Charlotte Lush

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Compare and contrast Aristotles account of the good for man with Platos
account of the good itself.

In this essay I will examine Aristotles account of the good for man; his theory of
the ultimate good for human beings, as proposed in the Nicomachean Ethics and Platos
examination of the good itself; the idea of the form of the good, illustrated in The
Republic. In doing this, I will attempt to explain the two differing accounts of good, and
from this examine them in relation to each other, to see where they differ and if, at all, they
overlap.
Aristotles account of the good for man begins with the notion that every art and
every enquiryis thought to aim at some sort of good (Nicomachean Ethics 1.1). He then
continues to reason that if everything is aimed at some sort of good, there must be a final
good that we aim for purely for its own sake, that for whose sake everything else is done
(Nicomachean Ethics 1.7), as that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that
which isfor the sake of something else (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7). Here Aristotle proposes
that if everything aims at some sort of good, there must eventually be a final good that we
aim for, and that will be something which is for the sake of itself as that is more final than
something which is for the sake of something else. After this, Aristotle moves on to examine
what this final good could be, arriving at the idea of happiness, as happiness is something
final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7). He then goes on
to propose that good artists or flute players are ones who fulfil their function, i.e painting
well or playing the flute well, and so for man good must also be fulfilling their function; for
all things have a function or activity, the good or the well is thought to reside in the function,
so would it seem to be for man (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7). So, the good for man is to be
good at being a man, and this leads Aristotle to question what uniquely human attributes there

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are for us to excel at, as we are seeking what is peculiar to man (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7).
He rules out simply existing, as life seems to be common even to plants (Nicomachean
Ethics 1.7), and then goes on to rule out perception, as it seems to be common to every
animal (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7). He is left, then, with the function of man is an activity of
soul which followssome rational principle (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7), and thus the
function of a good man is the good and noble performance of these [rational principles]
(Nicomachean Ethics 1.7). Aristotle then concludes that the good for man is the activity of
soul in accordance with virtue (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7).
Now he has established the function of man to be rational thought and the life
according to reason is best and pleasantest, since reason more than anything else is man
(Nicomachean Ethics 10.7), Aristotle examines the activity of reason which is
contemplative (Nicomachean Ethics 10.7), and thus happiness extends just so far as
contemplation does (Nicomachean Ethics 10.8). However, Aristotle recognises that as
mortal human beings, a life comprised solely of contemplation is impossible, and so by the
second degree life in accordance with other kinds of virtue is happy, for the activities in
accordance with this befit our human estate (Nicomachean Ethics 10.8), citing practical
wisdom as linked to virtue of character (Nicomachean Ethics 10.8) as it is in accordance
with moral virtues which are linked to our passions, and so must belong to our composite
nature (Nicomachean Ethics 10.8) which are intrinsically human, so practical wisdom is also
good for man and can lead to happiness.
Aristotles account of the good for man extends to politics, with the notion that not
everyone is naturally inclined towards committing themselves to a life of contemplation and
to the fullest exploration and use of human rationality, and so will not be able to achieve the
highest good. Due to this, laws and teaching must be used to encourage people to focus on
the best and most productive habits and pursuits, as it is difficult to get from youth up a right

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training for virtue if one has not been brought up under right lawsfor this reason their
nurture and occupations should be fixed by law (Nicomachean Ethics 10.9). Here Aristotle
proposes that our habits, which determine our behaviour, are shaped by our laws, and so
excellence can be imposed upon people through the implementation of proper laws, as it
legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, [so] the end of this science
must include those of others, so that this end must be the good for man (Nicomachean Ethics
1.2). Therefore, the good for man is reliant on laws and legislators that actively create laws
that encourage the cultivation of positive habits and from there push people towards using
their human rationality most completely, thus enabling them to flourish and to achieve the
highest good.
Platos account of the good itself is his account of a single form of that which is beautiful
and good in itself, a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good (Republic
507b), and cannot be seen but can be thought. He then continues to clarify this idea with the
analogy of the sun. Plato claims that vision is the greatest of all the senses, and is the only
sense that needs another medium to work through, arguing the other senses need nothing
(Republic 507d) whereas vision requires more than this, as vision may be in the eyes and its
possessor may try to use it, and though colour be present, yet without the presence of a third
thingvision will see nothing and the colours will be invisible (Republic 507e). Plato
continues to posit that this third medium is light, specifically the sun. He explains that light
enables vision to function, and the sun is the source of light, however neither vision nor light
are the same as the sun; neither vision itself nor its vehicle, which we call the eye, is
identical with the sun (Republic 508a), however vision can behold the sun, which enables it
to see, as the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause thereof is beheld by vision itself
(Republic 508b). According to Plato, this is analogous to good and the form of the good as
the form of the good provides truth to objects of knowledge (Republic 508e), much like the

