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KEVIN SINGER
SUPERIOR COURT REFERE!t
RECEIVERSHIP SPHCIALISTS
795 Folsom Street, lst Floor
San Francisco. California 94107

Telephone: (415) 848-2984

Fa.x:

( 415) 848-2301
E-mail: Kcvin@ReceivershipSialists.com

Court Referee for tbe property

1051 Shotwell Street

San

Fra11c.isco, CA 941l0

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE ST ATE OF

IJ-

':i

u:

lO

located at:

CAtlFORNIA

FOR "I'HE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCOUNLIMITED JURJSDICTION

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ESTER JUAREZ, LETICIA MARTINEZ,

THELMA s. MONtES,EDUARDO
JUAREZ. m, ALICIA PAYNE and
CARLOS GARCIA

CASE NO. CGC-09-493126

NOTICE OF MOTION ANO MO'l1.0N FOR
ORDER:

l) APPROVING THE DISTRIBUTION OF

FUNDS FROM THE SALE OF THE
PROPERTY; 2)APPROVING AND
SETTLrNGREFREE'S FINAL REPORT
AND ACCCmNTINOi 3) APPROVlNO
FlNAL COMPENSATION AND
REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS FOR
REFEREE 4) DISCHARGING REFEREE
FROM ASSIGNMENT; 5) APPROVING
AND RA'.nFYING ALL OF REFERE'S
OTHER ACTS; 6) RBTAININO
JURISDICTION REGARDING REFEREE
ESTATE AND APPOINTMfiNT; 7) AND
DECLARATION OF KEVIN SINGER

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v.

JORGE MARTIN DE ANDA

Defendant.

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., ...
-'

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-J

Date:

July 11 2012
Time: 9:30 a.m.
Dept: 302
Judge: Hon. Hon. Harold Kahn
Address: 400 McAllister St.
San Francisco, CA 94102-4514

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t'RJNTE!) ON

RBCYCLfiD l'Af'!lR

Appmva!

of The Distribution of Funds & Referee's Final Accounting alld Rt:quest Fur Discharge

TO: THE PLANTU'F, DEFENDANT AND

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THEIR RESPECTIVE ATTORNEY$ OF

RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on July

11, 2012, at the hour of 9:30 a.m. ot as sc1on

thereafter as the matter can be heard in Department302, at the San Francisco Superior Court,

located at 400 McAllister Street, San Francisco California 94102, Superior Court Referee. Kevin

Singer, will and does hereby move the Court for an Order: 1) APPROVING THE DISTRIBUTION

OP PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY;

REFEREE;S FINAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTING; 3) APPROVING PINAL

COMPENSATION AND REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS FOR REFEREE;

2) APPROVING AND SETTLING

4) DISCHARGING

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REFEREE FROM ASSIGNMENT; 5) APPROVING AND RATIFYING ALL OF REFEREE'S

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OTHER ACTS; AND 6) RETAINING JURISDICTION REGARDING REFEREEESTATE AND

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APPOINTMENT.

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Said Motion will be based on this Notice of Motion, on the .Declaration of Kevin Singer, the

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Memorandum of Points and Authorities served and filed hcrevvith, on the pleadings, records ang

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files herein, and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing of the

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Motion.

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DATED: June8,2012

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By: _.-...L._,.;._ __;;::..-,F-J---

Kevin Singer
Superior Court Refer
_

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Approval tYfThc lJistribuW:m of Funds & Referee's Final. Accounting arrd Request For Dischurgc

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INTRODUCTION

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sale

15. 201:2, Kevin Singer, was appointed Referee (the ''Referee} to partition by

single family

home

located 1051 Shotwell Street, San Francisco, CA 94110 (the

"Property").

The foHo-wing is a summary of some of

the Referee's accomplishments

since

his

appointment:

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1) Conducted a site inspection of the Property.

2) Engaged the services of Better Homes and Garden Real Estate to serve as the listing Broker

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on the Property ("Broker'').

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3) Sent

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an

introduction letter

the Referee
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to the parties informing them that the Prope rty was placed under

Estate and explained the partition procedure to them.

4) Researched the property records of the property.

5) Ordered a Preliminary Title Report from Old Republic Title Company. I resetrched and
investigated the Property's title.records for liens lmd encumbrances.

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6) Had the Pmperty appraised by Michael P. Tabacco who appraised the Property at $575000.

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7) Engaged 23 offers on the Property and facilitated multiple over-bids.

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1'1!%NTflOON

On February

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8) Entered into a Purchase Agreement with Chad

Brubaker and Sarah Brubaker

{''Buyers'') to

purchase the Property at the purchase price of$750,000.00.

9) Facilitated the Parties agreeing to stipulate to the Property being sold without a Court overbid
hearing, saving the Parties in legal and Re feree Fees.

10) Closing the sale with the Buyers on April 25th, 2012, for $750,000. The netproceeds from
the sale are

$664,291.58

PROCJilDS FROM THE SALE AND ACCOUNTING OF RENTAL FUNDS

There are currently proceeds from the sale of the Propt.'tty in the amount of$ $664,291.58
being held in Escrow No. 12544093-AC at Fidelity National

Title ("Proceeds in Escrow").

Approval of The Distribution of Funds & Referee's final Accounting and Request For Discharge

Attached hereto as "Exhibit 1" is the

Closing Escrow Statement from Fidelity National Title.

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REFEREES BII,LING FORTIME AND EXPENSES AND

RECOMMENDED ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO JACH I1ARTY

The Reforees outstanding fees and expenses from February 15 2()12 through the conclusion

of this

fees and expenses. Attached as "'Exlaibit l," is a breakdO\vn of Referee's fees and expenses that

should

hearing are estimated at $25 ,539.71. Referee has not been paid up to this point for any of his

be paid from Proceeds in Escrow.

DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS

OF THE

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Referee

is attaching "Exhibit 3" which is his recommendation for the distribution of funds

amongst the Parties which is summarized as follows:

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Court Referee:

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Legal Fees-Amanda Ebey: $18,345.01

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Legal Fees- Julfo Ramos:

$ 4,880.00

City

$ l ,26J .20

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Sidewalk Lien payoff:

Plaintiffs

$25,539.71

Esther Juarez:

$108,896.12

Alicia Payne:

$118,853.26

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Leticia Martinez:

$101,895.41

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.E.duardo Juarez:

$ 97,702.41

Carlos Garcia:

$ 86,988.02

111elma Montes:

$ 99,930.44

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Defendant
Jorge De Anda:

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TOTAL

$664,291.58

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l'RlNtBDON

PROPERTY

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RliCVCLED l'Al'BR

FROM THE SALE

Ill

Approval of The Disfrll:mtion of Funds & Referee'$ Pinal Accoum.ing and Rct11rest For Discharge

The Court should take notice that attached is 4Exhibit 4" is a judgment in the amount of

$255,545 that Plaintiffs obtained against the Defendant. Defendant's prooes of $54,028.30 will

used to pay do\Vl1 his judgment in favor of the .Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDIUM POlNTS AND AUTHORITY

The lnterlocutory Judgment entered on March 9, 2010, reads as follows:

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"'1. The Rea] Property described here shal1 be partitioned by sale and the procct--ds after an
accounting of costs, expenses and income incurre d by or received by each Party ofb1terestbetwcen
the

JUAREZ, It ALICIA PAYNE, CARLOS GARCIA AND JORGE MARTIN DE ANDA and which
accounting of fair rental value and damages to the property caused or permitted to

shall include

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be caused by Defondant JORGE MARTIN DE ANDA.

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3.

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Plaintiffs

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an

Costs of partition

are awarded to Plaintiffs and against Defendant JORGE MARTIN DE ANDA and

shares of Dcfondant JORGE MART1N DE ANDA in the property;

4.

Costs,

respectively

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interests therein."

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The Court Order appointing Kevin Sin ger as Referee erl.tered

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'"The Court appoints Kevin Singer

property

as

located at l 051 Shot\veH Street

Judgment for

on February 15, 2012 reads:

referee to supervise management and sale of the real

as

more

particularly described in the Interlocutory

Partition filed on March 9, 2010."

Attached as '*Exhibit 5" is the Interlocutory Judgmnt entered on fy!atch 9, 2010 and Court

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Order appointing

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R!!('.)'(LE[l ?APER

fees and expenses of referees, and other disbursements paid by the parties

entitled to share in the land shall otherwise be divided in proportion to their respective

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in this action, including attorney's foes and cost of suit incurred by

Plaintiff's shall account for these costs as Costs After Judgment. Said costs shall bec<>me a lien on

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PRJNit'.!>ON

0\1.t'ncrs: ESTER JAUREZ, LETICIA MARTINEZ, THELMA S. MONTES, EDUARDO

Kevin Singer as Referee entered on February 15. 2012.

Approval ofThc Distribution t>fFUrtds & Reforec's Final

Accnunting and Rt.<quest Fqr Discharge

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SUMMARY

Referee worked very hard to successfully partition the Property.

some animosity between tlle Parties, Referee pushed fotward and

Property over

$175,000 above the appr aised value.

A.

