Great Britains Blue-Water Policy, 1689-1815 - Daniel A. Baugh

Great Britain's 'Blue-Water' Policy, 1689-1815
Author(s): Daniel A. Baugh

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The International History Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Feb., 1988), pp. 33-58
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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DANIEL A. BAUGH
Great Britain's 'Blue-Water5Policy,

1689-1815
almost three centuries (from about 1650 to 1920), Great

Britainhad availableto it a highly distinctivesystemof national
security.The generalattributesof this systemare widely known,
if often vaguely,but the integratinglogic behind it is not at all clearly
understood.1Perhapsthis is not surprising.As the systemevolved from
1650 onwards, there were disagreements- sometimes profound ones
- as to its goals, instruments,and strategies.Surveyingthe long history
of debate, it is easy to form the impressionthat there was not much
common ground and that the basic issues were never resolved. One
might go further, and postulatethat they were impossibleto resolve
becauseof Great Britain'sgeopoliticalsituation.The 'islandrealm', as
Churchillliked to call it, could not affordto ignore politicalconditions
in western Europe any more than it could ignore the opportunities
summed up by Sir Walter Ralegh's oft-quoted maxim, 'Whosoever
commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the
tradeof the worldcommandsthe richesof the world, and consequently
the world itself.'2Ralegh wrote these words near the beginningof the
seventeenthcentury,and some of that century'sevents, most notably
the expansion of oceanic trade and the amazing rise of the Dutch
Republic,seemedemphaticallyto supporthim. On the other hand, the
influence of French military power upon western Europe after 1670
suggestedthat his idea might have seriouslimitations,and understandably, opposing schools of thought grew up - 'Maritime' and 'Continental'- which had an impact on Britishforeign policy throughout
1 I am currentlywriting a book on this subject. In the limited space here it is possible to specifyonly a small portion of the direct evidence for my judgementsand
and to indicateonly some of the detailed qualifications.
2 Quoted by R.H. Tawney, Business and Politics under James I (Cambridge,
1958), p. 3The International History Review, x, 1, February 1988, pp. 1-172
cn issn 0707-5332 The International History Review
34
Daniel A. Baugh
the eighteenth century. The bold claims issued on both sides have long
attracted the attention of historians.
As, undeniably, these claims played a role in shaping British policy,
it is important to grasp what that role amounted to. The Maritime
orientation was generally popular and much touted in the House of
Commons. The Continental orientation, however, was steadily favoured
by the Hanoverians, at least the first two Georges, and they were able
to find leading politicians who shared or were willing to support their
view. However, these politicians were usually unable to gain sufficient
support in Parliament for a strongly Continentalist policy. It is all very
well to say that 'the Crown never lost a general election in the eighteenth
century', but that fact, if it is a fact, did not translate into full support
for the king's favourite line of policy. The role of the two schools should
therefore be seen as setting limits on what kinds of diplomatic and
strategic plans would be allowable. In the course of the century the
plans leaned one way or the other according to circumstances of domestic politics, to diplomatic conjunctures, and to strategic opportunities.
On balance, the decisions tended against military commitment on the
Continent.
In the form of constitutional monarchy that developed in England
after 1650, the means of warfare were only obtainable through parliamentary vote; therefore, the contours of British national security were
bound to be shaped by necessity, convenience, and compromise. In
other words, the historicity and the main outlines of the British system
of national security between 1689 and 1815 are best ascertained by
keeping one's eye on the decisive policy arguments and the actual commitments (and non-commitments) of funds and force.
A system that is not easily identified and delineated is, by the same
token, not easily labelled. Of the great naval historians who wrote at
the turn of the century, Sir Julian Corbett came closest to producing a
comprehensive analysis. In Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
( 191 1 ) , a work whose analytical framework was deeply influenced by
Clausewitz's writings, Corbett argued that the important distinction
that (eventually) Clausewitz discerned between wars for 'a "Limited"
'
object and those whose object was "Unlimited" had laid open 'what
are the radical and essential differences between the German or Continental School of Strategy and the British or Maritime School - that is,
our own traditional School'. Corbett, entirely in agreement with
Clausewitz that strategy must grow out of policy, left no doubt as to
his opinion that the 'British or Maritime School' had dominated British
policy in the past and had been patterned upon the plan of 'Limited
war'. It was a plan whose advantages were consistently available to
'Blue-Water'Policy
35
Great Britain, thanks to her insularsituation, but not to Continental

powers.Aside from occasional referencesto the 'Britishor Maritime
School', the term 'Limitedwar' was as close as he came to giving the
time-honouredBritishsystema name, and he was not at all happy with
it.3 Its inadequacyis obvious,if only becauseit conveysso little.
Within five yearsof the publicationof Some Principlesof Maritime
Strategy,GreatBritainwas fightingan unlimitedwax on the continent
of Europe.4The reactionof the Britishnation to the First World War
did not reachfull flood until about a decade after it had ended, and in
the sphereof strategicstudiesthe most remarkableresponsewas surely
that of the famous militaryjournalist,analyst, commentator,and historian,Sir Basil LiddellHart. In a lecturetitled 'EconomicPressureor
ContinentalVictories'offered to a meeting of the Royal United Service Institutionin 1931, Liddell Hart concludeda rapid historicalsurvey by askingwhich line of strategywas heresy- the one pursuingContinentalvictoriesespousedby GreatBritainin the First World War, or
the one 'provedby three centuries'experienceof warfare'from which
she should never have departed?The latter had been denounced as
heresyby the 'rulingmilitaryleadersin 1914-18'. 'Yet in the light of
Britain'shistory,'he asked,'who were the real heretics,the violatorsof
tradition?Has any other theorythan the one we have here traced the
historictitle to be called "BritishStrategy"?'In 1931 that was the only
phrasehe could think of: 'historic... "BritishStrategy"'. But a year
later when he revisedthe lectureand assignedit the lead-offpositionin
a collectionof his essays,he came up with 'The BritishWay in Warfare',which he made the title of the book.5It is safe to say that Liddell
Hart, though he remains best known for his work in the 1920s on
mobile infantrytacticsand the strategyof 'indirectapproach',devoted
3 Julian S. Corbett,Some Principlesof Maritime Strategy (London, 1911), Part I,
Theory of War*,esp. p. 38; also 52-63, 73. On p. 81 he comments: *The expression "Limitedwar" is no doubt not entirely happy. Yet no other has been found
to condense the ideas of limited object and limited interest, which are its special
characteristics.'One of his fears was that it might be construed as implying that
battles should be regarded as unnecessary,and he did not mean that at all
(pp. 81-2).
4 For a brief sketch of Corbett's reaction to this fact, see Donald M. Schurman,
Julian S. Corbett, 1854-1922 (London, 1981), p. 172. Readers should take special note of Schurman'sstatement in the Preface that for particular reasons his
biography *shamefully>
neglects Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, a book
whose strengths can only be appreciated, he says, by reading it *first hand'
(p. viii).
5 B.H. Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (London, 1932), quotations on
p. 37. In the book he titled the essay The Historic Strategy of Britain'. The
original 'EconomicPressuresor ContinentalVictories' was publishedin the Royal
United ServicesInstitution Journal,lxxxvi ( 193 1) .
Daniel A. Baugh
36
much of the later part of his career to proselytizing for doctrines derived
from his concept of 'The British Way in Warfare'.6
For reasons that have mostly to do with the nature of the Second
World War and its aftermath, the concept as an historical tool has
suffered an eclipse, along with Liddell Hart's reputation. One reason,
perhaps, is the name itself; although 'The British Way in Warfare' has
a nice literary ring, it is obviously a mouthful, and for purposes of either
broad strategic application or analysis, sounds too historical and is too
particularist. Besides, the essentially non-Continentalist character of the
system ought to be stressed; therefore, a preferable name, herewith proposed, would be 'blue-water' policy.7
Specialists have not forgotten Liddell Hart's formulation. Michael
Howard brought it forward for examination in his Ford Lectures, published in 1972 as The Continental Commitment, and again in his Neale
Lecture of 1974, 'The British Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal'.8 In
both instances the examination was critical. A passage from the latter
sets the tone :
But it would be doing Liddell Hart an injustice, both as a historian and a
controversialist,to suggest that this analysis of British strategy was anything more than a piece of brilliant political pamphleteering, sharply
argued, selectively illustrated, and concerned rather to influence British
public opinion and government policy than to illuminate the complexities
of the past in any seriousor scholarlyway.9
Howard went on to suggest that Liddell Hart had seriously misinterpreted the true balance of traditional British strategy by failing to give
appropriate weight to Great Britain's long history of military and diplomatic involvement on the Continent. Nor, in this regard, does Liddell
6 I am including his anti-Clausewitzianwritings as part of this intellectual mission.
He remained passionate on the subject of Clausewitz; see especially The Ghost
of Napoleon (London, 1934) and the lecture he offeredat the Naval War College
in 1962, printed in War,Strategy, and Maritime Power, ed. B. Mitchell Simpson
III (New Brunswick,N.J., 1977), pp. 31-48.
7 Although my formulation differs in one or two important aspects from Liddell
Hart's, that alone would not have induced me to find another label. No historical
label can avoid being misleading in one way or another, and the one I have
chosen, while it has the merit of announcing more plainly to a non-specialist
readershipwhat it is really about, has the demerit of becoming confused with
the concept of a purely maritime strategy. It will become evident that by 'bluewater policy' I do not mean 'purelymaritimestrategy'.
8 Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (London, 1972); The British
Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal (London, 1975); this lecture is reprinted in
The Causes of Wars, ed. Michael Howard (2nd ed., Cambridge,Mass., 1984),
pp. 169-87.
9 Ibid., p. 172.
'Blue-Water'Policy
37
Hart's biographer,Brian Bond, come to his subject'srescue.Far from

