LLDA CASE DIGESTS

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN

DIVISION), VS. LAGUNA LAKE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,[G.R. NO.
191427, MAY 30, 2011]
Doctrines:

The th rust of the doc trine o f e x

haust ion of adm inist rati ve rem e
dies is tha t courts mus t allo wad
ministrative agencies to carry out t
heir functions and discharge their
responsibilities within thespecialized
areas of their respective competence.

Administrative due process cannot be

fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense for it isenough that
the party is given the chance to be heard
before the case against him is decided.
Facts:
Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA), respondent, found that
Universal Robina Corp. failed to
complywith government standards
provided under Department of Env
ironment and Natural Resources (
DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs)
Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. After
conducting
hearings,
the LLDA
resolvedthat respondent is found to
be discharging pollutive wastewater.
Petitioner moved to reconsider
however theLLDA denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration and
reiterated its order to pay the
penalties.
Petitioner challenged b y certiorar

i the orders before the Court of

Appeals . The appel late cour t
we nt on to chide petitioners
petition for certiorari as premature
since the law provides for an appeal
from decisions or orders of the LLDA
to the DENR Secretary or the
Office of the President, a remedy
which
should
have
first
beenexhausted before invoking judicial
intervention.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was deprived of due
process and lack of any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy as groundswhich
exempted it from complying with the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Held:
No. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a cornerstone of
our judicial system. The thrust of the
rule is that courts must allow admi
nistrative agencies to carry out
their functions and
discharge their responsibilities
within the specialized areas of their
respective competence. The rationale
for this doctrine isobvious. It entails
lesser expenses and
provides
for the
speedier
resolution
of controversies. Comity
andconvenience also impel courts of
justice to shy away from a dispute
until the system of administrative
redresshas been completed.Petitioner
had thus available administrative
remedy of appeal to the DENR
Secretary. Itscontrary arguments to
show that an appeal to the DENR
Secretary would be an exercise in

futility as the latter merely adopts the

LLDAs findings is at best, speculative and
presumptuous.The essence of due
process is simply to be heard, or
as applied
to administrative
proceedings, an
opportunityto
explain
ones
side,
or an
opportunity to seek a reconsiderat
ion
of the
action
or ruling complained
of. Administrative due process cannot
be fully equated with due process in
its
strict judicial
sense
for
it
is enoughthat the party is given the
chance to be heard before the case
against him is decided

LLDA V CA AND

dumping any form or kind of garbage and other

waste matter on the Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped
by the City Government of Caloocan. However,
sometime in August 1992 the dumping
operation was resumed after a meeting held in
July 1992 among the City Government of
Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of
Environmental Management Bureau Director
Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.
the LLDA issued another order reiterating the
December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias
Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City
Government of Caloocan from continuing its
dumping operations at the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the
assistance of the Philippine National Police,
enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by
prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks
into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being
utilized as a dumpsite.

FACTS:
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of
Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA), seeking to
stop the operation of the City Government of
Caloocan of an 8.6 hectare open garbage
dumpsite in Tala Estate, due to its harmful
effects on the health of the residents and the
pollution of the surrounding water.
LLDA discovered that the City Government of
Caloocan has been maintaining the open
dumpsite at the Camarin Area without a
requisite Environmental Compliance Certificate
from the Environmental Management Bureau of
the DENR. They also found the water to have
been directly contaminated by the operation of
the dumpsite.
LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order
against the City Government and other entities
to completely halt, stop and desist from

The City Government went to the Regional Trial

Court of Caloocan City to file an action for the
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist
order and sought to be declared as the sole
authority empowered to promote the health and
safety and enhance the right of the people in
Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its
territorial jurisdiction.
LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint, invoking
the Pollution Control Law that the review of
cease and desist orders of that nature falls
under the Court of Appeals and not the RTC.
RTC denied LLDAs motion to dismiss, and
issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
LLDA from enforcing the cease and desist order
during the pendency of the case.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision
that ruled that the LLDA has no power and
authority to issue a cease and desist order
enjoining the dumping of garbage.