Legal f'ees - Julio Rarnos:

$ 4,880.00

City Sidewalk Lien payoff:

$ l ,261.20

Plaintiffs
Esther Juarez:

$108896.12

Alicia Payne:

$118,853.26

Leticia Martinez:

$101895.41

Eduardo Juarez:

$ 97,702.41

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Carlos Garcia:

$ 86,988.02

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Thelma Montes:

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Defendant
Jorge De Anda:

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TOTAL

$664,291.58

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l 2544Q93-

AC funds as follows;

$18,345.01

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The Court should approve the Referee's foes

Order Fidelity National Title to distribute from Escrow Account Number

Legal Fees - Amanda Ebey:

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successfully partitioned the

WHEREFORE, Court Reforee requests that the Court grant the foHowitlg:

$25,539.71

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99,930.44
0

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?R!NiEDON
RJi( 'VCtEO PAPER

was

and expenses as presented and distribute balance of proceeds as recommended.

Court Referee:

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Even though there

B.

Approve the Reforee's Fees and Expenses as presented and an amount to be

presented by declaration five days prior to the hearing date;

c.

The Referee s actions and transactions are hereby ratified;

Approval ofThe Db'tribution of Funds & Referee's Final Aceounting and Reque:.1 fur Discharge

..

D.
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The Referee is hereby discharged from all further duties, liabilities. and

responsibilities;
E.

This Court

retains jurisdiction over any

matters

or

claims

which

may later arise

concerning this referee appointment and this referee estate;

F.

For such other

relief as the Court may deem just and appropriate;

DATED: June 8, 2012

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By: ..----"'_, '

Kevin Singer

___,

Superior Court Re

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1'RlNTED()N

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RECYClH> !'A?E!t

Approval of The Distribution ofFunds & Referee's Final Accounting and Request For Discharge

DECl.JARATION OF KEVIN SINGER

I. KEVIN SINGER, declare and state as follows:

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a Superior Court Referee,

past twelve years.

and have acted in tliat capacity in numerous

cases over

the

lam the Prt.>sident ofR.eceivership Specialists, which.jjeCializes in receiverships,

appoint.d Referee (the

referee assignments and partition sales. On February 15, 2()12, I was

''Referee"} to partition by sale a single family home located l 051 Sho.twell Street, San

Francisco1

California 94 l 1 Q (the "Property"). l submit this Declaration in support of the Ei,ccompanying: 1)

APPROVING THE

DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS FROM THE

SALEOF THE PROPERTY; 2)

ACCOUNTING; 3)

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APPROVING AND SETTLING REFEREE'S FINAL REPORT AND

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APPROVING FINAL COMPENSATION AND REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS FOR

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REFEREE; 4) DISCHARGING REFEREE FROM ASSIGNMENT; 5) APPROVING AND

RATIFYING ALL 01 REFEREE'S OTHER

REGARDING REFEREE ESTATE AND

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ACTS; 6) RETAINING JURISDICTION

APPOINTMENT; 7)

AND DECLARATION 01;'

KEVIN SINGER.

If called upon to testify. I could and would competently d-0

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l'!tlNTEDON

am

so as

to

the matters hereinafter set

forth,
The following is a summary ohome of my accomplishments since my appointment:
1) Conducted a site inspection of the Property.

2) Engaged the services of Better Hcimes and Garden Real Estate to serve as the liting Broker
on

the Propert;y ('"Broker'').

3) Sent an introduction lettt.'T. to the parties informing them that the Property was plac under
the

Referee Estate and explained the partitiou procedure to them.

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4) Researched .the property records. of the property.

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5) Ordered a Preliminary Title Report from Old Republic Title Company, I researched and

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RCYCLED !'Al'Blt

investigated the Property's title records for liens and encumbranes;

Appr()val of The Distrli:mil-Oli ofFunds & Referee's Final Accounting and Request F(}f Discharge

6) Fiad the Property appraised by Michael P. Tabacco who appraised the Property at $575.000.

7) Entertained 23 offers on the Property and facilitated

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multiple overbids.

8) Entered into a Purchase Agreement with Chad Brubaker and Sarah Brubaker ("Buyers") to
purchase the Property at the purchase price of $750,000.00.
9) Facilitated the Parties agreeing to stipulate to the Property being sold without a Court overbid
hearing, saving the Parties inJegal and Referee Fees.
l O} Closing

the sale with the Buyers

the sale are

on

April 25th, 2012,

$664,291.58 and are they

are

for $750,000. The net proceeds from

currently held in Escrow No.

12544093-AC at

Fidelity National Title ("Proceeds in Escrow").

My outstanding fees and expenses from February 15, 2012 through the conclusion of this
hearing are estimated at $25,539.71. I have not been paid up to this point for any of my fees and
expenses.

I declare under

penally of perjury,

under the

laws of the State of California, that the

foregoing is true and correct.

Ext.'CUted on gth day of June, 2012, at Los Angeles, California.

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IUiCYCL!'J:> l'A!'lHt .

Appmvi:il ofThe Distribution of Funds & Referee's Fi11al Accounting and Request ForDisthlirge

.I

EXHIBIT 1

Fidelity National Title Company

1300 S!ltlet s Suite 1200, San. GA 941
415 Sf',3<3500 FAX 415 563--01-03
.

MTf.!: May. 31 2012

ESCROW NO.: 125440n AC

lOCATE,NO,: CAINOOO!J lH)gJa-000 3,.
ESCROW OFFICER: Afin Cotkery

SEu.ER FINAL CLOSING At!M!NT

Sat.ER:
BUYER:

PR.C>nR,"N:

Alicia Payne arn:I Thelma s. Montes and .carlo$ Garcia arn:I. Letida Matti and Jorge Matti n
and Esther Juarez and Eduardo Juarez, u
CMcl Lewis Brubaker
1!i51 Shotwell Street, San frandsd}, CA 94110

DllBTS

PJNANCl'.AU
iota! Cons!deratlon

PROAAnONS/ADlU$TMEN1$t
Prepaid CoootyTaxe,s at$542.47 Semi-Annual from

7/1/'ln12

Cl' EnerW/Water COmpl!anm

Transf'efTax, Geller Paid Item

4/25/2012
. 1;l:I

1'IJLE CHARGES:
illcALTA HOmeowner's 1-4 Res. fur $750,000.00
16-ALTA,Expandad Res. LI:ian. for $450,000 .00
Other Polley Al.TA OWner's .POiicy
Rro.mling Vatio\Js Seller l>owmetits

o.oo

ooo
i,991.00
178.00

BCRO'W CHARGES!
Outside Coutler/Speda! M OVer Night Delivery fees
l:ll:(lry Fet.-s
f\lol:ary Fees to &incserv
DOC P Fees ti> Fidelity !l!atlooal 1'Jtte /Multiple
. Sellers at

$100.Eatti

Draw Deed
Doc Prep Fees Affldavlt of Death of Esther Haro

PAYOFFS. ca ... coast credit sentk:e, Inc.(Re: Thelma s. Montes}

Total yoft $1,U9.97 .
Payment Per Demand to Cal-O:iast Credit. lnc.(Re: Thelma
5, l"kmtes)
Interest from 03/00/2012. 04/30/2G12 to Cel-G'.last Credit
5ervlm, !nc.(Re: Thelma 5. Montes)

COMMiSlONS:
S
U$tlng Brokers COmmlssion to Bettet Homes & GardellS Real
E$tat$JJF Finnegan 2.50%
Setting ars commission tl'.l Vanguard PropertleS of S.f, 2.50%
MXSCl:l.:LANEOUS:

39.03
20.00
145.00

100.00

45.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00

CALflTA Withholding Pn:icesslng Fee

Doc Prep Fees IJSpousal Alicia's husband
Dot Prep Fees Aff. Death .of Rosario Haro

1,000.00
5,100.00

S<ln Frooclseo Health Department for Refuse Llehs

Gilberta Ramos for Reim!:>; LisT lnspedlori Fee
Gilberta Ramos for Relmb; 3R Report Fee
JCPLGS Nab,iral ard Disclosures for l\IHO Report
cyr11 6imnoe tor w.-Jfnef9 ins rees
flettrer Homes S.. Gal'dellS Rall Estate fi:it on Une File Acc::eS!l
Frara:h!Se Tax floardcWithho!4irig Dl1/!Sion for Pymt., fbo, Carlos
Garcia
Francii !Se Tax Boan:!Wtthholding Division for ?ymt., fbo, Jorge
Martm Oe Anda

1,320.53
19.44

1fJi750;00
18,750.00

536.99
75.00

16(100

123.95

249.00
. oo

3,568.00

3,568.00

De.Anda

Dam: May. 3, 2012

E'Sa<:IW .: 12"4093-AC
Ulcilt<i No.: CAINDOOO!.H:i93800G3'Franchise Tax SOal'(:lWithhold ing DMSion for Pymt., fbo, Edua!rlo
Juarez
Internal Revenue Setllh::e fur Pymt., fbo carlos Garcia
internal Revenue SeNice.fl;ir Pymt., fba Jorge Martin Oa.Anda
5an FralfcislX!Tax COilector fur 2011-12 Taxes+ Penaitles 8lock

6520/2SA

San Francisco county Tax Coll. ector for Defaulted Taxes 516Ck
6520/1..tl t 28A

3,558.00

10,714.39
10,71'!.39
1,474.12
2,672.48

NET PROCEEDS DUt SEtlER

$664,291.SS

1WAl..5

$1$0,19890

SAVE THJS STATEMENT FOR INCOME TAX

EXHIBIT2

Statement

Reeivership Specialists
11400 W. Olympic Blvd. Suite 2()0
Los Angeles, CA 90064

6/5/2012:

To:
l 051 E. Juares Vs. Jorge Martin De Amfa
Property: 1051 SJmtwdlStreet
San Francisco, tA 94.l l<I

Amount Enc.

