Preliminary Titles

1. TAADA, vs.TUVERA,

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

(1)
The court held that all statue including those of local application shall be published as condition for their effectivity unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
(2)
The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.
2. GONZAGA vs. DAVID G.R. No. L-14858

December 29, 1960

Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code provides

Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done the next
succeeding business day.
3. RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN vs. CA G.R. No. L-32116 April 2l, 1981
Section 9 of Act No. 3135, which provides:
Section 9. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the
municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be
published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
4. PEOPLE vs. QUE PO LAY, G.R. No. L-6791

March 29, 1954

Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
5. D. M. CONSUNJI, vs.

CA G.R. No. 137873

April 20, 2001

The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of the provision,
which, notwithstanding a persons ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws.
6. EMETERIO CUI, vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY G.R. No. L-15127

May 30, 1961

Scholarship grants, as pointed out by the Director of the Bureau of Private Schools in Memorandum No. 38, are awarded in recognition
of merit and not to attract and keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda value. To look at such grants as a business scheme
designed to increase the business potential of an educational institution is not only inconsistent with sound public policy but also good
morals. Consequently, the waiver signed by the student, waiving his right to transfer to another school unless he refunds to the
university the equivalent of his scholarship grants, is null and void.
7. MICIANO, vs.ANDRE BRIMO, G.R. No. L-22595

November 1, 1927

Article 16 of the New Civil Code

Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
8. BELLIS vs. BELIS G.R. No. L-23678

June 6, 1967

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Human Relations
9.ALBENSON ENTERPRISES vs. CA

G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993

Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or
occupation and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no damages will be given
10. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN vs. REYES G.R. No. 154259

February 28, 2005

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
11. Spouses QUISUMBINGvs. MERALCO), . G.R. No. 142943

April 3, 2002

Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral damages may be recovered. One such case34 is when the rights of
individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due process of law, are violated
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages

12. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, vs. JADER, . G.R. No. 132344

February 17, 2000

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
13. GLOBE MACKAY vs. CA
Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.

14. ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION vs. CA G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, 1984
Article 26 which provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another"
and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief".
Breach of Promise to Marry
15. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. CA G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
Award of damages pursuant to Article 21 is not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
16. WASSMER, vs. VELEZ

G.R. No. L-20089

December 26, 1964

"there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry , however, Article 21 of said Code provides
that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
17. HERMOSISIMA vs. CA

G.R. No. L-14628

September 30, 1960

In itself, mere breach of promise to marry is not actionable. However, when there has been carnal knowledge and the woman becomes
pregnant and subsequently delivers,, the breach may be actionable. Even assuming the woman cannot recover moral damages for the
breach, neverthless, she can recover compensatory damages for medical and hospitalization expenses as well as attorneys fees.
18. CONSTANTINO vs. MENDEZ G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992
An order of recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be irritant in the family or lives of the parties so
that it must be issued only if the paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence
Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire
Her false declaration on the dates of their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not alleged promise of marriage was the
moving force that made her submit herself

19. TENCHAVEZ, vs. ESCAO, ET AL

G.R. No. L-19671

November 29, 1965

Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich
citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries.

20. SPOUSES YU vs. PCIB

G.R. No. 147902

March 17, 2006

no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of
a writ of possession in a special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately and take their
own direction independently of each other.

21. DONATO vs LUNA

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was
proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in
the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.

Civil Personality
22. QUIMIGUING, vs. ICAO, G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts

. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its
progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee, even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even
if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code

23. GELUZ, vs. CA

G.R. No. L-16439

July 20, 1961

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a
criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband
does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on
record, have no factual or legal basis.

24. DE JESUS, ET AL vs.SYQUIA,

G.R. No. L-39110

November 28, 1933

breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of promise to marry
has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise.
25. CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING vs. MONTAO G.R. No. 182836
October 13, 2009
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural
person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and
may be lost.

26. LIMJOCO, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE.

G.R. No. L-770

April 27, 1948

Dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties. It
should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived
after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service
Commission.

27. DUMLAO vs. QUALITY PLASTIC., G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976
No jurisdiction was acquired over Oria. Hence, the judgment against him is patent nullity. Oria, upon his death, had no more civil
personality and his juridical capacity which made him capable of legal relations was lost through death. However, Dumlaos (heirs) are
not entitled to claim attorneys fee for the corporation.

