Spinozas Ethics Book I

Allen Jeffrey Gurfel

Well start at the very beginning, with Spinozas own
definitions of substance, attributes, and modesthe topics
of this inquiry.
By substance I mean that which is in itself and is
conceived through itself;
that is, that the conception of which does not require
the conception of
another thing from which it has to be formed.
By attribute I mean that which the intellect perceives
of substance as
constituting its essence.
By mode I mean the affections of substance; that is,
that which is in
something else and is conceived through something
else.
Our task will be to elaborate and unpack these concepts and
determine how they relate to one another.
And well keep in mind Spinozas grand metaphysical
conclusion: there is only and one substance, God, or
Nature. Well note that to come to such a conclusion by the
manipulation of language is one thingcertainly anyone can
follow along with a geometric- or mathematical-style proof
if theyre attentive and careful. But to understand, to
conceptualize, what such a conclusion actually means is a
wholly different matterand an important and essential
matter at that.
Let us begin, then, by trying to understand what monism
does and doesnt mean.
There are a number of monist doctrines. For example,
materialist monism asserts that all that exists is
physical. In other words, all existing concrete objects are
of one type, namely physical, composed of matter. The
materialist monist is challenged by the substance dualist
who claims that concrete objects are, contra the monist, of
two fundamental types: physical and mental. The challenge
the materialist monist faces it that of showing how,
although it may appear that there are mental objects, these

objects reduce to physical substance. As another example,

consider the doctrine that only universalssuch as red and
squareexist. All concrete objects are, on this view,
merely bundles of universals. These monist doctrines are
fairly
straightforward.
We
understand
what
theyre
claiming, even if we disagree.
What does Spinozas monist claim amount to? Well, let us
state the claim as it actually appears in the Ethics: There
can be, or be conceived, no other substance but God. And
what immediately follows: Whatever is, is in God, and
nothing can be or be conceived without God. So Spinoza is
very clearly attributing oneness to substance. We should
therefore be very interested in determining what exactly is
meant by substance.
Spinoza of course provides a definition of substance: that
which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that
is, that the conception of which does not require the
conception of another thing from which it has to be formed.
Because it is best to err on the side
clarity, let us unpack this definition.

of

caution

and

1) Substance is in itself.
2) Substance is conceived through itself.
3) The conception of substance does not require another
thing from which it has to be formed.
Are any of these perfectly clear? What is it to be in
itself? What is it to be conceived through itself? What
is a conception of substance and what would it be for a
conception to require another thing from which it has to
be formed? Unless we know the answers to these questions,
we do not understand what Spinozas monist claim is about.
An understanding of (1) and (2) may suffice, since the
clause following the semicolon, in which (3) appears, is
merely a restatement or elaboration of what comes before,
namely (1) and (2).
The natural question arises: Where should we look for
answers? Two answers immediately suggest themselves. First,
since the definitions appear at the very beginning of the
Ethics, we can surmise that Spinoza assumed his readers
would be prepared to accept them. Thus, as Spinoza was
writing in a historical and philosophical context and not
in a vacuum, we can look to the conceptions of substance of

his time. We can look to Aristotle, whose metaphysics were

alive and well. We can also look to Descartes. Second, we
can look to what Spinoza himself has said of substance or
of the terms he uses in its definitions, both elsewhere in
the Ethics and in his other writings. In doing so, we may
be wise to avoid all unclear claims and claims that are
substantiated only after elaborate arguments which feature,
in their premises, the notion of substance that we are
looking to clarify.
Before looking to Aristotle, Suarez, and Descartes, let us
take stock of what Spinoza says of substance and the terms
of its definition in Book I prior to the grand metaphysical
conclusion of Proposition 14.
Definition 4: By attribute I mean that which the intellect
perceives of substance as constituting its essence.
Substance, therefore, has an essenceor, at least, it is
perceived by the intellect as having an essence, whatever
essence means.
Definition 5: By mode I mean the affections of substance;
that is, that which is in something else and is conceived
through
something
else.
Substance,
therefore,
has
affections. And an affection of substance is in and
conceived
through
something
else,
presumably
either
substance or attributes.
Axiom 1: All things that are, are either in themselves or
in something else. Again, this notion of being in has not
yet been established clearly.
Axiom 2: That which cannot be conceived through another
thing must be conceived through itself. Like Axiom 1, Axiom
4 deals with terms found in the definition of substance.
But, again, these terms are not yet crystal clear.
Summing up: 1) substance has, or is perceived to have, an
essence or essences, and 2) substance has affections.
Substance is among those things that are in themselves and
that are conceived through themselves. We have made very
little progress.
In Proposition 1 Spinoza tells us that Substance is by
nature prior to its affections. In the brief proof Spinoza
cites Definitions 3 and 5the definitions of substance and
modes, respectively. If we do not understand Definition 3,