The importantpoint is not that both men have
it; he is highlycritical.10
doubts
about
the scholarlydepth and groundingof Liddell
expressed
Hart's history,for those doubts are well warranted,but that they are
inherentlyunsympatheticto his views on policy and grand strategy.
Indeed, Howardhas disinterred'The BritishWay in Warfare'in order
to displayits fundamentalerrors.
An interestingand commendablefeatureof Howard'scritiqueis that,
notwithstandingthe title, it grapplesmore intensivelywith Corbett's
Some Principlesof MaritimeStrategythan with LiddellHart'swritings.
Accordingto Howard, Corbett'sanalysisis 'moresubtle', and Corbett
is to be considered'at leastas much a criticof the maritimeschool as he
was a spokesmanfor it', becausehe saw 'that "maritimestrategy"was
not an alternativeto "Continentalstrategy"but an extension of it'.11
Readersof Corbett'sbook may judge for themselvesthe sensein which
theseinterpretationsare accurate.The parts of Howard'scritiquethat
situationare takenup in what follows.
pertainto the eighteenth-century
*
*
*
Blue-waterpolicy roseto a positionof primacyin England in the wake
of the English Civil War. This occurrencewas signalledby the Rump
Parliament'senactment of the Navigation Ordinances of 1650 and
165 1 and the outbreakof the FirstDutch War in 1652. Its motto may
be found in the Preambleto Articlesof War issuedin that year: 'It is
upon the navy under the Providenceof God that the safety, honour,
and welfareof this realm do chiefly attend.'12Many people think that
Englishdefencepolicyacquiredits maritimeaccentat someearlierdate,
particularlyat the time of the Elizabethanwar againstSpain, when the
Hawkinsesand Sir FrancisDrakepressedfor it. In fact, one greatevent
(the Armadacampaign) and excessiveenthusiasmon the part of some
naval historianshave combined to distort the historical picture. Although no Elizabethandenied the importanceof the floating 'Wooden
Walls',the queenand her leadingadviser,LordBurghley,reliedon three
lines of defence: first,expeditionaryeffortsto preventSpanish-Catholic
Leagueforcesfrom controllingthe oppositeshoresof the EnglishChannel; second, the navy; and third, military forces for coast defence.13
10 Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought (London, 1977). He
characterizes Howard's reappraisal as 'a restrained criticism of Liddell Hart's
historical arguments' (p. 70).
11 Howard, 'Reappraisal', pp. 173-4.
12 Frequently repeated in various preambles concerning maritime policy thereafter,
with 'strength' substituted for 'honour'.
18 The sketch given in J.G. Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, 1558-1603 (Oxford,
38
Daniel A. Baugh
They committed England's resourcesheavily to all three, and had

soundreasons- strategic,technological,and commercial- for doing so.
Under the EarlyStuarts,however,England'smilitaryand naval forces
were feeble, and her inviolabilitydependedchiefly upon the unsettled
situationof monarchicaland imperialpoliticsin Europe:there was no
defence policy deservingof the term. The duke of Buckingham'sconduct of war and diplomacyin the 1620s may be fairly describedas a
sequenceof catastrophes,and Englandwas fortunatethat the Bourbons
and Habsburgshad more importantthings to do elsewhere.14
Nevertheless,it was during the firsthalf of the seventeenthcentury
that two indispensableconditionsfor a viable blue-waterpolicy were
achieved.First, Englishcommercemoved away from its overwhelming
dependenceon the marketsof north-westernEurope: plantationproducts from Virginia and the Caribbeanplayed a small role; East India
Companytradea greater;and Mediterraneanand Iberiantradeby far
the greatest.(The tremendousgrowthof Englishtrade and shippingin
the Mediterraneanduring the seventeenthcenturymay be classed as
one of those important facts that scarcely anyone, other than a few
specialists,seemsto know.) Second,the Parliamentarynavy duringthe
Civil War - a fleet of all-weather,manoeuvrable,medium-sized,menof-war- proved remarkablyeffective in enforcingisolation,that is, in
preventingoutside military aid from reaching the royalists.Thus the
1640s witnesseda prolongedtest of the 'Wooden Walls'. As already
noted, the governmentof Elizabethhad regardedthe fleet as a second
line of defence among three,but after the 1640s the idea that the navy
might functionas the 'firstline of defence'no longerseemeddangerous
and unrealistic.Though this phrasedid not come into use until later,
!936), PP- 354-5 has not been substantiallymodified by more recent research.
For a thorough study of the accent then placed upon controlling the opposite
shores, see R.B. Wernham, After the Armada: Elizabethan England and the
Strugglefor WesternEurope 1585-1505 (Oxford, 1984).
14 This paragraphand the next constitutean extremedistillationof points addressed
in a paper that I presented in April 1983 to the Shelby Cullom Davis Center,
Princeton University, Towards a "Blue-Water"Defense Policy in SeventeenthCentury England'. There are two highly useful published surveys: G.M.D.
Howat, Stuart and CromwellianForeign Policy (London, 1974), and J.R. Jones,
Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century (New York, 1966). Recent
studies of note are: Hans-ChristophJunge, Flottenpolitik und Revolution: Die
Entstehung der englischenSeemacht wa.hrend der Herrschaft Cromwells (Stuttgart, 1980); Roger Crabtree, The Idea of a Protestant Foreign Policy', in
Cromwell:A Profile, ed. Ivan Roots (New York, 1973) ; Charles P. Korr, Cromwell and the New Model Foreign Policy (Berkeleyand Los Angeles, 1975) ; J.L.
Price, 'RestorationEngland and Europe',in The RestoredMonarchy, 1660-1688,
ed. J.R. Jones (Totowa, N.J., 1979) ; Phyllis Lachs, *Adviseand Consent: Parliament and Foreign Policy Under the Later Stuarts',Albion, vii (1975).
'Blue-Water'Policy
39
English naval superiority was from the middle of the seventeenth century considered the sine qua nan of defence of the realm.
The Restoration of 1660 not only left blue-water policy in place but
contributed to its enhancement. The Navigation Ordinances became
the Navigation Acts and were improved and tightened. Royal policy
continued to regard the Dutch Republic as a prime adversary, which
made adherence to a blue-water emphasis logical because, of course,
Dutch power was chiefly maritime and could be most conveniently
addressed by naval means.
But to be of any long-term significance, blue-water policy had to be
answerable to threats mounted by a power great upon land as well as
upon sea. France attained such a position by the 1670s, and for two
centuries thereafter France was generally regarded as the source of
greatest danger to England. It is pertinent that the English people, as
represented in the House of Commons, came to this conclusion before
their kings did; suddenly, in the year 1673, the Commons refused to vote
the necessary revenues to continue the Third Dutch War, in which
England and France were allies. This sudden alteration of opinion took
place against a background of dismaying events - the disclosure of the
duke of York's Catholicism and the outrageous inaction of the French
fleet in the battle off the Texel - but there were deeper reasons. First,
Louis XIV, under Jean Baptiste Colbert's guidance, had by the early
1670s built a powerful navy. Second, he was attempting during that
same decade to crush the Dutch Republic by force of arms, and French
domination of the Low Countries could never be in England's interest.
Third, Louis XIV's escalating persecution of the Huguenots contributed an element of moral outrage, and the English court's secret
dealings with him amplified religious and constitutional fears. Thus,
political concerns became entwined with and served to reinforce geopolitical ones. Although the House of Commons asked Charles II to
commence hostilities with France in 1677-8 and to form alliances suitable to the purpose, nothing much came of it. The king's heart was not
in it, and he suspected, rightly, that the Commons would fail to vote
him anything near the level of resources such a war would require.
(The excitement did generate, however, a huge appropriation for building thirty new ships of the line. ) A serious confrontation did not occur
until the Glorious Revolution of 1688-9 brought William of Orange and
his English wife Mary to the throne of England. William, as Dutch
Stadtholder, had spent his young manhood struggling in the field against
French armies bent on destroying the independence of the Dutch Republic, and his installation on the English throne led to immediate
hostilities between England and France. Along with this new era in the
40
Daniel A. Baugh
historyof the Englishconstitutionthere came a new era in the history