Date
01/31/2012

02;2912012
03f31/:2{}J2
04/30!2lJJ 2
-0'5/.3 ll2\H2
0010.512012
06105/2012

Transaction
lNV #Jan l 2003. Orig. Amount $838.00.
iNV ;1J:ebl2<l03. Ori.g. Amount $4.63'.UO.
lNV #Mari2003. Orig. Am-0unt $Hl,384.96.
INV #Apr12014. Orig. Anu;unt $4,777.25.
!NV #Ma:y11007. Orig. Amollilt $2,3fHWO.
!NV #Junl 200 l. {)tig. Amount $2,526.0(L
An1011nt Due

Amot1nt
838.(}(I
4,633.50

W,349(5
4,711.iS

2,:380;()()

2,5;26.00

Balance
8:38.00
Mi' i.50
l5Jt56.46
2M33.7l

23,013.71

25,539.71
25,5311.11

Kevin Singer, Superior Court Receiver

Receivership Specialists

Receivers Billing

11400 W. Olympic Blvd.# 200

Date

Phone: 310-552-9065

!!31!2012

Los Angeles. CA 90064

Fax:

310552-9066

II

lf

Invoice ,
Janl2003

Kevin@ReceiverShipSpeciaiists.com

smro
105 l E. Jwttes Vs, forge Martin De Anda
Property: l 051 ShotwcU Street
San Fra:m:isco, Cl\ 94 l l 0

Desa!pt!on

Pho11e/E-mail Plaintiff Counsel regarding Stipulation and

review draftStipulation
.&mail
review

Plaintiff Counsel regarding in:teriocutozy and

Create New QB Account/save

Review Court Records and found default
E-mail Plaintiff Counsel and Referee regarding
Stipulation and dfault
E-rnail Plaintiff Counsel regarding Stipulation and all
Plaintiff Signatmes
Create Temp. Fi1e/Folder
Draft Stipulaticm. and e-mail to Plaintiff Counsel
Review revised Stipulation and e-mail Plaintiff Counsel
regarding change and lodging
E-mail (2) Plaintiff Counsel regarding Referee transition
E"'mail Plaintiff and Counsel regarding lodging of
Stipulation

Review amend and sign and scan stipulation to Parties

E-mail Parties re: Harrington Signature
E-mail Plaintiff re: obtaining signatures
Prepare Fed-Ex to A. .Ebey
Ebey
Exp, Fed-Ex to

Oate

Rate

Amount

0.2

250.00

50.()()

l/4/2012

0.1

250.00

25.00

i/4/2012

0.2

150.00

30.00

l/3/2012

1/5/2012
1/5/2012

0.3

0.2

250.00
250.00

1/5/2012

OJ

250.00

115/2012

0.2

75.00

50.00

25.00

150.00

30.00

t/1212012

0.2

250.00

25.0.00

250.00

50.00

Ul5!20l2

0.2

250.00
250.00

50.00

250.00

75.00
25.0:0

l/9/2(H2

1122/2012
1124/2012
1124/2012

1/25/201

l/26/2012
1/26/2012

NOTE: Tile Los Angeles office handles all accounting and billing for San Francii..'00, San
Diego. Las

Qty

and Phoenix, Ple$ niail y<mr cha:k to lhc abtwe address. ThMk: )>t1u!

0.1

0.3

0.1
0.1
O.l
1

Total

250.00
250.00
150.00
38.00

25.QO

25;00
15.00

38.00

Kevin Singer, Superior Court Receiver

Receivership Specialists
l I 400 W. Olympic Blvd# 200

Receivers Billing
.tfme

Los Angeles, CA 90064

2/29!212

Ph011e: 3105529065
Fax: 3 l05529066

II

lnvQice#
FeMZ003

Kevi.n1ReceiverShipSpecialists;com

Bill To
l 051 E. Juares Vs. Jorge Martin De Anda
Property: 105] Sliotweil Street
San Fram.:iisco, CA 941 W

Description

Date

Email Plaintiff regarding status Qf the lodging of Stip

E-mail Defendant regru-di:ng Court Order and timing of
listing agreement
Email Plaintiff regarding c.tmtact for Defendant
Emaii Attorney regarding appointing Court Order and
interlocutory judgment
Review interlock and Court Order, phone Plaintiff
Cm.msel

Phone Harrington regarding appointment

E-mail Plaintiff Counsel regarding lien on Defendant's

proceeds
Phone/E:rnaU Gail Rmnos to request draft listing
agreement as well as BOV for the Property
Email Jeff Dasse to request Preliminary Title Report for
property
Re"iew and reply e-mail from Gail Rrunos regarding
preparation of listing agreement

Review and reply e-mail fmm Ester Ramos regarding

possible interterence by Defoud.ant to market

for sale

the property

Review and reply e-mail fr<)m Amanda.Ebey regarding

request

Deed

25.00

0.2

50.00

2/l512012
2/lS/2012

0.2
tl2

250.00
250.00

50.00
50.00

2115/2012

0.3

250.00

75.00

2/15/2012

2/1512012

0.2

0.2

25.0.00
250.00

50.00

211512012

0.2

2 50.0.0

50.00

2/15/2012

0.2

250.00

50.00

211512012

0.2

250.00

50.00

2/15/2012

0.2

250.00

50.()(}

2/!5/2012

0.2

250.00

S0.00

2/16/2012

OJ

2ft5/2tH2

NOTE: The Los Axigeies oftke handles allaccountingood blHing for San frooclsoo, San
Diego, Las Vegas and Phmmix, Pleillie mail Y<mr cheek w the shove adtlrt,')(. thank youl

Page1

Amount

250.-00
250.00

2ll6!20.I2

Broker regar4{ng BOV

Rate
0.t

from .Ester Ramos to remove Defendant from

Review and sign .listing agreement

E-mail

2/7/lfJ12

Qty

0.1

I Total

250.00

250.00

50.00

75.00

25.00

1.---1

Kevin Singer, Superior Court Receiver

Receivership Specialists

Receivers Billing

11400 W. Olynrpic Blvd.# 200

Los Angeles, CA 90064
Phone: 310-552-9065

Oate
Febl2003

Fax: 3 l 0-552-9066
Kevi11@ReeeivetShipSpeciaUsts.c-0m

Bill To
1051 E. Juares Vs. forge Martin De Anda
Properly: l 051 Shotwell Strt,'et
San Fnmcisco, CA 941 lO

Description

Date

Review Property Records

Phone from GaRRamos to discuss marketing ofpr<.'lperty.

dealing with disruptive Defondant, an<l process of

con.l:lrmation/overb1d hearing

Review and revise Listing 1ment and prepare

Addendum to Listing Agreement

Scan!E-mail signed Listing Agreement and Addendum to
Gail Ramos
E-mail Gail Ramos to confirm thattealtor ha. keys for the
property

Resenroh Court fHing services regarding obtaining

Certitied Orders

E-mail

211612012

Rate

Qty

Amount

2/1612012

0.3

0.2

250.00
250.00

50.00
75.00

2/l6/20t2

250.00

250.00

2/16/2012

0.2

250J)0

50.00

1/16/2012

0.2

250.00

50.00

2116/2012

0.3

150.00

45.00

2/16/2012

0:2

150.00

3-0.00

lSo.M

75.00

Ruby at Rapid Legal regarding instructions on

obtaining Certified copies
Create Perm file/folder and Contact Sheet
E,,maU (!ail regarding opinion of Value
E-mail Pfaintiff regarding property meeting
E-mail Plaintiff regardil'.lg Defondant's past behavior and
actions ef Referee estate
E-mail Plaintiff regarding restraining order and meeting
Email Gail Ran1os toschedu1e meeting at the property on

2/1712012
2/17/2012

0.1
0.2

250.00
250.00

25.00

2/l7/20l2

0.2

250.00

50.00

Preparation for meeting with parties

2/17/2012

0.2

250.00

..