The Court of Appeals sustained the position of

the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section
7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise
known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing
the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and
desist order was not incorporated in
Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive
Order
No.
927,
series
of
1983.
The residents seek a review of the decision.
THEORY OF THE PARTIES
City Government of Caloocan: As a local
government unit, pursuant to the general
welfare provision of the Local Government
Code, they have the mandate to operate a
dumpsite and determine the effects to the
ecological balance over its territorial jurisdiction.
LLDA: As an administrative agency which was
granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and
functions by RA No. 4850, it is invested with the
power and authority to issue a cease and desist
order pursuant to various provisions in EO No.
927.
The LLDA claims that the appellate court
deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded
the provisions of Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983, which granted administrative
quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution
abatement cases.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, under its Charter and its
amendatory laws, have the authority to
entertain the complaint against the dumping
of garbage in the open dumpsite in
Barangay Camarin authorized by the City
Government of Caloocan?

HELD:
YES
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution
cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases
where the special law provides for another
forum. It must be recognized in this regard that
the LLDA, as a specialized administrative
agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws
to carry out and make effective the declared
national policy 20of promoting and accelerating
the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of
San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and
Caloocan 21with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life
and ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration
and pollution.
Under such a broad grant and power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special
charter, obviously has the responsibility to
protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake
region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from
the surrounding areas.
In carrying out the aforementioned declared
policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to
pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans,
programs, and projects proposed by local
government offices/agencies within the region,
public corporations, and private persons or
enterprises where such plans, programs and/or
projects are related to those of the LLDA for the
development of the region.

In the instant case, when the complainant Task

Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of
Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA,
the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was
validly invoked by complainant on the basis of
its allegation that the open dumpsite project of
the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay
Camarin was undertaken without a clearance
from the LLDA, as required under Section 4,
par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended
by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927.
While there is also an allegation that the said
project was without an Environmental
Compliance Certificate from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the
primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case
was recognized by the Environmental
Management Bureau of the DENR when the
latter acted as intermediary at the meeting
among the representatives of the City
Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to
discuss
the
possibility
of
re-opening the open dumpsite.

therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial

of the power to issue the order in question
when the power "to make, alter or modify orders
requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is
expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA
by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

2. Does the LLDA have the power and

authority to issue a "cease and desist" order
under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts
presented in this case, enjoining the
dumping of garbage in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City?

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as

amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA
the means of directly enforcing such orders,
has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power
to institute "necessary legal proceeding against
any person who shall commence to implement
or continue implementation of any project, plan
or program within the Laguna de Bay region
without previous clearance from the LLDA."

The LLDA was not expressly conferred the

power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist
order" in a language, as suggested by the City
Government of Caloocan, similar to the express
grant to the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984
which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D.
No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983.
However, it would be a mistake to draw

Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue

a "cease and desist order" were not expressly
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough
to the effect that the rule granting such authority
need not necessarily be express. 25While it is a
fundamental rule that an administrative agency
has only such powers as are expressly granted
to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as
are necessarily implied in the exercise of its
express powers. 26In the exercise, therefore, of
its express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect
to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region,
the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and
desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it
may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper
agency.

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest

the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the
regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna
Lake region, whether by the government or the
private sector, insofar as the implementation of
these projects is concerned. It was meant to
deal with cases which might possibly arise
where decisions or orders issued pursuant to

the exercise of such broad powers may not be

obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe
objective. To meet such contingencies, then the
writs ofmandamus and injunction which are
beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be
sought from the proper courts.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs.
Court of Appeals
Posted on November 18, 2012
G.R.No.
120865-71
December 7, 1995
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in
order to execute the policy towards
environmental protection and sustainable
development so as to accelerate the
development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA
4850 since water quality studies have shown
that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are
not taken to check the same.
Presidential Decree No. 813 of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended
certain sections of Republic Act No. 4850
because of the concern for the rapid expansion
of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the
lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined
with current and prospective uses of the lake for
municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation,
fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of
the Government and the general public over
"SEC. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby
further amended by adding thereto seven new
paragraphs to be known as paragraphs (j), (k),
(1), (m), (n), (o), and (p) which shall read as
follows:chanrob