of Englishwarfareand warmakingpower.
Beforeexaminingthe periodbetween 1689 and 1815, it is vital that
we set forth the essentialfeaturesof blue-waterpolicy as they stood at
the outset.First,to reiteratea point that is too easilyforgotten,its basic
rationale,both at the time it originatedand thereafter,was pitchedupon
defence of the realm against foreign invasion; the central point, to
which all otherobjectivesand considerationsweresubsidiary,was naval
command of the English Channel and North Sea. European waters
came first. Second, blue-waterpolicy rested upon a particularsystem
for sustainingthe expenseof the prodigiousnaval force it required.The
keys here were trade and shipping. Trade supplied the liquid funds,
taxable and lendable,as well as a sourceof governmentrevenuein the
form of customsduties,and the shippingindustryprovidedfour things:
profitsto be taxed or lent, auxiliaryvesselsin time of war, shipbuilding
skillsand facilities,and aboveall trainedseamen.The indispensablerole
of the NavigationAct to blue-waterpolicy is thus evident. Colonies,it
shouldbe noted, were seen as usefulin seventeenth-century
calculations
insofar
as
or
to
the
contributed
enhancement
only
they
protectionof
trade. Obviously,blue-waterpolicy entaileda conceptof cost-effectiveness, for it was designed to minimize internal impositionsand taxes
(therein lay its appeal to the country gentry, however distastefulit
might seem to them on ideologicalor social grounds); and it promised
to minimizethe need for militaryrecruitmentand a standing army. A
land force was admittedlyrequiredto capture and garrisoncolonial
possessionsand overseasbases, to keep a steady eye on Ireland and
Scotland, and to be ready on occasion to deal with invasion threats
(in a manner we shall examine later). Such a policy implied that
the English population would be largely destitute of military training or experienceand the English aristocracywould be no longer attuned to calls of militaryvirtue.But in Englandthese thingshad pretty
well gone by the board during the sixteenthcentury,never to make a
lasting recovery:15as Stephen Baxter has remarked,since the late
Middle Ages, 'the English had become, as they remained,one of the
most stubbornly civilian societies on the face of the earth'.16The
splendidlyeffectiveNew Model Army seemsto have made little moral
or culturalimpressionon the nation, unless, perhaps,a negative one,
15 See the interestingarticle by JeremyGoring, 'Social Change and MilitaryDecline
in Mid-Tudor England', History, lx (1975), 185-97. The recovery of military
skills in the 1580s (p. 197) lasted only to the end of Queen Elizabeth I's reign.
16 Stephen B. Baxter, WilliamIII and the Defense of European Liberty 1650-1702
(New York, 1966), p. 249.
'Blue-Water'Policy
41
and JamesHarrington'sneo-machiavellianproposalin Oceana ( 1656)

provedto be a non-starter.In sum, blue-waterpolicy,asidefrom reducing militarynecessities,was cost-effective,practical,and mundane; it
installeda calculatingcommercialismat the heart of the most important task of government.Although some of its earliermilitantly Protestantproposershad entertaineddreamsof a ProtestantLeague on the
Continent,this aspectgave way to blue-waterpracticalitiesin the 1650s,
if not before. Truly, a revolutionin English defence policy had been
accomplished.
The Englishgrand strategy,in line with these principles,was essentially defensivein Europe (and Europeanwaters) and aggressiveoverseas. Overseasaggressivenesswas aimed at enlargingthe maritimeand
commercialbase of England's naval power while at the same time
reducingthat of actual or potential enemies. Successin war could be
achievedonly by economicpressure.Againstan adversarylike Holland
whose power base was maritime,thus highly vulnerableto blue-water
strategy,successcame quicklyin most instances;against an adversary
like France,a successfulwar was bound to be a long one, regardlessof
what some blue-waterenthusiastsliked to think. In our analysisof the
periodfrom 1689 to 1815, we shalltake note of the waysin which bluewater policy had to be adapted to confrontationwith a major land
power.
#
*
*
The importanthistoricaltest of blue-waterdefence policy would lie in
its capacityto meet the challengeof a great land power, and after the
1670s Francewas usuallythe greatestland powerin Europe.There was
a time (fromabout 1716101733) when GreatBritainand Franceoften
co-operated,which is well to remember,becausenothing illustratesthe
Still, if
'kaleidoscopicnatureof Europeanpolitics'more emphatically.17
17 Jeremy Black, British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole (Edinburgh, 1985),
p. 5. This is now the best general study of the period. See also Black's Natural
and Necessary Enemies: Anglo-French Relations in the Eighteenth Century
(Athens, Ga., 1986) and his 'The BritishNavy and BritishForeign Policy in the
First Half of the Eighteenth Century',in Essays in European History in Honour
of Ragnhild Hatton, ed. Karl Schweizer and Jeremy Black (Lennoxville, Que.,
1985). There are two important recent surveysof British external policy: J.R.
Jones, Britain and the World 1649-1815 (Glasgow, 1980), and Paul Langford,
The Eighteenth Century 1688-1815 (London, 1976). For a recent bibliographical
guide to Europeanforeign policy see Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, The Rise of
the Great Powers 1648-1815 (Harlow, 1983). Among other things, it gives the
locations of important articles by G.G. Gibbs. Recent work on British policy is
very thoroughly covered in a bibliographical essay by Jeremy Black, 'British
Foreign Policy in the Eighteenth Century: A Survey',Journal of British Studies,
xxvi (1987).
42
Daniel A. Baugh
therewas sometruthin the generalidea that Austriawas GreatBritain's