2/20112

E-mail Gail Ramos.to forward standard marketing report

be used during sale assignment

to

2li6/2iHl

2/l1!2(H1

2/l7/2012

2/18/2012

N0'.111: The Lus Angeles u1lke himdktH1.ll ix;counting and blU!ng for San Francisoo, San
! >icgo. Las Vegas and Phoenix. Please mail your check: to the abtwc addrtiss. Thank you!
Page2

0.5

0.2

0.2

0.2

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25\toO

250.00

250.00

50.00
50.00

50.00
50.00

50.00

Cal. Prac. Guide Prof. Resp. Ch. 1-D

California Practice Guide: Professional Responsibility
Paul W. Vapnek, Mark L. Tuft, Ellen R. Peck and Justice Howard B. Wiener (Ret.)
Chapter 1. Law As A Profession
D. Unauthorized Practice Of Law

4. [1:181] Activities Constituting Practice of Law: The following are examples of activities held to constitute
the practice of law:
a. [1:182] Holding self out as attorney: It is the unauthorized practice of law (and a misdemeanor) for a person who
is not an active member of the State Bar (or otherwise authorized to practice law in California by statute or court
rules) to hold himself or herself out as an attorney or entitled to practice law. [See Bus. & Prof.C. 6126(a);
Bluestein v. State Bar (1974) 13 C3d 162, 175, 118 CR 175, 183, fn. 13]
b. [1:183] Appearing on behalf of another in adjudicative proceedings: The practice of law has been repeatedly
defined as doing and performing services on behalf of another in a court of justice in any matter pending therein
throughout its various stages and in conformity with adopted rules of procedure. [See Birbrower, Montalbano,
Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Sup.Ct. (ESQ Business Services, Inc.) (1998) 17 C4th 119, 128, 70 CR2d 304, 308; People
ex rel. Lawyers Institute of San Diego v. Merchants Protective Corp. (1922) 189 C 531, 535, 209 P 363, 365; Baron
v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 C3d 535, 542, 86 CR 673, 677]
(1) [1:184] Depositions: Even though a deposition is conducted outside of court, it is considered a court
proceeding. Thus, appearing at a deposition on behalf of another constitutes the practice of law. [Ex Parte McCue
(1930) 211 C 57, 68, 293 P 47, 52]
(a) [1:185] Comparesitting in to assist lawyer: A nonlawyer (e.g., paralegal) who accompanies a State Bar
member to a deposition to provide assistance, under the direct supervision of the lawyer, and who takes no part
in the deposition proceedings (e.g., asking questions or interposing objections) is not engaged in the practice of
law.
(2) [1:186] Administrative proceedings: Appearing on behalf of another in administrative proceedings may
constitute the practice of law: (T)he character of the act, and not the place where it is performed, is the decisive
element, and if the application of legal knowledge and technique is required, the activity constitutes the practice of
law, even if conducted before an administrative board or commission. [Baron v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 2 C3d
at 543, 86 CR at 678; Benninghoff v. Sup.Ct. (State Bar) (2006) 136 CA4th 61, 6869, 38 CR3d 759, 763764
resigned attorney who represented parties in state administrative proceedings engaged in unauthorized practice of
law by analyzing agency disciplinary guidelines, advising clients on how to defend disciplinary charges,
responding to discovery requests, preparing hearing books and declarations, and examining witnesses at hearings]
(a) [1:186.1] Comparestatutory authorization: Certain statutes permit parties to be represented by
nonlawyers in administrative proceedings. See 1:173.6.
[1:186.2] Out-of-state Attorney not licensed in California but admitted to practice before federal courts in
California could not appear (and be compensated) as an attorney in state administrative proceedings. The fact
that the administrative proceedings involved federal law was irrelevant. [Z.A. v. San Bruno Park School Dist.
(9th Cir. 1999) 165 F3d 1273, 12741276]

However, because the statute governing the administrative proceedings permitted appearances by nonlawyer
advisors, Attorney could act as a nonlawyer advisor (but could not recover attorney fees for services rendered;
see discussion at 1:157.5). [Z.A. v. San Bruno Park School Dist., supra, 165 F3d at 12751276; see also
Longval v. Workers Comp. Appeals Board (1996) 51 CA4th 792, 803, 59 CR2d 463, 469out-of-state
attorney not licensed in Calif. could not recover fees for appearing before Workers Compensation Appeals
Board where statute prohibited fee recovery for nonlawyer appearances]
[1:186.3] Reserved.
(b) [1:186.4] Comparepractice before federal agencies: State law cannot regulate or interfere with the
practice of law before federal administrative agencies. [Benninghoff v. Sup.Ct. (State Bar), supra, 136 CA4th at
74, 38 CR3d at 768769attorney licensed in California who resigned during pending disciplinary proceedings
and thus was not entitled to represent parties in state administrative proceedings, was not precluded from
representing federal prisoners seeking prison transfers before U.S. Dept. of Justice]
However, federal law relevant to the practice of law before a federal agency may adopt or incorporate state law
standards and requirements regarding such practice. [Augustine v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Fed. Cir.
2005) 429 F3d 1334, 13401341; see also 1:20]
(3) [1:186.5] Appearing in pleadings: Appearing on behalf of another in the caption of pleadings filed with
the court may constitute the unauthorized practice of law where the filer is not licensed to practice or otherwise
authorized to appear before the court. [See Gentis v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. (1998) 60 CA4th 1294,
1308, 71 CR2d 122, 130denying petition for rehearing where attorney not licensed in Calif. was listed in caption
as representing petitioner]
(4) [1:186.6] Compareout-of-state attorney assisting California lawyer in federal court: See 1:180.15.
[1:187] Reserved.
(5) [1:188] Effect of power of attorney: See 1:158 ff.
[1:189194] Reserved.
c. [1:195] Giving legal advice: Giving legal advice and counsel constitutes practicing law, whether or not a case is
pending in any court. [See People ex rel. Lawyers Institute of San Diego v. Merchants Protective Corp. (1922) 189
C 531, 535, 209 P 363, 365]
(1) Application
[1:195.1] By traveling to California to give advice to Client about strategies for resolving a contract dispute
governed by California law, participating in settlement negotiations and assisting in the initiation of arbitration
proceedings related thereto, New York lawyers engaged in the (unauthorized) practice of law in California.
[Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Sup.Ct. (ESQ Business Services, Inc.) (1998) 17 C4th 119,
131, 133134, 70 CR2d 304, 310312]
[1:196] Giving advice regarding the law of a foreign country constitutes the practice of law: Whether a person
gives advice as to (local) law, Federal law, the law of a sister State, or the law of a foreign country, he is giving
legal advice (and thus practicing law within the meaning of Bus. & Prof.C. 6125). [Bluestein v. State Bar
(1974) 13 C3d 162, 174, 118 CR 175, 182 (parentheses in original; internal quotes omitted)]
[1:197] A real estate broker who was not involved in the sale of certain property charged the buyer and seller a
fee for advice as to the type of document to use in securing a loan on the property and for preparing the
document. (The parties were inexperienced in such matters and did not request any particular instrument securing
the loan.) By giving the advice, the broker engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. [People v. Sipper (1943)
61 CA2d Supp. 844, 846847, 142 P2d 960, 962 (overruled on other grounds in Murgia v. Mun.Ct. (1975) 15
C3d 286, 301, 124 CR 204, 214, fn. 11)]
[1:198] An eviction service provider (for landlords seeking to evict tenants) furnished forms for his clients
use and encouraged clients to discuss their specific cases with him. In personal interviews, he provided
information and advice on the clients specific legal problems in evicting tenants (e.g., advising one client that it

was unlawful to turn off the utilities at the rental). The eviction service provider was practicing law: Given
the aura of expertise created by the business practices of (eviction services provider), such advice would
undoubtedly be relied upon by its clients, perhaps to their serious detriment. [People v. Landlords Professional
Services (1989) 215 CA3d 1599, 1609, 264 CR 548, 553 (parentheses added)]
[1:199] A tax accountant was held to be practicing law in advising a client in preparing applications for
carryback adjustments and refund of taxes because strictly legal issues were involved. [Agran v. Shapiro (1954)
127 CA2d Supp. 807, 818819, 273 P2d 619, 626]
(2) [1:200] Comparetax advice: Advice on the tax consequences of a particular transaction may be within the
functions of either an accountant or lawyer because tax law involves both fields.
However, when the issues involve interpretation of law (tax law or general law) or uncertainties as to the
application of law to a particular transaction, the services of a lawyer are required. [Agran v. Shapiro, supra, 127
CA2d Supp. at 819, 273 P2d at 626]
(a) [1:201] IRS recognition not determinative: Federal regulations provide that accountants as well as
attorneys may represent taxpayers in dealings with the Internal Revenue Service. But those regulations do not
determine what constitutes the practice of law; that is a question of state law. [Agran v. Shapiro, supra, 127
CA2d Supp. at 821826, 273 P2d at 628631]
(3) [1:202] Comparefriends giving legal opinions: The argument that giving legal advice is so broad that it
could apply to friends offering opinions on legal matters has been rejected: Our research has found no case in
which one friend was either enjoined from giving legal advice to a friend or prosecuted for the giving of such
advice ... [People v. Landlords Professional Services (1989) 215 CA3d 1599, 1609, 264 CR 548, 554]
d. [1:203] Preparing legal instruments: The preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights
may be secured, whether or not a case is pending in court, constitutes the practice of law. [People ex rel. Lawyers
Institute of San Diego v. Merchants Protective Corp. (1922) 189 C 531, 535, 209 P 363, 365]
This includes the drawing of agreements, the organization of corporations and preparing papers connected therewith,
and the drafting of legal documents of all kinds, including wills and trusts. [Smallberg v. State Bar (1931) 212 C 113,
119120, 297 P 916, 919; see also Geibel v. State Bar (1938) 11 C2d 412, 422423, 79 P2d 1073, 1078unlicensed
persons drafted benevolent trusts for a fee]
(1) [1:204] Compareacting as scrivener: However, merely filling in blanks on a form selected by the parties or
acting as a scrivener in recording the parties agreement does not constitute the practice of law (see 1:222).
(2) [1:204.1] Compareacting as legal document assistant: Provided statutory registration requirements are
met, nonlawyers may act as legal document assistants. See discussion at 1:227 ff.
(3) [1:204.2] Compareacting as immigration consultant: Subject to carefully prescribed regulations, federal
and state laws permit certain nonlawyers to prepare and file documents for aliens in connection with immigration
matters. See discussion at 1:233.5 ff.
(4) [1:204.3] Compareacting as bankruptcy petition preparer: Under specified circumstances, federal law
also allows nonlawyers, acting in a purely clerical capacity, to prepare a debtors bankruptcy documents for filing.
See 1:234 ff.
e. [1:205] Negotiating and settling claims on behalf of others: Negotiating and settling claims on behalf of others
may amount to the practice of law. [See Howe v. State Bar (1931) 212 C 222, 228229, 298 P 25, 2627persons
licensed as insurance adjusters not authorized to practice law]
(1) [1:206] Personal injury claims: Interviewing injured persons with a view to getting them to sign agreements
authorizing a nonlawyer to control the conduct of whatever negotiations or litigation may ensue, including the right
to settle their claims, constitutes the practice of law. [See Smallberg v. State Bar (1931) 212 C 113, 119120, 297 P
916, 919attorney abetted practice of law by unlicensed persons]
(2) [1:207] Liability insurer settling claim against its insured: Liability insurance policies typically authorize

