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Civil-military relations in Pakistan

Each actor, in a given context, tends to maximise its political and


economic interests, and strives to assume the principal position in the
civil-military relations matrix of Pakistan
There is an abundance of literature on civil-military relations in general and
military intervention in particular. The majority of existing works, in my view,
are society-oriented whereby the military is not viewed as a different institution.
Rather, it is assumed as part and parcel of a given society. Hence, it is not
considered immune from the sociology and psychology of a society. Huntington,
Finer, Janowitz and recently Rebecca Schiff have extensively highlighted the
sociological side of the militaries of Asia, Africa and Latin America the
regions with comparatively interventionist militaries. Quite contrary to the
foregoing, a student of Huntington, Peter Feaver, questioned the earlier
perspectives both empirically and theoretically. Feaver argued that concepts
such as cultural values of a society and professionalism cannot explain the
phenomenon and practice of the coup dtat completely. In certain cases, even
professional and culturally homogenous militaries have staged coups against the
same society.To explain this puzzle, Feaver proposed an agency theory of civilmilitary relations. The agency here does not mean an intelligence agency such
as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) or Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Rather, in purely ontological terms, agency points to someones inherent ability
to make things happen. In other words, in a given context, if A is able to make
his or her preference prevail over B or C or both this very fact points to As
agency. Importantly, agency theory is grounded in another important theory of
social sciences: rational choice. This marriage with rational choice makes
agency theory more explanatory since it also assumes actors and stakeholders
to be both agentive and rational (in a cost-benefit analysis). Feaver, in the view
of this writer, has applied his agency model to the USs case quite convincingly.
Owing to empirical dissimilarities with the USs case, this writer has modified
and applied agency theory to the case of Pakistan during his doctoral research.
In so doing, four actors are assumed in the Pakistan case, namely, politicians,
civil bureaucracy, judiciary and the military. These actors interact with each
other both strategically and rationally. Each actor, in a given context, tends to
maximise its political and economic interests, and strives to assume the
principal position in the civil-military relations matrix of Pakistan. At partition,
the politicians led by Jinnah and Liaquat assumed the principal-ship of
Pakistans politics and the state constitutionally, legally, politically and morally.
The three remaining actors acted as agents. Nevertheless, the civil
bureaucracys preference prevailed post-Liaquat Ali Khans assassination and it
ruled Pakistan as the principal actor till October 1958. The military and the
judiciary, for that matter, worked as agents. From the agency perspective, the
military rationally and strategically allied with the bureaucracy to accrue
strategic and economic benefits, i.e. US aid. Because that was a structural
continuation of military rule, there was no need to stage coups. Paradoxically,
however, the 1958 martial law was technically declared by Iskander Mirza

though in strategic interaction with the Ayub-led military. Since Mirza wanted to
maximise his and his parent institutions interests, he was packed off. From late
October 1958, the military, for the first time in Pakistans political history, acted
as the principal. Interestingly, a section of bureaucrats, politicians and judiciary
allied with the military rationally. Each saw to its own interests rather than the
larger interests of Pakistan. Ayub Khan had to resign in the context of agitation
politics since the cost of confrontation was deemed high. Yahya Khan staged the
second coup to deal with the agitators. However, measuring the cost, he
announced democratisation. It worked since populist politicians left no time in
starting to participate in electoral politics. Unfortunately, the politicians and the
militarys preference could not converge post-elections and Pakistan was
partitioned. Importantly, however, the military could not continue as the
principal due largely to demoralisation and (internal) criticism. Contextually, the
Bhutto-led politicians acted as civilian principal. This change also reflects the
non-structural nature of civil-military relations. Had the military been
structurally (sociologically) embedded in Pakistans state and society, it would
have continued as the dominant force. Interestingly, Bhutto affected the
organisational makeup of the civil bureaucracy, judiciary and, importantly, the
military.Before Bhutto could achieve his vision fully, his government was
dismissed as a result of the third coup staged by the Zia-led military. Here, it is
useful to note the anti-military measures adopted by Bhutto, showing that if
and when the militarys institution is affected, there is a strong probability of a
backlash in terms of a coup. However, the coups timing was decided by the
military itself, contextually and rationally. Interestingly, a section of politicians,
the judiciary and bureaucracy chose to side with the new principal. From 1977
till now, the military has been the principal actor in the politics and the state of
Pakistan. The 1999 and 2007 coups were staged to teach agents a lesson since
they attempted to question and challenge the militarys principal-ship. Could
there be a sixth coup? Given the most recent divergence of choice between the
military led by General Raheel Sharif and Nawaz Sharif-led politicians, there is
less likelihood of a coup since Sharif (and others) seemed to have learned from
the 1999 episode. Also, there seems to be a strategic understanding between
politicians, the judiciary and the military over the Musharraf affair. In this case,
the militarys presence in domestic and foreign policy is constrained and, in case
the military does not revisit its stay-as-principal policy, there is then a strong
probability of a sixth coup. Contextually then, a section of politicians and the
bureaucracy, if not the judiciary, is expected to side with the military and
maximise politically and economically.