'naturalally', there was far more truth in the idea that France was
Great Britain's'naturalenemy'. This second truth rested not only on
France'spotentialto dominateaffairson the Continent,but also on the
strategicpossibilitiesinherent in France's geographicalposition: like
the Netherlands,Francewas convenientlysituatedto launch invasions
of GreatBritainand Irelandas well as to maintainsea communications
with transoceanictheatres of war. It was the triple combination of
France'smilitarypower in Europe,possessionof much of the opposite
shoreof the Channel,and difficult-to-interdict
oceanicaccessthat made
her GreatBritain's'naturalenemy'.
To discoverhow blue-waterpolicy adjustedto these challenges,it is
neither necessarynor advisableto go through the whole period 16891815, war by war. With the exception of two or three major changes
in circumstancesand orientation,the situation remainedstatic during
the centuryand a quarter,and will be analysedhere under two broad
headings: objectsand grandstrategy.
In the eighteenthcenturyit was commonto speakof 'Britishobjects':
that Great Britain ought always to fight for 'Britishobjects' was a
familiarrefrainin the House of Commonsand the press.The popular
mind fondly posed the issue in terms of British objects versus Continental objects,imagining that all Continentaldealingswere necessitated by the narrowand foreign,probablyHanoverian,concernsof the
Georgianmonarchs.But the real issue was whetherthe objects,whereever pursued,would serve to enhance Britishprosperityand national
security.
Politiciansand statesmenof coursedo not deal just in coolly calculated assessmentsof this kind: they also deal in special interestsand
morallysuffusedpassions.It is thereforenecessaryto acknowledgethe
existence,indeedthe seemingprevalence,of these influences.Naturally,
the widespreadpopularopinionthat the only genuinely'Britishobjects'
were commercial, colonial, and oceanic - never European- served
the interestsof thosewho hoped to profitfrom the lotteryof privateering, and more importantly,those who pursuedfar-flungprofitsbehind
a publiclyfinancednaval and militaryshield. This should not make us
forgetthat many peoplewere caughtup in a bona fide infatuationwith
the possibilitiesof maritime-commercialexpansion,which during the
second half of the eighteenthcenturyled to some dubiouspre-emptive
flourishesand acquisitionsin distant locales.18Although the objects in
18 See my Clark Library lecture of 1983, 'Seapower and Science:
Perspectives on
the Motives of Pacific Exploration in the Eighteenth Century', to be published in
a volume edited by Derek Howse (forthcoming). The impulse towards far-flung
'Blue-Water'Policy
43
view were indisputably'British',the bearing of many of them on national securitywas often remote and speculative.There was a high
incidenceof politicalopportunism: transoceanicobjectswere popular,
and oppositionpoliticiansoften playedupon them; to borrowan image
from GeorgeKennan, striking'attitudesbefore the mirrorof domestic
political opinion'.19Indisputably,the spokesmenfor maritime, commercial, and colonial objects were often self-serving,passionatelydeluded, or both, but given the unarguablepremisethat naval strength
depended heavily upon commercialreturns and shipping, there was
senseas well as sillinessin their arguments.
Opposition follies are loud and strident; government follies are
usually quiet, indeed often hushed up, or at least soberly exhibited.
Priorto the accessionof GeorgeIII in 1760, the governmentview was
heavilyinfluencedby the personalpredilectionsof William III, George
I, and GeorgeII. Bornand broughtup in Europe,still formallyresponsiblefor the safetyof their native realms,and deeply attachedto things
military,their perspectivewas indeliblyEuropean.There was as much
scope for politiciansto exploit a Continentaliststance at court as a
Maritimeone in the public forums.Yet it was seldoma matter of pure
opportunism.There was a Whig ideal, first implantedwhen William
III stood at the head of the GrandAlliance,that not only spokeof the
necessityof preservingthe 'balanceof power'but also expresseda fervent moralconcernfor the 'libertyof Europe'.It may not be too much
to say that these sentimentsamountedto a secular resurrectionof the
old passionfor a ProtestantLeague.They were genuineenough.Among
Whigs in oppositionin the 1730^there were Continentalistas well as
Maritime votaries.20Whig Continentalismmay well have found its
finest expression,however, after 1760, when Edmund Burke in the
early 1770s 'denouncedLordNorth [the primeminister]for sayingthat
maritime expansion at the end of the century is covered in David Mackay, In
the Wake of Cook: Exploration, Science and Empire ij8o~i8oi (New York,
1985).
19 GeorgeF. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), p. 54. On the degree to
which Pitt's shifting enunciationsof policy and strategy during the Seven Years
War arose from the difficultyof dealing with intractablepopular prejudices, see
the invaluable study by Marie Peters, Pitt and Popularity: The Patriot Minister
and London Opinion during the Seven Years' War (Oxford, 1980). The difficulties posed by public attitudes in William Ill's reign can be extracted from
Henry Horwitz'sdefinitive study, Parliament,Policy and Politics in the Reign of
William III (Newark,Del., 1977). Popular misgivingsduring the reign of Anne
are expertly exhibited in Douglas Coombs, The Conduct of the Dutch: British
Opinion and the Dutch Alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession (The
Hague, 1958).
20 Black, BritishForeign Policy, p. 84.
44
Daniel A. Baugh
the national honour did not consist of being busy meddlers in every
European quarrel'; such an attitude, Burke claimed, was bound to
undermine European respect for Great Britain, 'once the refuge and
protectoress of distressed nations'.21As so often, Burke's arguments from
sentiment walked hand-in-hand with national security arguments. He
went on to warn that the stance of Lord North's government would in
time cbe seen in all its impotence and folly; and when the balance of
power is destroyed, it will be found of what infinite consequence its
preservation would have been'.22
Great Britain's fundamental national security problem during the
eighteenth century was how to coexist safely with French power while
maintaining British power. The duke of Newcastle, Thomas PelhamHolles, and William Pitt, later earl of Chatham, stood for diametrically
opposed approaches, and their example at mid-century serves to illustrate the extreme polarity of possible objects. In 1749 Newcastle
expressed his anxiety about France's proceedings in Europe now that a
compromise peace had been signed. The French were offering subsidies
right and left to gain allies, and in due course, he predicted, all Europe
and finally Great Britain would be reduced to 'a state of dependency' :
If they go on in buying up all the powers upon the Continent when they
have bought those which are to be sold they will get the others from fear,
and therefore France will reasonablythen conclude that they may impose
what condition they please upon us without our daring to dispute them
and therefore in reality run no risk of engaging themselves in a new war;
whereas if we had a tolerable system and force upon the Continent ... [they
would be deterred].23
A week later he answered the objection that priority had to be given to
naval expenditure by acknowledging the necessity of a strong navy, but
only to add that:
21 Gaetano L. Vincitorio, 'Edmund Burke and the First Partition of Poland : Britain
and the Crisis of 1772 in the "Great Republic" ', Crisis in the 'Great Republic3,
ed. G.L. Vincitorio (New York, 1969), pp. 36-7. The first quotation is Vincitorio's summarizing, the second from Burke's speech in the House of Commons,
18 May 1774. The 'Great Republic' is a name Burke gave to civilized Europe.
The linkage between these sentiments and Burke's advocacy of a 'holy war*
against Jacobinism in Europe in the 1790s is fairly obvious.
22 Ibid., p. 37. Richard Pares's article, 'American versus Continental Warfare,
1739-63', first published in 1936 and reprinted in Pares, The Historian's Business
and Other Essays (Oxford, 1961), pp. 130-72, offers a rich texture of evidence
exhibiting the interplay of doctrinal prejudices and national security realities.
23 Newcastle to Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke, 25 Aug. 1749, quoted by D.B. Horn,
'The Cabinet Controversy on Subsidy Treaties in Time of Peace, 1749-50', The
English HistoricalReview, xlv (1930), 463-4.
'Blue-Water'Policy
45
a naval force, tho5 carried never so high, unsupported with even the
appearanceof a force upon the continent, will be of little use ... France will
outdo us at sea, when they have nothing to fear by land ... I have always
maintained that our marine should protect our alliances upon the continent; and they, by diverting the expense of France, enable us to maintain
our superiorityat sea.24
At the opposite extreme William Pitt, commenting on the peace of
1763, told the House of Commons:
France is chiefly, if not solely, to be dreaded by us in the light of a maritime
and commercial power ... [and] by restoring to her all the valuable WestIndia islands, and by our concessionsin the Newfoundland fishery,we had
given to her the means of recoveringher prodigious losses and of becoming
once more formidableto us at sea.25
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, he had inveighed against anything
even remotely directed towards broad Continental objects and engagements:
We have suffered ourselves to be deceived by names and sounds, the balance of power, the liberty of Europe, a common cause, and many more
such expressions,without any other meaning than to exhaust our wealth,
consume the profits of our trade, and load our posterity with intolerable
burdens.26
If policy consists of what is decided and then supported by genuine
effort, Newcastle's extreme interventionism was persistently rejected.
In 1749, the rejection was categorical; the objections of his brother
Henry Pelham and Lord Hardwicke were decisive, though the duke
was allowed to offer one or two subsidies to German principalities as a
consolation. (They stirred up nothing but trouble).27 On the other
hand, Pitt's comments on the peace of 1763 and his pronouncements at
the outset of the 1755-63 war may seem inconsistent with the policy he
actually pursued when he was given charge of its direction. After all,
24 Newcastle to Hardwicke, 2 Sept. 1749, quoted by Philip G. Yorke, The Life and
Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke ( 3 vols., Cambridge, 19 13 ) ,
ii. 23.
25 Quoted by H.M. Scott, 'The Importance of Bourbon Naval Reconstruction to the
Strategy of Choiseul after the Seven Years' War', The International History
Review, i (i979), 17.
26 Quoted by Pares, American versus Continental Warfare', p. 138.
27 See Horn, 'Subsidy Treaties', p. 466 : It 'resulted in a futile subsidy competition
between Britain and France, set Germany in an uproar, and contributed to the
alienation of Austria from Britain, and the break-up of the old system of alliances
which Newcastle had intended to confirm and consolidate'.
46
Daniel A. Baugh
he had approved, and against Lord Bute emphatically supported, sizeable subsidies to Prussia and the use of British military force in Germany. As is well known, it was a point upon which he did change his
mind, for he feared that Canada might otherwise be given back, as
Cape Breton had been given back in 1748. The Prussian alliance
appeared to offer an efficient means of preventing that : when Pitt said
that his purpose was to conquer America in Germany, he meant it. His
conception of the object of the war never changed;28 what changed was
his view of strategic and diplomatic methods, but we are concerned here
with objects. Pitt never thought that Great Britain was fighting for a
European balance of power. It is to the purpose to allow Henry Pelham, the first lord of the treasury, the last word. Defending the peace
of 1748 in the House of Commons, he asked :
Will any gentleman say that it was not more for the interest of this nation
to restore to France the possession of Cape Breton than to leave her in
possessionof Hainault, Flanders, Brabant and Namur, and consequently
of the whole coast from Zealand to the westernmostpart of Bretagne[?]...
Our restoringof Cape Breton upon this consideration was for the interest
of England, without any regard to our allies, or to the balance of power in
Europe.29
Henry Pelham's point is of central importance.
While not everyone considered French possession of the Netherlands
to be fatal, few could ignore the increased danger it presented, with
regard both to invasion and the safety of sea-lanes and commerce.
This leads us to an understanding of the true nature of Great Britain's
European concerns. In accordance with the principles of blue-water
policy, Great Britain had no territorial ambitions on the continent of
Europe, but there were particular areas not to be ignored. Excluding
Minorca because it was an island and patently defensible by sea power,
these were Gibraltar, Portugal, the Baltic Sea, the Netherlands, and
Hanover. In the earlier part of the eighteenth century, control of the
Mediterranean Sea was also very much coveted, but commercial and
diplomatic trends made that somewhat less important later on. In the
defence of all these except the Netherlands and Hanover, sea power was
decisive. Gibraltar's road communications with the Spanish mainland
were so bad that sea communications could readily outsupply a besieg28 Cf. Pares, 'American versus Continental Warfare', p. 168: 'However, though
their reasons and their spirit were very different, Pitt and Newcastle agreed in
defending the policy of the whole war against the new party [led by Bute] which
had arisen for contractingit*.Italics mine.
20 Quoted by HerbertW. Richmond,The Navy in the War of 1739-48 (Cambridge,
1920), iii. 241.
'Blue-Water'Policy
47
ing army. Portugal, whose reason to fear Bourbon power (whether

