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CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)

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FRANCISCO VS. PP (ANTI-FENCING LAW)


FACTS: Pacita Linghon was the helper of Jovita Rodriguez.
Pacita, through her brother Macario, sold to petitioner
Ernesto Francisco several pieces of jewelry stolen from
Rodriguez. The RTC found petitioner guilty of violating PD
1612.
The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. He
avers that the prosecution failed to prove that Pacita stole
the jewelry, and that the same was sold to him by Macario.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is guilty of violating PD 1612
HELD: No. One of the elements of fencing is that the accused
knew or should have known that the item was stolen. In the
case at bar, there was an absence of evidence as to the
knowledge of the accused regarding the item. Because of
this, the proof that was left was Macario's testimony.
However, Macario's testimony was not sufficient in proving
that Francisco knew that the jewelries were stolen.
DIMAT V. PEOPLE (2012) ANTI FENCING LAW
FACTS:
Sonia Delgado, wife of herein respondent, brought a Nissan
Safari from Mel Dimat. Spouses Delgado where driving along
E. Rodriguez Ave. when they were apprehended by the
Traffic Management Group(TMG), afterwards they found
out that the vehicle was a stolen property. Mantequilla, the
registered owner of the vehicle, filed charges against Mel
Dimat for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. On his defense
he claims that he did not know Mantequilla, and that he
bought it in good faith for value. The RTC found him to guilty
and which the CA affirms with modification.

PP V. DUNLAO (ANTI-FENCING LAW)


FACTS:
Petitioner Ernestino P. Dunlao, Sr. is accused of
violating Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as
the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer
and wholesaler of scrap iron in Davao City using the business
name Dunlao Enterprise.
On October 25, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m. Fortunato
Mariquit and Carlito Catog, both employees of Lourdes
Farms, were instructed by its proprietor, Mrs. Lourdes Du, to
go to petitioners premises together with police officers Pfc.
Epifanio Sesaldo and Pat. Alfredo Ancajas to verify
information received that some farrowing crates and G.I.
pipes stolen from Lourdes Farms were to be found thereat.
Upon arrival at petitioners compound, the group
saw the farrowing crates and pipes inside the
compound. They also found assorted lengths of G.I. pipes
inside a cabinet in petitioners shop and another pile outside
the shop but within the compound.
After he was informed by the police operatives that
said pipes were owned by Lourdes Farms and had been
stolen from it, petitioner voluntarily surrendered the
items. These were then taken to the police station.
On February 16, 1987, Criminal Case No. 14655 was
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao city, Branch 9,
accusing petitioner of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
On March 13, 1987, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded
NOT GUILTY. RTC rendered judgment holding petitioner
guilty. Petitioner appealed to CA, which affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Dimat guilty of fencing.

ISSUE:

RULING:

Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish the fact


that, in receiving and possessing the subject items, he was
motivated by gain or that he purchased the said articles.

Yes. The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has


been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article or object taken during that
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have
known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he
intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for
another.
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn
Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as
collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the
old certificate of registration and official receipt of the
vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of
registration and official receipt already in his name. But
Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that
Tolentinos failure to deliver the documents should not
prejudice him in any way. Delgado himself could not
produce any certificate of registration or official receipt.
Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan
Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said that
Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and
official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because,
the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no
documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make
good on his promise to produce new documents
undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came
from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia
Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers
covering her purchase. That she might herself be liable for
fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused in
the case.

HELD:
No, thus, he is guilty of violating the anti-fencing law.
Under Presidential Decree 1612, fencing is the act
of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal,
sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
There is no question that the farrowing crates and
assorted lengths of G.I. pipes were found in the premises of
petitioner. The positive identification by Fortunato
Mariquit, an employee of Lourdes Farms, Inc., that these
items were previously owned by it gave rise to a
presumption of fencing under the law:
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any
good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has
been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing.
In the instant case, did petitioner Ernestino Dunlao
succeed in rebutting this presumption?
We hold in the negative.
First of all, contrary to petitioners contention,
intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a
special law such as P.D. 1612.

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The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in


themselves called acts mala in se, and acts which would
not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them,
called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important
with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is
done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the
intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is,
has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent
of the offender is immaterial. Secondly, the law does not
require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by petitioner,
as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a
presumption of fencing.
It was incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow this
presumption by sufficient and convincing evidence but he
failed to do so. All petitioner could offer, by way of rebuttal,
was a mere denial and his incredible testimony that a person
aboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in front of his
establishment and left them there. The Court notes that the
stolen articles were found displayed on petitioners shelves
inside his compound. If petitioner were merely keeping the
farrowing crates and G.I. pipes for the men aboard the jeep,
why did he display them? When a storeowner displays
articles, it is assumed that he is doing so with the intention
of selling them.
Furthermore, the Court finds it strange that petitioner did
not even bother to ascertain the identity of the person or
persons who deposited the articles with him. Petitioner
should pay Lourdes Farms, Inc. represented by its owner
Mrs. Lourdes Du, the sum of P20,000.00 minus the value of
the pipes and farrowing crates recovered and in the custody
of the police, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
PEOPLE VS. ORTEGA
[G.R. NO. 116736. JULY 24, 1997]
FACTS:
On October 15, 1992 at about 5:30 in the
afternoon, Diosdado Quitlong, the victim Andre Mar
Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San
Andres were having a drinking spree in the compound near
the house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. While they were drinking,
accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were
already drunk arrived and joined them. The victim Andre
Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to the
back portion of the house. Then, the accused Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. followed him and later the the participants in the
drinking session heard the victim Andre Mar shouted,
Dont, help me! (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!) Diosdado
Quitlong and Ariel Caranto ran towards the back portion of
the house and saw accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top of
Andre Mar Masangkay who was lying down in a canal with
his face up and stabbing the latter with a long bladed
weapon. Quitlong went to Romeo Ortega in the place where
they were having the drinking session for the latter to pacify
his brother Benjamin, Jr. Romeo Ortega went to the place of
the stabbing and together with Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
Manuel Garcia lifted Andre Mar Masangkay from the canal
and brought Andre Mar to the well and dropped the latter
inside the well. Romeo Ortega, Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
Manuel Garcia then dropped stones to the body of Andre
Mar Masangkay inside the well. Upon reaching home, his
(Quitlong) conscience bothered him and he told his mother
what he witnessed. He then went to the residence of Col.
Leonardo Orig and reported the matter. Col. Orig
accompanied him to the Valenzuela Police Station and some
police officers went with them to the crime scene. Accused
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were apprehended
and were brought to the police station.
The NBI Medico Legal Officer testified after conducting an
autopsy that the cause of death is multiple stab wounds,
contributory, asphyxia by submersion in water. There were
13 stab wounds, 8 of which were on the frontal part of the
body, 2 at the back and there were contused abrasions
around the neck and on the left arm. The large airway is

filled with muddy particles indicating that the victim was


alive when the victim inhaled the muddy particles.
The RTC ruled that the crime committed by the accused is
Murder with conspiracy and the taking advantage of
superior strength.
ISSUE:
WON Manuel Garcia should be acquitted for the
crime charged.
HELD:
Appellant Ortega is guilty only of homicide.
Appellant Garcia deserves acquittal. The drowning was the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that
Appellant Garcia had intended to commit; it
exemplifies praeter intentionem covered by Article 4, par. 1,
of the Revised Penal Code. Under this paragraph, a person
may be convicted of homicide although he had no original
intent to kill. In spite of the evidence showing that Appellant
Garcia could be held liable as principal in the crime of
homicide, there are, however, two legal obstacles barring
his conviction, even as an accessory.
First. The Information accused Appellant Garcia and
Appellant Ortega of attacking, assaulting, and stabbing
repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of
the body of one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA The
prosecutions evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing
to do with the stabbing which was solely perpetrated by
Appellant Ortega. His responsibility relates only to the
attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting
drowning of Victim Masangkay. The hornbook doctrine in
our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted of an
offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or
information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To
convict him of an offense other than that charged in the
complaint or information would be a violation of this
constitutional right.
Second. Although the prosecution was able to prove
that Appellant Garcia assisted in concealing the body of the
crime, in order to prevent its discovery, he can neither be
convicted as an accessory after the fact defined under
Article 19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records
show that Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant
Ortega, the latters sister, Maritess, being his wife. Such
relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from criminal liability
as provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant Garcia, being a covered relative by affinity
of the principal accused, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., is legally
entitled to the aforequoted exempting provision of the
Revised Penal Code. This Court is thus mandated by law to
acquit him.
PEOPLE VS SALLE JR.

Where the judgment of conviction is


still pending appeal and has not yet
therefore attained finality, as in
the instant case, executive clemency
may not yet be granted to the
appellant.
The acceptance of the pardon shall
not operate as an abandonment or
waiver of the appeal.

FACTS:
Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and each is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity.
The appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On

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24 March 1993, the Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January


1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent
Motion to Withdraw Appeal.
They were granted a conditional pardon that with their
acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants will be
released from confinement, the appellants impliedly
admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence,
the appeal should be dismissed. They were discharged from
the New Bilibid Prison on 28 December 1993. Atty. Lao
further informed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote
left for his province without consulting her. She then prays
that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal
and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the
conditional pardon. Mengote has not filed a motion to
withdraw his appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by
the trial court is enforceable.
HELD:
No pardon may be extended before a judgment of
conviction becomes final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal
is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused commences
to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is
expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty
was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the
accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to
appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending
appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in
the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted
to the appellant.
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section
19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant
of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during
the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial
court.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an
accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or
parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those
responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly,
those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the
pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from
confinement.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote
y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof
within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his
appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon
granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect
only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of noncompliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back
into his custody the said appellant, for which purpose he
may seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police or
the National Bureau of Investigation.
RAMON C. TAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno
Metal Industries, located at 301 Jose Abad Santos St.,
Tondo, Manila, engaged in the business of manufacturing
propellers or spare parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez was
one of the employees working for her. Sometime in
February 1991, Manuelito Mendez left the employ of the
company. Complainant Lim noticed that some of the
welding rods, propellers and boat spare parts, such as
bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws were

missing. She conducted an inventory and discovered that


propellers and stocks valued at P48,000.00, more or less,
were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy,
uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of the loss. Subsequently,
Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he
admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole
from the complainants warehouse some boat spare parts
such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass
screws. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainants
forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the
one who bought the stolen items and who paid the amount
of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they split
the amount with one another. Complainant did not file a
case against Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of having
committed the crime of fencing
HELD:
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain
items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole those
items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim
never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She
admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former
employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she
forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public
crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a
private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As
complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for
certain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the
first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a
crime of robbery or theft has been committed.
There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking
of anothers property. True, witness Mendez admitted in an
extra-judicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had
pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, an
admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense
may be given in evidence only against the person admitting
or confessing.[15] Even on this, if given extra-judicially, the
confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise,
the admission would be inadmissible in evidence against the
person so admitting.[16] Here, the extra-judicial confession of
witness Mendez was not given with the assistance of
counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither
may such extra-judicial confession be considered evidence
against accused.[17] There must be corroboration by
evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of
guilt.[18] Corpus delicti means the body or substance of the
crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the
crime has been actually committed.[19] The essential
elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2)
the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was
done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is
accomplished without violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things (U. S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil.
1000).[20] In theft, corpus delicti has two elements,
namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2)
that it was lost by felonious taking.[21] In this case, the theft
was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not
complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of
her property. She sought out her former employee
Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain
articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold
them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to
convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.[22]
What is more, there was no showing at all that the
accused knew or should have known that the very stolen
articles were the ones sold to him. One is deemed to know
a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or
awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of
something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has
something within the minds grasp with certitude and
clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact
is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if
a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless

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he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other


hand, the words should know denote the fact that a
person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would
ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or
would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness
about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of
an accused and state with certainty what is contained
therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from
the overt acts of that person. And given two equally
plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the
court should choose the one which sustains the
constitutional presumption of innocence.[23]
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen
articles, he can not be guilty of fencing.[24]
Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish
the essential elements of fencing, and thus petitioner is
entitled to an acquittal.
PEOPLE V. YANSON-DUMANCAS
FACTS:
Acting upon the alleged inducement of spouses Jeanette and
Charles Dumancas, under the direction cooperation and
undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas Torres, taking
advantage of his position as the Station Commander of the
PNP, with the direct participation and cooperation of other
Police Inspectors, concurring and affirming in the said
criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct,
kidnap and detain Rufino Gargar Jr., with evident
premeditation and treachery, nocturnity, and the use of
motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said
victim, while being handcuffed and blindfolded; that
accused did then and there secretly bury the corpse in a
shallow grave or the purpose of concealing the crime of
murder in order to prevent its discovery.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15562, each of the Accused
charged as principal is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the
law; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Heirs of Rufino
Gargar Jr.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15563, each of the Accused
charged as principal is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the
law, indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of Danilo
Lumangyao.
Accused Charles Dumancas, Police Officers Pahayupan and
Cadunay Jr. are hereby acquitted of the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. On the case of accused-appellant
Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas, the information charged her of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder as principal
by induction together with her husband, Charles, who was
found by the trial court not guilty of the crime.
ISSUE: WON Jeanette is principal by Inducement
HELD: No
Why?
Requisites of PBI
Article 17, Revised Penal Code, provides: The following are
considered principals: (i) Those who take a direct part in the
execution of the act; (ii) Those who directly force or induce
others to commit it; and (iii) Those who cooperate in the
commission of the offense by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished.

There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a


crime, namely: (i) by using irresistible force, or (ii) by
causing uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimony
of all the witnesses of the prosecution, we find nothing to
conclude that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused
uncontrollable fear upon the other accused-appellants.
Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to
commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, or
offering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of
command. The Court finds no evidence, as did the trial
court, to show that Jeanette offered any price, reward, or
promise to the rest of accused-appellants should they
abduct and later kill the victims in this case.

In the Present Case


What the Court now has to examine is whether or not
sufficient evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed performed
any of the following acts: (a) directly forcing the killers to
commit the crime, or (b) directly inducing them to commit
the crime. (verbatim)
The record is entirely bereft of any evidence to show that
Jeanette directly forced the participants of the said meeting
to come up with such plan, by either using irresistible force
or causing uncontrollable fear. The only basis relied upon by
the trial court in arriving at its conclusion that Jeanette is
guilty of the crime as principal by inducement, is the
supposed commands or order given by her to accusedappellant Dominador Geroche.
By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to take
care of the two does not constitute the command required
by law to justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by
inducement.
Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly the act of
inducement, should precede the commission of the crime
itself (People vs. Castillo, July 26, [1966]). In the case at bar,
the abduction, which is an essential element of the crime
charged (kidnapping for ransom with murder) has already
taken place when Jeanette allegedly told accused-appellant
Geroche to take care of the two. Said utterance could,
therefore, not have been the inducement to commit the
crime charged in this case. (emphasis supplied)
Note: In short, nagsabi lang sya na kayo na bahala which
the SC did not rule as a command.
PEOPLE VS. BACANG
July 30, 1996
FACTS:
On December 1, 1993, William Casido and Franklin Alcorin,
together with the other co-accused(s), were found guilty of
murder by the RTC, sentencing each of them to reclusion
perpetua plus damages.
William and Franklin filed a supplemental notice of appeal to
the Supreme Court, which was accepted on December 7,
1994. However on January 11, 1996, the SC received an
Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal from appellants which
did not state the reason therefor. The SC first required the
counsel of the appellants to comment on the urgent motion.
On 22 March 1996, the SC received a 1st Indorsement from
Superintendent Venancio Tesoro informing the Court that
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin "were released on
Conditional Pardon on January 25, 1996."

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Upon direction by the SC, Tesoro submitted certified true


copies of the conditional pardons separately granted to
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
showing that they were released from confinement on
January 25, 1996 in view of the grant of conditional pardon.
ISSUE:
Whether the conditional pardons were valid.

Pardon must be granted not only by the parents of an


offended minor but also by the minor herself to be effective
as an express pardon.
In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused
was allegedly granted only by the mother B, without the
concurrence of the minor A. Hence, for the sake of
argument, even if said mother B initially pardoned the
accused, it is clear that such pardon is ineffective without
the express concurrence of the minor victim A.

HELD:
No. It is clear that the conditional pardons separately
extended to the accused-appellants were issued during the
pendency of their instant appeal.
In a prior resolutions, the SC categorically declared the
"practice of processing applications for pardon or parole
despite pending appeals" to be "in clear violation of law."
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section
19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant
of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during
the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial
court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not
be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be
begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. The acceptance of
the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver
of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a
pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the
withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible
administratively liable.
It follows then that the conditional pardons granted in this
case to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin
Alcorin are void for having been extended on January 19,
1996 during the pendency of their instant appeal.

PEOPLE VS TADULAN
(PARDON BY THE OFFENDED PARTY)
FACTS:
Complainant B owns a house in Metro Manila, where she
resides with her common-law husband and their minor
daughter A. Beside their house is an apartment building
wherein one unit was rented by accused Irvin Tadulan along
with his family.
One morning, when Complainants minor daughter A was
playing outside the apartment, accused Tadulan brought
called her and brought her upstairs where he eventually had
intercourse with the child. Initially, A did not inform her
mother about the incident, and it was only when the laundry
woman discovered bloodstains on the panty of A that they
knew of the said incident. When accuseds wife returned to
the apartment, Complainant B told her of her husbands
sexual advancement towards her her daughter A, and that
she would not take legal action against the accused if he
would vacate the apartment unit right away. Accuseds wife
promised to uphold the condition, but her husband was still
coming home to the apartment every night.
Days later, Complainant B heard a commotion in the
apartment unit of the accused, where she saw the accused
arguing with his wife. B called the police, and when they
came, the accuseds wife denounced him and told the police
that he raped the minor daughter of Complainant B, in
which he was thereafter arrested. The trial court found the
accused guilty of rape, and upon appeal, raised the
contention that he was pardoned by the mother of the
victim.
ISSUE:
W/ N pardon granted by the mother of the minor offended
party without the concurrence of the offended minor is valid
HELD:

PEOPLE VS NERY
FACTS:
Accused Soledad Nery received 2 diamond rings
from Federico Matillano to be sold by her on commission on
Nov 15, 1954. In their agreement, Nery should deliver Php
230.00 to her principal, to whom she represented having a
ready buyer, and whatever excess money obtained by her
be retained as her commission. She failed to comply with
their agreement, and was thus brought to the police station
where she promised to pay the price of the rings.
After failing to pay, a complaint was filed against
her. This was however withdrawn/dismissed following her
partial payment of Php 40.00. After failing again to pay the
balance of Php 190.00, an estafa case was filed against her.
During the pendency of the case, she paid Php 50.00, but
the remaining balance was never paid. She was eventually
convicted for estafa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the agreement made between
the accused and Matillano (with partial payments) novated
her criminal liability into a simple civil liability.
HELD :
NO. the court held that novation does not apply
in the case at bar, wherein a criminal information has
already been filed by the complainant. Furthermore, said
liability cannot already be novated since this is a public
offense, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish
the criminal liability that the law imposes for the
commission of the offense.

DEGANOS VS. PEOPLE


FACTS:
Office of provincial prosecutor of Bulacan
charged Brigida/Aida Luz and Narciso Deganos with estafa.
They allegedly received from spouses Atty. Jose and Lydia
Bordador gold and jewelry amounting to 438,702 to sell on
commission and remit the proceeds or return the unsold
pieces of gold and jewelry. However, the accused misapplied
and use for their own benefit the said merchandise and/or
the proceeds thereof. RTC held Narciso guilty but acquitted
Brigida/Aida. CA affirmed trial courts decision with
modification.
On appeal, Narciso contented that the
transaction between him and spouses Bordador was
converted from agency to sale on credit when he made
partial payments thereby converting his liability from
criminal to civil.
ISSUE:
W/N Novation converted liability of Narciso to a
civil liability
RULING: The court ruled that the transaction between
Narciso and the spouses was an agency and not a sale on
credit. The Kasunduan at Katibayan, document covering
the transaction expressly states that the accused received
the items to sell it in behalf of the complainants. It was a
consignment and Narciso was under obligation to account
for the proceeds. The court denied Narcisos contention that
their contract was novated from agency to loan when he

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paid partial payments to the spouses. Novation must be


clear and express. Furthermore, even if there was Novation,
the court held that. . . .
Novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal
liability. It is well settled that criminal liability for estafa is
not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is
a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by
the Government on its own motion even though complete
reparation should have been made of the damage suffered
by the offended party. A criminal offense is committed
against the People and the offended party may not waive or
extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the
commission of the offense. The criminal liability for estafa
already committed is not affected by the subsequent
novation of the contract.
In short, Novation is not a ground to extinguish
criminal liability. Therefore, Narciso is guilty.

ROMUALDEZ VS MARCELO (July 28, 2006)


FACTS:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman
gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of
24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act:
A.)

B.)

that the Ombudsman cannot revive the


aforementioned cases which were previously
dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution
of February 10, 2004;
that the defense of prescription may be raised
even for the first time on appeal; and thus there
is no necessity for the presentation of evidence
thereon before the court a quo.

Prayer of Petitioner: This Court may accordingly dismiss


criminal cases pending before the Sandiganbayan and the
RTC, all on the ground of PRESCRIPTION.
The Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the
informations in the criminal cases does not mean that
petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution.
A.)