Civil-Military relations
A lack of sociological imagination and the consequent disconnect from reality and
clarity cause confusion and crises. The debate regarding civil-military relations
appears to be an effort to deliberately create an environment of conflict to malign
the defence forces and intelligence agencies of Pakistan to the extent of
harassment and embarrassment. There is need for new attitudes about our
national security issues; to understand and tackle the external and internal forces
trying to destabilize Pakistan.
Zulam rahe aur aman bi ho
Kya mumkin hai
Tum he kaho
Can peace and tyranny co-exist is the question; a question which may be put to
the sponsors of Aman ki Asha which stands neither for peace nor any such
wish. This fact, our simple people do not understand.
The rule of the situation has always been the guiding principle in politics and
administration. When I wrote, Let democracy succeed (The Nation, June 5,
2008), it was another time, another place. Todays trivialism, confusion and
tension is different. Former Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Aslam Beg has succinctly
reflected on the current scenario, presented a solution and arrived at some
conclusions with which we may or may not agree. However, our consideration
should be to establish an environment that is stress free for a way forward within
the democratic political structure.
General Aslam Beg has proposed a three-point formula to normalize tense civilmilitary relations: 1) the high treason case against Gen. Pervez Musharraf should
be dropped and he should be allowed to go abroad; 2) PEMRA should ensure
that no TV channel telecasts programmes that undermine the prestige of the
army; and 3) ministers or other leaders should be barred from speaking against
the people who defend the country even at the cost of their lives. The General
was of the firm view that the Constitution would not be able to block a military
intervention if the rulers did not give the army its due respect.
The army is the defender of our geographical and ideological frontiers. People
truly respect the army for its vital role in nation building and providing essential
support to civilian administration in disaster and crisis management, and boosting

the economy. The same is expected of the media and other institutions.
What a country needs has to be viewed in the context of a realistic and objective
framework. Some people, although not affected in any significant way, complain
of emptiness, of the insipidity in life because the country is ruled by the military.
They complain the morning news sours their breakfast and their whole day. But
what exactly are these people contributing to the establishment of a meaningful
constitutional democratic order? Perhaps its just fashionable to say these things
in passing.
The country was exposed to serious internal threats, including the challenge of
coping with the needs of its rapidly increasing population, human resource
development, economic performance, alleviating poverty, addressing and
reviewing civil-military relations, governance and, above all, extremism.
There are pitfalls in civil as well as military ways of handling issues and solving
problems. The problem with military rule is that civilian institutions cannot retain
and maintain their democratic character. The missing link is thus the element of
consensus on policies through negotiation. The military becomes part of the
problem rather than the part of the solution. Moreover, in military rule people lose
confidence in the institutions which ultimately affects their performance
negatively.
There is a crisis of governance and absence of democracy within political parties.
Issues of national integration are critical to Pakistans democratic development.
The development of the political processes is constrained by the legacy of long
periods of military rule. Religious intolerance and sectarian divide presents a
challenge. Other challenges to the civil society include lack of political will; the
moral vacuum that exists in public administration; and fast deteriorating human
rights and the law and order situation. We need an enabling culture to meet the
challenges of change and to create opportunities for the welfare of the people.
Things have to move beyond political expediency.
The civil-military relations in Pakistan are difficult. Disgruntled politicians are
partly responsible for inviting the army to take over the government and
frequently repeat the episode. Each branch of the government should develop
independently in terms of its professional excellence, yet they should all perform
jointly for achieving national goals, working collectively under a system of checks
and balances and responding to the call of transparency and accountability. It is
time that the Pakistan armyfocus all its energies on developing professional
competencies and excellence rather than indulge in politics. This is the time to

rethink civil-military relations. This is the time to remove misperceptions and


avoid prejudices. This is the time for politicians of all shades to demonstrate a
higher sense of responsibility. This is the time to empower the people so that
they can preside over their own destiny.
Strengthening civil-military relations will be desired and required for a meaningful
counter-terrorism cooperation aimed at bringing peace and stability to the
country. This assumes special significance in the context of the Post 2014
situation in Afghanistan in which Pakistan will have a key role to play.

Civil-military relations in Pakistan- History repeats itself?

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It is time for Nawaz Sharif to revisit his earlier stints in power for obvious reasons

A supporter of Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) stands with a pro-military sign near a graffiti during a
rally in support of the Pakistan Army in Karachi

TS Eliot had termed April as the cruellest month in his famous poem The Waste Land. The
incumbent government experienced the travails of April, as it appeared to be rudderless and defensive.
Not surprisingly, a key challenge for Sharif administration has been the management of relations with
the powerful military. Media reports, at times, have overplayed the tensions between the two powercentres. On other occasions, there has been a sense of dj vu: Even the third chance to exercise and
enjoy power for Nawaz Sharif and his party loyalists has been far from smooth.