Family Code
Requisite of Marriage
28. PT & T vs. NLRC G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation
of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee
shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of marriage.
29. CAMARA, vs. RUEDA

G.R. No. 11263

November 2, 1916

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the
husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his
own home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate
his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the
wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim
support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.
30. BALOGBOG, vs. CA G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997
a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it would not mean that marriage did not take place.
Other evidence may be presented where in this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove
the marriage
31. COSCA vs. PALAYPAYON, . A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.
32. EUGENIO vs. VELEZ, G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial
shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.
33. ALCANTARA, vs. ALCANTARA, G.R. No. 167746

August 28, 2007

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. [39] Every intendment of the law
or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
34. NAVARRO, vs. DOMAGTOY A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]
(1) Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that a marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
Art. 7. A marriage may be solemnized by (1) any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction xxx . Article 8,
however, states that marriages shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or
temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Art. 29 of the Family Code, or where both parties in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
35. ARAES vs OCCIANO, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts
to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. An appellate court Justice or a
Justice of thisCourt has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official
to administrative liability.
36. LAXAMANA, vs. BALTAZAR, G.R. No. L-5955

September 19, 1952

The vice mayor, by operation of law, assumes the office of the acting municipal mayor during the suspension of the mayor

37 LIM TANHU vs. RAMOLETE G.R. No. L-40098 August 29, 1975
Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set
forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the
primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other
competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of the person who
allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other
satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court.
38. VDA. DE CHUA, vs. CA G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when
the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a
letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.
39. REPUBLIC vs. CASTRO, G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of
the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage voidab initio
40. GARCIA vs. RECIO G.R. No. 138322

October 2, 2001

A divorce decree obtained abroad by a foreigner may be recognized in the Philippines, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing national law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce
must be proved.
41. ROEHR vs. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. 142820

June 20, 2003

A foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
42. PILAPIL, vs. IBAY-SOMERA, G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code.
private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
43. VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO, G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
44. REPUBLIC vs. ORBECIDO G.R. No. 154380

October 5, 2005

ART. 26. par 2

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Marriage Exempt from License Requiremnt
45. NIAL vs. BAYADOG, G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
If a man and a woman have been living together as husband and wife aawithout the benefit of marriage for at least 5 years, they are
exempted from securing a marriage license to marry. But such law requires that their act of living together must be characterize by
exclusivity and continuity. There must be no legal impediment to marry one another during the 5-year cohabitation immediately before
the day of marriage. Otherwise, if the 5 year period is computed without any distinction as to whether they were capacitated or not to
marry, the law would then be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common-law relationships and placing them on
the same footing with those who live faithfully with their spouses.
46. MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ, . A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to
marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage
47. COSCA vs. PALAYPAYON,

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

Art 4. of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
48. MARIATEGUI vs. CA G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man
and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful
wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life
49. REPUBLIC vs.DAYOT, G.R. No. 175581

March 28, 2008

The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and desire to marry each other.
jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken
Void and Voidable Marriage
50. DOMINGO vs. CA

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings."
51. REPUBLIC vs. CA G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
52. SANTOS, vs. CA G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
53 . MARCOS, vs MARCOS

[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It
is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment
and the like.[12]At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void

54. REPUBLIC vs. QUINTERO-HAMANO, G.R. No. 149498

May 20, 2004

We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the
marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a
person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
55. CHOA, petitioner, vsCHOA, G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a
refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
does not constitute psychological incapacity.
56. ANTONIO vs. REYES G.R. No. 155800

March 10, 2006

The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and
extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to
psychological incapacity.
57. CHI MING TSOI vs. CA G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
58. FERRARIS, vs FERRARIS,

G.R. No. 162368

July 17, 2006

We find respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time
with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
58. NAVARRO vs. NAVARRO G.R. No. 162049 April 13, 2007
Frequent squabbles and respondents refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitute psychological
incapacity. The records show that petitioner and respondent were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore
them four children. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some
marital obligations,[9] it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness[10] existing
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
59. TE vs. TE G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
60. TENEBRO, vs. CA G.R. No. 150758

February 18, 2004

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage
to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument
for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
61. CACHO vs.PEOPLE G.R. No. 145226

February 06, 2004

Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of
his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case
filed.
62. WIEGEL, vs. SEMPIO-DIY G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming
this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she
married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is void
63. VALDEZ vs. RTC G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
64. PEOPLE vs. ARAGON

