G.R. No.

L-4089

January 12, 1909

ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
J.H. Junquera, for appellant.
Filemon Sotto, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a complaint against
Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the 13th of October of said year, at
night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon
arrival he was requested by them to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about
to give birth to a child; that therefore, and after consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escao, it
was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which
operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth, in which services he
was occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient
several times; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the
defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that
the judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and
costs, together with any other relief that might be deemed proper.
In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation therein contained and
alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth,
and that when she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house without
any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the
defendants, her stay their was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances; therefore, he prayed that
the defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff demurred to the above answer, and the court below sustained the demurrer, directing the
defendants, on the 23rd of January, 1907, to amend their answer. In compliance with this order the
defendants presented, on the same date, their amended answer, denying each and every one of the
allegations contained in the complaint, and requesting that the same be dismissed with costs.
As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties, judgment was entered by the court below on the
5th of April, 1907, whereby the defendants were absolved from the former complaint, on account of the
lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action against the defendants, with costs against the
plaintiff, who excepted to the said judgment and in addition moved for a new trial on the ground that
the judgment was contrary to law; the motion was overruled and the plaintiff excepted and in due
course presented the corresponding bill of exceptions. The motion of the defendants requesting that the
declaration contained in the judgment that the defendants had demanded therefrom, for the reason that,
according to the evidence, no such request had been made, was also denied, and to the decision the
defendants excepted.
Assuming that it is a real fact of knowledge by the defendants that the plaintiff, by virtue of having
been sent for by the former, attended a physician and rendered professional services to a daughter-inlaw of the said defendants during a difficult and laborious childbirth, in order to decide the claim of the

said physician regarding the recovery of his fees, it becomes necessary to decide who is bound to pay
the bill, whether the father and mother-in-law of the patient, or the husband of the latter.
According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasicontracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in special
laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between
the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and
1091.)
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to
which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.)
If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses are
mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason
of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to
furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be
freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is
therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services.
This liability originates from the above-cited mutual obligation which the law has expressly established
between the married couple.
In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to
the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants
during her childbirth, is the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants
herein. The fact that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his
wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent
danger, to which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance
was urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services
of a physician at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been seen, and
compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is entitled to recover
his fees, must direct his action against the husband who is under obligation to furnish medical
assistance to his lawful wife in such an emergency.
From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to have brought an action against
the defendants simply because they were the parties who called the plaintiff and requested him to assist
the patient during her difficult confinement, and also, possibly, because they were her father and
mother-in-law and the sickness occurred in their house. The defendants were not, nor are they now,
under any obligation by virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of
any contract entered into between them and the plaintiff from which such obligation might have arisen.
In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an action for support, the supreme court of Spain, while
recognizing the validity and efficiency of a contract to furnish support wherein a person bound himself
to support another who was not his relative, established the rule that the law does impose the obligation
to pay for the support of a stranger, but as the liability arose out of a contract, the stipulations of the
agreement must be held. (Decision of May 11, 1897.)
Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation

that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing of medical
assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it does not appear that a
contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which reason it is obvious that
the former can not be compelled to pay fees which they are under no liability to pay because it does not
appear that they consented to bind themselves.
The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned to the judgment below
are unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has no right of action against the defendants, it is needless to
declare whether or not the use of forceps is a surgical operation.
Therefore, in view of the consideration hereinbefore set forth, it is our opinion that the judgment
appealed from should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Mapa and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Carson, J., concurs in the result.
Willard, J., dissents.
G.R. No. L-26002