we are hard-pressed to see how it serves as a proof to this

proposition.
But we can see what elements of the
definitions are meant to do the work. Modes are in
something else and conceived through something else while
substance is in itself and conceived through itself. Thus
it appears that for something to be prior by nature is for
it to be in itself and/or conceived through itself while
that to which it is being compared is not. Of course, this
is of little help as we still have not been told what it is
for something to be in itself or to be conceived through
itself.
Perhaps we should halt our cataloguing lest the confusions
multiply. Still, if we can only say what it is for
something to be in itself we will have made some small but
genuine progress.
Here are some possibilities: To say that something exists
in itself is to say that 1) it exists independently of any
other thing, 2) that it is not caused by any other thing,
3) that it is causally isolated from all other things. To
say that something is conceived through itself is to say
that the concept of that thing is intelligible all on its
own, not requiring the concept of any other thing.
In Spinoza's Ethics, Parts I and II: A Platonic Commentary
Alan Hart writes, Spinozas definition of substance is
similar to that of Descartes insofar as it emphasizes the
independence of substance. By substance, I understand
that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in
other words, that, the conception of which does not need
the conception of another thing from which it must be
formed. The expression that which is in itself indicates
the independence of substance. The expression that which
is
conceived
through
itself,
not
only
indicates
independence, but emphasizes that substance is selfsufficient, is its own cause.
In what does independence consist if not causal autonomy or
self-causation and self-sustenance? And if it consists in
precisely this, then how is it that this is part of the
definition of substance, when it is also a claim that is
proven in Proposition 7? We should carefully examine the
proof of Proposition 7 and determine whether it can stand
up without presupposing in its premises any as yet unclear
notions. We will do this presently.

I quote Proposition 7 and its Proof:

(Proposition 7) Existence belongs to the nature of
substance.
(Proof) Substance cannot be produced by anything else
(Cor.Pr.6) and is
therefore self-caused (causa sui); that is (Def.1),
its essence necessarily
involves existence.
This proof invokes the Corollary to Proposition 6 and
Definition 1. Since the establishment of Proposition 7
would be a great win for us in understanding substance I
quote both in full:
(Definition 1) By that which is self-caused I mean
that whose essence
involves existence; or that whose nature can be
conceived only as
existing.
(Proposition 6) One substance cannot be produced by
another substance.
(Proof) In the universe there cannot be two substances
of the same
attribute (Pr.5); that is (Pr.2), two substances
having something in common. And
so (Pr.3) one cannot be the cause of the other; that
is, one cannot be produced by
the other.
(Cor.Pr.6) Hence it follows that substance cannot be
produced by anything
else. For in the universe there exists nothing but
substances and their
affections, as is evident from Axiom 1 and Definitions
3 and 5. But, by
Proposition 6, it cannot be produced by another
substance. Therefore,
substance
cannot
be
produced
by
anything
else
whatsoever.
(Another Proof) This can be proved even more readily
by the absurdity
of the contradictory. For if substance could be
produced by something
else, the knowledge of substance would have to depend
on the knowledge