G.R. No. L-10016

February 28, 1957

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed
after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's
prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.
65. BOBIS vs. BOBIS
G.R. No. 138509
July 31, 2000
Article 40 of the Family Code, which has already been promulgated on his second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage before the respondent could have married for the second time. Whether or not the first marriage was void
for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was
contracted.
66. CARIO vs. CARIO

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable
property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would be not absolute
community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, on Property
Regime of Unions Without Marriage
67. DE CASTRO, vs. DE CASTRO,

G.R. No. 160172

February 13, 2008

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a
defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.
Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
68. REPUBLIC vs. NOLASCO

G.R. No. 94053

March 17, 1993

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to 4 years; however, there is a need for judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to marry. However, Article 41 imposes a stricter standard before
declaring presumptive death of one spouse. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
69. LUKBAN vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. L-8492. February 29, 1956.]

It provides that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee.
The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse
present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
70. Gue vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. L-14058

March 24, 1960

A judicial presumption even if final and executor, would still be aprima facie presumption only and it still disputable, it is for this
reasonthat it cannot be a subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration,proof of actual death would still have to be determined. The
provisions of Art 390 of the New Civil Code , absence of 7 years, for succession shallnot be presumed dead till after an absence of 10
years
71. Mercado vs Tan

G.R. No. 137110 August 1, 2000

Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows: "Article 40. The
absolute nullity of a previous, , marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such marriage void
72. Armas vs. Calisterio GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000
Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is
not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then
Marrietas marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.
73. REPUBLIC vs. CA

G.R. No. 159614

December 9, 2005

Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial
evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any
fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the

conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light
on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
74. SSS vs. VDA. DE BAILON

G.R. No. 165545

March 24, 2006

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action,
such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.
Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the
subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.
75. Valdez vs Republic

G.R. No.180863, September 8, 2009

The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because Civil Code governs during 1971 and not
Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their
marriage is legal and valid.
76. ANAYA, vs. PALAROAN,

G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970

The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of those enumerated that would constitute
fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last paragraph providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as
to.. chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would
not warrant an annulment of marriage.
77. AQUINO vs. DELIZO G.R. No. L-15853

July 27, 1960

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes
fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage.
78. JIMENEZ vs. CAIZARES

G.R. No. L-12790

August 31, 1960

The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim cannot
be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact that women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and
unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical examination in this case is not
self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being
an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The case was remanded to trial court.
79. ALMELOR, vs. RTC

G.R. No. 179620

August 26, 2008

The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage. It is the concealment of homosexuality that would.
80. SIN, vs. SIN G.R. No. 137590

March 26, 2001

Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an
evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.
81. OCAMPO vs. FLORENCIANO G.R. No. L-13553

February 23, 1960

What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the
adultery independent of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it
would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based
exclusively on defendants confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.
82. TUASON, vs. TUASON

G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996

Art 48 of the Family Code is inapplicable. The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or
fabricated.
83. RUMBAUA, vs. RUMBAUA,

G.R. No. 166738

August 14, 2009

Article 36 of of its celebration the Family Code which provides that a marriage contracted by any party who at the time of its
celebration, was psychological incapacitated to comply with the essential marital Obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even is
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Legal Separation
84. LAPUZ SY vs. EUFEMIO G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of
decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can
be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
85. GANDIONCO vs PEARANDA ,G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987
A civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal
actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the
legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and
disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of
evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
86. GINEZ, vs.BUGAYONG G.R. No. L-10033

December 28, 1956

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital
intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is
presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation. Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation
may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.

87. BROWN vs., YAMBAO G.R. No. L-10699

October 18, 1957

In an action for legal separation on the ground of adultery filed by the husband, even though the defendant wife did nit interpose the
defense of prescription, nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a deceree of legal separation or
annulment of marriage involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto
appear upon the record. Also the husband was guilty of commission of the same offense by living with another woman.
88. Pacete vs Carriaga G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not
collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that
the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in
order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
Rights and Obligations Beteen Husband and Wife
89. POTENCIANO vs. CA G.R. No. 139789

July 19, 2001

What the law provides is that husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction
thereof is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order to enforce
consortium. Empathy as defined by SC is a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. It is for two loving adults who view the
relationship with respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
90. TY vs. CA G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000
No damages should be awarded to the wife who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her
mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner
wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To
grant her petition for damages would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds.
To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages between
husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.
91. AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. CA G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
Property Relations
92. AGAPAY vs. PALANG G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997

Only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their
respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no coownership and no presumption of equal shares.
93. ARCABA vs. TABANCURA