October 31, 1969

ABELARDO BAUTISTA and ROBERTO TAN TING, petitioners-appellees,

vs.
FEDERICO O. BORROMEO, INC., HONORABLE CESAR C. CRUZ, Judge of the Municipal
Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal and JESUS BAUTISTA, Deputy Sheriff of Manila as Special
Sheriff, respondents-appellants.
Dante O. Tinga and Leopoldo V. Repotente, Jr. for petitioners-appellees.
Modesto S. Mendoza for respondents-appellants.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Respondents-appellants seek to overturn the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal of January
6, 1966 granting petitioners-appellees' petition for relief from judgment, setting aside the July 23, 1965
decision of the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, in Civil Case 1365 and ordering a new trial.
The background facts are as follows:
On September 15, 1964, the Ford truck of petitioner Roberto Tan Ting driven by Abelardo Bautista, the
other petitioner, and the Volkswagen delivery panel truck owned by respondent Federico O. Borromeo,
Inc. (hereinafter called Borromeo) were involved in a traffic accident along Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue. In said traffic accident, Quintin Delgado, a helper in Borromeo's delivery panel truck,
sustained injuries which resulted in his instantaneous death. Borromeo had to pay Delgado's widow the
sum of P4,444 representing the compensation (death benefit) and funeral expenses due Delgado under
the Workmen's Compensation Act.
On June 17, 1965, upon the averment that the said vehicular accident was caused by petitioners'
negligence, Borromeo started suit in the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal to recover from
petitioners the compensation and funeral expenses it paid to the widow of Quintin Delgado.1
At the scheduled hearing of the case on July 23, 1965, neither petitioners nor their counsel appeared.

Borromeo was thus allowed to present its evidence ex parte. On the same day, July 23, 1965, the
municipal court rendered judgment in favor of Borromeo and against the petitioners in the principal
sum of P4,444, and P500 attorney's fees, and costs. Respondents aver that this judgment has been
executed and satisfied.
On August 6, 1965, petitioners received copy of the municipal court's decision.
On August 13, 1965, petitioners moved to set aside the decision. On August 14, 1965, this motion was
denied.
On August 16, 1965, copy of this order of denial was sent by registered mail to counsel of petitioners.
Said counsel did not receive this registered mail and the mail matter was returned to the court
unclaimed. However, said counsel learned of this denial on September 2, 1965 allegedly "in the course
of his investigation."
Petitioners filed a notice of appeal dated September 2, 1965. They, however, paid the appellate docket
fee and deposited their cash appeal bond only on September 28, 1965. Their appeal was consequently
turned down by the municipal court, for the reason that the deposit of the bond and the payment of the
docket fee were done after the lapse of the reglementary period.
Nothing was done by petitioners until October 26, 1965, when they lodged a petition for relief from the
inferior court's judgment in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.2 They there claimed excusable
negligence for the failure of petitioners' counsel to appear in the July 23, 1965 hearing at the municipal
court and asserted that they had a good and substantial defense in that "there was no contractual
relationship between the parties, whether express or implied." They sought preliminary injunction,
prayed for trial de novo on the merits. A restraining order was at first issued by the court; but the prayer
for preliminary injunction was eventually denied.
Respondents' answer contended that the petition for relief was filed out of time; that petitioners'
counsel's failure to attend the hearing of July 23, 1965 does not constitute excusable negligence; and
that the affidavits attached to the petition do not show good and substantial defense.
Petitioners thereafter moved for judgment on the pleadings. No objection thereto was interposed by
respondents. The lower court then rendered the judgment mentioned in the first part of this opinion.
A move to reconsider failed. Hence, this appeal.
We vote to reverse the lower court's judgment for the following reasons:
1.
The petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is unavailable to
petitioners.
A basic precept is that when another remedy at law is open to a party, he cannot sue out a petition for
relief under Rule 38.3 Thus, a petition for relief is not a substitute for appeal. It has been held that
where a defendant could have appealed but did not appeal from the decision of the inferior court
to the Court of First Instance but instead filed a petition for relief, his petition was inappropriate as it
"would amount to reviving his right to appeal which he had irretrievably lost through the gross inaction
of his counsel."4