(and obligate) the insurer to settle or defend claims or suits against the insured for damages covered by the
policy. This does not, however, entitle the insurer to practice law. Where settlement or defense requires a lawyers
services, the insurer must engage the services of competent counsel. [See Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co. (1973) 34
CA3d 858, 880881, 110 CR 511, 526]
(3) [1:208] Negotiating IRS settlement on behalf of another: Negotiations with the IRS to settle tax liabilities of
another involve the practice of law where the negotiations involve difficult or doubtful legal issues. [Agran v.
Shapiro (1954) 127 CA2d Supp. 807, 812813, 273 P2d 619, 622623]
[1:209] An accountant who spent four days reviewing over 100 cases and cited numerous cases to IRS agent on
a difficult legal issue (carryback of operating losses) was held to be practicing law. [Agran v. Shapiro, supra, 127
CA2d Supp. at 813814, 273 P2d at 623624]
[1:210] But an accountant whose negotiations with the IRS focused strictly on a factual issue (the availability
of reserves), and who neither read nor cited cases to the IRS, was not practicing law. [Zelkin v. Caruso Discount
Corp. (1960) 186 CA2d 802, 806, 9 CR 220, 224]
(4) [1:211] Negotiating with opposing counsel for continuance while under suspension: A suspended attorneys
engaging in negotiations with opposing counsel concerning settlement of a marriage dissolution action and
agreeing that the case be continued to a later date, constitutes the practice of law. [Morgan v. State Bar (1990) 51
C3d 598, 604, 274 CR 8, 10]
(5) Bankruptcy cases
(a) [1:212] Negotiating reaffirmation agreements: The negotiation of a reaffirmation agreement with a debtor
by a law school graduate not licensed in California constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. [In re Carlos
(BC CD CA 1998) 227 BR 535, 539]
Moreover, a law firm that knowingly uses a nonlawyer employee to negotiate reaffirmation agreements with
debtors aids and abets the unauthorized practice of law. [In re Carlos, supra, 227 BR at 539540]
(b) [1:212.1] Preparing bankruptcy petitions: Soliciting financial information from debtors, advising them to
file bankruptcy petitions and assisting them in preparing bankruptcy schedules constitutes the practice of law. [In
re Glad (9th Cir. BAP 1989) 98 BR 976, 978; In re Agyekum (9th Cir. BAP 1998) 225 BR 695, 702]
Compare: Nonlawyer bankruptcy petition preparers may be compensated for preparing bankruptcy petitions
for filing. However, those services are limited to clerical work (essentially, typing). [See 11 USC 110; and
further discussion at 1:234 ff.]
f. [1:213] Serving as private arbitrator, mediator or other dispute resolution neutral: The State Bar takes the
position that acting as a private arbitrator, mediator, referee or other dispute resolution neutral constitutes the practice
of law and hence may not be performed by an inactive State Bar member. This is based on the presumption that
these activities call upon a member to give legal advice or counsel or examine the law or pass upon the legal effect on
[sic] any act, document or law. [See Application for Transfer to Inactive Membership Status, available at
http://calbar.ca. gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Y3uzheHB8w & tabid= 1476; and State Bar Rule 2.30(B)]
(1) [1:213.1] Compareserving as dispute resolution neutral for court or governmental agency: See
1:222.1.
[1:214] Reserved.
5. [1:215] Activities Not Constituting Practice of Law: The following are examples of activities held not to
constitute the practice of law:

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF LAW
MANUAL FOR PROSECUTORS

LOS ANGELES COUNTY

OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Steve Cooley
District Attorney
County of Los Angeles
Thomas A. Papageorge
Head Deputy District Attorney
Consumer Protection Division

Kathleen J. Tuttle
Deputy District Attorney
Karen Nobumoto
Deputy District Attorney
February 2004 Edited for Public Release

14

Chapter IV
STATUTES APPLICABLE
TO UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF LAW

Chapter Outline
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Business and Professions Code section 6125 et seq.: Definition
of UPL and Elements of the Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. UPL Statutory Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Definition of the Practice of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Elements of the Offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Other Statutory Alternatives for Prosecuting UPL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Grand Theft by False Pretenses (Pen. Code 484/487) . . . . . . . . .
2. Illegal Practice of Business (Bus. & Prof. Code 16240) . . . . . . . .
3. Immigration Consultants Act (Bus. & Prof. Code 22400 et seq.) .
4. False or Misleading Statements in an Immigration Matter
(Penal Code 653.55) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. False Advertising (Bus. & Prof. Code 17500) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Unfair Competition (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq.) . . . . . . . .
7. State Bar Ethical Standards and Related Rules and Statutes . . . . . .

Introduction
Acts constituting the unauthorized practice of law may violate many different California
statutes and ethics regulations. In assessing potential charges, the prosecutor should consider all
alternatives, including criminal sanctions in the Business and Professions and Penal Codes, civil
remedies in the Business and Professions Code and elsewhere, and potential referral for
violations of State Bar ethical standards. UPL cases need not be complex, and often the basic

15
UPL misdemeanor charge is all that is appropriate. However, sound charging decisions call for
consideration of all relevant alternatives.
In considering these alternative charges, the prosecutor should consult as needed with the
special units in the District Attorneys Office which have relevant expertise:
Justice System Integrity Division (213-974-3888) Felony charges against disbarred
or resigned attorneys who continue to practice, or for attorney misconduct more generally;
Consumer Protection Division (213-580-3273) Cases involving unfair and deceptive
business practices, false advertising, and for information or assistance with civil enforcement
tools;
Major Fraud Division (213-580-3200) Cases involving complex and large-scale
fraud offenses.
These divisions stand ready to assist in case evaluation and application of the statutes
referenced in this chapter.
A note of caution is appropriate with regard to the broad concept of practice of law
upon which the crime of UPL is dependent. Although this chapter summarizes the extensive case
law guidance on this term, there is no state statute which comprehensively defines the practice
of law. Most cases will involve clear facts of law practice, but prosecutors should be alert for
issues arising in this regard.

A.

Business and Professions Code section 6125 et seq.: Definition of UPL

and Elements of the Crime
1. UPL Statutory Scheme

The unauthorized practice of law is governed by Business and Professions Code sections
6125-6133. (All following references in this section are to the Business and Professions Code,
unless otherwise specified.) The California Legislature enacted these provisions originally in
1927 as part of the State Bar Act which comprehensively regulated the practice of law in
California. These provisions require licensure to practice law; punish unauthorized practice of
law and related practices; and provide a wide range of potential civil remedies ancillary to an
enforcement case.

16
a. Licensure Required
Section 6125 establishes the basic requirement of licensure to practice law: No person
shall practice law in California unless the person is an active member of the State Bar. (6125.)
The California requirement of licensure to practice law is a valid exercise of the states
police power and serves the legitimate state interest of assuring the competency of those
performing this service. (J.W. v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 958.). The licensure
requirement does not violate First Amendment free speech rights (Howard v. Superior Court
(1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 722), and has survived Equal Protection challenge (People v. Sipper
(1943) 61 Cal.App.2d Supp. 844).
b. Unauthorized Practice or Attempted Practice Prohibited
Section 6126 is the basic charging statute for most UPL crimes. Section 6126(a)
provides, in relevant part:
Any person advertising or holding himself or herself out as
practicing or entitled to practice law or otherwise practicing law
who is not an active member of the State Bar, or otherwise
authorized . . . to practice law in this state at the time of doing so,
is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . (6126(a).)
Misdemeanor violation of section 6126 is punishable by up to one year in county jail or a
fine of up to $1000, or both. However, in a new provision sponsored by the State Bar and this
Office, upon a second or subsequent conviction, the defendant shall be confined in a county jail
for not less than 90 days, except in an usual case where the interests of justice would be served
by a lesser sentence. If the court imposes the lesser sentence, it must state its reasons on the
record. (6126(a).)
A felony charge is available for any person who has been suspended from membership
from the State Bar, or has been disbarred, or has resigned from the State Bar with charges
pending, and thereafter practices or attempts to practice law , or advertises or holds himself or
herself out as entitled to practice law. (See alternate felony/misdemeanor provision of
6126(b).)
c. Other Sanctions for UPL-Related Offenses