Spanishor French) remainedconstant,was a steady,indeed dependent,
ally -the only one, in fact; its interior terrain facilitated military
defence; and sea power could decisivelyaffect the defence of Lisbon.
Great Britain'saccess to Baltic ports had to be maintainedby diplomacy and occasionallyby militaryforce, but in both respectssea power
had a decisive influence. The most expensivearea to defend was the
Netherlands,and the preservationof 'theBarrier'and the independence
of the Netherlandsinevitablyposed a problem.So did Hanover.
All of these sphereswere of serviceto blue-waterpolicy, except one.
Gibraltar'skey role was of courseto monitorthe movementsof French
fleets; Portugalnot only providedan advancedstation to assistMediterraneanvoyages, but also stood near the primarysea-lane for outbound voyagesto the West Indies and North America; the Baltic was
a primarysourceof mastsand naval storesfor all the maritimepowers
of Europe;and the Netherlandscontainedthe best ports and estuaries
for hiding and sheltering invasion barges. These were the specific
objectsof Britishpolicyin Europe,and in additionthe generalconcern
to keep Europe'sports open to Britishtrade. The exceptionwas Hanover, whose dynasticconnectionwas railed againstnot only becauseit
affrontedthe chauvinismand isolationismof the Britishpopulace,but
also becauseit often obstructedthe best diplomaticand strategicchoices
for preservingBritishinterestsin the Netherlandsand the Baltic. Hanover was a millstone,its only strategicvalue its (and Hesse-Cassel's)
capacity to provide loyal mercenaries.In sum, when we scrutinize
Great Britain'sEuropeanobjectives,we are driven to the same conclusionsthat caused the Britishpublic in the 1670s to regard France
rather than Holland as the most menacing neighbour: first, because
France had built a battle-fleet;and second, because powerful French
armies were attempting to bring the Low Countries under French
dominion.
What, then, of the balance of power? The short answer, evinced
repeatedlyby policy decisions of the British governmentduring the
eighteenthcenturyespeciallyin the termsof peace settlements,was that
the 'balanceof powerwas worth a certainprice, but a very low one'.30
Counterpoiseand equipoise were objects only so long as they were
achievableby minor naval and militaryefforts or by diplomatic gesturesand linkagesof mutual convenience.31
30 Pares, 'American versus Continental Warfare', p. 138. Pares did not say, as I do,
that this represented the prevailing policy doctrine.
31 Vincitorio, 'Edmund Burke and the First Partition of Poland', p. 37. Burke
played to this disposition in 1774 when he alleged that adverse trends in Europe
'might have been prevented by mere force of negotiation'.
48
Daniel A. Baugh
It may be argued that the distinctiondrawn here between specific

Europeanobjects (consonantwith blue-waterpolicy) and the general
structureof European politics (the balance of power) disappeared
when it came to actual practice; that even limited Continentalobjectives were seen to requirea favourablepower balance. Such reasoning
rests, however, on the fallacious idea - entertainedby Newcastle, as
we have seen- that an adversetipping of the balance would probably
lead to a calamitous slide (today's 'domino theory'); that because
nationaldefence based on naval and commercialsupremacycould not
be successfullycarriedon againstan establishedContinentalhegemony,
the danger was too great to be ignored. This argument,usually laid
down as an axiom, was as speciousin its eighteenth-centurycontext as
it is in today's.
RegardingNewcastle'sfallacy, we may note that some theoristsof
the eighteenthcenturyarguedthe preciselyoppositecase, that the balance was invariablyself-adjusting:32
the historicalfacts of the period
1689-1815 tend to favour the self-adjustmenttheory over the domino
theory. The conduct of the smaller polities near France'sbordersinvolves intricaciesthat cannot be delved into here; with respectto the
largerpowers,the crucialissue was whetherthey feared France more
than they feared each other. Newcastle, for instance, was always inclined to think that other powersviewed France as the main menace
becauseGreatBritaindid.33He was wrong.
When William III formed the Grand Alliance at the outset of the
period,he could draw upon westernEurope'swidespreadfear of Louis
XIV's ambition. And when that ambition extended to upholding a
dynasticconnectionwith Spain, it was difficulteven for Tories, who
detestedWilliam'sContinentalism,to opposea war aimedat preventing
it, because practicallyeveryonefeared that commercialaccess to the
Spanish Empire overseas would otherwise fall under the sway of
France.34The Britishpublic'senthusiasmfaded duringthe courseof the
war as this sway came to appearless plausible.After 1714, the circumstances for creating a Grand Alliance disintegrated: the war-weary
Netherlandsceased to regardFrance as its only sourceof danger, and
Austria and Prussiacame to fear each other more than France. By
32 See M.S. Anderson,
'Eighteenth-Century Theories of the Balance of Power',
Studies in Diplomatic History: Essays in Honour of D.B. Horn, ed. Ragnhild
Hatton and M.S. Anderson (London, 1970), pp. 189-90.
33 Pares, 'American versus Continental
Warfare', p. 135.
34 A good account of the degree to which maritime
objects, especially the question
of access to the trade of the Spanish Empire, influenced public support for the
war of the Spanish Succession may be found in Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond,
The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 1558-1727 (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 276-81.
'Blue-Water'Policy
49
mid-centurythe Austrianswere causingpracticallyeveryonein London

to despair except the duke of Newcastle, who was ever disposed to
propitiatethem in hopes of restoringthe 'good old system'. (The word
'system'in the eighteenth century was commonly used to describe a
diplomaticplan.)
After George HI came to the throne in 1760, Court pressurefor
Europeanallianceslessened;George III, born not in Hanover but in
England,was not a Continentalist,and 'gloriedin the name of Briton'.
Neither he nor his ministersignored Hanover and Europe, but their
policies stuck closely to 'Britishobjects' (Burke was in opposition).
When Frederickof Prussiaexpostulatedin 1768 : 'The EnglishSystem?
The English have no system', he was speaking nothing less than the
truth with regardto the period after 1760. This diminutionof British
concernfor Europeanconnectionswas matchedthree yearslater by an
equally important diminution of French aggressivenesson the Continent; the policyof the dukeof Choiseuland of the count of Vergennes
after him aimed at keeping Europe contentedand unthreatened,thus
creatinga situationin which Great Britain would find it less easy to
fashion useful alliances.35Not until Jacobinism arose in France and
BonapartismshowedEuropean ambitionand intransigencemore compellingthan LouisXIV's, did the possibilityof forminga coalitionwith
purposesakin to those of the GrandAlliance (let alone with a view to
overthrow)reappear,and even then it took a long time before Prussia
and Austriawere disposedto dread France as much as they dreaded
35 Their object, as noted below, was to build up Bourbon maritime sinews with a
view towardsreducing Great Britain's,and to accomplishthis they believed they
needed a quiet Continent. See Scott, 'Importanceof BourbonNaval Reconstruction', esp. pp. 18, 28, 34-5; and Orville T. Murphy, Charles Gravier,Comte de
Vergennes: French Diplomacy in the Age of Revolution, 171g- 1787 (Albany,
N.Y., 1982), esp.pp. 216, 230-1, 239, 269, 304-5, 3 10. It is sufficientlyevident that
Great Britain's 'diplomatic isolation' was not entirely the consequence of Lord
Bute's absurdlyinept mode of abandoningthe alliance with Prussia.Reasons for
the sagging value of a Dutch alliance in the eighteenth century are set forth in
Alice Clare Carter, Neutrality or Commitment:The Evolution of Dutch Foreign
Policy i66j-i7Q5 (London, 1975). The vicissitudes of policy-making circumstances after 1714 are illustrated in Jeremy Black, Natural and Necessary
Enemies, Michael Roberts's Stenton lecture, Splendid Isolation, 1763-1780
(Reading, 1970) is an introductorysurvey of considerableimportance.The use
of sea power in the exerciseof foreignpolicy during the early yearsof George Ill's
reign is exploredby Nicholas Tracy, 'The Royal Navy as an Instrumentin British
Foreign Relations, 1763-1775' (Ph.D., Southampton, 1972), and in the following
four articles: 'Parry of a Threat to India, 1768-1774', Mariner's Mirror, lix
(1973), 35-48; 'The Gunboat Diplomacy of the Government of George Grenville, 1764-1765', Historical Journal, xvii (1974), 71 1-31; 'The Administration
of the Duke of Grafton and the French Invasion of Corsica',Eighteenth-Century
Studies, viii (1974-5), 169-82; 'The Falkland Islands Crisis of 1770: Use of
Naval Force', English Historical Review, xc (1975), 40-75.
50
Daniel A. Baugh
each other. In all this, it is evident that Great Britain'schances of