of its cause (Ax.4), and so (Def.3) it would not be a

substance.
Let us reconstruct the argument leading to Proposition 7 in
premise-conclusion form.
1) Two
substances
having
different
attributes
have
nothing in common. (Proposition 2)
2) When things have nothing in common, one cannot be the
cause of the other. (Proposition 3)
3) Therefore, one substance cannot be the cause of
another substance, or, what is the same, one substance
cannot be produced by another substance. (Proposition
6)
4) There are no other candidates for producing substance
since all that exists is substances and their
affections.
5) Therefore,
since
substance
cannot
cause
another
substance and there is nothing else that can cause
substance, substance is self-causing.
6) What is self-causing has a nature that can only be
conceived
as
existingwhose
essence
involves
existence. (Definition 1)
7) Therefore,
existence
belongs
to
the
nature
of
substance. (Proposition 7)
Setting the soundness of these premises and the validity of
ontological arguments to one side, we can at least be sure
that Spinoza holds that substance is necessarily existing.
It is the (an) essence of substance to exist necessarily.
We return to our original question: What is Spinozas
monistic claimthat there is no substance but the one
substance, Godabout? We now know that substance is
something that exists necessarily. So far we can say, then,
that there is some substance S such that nothing besides S
existsi.e. only S existsand S exists necessarily. This is
Spinozas claim, though we have not yet shown that S and S
alone exists. We will do so now.
1) God, a substance, exists necessarily and has infinite
attributes. (Def.6)
2) If another substance existed it would have to share an
attribute with God. (Since God has infinite, or allpossible, attributes.)
3) But no two substances can share an attribute. (Pr.5)
4) Therefore, there can be no substance but God.

5) Therefore, God is the only substance.

Assuming
Spinozas
arguments
go
through,
we
have
established that there is one single substance which exists
necessarily. Our question is only partially answered. We
know something about substance, but very little: Substance
is self-caused; that is, it exists necessarilyits essence
involves existence.
Weve also been told something about the one, necessarilyexisting substance:
(Definition 6) By God I mean an absolutely infinite
being; that is,
substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of
which expresses
eternal and infinite essence.
And of course this definition was crucial in establishing
Spinozas monistic claim. But is it true? Is it meaningful?
What is an attribute? What is it to consist of infinite
attributes? What is it to express eternal and infinite
essence? These are questions we will come back to.
(It is worth noting here that our questions persist not
only because we arent certain of particular technical
definitions. Our question persist because we still arent
sure how we, our friends, our bicycles, our lives, or
desires, trees, dogs, freedom, rightness, pumpkins, or
anything else for that matter fit into this metaphysical
picture. It certainly doesnt seem that there is only one
something. It seems like there are lots of somethings.
Recall that the materialist monist owed us an account of
consciousness, of the fact that apparently mental stuff
also exists. But at least we understood the positive
content of his claim that there is only physical stuff. It
seems, then, that Spinoza still owes us an account of how
everything we ordinarily perceive fits into the monist
scheme. Moreover, we could definitely stand to have a
clearer picture of what substance really is, beyond
necessarily existing stuff. Again, we will come back to
these issues as we proceed.)
Here Id like to take a detour. Since this paper is meant
to be a broad, even if cursory, introduction to the
philosophy Spinoza presents in the Ethics it will be
valuable to consider Spinozas context, as we aimed to do