17
A felony may also be charged in a case of a willful failure of a State Bar member to
comply with a Supreme Court order under Rule 955 regarding return of documents and legal
fees, notice to clients and opposing counsel, and other matters. (6126(c).) And contempt of
court sanctions are available where a person assumes to be an attorney without authority, or
advertises or holds himself or herself out as entitled to practice law. (6127.) All penalties
under section 6126 are cumulative to each other and any other remedies provided by law.
(6126(d).)
d. Other Remedies for UPL Violations
In an important new development in UPL enforcement, legislation in 2001 (Stats.2001,
c.304 (SB 1194)) added a new section 6126.5, which provides prosecutors a wide range of
additional remedies and penalties available in any enforcement action brought in the name of
the people of the State of California by the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city
attorney, acting as a public prosecutor. In UPL cases where victims purchased services or
goods, or were otherwise harmed, the court is empowered to award as additional relief in the
enforcement action:
(1) Actual damages.
(2) Restitution of all amounts paid.
(3) The amount of penalties and tax liabilities incurred in
connection with the sale or transfer of assets to pay for any goods,
services, or property.
(4) Reasonable attorney's fees and costs expended to rectify errors
made in the unlawful practice of law.
(5) Prejudgment interest at the legal rate from the date of loss to
the date of judgment.
(6) Appropriate equitable relief, including the rescission of sales
made in connection with a violation of law. (6126.5(a).)
The court is to award this relief directly to victims, or if direct restitution is impracticable,
the court may distribute this relief as it chooses pursuant to its equitable powers. (6126.5(b).)
Significantly, prosecutors may also recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs and, in
the court's discretion, exemplary damages as provided in Section 3294 of the Civil Code (the
provision governing such damages in California litigation). (6126.5(c).)

18
Prosecutors should now actively consider these alternative remedies in UPL cases, in
addition to traditional criminal fines and imprisonment. And these new remedies are expressly
cumulative of each other and all other remedies and penalties provided by law. (6126.5(d).)
2. Definition of the Practice of Law
a. Case Law Definition of Practice Law
Successful UPL prosecution under section 6126 requires that the prosecutor prove the
defendant sought to practice law," or advertised or held himself or herself out as entitled to
practice law. (6126(a).) Neither the Business and Professions Code, nor any other California
statute, comprehensively defines the practice of law.
However, the California Supreme Court and courts of appeal have developed a definition
of law practice within the meaning of the State Bar Act, and the Supreme Court has concluded
that this case law definition serves the purpose of . . . definitively establishing, for the
jurisprudence of this state, the meaning of the term practice law. (Birbower, Montalban,
Condo & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 119, 127-128.)
The Supreme Court has determined that the term practice law as used in sections 6125
and 6126 means:
. . . the doing and performing services in a court of justice in any
matter depending therein throughout the various stages and in
conformity with the adopted rules of procedure. It includes legal
advice and counsel and the preparation of legal instruments and
contracts by which the legal rights are secured although such
matter may or may not be depending in a court.
People v. Merchants Protective Corp. (1922) 189 Cal. 543, 535 (emphasis added), cited with
approval in Birbower, Montalban, Condo & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th
119, 127-128. Law practice encompasses legal advice and legal instrument and contract
preparation, whether or not these subjects were rendered in the course of litigation (Birbower,
Montalban, Condo & Frank, P.C., supra, at 128), and the giving of legal advice on a matter not
pending before a court is nonetheless a violation of section 6125 and 6126. (Mickel v. Murphy
(1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 718, 721.)

19
Thus the California Supreme Courts functional definition of law practice, as
developed in Birbower and Merchants Protective Corp., supra, can be summarized as the giving
of legal advice and counsel and the preparation of legal instruments affecting the clients
legal rights. This definition, does not encompass all lawyers professional activities which
could reasonably be included . . . however, the definition does delineate those services which
only licensed attorneys can perform. Baron v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 535, 542543. See also State Bar of California v. Superior Court (1929) 207 Cal. 323, 331; People v. Ring
(1937) 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768, 772-773. (See further discussion of definition of law
practice and policies behind it in Ch. II (The UPL Problem in California).)
Although the Business and Professions Code does not provide a comprehensive statutory
definition of law practice for all purposes, other statutes in the Code provide additional guidance
and may be useful to supplement the broad definition of Merchants and Birbower. Most directly
applicable are the provisions of the Business and Professions Code governing the work of legal
document preparers (sections 6400 et seq.). For the purposes of this regulatory scheme, section
6411(d) provides: The practice of law includes, but is not limited to, giving any kind of advice,
explanation, opinion, or recommendation to a person about that person's possible legal rights,
remedies, defenses, options, selection of forms or strategies.
b. Examples of the Practice of Law
California courts have found the practice of law in circumstances including the following:
Providing legal advice and counsel for clients even when no matters were pending
before a court (People v. Merchants Protective Corp. (1922) 189 Cal.531, 535; Simons v.
Stevenson (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 693);
Preparing a trust deed (People v. Sipper (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d Supp. 844);
Operating an eviction service by providing information to clients concerning eviction
procedures (People v. Landlords Professional Services (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1599);
Providing bankruptcy legal services (In re Anderson (1987) 79 B.R. 482, 485
(paralegal assisting with bankruptcies answered legal questions and assisted in legal decisions,
all of which acts "require the exercise of legal judgement beyond the knowledge and capacity of
the lay person"); In re Kaitangian (1998) 218 B.R. 102, 113 ("bankruptcy petition preparers are
strictly limited to typing bankruptcy forms"); In re Boettcher (2001) 262 B.R. 94 (bankruptcy

20
petition preparer selected appropriate form, later prepared by attorney, but actions still
constituted UPL);
Selection and preparation of marital dissolution documents, and providing
counseling/ drafting services for the public concerning corporate formation, bankruptcy and real
estate (State Bar Ethics Opinions 1983-7, 1983-12);
Selling estate planning services (involving preparation of trusts and wills), and falsely
representing that attorneys would oversee such services and prepare the documents (People v.
Fremont Life Ins. Co., (2002) 104 Cal. App. 4th 508);
Operating a phony legal aid business providing legal advice, violating both the
State Bar Act and the unfair competition law (Brockey v. Moore (2002) 107 Cal. App.4th 86);
Merely holding oneself out as a licensed attorney by a layman or suspended
attorney, even if no actual legal services are rendered (Farnham v. State Bar (1976) 17 Cal.3d
605);
A single act of law practice, even without allegation or proof of a pattern of conduct or
a business practice (People v. Ring (1937) 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768);
Providing legal advice or assistance from out-of-state to a California resident, using
the telephone, fax, computer, or other new technologies (Simons v. Stevenson (2001) 88
Cal.App.4th 693).
c. Examples of Activities Which Are Not the Practice of Law
California courts have found no practice of law, within the meaning of sections 6125 and
6126, in the following circumstances:
Self-representation, as law practice in this context means practice or assistance on
behalf of others and does not affect a persons right to appear and conduct his or her own case
(Gray v. Justice Court of Williams Judicial Township (1937) 18 Cal.App.2d 420);
Giving a client a manual on the preparation of unlawful detainer cases, where
defendant did not personally advise the client with regard to a specific case (People v. Landlords
Professional Services (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1399, review denied);

21
Tasks merely preparatory in nature performed by nonattorneys in a law firm
supervised by an attorney (In re Carlos (Bkrtcy.C.D.Cal.1998) 227 B.R. 535);
Negotiating a tax settlement with the federal government on behalf of a client, where
the issue (whether reserves constituted taxable income) was within the normal purview of an
accountant (Zelkin v. Caruso Discount Corp. (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 802);
The acts of a scrivener filling in the blanks on a form at the direction of a client
(People v. Landlords Professional Services (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1608 (defendants who
"made forms available for the client's use and filed and served those forms as directed by the
client did not practice law); Mickel v. Murphy (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 718; People v. Sipper
(1943) 61 Cal.App.2d Supp. 844).
3. Elements of the Offense
The elements of the offenses of unauthorized practice of law, as prohibited in section
6126, are as follows:
a. Practicing law, or advertising or holding oneself out as practicing law,
without authorization
(Bus. & Prof. Code 6126(a), a misdemeanor)
(1)
A person practiced law, OR advertised or held himself or herself out as
entitled to practice; AND
(2)

That person is not an active member of State Bar or otherwise entitled to

practice law pursuant to statute or court rule.

b. Practicing law while involuntarily enrolled as inactive member

(Bus. & Prof. Code 6126(b), an alternate felony/misdemeanor)
(1)

A person practiced law or attempted to practice law, OR advertised or held

himself out as practicing or otherwise entitled to practice law; AND

(2)
Bar.

That person was involuntarily enrolled as an inactive member of the State

22
c. Practicing law, or advertising and holding oneself out as entitled to
practice law, while disbarred/suspended/resigned with charges pending
(Bus. & Prof. Code 6126(b), an alternate felony/misdemeanor)
(1)

A person practiced law or attempted to practice law, OR advertised or held

himself out as practicing or otherwise entitled to practice law; AND

(2)

That person was suspended from membership from the State Bar, OR was
disbarred, OR had resigned from the State Bar with charges pending.

d. Failing to comply with an order of the Supreme Court under Rule 955
(Bus. & Prof. Code 6126(c), an alternate felony/misdemeanor)

B.

(1)

A person was a member of the State Bar, OR a former member who

has resigned from the State Bar, OR has been disbarred;

(2)

That person failed to comply with an order of the Supreme Court

pursuant to Rule 955; AND;

(3)

The failure to comply with Rule 955 was willful.