making useful alliances depended upon the aggressivenessof France
more than any other factor. Yet a common practice of historianshas
been to grant the pronouncementsof the duke of Newcastlethe status
of policy,and to see the situationunderLouisXIV or Bonaparteas the
paradigm.
Beforeleaving the questionof the practicalityof blue-waterpolicy's
objectives,we must addresstwo other ideas commonly found in the
historicalliterature.One of them echoes Newcastle'stenet that France
would 'outdo us at sea, when they have nothing to fear by land5.The
implicationhere is that France, freed from the heavy cost of military
preparednessand campaigning,couldin peaceand war devoteresources
to naval augmentationto a degreethat GreatBritaincould not possibly
match; therefore,naval defence itself necessitatedsignificantmilitary
alliances.Between 1763 and 1783, when Europewas quiet and Great
Britainwas 'isolated',this propositionwas tested. French governments
tried very hard to outbuildthe Britishnavy, and urged the Spanishto
do likewise.There was a brief span of Bourbonsuccessbetween 1778
and 1781, causedby the Britishgovernment'sfailureto matchthe naval
challengeearlyin the war (it was expensivelypursuingthe chimeraof
quick military victory in the Thirteen Colonies), but in the end the
effortto outbuildthe Britishnavy failed, in both peace and war.36
The otheridea is somewhatrelated.It pointsnot to unbearablefinancial strains,but to the spectreof a grand amalgamatedfleet which a
hegemonicEuropeanpower, by gatheringtogether all the naval and
maritimeresourcesof Europe, might then employ to overcomeGreat
Britain's'Wooden Walls'.37This idea overlooksthe difficultya hegemonic power in those days would have encounteredon attemptingto
draw upon the naval resourcesand co-operationof so vast an arrayof
conqueredor dependentcountries;it could not be done without extensive garrisoningand administrativeexpense,as Bonaparte'sexperience
demonstrated,and it was scarcely possible even then. Moreover, as
capitalshipshad to be builton tidewater,such a fleet could be damaged
by pre-emptivestrikes. In the Napoleonic era this was part of the
rationalebehind the attackson Copenhagenand the Walcherenexpedition. The instinct that later saw to the ruthlessdestructionof the
navy of Vichy Francewas deeplyrooted.
36 The French failure in the period from 1763 to 1775 is cogently set forth in
Scott, 'Importance of Bourbon Naval Reconstruction*. I have analysed the loss
and recovery of British naval superiority in the War for American Independence
in 'Why Did Britain Lose Command of the Sea during the War for America?', to
be published in a volume edited by Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine.
37 Cf. Howard, 'Reappraisal', p. 184.
'Blue-Water3 Policy
*
51
In addressingthe two matters immediatelyabove, we have entered

upon the regionwhereobjectsand grand strategyoverlap;it is time to
turn to Britishgrandstrategyduringthe 'SecondHundredYearsWar'.
As the subjecthas been well studied, many of its featuresare familiar
and in most respectsa summaryof its principleswill be sufficient.
The first considerationwas home defence. The defence of Great
Britain was founded upon the fleet in the Channel, seconded by a
flotillaof small craft,plus an army (supplementedby militia) upon the
coast and in reserve.The militaryforce for home defence,amplifiedby
special volunteer units at moments of invasion-alert,was partly for
insurancebut mainly to make the task of invasion formidable.The
intent was to compel a large-scaleenemy effort in order to compound
its difficultiesand ensureadequatewarning. (A sizeableinvadingarmy
could hardly be prepared,embarked,and ferried acrossundetected.)
For the same reason it was desirableto forbid any puissant military
power ready access to the ports and estuariesof the Low Countries,
though if circumstancespreventedthe achievementof this, the result
would not be fatal, merelyuncomfortable.38
One problemof Britishgrandstrategy,ratherobviousbut sometimes
overlooked,was the huge expenseof keepingin commissiona main fleet
of line-of-battleships, fully manned and ready to answer invasion
threats. Theoreticallysuch a fleet's assignmentwas to block up the
Frenchnavy in its portsand thus ensurethe safetyof Britishtrade, but
in fact the blockadingof eitherBrestor Toulon was hard to accomplish
in the eighteenthcentury.39One major problemwas that ships could
not continue long at sea without courting scurvy; it was temporarily
solvedin 1758, but the solutionwas arduous(regularsupplyboatswith
fresh provisions) and not fully understood,so the difficultypersisted
until lemon juice came to be a regular dietary issue in the 1790s.
38 During the uneasy peace of 1802-3 the British government, mindful of France's
control of the Low Countries, maintained an army of 132,000. Of these troops,
about 50,000 were in overseas garrisons; 81,000 regulars stood alongside 50,000
militia in the British Isles to make sure that the task of invasion would be
formidable. See Richard Glover, Britain at Bay: Defence against Bonaparte,
1803-14 (London, i973),P-4339 Even when blocking up the main fleet was achieved, convoy escorts for trade were
still necessary because it was impossible to prevent small squadrons and individual privateers from operating. A.N. Ryan's most recent reflections on the most
important and enduring naval strategic problem of the century are contained in
'The Royal Navy and the Blockade of Brest, 1689- 1805: Theory and Practice', in
Les Marines de Guerre europlenties XVIIe-XVIHe siicles, ed. Martine Acerra,
Jose"Merino, Jean Meyer (Paris, 1985).
52
Daniel A . Baugh
When therewas no likelihoodof invasion,the fleet might be used in

some other way, particularlyin combined operationsin European or
West Indian waters. One reason why large British fleets went to the
Mediterraneanin 1694 and 1707 to supportmilitarycampaignsthere
was that it gave them something useful to do.40 Lord Chancellor
Cowper'sminutes of a high-level meeting in early 1707 record the
following: 'The Fleet must be [placedin] the Mediterranean]and this
methodwill find businessfor it besidesrulerof the Seas.'41For want of
time and space, we must passover the navy'stransoceanicemployment
in pursuitof the dynamic and aggressiveobjects of blue-waterpolicy.
The contentiousquestionof grand strategyis the one that concerns
Great Britain'sdegree of commitmentto military operationson the
Continent. In his famous treatise, The Idea of a Patriot King, Lord
Bolingbrokediscoursedfor eight pageson the natureof what amounted
40 Liddell Hart did not realize (British Way in Warfare, p. 31) that although
William III neglected transatlantictheatres in the 1689-97 war, he readily and
boldly grasped opportunities to use the fleet to assist military operations in
Europe,especiallyin the Mediterranean.
41 Quoted in Henry L. Snyder, The Formulation of Foreign and Domestic Policy
in the Reign of Queen Anne : Memorandaby Lord Chancellor Cowper of Conversationswith Lord Treasurer GodolphhV,The Historical Journal, xi (1968),
154. In many respectsthe most useful generalworkon naval strategyremainsthat
of AdmiralSir HerbertRichmond.His Navy as an Instrumentof Policy, published
posthumously,extendsonly to 1727. His earlier survey,Statesmenand Sea Power
(Oxford, 1946) remainsuseful, but one should also consult the importantsurvey
by Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (2nd ed.,
London, 1983 ) . The following specializedstudies of grand strategyare especially
useful because, like the general works just mentioned, they too take policy considerations into account: Stephen Baxter, William III; John B. Hattendorf,
England in the War of the Spanish Succession:A Study of the English View and
Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702-1712 (New York, 1987) ; Admiral Richmond,
Navy in the War of 1739-48. Alongside Sir Julian S. Corbett, England in the
Seven Years' War: A Study in CombinedStrategy (2 vols., London, 1907), one
should read Marie Peters,Pitt and Popularity,and Richard Middleton, The Bells
of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the Seven Years'
War 1757-1762 (Cambridge, 1985). Piers Mackesy, The War for America 17751783 (London, 1964) is indispensable.The most reliable inquiry into the war of
the First Coalition from 1793 to 1796 is now John Ehrman, The YoungerPitt:
The Reluctant Transition (London, 1983). There are some excellent studies of
the Second Coalition: A.B. Rodger, The War of the Second Coalition, 1798 to
1801: A Strategic Commentary (Oxford, 1964); Piers Mackesy, Statesmen at
War: The Strategy of Overthrow1798-1799 (London, 1974), and War without
Victory: The Downfall of Pitt 1799-1802 (Oxford, 1984); Edward Ingram,
Commitment to Empire: Prophecies of the Great Game in Asia 1797-1800
(Oxford, 1981). For a revisionist view of Great Britain's policy and grand
strategy in Europe see Paul W. Schroeder, *The Collapse of the Second Coalition', Journal of Modern History, xlix (1987). Arthur Wellesley'smilitary caution in the Peninsularwar may be traced in John Kenneth Severn, A Wellesley
Affair: Richard Marquess Wellesley and the Conduct of Anglo-SpanishDiplomacy, 1809-1812 (Tallahassee, 1981).
'Blue-Water'Policy
53
to blue-water policy. At one point he asks, rhetorically, 'Are we never