The Musharraf case seems to have become a liability for PM Sharif and his government. It takes no
rocket science to conclude that the military and its ranks are not too delighted with their former chief
facing charges of treason. The PMLN government remains committed to upholding constitutional
governance but its selective view of accountability is worrisome. Gen Musharrafs trial as a sole offender
gives the impression of a person-specific application of law. Unless the abettors of extra constitutional
acts are not questioned, fair application of law cannot be achieved. This becomes even more
problematic when some of the Musharraf associates are found sitting in the cabinet or government
benches in the National Assembly.

A few weeks ago, some of the over-zealous ministers opined on the role of the military and passed a few
unsavoury remarks about the Musharraf, which led to the furore in the media. Not unexpectedly, the
media remained divided and there was a robust debate on civil-military relations. However, it did not
make much sense to relay old speeches of the present Defence Minister to prove how unpatroitic
PMLNs cabinet was. This led to the need for the federal government to manage the brewing crisis.
Statements of allegiance to the military were immediately issued by all concerned; and an impression
was given that relations had returned to normal.

Within days of this saga, the assassination attempt on Hamid Mir on April 19; and the subsequent
accusations of Mirs family and GEO network on the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) revived the stories on

civil-military discord. The government apparently was silent and the statement of Information Minister
came out strongly in favour of free speech and daleel (arguments). The flashing of DG ISIs picture by
GEO TV as the alleged mastermind of the attack on Mir set a dangerous precedent. Without preliminary
investigation, many opined, the channel had undermined journalistic standards. For the past two weeks,
GEO TV has faced a ruthless campaign on electronic and social media branding it as a traitor and is now
facing formal proceedings for its closure.

The rise of electronic media as a power-broker has been noted for years now. Pakistans media industry
tasted its newfound power when it ran a vigorous campaign to oust Gen Musharraf in 2007-2008.
However, in the current crisis, it seems that the effort to mount pressure on the ISI backfired and
effectively swung the public opinion in favour of the military.

It is often forgotten that the military continues to have a popular base in the Punjab province and parts
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In Karachi, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) also aligns itself with the
military and its partnership with Gen Musharraf is all too known. Most notably, the rival media houses
drummed up the anti-GEO campaign and did not refrain from accusing the Prime Minister and his
government to be covertly backing GEOs tirade against the ISI and the military by extension. It is
interesting to note the popular perception holds the ISI as a veritable arm of the military contrary to the
legal position whereby the PM heads the institution.

Sharif completes a year in office next month. The tensions with the military are not a good omen. Unlike
his past two tenures where these differences took longer to surface, this time it has been sooner than
expected. The new army chief only assumed office in November 2013. The popular, not necessarily
accurate, perception in Pakistan is that the civilian and military leadership are not on the same page.

Across the country, there have been protests against the conduct of GEO TV. Sadly, some of the banned
or questionable outfits have also participated in these processions. While supporting the military, the
protestors have also lambasted the government of backing the anti-Army campaign. In response,
nearly every Minister has sworn allegiance to the military. Even the strong-willed Defence Minister has
forwarded the ISIs complaint against GEO to the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority
(PEMRA). Appeasement is underway but some damage may have been done.

Taking advantage of this emerging situation, the leader of Pakistan Tehreek e Insaf (PTI) and the antisystem Dr Tahir ul Qadri have announced agitation against the government from May 11. Surely this is
no coincidence as the support of Imran Khans PTI to #BanGeo campaign mirrors the efforts of pro-Army
quarters in achieving the twofold objective: building public opinion in favour of the military and
undermining the effort of civilian PM to assert his constitutional power. The protest of Imran Khan is

ostensibly against the rigging in 2013 elections. By all standards, this is way too delayed and is a clear
effort to attack the legitimacy of Sharif government and the Parliament.

It is too early to predict the outcome of these developments. Notwithstanding their capacity, the armed
forces are not in a position to launch a coup even if they wanted to. Pakistans internal security situation
and the endgame in Afghanistan prevent that to happen. Further, the courts are not likely to endorse a
military rule. The other option is to pressurize the government to hold mid-term elections. In this case,
PMLN is likely to return to power. So the plausible outcome of the ongoing efforts is to mount pressure
on Nawaz Sharif and keep him busy in dealing with political unrest so that he can forget his mission of
attaining civilian supremacy. At least for now.

The unfortunate, avoidable set of crises is partly the making of the government itself. Before taking on
the military, it is essential that the civilian capacities to lead on foreign and security policies are
augmented. The cabinet has approved the security policy but it needs to strengthen National Counter
Terrorism Authority (NACTA), the secretariat Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS); and
related parliamentary committees. The signature style of running the country through a kitchen cabinet
comprising favourites, clan and/or family members also needs to change. This is not how civilian
power can assert itself. Resetting civil-military imbalance is a long term project and can only happen
through negotiated transactions with military leadership, informed decision making through improved
institutions such as NACTA and CCNS; and evolving a multi-party consensus on the key issues. Instead of
issuing gung-ho statements, it might help to restructure the way federal government works and launch
the much needed civil service reform. It is time for Nawaz Sharif to revisit his earlier stints in power for
obvious reasons

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