Other Statutory Alternatives for Prosecuting UPL

Cases involving unauthorized practice of law, as prohibited by Business and Professions

Code section 6126, may also be appropriate for charges under a number of other statutes. The
following are those statutes most likely to apply to such facts, but other statutes may also apply
in particular circumstances, and thus this list is not exhaustive.
1. Grand Theft by False Pretenses (Pen. Code 484/487)
a. Provisions and Applicability to UPL
Many factual situations involving unauthorized practice of law can also be charged as
grand theft under Californias unified theft statute, Penal Code sections 484(a) and 487. Often
the use of Penal Code sections 484/487 is the most appropriate means of charging a felony in
these cases, as UPL by a non-attorney is a misdemeanor. But note that it is generally also
appropriate to charge a parallel misdemeanor under Business and Professions Code section 6126,

23
in light of the newly added provision of Bus. & Prof. Code section 6126(a) which, effective
January 1, 2003, requires a minimum county jail sentences of 90 days for repeat offenders.
The essential elements of grand theft by false pretenses (the theft theory most likely to be
applicable) include a misrepresentation of a past or existing fact, made with the intent to defraud
and to permanently deprive the victim, which statement is relied upon by the victim, who parts
with money or property in excess of $400.
Many UPL cases involve misrepresentations of fact by the UPL suspect which statements
can readily meet the required elements of the grand theft offense. Examples of these
misrepresentations include:
the knowing misrepresentation that the UPL suspect is in fact a lawyer when the suspect
is not (or is not now) qualified or entitled to practice law;
the knowing misrepresentation that the UPL suspect is able lawfully to handle all
aspects of the victims case including court appearances;
false claims of special influence with the INS in an immigration context, or similar
claims that a potential immigration strategy (such as political asylum) is available or has worked
previously.
b. Elements of the Offense
Grand theft by false pretenses
(Penal Code sections 484(a) and 487a, a felony)
(1)

A person made or caused to made a promise without intent to

perform it, OR a false pretense or representation of a past or
existing fact known to be false or made recklessly;

(2)

The person made the pretense, representation or promise with

the specific intent to defraud;

(3)

The pretense, representation or promise was believed and relied

upon by the victim and was material in inducing the victim to
part with money or property; AND

24
(4)

The theft was accomplished in that the victim parted with his or
her money or property intending to transfer ownership thereof.

(See CALJIC 14.10.)

2. Illegal Practice of Business (Bus. & Prof. Code 16240)
a. Provisions and Applicability to UPL
Because the practice of law requires a license in California, individuals who wrongly
hold themselves out as lawyers are also subject to prosecution under Business and Profession
Code section 16240. This misdemeanor statute does not depend on the definition of what
constitutes the practice of law. Instead, mere holding oneself out while not actually having a
valid certificate is a completed misdemeanor violation.
Section 16240 provides that every person who practices, offers to practice, or advertises
any business, trade, profession, occupation, or calling, or who uses any title, sign, initials, card,
or device to indicate that he or she is qualified to practice any business, trade, profession,
occupation, or calling for which a license, registration, or certificate is required by any law of
this state, without holding a current and valid license, registration, or certificate as prescribed by
law is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000, or six months in
county jail, or both (see Penal Code 19).
b. Elements of the Offense
Illegally practicing or offering to practice a business without a
required business license
(Bus. & Prof. Code 16240, a misdemeanor)
(1)

A person practiced, OR offered to practice, OR advertised any business,

trade, profession, occupation, or calling, or who used any title, sign,
initials, card, or device to indicate that he was qualified to practice any
business, trade, profession, occupation, or calling;

(2)
That business, trade, profession, occupation or calling is one which a
license, registration, or certificate is required by law; AND

25
(3)
That person did not hold the requisite current and valid license,
registration, or certificate.

3. Immigration Consultants Act (Bus. & Prof. Code 22400 et seq.)

a. Provisions and Applicability to UPL
The single most common form of unauthorized practice of law in California today
involves the activities of immigration consultants or others seeking to assist recent immigrants to
this country with their legal status. Thus activities constituting UPL often raise issues of
potential violations of the Immigration Consultants Act (ICA), found in Bus. and Prof. Code
22440-22448), which governs the activities of immigration consultants in California.
Originally enacted in 1986, the Immigration Consultants Act recognized a new class of
service providers called immigration consultants who were to provide assistance to the
millions of persons who sought to take advantage of the Federal governments sweeping
amnesty program then briefly in existence.
Under the ICA an immigration consultant is defined as a person who gives nonlegal
assistance or advice on any immigration matters. (22441.) The ICA specifically limits the
scope of work for immigration consultants solely to non-legal matters. Assistance is confined to
helping persons complete INS forms, translating their answers to questions on the forms,
submitting completed forms to the INS, and making referrals to those who are qualified to
perform legal tasks. (Id.) The ICA specifically prohibits immigration consultants from practicing
law, and even from advising persons concerning their answers on the INS forms. (22440(a).)
The ICA imposes a number of specified obligations on immigration consultants. An
immigration consultant is required to conspicuously display a notice in English and in the native
language of his clients, which notice includes the consultants name, address, proof of bond with
its number, and a statement that the consultant is not an attorney. (22442.2.)
The consultant must have a written contract in English and in the clients native language
specifying the services the consultant will perform, describing fees to be charged, and providing
notification that the client can rescind the contract within 72 hours of signing. (22442.) The
consultants contract must state clearly and conspicuously that the immigration consultant is not

26
an attorney. (22442.2.)
Immigration consultants are required to obtain and maintain a $50,000 bond which may
be access by clients in cases of wrongdoing (22443.1). The consultants must keep copies of
client documentation and forms for at least 3 years (22443(b)), but are prohibited from retaining
original documents belonging to the client. (22443(c).)
An immigration consultant cannot translate documents or advertisements in
a way that misleads the client or implies to the client that he is are an attorney. (22442.)
The ICA has been strengthened through legislative amendment numerous times in recent
years, often at the initiation of this Office. Misdemeanor criminal sanctions are now imposed for
the following violations:
Failure to provide a client with a written contract (22442(a));
Failure to conspicuously display in the office adequate notice, in the language of the
consultants clients, providing phone and address, that the consultant has a bond, the bond
number, and that the consultant is not an attorney (22442.2);
Intentionally translating from English into another language word(s) that imply the
consultant is an attorney in any document describing the consultant (22442.3);
Failure to notify the California Secretary of State within 30 days of a change of name,
address, phone number, etc. (22442.4);
Failure to obtain and maintain a $50,000 bond accessible for victims of misconduct
(22443.1); and
Failure to provide a disclosure statement in all advertising that the immigration
consultant is not an attorney (22442.2).
Criminal sanctions and civil remedies under the ICA. First violations of most of the
ICAs misdemeanor provisions are punishable by a fine of between $2,000 and $10,000 as to
each client-victim, or county jail of up to one year, or both (although victim restitution takes
precedence over these fines). (22445(b).) The posting and notification provisions of the ICA
are punishable as misdemeanors only for the second and subsequent offenses. (22445(c).)

27
Second and subsequent offenses other the posting and notification offenses are punishable as
felonies. (22445(c) (Certain practices prohibited by the ICA are characterized only as
unlawful, and do not appear to have criminal sanctions (see, e.g., misrepresentations regarding
special influence with the INS, 22444). These practices would, however, trigger civil remedies
under the Unfair Competition Law, infra.)
The ICA also provides substantial civil remedies. Civil lawsuits may be brought by any
person injured by violations under the Act, and a civil penalty of up to $100,000 may be imposed
for each violation. (22445). Victims may also seek injunctive relief or damages, or both. A
court may award actual damages, treble damages, and reasonable attorneys fees and costs.
(22446.5) Prosecutors should be alert for circumstances where these remedial alternatives are
applicable, as these alternatives may be of special value for victims in cases where criminal
prosecution is not viable or appropriate.
b. Elements of the Offense
The elements of the numerous distinct misdemeanor offenses of the Immigration
Consultants Act are provided in the sample jury instructions in chapter VII (Models and
Forms).
4. False or Misleading Statements in an Immigration Matter (Penal Code 653.55)
a. Provisions and Applicability to UPL
Unscrupulous immigration consultants often file unnecessary INS paperwork and charge
their clients knowing these papers are improper and cannot yield the promised results. Obtaining
money based on misleading promises of this kind such as filing asylum papers for a victim
from a country not eligible for asylum status can also be addressed by charging a violation of
recently enacted Penal Code section 653.55. This misdemeanor statute should prove to be a
useful additional tool to punish misleading material statements made in connection with
immigration assistance.
Section 653.55 generally prohibits the making of false or misleading material statements
detrimentally relied upon by those seeking assistance with immigration matters. Specifically the
new law provides:
It is a misdemeanor for any person for compensation to knowingly make a
false or misleading material statement or assertion of fact in the

28
preparation of an immigration matter which statement or assertion is
detrimentally relied upon by another.
Violation of section 653.55 is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding six months, or by a fine not exceeding $2,500, or both.
b. Elements of the Offense
False or misleading statements in an immigration matter
(Penal Code 653.55, a misdemeanor)
(1)

A person made a false or misleading statement or assertion in the

preparation of an immigration matter;

(2)

That person received compensation for the services performed in

the preparation of the immigration matter;

(2).