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sun provides visibility to visible things, and it allows the faculty of reason to reason much
like sun allows the faculty of vision to see; good is in the intelligible region to reason and
the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision
(Republic 508c). Additionally, the form of the good is the cause of knowledge and truth much
like the sun is the cause of visibility and seeing, and the form of the good can be known much
like the sun can be seen, however, the form of the good is not identical to knowledge and
truth, as the sun is not identical to visible objects and sight. Plato continues his analogy by
further explaining the relation of the form of the good to knowledge and truth, claiming that
when [the form of the good] is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine
resplendent it apprehends and knows thembut when it inclines to that region which is
mingled with darknessit opines onlyand again seems as if it lacked reason (Republic
508d). Here Plato is stating that much like how if there is no sun it is difficult to see, if the
good itself is not present it is difficult to know any truths and to reason.
Clarifying further the idea that the form of the good, Plato argues that it is the form of the
good itself that gives truth to objects of knowledge (Republic 508e) and is the cause of
knowledge (Republic 508e) however again like it is right to deem light and vision sunlike
but never to think they are the sun (Republic 509a) the same applies to the form of the good,
and it is the source of knowledge and truth but surpasses them in beauty (Republic 509a).
As the sun not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their
generation and growth and nurture though it itself is not generation (Republic 509b), Plato
argues that the form of the good also works in this way, not only does it allow the objects of
knowledge to be known but also their very existence and essence is derived to them from it,
though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing
power (Republic 509b). Thus, for Plato, the good itself is the ultimate encapsulation of
good, which is good purely in itself, and it is through this that we are able to recognise and

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know truth but also the form of the good bestows the essence of truth and knowledge on
knowable things.
Platos account of the good itself and Aristotles account of the good for man do share
some similarities in that both concepts of good are seen as good in themselves, or good for
their own sake. Both are depicted as the ultimate or highest good achievable, with Plato
describing the form of the good as a good that is only and merely good (Republic 507b),
which is mirrored by Aristotles depiction of the good for man as never for the sake of
something else (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7) or for anything other than itself (Nicomachean
Ethics 1.7). Here, both Plato and Aristotle depict good as being an end in itself, and being
the ultimate and purest good that is attainable.
Despite this, however, Aristotle and Platos accounts also feature various disparities. Platos
notion of the good itself is an idea, which bestows the essence of truth to objects of
knowledge and allows them to be known. Here Plato focuses on a more conceptual notion of
good, positing the good itself as a more epistemological term, as something that gives
their truth to the objects of knowledge (Republic 508e). Aristotles account of the good for
man however, is much more anthropic, and focuses on the ultimate good in relation to
humans, not the ultimate idea of good. For Aristotle, the good is not some common element
answering to one idea (Nicomachean Ethics 1.6) because good comes from the particular
essence of a certain thing; the goodness of a thing varies depending on what it is. Aristotle
claims that the idea of the good itself is useless as clearly it could not be achieved or
attained by man (Nicomachean Ethics 1.6). He uses the example of a carpenter, stating that
he will not be benefitted in regard to his own craft by knowing the good itself, as the
carpenter must practice the functions specific to a good carpenter in order to be good, not
simply be aware of a universal notion of good.

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Overall, the most noticeable comparison between Aristotles the good for man and Platos
the good itself is that Platos account posits good as a universal idea that is the cause of all
good and the reason we are able to recognise good, whereas Aristotles the good for man
argues that good is dependent on function, there is no one universal good that applies to
everything, rather good comes from excelling at the unique function of a given thing, and for
man this is the use of reason.

Charlotte Lush
Bibliography
Plato (1974), The Republic, London: Penguin Books
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html

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