G.R. No. 146683

November 22, 2001

The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. Cohabitation means more
than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least,
cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.
94. SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS G.R. No. 133743

February 6, 2007

A partner is capacitated after obtaining a valid foreign divorce, thus Art. 147 applies. But if the validity or the extent of the divorce must
be proven, otherwise Art. 148 applies
95. UY vs CAG.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000
Administration does not include disposition and encumbrance
96 DE LEON vs. DE LEON G.R. No. 185063 July 23, 2009
Sale is not valid. So it is that in several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership
without the consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like
causes. The nullity, as we have explained, proceeds from the fact that sale is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art.
166 of the Code
97. DE LA CRUZ vs. DE LA CRUZ

G.R. No. L-19565

January 30, 1968

To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have willfully and with intention of not coming back and
perpetual separation. There must be real abandonment and not mere separation. In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly
financial support as admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the conjugal abode.
98. PARTOSA-JO vs. CA G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992
For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
separation. Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the
petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.
99. BA FINANCE CORPORATION, vs. CA G.R. No. L-61464 May 28, 1988
The said proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the same. Hence, it is presumed
that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.
However, for the property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
100. JOHNSON vs, CA G.R. No. 102692 September 23, 1996
Page 576 of Book
101. LAPERAL vs. KATIGBAK G.R. No. L-16991

March 31, 1964

All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is however not conclusive but merely rebuttable, unless it be
proved that the property belong exclusively to the husband and wife. In the case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the
wife. At the time it was purchased, the property was of substantial value and as admitted, the husband by himself could not have
afforded to buy considering the singular source of income.
102. VILLANUEVA vs. IAC G.R. No. L-67742 October 29, 1987
Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for utility or adornment made on the separate property of the spouses
through advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either spouse belong to the conjugal partnership, and buildings
constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the
partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
103. BPI vs. POSADAS G.R. No. L-34583

October 22, 1931

1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership,
constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the premiums were
paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in
part; and (3)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary
administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according
to the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or
outside.

104. WONG vs. IAC

G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991

The properties were acquired during the marriage and in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the husband, they are
presumed to be conjugal property. They cannot answer for the person indebtedness of one spouse as his or her rights to her share are
inchoate and only materialize upon dissolution of the property.
105. CARLOS vs. ABELARDO G.R. No. 146504

April 9, 2002

A loan obtained to purchase the conjugal home may be charged against the conjugal partnership as it has redounded to the benefit of
the family. Notwithstanding, therefore, the alleged lack of consent of the other spouse under Art 121, the husband shall be solidarily
liable for the loan together with his wife.
106. MARIANO vs. CA

G.R. No. L-51283 June 7, 1989

The husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a stranger to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. In any case,
whether by intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by separate action, it is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband,
Daniel, to seek preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of possession against their conjugal assets. For it being established, as afore
stated, that Esther had engaged in business with her husbands consent, and the income derived there from had been expended, in
part at least, for the support of her family, the liability of the conjugal assets to respond for the wifes obligations in the premises cannot
be disputed
107. CHING vs CA

G.R. No. 124642

February 23, 2004

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife.
108. BUADO vs. CA G.R. No. 145222

April 24, 2009

Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable
to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make
advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
Property Regime of Unions without Marriage
109. MALLILIN vs. CASTILLO

G.R. No. 136803

June 16, 2000

Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution,
property or industry, shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co-ownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each
other.
110. FRANCISCO vs MASTER IRON WORKS & CONSTRUCTION CORPG.R. No. 151967

February 16, 2005

Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got married before the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied
retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that she had any vested right.
111. ABING vs. WAEYAN G.R. No. 146294

July 31, 2006

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
112. JUANIZA vs. JOSE G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 30, 1979
The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not incapacitated to marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to
the conjugal partnership with the lawful wife. The common-law wife not being the registered owner cannot be held liable for the
damages caused by its operation. There is therefore no basis for her liability in the damages arising from the death of and physical
injuries suffered by the passengers.
113. TUMLOS vs. FERNANDEZ G.R. No. 137650

April 12, 2000

Under Article 148, proof of actual contribution must be presented to be deemed as co-owner of the property acquired during the
cohabitation. In this case, Guillerma failed to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the apartment
building
114. DOCENA vs. LAPESURA

G.R. No. 140153

March 28, 2001

Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and wife jointly. However, unlike an act of
alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that the
husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention
of the court in proper cases.
115. MARTINEZ vs. MARTINEZ G.R. No. 162084

