including the level of human survival
on Earth. And, of course, theres the matter of ecological overshoot, which is where
were spending all our time since at least 1980. Every day in overshoot brings us 205,000

people to deal with later. In this case, deal with means murder. Shall we reduce Earth to a lifeless
pile of rubble within a generation? Or shall we heat the planet beyond human habitability within two generations? Or shall we keep
procreating as if there are no consequences for an already crowded planet? Pick your poison, but recognize its poison. Were dead
either way. Dont slit those wrists just yet. This essay bears good news. Western civilization has been in decline at least since 1979,
when world per-capita oil supply peaked coincident with the Carter Doctrine regarding oil in the Middle East. In my mind, and
perhaps only there, these two events marked the apex of American Empire, which began about the time Thomas Jefferson arguably
the most enlightened of the Founding Fathers said, with respect to native Americans: In war, they will kill some of us; we shall
destroy all of them. It wasnt long after 1979 that the U.S. manufacturing base was shipped overseas and we began serious
engagement with Wall Street-based casino culture as the basis for our industrial economy. By most economic measures, weve
experienced a lost decade, so its too late for a fast crash of the industrial economy. Were in the midst of the same slow train wreck
weve been experiencing for more than a decade, but the train is teetering on the edge of a cliff. Meanwhile, all we want to discuss, at
every level in this country, is the quality of service in the dining car. When the price of crude oil exhibits a price spike, an economic
recession soon follows. Every

recession since 1972 has been preceded by a spike in the price of

oil, and direr spikes translate to deeper recessions. Economic dominoes began to fall at a
rapid and accelerating rate when the price of crude spiked to $147.27/bbl in July 2008.
They havent stopped falling, notwithstanding economic cheerleaders from government
and corporations (as if the two are different at this point in American fascism). The reliance of our economy on derivatives
trading cannot last much longer, considering the value of the derivatives like the U.S. debt greatly exceeds the value of all the
currency in the world combined with all the gold mined in the history of the world. Although

its all coming down, as

relatively clear imperial decline is accelerating. Were obviously
headed for full-scale collapse of the industrial economy, as indicated by these 40 statistics. Even Fortune
it has been for quite a while, its

and CNN agree economic collapse will be complete soon, though they dont express any understanding of how we arrived at this point
or the hopelessness of extracting ourselves from the morass. We

know what economic collapse looks like,

because were in the midst of it. What does completion of the collapse look? I strongly
suspect the economic endgame is capitulation of the stock markets. Shortly after we hit Dow 4,000,
within a few days or maybe a couple weeks, the industrial economy seizes up as the lubricant is overcome with sand in the crankcase.
Why would anybody work when the company for which they work is, literally, worthless? Even if they show up for a few days to
punch the time-clock, the bank will not issue a check, and the banks wont be open to cash it. It wont be long before publicly traded
utility companies dont have enough employees to keep the lights on. It wont be long before gas (nee service) stations shutter the
doors. It

wont be long before the grocery stores are empty. It wont be long before the
water stops flowing through the municipal taps.

AT: Postponing Collapse Good

Postponing the collapse will waste resources needed for the transition
Orlov 11 [Dmitry Orlov is the author of the award-winning book Reinventing Collapse: The
Soviet Example and American Prospects. Born in Russia, he moved to the US while a teenager,
and has traveled back repeatedly to observe the Soviet collapse during the late eighties and midnineties. He is an engineer who has worked in many fields, including high-energy physics
research, e-commerce and internet security. Definancialization, Deglobalization and
Relocalization, Editors: Richard Douthwaite is co-founder of Feasta, an Irish economic think
tank focused on the economics of sustainability. He is also a council member of Comhar, the Irish
government's national sustainability council. He acted as economic adviser to the Global
Commons Institute from 1993 to 2005, during which time GCI developed the Contraction and
Convergence approach to dealing with greenhouse gas emissions which has since been backed by
many countries. Gillian Fallon is a writer, journalist, and editor with a particular interest in food
security. Fleeing Vesuvius: Overcoming the Risks of Economic and Environmental Collapse,
New Society Publishers, 2011, ISBN: 0865716994, pg. 168]
It would be excellent if more people were thinking along these lines and had started making their lives a bit more sustainable, but
social inertia is considerable, and the process of adaptation takes time. So the question is, is

there enough time for

significant numbers of people to realize the situation and to adapt, or will they have to
endure quite a lot of discomfort? I believe that people who start the process now stand a
fairly good chance of making the transition in time but that it would be unwise to wait
and try to grab a few more years of comfortable living. Not only would that be a waste of
time on a personal level, but wed be squandering the resources we need to make the
transition.

AT: Transition = Violent

Even if the collapse of growth is violent, the transition doesnt have to bethe
collapse that the 1ac describes will spark rethinking and a non-violent
transition to non-growth societies
Trainer, 2K [Ted Trainer, Visiting Fellow in the Faculty of Arts at the University of New
South Wales, 2000, Where are we, where do we want to be, how do we get there?, Democracy
& Nature, Volume 6, Number 2, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic
Search Complete]
It should also be recognised that sometimes