Here, petitioners learned of the municipal court judgment on August 6, 1965, when they received a
copy of its decision. They moved to set aside that judgment on August 13, 1965. At that time, a petition
for relief could not be availed of because the judgment of the municipal court had not yet become
final.5 But, on September 2, 1965, petitioners learned of the court's order of August 14, 1965 denying
their motion to set aside. They could have appealed. Because, nothing in the record suggests that the
notices to petitioners to take delivery of the registered envelope containing the inferior court's
resolution denying petitioners' motion to set aside the decision were ever served on said petitioners.
On the contrary, Teresita Roxas, secretary of petitioners' counsel, in her affidavit dated October 23,
1965, Annex E of the petition for relief, categorically denied receipt of any such notice, thus: "That I
have not received any registry notice corresponding to a registered mail at the Manila Post Office
containing an order by the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, dated August 14, 1965."6
But petitioners did not perfect their appeal to the Court of First Instance on time they paid the
appellate docket fee and deposited their appeal bond only on September 28, eleven (11) days late.
Clearly, their failure to seasonably appeal was through their own fault.
And, when they did file a petition for relief on October 26, 1965, it was way beyond the sixty-day
period from August 6, 1965, the time they first learned of the judgment to be set aside, as required by
Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
We accordingly, rule that petitioners' petition for relief must fail.
2.
Petitioners failed to make out a case of excusable negligence for counsel's non-attendance at the
July 23, 1965 hearing.
Their counsel, Atty. Leopoldo V. Repotente, Jr., explains his failure to attend the hearing in this wise
"he relied on the assurance of his associate, Atty. Lucenito N. Tagle, that the latter will attend to the
case for him since on that same date he (Atty. Repotente) had another case before the City Court of
Quezon City." In his sworn statement, Atty. Tagle in turn stated that he was unable to attend the hearing
despite his promise to do so because, in his own words, "when I transferred to my new office at A & T
Building, Escolta, Manila, the record of this case was misplaced, mislaid or otherwise lost by my
helpers and was not among those turned over to my possession" and "it was only a few days after the
date of hearing on July 23, 1965, that I found the record of this case in one of the drawers of my table
in my former office and it was only then that I realized my failure to attend the hearing on July 23,
1965, ... ."
We cannot view such negligence of petitioners' two attorneys as excusable. There was no plausible
reason for Repotente to entrust the hearing of the case to another lawyer. His lame excuse was that he
requested Tagle to attend the hearing of said case for him because he had another hearing at the City
Court of Quezon City. This is unworthy of serious consideration. For, as respondents aver and this is
not denied by petitioners the hearing of July 23, 1965 before the municipal court was set in open
court during the initial date of hearing held on July 1, 1965 after Atty. Repotente consulted his calendar.
When Repotente agreed in open court to set the trial of the case for July 23, 1965, it may very well be
presumed that his other case in Quezon City was not yet calendared for hearing. He could not have, in
good faith, agreed to set the case for hearing on the day on which he had another previously scheduled
trial. Further, he failed to notify his clients of the hearing set for July 23, 1965; they also failed to
appear thereat. Certainly, Repotentes' inadvertence cannot be labeled as excusable.
Nor may Atty. Tagle offer as excuse the fact that the record of the case "was misplaced, mislaid or

otherwise lost." This is a stereotyped excuse. It is resorted to by lawyers in order to win new trial of the
case and thereby move farther away the day of reckoning. To be remembered is that the life of each
case is in its record. If the record of the case was misplaced, mislaid or lost, he should have
nevertheless attended the scheduled hearing and requested for a postponement by reason thereof. But
he did not. Appropriate it is to recall here that a prudent lawyer keeps a separate record or diary of
hearings of cases he handles and of his professional engagements. A lawyer's schedules of hearings
intended as reminder are not noted by the lawyer in his record of the case. That would be useless for
the purpose.
There is then no excusable negligence to which the petition for relief can cling.
3.

Even on the merits, petitioners' case must fall.

Borromeo paid the widow of its employee, Quintin Delgado, compensation (death benefit) and funeral
expenses for the latter's death while in the course of employment. This obligation arises from law
Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.7 The same law in its Section 6 also provides that "[i]n
case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person
besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation
from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with law; and
in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid such
compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right of
recovering from such person what he paid: ..."8
It is evident from the foregoing that "if compensation is claimed and awarded, and the employer pays
it, the employer becomes subrogated to and acquires, by operation of law, the worker's rights against
the tortfeasor."9
No need then there is to establish any contractual relationship between Quintin Delgado and herein
petitioners. Indeed, there is none. The cause of action of respondent corporation is one which does not
spring from a creditor-debtor relationship. It arises by virtue of its subrogation to the right of Quintin
Delgado to sue the guilty party. Such subrogation is sanctioned by the Workmen's Compensation Law
aforesaid. It is as a subrogee to the rights of its deceased employee, Quintin Delgado, that Borromeo
filed a suit against petitioners in the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal. 10
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the appealed decision of January 6, 1966 under review is hereby
reversed and the petition for relief is hereby dismissed.
Costs against petitioners-appellees. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-21676

February 28, 1969

VICENTE ALDABA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR ALDABA, ET AL., respondents.
Rodas and Almeda for petitioners.