at the very beginning. I will begin with an account of the

idea
of
substance
in
philosophy
and
then
discuss
Aristotelian substance, specifically, in some more depth.
Then I will present Descartes and Leibnizs conception of
substance. After dealing with substance, I will consider
several other monist doctrines before returning to Spinoza.
The word substance comes from the Latin substantia,
meaning something that stands under, or grounds, things
in Greek, ousia, meaning being. We can see in what way
matter is the substantia for the materialist monist:
physical stuff is the foundational entity to which all
concrete objects, including seemingly mental objects such
as minds, are to be reduced. For an atomist, atoms are the
basic stuff to which everything can be reduced. For an
idealist,
substance
is
ideal,
perhaps
Thoughts
or
Perceptions, not physical. It should also be noted that not
all metaphysical views contain an idea of substance.
Pragmatic and positivist views, for example, tend to leave
the matter open, focused as they are on convention and not
on a realist description of anything that could be called
fundamental reality. Other views do not see concrete
objects of any sort as fundamental. They may hold that the
fundamental
entities
are
bundles
of
properties,
as
mentioned earlier, or events. On a view that holds events
to be fundamental, what we take to be concrete objects
might be somehow reduced to features of series of events.
Consider the familiar term illegal substance. In deciding
whether a new substance should be classified as illegal the
government (if it had any sense and did anything with
either rhyme or reason) might ask questions about the
essence
of illegal substanceWhat are the
essential
features of illegal substances? and Does this new substance
in question fit the bill? The government might answer that
the essence of an illegal substance consists in its effect
on human beings: If the substance, when consumed, poisons
the human body, causes severe cognitive impairment, or is
highly likely to create dependence and addiction while
having no redeeming medicinal benefits then it should
properly be called an illegal substance.
Aristotle was
familiar with this type of inquiry into essences and
substance. Consider this passage from his Categories:
each [individual term] signifies either substance or
quantity or qualification or

a relative or where or when or being in a position or

having or doing or being
affected. To give a rough idea, ideas of substance
are man, horse; of quantity:
four foot, five foot; of qualification; white,
grammatical; of a relative: double,
half, larger; of where: in the Lyceum, in the marketplace; of when: yesterday,
last year; of being in a position: is-lying, issitting; of having: has-shoes-on,
has-armor-on; of doing: cutting, burning; of beingaffected: being-cut,
being-burnt. (1b25 - 2a4)
Consider the substances Allen Jeffrey and man. Allen
Jeffrey is an individual object; man is a kind of
individual object. Aristotle would call Allen Jeffrey a
primary substance. Man or manhood would be a secondary
substance, or substantial kind. The obvious questions that
arise are the following. What makes a thing a thing of a
certain kinde.g. what makes a thing a man, or a tree, or a
father? Here were asking what the essence of these kinds
are. We can also ask: What makes Allen Jeffrey, Allen
Jeffrey? Or, what makes this computer Im presently using
this computer, as opposed to another computer? Here were
asking about the essence of individual substances. To
clarify what is at stake with an example, consider that
Allen Jeffreys skin tone is now, presently, olive and he
is located on the F train. These two attributions are what
Aristotle calls qualification and where (or location)
above, respectively. But are these essential to being Allen
Jeffrey? It seems that they are not, for I, Allen Jeffrey,
might get a fine-looking tan and transfer to the B train
while remaining Allen Jeffrey. We can see that the question
of my essence is identical with, or at least apparently
related to, the question of my identity and persistence
conditions. In other words, under what circumstances would
I no longer be Allen Jeffrey? On might hold, for example,
that an individual person remains that person only so long
as he has conscious access to a certain amount of crucial
memories. On such a view, if the individual were to suffer
total amnesia he would no longer be that individual. We can
see that on this view my essence as an individual substance
has to do, at least partially, with psychological facts.
But what if I were to suffer total memory loss? Granted,
(on this view) I would no longer be Allen Jeffrey, but, we
want to say, I would still be a man. My persistence

conditions
qua
Allen
Jeffrey
are
distinct
from
my
persistence conditions, my essence, qua man. Another
question might arise: which is more fundamental, basic
kinds, such as man, or individuals, such as this man, the
one called Allen Jeffrey? Different answers have been
given.
Consider the way substance is used in chemistry. In that
field substances are kinds, perhaps defined by there atomic
structures, e.g. Helium, Nitrogen, H2O, Carbon Monoxide. The
chemist might hold that only the basic elements are
fundamental substance. This would exclude H2O and Carbon
Monoxide, which would be reduced to permutations of the
fundamental substances Hydrogen, Oxygen, and Carbon. Or he
might hold, for some principled reason, that all stable
compounds are in fact equally fundamental with elements. A
particle physicist, on the other hand, might hold that
elementary particles or superstrings are what fundamentally
exist, and that all elements and compounds ultimately
reduce to those entities. (It is worth noting that our
physicist could be a monist or a pluralist. For example, he
may postulate a single kind of elementary particle or he
might postulate, as modern physics does, a zoo of
elementary particles. And suppose he does postulate only
one, single kind of particle. He is a monist with regard to
the kinds of substance that exist, e.g. only elementary
particles. At the same time, he may hold that there are
trillions upon trillions or an infinity or individual
particles.)
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 entry on Substance
identifies six overlapping ideas that contribute to the
philosophical concept of substance:
i.
being ontologically basicsubstances are the
things from which everything else is made
or by
which
it is metaphysically sustained;
ii.
being, at least compared to other things,
relatively independent and durable, and,
perhaps,
absolutely so;
iii.
being the paradigm subjects of predication and
bearers of properties;
iv.
being, at least for the more ordinary kinds of
substance, the subjects of change;
1