radical change seems to occur without any overt

conflict. Sometimes it is more like the fading out of a once-dominant thesis, to be
replaced by a newly popular one. This is in fact the norm at the level of paradigm change
in science[17], and in many cultural realms such as art, pop music and fashion. A particular view or
theory or form is dominant for a time, but then people more or less lose interest in it,
cease attending to it and supporting it, and move to another one. Some of the most
revolutionary changes of the twentieth century seem to have occurred predominantly in
this way, such as the collapses of the Soviet Union and the apartheid regime in South
Africa, and the fall of the Berlin Wall. All seem to have been characterised mostly by
people voting with their feet, after a long period of growing disenchantment and
increasing awareness of the desirability of other ways. These revolutionary changes seem
to be much better described as instances of collapse or abandonment due to increasing
internal failure to perform, and loss of legitimacy and support, rather than as defeats in
head-on combat with superior opposing powers. In the end the vast military, bureaucratic
and economic power of the ruling establishments counted for nothing in the face of a
withdrawal of support. They did not have to be engaged in direct and open battle and
conquered. It is not obvious that the passing of capitalism and the emergence of The
Simpler Way cannot possibly proceed in this way. Certainly if the Ecovillage Movement
were to become a significant threat capitalism would seek to oppose it strenuously, but
the question is whether it will be able to do this effectively. At present the Eco-village
Movement is minuscule but it is rapidly growing. There are also impressive reasons for
thinking that despite capitalisms present triumph, in perhaps as little as twenty years
time it will have plunged into an era of great troubles and be incapable of dealing with us
effectively. (See below.) But before that it is quite likely that capitalism will enjoy another
period of boom.

AT: Elites Will Maintain Growth Even After Collapse

Even the elites will change their minds after the global economic system
collapses.
Kassiola 3 [Joel Jay Kassiola, Dean of the College of Behavioral and Social Sciences at San
Francisco State University, 2003, "Questions to Ponder in Understanding the Modern
Predicament," Explorations in Environmental Political Theory: Thinking About What We Value,
edited by Joel Jay Kassiola, Published by M.E. Sharpe, ISBN 0765610523, p.186-187]

The unhappy experience and knowledge of increasing environmental degradation with

threats to all planetary life should move the industrial rich to recognize the self-defeating
and unsatisfactory nature of modern values and social practices. They may come to
accept the necessity of a new, postmodern social order, one not so characterized by the
ideologies of capitalism, industrialism, and Hobbesianism. In this new order citizens
including the richcan have more leisure time to experience and contemplate the
nonmaterial and more fulfilling aspects of the human condition, like nature. Natures
value to humans, as Goodin tells us, lies in directing humans to something outside themselves,
something larger than themselves, that locates the self.16 Of course, extensive social
learning will have to occur if such a radical change is to occur, but it is precisely such a
type of change that is needed to realize sustainability and justice. The crucial role of such social
learning to societal transformation is emphasized by both Milbraths and Piragess contributions. An urgent question
remains: What specific agent can transform modern society to an environmentally
consistent, moral, and satisfying social order? Several contributors note the role of disappointment, or tragedy
(in Oscar Wildes sense of emptiness after success) on the recognition of mistaken goals. We experience alienation as we work
harder and longer getting and spending yet increase our anguish and dissatisfaction with life. Some of our authors have remarked
about the Wildean tragedy, or irony, of the most materially successful society in world history having success be its downfall.
However, just as Zimmerman admonishes us to preserve what is positive about modernity (for example, freedom from the shackles of
feudalism and increased productivity to meet human biological needs), I feel compelled to remind the reader of Paehlkes discussion
of globalization, especially as it pertains to the global industrial elites and the effective spread of their ideology of growthmania and
endless consumption. These elites

control the global mass media of communications and direct the

expanding reach of increasingly large and powerful transnational corporations. The
dynamics of how the current hegemonic rule of the industrial corporate behemoths will
be undermined has yet to be written, posing a significant challenge to all environmental
political theorists, environmental researchers and activists (similar to Zimmermans unforeseen
caterpillar [end page 186] into a butterfly transformation analogy). As Paehlke fears, we merely may be moving
forward between cars on a train as it moves backward without changing its direction! But
even the most destination-minded train engineer will stop, change direction, and reassess
her/his stated objective when they run out of fuel, see disastrous circumstances ahead,
and realize the trains projected destination does not exist!

AT: Social Learning Fails/Is Not Key

Rethinking is fundamentally importantonly a process of sustained social
learning can pave the way for a new society.
Milbrath 3 [Lester W. Milbrath, Director Emeritus of the Research Program in Environment
and Society at the State University of New York at Buffalo, 2003, "Envisioning a Sustainable
Society," Explorations in Environmental Political Theory: Thinking About What We Value,
edited by Joel Jay Kassiola, Published by M.E. Sharpe, ISBN 0765610523, p. 41]

both societies and

people resist change. Achieving change is not as easy as giving an order; even the most
powerful dictators must persuade the people that they will be better off if they change. My
answerI believe it is the only answeris that we must learn our way to a new society. The key aspect
of our relearning is to transform the way we think. It is absolutely essential to change the
way we think. All other attempts at change will fail if we do not transform our thinking.
If we can make the right changes in our thinking, the necessary changes in society will
follow. Can we learn in time? We all know that social learning usually is slow and painful, but not
always; sometimes we cross a threshold and learning comes about astonishingly swiftly.
Who among us would have predicted the sweeping changes that occurred in Eastern
Europe in the fall of 1989? How many foresaw that the Soviet Union would disintegrate
with hardly a shot fired? When people changed their thinking the old order simply
disappeared. When a society has no other choice than to change, we get little guidance
from the past; we cannot predict the future from the past in those circumstances. Can we
How do we transform our present unstable society to a new sustainable society? We all know that

manage to look ahead and make careful plans to bring about the changes that we know must come, or will we resist change and have it
painfully forced upon us? Either way, our

only option is to relearn; nature, and the imperatives of its

laws, will be our most powerful teacher as we learn our way to a new society. I characterize
the new society that we must create as sustainable; but what do I mean by sustainable? A sustainable society
does something more than keep people alive; living is more than merely not dying. In a
sustainable society, people conduct their lives so that nature can cleanse itself and living
creatures can flourish. People living sustainably husband nature and resources so that
future generations of people, and other creatures, can enjoy a life of decent quality.