Canons of statutory construction are rules of construction for the interpretation of statute

law. Canons give common sense guidance to courts in interpreting the meaning of statutes.
Proponents of the use of canons argue that the canons constrain judges and limit the ability
of the courts to legislate from the bench in US. Rules of construction or statutory
construction is the process of determining how the provisions of the general law relate to a
specific legal case, and distinguishes the rules of statutory interpretation from other rules or
aids for the interpretation of law in common law jurisdictions. Rules of construction has also
been defined as "the drawing in inference by the act of reason, as to the intent of an
instrument, from given circumstances, upon principles deduced from men's general
motives, conduct and action.
There are are certain general principles of interpretation which has been applied by the
courts from time to time. And one of them viz. Construction Ejusdem Generis has been
explained herein below. Ejusdem Generis is a Latin term which means "of the same kind," it
is used to interpret loosely written statutes. Where a law lists specific classes of persons or
things and then refers to them in general, the general statements only apply to the same
kind of persons or things specifically listed. Example: if a law refers to automobiles, trucks,
tractors, motorcycles and other motor-powered vehicles, "vehicles" would not include
airplanes, since the list was of land-based transportation. The term Ejusdem Generis in
other words means words of a similar class. The rule is that where particular words have a
common characteristic (i.e. of a class) any general words that follow should be construed as
referring generally to that class; no wider construction should be afforded.
Construction Ejusdem Generis
According to the Black's Law Dictionary (8th edition, 2004) the principle of Ejusdem Generis
is where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. it
is a canon of statutory construction, where general words follow the enumeration of
particular classes of things, the general words will be construed as applying only to things of
the same general class as those enumerated.
The expression Ejusdem Generis means of the same kind. Normally, general words should
be given their natural meaning like all other words unless the context requires otherwise.
But when a general word follows specific words of a distinct category, the general word may
be given a restricted meaning of the same category. The general expression takes it's
meaning from the preceding particular expressions because the legislature by using the
particular words of a distinct genus has shown its intention to that effect. This principle is
limited in its application to general word following less general word only. If the specific
words do not belong to a distinct. Genus, this rule is inapplicable. Consequently, if a general
word follows only one particular word, that single particular word does not constitute a
distinct genus and, therefore, Ejusdem Generis rule cannot be applied in such a case.
Exceptional stray instances are, however, available where one word genus has been created
by the courts and the general word following such a genus given a restricted meaning. If the
particular words exhaust the whole genus, the general word following these particular
words is construed as embracing a larger genus. The principle of Ejusdem Generis is not a

universal application. If the context of legislation rules out the applicability of this rule, it has
no part to play in the interpretation of general words. The basis of the principle of Ejusdem
Generis is that if the legislature intended general words to be used in unrestricted sense, it
would not have bothered to use particular words at all.
It is an ancient doctrine, commonly called Lord Tenterden's Rule, dating back to Archbishop
of Canterbury's Case in 1596. Singer 47:17, at 272-73. It provides that when general words
follow specific words in a statute, the general words are read to embrace only objects
similar to those objects of the specific words. The rule recognizes and gives effect to both
the specific and general words by using the class indicated by the specific words to extend
the scope of the statute with the general words to include additional terms or objects within
the class. In using the doctrine as an interpretative aid, it is important to keep in mind that it
is not applied in a vacuum, and disputes cannot be resolved by merely tying the issue to the
procrustean bed of Ejusdem Generis. In fact, there are several conditions that have been
identified for the doctrine to apply, but none more important than the identification of the
class.
There are five conditions that have been identified:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The statute contains an enumeration by specific words;

The members of the enumeration suggest a class;
The class is not exhausted by the enumeration;
A general reference supplementing the enumeration, usually following it; and
There is not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader
meaning than the doctrine requires.

Classes can be defined in a vast number of ways, but the key to unlocking the true value of
the doctrine is to ensure that the identified class has some objective relationship to the aim
of the statute. In other words, the basis for determining, which among various semantically
correct definitions of the class should be given effect is found in the purpose and subject of
the statute as revealed in the legislative intent.
The rule of Ejusdem Generis must be applied with great caution, because, it implies a
departure from the natural meaning of words, in order to give them a meaning on a
supposed intention of the legislature. The rule must be controlled by the fundamental rule
that statutes must be construed so as to carry out the object sought to be accomplished.
The rule requires that the specific words are all of one genus, in which case, the general
words may be presumed to be restricted to that genus. For example, the words 'or
otherwise' are generally used as ancillary to the specific proposition which precedes them.
In Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan , the validity of the Rajasthan Land Reforms
and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 was impugned. One of the tenures was known as
Bhomichar tenure and it was contended that its holders were not jagirdars. It was held: We
agree with the petitioners that a jagir can be created only by a grant, and that if it is
established that Bhomichar tenure is not held under a grant, it cannot be classed as a jagir.
We do not base this conclusion on the ground put forward that the word 'Jagir' in Article 31A of the Constitution should be read Ejusdem Generis with 'other similar grants', because,