For the purpose of effectively regulating and

monitoring activities in Laguna de Bay, the
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue new permit for the use of the lake waters
for any projects or activities in or affecting the
said lake including navigation. construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish
corrals and the like, and to impose necessary
safeguards for lake quality control and
management and to collect necessary fees for
said activities and projects... provided, That the
fees collected for fisheries may be shared
between the Authority and other government
agencies and political sub-divisions in such
proportion as may be determined by the
President
of
the
Philippines
upon
recommendation of the Authoritys Board

EO 927 further defined and enlarged the

functions and powers of the LLDA and
enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay
Region.
For the purpose of this Executive Order, the
term Laguna de Bay Region shall refer to the
Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of
San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila
and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto.
Tomas and Malvar in Batangas Province; the
towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite
Province; the town of Lucban in Quezon
Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig,
Taguig, Muntinlupa, and Pateros in Metro
Manila.
"SECTION

41.

Definition

of

Terms.

(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna

Lake or lake is used in this Act Laguna de Bay
which is that a water when it is at the average

level of elevation 12.50 meters, 10.00 meters

below mean lower low Lands located at and
below such elevation are public lands which
form part of the bed of said lake."
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991. The municipalities
in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the
provisions of this law to mean that the newly
passed law gave municipal governments the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges
within their municipal waters
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991), the municipalities
assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to
issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters
since Sec.149 thereof
provides:
Municipal corporations shall have the authority
to grant fishery privileges in the municipal
waters and impose rental fees or charges
therefore
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the
occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to
the
consternation
of
the
LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent
policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and
the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by
the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the
lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the
current environmental problems and ecological
stress of Laguna Lake.
Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July,
1995, occupied almost one-third the entire lake
water surface area, increasing the occupation
drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to
almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayors
permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were
all undertaken in violation of the policies
adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and
the Laguna Lake carrying capacity.

The LLDA then served notice to the general

public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aquaculture structures unregistered with the LLDA
as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2)
those declared illegal shall be subject to
demolition by the Presidential Task Force for
Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3)
owners of those declared illegal shall be
criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of
RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising
the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
advising them to dismantle their respective
structures otherwise demolition shall be
effected.
Issues:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA
or the towns and municipalities comprising the
region should exercise jurisdiction over the
Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishery privileges is
concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial
agency?
Held:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA
4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of
EONo.927, specifically provide that the LLDA
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits
for the use of all surface water for any projects
or activities in or affecting the said region. On
the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the
municipalities the exclusive authority to grant
fishery privileges on municipal waters. The
provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily
repeal the laws creating the LLDA and
granting the latter water rights authority over
Laguna de Bay and the lake region.

Where there is a conflict between a general

law and a special statute, latter should
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly than the general statute. The
special law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
Implied repeals are not favored and, as much
as possible, effect must be given to all
enactments of the legislature. A special law
cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent
general
law
by
mere
implication.
PELBEL CORP. SUBSTITUTED BY Pelagia
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges
was granted for revenue purposes. On the
other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant
permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other
aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of
effectively regulating & monitoring activities in
the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control
and management. It partakes of the nature of
police power which is the most pervasive,
least limitable and most demanding of all
state powers including the power of taxation.
Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which
embodies a valid exercise of police power
should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters
affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to
pollution cases with authority to issue a cease
and desist order and on matters affecting the
construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and
other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the
provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850,
as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of
fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the
exclusion of municipalities situated therein and
the authority to exercise such powers as are by
its charter vested on it.

Beltran, and VIRGINIA MALOLOS,

Petitioners,
- versus HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
and
THE
REPUBLIC
THEPHILIPPINES,

OF

FACTS:
The original applicants for registration are
Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation, Aladdin
Trinidad and Virginia Malolos. The lots sought
to be registered are two parcels of land covered
by Plan.
Both parcels of land are situated [in] San Juan,
Taytay, Rizal.
after fulfillment by the applicants of the
jurisdictional requirements of notice, posting
and publication, initial hearing took place as
scheduled. There being no formal opposition
on record, an Order of general default was
issued.
Earlier on March 28, 1985 however, the Laguna
Lake
Development
Authority
filed
a
Manifestation stating that, as per projections of
the subject lots in the topographic map