B.)

that the filing of the complaint with the


Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information
with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 INTERRUPTED
the PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD ;
that the ABSENCE OF PETITIONER from the
Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also
INTERRUPTED the PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD based
on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether the offenses for which petitioner are being


charged have already prescribed
RULING: We reconsider our stance and shall rule in the
AFFIRMATIVE.
PROVISIONS ON PRESCRIPTION AS PROVIDED IN RA NO
3019 (the law which petitioner violated)
Petitioner is being charged with violations of
Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his Statements of
Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his
tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical
Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses
punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years. Significantly,

the Court already declared in a previous jurisprudence that


for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from
1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10
years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed
by the petitioner during the period from March 16,
1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference
is made to Act No. 3326 which governs the computation of
prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under
special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall
begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof
and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be
interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
In view of the nullity of the proceedings initiated
by then Solicitor General Chavez in 1987 with the PCGG and
by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989, no
proceedings exist that could have merited the suspension of
the prescriptive periods.
ABSENCE OF PETITIONER IN THE COUNTRY : Should Art 91
apply when the special law is silent on this matter?
Both respondents in the instant case aver that,
applying Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily,
the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986
until April 27, 2000 prevented the prescriptive period for the
alleged offenses from running.
The Court disagrees.
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to
whether the absence of the offender from
the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period.
The silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean that
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption
of the prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the
prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall
be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not
provide that the absence of the accused from
the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive
period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from
the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No.
3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from
the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the
prescriptive period. Had the legislature intended to include
the accuseds absence from the Philippines as a ground for
the interruption of the prescriptive period in special laws,
the same could have been expressly provided in Act No.
3326.
Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily
conclude that a special law such as RA No. 3019 is
supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and all
cases.
In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail
over Article 91 because it specifically and directly applies

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to special laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply


to special laws only suppletorily and only when the latter do
not provide the contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of
statutory construction dictate that special legal provisions
must prevail over general ones.
LIBERAL APPLICATION OF PRESCRIPTIVE LAWS
Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny
petitioner the benefits accruing from the liberal construction
of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription
emanates from the liberality of the State. Any bar to or
cause of interruption in the operation of prescriptive periods
cannot simply be implied nor derived by mere
implication. Any diminution of this endowment must be
directly and expressly sanctioned by the source itself, the
State. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of
the grantee thereof, the accused.
EUGENIO DAMASCO VERSUS JUDGE HILARIO LAQUI
FACTS:
Atty. Damasco on July 1987 threaten Rafael
Sumadohat with the infliction upon his person of a wrong
amounting to crime. The petitioner pleaded not guilty.
Respondent Judge Laqui found that the evidence presented
did not establish the crime of grave threats but only light
threats. Petitioner filed a motion to rectify and set aside the
dispositive part of Respondent Judge contending that he
cannot be convicted of light threats necessarily included in
grave threats charged in the information as the lighter
offense prescribed in the information filed.
The crime was committed on July 8, 1987, it was filed
on September 17, 1987. Light threats prescribes in 2 months
which means 60 days. The complaint was filed after 71 days.
The trial court holds on to the principle that the allegation in
the information confers jurisdiction and that jurisdiction
once acquired cannot br lost. The information was filed
within prescriptive period. Grave threats cannot be lost by
prescription if after trial what has been proven is merely
light threats.
The Office of Solicitor General agreed with the trial
court that the allegations in the information confer
jurisdiction and once acquired cannot be lost but this is not
applicable in the case. The jurisdiction of lower court was
never questioned, instead the legal dispute is whether or
not the Judge was right to convict the petitioner after
finding him guilty of the lesser offense of light threats but
has already prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offense of light threats already
prescribed.
RULING: Yes, the Petition is granted.
Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of a
crime or offense as a loss or waiver by the state of its rights
to prosecute an act prohibited or punishable by law. Hence,
while it is the rule that an accused who fails to move to
quash pleading is deemed to waive all objections but thus
rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, Article 69
of the Revised Penal Code to apply such rule contravenes
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code which is a part of
substantive law. Further strengthened by Section 8 Rules
117 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which added
extinction of offense as one exception to the General rule
regarding the effects of a failure to assert a motion to quash.
YAPDIANGCO V. BUENCAMINO (122 SCRA 713)
FACTS:
On February 1, 1965, the fiscal filed information for slight
physical injuries allegedly committed by the petitioner on
December 2, 1964. Since the information was filed after the
prescribed 60-day period, petitioner moved to quash the
criminal prosecution on the ground of prescription.
Respondent contended that it was filed within the
prescriptive period since the last day fell on a Sunday or
legal Holiday, therefore, should not be counted.

ISSUE:
Whether period of prescription is interrupted by Sundays or
Legal Holidays.
HELD:
No. A Sunday or legal holiday does not interrupt nor stop
the running of the prescriptive period as a matter of
statutory articulation. According to Article 91, the only
exception is the offenders physical absence and no other
cause can be sufficient to interrupt prescription.
The Court ruled that Where the sixtieth and last day to file
information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day
period cannot be extended up to the next working day.
Prescription has automatically set in.
The fiscal cannot file the information on the next following
working day as it would tantamount to extending the
prescriptive period fixed by law.
Therefore, the motion to quash the criminal prosecution
was granted on the valid ground of prescription.
CABRAL V. PUNO 1976
70 SCRA 606
FACTS:
Petitioner Eugenio Cabral was accused of Falsification of
Public Documents for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948
the signature of private respondent Silvino San Diego in a
deed of sale of a parcel of land. Cabral moved to quash the
Information on the ground of prescription of the crime
charge, since the said document of sale was notarized on
August 14, 1948 and registered with the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan on August 26, 1948. The said notarization caused
the cancellation of the original certificate of title and a new
transfer certificate of title was then issued. On March 25,
1975, the motion to quash was granted on the ground of
prescription. Private prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said Resolution. However, according
to petitioner Cabral, respondent San Diego can no longer
intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action
against the same accused (Cabral) on the basis of the same
factual averments contained in the criminal information. The
Fiscal, upon the order of respondent Judge Puno, submitted
his comment expressing the view that the crime, has not
prescribed as Silvino San Diego stated that he only
discovered the crime sometime in October 1970, and that in
the interest of justice, arraignment and trial is proper to
ventilate the respective evidence of both parties in their
total meaning.
Two (2) days later, respondent Judge set aside the grant of
motion to quash. Petitioner Cabral moved for
reconsideration of the Order on the ground that (a) "the
judgment of acquittal which became final immediately upon
promulgation and could not, therefore, be recalled for
correction or amendment"; and (b) by instituting Civil Case
No. 120-V-74, respondent San Diego lost his right to
intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case. This
motion was denied, as well as the second motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Resolution of March 25, 1975
(granting the motion to quash and dismissing the
Information) based on prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense
HELD:
YES. The Resolution of March 25, 1975 dismissing the
Information on the ground of prescription of the crime
became a bar to another charge of falsification, including the
revival of the Information. This is more so, because said
Resolution had already become final and executory. When
the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21, 1975, or
about two (2) months from receipt of a copy of the order of
dismissal, the same had already long been final.
The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a
motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense. Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code also provides that "prescription of the crime" is
one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability."

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Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under


Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal
Code, which carries an imposable penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine
of not more than P5,000.00. This crime prescribes ten (10)
years. Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice
of the alleged forgery after the document was registered in
the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.
While it is true that the offended party, San Diego, through
the private prosecutor, filed a motion 'for reconsideration
within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did
not stop the running of the period for appeal. He (private
prosecutor) did not have the legal personality to appeal or
file the motion for reconsideration on his (San Diegos)
behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the
private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the
Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or appeal
filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for
appeal.
More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal
case. Prior to the filing of the criminal case on September
24, 1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and Eugenia
Alcantara, on the basis of the same allegations that San
Diego's signature on the deed of August 14, 1948 was a
forgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action against Eugenio
Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with the Bulacan Court of First
Instance (Civil Case No. 120-V-74) for the recovery of the
same property and damages. It appearing, therefore, from
the record that at the time the order of dismissal was issued
there was a pending civil action arising out of the same
alleged forged document filed by the offended party against
the same defendant, the offended party has no right to
intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case and
consequently cannot ask for the reconsideration of the
order of dismissal, or appeal from said order.
SERMONIA v CA
Petitioner: Jose Sermonia
Respondent: Court of Appeals, RTC
FACTS: Jose Sermonia entered into a subsequent marriage in
1975 during the subsistence of a previous marriage. Upon
the knowledge of a second marriage, his first wife filed an
information charging Sermonia with bigamy.
Sermonia moved to quash said information contending that
his criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by
prescription, since bigamy is punishable by an afflictive
penalty, it prescribes in 15 years. The information had been
filed only in 1992, seventeen years after he contracted the
said marriage.
The RTC denied the motion to quash, as well as the
consequent motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the appellate court, however, dismissed his
petition for lack of merit, hence the present recourse.
Petitioner avers that since the second marriage contract was
duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975,
such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record
and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The
offended party therefore is considered to have had
constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975;
hence, prescription commenced to run on the day the
marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the
corresponding information for bigamy should have been
filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
ISSUE: whether the prescriptive period is deemed to have
taken place from the time the offended party actually knew
of the second marriage or from the time the document
evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with the
Civil Registry consistent with the rule on constructive notice.

RULING: Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by


contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. Bigamy
carries with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being
punishable by an afflictive penalty, this crime prescribes in
fifteen (15) years. The fifteen-year prescriptive period
commences to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents.
Moreover, the Court is of the view that the principle of
constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the
crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact
that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the
offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous
subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is generally
entered into in a place where the offender is not known to
be still a married person, in order to conceal his legal
impediment to contract another marriage.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle
of constructive notice is not contrary to the well-entrenched
policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor
of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the
offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount
to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability
therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage
may be said to be open and made of public record by its
registration, the offender however is not truthful as he
conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned
the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does
not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He
likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous
marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a
married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under
which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage
is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is
therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the
crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on
which the said crime was discovered by the offended party,
the authorities or their agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by
the offender, if the prescriptive period for the offense of
bigamy were to be counted from the date of registration
thereof, the prosecution of the violators of the said offense
would almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the
petitioner would encourage fearless violations of a social
institution cherished and protected by law.
G.R. Nos. 74226-27 July 27, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIZPAH R. REYES
FACTS:
Spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a land. Both
are now deceased. Julio died on September 6, 1970 and his
wife on August 7, 1977. They were survived by the following
children: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes (Petitioner) and the
complainants Cristina R. Masikat, Julieta R. Vergara and
Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.
In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered from
the records of the Register of Deeds that the property had
already been transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes, the
conveyance was allegedly effected through a notarized deed
of sale executed and signed on May 19, 1961 by their
parents Julio and Patricia. The deed of sale was registered
with the ROD on May 26, 1961. The complainants found out
that the signature of their parents were allegedly falsified
and that Reyes also made an untruthful statement that she
was single although she was married to one Benjamin Reyes
on May 2, 1950. The document was examined by the NBI
experts, and a report was returned with the finding that the
signature of Julio Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia
Pampo was forged. Upon complaint by the sisters of the

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accused and after conducting an investigation, the fiscal


filed with the RTC on October 18, 1984 2 informations both
for falsification of public document and for making an
untruthful statement by stating that accused was single.
Before arraignment, Reyes filed a motion to quash both
informations on ground that the action has prescribed
The trial court granted the petition, stating that:
...The title, once registered, is a notice to the world. x x x
If registration is a notice to the whole world, then
registration is in itself a notice and therefore, the
prescriptive period of registered document must start to
run from the date the same was annotated in the Register
of Deeds.
The CA affirmed the RTCs decision, further stating that:
The rule on constructive notice has been applied in the
interpretation of a provision in the Civil Code on the
prescription of actions for annulment of contracts which is
parallel to Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The Civil Code
provision states:
Art. 391. The action for annulment shall be brought within
four years. This period shall begin:
xxx
In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of
the same [Emphasis supplied].

The considerations in providing for prescription of civil suits


are based mainly on practical and equitable grounds. The
lapse of a considerably long period of time obscures the
surrounding circumstances of a particular claim or right and
erodes the integrity of whatever evidence may be presented
in support of an action to enforce or contest such claim or
right. Moreover, where a particular right has accrued in
favor of a party, the enjoyment of such right cannot forever
be left on a precarious balance, always susceptible to
possible challenge by an adverse party.
In the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes,
that which is most favorable to the accused is to be
adopted. The application of the rule on constructive notice
in the construction of Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code
would most certainly be favorable to the accused since the
prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned
with earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of sale
was recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant case,
the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961.
The criminal informations for falsification of a public
document having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or
more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for
which the accused was charged has prescribed. The Court of
Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible error in
affirming the trial court's order quashing the two
informations on the ground of prescription.
CABELIC VS JUDGE GERONIMO
FACTS:

In Armentia v. Patriarca, x x x the Court, interpreting the


phrase "from the time of the discovery" found in the
aforequoted provision of the Civil Code, ruled that "in legal
contemplation, discovery must be reckoned to have taken
place from the time the document was registered in the
Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is
a notice to the whole world . . ."
Petitioner contends that Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code
which states that "the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day the crime is discovered by
the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. . .
cannot be construed in the same manner because the rule
on constructive notice is limited in application to land
registration cases.
ISSUES:
(1) W its discovery may be deemed to have taken place from
the time the document was registered with the Register of
Deeds. YES
(2) W the rule on constructive notice may be applied to
criminal cases. YES
RULING:
The crime of falsification of a public document carries with it
an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine of not more than
P5,000.00. Being punishable by a correctional penalty, this
crime prescribes in ten (10) years. The ten (10) year
prescriptive period commences to run "from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents . . ."
Citing Cabral vs Puno, x x x This crime prescribes in ten (10)
years.
Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive
notice of the alleged forgery after the document was
registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.
The rule is well-established that registration in a public
registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is
constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests,
legal and equitable, included therein.
The Court does not subscribe to the conclusion that the
presumptions and rules of interpretation used in the law on
prescription of civil suits, including the rule on constructive
notice, can not be applied in criminal actions.