the true scope of the rule of 'Ejusdem Generis' is that words of a general nature following
specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same
nature as those specified and not its reverse, that specific words which precede are
controlled by the general words which follow.
In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan , the question was whether the appellant was entitled
under Section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, to requisition, as for a
public purpose, premises for housing a member of a foreign consulate. The sub-section
provided that the State Government may requisition for the purpose of a State or any other
public purpose. The High Court held that the words 'any other purpose' should be
read' Ejusdem Generis' with the purpose of the State that accommodation for a member of
the foreign consulate staff is a 'purpose of the Union' and hence the State Government was
not entitled to requisition. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held: With great respect,
we are constrained to say that the 'Ejusdem Generis' rule of construction, which found
favour in the court below for reaching the result that the words 'any other public purpose'
are restricted to a public purpose which is also a purpose of the State, has scarcely any
application. Apart from the fact that the rule must be confined within narrow limits, and
general or comprehensive words should receive their full and natural meaning unless they
are clearly restrictive in their intendment, it is requisite that there must be a distinct genus,
which must comprise more than one species, before the rule can be applied.
In Lilavati Bai v. Bombay State , the petitioner was the widow of a tenant of certain
premises and she had vacated from such premises. Finding the premises vacant, the
respondent requisitioned the premises under Section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land
Requisition Act, 1948, for the public purpose of housing a government servant. One of the
contentions of the petitioner was that under the Explanation to the sub-section there would
be deemed to be a vacancy when the tenant 'ceases to be in occupation upon termination
of his tenancy, eviction or assignment or transfer in any other manner of his interest in the
premises or otherwise', and that the words 'or otherwise' should be construed as Ejusdem
Generis with the words immediately preceding them. It was held:
The rule Ejusdem Generis sought to be expressed in aid of the petitioner can possibly have no
application. The legislature, when it used the words 'or otherwise', apparently intended to
cover other cases which may not come within the meaning of the preceding clauses, for
example, a case where the tenant's occupation has ceased as a result of trespass by a third
party. The legislature intended to cover all possible cases of vacancy occurring due to any
reasons whatsoever. Hence, far from using those words Ejusdem Generis with the preceding
clauses of the explanation, the legislature used those words in an all-inclusive sense. The rule
of Ejusdem Generis is intended to be applied where general words have been used following
particular and specific words of the same nature on the established rule of construction that
the legislature presumed to use the general words in a restricted sense that is to say, as
belonging to the same genus as the particular and specific words.
Such a restricted meaning has to be given to words of general import only where the context
of the whole scheme of legislation requires it. But where the context and the object and
mischief of the enactment do not require such restricted meaning be attached to words of
general import, it becomes the duty of the courts to give those words their plain and
ordinary meaning.

In Western India Theatres v. Municipal Corporation, Poona, the respondent levied a tax of
Rs. 2 per day as license fee on the appellants, who were lessees of a cinema house. The levy
was under Section 59(1)(xi) of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, which provides that
the municipality could levy 'any other tax to the nature and object of which the approval of
the Governor shall have been obtained'. It was contended that Section 59(1)(xi) is
unconstitutional in that the legislature had completely abdicated its-functions and
delegated the power to the municipality to determine the nature of the tax to be imposed.
The contention was rejected by the Supreme Court and one of the reasons given for the
decision is: Although the rule of construction based on the principle of Ejusdem Generis
cannot be invoked in this case, for items (i) to (x) do not, strictly speaking, belong to the
same genus, they do indicate, to our mind, the kind and nature of tax which the
municipalities are authorized to impose.
In Kochunni v. State of Madras , it was observed: The rule of Ejusdem Generis is that when
general words follow particular and specific words of the same nature, the general words
must be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified. But it is clearly laid down
by decided cases that the specific words must form a distinct genus or category. It is not an
inviolable rule of law, but is only a permissible inference in the absence of an indication to
the contrary.
In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, the respondent issued a notification under Section 4 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the acquisition of the appellant's land. The notification
directed that action under Section 17(2)(c) of the Act shall be taken on the ground of
urgency and that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply in regard to the acquisition.
The appellant contended that though Section 17(2)(c) read by itself covers a very large field,
that provision should be given a narrower meaning because of the provisions of Section
17(2)(a) and (b). It was held: The Ejusdem Generis rule is not a rule of law but is merely a
rule of construction to aid the courts to find out the true intention of the legislature. If a
given provision is plain and unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear, there is no
occasion to call in aid that rule. Ejusdem Generis rule is explained in HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND thus: 'As a rule, where in a statute there are general words following particular
and specific words, the general words must be confined to things of the same kind as those
specified, although this, as a rule of construction, must be applied with caution, and subject
to the primary rule that statutes are to be construed in accordance with
the intention of Parliament. For the Ejusdem Generis rule to apply, the specific words must
constitute a category, class or genus, then only things which belong to that category, class
or genus fall within the general words'.
The Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board v. Harishanker, has laid down
the following five essential elements of this rule:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The statute contains an enumeration of specific words;

the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category;
that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration;
the general terms follow the enumeration; and