Dakila F. Castro and Associates for respondents.

ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in case CA-G.R. No. 27561-R, entitled
"Vicente Aldaba, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, versus Cesar Aldaba, et al., defendants-appellees",
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 41260.
When Belen Aldaba, a rich woman of Malolos, Bulacan, died on February 25, 1955, she left as her
presumptive heirs her surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother Cesar Aldaba. Belen
Aldaba was childless. Among the properties that she left were the two lots involved in this case,
situated at 427 Maganda Street, Santa Mesa, Manila.
Petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, father and daughter, respectively, lived during the last
war in their house in Malate, Manila. Belen Aldaba used to go to their house to seek the advice and
medical assistance of Dr. Vicente Aldaba. When the latter's house was burned during the liberation of
Manila in 1945, Belen Aldaba invited Dr. Aldaba and his daughter, who was then a student in medicine,
to live in one of her two houses standing on the lots in question, and the Aldaba father and daughter
accepted the offer of Belen and they actually lived in one of those two houses until sometime in 1957
when respondent Emmanuel Bautista filed an ejectment case against them in the city court of Manila.
Dr. Vicente Aldaba continued to act as a sort of adviser of Belen and Jane, after becoming a qualified
doctor of medicine, became the personal physician of Belen until the latter's death on February 25,
1955.
On June 24, 1955, the presumptive heirs Estanislao Bautista and Cesar Aldaba, executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition of the properties left by the deceased Belen Aldaba, by virtue of which deed the
two lots in question were alloted to Cesar Aldaba. Subsequently, on August 26, 1957, herein
respondents Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, the latter being a grandson of Estanislao Bautista by
his first marriage, executed a deed whereby the two lots that were alloted to Cesar Aldaba were ceded
to Emmanuel Bautista in exchange of the latter's lot situated at San Juan, Rizal. By virtue of the deed of
extra-judicial partition and the deed of exchange, Transfer certificates of Title Nos. 1334 and 1335,
respectively, covering lots Nos. 32 and 34 now in question both in the name of Belen Aldaba,
were cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Manila, and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 49996 and
49997 in the name of Emmanuel Bautista were issued in lieu thereof.
Emmanuel Bautista then required Dr. Vicente Aldaba to vacate the lots in question and, upon the latter's
refusal, filed an ejectment case against him in the City Court of Manila. Without awaiting the final
result of the ejectment case, herein petitioners filed, on August 22, 1959, a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 41260, against herein respondents Cesar Aldaba
and Emmanuel Bautista and the Register of Deeds of Manila, alleging that they had become the owners
of the two lots in question, and praying that the deed of partition entered into by Estanislao Bautista
and Cesar Aldaba be declared null and void with respect to Lot No. 32, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 1334, and lot No. 34 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No 1335; that said lots be
declared the property of therein plaintiffs (herein petitioners); and that the Register of Deeds of Manila
be ordered to cancel TCT Nos. 49996 and 49997 in the name of Emmanuel Bautista and in lieu thereof
issue two new TCTs in the name of therein plaintiffs.
After hearing, the court a quo rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, and declaring, among
others, that if the deceased Belen Aldaba intended to convey the lots in question to Vicente Aldaba and