Loreto Cabelic charges Judge Geronimo of MTCC


with Gross Ignorance of the Law.
Cabelic avers that he was manhandled at his
former employer in Antipolo, hence he filed a criminal case
for slight physical injuries and grave coercion before the
Prosecutors Office which referred it to the barangay
authorities of Antipolo (for settlement of the case). No
settlement happened thus it was returned to the
Prosecutors Office. A criminal case for slight physical
injuries was filed before MTCC Antipolo (in Judge
Geronimos court). On February 29, 1990, respondent Judge
dismissed the case on the ground of prescription. Slight
Physical Injuries is a light offense which prescribes in two
months (Art. 90, RPC). It was filed only on February 14, 2000,
it happened on October 9, 1999- more than sixty days.
MR was denied by Judge Geronimo. He said the
filing of criminal action with office of public Prosecutors
Office did not stop the running period of prescription.
Here (this administrative case), complainant
charges respondent with gross ignorance of the law. He
contends that the filing of his criminal case to the
Prosecutors Office on November 3, 1999 tolled the running
of prescriptive period.
Judge contends that the criminal case in question
falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure and therefore
the interruption of the prescriptive period under Section 1,
rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not apply.
Court
Administrator
recommended
the
dismissal of the administrative case. The filing to the
Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period. It would have interrupted the period if
the information was filed with the MTCC Antipolo, Rizal on
February 20, 1999.

ISSUE:
1.
2.

Whether or not the administrative case against


Judge Geronimo should be dismissed?
Whether the filing of the criminal action with the
Public Prosecutors Office suspended the running
of the period of prescription?

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1 Wigmore

DECISION:
1.
2.

Yes, it should be dismissed.


Yes, it suspended the running of the period of
prescription.

HELD:
The Supreme Court agrees with the court
administrator only in so far as the dismissal of the instant
case is concerned. The respondent judge was correct in
stating that Slight Physical Injuries is a light offense (arresto
menor- one day to thirty days), being a light offense, the
crime of slight physical injuries prescribes in two months.
Article 91 of RPC provides the period of
prescription shall be interrupted by filing the complaint of
information. In the case of Reodica vs CA, filing of the
complaint even with the fiscals office suspends the running
of the statute of limitations (citing Fransisco vs CA and Pp vs
Cuaresma).
In the Reodica case, Section 9 of Rule on
Summary Procedure which provides that cases covered
thereby, the prosecution commences by filing the
complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or
MTCC cannot be taken to mean that prescriptive period is
interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with said court. In case of conflict between Rule on
Summary Procedure and RPC (which is a substantive law),
latter prevails.
Respondent Judge erred in declaring the crime of
slight physical injuries had prescribed and that the filing of
the complaint before the Prosecutors Office did not toll or
suspend the running of the prescriptive period.
The matter however is judicial in nature and the
rule is that a partys remedy (if prejudiced by the orders of a
judge given in the course of trial) is the proper reviewing
court and not with the Office of the Court Administrator by
means of administrative complaint.
An administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed
aberrant or irregular. Administrative liability for ignorance of
the law does not arise from the mere fact that a judge
issued an order that may be adjudged to be erroneous.
Rule: Only when a Judge acts fraudulently or
with gross ignorance that administrative sanctions are
called for.
Wherefore, administrative case is dismissed.

REPUBLIC VS COJUANGCO ET AL
Facts:

On April 25, 1977 respondents incorporated the


United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM).

On September 26, 1978 UNICOM amended its


capitalization by (1) increasing its authorized capital
stock to three million shares without par value; (2)
converting the original subscription of 200,000 to one
million shares without par value and deemed fully
paid for and non-assessable by applying the P5 million
already paid; and (3) waiving and abandoning the
subscription receivables of P15 million.

On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its


authorized capital stock to 10 million shares without
par value. On September 18, 1979 a new set of
UNICOM directors, approved another amendment to
UNICOMs capitalization.

About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of


the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a complaint for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
3019 against respondents.

The OSG alleged that UCPBs investment in UNICOM

was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the


government since UNICOM had a capitalization of
only P5 million and it had no track record of
operation.
About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) issued a
Memorandum, stating that although it found
sufficient basis to indict respondents for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the action has already
prescribed.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents alleged violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed.
Held:
Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the
offenses committed under that law prescribes in 15 years.
Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on
March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive period for
offenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10
years. Since the acts complained of were committed before
the enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive period for such
acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as
originally enacted.
Assuming the offense charged is subject to
prescription, the same began to run only from the date it
was discovered, namely, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution.
Thus, the charge could be filed as late as 1996.
Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year
prescriptive period should be computed in accordance with
Section 2 of Act 3326, which provides:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of
the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
Two rules for determining when the prescriptive
period shall begin to run: first, from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, if such commission is
known; and second, from its discovery, if not then known,
and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The Court reckoned the prescriptive period from the
discovery of such loans.The reason for this is that the
government, as aggrieved party, could not have known that
those loans existed when they were made. Both parties to
such loans supposedly conspired to perpetrate fraud against
the government. They could only have been discovered after
the 1986 EDSA Revolution when the people ousted
President Marcos from office. And, prior to that date, no
person would have dared question the legality or propriety
of the loans.
PEOPLE V. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN
FACTS:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavitcomplaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP)
Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan(respondent) with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint
alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an
aggregate amount of P9,658,592.00 in favor of private
complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for
payment. Consequently the case was modified, and only on
February 3, 2000 that two countsfor violation of BP Blg. 22
were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan inthe
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. On 17 June 2000,
respondent filed anOmnibus Motion to Quash the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest
before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her

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criminal liabilityhas been extinguished by reason of


prescription. In defense of her claim, Pangilinan said that
the prevailing law that governs theprescription of special
penal law, B.P. 22, is Section 2 of Act No. 3326 (An Act
ToEstablish Periods Of Prescription For Violations Penalized
By Special Acts) where the right to file an action to a proper
court and not to merely to prosecution office forB.P. 22,
prescribes four (4) years from the commission of the crime.
The imputed violation occurred sometime in 1995, and only
on February 3, 2000 that a case was formally filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore the action already
prescribes. RTC granted the motion.On the other hand, the
complainant argued that the filing with the office of
cityprosecutor constitutes an interruption to the
prescription.
ISSUE: Is filing complaint to city prosecutor office considered
a judicial proceeding that can interrupt prescription of
crime under B.P. 22?
HELD: YES. Following a catena of cases, the court held that,
there is no more distinction between cases under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and those covered by special laws
with respect to the interruption of the period of
prescription; that the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation in the office of prosecutor against
accused interrupts the period of prescription. Following the
factual finding the crime was committed sometime in 1995,
the filing of complaint on September 1997, two (2) years
from the commission of the crime validly interrupts the
running of precription. Therefore the action against the
respondent Pangilinan did not prescribe.
GARCIA VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Guevarra spouses seeks recovery of one (1) ladys
diamond ring 18 cts. White gold mounting, with one (1) 2.05
cts. Diamond. Solitaire, and four (4) brills 0.10 cts. Total
weight which she brought on October 27, 1947 from R.
Rebullida, Inc. Mrs. Guevara lost her ring on February 1952.
On October 11, 1953, while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia,
owner of La Bulakena restaurant recognized her ring in the
finger of Mrs. Garca and inquired where she bought it,
which the defendant answered from her Comare. Spouses
Garcia together with Lt. Cementina and their Attorney
proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida who examined the
ring, Rebudilla confirmed that indeed it was her ring. Mrs.
Garcia refuted that the said ring was purchased by her from
Mrs. Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in
turn got it from the owner , Aling Petring who was boarding
in her house; that the ring might be similar but not the same
with that she bought from Rebudilla.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mrs. Garcia is liable for the lost
ring of Mrs. Guevara
HELD:
Yes, according to Article 559 of the Civil Code,
recovery of the lost possession even though the one who
got it is in good faith. But in the case at bar, Mrs. Garcia
cannot invoke good faith since she ought to know that the
said ring is a property in question. The Court found out that
Aling Petring is a mysterious and ephemeral figure. The
testimony of Mr. Rebullida was reliable. Therefore, Mrs.
Garcia will pay Attorneys fee and Exemplary damage.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PERCIVAL GECOMO y
OSIT
FACTS:
Complainant Regina Rapuzon alleges that she has been
raped twice by the accused-appellant Percival Gecomo the
first instance being on June 20, 1994 and the second on July
3, 1994.
Regina and Percival were co-employees at Kim Hiong
Restaurant located near Gil Puyat Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila
where the former worked as a waitress and the latter, a

mami steamer. Both worked in the 7:00 P. M. to 5:00 A.


M. shift of said restaurant.
According to the complainant, on June 20, she was walking
towards her workplace when the accused suddenly placed
his left arm over her shoulder and poked a knife at her. She
was threatened of being killed if she wouldnt come with
him. Scared and intimidated, the victim went with him and
she was brought to Mansion Hotel where she was hit in the
stomach twice leaving her unconscious. When she woke up,
she found blood on her genitalia. The accused slapped her
and then again had carnal knowledge of her and was
threatened that she would be killed if she told anyone about
it.
On July 3, Regina went to her workplace to inform her
employer about her resignation. As she was going home, the
accused again intercepted her as he did on June 20 and took
her to his house where the second instance of rape
happened.
Upon arriving home in the morning of the following
day, July 4, 1992, complainants mother noticed her
wounded and blackened right cheek and asked her how she
got those injuries. It was then that she told her mother
everything that happened to her. They then went to the
Jose Abad Santos Police Station in Tondo to report the
crimes committed by appellant.
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) medico-legal officer
Dr. Louella I. Nario conducted a physical examination of
Regina. Genital findings compatible with sexual intercourse
with man on or about the alleged date of commission.
For his defense, appellant vehemently denied the
charges of rape. He claimed that the complainant was his
girlfriend and that the sexual intercourses on June 20 and
July 3, 1992 were with the voluntary will of complainant. He
added that the second carnal intercourse occurred in the
Pension Hotel, and not in his house as alleged by
complainant.
Appellant posits that under ordinary situations, if the
accusations were true, complainant should have shouted
and cried or screamed for help from the time she was
accosted in the street up to the time that they checked out
from the hotel.
Also, appellant holds it against complainant for failing
to immediately tell her mother or the police authorities
about her ordeal on June 20, 1992. He postulates that the
effects of his supposed threats should have ceased to exist
after the June 20 incident and said complainant being free
from the clutches of her transgressor, no amount of threats
could have prevented her from reporting the crime to her
mother or to the police authorities thereafter
ISSUE:
W/ N the failure of complainant to disclose her defilement
without loss of time to persons close to her or to report the
matter to the authorities destroys the contention that she
was sexually molested and that her charges against the
accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated
HELD:
Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indication
of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain
or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to
bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame
to the world or risk the offenders making good their threats
to kill or hurt their victims.
The failure of herein complainant to report the
incident immediately does not discredit her credibility, her
hesitation being attributable to the death threats made by
appellant, not to speak of the natural reluctance of a woman
having to admit in public her having been raped. It is not
uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the
assault on their virtue because of the rapists threat on their
lives. Not every victim of a crime can be expected to act

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1 Wigmore

reasonably and conformably with the expectation of


mankind. One persons spontaneous or unthinking, or even
instinctive, response to a horrid and repulsive stimulus may
be aggression, while anothers may be cold indifference.
The law on prescription of crimes would be
meaningless if we were to yield to the proposition that delay
in the prosecution of crimes would be fatal to the State and
to the offended parties. In fixing the different prescriptive
periods on the basis of the gravity of the penalty prescribed
therefor, the law takes into account or allows reasonable
delays in the prosecution thereof. In a number of cases, we
have ruled that a delay of seventeen days, thirty-five days,
or even six months,by a victim of rape in reporting the
attack on her honor does not detract from the veracity of
her charge.