For this discussion of substance I have relied on the

Substance entry in the SEP as a guide.

v.
being typified by those things
classify as objects, or kinds of objects;
vi.
being typified by kinds of stuff.

we

normally

A metaphysical theory may emphasize or ignore one or more

of these criteria.
We now have some idea of what the question of substance
involves as well as an idea of how it might be answered.
Weve also touched on the idea of essences.
With our general discussion of substance complete, we turn
now to Aristotles conception of substance, which has
already been mentioned above. I begin by throwing out some
definitions,
drawing
some
distinctions,
raising
and
partially answering some questions. Then I consider what we
can say of substance with certainty. Finally, I attempt to
go over the same ground more clearly and concisely and
intuitively. I like this way of doing philosophy because it
seems to be a good parallel to the project of philosophy:
to make order out of chaosthis means, then, that chaos is
an alright starting point. If we dont drown it, were
doing alright.
What is being? that is to say, what is substance?
Aristotle asks in Book Z of Metaphysics, the question
which, now and in the past, is continually posed and
continually puzzled over. Aristotle answers, a substance
is whatever is an ultimate subject, which is no longer said
of anything else; and a substance is a this so-and-so which
is also separable. This needs to be unpacked. But first,
so we can keep an eye on the final destination, let us list
some paradigmatic examples of Aristotles substances:
roses, stones, chickensthings most familiar to us.
Now, lets consider the ultimate subject, which is no
longer said of anything else. It will be helpful to
consider what is said of other things, so let us take an
example. He is a tall musicianit is said of him that he
is tall and that he is a musician. Thus Aristotle is making
a
claim
about
predication,
but
it
articulates
an
ontological intuition. Substances are picked out by the
phrase This X or This so-and-so. This is not always the
case. In addition, the thing picked out must be one in
number. So, This whiteness does not pick out a
substance; This man does pick out a substance. What about
This musician? In order for there to be musicians, there

must be people who are musical, who exemplify musicianship.

But wait: if we say that this person is a substance, and
that this musician is this person, it seems to follow that
this musician is a substance. Aristotle finds this
unacceptable and is keen to show why this argument fails.
We can say that musician is not a substance-terma term
F is a substance-term just in case the existence of Fs is
not parasitical upon the existence of anything else 2 and
so, while it does designate a substance, it does not
designate the substance as a substance. So although we can
say This musician, it remains the case that musician is
said of something else.
Alternatively, Aristotle can, and does, appeal to a
distinction between accidental identity and essential
identity. The argument turns on an application of what is
sometimes called Leibnizs Law: if x is identical with y,
then if x is F, y is F. (For example, if David Bowie is
identical with Ziggy Stardust, and if David Bowie is 5 feet
and 11 inches tall, then Ziggy Stardust is 5 feet and 11
inches tall.) Aristotle accepts the Law in only a
restricted form: if x is essentially identical with y, then
if x is F, y is F. Now this man is only accidentally
identical with this policeman and thus the argument for
substantial policemen fails. Of course, it is not
perfectly clear the distinction between accidental and
essential identity.
Let us digress to consider accidents. Aristotles ontology
is
one
of
substances
and
accidents.
The
ultimate,
ontologically fundamental category is that of substances,
such as a rose, a man, or a mule. Accidents are dependent
entities that inhere in substances. An accident can be
called a property of substance. Take Socrates, the man.
Socrates himself, the man, is a substance. But Socrates
skin color is an accident. Color can not exist except
manifested or expressed in some substance. There may be,
however, an intermediate, mediating third entity: the
accidental being. Note that it isnt enough, for there to
be an instantiation of a given color, merely that a
substance, Socrates the man, exists. Similarly, it isnt
enough, for there to be an instance of jogging, that a
substance, a man, exists. There must be a substance,
Socrates the man, colored-thusly; there must be a jogging
2