Jane Aldaba, by way of donation, the conveyance should be considered a donation inter vivos, for the
validity of which a public instrument was necessary pursuant to Article 749 of the Civil Code. The
dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court reads as follows:
IN VIEW WHEREOF both complaint and counterclaim dismissed; the Court holds Emmanuel Bautista
to be the absolute owner of the property in question, land and improvement, but with the right of
plaintiffs to stay until they should have been reimbursed of P5,000.00 but without any obligation, until
such reimbursement, to pay any rental unto defendant Emmanuel Bautista. No pronouncement as to
costs.
From this decision, therein plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter court rendered a
decision, on June 21, 1963, raising from P5,000 to P8,000 the amount to be reimbursed to plaintiffsappellants, but affirming in all other respects the decision of the lower court. Herein petitioners' motion
for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals, they forthwith filed the
present petition in this Court.
Before this Court, petitioners now contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the decision
of the Court of First Instance; (2) in holding that the donation, as found by the Court of First Instance
of Manila, was a simple donation inter vivos and not a donation "con causa onerosa and so it was void
for it did not follow the requirements of Article 749 of the Civil Code; (3) in not holding that the
property in question had already been donated to herein petitioners in consideration of the latter's
services; (4) in not declaring petitioners to be the absolute owners of the property in dispute; and (5) in
considering testimonies which had been stricken out.
The errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated, We are going to discuss them together.
Petitioners contend that petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba had rendered services to the
deceased Belen Aldaba for more than ten years without receiving any compensation, and so in
compensation for their services Belen Aldaba gave them the lots in dispute including the improvements
thereon. It is the stand of petitioners that the property in question was conveyed to them by way of an
onerous donation which is governed by Article 733, and not Article 749, of the Civil Code. Under
Article 733 of the Civil Code an onerous donation does not have to be done by virtue of a public
instrument. The petitioners point to the note, Exhibit 6, as indicating that a donation had been made,
which note reads as follows:
June 18, 1953
Jane,
Huag kayong umalis diyan. Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo. Alam nila na iyan ay sa inyo.
Belen A. Bautista.
Petitioners maintain that the note, although it could not transmit title, showed, nevertheless, that a
donation had already been made long before its writing, in consideration of the services rendered
before the writing and to be rendered after its writing. And the donation being with an onerous cause,
petitioners maintain that it was valid even if it was done orally. Petitioners further maintain that if
Exhibit 6 labors under some ambiguity, this ambiguity is cured by Exhibit 7, which reads as follows:

June 27, 1956

Dear Nana Tering,
Narito po ang notice tungkol sa amillaramiento na pagbabayaran diyan sa lupa at bahay na
kinatatayuan ninyo. Sa Malolos po ito tinanggap. Ang pagbabayaran po ng Inkong ay bayad na.
Gumagalang,
"Cely."
The addressee, Tering, was the wife of Dr. Vicente Aldaba, and the sender, Cely was the wife of
respondent Emmanuel Bautista. This note, petitioners argue, proves that respondents had recognized
the ownership of the petitioners of the house and lot, for, otherwise, Cely should have sent the notice of
real estate tax to respondent Cesar Aldaba, to whom was alloted the property in question by virtue of
the extra-judicial partition.
Respondents, Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, on the other hand, contend that the evidence of the
plaintiff does not disclose clearly that a donation had been made. Respondents point out that the note,
Exhibit 6, as worded, is vague, in that it could not be interpreted as referring to the lots in question, or
that which was given therein was given for a valuable consideration. And finally, respondents contend
that if the property had really been given to petitioners, why did they not take any step to transfer the
property in their names?
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, made the following findings and conclusions:
(1) The note Exhibit 6 did not make any reference to the lots in question, nor to the services rendered,
or to be rendered, in favor of Belen. The note was insufficient is a conveyance, and hence could not be
considered as evidence of a donation with onerous cause. This note can be considered, at most, as
indicative of the intention to donate.
(2) There is no satisfactory explanation why from 1945 to 1955, no notarial document was executed by
Belen in favor of petitioners who were educated persons. The reason given was "extremada delicadeza"
which reason the Court of Appeals considered as unsatisfactory.
(3) The evidence regarding the value of the services (P53,000.00) rendered by petitioners (father and
daughter) to Belen does not improve the proof regarding the alleged donation. If petitioners believed
that the gratuitous use of the property was not sufficient to compensate them for their services, they
could have presented their claims in the intestate proceedings, which they themselves could have
initiated, if none was instituted.
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals, as well as that of the trial court, that there was no onerous
donation made by Belen Aldaba to petitioners is based upon their appreciation of the evidence, and this
Court will not disturb the factual findings of those courts.lawphi1.nt
The question to be resolved in the instant case is: Was there a disposition of the property in question
made by the deceased Belen Aldaba in favor of herein petitioners? The note, Exhibit 6, considered
alone, was, as held by the Court of Appeals, confirming the opinion of the lower court, only an
indication of the intention of Belen Aldaba to donate to the petitioners the property occupied by the
latter. We agree with this conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The note, in fact,