That person knew the statement or assertion was false or

misleading; AND

(3)
The false or misleading statement was detrimentally relied upon by
another.
5. False Advertising (Bus. and Prof. Code 17500 et seq.)
a. Provisions and Applicability to UPL
Any non-attorney, or attorney no longer entitled to practice law, who advertises or holds
himself or herself out as a lawyer or as practicing law violates Californias false advertising
statute, Business and Professions Code section 17500. This section provides, in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association, or any employee
thereof, with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property or
to perform services...to make or disseminate...any statement which is untrue or
misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care
should be known, to be untrue or misleading.

29
Any non-attorney or former representing in any manner that he/she is a lawyer, on
business cards, stationary, signs, billboards, or in advertisements, including those in telephone
books, is violating the false advertising law. Section 17500 is governed by the capacity to
deceive legal standard, meaning that there is a violation of law if the advertisement or statement
has a tendency or capacity to deceive or confuse the public. (Committee on Childrens Television
v. General Foods (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank (1979) 23
Cal.3d 442, Chern v. Bank of America (1976) 15 Cal.3d 866, 876.) It is necessary only to show
that members of the public are likely to be deceived. Committee on Childrens Television,
supra, at 211. It is not necessary to prove intent to defraud, reliance, or actual injury in such
cases (id.), greatly reducing the prosecutors proof burden in contrast to most other fraud
offenses. And industry customs or practices are not a defense to a false advertising allegation,
rendering ineffective the common defense that no one is deceived because everyone says this
in the particular industry. (People v. Cappuccio (1988) 204 Cal. App. 3d 750.)
The untrue or misleading statements under section 17500 can take the form of affirmative
misrepresentations or indirect deception by statements or inferences which omit material facts
necessary to avoid misleading the consumer. For instance, appropriating the symbol for scales
of justice, or use of the statement Law Offices, on business cards, without any further
clarification about whether anyone employed in the business is in fact a licensed attorney, may
convey the impression that a licensed attorney works in that office. The California Supreme
Court has declared: [w]here, in the absence of an affirmative disclosure, consumers are likely to
assume something which is not in fact true, the failure to disclose the true state of affairs can be
misleading and thereby a violation of law. (Ford Motor Dealers Association v. DMV (1982) 32
Cal.3d 347, 363-364). If the overall impression of the words, pictures or format of an
advertisement has the capacity to deceive, the advertisement violates section 17500, as well as its
companion statute, the Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions Code section 17200,
detailed below (see Committee on Childrens Television, supra).
Knowledge element for criminal violations. Section 17500 requires that the
misrepresentation be one "which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be
known to be untrue or misleading." This provision requires some proof of mens rea, and thus
"[t]his section proscribing...misleading statements does not impose strict criminal liability."
People v. Regan (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1. However, the legal standard of know or
should have known is substantially less burdensome for prosecutors than a minimum
requirement of actual knowledge.
Even in the misdemeanor context, the acts of employees can visit liability on corporation,

30
although for individual defendants to incur liability, some evidence of individual participation or
knowledge of the subordinates' acts is required. (People v. Toomey (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1,
15.) (In this context, the prosecutor should also consider also the possible allegation of
conspiracy to misrepresent, see, e.g, People v. Bestline (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 879, 918.)
However, the defense claim that a violation involved only "low level" employees was held
meritless in Dollar Rent-A-Car, supra. And the owner/president of car dealership was held
criminally liable for misrepresentations by salesmen in People v. Conway (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d
875. Thus businesses or corporations engaged in UPL activities -- and their operators or
principals -- may be subject to false advertising liability, including potential criminal sanctions,
if their employees or staff misrepresent the nature of their work or their entitlement to practice
law.
b. Criminal Sanctions and Civil Remedies for False Advertising
False advertising is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine up to $2500 and by up to six
months in county jail.
The civil remedies under section 17500 (and the Unfair Competition Law) are potent, and
may be even more effective than criminal sanctions in certain contexts. Section 17536 provides
for:
Civil penalties of up to $2500 "per violation" are available, but only to public
agencies. A "per victim" test is applied, permitting substantial aggregation of penalties. Under
Sec. 17534.5, penalties are cumulative of all penalties and remedies of other laws. (Toomey,
supra, at 22). Six factors are used in assessing penalties. (17536.)
Injunctive relief, including permanent injunctions entailing both prohibitory and
mandatory injunctive terms (17535),
Restitution for any money or property taken by means of false advertising (see
Children's Television, supra, 35 Cal.3d at 215), but damages other than restitution may not be
recovered, Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254.
Costs for specified public agencies may be recovered under section 17536.
c. Elements of the Offense

31
False advertising
(Business and Professions Code section 17500, a misdemeanor)
(1)

A person made an untrue or misleading statement;

(2)

The statement was made in connection with the sale or lease

of goods or services;

(3)

The statement was made in circumstances where the suspect

knew or should have known that the statement was untrue
or misleading.

Consultation with the Consumer Protection Division (213-580-3273) may be appropriate

when considering a criminal false advertising charge, and is required before proceeding with a
civil false advertising case.
6. Unfair Competition (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq.)
a. Provisions and Applicability to UPL
A non-attorney or a former attorney who practices law or advertises or holds himself or
herself out as entitled to do so violates Californias broad-scale Unfair Competition Law (UCL),
Business and Professions Code section 17200. Although not a criminal statute, the UCL
provides powerful civil remedies (including permanent injunctions, restitution, and large civil
penalties) and is thus a useful adjunct or alternative form of enforcement in particular business
circumstances.
Section 17200 prohibits unfair competition, defined as an unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice, and any unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.
(17200.) (See generally Barquis v. Merchant Collection Association (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 113;
People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626; Saunders v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 832,
839.) By its specific terms, the UCL is also triggered by any act violating Californias false
advertising law, Business and Professions Code section 17500, described above.
Of particular relevance here is the UCLs prohibition against unlawful business
practices. The California Supreme Court has held that this provision applies to anything that
can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law. (People
v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626, 632; Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94,

32
111-112.) Thus, a criminal violation of Business and Professions Code sections 6125 and 6126
will generally also trigger civil liability under section 17200 as it is both a business activity and it
is proscribed by law. The only defense to an allegation of an unlawful business act or practice
based upon a violation of another law is that the underlying law was not violated (Hobby
Industry Assn. Of America. Inc. v. Younger (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 358, 372). With specific
reference to UPL, the California court of appeals has recently held that misrepresentations
regarding entitlement to practice law and the improper legal activities of non-lawyers violate
section 17200. (People v. Fremont Life Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal. App. 4th 508 (permanent
injunction and $2.5 million in civil penalties and restitution upheld in living trusts case).)
By its own language, section 17200 includes any act which violates the false advertising
laws defined in section 17500 and discussed above. Thus, both violations of the unfair
competition statute and the false advertising statute trigger exposure to legal remedies that
include substantial civil penalties, costs, and injunctive relief.
b. Civil Remedies for Unfair Competition
The Unfair Competition Law provides only civil remedies for unlawful, unfair, or
fraudulent business acts or practices, but these remedies are potent. Like the false advertising
statute, Business and Professions Code section 17200 provides for:
Civil penalties of up to $2500 "per violation" are available for public agency
enforcement actions. (17206.) A "per victim" test is applied, permitting substantial aggregation
of penalties. Under Sec. 17205, penalties are cumulative of all penalties and remedies of other
laws. (Toomey, supra, at 22). Six factors are used in assessing penalties. (17206.) Civil
penalties under these statutes are mandatory, in an amount determined by the court, once a
violation of the statute has been established in a public enforcement action. (People v. National
Association of Realtors (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 578.). The civil penalties of sections 17500 and
17200 are cumulative.
Injunctive relief (17203) including permanent injunctions entailing both prohibitory
and mandatory injunctive terms,
Restitution for any money or property taken by means of false advertising (see
Children's Television, supra, 35 Cal.3d at 215), but damages other than restitution may not be
recovered, Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254.

33
Costs for specified public agencies may be recovered under section (17206.)
Consultation with the Consumer Protection Division (213-580-3273) is required before
proceeding with a civil unfair competition action, and most such cases will be referred to CPD
for investigation and litigation.
7. State Bar Ethical Standards and Related Rules and Statutes
State Bar ethical rules and related California Rules of Court and statutes also establish
ethical and legal prohibitions applicable to the unauthorized practice of law. Although local
prosecutors do not enforce most of these prohibitions directly, facts revealed in UPL
investigations may often call for appropriate referral of findings to the State Bar disciplinary
system. In addition, certain provisions of the Business and Professions Code carry criminal
sanctions for attorney and non-attorney conduct violating California norms of professional
practice.
The full range of these standards is beyond the scope of this manual, but a selected few of
these applicable standards include:
Improper fee sharing between attorneys and non-lawyers (see, e.g.,
Professional Conduct 1-320: Financial Arrangements with Non-Lawyers);

Rules of

Standards governing the conduct of legal service programs utilizing non-attorney

personnel (Rules of Professional Conduct 1-600: Legal Service Programs);
Business and Professions Code sections 6151-6152 prohibiting acting as a runner or
capper soliciting or procuring business for an attorney, including paralegals acting in that illegal
capacity as prohibited by Business and Professions Code section 6450(b).
Cal Rules of Court, Rule 955, which imposes duties on disbarred, resigned, or
suspended attorneys, including: notification of clients; return of client papers and property; and
notices to opposing counsel. (Sanctions include contempt of court and criminal sanctions, see
Bus. & Prof. Code 6126(c), supra.)