prepared by the Bureau of Coast and Geodetic

Survey using technical description of the lots
approved by the Bureau of Lands, subject lots
are situated below the elevation of 12.50
meters, thus forming part of the bed of the
Laguna Lake in accordance with Sec. 41
(paragraph 11) of Republic Act No. 4850 as
amended by P.D. No. 813.
the Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Opposition (Record, p. 40) alleging that neither
the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the
land since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto
and that applicant Pelbel Manufacturing
Corporation is disqualified, being a private
corporation
a Motion For Substitution of Party Applicant
was filed by Pelbel to substitute Pelagia P.
Beltran---GRANTED
the lower court rendered the assailed Decision
(Record, p. 49) adjudicating the parcels of land
applied for in favor of the following: Pelagia
Beltran 17,500 square meters; Aladdin
Trinidad 2,500 square meters; Virginia
Malolos

be considered a part of the bed or basin of

Laguna de Bay nor as a foreshore land.

A Motion to Amend Order of General Default

and Set Aside Decision dated May 4,
1985 (Record, pp. 64-[6]7) was filed by Laguna
Lake Development Authority on the ground that
LLDA had already established by preliminary
investigations that the lots are below elevation
of 12.50 meters, hence are of public dominion.

(1)
Whether the subject parcels of land
are public land; and
(2)
If they are not public land, whether
applicants-petitioners have registrable title to
the land.

PETITIONERS (APPLICANTS): cited Supreme

Court decisions in Republic of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals and Santos del Rio, 131
SCRA 532 and Bautista vs. Court of Appeals
and Santos del Rio, 131 SCRA 532 which held
that parts around Laguna de Bay which become
covered with water four to five months a year,
not due to tidal action, but due to rains cannot

LLDA: Paragraph 11 of R.A. 4850 as amended

states:
(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna
Lake or lake is used in this Act, the same shall
refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area
covered by the lake waterwhen it is at the
average annual maximum lake level of
elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum
10.00 meters below mean lower low water
(m.L.L.W.). Lands located at and below such
elevation are public lands which form part of the
bed of said lake. (Underlining supplied.)
OSG: the OSG filed its Comment supporting
the LLDAs position that lakes and their beds
such as the lots sought to be registered are,
under Article 502, par. 4 of the [N]ew Civil
Code, considered public domain.
the lower court rendered the questioned
decision which substantially affirmed
CA REVERSED-- It dismissed the applications
ISSUES:

HELD:
1.Both parcels of land are located in San Juan,
Taytay, Rizal, near the shore of Laguna de
Bay. The controlling law in the instant case is
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
Under the Public Land Act, there is a
presumption that the land applied for belongs to
the state, and that the occupants and
possessors can only claim an interest in the

land by virtue of their imperfect title or

continuous, open, and notorious possession
thereof[15] for a period prescribed by law. This
principle is rooted in the Regalian doctrine
Any applicant for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title has the burden of proving, by
incontrovertible evidence,[17] that the (a) land
applied for is alienable and disposable public
land; and, (b) the applicant, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest had
occupied and possessed the land, in the
concept of owner, openly, continuously,
exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.[18]
In the instant case, petitioners failed to show
that the parcels of land subject of their
application are alienable and disposable.
The government, through the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, established that the
areas sought to be registered are below the
statutory minimum elevation of 12.50 meters,
hence
formed
part
of
the
bed
of Laguna Lake under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
4850, as amended.
R.A. No. 4850 sets the minimum water
elevation at 12.50 meters. Lands located at
and below such elevation are public lands
which form part of the bed of said lake.
Petitioners invoke the case of Bautista v.
Court of Appeals and the case of Government
of the Philippine Islands v. Colegio de San
Jose[21] which defines the phrase highest
ordinary depth as the highest depth of the
waters (the Laguna Lake, in this case) during
the dry season, such depth being the regular,
common, natural depth which occurs always or
most of the time during the year.
Petitioner
concluded
that
since
the
[22]
measurement was made in November, which
is still rainy season, such measurement cannot
be considered as it was not done on dry season
as required.
We disagree for while November is not part of
the summer season, it is not part of the rainy