expressed that the property was really intended for the petitioners, "talagang iyan ay para sa inyo." If
the property was only intended for petitioners then, at the time of its writing, the property had not yet
been disposed of in their favor. There is no evidence in the record that such intention was effectively
carried out after the writing of the note. Inasmuch as the mere expression of an intention is not a
promise, because a promise is an undertaking to carry the intention into effect, 1 We cannot,
considering Exhibit 6 alone, conclude that the deceased promised, much less did convey, the property
in question to the petitioners. That the note, Exhibit 6, was only an indication of an intention to give
was also the interpretation given by petitioners themselves, when they said in their memorandum, dated
February 2, 1960, in the lower court 2 thus:
Legally speaking, there was a contractual relation created between Belen Aldaba and the plaintiff since
1945 whereby the former would give to the latter the two parcels of land, together with the house
standing thereon, upon the rendition of said services. This fact can be gleaned from the note (Exh. "6",
Plaintiffs) which in part says: TALAGANG IYAN AY PARA SAINYO
We have said that Exhibit 6 expressed only the intention to donate. Let us suppose, for the sake of
argument, that previous to the writing of the note there had already been a disposition of the property in
favor of the petitioners. This disposition alone, would not make the donation a donation for a valuable
consideration. We still have to ask: What was the consideration of such disposition? We do not find in
the record that there had been an express agreement between petitioners and Belen Aldaba that the
latter would pay for the services of the former. If there was no express agreement, could it not be at
least implied? There could not be an implied contract for payment because We find in the record that
Jane did not expect to be paid for her services. In the memorandum of counsel for the petitioners in the
trial court We find this statement:
For all she did to her aunt she expected not to be paid.3
When a person does not expect to be paid for his services, there cannot be a contract implied in fact to
make compensation for said services.
However, no contract implied in fact to make compensation for personal services performed for another
arises unless the party furnishing the services then expected or had reason to expect the payment or
compensation by the other party. To give rise to an implied contract to pay for services, they must have
been rendered by one party in expectation that the other party would pay for them, and have been
accepted by the other party with knowledge of that expectation. (58 Am. Jur. p. 512 and cases cited
therein).
In the same manner when the person rendering the services has renounced his fees, the services are not
demandable obligations. 4
Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the services of petitioners constituted a demandable
debt, We still have to ask whether in the instant case this was the consideration for which the deceased
made the (alleged) disposition of the property to the petitioners. As we have adverted to, we have not
come across in the record even a claim that there was an express agreement between petitioners and
Belen Aldaba that the latter would give the property in question in consideration of the services of
petitioners. All that petitioners could claim regarding this matter was that "it was impliedly understood"
between them. 5 How said agreement was implied and from what facts it was implied, petitioners did
not make clear. The question of whether or not what is relied upon as a consideration had been
knowingly accepted by the parties as a consideration, is a question of fact, 6 and the Court of Appeals

has not found in the instant case that the lots in question were given to petitioners in consideration of
the services rendered by them to Belen Aldaba.
We find, therefore, that the conditions to constitute a donation cum causa onerosa are not present in the
instant case, and the claim of petitioners that the two lots in question were donated to them by Belen
Aldaba cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. It is
so ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-36840