Jonathan Barnes, Metaphysics, The Cambridge Companion to

Aristotle

man. A man as such is not necessarily or essentially a

jogging man; they are not identical. They clearly have
different persistence (and identity) conditions: Socrates
is a jogging man as long as he is jogging, but as soon as
he is no longer jogging the jogging man has gone out of
existence, while the man as such has persisted, continued
to exist. Thus the accident of jogging or paleness depends
on the particular instantiation of the quality by an
accidental being, such as a jogging man or a pale-colored
man. The instantiation is particular because it is
instantiated by a unique, individual substance, the
substance of Socrates the man, or this horse, or that cup,
and so on. A consequence of this is that Socrates and a
jogging man, or jogging Socrates, are two entities that may
spatio-temporally coincide, in this case temporarily.
To summarize: the existence of universals, such as
whiteness or roundness, depends on the existence of white
things and round things. Whitely-colored and roundly-shaped
things depend on a substance existing just so. The
substance is ontologically prior. Again, the existence of
walking, for example, depends on a particular instantiation
of walking, which depends on substance being walkingly.
It now becomes clear that the man Socrates and a jogging
man may be identical accidentally, but not essentially.
Similarly, this man and this musician may pick out the
same substance, but only accidentally. This musician may go
out of existence, this musical man may go out of existence
for example if he stops playing his instrument for years
and yearsin the same way as this jogging man may go out of
existence. At the same time, this man, the substance which
instantiated musicality or jogging, may persist, for they
are not essentially identical. That is accidental which
occurs, but neither always nor necessarily, nor for the
most part, says Aristotle. Musicality or musicianship
sometimes occurs in persons, but it does not occur always
or necessarily, and is hence accidental and said of
something else, of some person, some substance.
Let us take stock of what weve staked out so far. First,
Aristotle is not a monist. He believes there are many
substancesthis horse, that horse, this tree, that tree.
Second, Aristotle has an idea of accidents, or properties,
as inhering in substancesthus, for example, whiteness
exists only insofar as there is something existing which is
white, or something existing whitely. Third, Aristotle

believes that certain features are essential to substances,

without which they would not be the substances that they
are. Fourth, Aristotle has a criteria for identifying what
things are substancesin Categories he writes that primary
substance is what is neither in a subject nor said of a
subject, and in Metaphysics he repeats a similar idea: a
substance is whatever is an ultimate subject, which is no
longer said of anything else; and a substance is a this soand-so which is also separable.
I have now introduced some of the basic questions and
distinctions Aristotle makes in his investigation of being,
or substance. But, to be honest, to ask for a perfectly
clear picture may be to ask too much. After all,
Aristotles metaphysics has been debated, interpreted,
reinterpreted, and misinterpreted for a very, very long
time. Even so, Im young and hopeful
I imagine that I am a Greek two and a half millennia ago. I
perceive that things change. In the winter my skin was
pale. Now, in the summer, its dark. Now the trees are
green with leaves. In the winter they were barren. Now my
friend is living and animated, apparently self-moving. I
know one day he will die, he will cease to be animated,
living, and self-moving. He will be a corpse, inert, and
before long he will be nothing. Yet I also perceive that
things stay the same. Before I was pale, now I am tanbut I
am still me. My horse was once fast, now it has slowed
downbut it is still the same horse. I perceive that there
are in the world types of thingshorses, trees, people,
clouds. I also perceive that there are individual thingsmy
horse, that tree. What questions will I ask?
What is it that bears changes? What sorts of change can a
thing bear before it is no longer that thing? How can I
identify individual things as things of a certain type?
I have an insight. In language and in thought some things
are basic and other things are said of those things. I can
say of my horse that it is slow or I can say of my horse
that it is fast. I can say that it is brown or I could say
that it is white. The horse is basic and I apprehend that I
have in my mind a basic schematic or blueprint idea of
horse to which I attribute a plethora of properties. Thus I
say that the horse has an essence, those necessary features
that make it a horse. If a thing does not meet the
conditions of my barebones blueprint of horse, I will not