season either. It still is part of the dry season

during which the waters are at their highest
ordinary depth.
2. simple possession of a certificate of title,
under the Torrens System, does not make the
possessor the true owner of all the property
described therein. If a person obtains a title,
under the Torrens System, which includes by
mistake or oversight land which cannot be
registered under the Torrens System, he does
not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become
the owner of the lands illegally included.
When the government is the real party in
interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its
own rights and recover its own property, there
can be no defense on the ground of laches or
limitation. . .
Public land fraudulently included in patents or
certificates of title may be recovered or reverted
to the State in accordance with Section 101 of
the Public Land Act.
no substantial evidence that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous,
exclusive,
and
notorious
possession and occupation of the entire area in
question, in the concept of owner since June
12, 1945, or prior thereto.
Mere possession of land[31] and the making of
vague assertions to the public that a possessor
is claiming the land[32] are not sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of open and notorious
possession. Bernardo failed to show that his
alleged possession and occupation were of the
nature and duration required by law. Bare and
general allegations, without more, do not
amount to preponderant evidence that would
shift the burden to the oppositor, in this case,
the Republic

PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC.,

Petitioner, v. LAGUNA
LAKE DEVELOPMzAUTHORITY,
FACTS:
Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc.
(petitioner) is a company engaged in the
business of laundry service.
the Environmental Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
the inspection report on the complaint of black
smoke emission from petitioners plant located
at 114 Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.
LLDA conducted an investigation and found
that untreated wastewater generated from
petitioners laundry washing activities was
discharged directly to the San Francisco Del
Monte River.
perating without LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI,
and Discharge Permit from LLDA.
the Environmental QUALITY MANAGEMENT
Division of LLDA conducted wastewater
sampling of petitioners effluent.[5] The result of
the laboratory analysis showed non-compliance
with effluent standards particularly Total
Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen
Demand (BOD), Oil/Grease Concentration and
Color Units.[6] Consequently, LLDA issued to
petitioner a Notice of Violation.
Petitioner submitted its application for LLDA
Clearance and Discharge Permit and informed
LLDA that it would undertake the necessary
measures to abate the water pollution.
still showed non-compliance
a Pollution Control and Abatement case was
filed against petitioner before the LLDA. During
the public hearing on 30 April 2002, LLDA
informed petitioner of its continuous noncompliance with the effluent standards.
Petitioner requested for another wastewater
sampling.
finally showed compliance

According to LLDA, the penalty should be

reckoned from 5 September 2001, the date of
initial sampling, to 17 May 2002, the date LLDA
received the request for re-sampling.
Petitioner manifested that its wastewater
discharge was not on a daily basis.
and the penalty and fine imposed be reckoned
from the date of actual hearing on 15 April
2002.
LLDA: ORDER TO PAY
PET: REVIEW: DENIED
PET: CA
CA: that LLDA has the power to impose fines,
thus:
Concededly, the power to impose
administrative fines in pollution abatement
cases was expressly granted under Section 9 of
P.D. 984 to the now defunct National Pollution
Control Commission
the express grant of power to impose
administrative fines as couched in the language
of P.D. 984 was not reproduced in E.O. 927,
however, it can be logically implied from LLDAs
authority to exercise the power to make, alter
or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution. In addition, the clear intendment of
E.O. 927 to clothe LLDA not only with the
express powers granted to it, but also those
implied, incidental and necessary for the
exercise of its express powers can be easily
discerned from the grant of the general power
to exercise (such) powers and perform such
other functions as may be necessary to carry
out its duties and responsibilities.

ISSUE:
1.
Does the respondent LLDA have the
implied power to impose
fines as set forth
in PD 984?

2.
Does the grant of implied power to
LLDA to impose penalties
violate the rule
on non-delegation of legislative powers?
PARTIES CONTENTIONS:
Petitioner: asserts that LLDA has no power to
impose fines since such power to impose penal
sanctions, which was once lodged with the
National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC),
is now assumed by the Pollution Adjudication
Board pursuant to Executive Order No. 192
HELD:
Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD
984)
created and established the NPCC
under the Office of the President. EO 192,
which reorganized the DENR, created
the Pollution Adjudication Board under the
Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed
the powers and functions of the NPCC with
respect to adjudication of pollution cases.
[19]

On the other hand, LLDA is a special agency

created under Republic Act No. 4850 (RA
4850)[20] to manage and develop the Laguna
Lake region, comprising of the provinces of
Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan. RA
4850, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
813 (PD 813),[21] mandates LLDA to carry out
the development of the Laguna Lake region,
with due regard and adequate provisions for
environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration
and pollution.[22]
Exercise such powers and perform such
other functions as may be necessary to
carry out its duties and responsibilities
under this Executive Order