PANGAN v GATBALITE
GR No. 141718 January 21, 2005
Petitioner : Benjamin Pangan y Rivera
Respondents : Hon Lourdes F. Gatbalite Col. James D.
Labordo

petitioner that the penalty imposed on him in the decision


adverted to above had already prescribed, hence, his
detention is illegal for under Article 93 of the Revised Penal
Code:
Article 93. The period of prescription of penalties shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted if
the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should
go to some foreign country with which this Government has
no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime
before the expiration of the period of prescription.
The elements of prescription are:1. That the penalty is
imposed by final judgment;
2. That convict evaded the service of the sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence;
3. That the convict who had escaped from prison has not
given himself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign
country with which we have no extradition treaty, or
committed another crime;
4. The penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time
from the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence
by the convict.

FACTS
The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in a
criminal case in Angeles City MTC.During the trial of the
case, Atty. Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the case
for decision without offering any evidence, due to the
petitioners constant absence at hearings.

In this case, the essential element of prescription which is


the evasion of the service of sentence is absent. It was cited
in the case of Infante v. Warden that There was no evasion
of the service of the sentence in this case, because such
evasion presupposes escaping during the service of the
sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.

On September 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the


offense charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty of
two months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the
RTC on October 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the
MTC.

It appears that the Infante ruling imposes that, as an


essential element, the convict must serve at least a few
seconds, minutes, days, weeks or years of his jail sentence
and then escapes before the computation of prescription of
penalties begins to run.

On August 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the


decision in the court of origin. Despite due notice, counsel
for the petitioner did not appear. Notice to petitioner was
returned unserved with the notation that he no longer
resided at the given address. As a consequence, he also
failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation. The court of
origin issued an order of arrest against the petitioner.

The period for prescription of penalties begins only when


the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during
the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered
deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000
and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping
during the term of his service, the period for prescription
never began.

The petitioner was detained at the Mabalacat Detention


Cell. On January 24, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus and contended that his arrest was
illegal and unjustified on the grounds that:

Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his


sentence of two months and one day of arresto mayor and
should forthwith be released unless he is being detained for
another offense or charge.

(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of


arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3, Article 93
of the RPC
(b) having been able to continuously evade service of
sentence for almost nine years, his criminal liability has long
been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 of the RPC
Petitioner claims that:The period for the computation of
penalties under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code begins
to run from the moment the judgment of conviction
becomes final and the convict successfully evades, eludes,
and dodges arrest for him to serve sentence.
ISSUE
Whether or not the crime charged with a penalty of arresto
mayor has already prescribed.

TORRES V THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS


FACTS:
In 1979, Torres was convicted of estafa and was pardoned
by the president with the condition that if he shall violate
any penal law again, his sentence will be carried out.
Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was
released from prison. However, by 1982, the Board of
Pardons and Parole recommended to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres
because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of
estafa before, and convicted of sedition. His pardon was
cancelled. He appealed the issue before the Supreme Court.
He contended that his pardon should not have been
cancelled since the judgment on the new estafa cases were
still on appeal. Through his wife and children, he petitioned
to be released from prison alleging that he was denied due
process, and that his constitutional rights to be presumed
innocent and to a speedy trial were violated upon his
recommitment to prison.

HELD
NO. The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the

ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final


judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can

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be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the


terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.

RULING: Where a conditional pardonee has allegedly


breached a condition of a pardon, the President who opts to
proceed against him under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code need not wait for a judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his
conviction therefore by final judgment, in order to
effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee to prison.
It did not matter that Torres was allegedly been acquitted in
two of the three criminal cases filed against him subsequent
to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains
pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his
right to a speedy trial.
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's
liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful.
The incarceration of Torres is legal since he would have
served his final sentence for his first conviction until
November 2, 2000, had he not violated the conditions of the
pardon and had thus had it revoked.
Lastly, only the President has the prerogative to reinstate
the pardon if in his own judgment.Courts have no authority
to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a
convicted criminal.A final judicial pronouncement as to the
guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to
determine whether or not there has been a breach of the
terms of a conditional pardon.
MONSATO VS FACTORAN
FACTS:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.
Monsanto (assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three
other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced them to
imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a
fine of P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly and
severally indemnify the government in the sum of
P4,892.50.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction which was
granted. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but
while said motion was pending, she was extended by then
President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City
treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post
as assistant city treasurer since it was still vacant.
Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of
Finance for resolution in view of the provision of the Local
Government Code. The Finance Ministry ruled that
petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date
she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the
city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50
which the Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in
favor of the government as well as the costs of the litigation,
be satisfied.
Petitioner wrote the Ministry addressing that the full pardon
bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that
her service in the government has never been interrupted.
That the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the
date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to
backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that
she should not be required to pay the proportionate share
of the amount of P4,892.50.
Petitioner's letter was referred to the Office of the President
for further review and action and through Deputy Executive

Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. It was held that the


acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is
the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and
entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and
emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension
pendente lite.
Petitioner's contends that the general rules on pardon
cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she was
extended executive clemency while her conviction was still
pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final
judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as
assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been
terminated or forfeited. In other words, without that final
judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture
of office did not attach and the status of her employment
remained "suspended." More importantly, when pardon
was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an
acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect,
the President has declared her not guilty of the crime
charged and has accordingly dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not public officer, who has been granted
an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.
RULING:
The petitioner had been convicted of the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced
to imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of
prision correccional as minimum, to ten years and one day
of prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor
carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the
principal penalty. Temporary absolute disqualification bars
the convict from public office or employment, such
disqualification to last during the term of the sentence. Even
if the offender be pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the
accessory penalties remain unless the same have been
expressly remitted by the pardon. The penalty of prision
correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties,
suspension from public office.
Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute
pardon, the Chief Executive declared her not guilty of the
crime for which she was convicted. Pardon cannot mask the
acts constituting the crime. Thus pardon does not ipso facto
restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction
although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for
appointment to that office.
The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended
primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of
the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor
private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement
because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly
untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot
preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment
to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk,
or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public
office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public
documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that
when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her
pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed.
Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the
office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And
in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public
post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should
be evaluated and taken into account to determine
ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with
public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to
petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from

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1 Wigmore

holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To


regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must
re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a
new appointment.
Lastly, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The
Court cannot oblige her since civil indemnity subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation
of sentence.
PP V. NACIONAL
Facts:
On December 18, 1989, Walter Nacional alias "Ka Dennis,"
Absalon Millamina alias "Ka Alvin," Efren Musa, Rudy Luces,
Javier Mirabete alias "Commander, " and Zacarias
Militante alias "Care" were charged with murder.
The six accused were all civilian members of the barangay
organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
NPA at Daraga, Albay. 10 A few days before February 21,
1985, their organization had conference at Barangay Lacag,
Daraga for the purpose of identifying suspected informers of
the military whom they perceived as posing a threat to the
NPA's operations within the vicinity. They identified Quirino
and Joel Lagason, both residents of Barangay Salvacion,
Daraga as military informants and conspired to kill them.
Elevino Rincopan, their team leader, however, disapproved
the proposal for lack of clearance and approval from the
higher NPA authorities.
On Febuary 21 1985 they found them and carried out their
plan. Walter Nacional approached Quirino and said
something to him. Walter then pulled out a gun from his
waist and shot Quirino in the face, hitting him between the
eyebrows. Quirino fell to the ground and died instantly. A
few seconds later, Absalon Millamina shot Joel Lagason on
the head. The group then fled towards the direction of the
RCPI Relay Station. Joel's mother, who was at the scene of
the crime, rushed him to the hospital where he died a few
hours later.
Five of them were caught and tried and the trial court found
them guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt and were
sentenced accordingly (RP+50k indemnity) The decision was
made on May 31, 1993. And then all five of the accused
appealed their case.
On March 1, 1994, Walter Nacional, Zacarias Militante and
Efren Musa, through counsel, moved to withdraw their
appeal. They claimed that the charges against them were
political in nature "committed while they were members of
the New People's Army (NPA). They informed the Court that
as political prisoners, they applied for and were
recommended by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M.
Drilon for conditional pardon by the President of the
Philippines. The Court granted their motion on May 11,
1994.
ISSUE:
Does the conditional pardon and consequent dismissal of
the appeals of the accused exempt them from payment of
the civil indemnity?
RULING:
The court ruled that the grant of conditional pardon and the
consequent dismissal of the appeals of Walter Nacional,
Zacarias Militante, Efren Musa and Rudy Luces does not
exempt them from payment of the civil indemnity. A
conditional pardon, when granted, does not extinguish the
civil liability arising from the crime.

ARNEL COLINARES v. PEOPLE


PROBATION

FACTS: Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that


at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000, he and Jesus
Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby
store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with
Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked
behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge
stone, about 15 inches in diameter. Rufino fell
unconscious as Jesus fled.
Ananias testified that he was walking home when he saw
Rufino lying by the roadside. Ananias tried to help but
someone struck him with something hard on the right
temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had
hit him. Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the
whole incident since he happened to be smoking outside his
house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they
brought Rufino to the hospital. The doctor testified that
these injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino
chose to go home after initial treatment.
On the other hand, Arnel claimed self-defense. He testified
that he was on his way home that evening when he met
Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel
asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was
but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his
fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on
the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter
picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on
the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged
towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was
able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the same
stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sisters house. On
September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon
Municipal Police Station.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and
four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years
and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the
maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was
only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court
required Arnel and the Solicitor General to submit their
respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel
committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with
its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four
months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still
apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial
court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should
be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes
out a new penalty on him that makes his offense
probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law
warrants such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other
hand, argues that under the Probation Law no application
for probation can be entertained once the accused has
perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arnel has the right to apply
for probation, when he had already appealed his case, and
the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the
one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject
to probation?
HELD: The Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted
homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be
entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the
judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of
attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the
penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment
of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years
and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With