May 22, 1973

PEOPLE'S CAR INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
COMMANDO SECURITY SERVICE AGENCY, defendant-appellee.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this appeal from the adverse judgment of the Davao court of first instance limiting plaintiffappellant's recovery under its complaint to the sum of P1,000.00 instead of the actual damages of
P8,489.10 claimed and suffered by it as a direct result of the wrongful acts of defendant security
agency's guard assigned at plaintiff's premises in pursuance of their "Guard Service Contract", the
Court finds merit in the appeal and accordingly reverses the trial court's judgment.
The appeal was certified to this Court by a special division of the Court of Appeals on a four-to-one
vote as per its resolution of April 14, 1973 that "Since the case was submitted to the court a quo for
decision on the strength of the stipulation of facts, only questions of law can be involved in the present
appeal."
The Court has accepted such certification and docketed this appeal on the strength of its own finding
from the records that plaintiff's notice of appeal was expressly to this Court (not to the appellate court)"
on pure questions of law" 1 and its record on appeal accordingly prayed that" the corresponding records
be certified and forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court." 2 The trial court so approved the same 3
on July 3, 1971 instead of having required the filing of a petition for review of the judgment sought to
be appealed from directly with this Court, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 5440. By
some unexplained and hitherto undiscovered error of the clerk of court, furthermore, the record on
appeal was erroneously forwarded to the appellate court rather than to this Court.
The parties submitted the case for judgment on a stipulation of facts. There is thus no dispute as to the
factual bases of plaintiff's complaint for recovery of actual damages against defendant, to wit, that
under the subsisting "Guard Service Contract" between the parties, defendant-appellee as a duly
licensed security service agency undertook in consideration of the payments made by plaintiff to
safeguard and protect the business premises of (plaintiff) from theft, pilferage, robbery, vandalism and

all other unlawful acts of any person or person prejudicial to the interest of (plaintiff)." 4
On April 5, 1970 at around 1:00 A.M., however, defendant's security guard on duty at plaintiff's
premises, "without any authority, consent, approval, knowledge or orders of the plaintiff and/or
defendant brought out of the compound of the plaintiff a car belonging to its customer, and drove said
car for a place or places unknown, abandoning his post as such security guard on duty inside the
plaintiff's compound, and while so driving said car in one of the City streets lost control of said car,
causing the same to fall into a ditch along J.P. Laurel St., Davao City by reason of which the plaintiff's
complaint for qualified theft against said driver, was blottered in the office of the Davao City Police
Department." 5
As a result of these wrongful acts of defendant's security guard, the car of plaintiff's customer, Joseph
Luy, which had been left with plaintiff for servicing and maintenance, "suffered extensive damage in
the total amount of P7,079." 6 besides the car rental value "chargeable to defendant" in the sum of
P1,410.00 for a car that plaintiff had to rent and make available to its said customer to enable him to
pursue his business and occupation for the period of forty-seven (47) days (from April 25 to June 10,
1970) that it took plaintiff to repair the damaged car, 7 or total actual damages incurred by plaintiff in
the sum of P8,489.10.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant was liable for the entire amount under paragraph 5 of their contract
whereunder defendant assumed "sole responsibility for the acts done during their watch hours" by its
guards, whereas defendant contended, without questioning the amount of the actual damages incurred
by plaintiff, that its liability "shall not exceed one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos per guard post" under
paragraph 4 of their contract.
The parties thus likewise stipulated on this sole issue submitted by them for adjudication, as follows:
Interpretation of the contract, as to the extent of the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff by reason
of the acts of the employees of the defendant is the only issue to be resolved.
The defendant relies on Par. 4 of the contract to support its contention while the plaintiff relies on Par. 5
of the same contract in support of its claims against the defendant. For ready reference they are quoted
hereunder:
'Par. 4. Party of the Second Part (defendant) through the negligence of its guards, after an
investigation has been conducted by the Party of the First Part (plaintiff) wherein the Party of the
Second Part has been duly represented shall assume full responsibilities for any loss or damages that
may occur to any property of the Party of the First Part for which it is accountable, during the watch
hours of the Party of the Second Part, provided the same is reported to the Party of the Second Part
within twenty-four (24) hours of the occurrence, except where such loss or damage is due to force
majeure, provided however that after the proper investigation to be made thereof that the guard on post
is found negligent and that the amount of the loss shall not exceed ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00)
PESOS per guard post.'
'Par. 5 The party of the Second Part assumes the responsibility for the proper performance by the
guards employed, of their duties and (shall) be solely responsible for the acts done during their watch
hours, the Party of the First Part being specifically released from any and all liabilities to the former's
employee or to the third parties arising from the acts or omissions done by the guard during their tour
of