to be soldiers?' and answers,
Occasionally ... and for offence as well as defence; but in proportion to the
nature of the conjuncture, considered always relatively to the difference
here insisted upon between our situation, our interest, and the nature of
our strength, compared with those of the other powers of Europe; and not
in proportionto the desires,or even to the wants, of the nations with whom
we are confederated. Like other amphibious animals, we must come occasionally on shore: but the water is more properly our element, and in it,
like them, as we find our greatest security, so we exert our greatest force.42
The style is elevated, not to say convoluted, but the key issue, the question of limits, is laid bare.
In addressing this key issue, it is necessary to ask not only 'how much'
British effort was in fact devoted to Continental military operations, but
also according to what methods and, above all, with what conception as
to how a war was to be brought to a successful conclusion. In Liddell
Hart's opinion, there were three Clausewitzian theories that had the
greatest impact on modern military thinking: '( 1 ) the theory of "absolute" warfare ... ; (2 ) the theory that you must concentrate against the
main enemy, who must be overthrown first; and (3) the theory that
the armed forces form the true objective, and the battle the true means
to it'.43 My criteria do not match Liddell Hart's three 'Clausewitzian'
theories precisely. The first two (how much, and according to what
methods) relate to 'absolute' warfare; the last (how war is to be
brought to a successful conclusion) relates to the second and third
theories about the 'main enemy', and the function of battle.
First, the questions of how much, and how to. Great Britain's direct
military contribution had two components: British (and Irish) regiments; and hired mercenaries, sometimes under British commanders
(for example, Marlborough), sometimes not (for example, Prince
Ferdinand of Brunswick). Usually the two were intermixed, and quite
often intermixed with allied forces as well. Though the total British
army grew to considerable size after 1689, the numbers sent abroad to
campaign on the Continent were small. For instance in 1760, at the
height of the Seven Years War, there were 187,000 soldiers in British
pay, of which 55,000 were German mercenaries, yet the force recruited
42 Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, The Idea of a Patriot King, ed. Sydney
W. Jackman (Bobbs-Merrill ed., 1965), p. 70; the eight pages run from 64 to 71.
43 Liddell Hart, British Way in Warfare, p. 17. He apparently believed that Clausewitz himself had insisted without equivocation on these points, but modern
scholarship has shown that some of the alleged Wessons' from Clausewitz have
been misinterpretations and distortions.
54
Daniel A. Baugh
in Great Britain and Ireland and sent to Germany numbered only about
20,000. British troops were used chiefly for defence and policing in the
British Isles, raids and diversions in Europe, and transoceanic campaigning and garrisoning, while Great Britain's military operations in
Europe depended largely upon taking foreign regiments into British
pay (often German, but in the Peninsular War Spanish and Portuguese) and upon allied armies.44
British governments spent large sums of money subsidizing allies. A
common opinion holds that eighteenth-century Great Britain was an
untrustworthy ally - 'perfidious Albion' - and certainly there were
moments when the British government behaved very badly, especially
when it opted to break off the struggle, as in 1711-13 and 176 1-2.
Frederick of Prussia remarked in one of his Political Testaments: 'England will pay you a subsidy and will regard you as a mercenary whom
she can dismiss as soon as you have accomplished the task allotted you.'45
This was entirely accurate, and in view of the events of 176 1-2 we can
hardly blame him for saying it; but we need not look very far into
eighteenth-century wartime diplomacy to find that Great Britain had
no monopoly on perfidy and inconstancy.46 It was a comfortable pretense for Continental statesmen to imagine that their own inconstancy
was entirely provoked by British attitudes.
Fragility of alliances was the rule, not the exception, with the smaller
polities recognizing and calculating their particular risks, burdens, and
interests as readily as the larger. The conduct of Victor Emmanuel of
Piedmont-Savoy in 1696 provides an example: measuring his risks
and opportunities, he changed sides in a move that led to the collapse
of the Grand Alliance, for which William III never forgave him.47Yet
in spite of the uncertainties, Great Britain sought and found military
44 The years from 1813 to 1815 constitute a special case, and so do the circumstances. In hopes of achieving a lasting victory, Great Britain raised the level of
her forces in Europe very substantially. Nevertheless, her policy, guided by
Gastlereaghwho agreed with Metternich on the point, maintained a wary and
limited conception of war aims; see Gordon A. Craig, Troblems of Coalition
Warfare: The Military Alliance Against Napoleon, 1813-14', in War, Politics,
and Diplomacy: Selected Essays,ed. G.A. Craig (New York, 1966).
45 Quoted in Hermann Kantorowicz, The Spirit of British Policy, trans. W.H.
Johnston (London, 193 1) , pp. 45-6.
46 Murphy (Vergennes,p. 295) comments that Vergennes 'knew as well as anyone
Frederick'srecordof deception and betrayal'.
47 See generally Geoffrey Symcox, 'Britain and Victor Amadeus II: Or, The Use
and Abuse of Allies', England's Rise to Greatness, 1660-1763 ed. Stephen B.
Baxter (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), pp. 151-84, esp. 159-62. In 1706,
Victor Amadeusexecuted a volte-face in the opposite direction. Symcox observes
that Allied leaders regarded this one as 'a logical, even admirable, display of
enlightenedself-interest'.
'Blue-Water'Policy
55
allies on the Continentin all but one of the seven French wars. The
school that favoureda purelymaritimestrategyinveighed against this
practice,but it was sensibleon many occasionsbecauseit was efficient.
One may find a carefullyelaboratedstatementof its efficiencyin a
pamphletby Josiah Tucker publishedanonymouslyin 1755.48Tucker
arguedthat it was betterto hire foreignsoldierswith moniesderivedby
taxing British manufacturingworkersthan to convert those workers
into soldiers.There was no point in leaving France militarilyunopposed;if nothingbut a 'Sea-War'were pursuedit would end up costing
just as much, perhapsmore, and would entail risksthat Great Britain
ought to avoid. Tucker did not mention that the efficiencyof this system would be diminished,possiblynullified,if an ally failed to deliver,
either by laxity in assemblingits army or inclination towards other
prioritiesthan fightingFrance.Britishdiplomats,however,were acutely
aware of the problem. Subsidy negotiationswith the Austriansoften
called for doling out payments according to progressmade towards
agreed purposes: a payment when the regimentswere formed; more
when they marched; then regularmonthlyinfusionswhen they reached
the specifiedtheatreof war. Otherwisethe Austriansmight be tempted
to use the money to move into Silesiaor Italy. When Viscount Castlereagh became foreignsecretaryin 1812, he resolvedto get away from
this untrustfulsort of rationing, rightly feeling it was not good for
Grand-Alliance-stylemorale.By 1813, however,he had learnedthat he
couldnot changethe system;if the moneywas all paid at the outset,the
allied armies would fail to materializeor to move.49Although hard
bargainingwas indispensable,when the interestsof an ally coincided
with the aims of GreatBritainthe subsidysystempaid handsomedividends; the militaryeffect came at a cheaperrate than hiring mercenariesand at a much cheaperrate than sending Britishtroopsabroad.50
48 [Josiah Tucker,] The Important Question concerning Invasions, A Sea-War,
Raising the Militia, and paying Subsidies for Foreign Troops (1755). Walter
Ernest Clark identified Tucker as the author in Josiah Tucker: Economist,
ColumbiaStudies in History,Economicsand Public Law, xix (New York, 1903),
245.
49 EdwardV. Gulick, Europe'sClassicalBalance of Power (Ithaca, N.Y., 1955), p.
133. Gulick has provided a useful brief surveyof Fourth Coalition policy in 'The
Final Coalition and the Congress of Vienna 1813-1815', in New Cambridge
Modern History, ix, ed. C.W. Crawley (Cambridge, 1965).
50 Cf. Symcox, 'Britainand Victor Amadeus',pp. 165-6. On p. 158 Symcoxwrites:
Everything hinged on finding an ally whose interests harmonizedas closely as
possiblewith Britain'sand whose strategicposition made it a key element in the
currentalignmentof forces on the Continent. Mere payment to an unwilling ally
could never produce results: foot-dragging and evasion would have been the
only consequence.'
56
Daniel A. Baugh
Coincidinginterestswere the key. Great Britain'sallies could from