call it a horse at all. I also say that my horse

instantiates accidental properties, such as color. The
horse could be black, white, grey, brown, or beige and
remain a horse. It can still answer, so to speak, to my
blueprint of horse. But then I wonder, is it really true
that things are said of the horse but that the horse is not
said of anything? Certainly, the horse appears basic in a
way that universal properties do not. I can say of a
million things that they are white, or fast, or fourlegged, but the horse is just the horse. But I do say This
is a horse. It seems that Im attributing horse to this in
a manner parallel to that when I say John, the man, is a
musician. I know that for musicians to exist, musical men
must exist, and for musical men to exist, men must exist.
So when I say This is a man am I committed to saying that
this must exist? And if so, what is this? This seems to be
some indeterminate stuff, stripped of all predication and
properties. So isnt it this this, this prime matter, that
is the ultimate subject of predication, the zero-level of
predication? It seems to me then that I have at least two
candidates for my basic entity: matter, or the stuff that
makes up men, horses, trees, and so on and bears change; or
form, those blueprints I perceive of kinds of things in the
world. I could add a third candidate for my basic entity:
universals, those things I predicate of other things, e.g.
whiteness, roundness, and so on. I may even entertain a
fourth option: a union of form and matter. Potentially even
a fifth: a union of matter and universals. Or perhaps my
basic entities are essences? What basis can I find for
deciding?
First,
if
a
certain
position
leads
to
a
logical
contradiction I should abandon it, for even if in reality
it may somehow be said to obtain I certainly could not
conceive of it. Second, I could should that conceptually
certain thingsmatter, form, universals, essencesmust be
prior. Third, I can argue that not only conceptually but
physically, temporally some thing must exist prior to
another or, what is the same, that some thing can only
exist after some other thing.
So I consider form and undifferentiated, indeterminate
matter. It seems to me that indeterminate matter cannot
exist temporally prior to form since, if it did, it would
always remain merely indeterminate matter. There would be
nothing which could cause it to suddenly take on one form
or another or suddenly instantiate one or more universals.

It would be absurd for it to instantiate any one universal

or bundle of universals and not another since there would
be nothing to account for such a state of affairs as
opposed to any other. And the same goes for forms.
Could form exist temporally prior to matter? This too seems
absurd for what would it even mean for a form to exist
without being instantiated in matter? This isnt clear, and
even if we take it as a brute, ambiguous fact were left
with a puzzle parallel to the one directly above: if form
exists first, why should and how could there ever suddenly
appear matter?
So it seems that form cannot precede matter and that matter
cannot precede form, either conceptually or in reality, yet
both exist. I conclude that if both form and matter exist,
and if neither could have existed first, then either they
have always both exists or else they began to exist
simultaneously. However, there is a sense in which form has
a conceptual upper-hand over matterafter all, I can
conceive of form without matter while I cannot conceive of
matter without form, matter being completely indeterminate.
Similarly, I can conceive of essences without conceiving
that there exists anything instantiated in matter that
corresponds to that essence. But I cannot see how matter
could come to exist from essences or in what sense essences
could actually exist without being instantiated in matter.
And as soon as I conceive of essences instantiated in
matter, I am thinking not of prime, undifferentiated matter
but of determinate matter. This applies as well to
universals. The moment I think of a universal I think of it
instantiated not in indeterminate matter but in determinate
matter, namely matter instantiating that universal.
I conclude that matter alone cannot be my basic entity. I
also conclude that form alone cannot be my basic entity.
Existing together, it will always and necessarily be the
case that whatever things there are they will not be
indeterminate but determinate and differentiated, unions of
form and matter. But saying that form is united with
indeterminate matter is like saying that cheese is united
with
negative
numbers,
i.e.
confusing
and
somehow
inconceivable. Form makes matter determinate, matter takes
form, or form is in matter. It is in this sense that
substance is a union of form and matter.