duty.' ... 8
The trial court, misreading the above-quoted contractual provisions, held that "the liability of the
defendant in favor of the plaintiff falls under paragraph 4 of the Guard Service Contract" and rendered
judgment "finding the defendant liable to the plaintiff in the amount of P1,000.00 with costs."
Hence, this appeal, which, as already indicated, is meritorious and must be granted.
Paragraph 4 of the contract, which limits defendant's liability for the amount of loss or damage to any
property of plaintiff to "P1,000.00 per guard post," is by its own terms applicable only for loss or
damage 'through the negligence of its guards ... during the watch hours" provided that the same is duly
reported by plaintiff within 24 hours of the occurrence and the guard's negligence is verified after
proper investigation with the attendance of both contracting parties. Said paragraph is manifestly
inapplicable to the stipulated facts of record, which involve neither property of plaintiff that has been
lost or damaged at its premises nor mere negligence of defendant's security guard on duty.
Here, instead of defendant, through its assigned security guards, complying with its contractual
undertaking 'to safeguard and protect the business premises of (plaintiff) from theft, robbery, vandalism
and all other unlawful acts of any person or persons," defendant's own guard on duty unlawfully and
wrongfully drove out of plaintiffs premises a customer's car, lost control of it on the highway causing it
to fall into a ditch, thereby directly causing plaintiff to incur actual damages in the total amount of
P8,489.10.
Defendant is therefore undoubtedly liable to indemnify plaintiff for the entire damages thus incurred,
since under paragraph 5 of their contract it "assumed the responsibility for the proper performance by
the guards employed of their duties and (contracted to) be solely responsible for the acts done during
their watch hours" and "specifically released (plaintiff) from any and all liabilities ... to the third parties
arising from the acts or omissions done by the guards during their tour of duty." As plaintiff had duly
discharged its liability to the third party, its customer, Joseph Luy, for the undisputed damages of
P8,489.10 caused said customer, due to the wanton and unlawful act of defendant's guard, defendant in
turn was clearly liable under the terms of paragraph 5 of their contract to indemnify plaintiff in the
same amount.
The trial court's approach that "had plaintiff understood the liability of the defendant to fall under
paragraph 5, it should have told Joseph Luy, owner of the car, that under the Guard Service Contract, it
was not liable for the damage but the defendant and had Luy insisted on the liability of the plaintiff, the
latter should have challenged him to bring the matter to court. If Luy accepted the challenge and
instituted an action against the plaintiff, it should have filed a third-party complaint against the
Commando Security Service Agency. But if Luy instituted the action against the plaintiff and the
defendant, the plaintiff should have filed a crossclaim against the latter," 9 was unduly technical and
unrealistic and untenable.
Plaintiff was in law liable to its customer for the damages caused the customer's car, which had been
entrusted into its custody. Plaintiff therefore was in law justified in making good such damages and
relying in turn on defendant to honor its contract and indemnify it for such undisputed damages, which
had been caused directly by the unlawful and wrongful acts of defendant's security guard in breach of
their contract. As ordained in Article 1159, Civil Code, "obligations arising from contracts have the
force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith."

Plaintiff in law could not tell its customer, as per the trial court's view, that "under the Guard Service
Contract it was not liable for the damage but the defendant" since the customer could not hold
defendant to account for the damages as he had no privity of contract with defendant. Such an approach
of telling the adverse party to go to court, notwithstanding his plainly valid claim, aside from its ethical
deficiency among others, could hardly create any goodwill for plaintiff's business, in the same way that
defendant's baseless attempt to evade fully discharging its contractual liability to plaintiff cannot be
expected to have brought it more business. Worse, the administration of justice is prejudiced, since the
court dockets are unduly burdened with unnecessary litigation.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and judgment is hereby rendered
sentencing defendant-appellee to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P8,489.10 as and by way of
reimbursement of the stipulated actual damages and expenses, as well as the costs of suit in both
instances. It is so ordered.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.