their perspectiveslook for a variety of militarybenefitsbesides direct
assistancefromthe Britisharmy. In some situationsBritishnaval power
was used, usuallylogistically,to assistmilitaryoperations,particularly
in Spanishand Italian theatres.Great Britain'sability to launch expeditionaryraids ( 'descents') on the French or Flemish coast was occasionallyvalued by a hard-pressedally as a diversion,but in generalwe
ought to see the 'descents'for what they mainlywere: a meansof keeping the House of Commonsinterestedin and supportiveof the war
effort: the House of Commonsalways loved to hear that a 'descent'
was in progress,and alwaysseemedto forgetveryquicklyhow miserably
mostof them workedout in practice.
But Great Britain'smain value as an ally was its subsidy money;
othernationstried to buy allegiancebut none paid hard cash so reliably
and in such quantities.AdmiralMahan'sdescriptivewordsare wonderfully exaggerated: 'Great Britain, ... the fruitful mother of subsidies,
upon whose bountiful breastshung the impoverishedand struggling
nationsof the Continent.'51
But the historicalpoint is sound.The financial power unleashedby what P.G.M. Dicksonhas called 'The Financial Revolutionin England'was evidentby 1708 if not earlier,though
the full measureof its strengthwas not obviousuntil the refinancingof
the national debt in 1749 at an interest rate so low that it amazed
Englishmenas well as foreigners.52
Clearly and overwhelmingly,the contributionof Great Britain to
militarycampaigningon the Continentderivedmainlyfrommoneyand
credit.The length of the wars ensuredthat money would be crucialto
success: whateverwassaid and hopedby Englishmenwho day-dreamed
of quickvictories,the methodpursuedin the end was financialattrition.
In this lay the distinguishingessenceof blue-waterpolicy, which in the
final analysiswas made feasibleby sea power.As the earl of Holderness
remarkedto his envoyat Berlinin 1758, 'moneyhas alwaysbeen looked
upon as the proper and most effective contingent of England'.53
51 Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and
Empire ( 2 vols., Boston, 1893 ) , ii. 381. This long, final chapter of the second sea
power book is the only place in all his historicalwritings where Mahan seriously
addressedthe basic problemof Britishgrand strategy.
52 P.G.M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit 1688-1756 (London, 1067).
53 Quoted by Carl William Eldon, England'sSubsidy Policy towards the Continent
during the Seven Years' War (Philadelphia, 1938), p. 160, quoting a letter from
Holderness to Andrew Mitchell. John M. Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder:
British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1^3-1815 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1969) is of the first importance,though curiously it gives not the slightest hint
that subsidieshad been a key element of Britishwar policy for a century.
'Blue-Water*Policy
57
'Always5,however, is an exaggeration : Great Britain fell into the money

method during the eighteenth century because it worked and because
other methods were uncongenial. One reason it proved so effective was
that the financial system of France was so ramshackle. The method
failed between 1795 and 181 2 when the Napoleonic system of sustaining armies from conquered resources reduced its possibilities, but in the
end the British treasury outlasted the French system of conquests and
requisitions.
Modern observers never tire of pointing out that Great Britain could
not win by such a method, as Michael Howard has emphasized : 'it
never enabled us to win'.54To which two responses are to be given: first,
Great Britain did not win eighteenth-century wars by military campaigns on the Continent either. The reason may have been that she
seldom chose to give a 'commitment of support to a Continental ally in
the nearest available theatre, on the largest scale that contemporary
resources could afford'.55 As noted earlier, emphasis and degree are
essential to an understanding of the policy. Only once did Great Britain
follow a recipe that called for maximum military effort in Europe; that
was between 1813 and 1815, when particular circumstances rendered
it the most efficient course; in earlier wars such circumstances did not
exist and such commitments were not made. Whether a greater military
effort in some 'main theatre' would have brought victory in other wars
is anybody's guess, but when the chips had to be put down British policy
makers were either unwilling or unable to try it. Before 1793 campaigns
in Flanders, whatever their outcome, were nullified by different outcomes in other spheres. The consequence was either stalemate or limited
victory, and the main adversaries were drawn to the peace table generally because Great Britain (or one of her leading allies) was reasonably
satisfied, or tiring of the struggle, and France was financially exhausted.
The second response carries us from grand strategy back to objects.
The point is that Great Britain was not in fact trying to win ; she was
merely seeking a successful outcome; hoping to secure a not-too-ominous settlement in Europe while at the same time retaining what had
been acquired by campaigns overseas. This was perfectly logical. Bluewater policy was accepted by the British public and government because it secured the defence of the realm : though aggressive overseas, it
was defensive in Europe. It could not, and did not, fulfil the dream,
54 Howard, Reappraisal', p. 180.
55 The words are Michael Howard's (ibid., p. 180), who goes on to say that 'so far
from being alien to traditional British strategy, [this principle] was absolutely
central to it'.
Daniel A. Baugh
58
popularin London, of making wars that would 'pay5: the rising national debt was proof of that. But it did succeedin achievingsomething
more important. While other European powers emerged from wars
weakenedeconomicallyand financially,sometimesseverely,Great Britain emerged economicallyand financiallystrongerthan ever. If the
true geopolitical object of a nation's external policy is to ensure a
relativelyfavourablepost-waroutcome, blue-water policy served the
purposeremarkablywell.56
We may concludeby glancingonce moreat an interestingaberration:
the caseof the ElderPitt and the Seven YearsWar. Pitt began political
life, and alwaysspoke, as a devout blue-water man. Yet in 1761-2 he
insistedmore vigorouslythan anyone on keeping up the war in Germany and maintainingthe Prussianalliance. Why? The answerlies in
the matterof winning.Pitt wantedto win, to achievemorethan a comfortablesettlement: his object was to raise Great Britain a very substantialnotch above France, to create a world in which Great Britain
might be permanentlysecure.Very few Britishleadersin the eighteenth
centurythought this way; until Jacobinismand Bonapartismforced a
change, such thinking was politically out of step with the times. Although from a close point of observationthe accessionof George III
seemsdecisivein the disappointingof the ElderPitt'shopes,thosehopes
would probablyhave been disappointedanyway.
CornellUniversity
56 In this connection everyone ought to read Liddeil Hart's final paragraphabout

the meaning of the word 'victory' (British Way in Warfare,p. 41 ).

Great Britains Blue-Water Policy, 1689-1815 - Daniel A. Baugh

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Great Britains Blue-Water Policy, 1689-1815 - Daniel A. Baugh

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Great Britain's 'Blue-Water' Policy, 1689-1815

Author(s): Daniel A. Baugh

Great Britain's 'Blue-Water5Policy,

almost three centuries (from about 1650 to 1920), Great

Great Britain, thanks to her insularsituation, but not to Continental

Hart's biographer,Brian Bond, come to his subject'srescue.Far from

They committed England's resourcesheavily to all three, and had

historyof the Englishconstitutionthere came a new era in the history

and JamesHarrington'sneo-machiavellianproposalin Oceana ( 1656)

therewas sometruthin the generalidea that Austriawas GreatBritain's

English HistoricalReview, xlv (1930), 463-4.

ing army. Portugal, whose reason to fear Bourbon power (whether

It may be argued that the distinctiondrawn here between specific

mid-centurythe Austrianswere causingpracticallyeveryonein London

each other. In all this, it is evident that Great Britain'schances of

In addressingthe two matters immediatelyabove, we have entered

When therewas no likelihoodof invasion,the fleet might be used in

to blue-water policy. At one point he asks, rhetorically, 'Are we never

Coincidinginterestswere the key. Great Britain'sallies could from

'Always5,however, is an exaggeration : Great Britain fell into the money

56 In this connection everyone ought to read Liddeil Hart's final paragraphabout

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