A comparison of the powers and functions of

the Pollution Adjudication Board and the LLDA
reveals substantial similarity. Both the Pollution
Adjudication Board and the LLDA are
empowered, among others, to: (1) make, alter
or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution; (2) issue, renew, or deny permits for
the prevention and abatement of pollution, for
the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for
the installation or operation of sewage works
and industrial disposal system; and (3) exercise
such powers and perform such other functions
necessary to carry out their duties and
responsibilities.
The difference is that while Section 19 of EO
192 vested the Pollution Adjudication Board
with the specific power to adjudicate pollution
cases in general,[24] the scope of authority of
LLDA to adjudicate pollution cases is limited to
the Laguna Lake region as defined by RA 4850,
as amended.
Although
the
Pollution
Adjudication
Board assumed the powers and functions of
the NPCC with respect to adjudication of
pollution cases, this does not preclude LLDA
from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases
within its area of responsibility and to impose
fines as penalty.
holding that an administrative agency has also
such powers as are necessarily implied in the
exercise of its express powers. The Court ruled
that LLDA, in the exercise of its express powers
under its charter, as a regulatory and quasijudicial body with respect to pollution cases in
the Laguna Lake region, has the implied
authority to issue a cease and desist order. In
the same manner, we hold that the LLDA has
the power to impose fines in the exercise of its
function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body
with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna
Lake region.

2. NO UNDUE DELEGATION
PET:
Petitioner contends that if LLDA is
deemed to have implied power to impose
penalties, then LLDA will have unfettered
discretion to determine for itself the penalties it
may impose, which will amount to undue
delegation of legislative power.
LLDAs power to impose fines is not
unrestricted. In this case, LLDA investigated the
pollution
complaint
against
petitioner
and conducted
wastewater
sampling of
petitioners effluent. It was only after the
investigation result showing petitioners failure
to meet the established water and effluent
quality standards that LLDA imposed a fine
against petitioner. LLDA then imposed upon
petitioner a penalty of P1,000 per day of
discharging pollutive wastewater. The P1,000
penalty per day is in accordance with the
amount of penalty prescribed under PD 984:

WRIT OF KALIKASAN
AGHAM PRATY LIST V. RAMON PAJE,
PROTECTED AREA MANAGEMENT BOARD
OF THE TAAL VOLCANO PROTECTED
LANDSCAPE

point of exceeding its established carrying

capacity. Also, despite efforts to improve the
water quality, the same still fell below standards
in the vicinity of the fish cages. It likewise called
attention to the abusive piggeries operating in
the area.
Agham explained the nature of Taal lake: that it
has a ling retention time making it a very
sensitive ecosystem since its waters need 20
years or more to be flushed out or replaced;
that long water retention times means that inlake changes are often gradual in nature,
thereby difficult to observe; that the expected
improvements may take a long time to exhibit
visible results.
Agham also cited alarming incidents that
happened in Taal: 1. May to June 2011 bangus
fish kill due to a substantial temperature change
in water and 2. December 10 2011 hog waste
incident where a large volume of piggery waste
covering at least half a hectare was seen from
the shores of Taal Lake fronting Lipute River in
Batangas.
To convince the court, the party list argued that
the writ of kalikasan is a favored remedy for
cases such as this since the rationale to the
rules of procedure for environmental cases
states that the writwas refashioned as a tool
to bridge the gap between allegation and proof
by
providing
remedy
for
would-be
environmental litigants to compel the production
of information within the custody of the
governmentthe scope of the fact-finding
power could be: 1. Anything related to the
issuance, grant of a governmental permit
issued or information contained in documents

FACTS:
Agham party list grounded its action on the fact
that its members were allegedly disturbed by
the proliferation of fish cages in Taal lake to a

The party list asserted that the continuing

deterioration of the water quality of Taal lake
coupled with its nature makes it imperative that
the best and fastest remedy is secured so that

generations to come may again experience the

lake in its original state.

and for the hearing, reception of evidence and

rendition of judgment.