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1 Wigmore

this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right
to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
It is true that under the probation law the accused who
appeals from the judgment of conviction is disqualified
from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it
happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out
to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the
regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for
attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
The Probation Law requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. This requirement outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the
result of his appealthat when his conviction is finally
affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand,
and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies
for probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory
the appellate courts affirmance of his conviction. Here,
however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would
have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a
choice between appeal and probation.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of
correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that
the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for
attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for
a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought
from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level
where the law would allow him to apply
for probation. Arnel was convicted of a wrong crime,
frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6
years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a
crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He
only committed attempted homicide with its maximum
penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for
probation under the reduced penalty, it would be sending
him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the
chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent
offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was
right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years
and four months maximum, he would have had the right to
apply for probation.
TOLINTENO V ALCONEL
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo Tolentino was charged wih Section 4,
Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Upon arraignment on
September 4, 1981, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.
On October 8, 1981, after the prosecution had presented
part of its evidence, petitioner manifested his desire to
change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the lesser
offense of possession of Indian Hemp [marijuana], under
Section 8 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425.
As no objection was interposed by the fiscal, the court
allowed petitioner to withdraw his former plea of guilty and
to enter a plea of guilty to said lessor offense. Petitioner was
thereupon sentenced to imprisonment of six [6] months and
one [1] day to two [2] years and four [4] months, to pay a
fine of P1,000.00, and to pay the costs, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On October 13, 1981, petitioner applied for probation.
Respondent judge forthwith directed the probation officer
of the City of Manila to conduct a post sentence
investigation on said application and to file said report
thereon within 60 days. After conducting such investigation,
the probation officer submitted its report, recommending
that petitioner be placed on a two-year probation upon the
claim that the latter was already on his way to reformation
and that a prison cell would turn him into a hardened

criminal.
Such recommendation notwithstanding, the respondent
judge issued the challenged order of March 9, 1982, denying
petitioners application on the ground that it will depreciate
the seriousness of the offense committed.
Motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion in holding that "probation will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed.
RULING:
"SEC. 5. Post Sentence Investigation. No person shall be
placed on probation except upon prior investigation by the
probation officer and a determination by the court that the
ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as
that of the defendant will be served thereby."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It is evident from the foregoing that the potentiality of the
offender to reform is not the sole, much less the primordial
factor, that should be considered in the grant or denial of an
application for probation. Equal regard to the demands of
justice and public interest must be observed. Thus, Section 8
of P.D. 968 lays down the criteria for the placing of an
offender on probation, as follows:
"Sec. 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. In
determining whether an offender may be placed on
probation, the court shall consider all information, relative
to the character, antecedents, environment, mental and
physical condition of the offender and available institutional
and community resources. Probation shall be denied if the
court finds that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) . . .
b) . . .
c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense
committed."cralaw virtua1aw library
"The conclusion of respondent judge that "probation will
depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed" is
based principally on the admission by the petitioner himself,
as reflected in the report of the probation officer, that he
[petitioner] was actually caught in the act of selling
marijuana cigarettes. Petitioner did not deny or dispute the
veracity of the fact that he was caught in flagrante delicto of
selling marijuana cigarettes. He merely attempted to justify
his criminal act by explaining in his motion for
reconsideration that "he did it only to make some money for
the family during Christmas. Such admission renders a
hearing on the application for probation an unnecessary
surplusage and an idle ceremony.
Probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon
the discretion of the court. As aptly noted in U.S. v. Durken,
this discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused.
Thus, while under Rep. Act 6425, as amended by P.D. 44,
possession or use of marijuana was punishable by
imprisonment of 6 mouths and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months and a fine ranging from P600.00 to P6,000.00 - the
penalty imposed upon petitioner herein -possession and use
thereof is now punishable by imprisonment ranging from 6
years and 1 day to 12 years and fine ranging from P6,000.00
to P12,000.00 under B.P. Blg. 179.
The observation of the Solicitor General on this increase of
penalty is apropos:
"The implication is clear. The penalties were increased to
take it out of the range of probationable offenses. Thus, the
State has spoken and considers that this is one case where
probation will depreciate the offense committed, and will

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1 Wigmore

not serve the ends of justice and the best interest of the
community, particularly, the innocent and gullible young."
Petition dismissed..
CABATINGAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 102 SCRA 187 [1981]
Criminal Law 1: Probation Law (PD 968)
FACTS:
Petitioner Alicia Cabatingan was convicted for operating an
illegal Jai-Alai betting station. She applied for probation, but
the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan on the grounds
that there is undue risk of her committing another crime
and that the granting of the petition will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense she committed. The decision was
mainly based on the probation officers recommendation for
dismissal of the said application.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on
Sandiganbayans act of denying petitioners application for
probation.
HELD:
YES. In the case at bar, it was established by ample evidence
that petitioner is entitled to the benefits of probation.
Moreover, it was not established that she is a hardened
criminal beyond correction or redemption. Furthermore,
the Sandiganbayan merely relied on the probation officers
report, which is mostly speculative and misleading.
PABLO C. FRANCISCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS

Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly


mandates that "no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction,"
In the case at bar, the petitioner perfected an appeal upon
raising it to the RTC.
Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC
were already probationable. Hence, there was no need to
appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the
probationable period.
The petitioner in the case contended that the appeal made
is for the court to lessen the penalty for him to avail of the
probation (which limits it to the penalty of imprisonment
not exceeding 6 years) and not on asserting his innocence.
The court found the petitioners contention untenable. The
penalty imposed by the MTC is probationable. The petitioner
does not have to appeal for reduction of penalty. The court
provided the following guidelines in computing for the
maximum period to qualify in a probation:
Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found
guilty of several offenses in one decision are not, and should
not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms
imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of
his eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation.
The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and
if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the
Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is
entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically
disqualified.

FACTS:
Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon humiliating his
employees, was accused of multiple grave oral defamation
in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five of his
employees, each Information charging him with gravely
maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12
April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found petitioner
Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral defamation, in four
(4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, and sentenced him
to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1)
year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each
crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in
the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the
offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda
Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of
suit. However, he was acquitted in for persistent failure of
the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.
Unsatisfied with the decision of MeTC, the petitioner
appealed to the RTC.
After failure to interpose an appeal, the RTCs decision
became final.
Before he was arrested, we filed a certiorari to the CA, and
dismissed the petition.

P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word maximum not total


when it says that "[t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be
extended to those . . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term
of imprisonment of more than six years." Evidently, the law
does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take
each penalty separately and distinctly with the others.
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even
correct the penalties imposed by the MeTC, but to assert
his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that petitioner
appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose
of reducing his penalties to make him eligible for probation
since he was already qualified under the MeTC Decision
but rather to insist on his innocence. In such case, makes
the petitioner disqualified in availing probation.
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond
the period allowed by law. This is vital way beyond the
period allowed by law and crucial.
From the records it is clear that the application for probation
was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner
had been issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his)
receipt of the Decision" of the RTC. This is a ground of
disqualification as provided in Sec 4 of PD 968:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of
this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted
and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal. . . .
place the defendant on probation

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation
even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which
affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the
penalties imposed.

SABLE VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


APRIL 7, 2009
Purpose of Probation and when to file
Probation not tenable when appeal has been perfected

HELD:
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits
cannot extend to those not expressly included.

FACTS:
Petitioner allegedly falsified an Extrajudicial Declaration of
Heirs with Waiver of Rights and Partition Agreement, as the
signatures contained therein were not the signatures of the
true owners of the land. Petitioner and Ildefonsa also

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allegedly caused it to appear that a certain Remedios


Abangan, who was already dead, signed the document. On
28 November 2000, the RTC convicted petitioner of the
crime of Falsification of Public Documents under Article 172
in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, but
Ildefonsa was acquitted.
On 13 December 2002, a copy of the Order denying
reconsideration of the judgment was received by
petitioners counsel. Due to petitioners failure to interpose
a timely appeal, an entry of judgment was issued on June 5,
2003.
Pending resolution of the Motions to Recall Warrant of
Arrest and to Vacate Entry of Judgment with
Reconsideration, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on 17
June 2003. Subsequently, in an Order dated 22 July 2003,
respondent Judge denied the Motions to Recall Warrant of
Arrest and to Vacate Entry of Judgment. Petitioners Notice
of Appeal was also denied for having been filed out of time.
On 25 August 2003, petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the 22 July 2003 Order and intimated
her desire to apply for probation instead of appealing the
judgment of conviction. The RTC and CA denied her motion
for lack of merit. They stated that the alleged failure of
petitioners counsel to timely appeal the judgment of
conviction following the denial of the reconsideration
thereof could not amount to excusable negligence. It further
enunciated that a notice of appeal of judgment filed six
months after the denial of the motion for reconsideration
was denied is filed out of time and, as a result, the
application for probation must necessarily fail because the
remedies of appeal and probation are alternative and
mutually exclusive of each other.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in affirming the trial courts order denying
petitioners application for probation
HELD:
NO.
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a
penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and
encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately
admit his liability and save the state the time, effort and
expenses to jettison an appeal. The pertinent provision of
the Probation Law, as amended, reads:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation.Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal,
suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction.
The petitioner filed the application for probation on 25
August 2003, almost eight months from the time the
assailed judgment of the RTC became final. Clearly, the
application for probation was filed out of time pursuant to
Rule 122, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court, which states that an
"appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final
order appealed from."
Furthermore, the application for probation must necessarily
fail, because before the application was instituted,
petitioner already filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC on
17 June 2003. The Probation Law is patently clear that "no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction."

The law expressly requires that an accused must not have


appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the
part of the accused -- to wager on the result of his appeal -that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the
moment of truth well night at hand and the service of his
sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an
"escape hatch," thus rendering nugatory the appellate
courts affirmance of his conviction. Consequently,
probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by
convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated;
who manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
Therefore, there is no abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution affirming the trial courts Orders
denying petitioners Notice of Appeal, Motions to Recall
Warrant of Arrest and to Vacate Entry of Judgment, and the
application for probation. There is nothing capricious in not
granting an appeal after the time to file the same has lapsed,
nor is there anything arbitrary in denying an application for
probation after a notice of appeal has been filed.
LAGROSA VS PP (PROBATION)
FACTS:
The RTC of Tagbilaran City, rendered a decision in Criminal
Case finding petitioners Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin
guilty of violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 for having in their
possession forest products without permits. The trial court
sentenced them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from (2) years, (4) months and (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC, with the modification as to
the penalty imposed, which was reduced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from (6) months and (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, tom(1) year, (8) months
and (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
Petitioners filed an application for Probation with the trial
court which was denied. Hence, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA. However, the CA still affirmed the
resolutions of the trial court.
Petitioners contend that they should be allowed to apply for
probation even if they had already appealed the decision of
the trial court. They argue that their case should be
considered an exception to the general rule which excludes
an accused who has appealed his conviction from the
benefits of probation. In the case at bar, the trial court
sentenced petitioners to a maximum term of eight years,
which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They
only became eligible for probation after the CA reduced the
penalty imposed on them. They submit that the ruling in the
case of Francisco v. CA is not applicable because the accused
appealed their conviction notwithstanding the fact that the
maximum term of the prison sentence imposed by the trial
court was less than six years.
OSG reiterates the express provision of P.D. 968 prohibiting
the grant of probation to those who have appealed their
convictions. It argues that, even if the petitioners have
appealed for the purpose of reducing an incorrect penalty,
this fact does not serve to remove them from the
prohibition in Section 4 of P.D. 968 for the law makes no
such distinction.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners can apply for probation. Held:
HELD: No. Petitioners should be precluded from seeking
probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto
relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the
Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to prevent

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1 Wigmore

speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who,


although already eligible, does not at once apply for
probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal.