So now I can consider some particular substance, some

particular union of form and matter. Finally, I have
arrived at some thing of which something can be predicated.
But prior to predicating anything accidental of this union
of form and matter I must admit that it already exists in
some determinate way and if it did not exist in that
particular determinate way then it would not be that
particular union of form and matter, it would not be that
particular substance. Thus there is something essential to
that substance in virtue of which it is that substance and
not another substance. But we already saw that we could, at
least conceptually, strip this substance of all form and
predication to be left with an idea of undifferentiated,
indeterminate prime matter. To say that we strip the
substance of all predication is to say that we delete from
it the instantiation of any and all universals. Since this
leads to absurdity we must admit that there is at least one
and perhaps a bundle of universals that are instantiated by
any given substance necessarily and which constitute its
essence, without which it would either not be that
substance or else not be a substance at all, devolving back
into the absurdity of prime matter without form.
Thus any and all substances must instantiate one or more
universals necessarily and essentially. If there are two
distinct substances that instantiate the same set of
universals then they are substances of the same type, or
species, and it is said that they share an essence. If one
of these substances instantiates another universal over and
above its essence then it does so only accidentally and it
is still said that the two substances are of the same kind
or species or genus. But we can consider a situation in
which one substance instantiates universals a, b, and c
while another substances instantiates universals a, b, c,
and d and it is the case that both essentially and
necessarily instantiate the universals that they do. In
this case, the two substances are not of the same kind. It
is essential for one that it instantiates d but it is not
essential for the other. We can thus conceive of universals
inhering
together
in
substances
necessarily
and
of
universals inhering in substances together accidentally. A
question arises: can there be a substance in which a, b, c,
and d inhere necessarily and essentially while at the same
time another substance exists in which a, b, and c inhere
necessarily and d inheres accidentally? To illustrate the
question by an example, take man, whose essence it is to be
a rational animal. A horse, whatever else it might be, is

an animal. If a horse were to become rational would it then

be a man, or a horse instantiating rationality only by
accident? The question is really puzzling and perhaps we
can leave it unanswered. Even so, we can note something
about what we see horse and man as sharing in common: that
they are both animals. Is this animal-ness an essence? It
seems no, for it is said of particular things that they are
(or arent) animals. The category of animal is not only
said of other things but depends on the existence of
particular things. We come back to a familiar problem. Why
is the form horse somehow more basic than the form animal?
Perhaps we can say that the particular things instantiate
the most fundamental bundles of universals coexisting
necessarily together in a single substance. It seems then
that forms, such as horse or tree, are complex universals.
If we have 1) a substance composed of universal-bundle a,
b, and c, 2) a substance composed of universal-bundle a,
b, and d, and 3) a substance composed of universal-bundle
b, c, and d, then we can extrapolate a form whose essence
consists in only b. However this is a sort of derivative
form, a categorization, a conceptual scheme. In each of our
three substances, those universals they necessarily and
essentially instantiate exist as one, unified, and not
as separate bits and pieces.
It is, of course, difficult
to see how whiteness and baldness can be said to be one.
It also seems that the universals whiteness or baldness can
never themselves be substance or essence. For what is
whiteness necessary or essential?
Answers to these questions are varied and it may be best to
leave off here. We have now an idea of what substance is
for Aristotleindividual, separable everyday things that
are unions of form and matter and of which other things are
predicated and on which those predications depend for their
existenceand how he comes to his view. We also have an
idea of the questions and confusions that can arise. Let us
now leave Aristotle and move on to consider Descartes.