RULING:
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition by
issuance of a temporary environmental
protection order (TEPO) or writ of kalikasan.

WIRT OF KALIKASAN TO STOP BT TALING

FIELD TRIALS

The writ mandated the respondents to refrain

from issuing any PAMB clearances for fish cage
operations within the Taal lake in compliance
with SEC 45 of RA 8550.

A petition was filed seeking a temporary

environmental protection order and an issuance
of a Writ of Kalikasan to stop the ongoing field
trials of the Bacillus Thuringiennsis (Bt)
eggplant, which was genetically modified to
incorporate a gene from the Bt bacteria, which
enables it to secrete its own pesticide against
destructive insects.

AGHAM PARTY LIST V LNL ARCHIPELAGO

MINERALS, INC.
JUNE 13, 2012
FACTS:
Residents of brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales
complained to Agham party-list Rep. Angelo
Palmones and Laguna Rep. Danilo Fernandez,
chairman of committee on ecology of the House
of Representatives regarding the mining in their
areas. These prompted the congressmen to
conduct on-site inspection.
After
inspection,
Fernandezs
panel
recommended to the Environmental and
Natural Resources Sec. Ramon Paje the
issuance of a cease and desist order against
the irresponsible mining firm:. On June 4, 2012
or more than a month after the congressmen
pointed out the alarming destruction of
environment to Sec. and the police, LAMI
continued to destroy the environment by cutting
mountain trees and leveling a mountain to the
damage and detriment of the residents of
Zambales. This prompted Palmoes to file with
SC an issuance of Writ of Kalikasan.
RULING:
The SC GRANTED the issuance of the Writ of
Kalikasan. The Court also referred the case to
the CA for acceptance of the return of the writ

FACTS:

The petitioners highlighted the need for a

genuine and comprehensive process of
informing and consulting the public to ensure
the safety of Genetically Modified Organisms
(GMOs) on peoples health and the
environmental before such are released into the
society. They further argued that GMOs and
GMO field trials were violate every Filipinos
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
RULING:
SC GRANTED the issuance of Writ of
Kalikasan to stop field trails of the genetically
modified organism Bt eggplant in the
Philippines.
WRIT OF KALIKASAN TO STOP LARGE
SCALE
MINING
IN
ILOCOS
AND
PANGASINAN
FACTS:
Sen. Koko Pimentel III prayed for the SC to
issue Writ of kalikasan against a mining
scheme in the provinces of Pangasinan, Ilocos
Norte and Sur. Joining Pimintel were other
party-list representatives.

The petitioners alleged that the former exec.

sec.
Leandro
Mendoza,
acting
as
representative of the former president
Arroyo, forged a mining agreement with
Altamina Exploration and Resources, Inc.
They claimed that it was a midnight mining
deal as it was done one day before Aquino
assumed presidency and that it should have
been signed by Arroyo herself.

Mining necessitates moving soil to be able to

reach and extract the ores containing the
desired minerals deep within the earth. Thus,
there is no way that the physical landscape will
not be altered or destroyed along with the
greenery on top the petitioners argue.
Furthermore, the damage to the environment
brought about by mining does not end with the
moving of soil and the flattening of mountains.

The petitioners revealed that the mining

operations goal was to extract magnetite
ore or black sand which is used to produce
steel, toners for photocopying machines,
fertilizers and high-density concrete and that
it is an important mineral because it keeps
sand particles heavier and more
compressed. Thus serving as a natural
barrier of land surfaces and fresh water
deposits from seawater and ensures that
seawater is at a lever lower than land
surface area.

RULING:
SC GRANTED the issuance of the writ of
kalikasan.

RULING:
SC GRANTED the writ of kalikasan
PHILIPPINE EARTH JUSTICE CENTER
INC. ET AL. V. SECRETARY OF DENR
FACTS:
Petitioners: Philippine Earth Justice
Center Inc., and Alliance to Save the
Integrity of Nature Inc. and all others
(resident of Zamboanga
Respondents: Sec. Paje, head of DENR,
MGB, PAWB, NCIP
The petitioners alleged that this petition is
urgent lest the last of the Peninsulas remaining
forests will be cut-off and its mountains
flattened or made hollow underneath.
They alleged that the respondents violated or
threaten to violate petitioners right to ecology.