5. There is no indication of a different legislative intent. If the legislative purpose of a

statute is such that a statutory series should be read Ejusdem Generis, so be it, the
rule is helpful.
But if not, the rule is more likely to defeat than to fulfill the purpose of the statute. The rule
like many other rules of statutory interpretation is a useful servant but a bad master.
In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, the interpretation of Section 6 (4) (a) of the Bombay
Land Requisition Act, 1948 which said: 'State Government may requisition for the purpose
of State or any other public purpose, was involved. It was contended that under the
provision the appellant was entitled to requisition premises for housing a member of the
foreign consulate. The High Court held that the expression any other public purpose should
be read Ejusdem Generis with purpose of state, and providing accommodation to a member
of the foreign consulate being a purpose of the Union and not of the State, the State
Government had no authority to requisition. The Supreme Court held that the High Court
was in error in applying the principle of Ejusdem Generis. The general expression any other
public purpose follows only a single expression for the purpose of a State which is not a
distinct genus. In the absence of a genus the rule has no application. Further, the intention
of the legislature is quite clear by the words used in the enactment. By giving the words
their natural meaning it is apparent that the expression any other public purpose includes
providing accommodation to a member of a foreign consulate.
Where the preceding words do not belong to a distinct genus, the rule of Ejusdem Generis
does not apply. For instance, in N.A.L.G.O. v. Bolton Corporation, the words 'or otherwise'
had to be interpreted in the definition of a 'workman' as any person who has entered into a
work under a contract with an employer whether the contract be by way of manual labour,
clerical work or otherwise: The court refused to apply the principle of Ejusdem Generis
saying the preceding words manual labour' and 'clerical work' did not form a distinct
category to be called a gems. In Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay the petitioner, the widow of
a tenant of a certain premises, was not residing in it at the time. The respondent
requisitioned the premises under Section 6(4) (a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948
for providing accommodation to a government servant. The petitioner challenged the
requisition on the ground that the premises was not vacant within the meaning of the
explanation attached to the section according to which a vacancy will exist when the tenant
'ceases to be in occupation upon termination of his tenancy, eviction or assignment or
transfer in any other manner of his interest in the premises or otherwise: According to her
the expression or otherwise should be construed Ejusdem Generis with the expressions
preceding it. The Supreme Court held that the rule has no application in the present
instance because the expressions preceding the words or otherwise are not species of the
same nature, and therefore, do not belong to any identifiable genus. Assigning the natural
meaning to the words used in the enactment it is clear that the expression or otherwise is
intended to include all cases not covered by the preceding expressions. This interpretation is
quite consistent with the object of the legislation.
In Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India through the Fruit Products Order, 1955, issued
under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, it was made obligatory that the
peonage of fruit juice in fruit syrup should be twenty-five. The appellant argued that the

order did not apply to its product Rooh Afza even though it contained fruit juices because
clause 2 (d) (v) of the Order includes squashes, crushes, cordials, barley water, barrelled
juice and ready-to-serve beverages or any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit
pulp and that the expression any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp
should be construed Ejusdem Generis. The Supreme Court rejected the contention and held
that the rule had no application here because the things mentioned before the general
expression any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp did not fall under a
determinable genus. Further, the context makes it clear that all beverages containing fruit
juice are intended to be included.
Conclusion

EJUSDEM GENERIS is (a) In an enumeration of different subjects in an Act, general words

following specific words may be construed with reference to the antecedent matters, and
the construction may be narrowed down by treating them as applying to things of the same
kind as those previously mentioned, unless of course, there is something to show that a
wider sense was intended. (b) If the particular words exhaust the whole genus, then the
general- words are construed as embracing a larger genus.
This is a rule of language employed by the courts when a situation arises that may not have
been foreseen when the statute was being drafted. It will bring within the meaning of the
statute things that are of the same class or genus as those mentioned within the statute
itself. Thus, if specific items are listed, plus a general term (for example, houses, offices,
rooms or other places), the general term of other places will include things only of the same
class as the specific list, in this case indoor places.
General words in a statute should be taken ordinarily in their usual sense. General words,
even when they follow specific words, should ordinarily be taken in their general sense,
unless a more reasonable interpretation requires them to be used in a sense limited to
things Ejusdem Generis with those specifically mentioned. If, however, the particular words
exhaust the whole genus, the general words must be understood to refer to some larger
genus.
The doctrine of Ejusdem Generis is only part of a wider principle of construction, namely,
that, where reasonably possible, some significance and meaning should be attributed to
each and every word and phrase in a written document. That being the object of the
doctrine, it is difficult to see what difference it can make whether the word 'other' is or is
not used, provided-and this is essential-that the examples which have been given are
referable to a clearly ascertainable genus.