than two hundred pesos, is disqualified from applying for


probation.
ANSELMO DE LEON CUYO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Although it has been suggested that an appeal should not


bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is
solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable
limit may be equitable, the court did not accept this
proposition, especially given the factual circumstances of
this case. Had the petitioners appeal from the decision of
the trial court raised the impropriety of the penalty imposed
upon them as the sole issue, perhaps the Court would have
been more sympathetic to their plight.
PABLO V. CASTILLO (2000)
FACTS:
On 1994, petitioner Alejandra Pablo was charged with a
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as
the Bouncing Checks Law, in three separate Informations,
for issuing three bad checks in the total amount of
P2,334.00 each to complainant Nelson Mandap.
Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D, 94-00198-D
and 94-00199-D, respectively, the three cases were not
consolidated.
On June 21, 1995, Branch 41 of the said lower court
rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. 94-0199-D,
convicting petitioner of the crime charged and imposing
upon her a fine of P4, 648.00.
On November 28, 1995, Branch 43 promulgated its decision
in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D and 94-00198-D, finding
petitioner guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, and sentencing her
to pay the amount of P4, 668.00 and to serve a prison term
of thirty (30) days in each case.
Petitioner applied for probation in Criminal Cases Nos. 9400197-D and 94-00198-D. Her application was denied on the
ground that the petitioner is disqualified under Section 9 of
P.D. 968 (Probation Law). Respondent judge denied
petitioners application for probation in the Order dated
March 25, 1996. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but to
no avail. The same was denied on April 29, 1996.
ISSUE: Whether the denied application for probation by the
petitioner, in violation of Section 9 of P.D. 968, is proper.
RULING: Yes.
Under Section 9 of the Probation Law, P.D. 968, the
following offenders cannot avail of the benefits of
probation:
a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years;
b) those convicted of subversion or any crime against the
national security or the public order;
c) those who have previously been convicted by final
judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or fine of not less
than two hundred pesos;
d) those who have been once on probation under the
provisions of this Decree; and
e) those who are already serving sentence at the time the
substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable
pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
The National Probation Office denied petitioners
application for probation under Section 9 paragraph (c) P.D.
968 because a prior conviction was entered against the
petitioner on June 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 94-0199,
penalizing her with a fine of P4,648.00; thereby placing her
within the ambit of disqualification from probation under
Section 9 paragraph (c) of P.D. 968.
Section 9 paragraph (c) is in clear and plain language, to the
effect that a person who was previously convicted by final
judgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less

FACTS:
On August 25, 2009, Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) in San Fernando City, La Union, found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced him to imprisonment of four (4) months and one
(1) day to one (1) year. He was likewise ordered to pay
private complainant Alejo Cuyo the amount of P10,000 for
attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Petitioner was not
present during the promulgation of the judgment and was
represented by his counsel instead.
His motion for reconsideration was denied on October 23,
2009. He subsequently filed a Motion for Probation on
November, 5, 2009 but is denied on the ground that it had
been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen days as
provided in Sec. 4 of P.D. 968.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of
probation.
HELD:
This court held that the RTC that the Motion for Probation
was filed out of time.
Sec. 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:
Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated
by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of
the Court in which it was rendered. However, if the
conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside the
province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the
clerk of court.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation
shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the
accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall
lose the remedies available in these Rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court
to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his
absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that
his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to
avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1
day to 1 year, a period which is considered as a correctional
penalty. Under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, light
felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of
which the penalty of arresto menor (one to thirty days of
imprisonment) or a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos
(P200), or both are imposable. Thus, perjury is not a light
felony or offense contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was
therefore mandatory for petitioner to be present at the
promulgation of the judgment.

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)


1 Wigmore

To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent


when the MTCC promulgated its judgment on 25 August
2009. Pursuant to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only when the
accused is convicted of a light offense that a promulgation
may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. In case the accused failed to appear on the
scheduled date of promulgation despite notice, and the
failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused
shall lose all the remedies available in the Rules against the
judgment.
MORENO VS. COMELEC
(G.R. NO. 168550. AUGUST 10, 2006)

conclusion favorable to him. According


to Moreno, Dela Torre v. Comelec involves a conviction for
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense involving moral
turpitude covered by the first part of Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code. Dela Torre, the petitioner in that case,
applied for probation nearly four (4) years after his
conviction and only after appealing his conviction, such that
he could not have been eligible for probation under the law.
In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for
and was granted probation within the period
specified therefor. He never served a day of his sentence as
a result. Hence, the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code does not apply to him.

FACTS:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to
disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the
ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of
the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to
Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition
states no cause of action because he was already granted
probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayonv. Mutia,
the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties, was thereby
suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the
Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge
of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil
rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to
fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order of
the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly
terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil
rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right
to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for preliminary
hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer
recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running
for Punong Barangay. The Comelec First Division adopted
this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration filed
with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First
Division was affirmed. According to the Comelec en
banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that
those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year
or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local
position. The grant of probation to Moreno merely
suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect
his disqualification from running for an elective local office.
Moreno argues that the disqualification under
the Local Government Code applies only to those who have
served their sentence and not to probationers because the
latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation
Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local
Government Code because it is a special law which applies
only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is
disqualified, his subsequent election
as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon
of his previous misconduct.
In its Comment dated November 18, 2005 on
behalf of the Comelec, the Office of the Solicitor General
argues that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec definitively
settled a similar controversy by ruling that conviction for an
offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the
candidate was granted probation. The disqualification under
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code subsists and
remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of
probation.
Moreno filed a Reply to Comment dated March
27, 2006, reiterating his arguments and pointing out
material differences between his case
and Dela Torre v.Comelec which allegedly warrant a

ISSUE:
WON Morenos sentence was in fact served.
HELD:
Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable.
the phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence
should have been interpreted and understood to apply both
to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude and to those who have
been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. It has been held
that the perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the
alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the
purpose of which is to prevent speculation or opportunism
on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, did
not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing
in his appeal.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an
order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but
is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner
suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the
accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from
the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage,
attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed
upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of
probation. It appears then that during the period of
probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration
of the probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is
under probation cannot be equated with service of the
sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically
provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution
of the sentence. During the period of probation, the
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him
by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order.
When Moreno was finally discharged upon the
courts finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions
of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all
civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction
were restored to him, including the right to run for public
office.
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere
privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity
conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving
defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the
penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was
convicted. Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent
standards regarding who are qualified for probation.

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1 Wigmore

We agree with Moreno that the Probation Law


should be construed as an exception to the Local
Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a
later law which sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law
is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It
is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute,
general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior
special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special
provisions of such earlier statute.
We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run
for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in
the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections
.
SAPIERA VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Remedios Nota Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, on several
occasions, purchased from Monrico Mart grocery items,
mostly cigarettes and paid for them with checks issued by
one Arturo de Guzman. These checks were signed by Sapiera
on the back. When they were presented for payment, the
checks were dishonoured because the drawers account was
already closed. Respondent Ramon Samua informed Arturo
de Guzman and petitioner but both failed to pay. Hence,
four charges of Estafa were filed against Sapiera while two
counts of BP 22 was filed against Arturo de Guzman. These
cases were consolidated.
Petitioner was acquitted in the charge of estafa filed against
her but she was found liable for the value of the checks.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable
when she was acquitted in the criminal charges against her.
HELD:
Yes. Sec. 2 of rule 111 of the rules of court provides that
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil, unless this shows that the fact from
which the civil liability is based is proven to not have existed
because of such acquittal. Civil liability is not extinguished
where: (a) the acquittal is not based on reasonable doubt.
(b) Where the court expressly declares that the liability is
not criminal but only civil, (c) where the civil liability is not
derived from or based on the criminal act. The decision of
the case would show that the acquittal was based on failure
of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence showing
conspiracy between her and De Guzman. Since all checks
were signed by Sapiera on the back, sec 17 of Negotiable
instruments law says that she would be considered an
indorser of the bill of exchange and under section 66 thereof
would be held liable for breach of warranty and is held liable
to pay the holder who may be compelled to pay the
instrument.
LUISITO P. BASILIO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS
G. BERSAMIRA, and FE ADVINCULA
FACTS:
On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with double
homicide and double physical injuries.[4] The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 70278.
"That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the
municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a
dump truck with plate no. NMW-609 owned and registered
in the name of Luisito Basilio, without due regard to traffic
laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary
care and precaution to prevent damage to property and
avoid injuries to persons, did then and there willfully,

unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate said


dump truck in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent
manner as a result of which said dump truck being then
driven by him hit/bumped and sideswiped the following
vehicles, to wit: a) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NF2457 driven by Benedicto Abuel thereby causing damage in
the amount of P1,100.00; b) an automobile Toyota Corona
with plate no. NAL -138 driven by Virgilio Hipolito thereby
causing damage in the amount of P2,190.50 c) a motorized
tricycle with plate no. NW-9018 driven by Ricardo Sese y
Julian thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount
d) an automobile Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. PHE-283
driven by Angelito Carranto thereby causing damage of an
undetermined amount and 3) a Ford Econo Van with plate
no. NFR-898 driven by Ernesto Aseron thereby causing
damage of an undetermined amount; that due to the strong
impact caused by the collision, the driver Ricardo Sese y
Julian and his 3 passengers including Danilo Advincula y
Poblete were hit/bumped which directly caused their death;
while the other 2 passengers, namely; Cirilo Bangot
sustained serious physical injuries which required medical
attendance for a period of more than 30 days which
incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for
the same period of time and Dominador Legaspi Jr.
sustained physical injuries which required medical
attendance for a period of less than nine days and
incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for
the same period of time.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the
trial court a "Special Appearance and Motion for
Reconsideration"[6] praying that the judgment dated
February 4, 1991, be reconsidered and set aside insofar as it
affected him and subjected him to a subsidiary liability for
the civil aspect of the criminal case. The motion was denied
for lack of merit on September 16, 1991.[7] Petitioner filed a
Notice of Appeal[8] on September 25, 1991. Mis spped
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion
for Execution of the subsidiary civil liability[9] of petitioner
Basilio.
On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders.
One denied due course and dismissed Basilios appeal for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period.[10] The
other directed the issuance of a writ of execution against
him for the enforcement and satisfaction of the award of
civil indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991.[11]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[12] under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1)
the Order dated September 16, 1991, denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the judgment
dated February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary liability of
the petitioner was concerned, and (2) the Order dated April
7, 1992, directing the issuance of a writ of execution against
the petitioner. Before the appellate court, petitioner
claimed he was not afforded due process when he was
found subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of the accused
Pronebo in the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred and committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying the special civil action under Rule
65.
HELD:
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is
found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.[17] This
liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding
where the award is made.[18] However, before execution
against an employer ensues, there must be a determination,
in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)


1 Wigmore

employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is


engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not
necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge
of such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent.[19]
There are two instances when the existence of an employeremployee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged
vehicle owner may be determined. One during the criminal
proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the
execution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner
should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the
essence of due process.[21]
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against
accused because it was his truck that was involved in the
incident.[22] Further, it was the insurance company, with
which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for
the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their
contract.[23] Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal
proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel, that the
prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee
relationship.[24] With the convicts application for probation,
the trial courts judgment became final and executory. All
told, it is our view that the lower court did not err when it
found that petitioner was not denied due process. He had all
his chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and
prove that he was not the employer of the accused, but he
chooses not to intervene at the appropriate time. Nex old
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the
proceedings for the enforcement of judgment. Even
assuming that he was not properly notified of the hearing on
the motion for execution of subsidiary liability, he was asked
by the trial court to make an opposition thereto, which he
did on October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that
there was no employer-employee relationship between him
and accused and that the latter was not discharging any
function in relation to his work at the time of the
incident.[25] In addition, counsel for private respondent filed
and duly served on December 3, 1991, and December 9,
1991, respectively, a manifestation praying for the grant of
the motion for execution.[26] This was set for hearing on
December 13, 1991. However, counsel for petitioner did not
appear. Consequently, the court ordered in open court that
the matter be submitted for resolution. It was only on
January 6, 1992, that the petitioners counsel filed a
counter-manifestation[27] that belatedly attempted to
contest the move of the private prosecutor for the execution
of the civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court
issued the Order granting the motion for execution of the
subsidiary liability. Given the foregoing circumstances, we
cannot agree with petitioner that the trial court denied him
due process of law. Neither can we fault respondent
appellant court for sustaining the judgment and orders of
the trial court.
PEOPLE VS. DAGAMI
Rape-Indeterminate Sentence Law-Information-Aggravating
Circumstance
Facts:
Visitacion Locaas is a mother of 3 and wife of a convict. On
October 31, 1991, respondent ALBERTO DAGAMI entered
the house of the victim Visitacion. The respondent with the
aid of a gun, raped the victim.
Later, the victim went to her father and reported the
incident to the Barangay Captain which is the respondents
brother who told them to lodge the complaint to the police.
Visitacion submitted herself to an examination by an OBGYNE. Which the latter affirmed that rape actually
happened.