June 28, 2005

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but the same have failed.
116. HONTIVEROS vs. RTC

G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999

Article 151. Under this provision, the phrase members of the same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children,
ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are
not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction
117. DE MANALO, vs. CA G.R. NO. 129242

January 16, 2001

The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. It is clear from the term suit that it refers to an action by one
person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for
the redress of an injury or enforcement of a right.
118. ALBANO, vs GAPUSAN A.M. No. 1022-MJ May 7, 1976
A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and
extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. To
preserve the institution of marriage, the law considers void any contract for personal separation between husband and wife and every
extra-judicial agreement for the dissolution of the partnership.
The Family Home
119. MODEQUILL vs. SALINAS G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990.
Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as
said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code
120. MANACOP vs CA

G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997

The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such
provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioners included, are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988.
121. ARRIOLA VS. ARRIOLA

G.R. No. 177703 January 28, 2008

Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period
of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefore. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
Paternity and Filiation
122. ANGELES vs . MAGLAYA,

G.R. No. 153798

September 2, 2005

Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents
are legitimate.
The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
123. ANDAL vs MACARAIG G.R. No. L-2474

May 30, 1951

The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be
rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300
days next preceding the birth of the child.
124. BENITEZ-BADUA vs. AGUILAR G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not
confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
125. CONCEPCION vs. ALMONTE G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005

Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

126. LIYAO vs LIYAO G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002

Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he
was the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.
127. ECETA vs. ECETA G.R. No. 157037

May 20, 2004

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is,
in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required.
128. BERNABE, vs ALEJO G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given
by the new code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and
without the legitimate family being aware of their existence.
129. JISON vs. CA

G.R. No. 124853 February 24, 1998

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as Moninas, may be established in the same way and on the same
evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established. Moninas evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish ones illegitimate
filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws; moreover, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
130. DELA CRUZ vs. GRACIA

G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009

It is thus the policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children. The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.
131. CONDE, vs. ABAYA G. R. No. 4275. March 23, 1909
The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the
child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child,
to wit: if he or she died during his or her minority, or while insane, or after action had already been instituted. Inasmuch as the right of
action accruing to the child to claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime, he or she may exercise it either against
the presumed parents or his or her heirs.
132. MARQUINO vs IAC G.R. No. 72078 June 27, 1994
acknowledgment as a natural child can never be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as
an exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in an action for recognition of a
natural child can not be continued by the heirs of the former since the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative
parent himself.
133. ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN

A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995

Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.

Adoption
+ RA 8552
+ RA 8043
134. TEOTICO vs. DEL VAL G.R. No. L-18753

March 26, 1965

the law does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an
illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that relationship
established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except
only as expressly provided by law.
135. REPUBLIC vs. CA G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), where such petition may be
filed either of the spouses or both of them. After the trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on
appeal in CA, Family Code took effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory.
136. TAMARGO vs. CA

G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the
period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the
shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.
137. LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 164948

June 27, 2006

Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be
obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice.
138. IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,

G.R. Nos. 168992-93

In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that joint adoption of
husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly.
Support
139. JAVIER vs. LUCERO G.R. No. L-6706

March 29, 1953

Alfredo Jr. indeed has reached the age of majority yet under the provision of Family Code, the support may be given beyond the age of
majority in order enable him to complete his education, for some trade and profession.
140. DE ASIS vs. CA

G.R. No. 127578. February 15, 1999

The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The original agreement between the parties
to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law.
Parental Authority
141. SALIENTES vs. ABANILLA, G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006
although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant
of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child.
142. ESPIRITU vs. CA

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be the paramount concern and that even a child
under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the
best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive.
143. AMADORA vs CA. G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death, since none of them was found to have
been charged with the custody of the offending student, or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties.
144. YLARDE vs. AQUINO

G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988

A teacher who stands in loco parent is to his students should make sure that the children are protected from all harm.

145. ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002
Authority and responsibilities shall apply to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premise of the school,
entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursion, and other affairs of the students outside the
school premise whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
146. LIBI vs. IAC G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of
Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of
the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons
can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Use of Surnames
147. LAPERAL, vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. L-18008
October 30, 1962
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum.
148. LLANETA vs AGRAVA G.R. No. L-32054 May 15, 1974
The principle that disallows change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship, remains valid but only to the
extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is
that is involved or to the community in general.
Civil Registrar
+ Republic Act No. 9048
+ RULE 108
149. REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN, G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court's grant of
respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name.
Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male