Upon the release of her husband, Visitacion later went to


fetch and live with him.
In the respondents defense, he invoked the sweetheart
story. He alleged that Visitacion and him had an illicit affair
while the formers husband is in jail. His testimonies were
supported by some witnesses.
RTC found the respondent guilty. .with the use of a
deadly weapon, a handgun, and applying the pertinent
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, convicts him
to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
provided for by law
CA affirmed RTC decision: .The appellate court found no
cogent reason to disturb the judgment of the trial court, but
ruled that the trial court erred in applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law because the law does not apply to persons
convicted of offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua. Rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua, a
single indivisible penalty which, under Art. 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, must be applied regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. Thus, the CA increased the
penalty meted to the appellant from reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua, and likewise increased his
civil liability from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00
Issue: WON Alberto Dagami is guilty of rape with attendant
aggravating circumstances?
Held:
Alberto Dagami is guilty of rape but the aggravating
circumstances being not alleged in the information will not
be counted. ..the aggravating circumstances in question
cannot be appreciated for the purpose of fixing a heavier
penalty in this case, they can, however, be considered as
basis for an award of exemplary damages. Evidence proving
these circumstances forms part of the actual commission of
the crime and justifies an award of exemplary damages
under Article 2230 of the Civil Code even when the said
aggravating circumstances were not alleged in the
information...
During the trial, the special aggravating circumstance of the
use of a weapon (handgun) and the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling were proven. Nonetheless, these
aggravating circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the
penalty because the same were not alleged in the
Information. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure now provide that aggravating as
well as qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the
information; otherwise, they cannot be considered against
the accused even if proven during the trial. Being favorable
to the appellant, this rule, as amended, should be applied
retroactively to this case.
PEOPLE VS. BANGCADO
November 28, 2000
FACTS:
On 27 June 1993, Cogasi, Clemente, Adawan and Lino were
at the Skyview Restaurant. Moments later, the group of
SPO1 Jose Bangcado and PO3 Cesar Banisa sat one table
away from Cogasi and his friends. When the latter left the
restaurant to go home, they noticed Bangcado and Banisa
following them. Asserting their authority as part of
Operation Kapkap, Bangcado frisked the 4 persons for
possible weapons, to which they obliged since the two
policemen were armed. With Banisa standing guard behind
him with a drawn gun, Bangcado ordered Cogasi, Clemente,
Adawan and Lino to form a line against the Ford Fierra facing
him in that order. Without any warning, Bangcado suddenly
fired his gun in quick succession at the 4 persons.
Cogasi woke up to find himself confined together with
Clemente. Lino and Adawan died from gunshot wounds in

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)


1 Wigmore

their heads while Cogasi suffered a gunshot wound at the


neck and Clemente received 2 gunshot wounds. After their
release from the hospital, Cogasi and Clemente filed a
complaint with the NBI in Baguio City and thereafter
positively identified the accused during a lineup.

the time of his death. The testimony of Adawans


father sufficiently established the basis for making
such an award.
On the other hand, the Court has no basis to award
damages for Richard Linos loss of earning capacity
because the prosecution failed to introduce any
evidence on this matter. Civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00 is automatically granted to the
offended party, or his/her heirs in case of the
formers death, without need of further evidence
other than the fact of the commission of any of the
crimes of murder, homicide, parricide or rape. Moral
and exemplary damages may be separately granted in
addition to indemnity.

Accused-appellants insist that they had no motive to shoot


the victims. However, even in the absence of a known
motive, the time-honored rule is that motive is not essential
to convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of the
culprit. Lack of motive does not preclude conviction when
the crime and the participation of the accused therein are
definitely shown.
*The RTCs ruling wasnt presented in the full text, but I
presumed that in the ruling of the RTC, the civil indemnities
awarded were kind of excessive or unsupported since this
issue was comprehensively addressed by the SCs ruling. Its
just a logical deduction though.*

Under present case law, the award of P50,000.00 for


civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the
fact
of
murder. Moral
damages, vis-avis compensatory damages or civil indemnity, are
different from each other and should thus be
awarded separately.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Banisa is considered a co-conspirator in the case;
2. Whether the civil indemnities awarded by the RTC were
proper and justifiable
HELD:
1. NO. From the testimony of the victims as well as
from the physical evidence, it seems that SPO1
Bangcado was the lone gunman, while PO3 Banisa
merely stood behind him with his gun drawn. Thus,
as to the identity of the gunman, it is apparent that
both witnesses were positive only as far as
Bangcado was concerned. However, it seems that
they only concluded that Banisa participated in the
shooting because he was also holding a gun. The
failure of the surviving victims to assert with
confidence that Banisa also fired his gun raises
reasonable doubt as to whether he participated in
the shooting.
In the absence of any previous plan or agreement to
commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising
from different acts directed against one and the
same person is individual and not collective, and
that each of the participants is liable only for his
own acts. Consequently, Banisa was absolved from
criminal responsibility for the assault on the victims.
2.

YES. The general rule is that claims for actual


damages should be supported by actual
receipts. However, it was undisputed that the victims
are members of the indigenous community and were
buried according to their customs and traditions. The
relatives of the victims attested that they incurred
expenses for the caao, the traditional gathering of
Igorots. The Court is not unaware that the informal
market system still governs the economic
transactions of indigenous communities. Thus,
receipts and other documents do not play a large role
in their daily commercial transactions. In this case,
wherein it is clearly established that the claimants
were indeed members of indigenous communities,
then the court should allow reasonable claims for
expenses incurred in relation to traditional burial
practices.
The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased Leandro
Adawan. The fact that the prosecution did not
present documentary evidence to support its claim
for damages for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased does not preclude recovery of the
damages. Testimonial evidence is sufficient to
establish a basis for which the court can make a fair
and reasonable estimate of the damages for the loss
of earning capacity. Moreover, in fixing the damages
for loss of earning capacity of a deceased victim, the
Court can consider the nature of its occupation, his
educational attainment and the state of his health at

Bangcado was convicted and held liable for:


1. P75,000.00 as indemnity for Linos death,
P59,300.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as
moral damages;
2. P75,000.00 as indemnity for Adlawans
death, P93,100.00
as
actual
damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P100,000.00 each as moral damages to Cogasi
and Clemente
PEOPLE VS CASTILLANO
(Civil Indemnities)
FACTS:
The family of victim Diosdado Volante, a farmer,
and that of accused Jaime Castillano and his family, were in
bad blood since the latters frequent indiscriminate firing of
his gun in their neighborhood. This incident worsened when
the victim approached the accused and asked to stop firing
his gun, for fear of someone from his family getting hit; but
accused rebutted that their neighbors arent even
complaining. A heated altercation ensued, and prompted
the accused to fire towards the house of the victim. Since
then, the accused was always carrying a bolo everytime he
passed
the
house
of
the
victim.
A week later, a neighboring teacher witnessed
the accused and his two sons as they were planning to go to
the victims house, and tried to convince them to settle the
dispute peacefully. But the accused and his sons forged on
towards the house of the victim at night. At first, the victim
did not mind them, but the accused and sons barged inside
the house and his sons ganged up on the victim by taking
turns on stabbing him. The victim died.
When the trial ensued, the victims wife testified
that when he was still alive, he had an annual income of
over P 65,000. She also spent P 18,000 for the funeral and
9,000 for the food and other expenses. She also suffered
sleepless nights and mental anguish from his death. Thus,
the trial court found the sons of the accused guilty of
murder and to pay the heirs of the victim P 77, 421 for the
actual and moral damages including death indemnity.
ISSUE:
W/ N the trial court erred in the civil indemnity and actual
and moral damages given to the heirs of the victim
HELD:
There is no sufficient basis as an award for
unearned income, isnce the said P 65,000 alleged income of
the victim who is a farmer, is self-serving. The wife of the
victim did not also adduce proof of the average expenses of
the
victims
burial
and
his
net
income.
It bears stress that compensation for lost income
is in the nature of damages and as such requires due proof

CRIM LAW 1 Cases (Third Exam Coverage)


1 Wigmore

of the damage suffered; there must be an unbiased proof of


the deceaseds average income. Hence, in the present case,
with the accuseds wife giving only a self-serving and
assumed average income of the victim, and having no
sufficient proof of the expenses made., there can be no
reliable estimate of the deceaseds lost income.

PEOPLE VS MALLARE
FACTS:
On October 4, 1999, an Information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan charging Melchor M. Mallare (Mallare) and
Elizabeth M. Gosudan (Gosudan), Mayor and Treasurer,
respectively with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the accused
were public officers and that an audit report was made.
There was also restitution in the amount of 110,000.00.
Additionally, there was a written demand on the accused to
pay the shortage amount of 1,487,107.40.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court is correct in convicting Mallare and
Gosudan of Malversation of funds
HELD :
The essential elements of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds are the following:
(1) That the accused is a public officer;
(2) That he/she had custody and/or
control of funds by reason of his/her
office;
(3) That the funds involved were
public funds for which he/she is
accountable; and
(4) That he/she appropriated or
consented, or through abandonment
or through negligence, permitted
another person to take said public
funds.

On the first element, Mallare and Gosudan are


public officers at the time of the commission of
the alleged offense. On the second and third
elements, as Municipal Treasurer, accused
Gosudan had the duty to have custody and the
obligation to exercise proper management of the
municipal funds, and accused, Mallare, as the
local chief executive, is responsible for the
supervision of all government funds and property
pertaining to his agency. On the fourth element,
there is evidence showing that accused Gosudan
herself admitted that she gave the missing
amount to several municipal officials and
employees.
The petitioners contended that what Gosudan
gave to certain officials and employees were not
loans but reimbursement expenses such as cash
advances for traveling expenses, purchase of
spare parts and salary advances. The prosecution
contended that all the elements of Malversation
of Funds were present.
The Court carefully reviewed the records and find
no reason to overturn Sandiganbayans decision.
The subject loans that Gosudan extended to the
said municipal officials and employees including
herself were unofficial and unauthorized loans
and, therefore, anomalous in nature. The
Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that said

loans were nothing but personal loans taken


from the cash account of
the Municipality of Infanta, Pangasinan. Gosudan
unlawfully disbursed funds from the coffers of
the municipality and, therefore, guilty of the
crime of Malversation of Public Funds. Like
Gosudan, Mallare is also guilty of the same crime
for accepting or getting for himself the loan
amount of 300,998.59 from Gosudan as
evidenced by his written acknowledgment in the
COA Audit Teams confirmation letter. His
acceptance of the subject loan amount of
300,998.59 without any supporting official
voucher is proof that there was a conspiracy in
the illegal disbursement of the subject loan
amounts. Mallare and Gosudan appropriated,
took, misappropriated or consented or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another
person to take public funds.