Masters Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies

Spring 2014
Department of Peace and Conflict Research
Supervisor: Hvard Hegre
UPPSALA UNIVERSITY

COALITION SIZE MATTERS

Explaining Variations in Severity of State Repression in Tunisia

and Syria during the Arab Spring

Natalie Verstndig

ABSTRACT

The variation in state responses to popular uprisings begs the question of why some
authoritarian states are more repressive than others? Assuming that no ruler stands alone,
this question is approached by studying factors that influence elites decisions to
participate in repression, or rather support the protest movement. Previous works have
argued that minority rule is associated with a higher likelihood of different types of
violent outcomes. While a similar relationship could be expected for the outcome of state
repression as a response to popular uprisings, there is a lack of studies delving deeper into
the mechanisms behind this. This study will adopt Bueno de Mesquitas Minimum
Winning Coalition (MWC) concept, hypothesizing that the size of the MWC is
negatively correlated to the severity of state repression as a response to uprisings. The
hypothesis will be tested on two recent cases of uprisings from the Arab Spring; Tunisia
and Syria. The regimes of these countries both experienced uprisings in 2010-2011, but
responded differently. This study will show that the size of the MWC helps account for
this difference. In small MWCs, the higher level of higher level of private benefits for
each coalition member, fear of permanent exclusion in the future, and increased loyalty to
the regime, are the explanations for the increase in severity of state repression.

1.Introduction.............................................................................................................4
2.TheoreticalFramework............................................................................................6
2.1 Previous Research: Identifying the Gap ..................................................................................... 6
2.2 The Minimum Winning Coalition .............................................................................................. 8
2.3 State Repression ....................................................................................................................... 11
2.4 The Argument and the Causal Chain ........................................................................................ 13

3.ResearchDesign.....................................................................................................16
3.1 Method ...................................................................................................................................... 16
3.2 Case Selection .......................................................................................................................... 17
3.3 Operational Definitions ............................................................................................................ 20
3.4 Loyalty and Defections Tracing the Mechanism ................................................................... 25
3.5 Sources and Time Frame .......................................................................................................... 26

4.CaseStudies...........................................................................................................28
4.1 Tunisia: Background ................................................................................................................ 28
4.2 Syria: Background .................................................................................................................... 31
4.3 Tunisias Minimum Winning Coalition under Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali 19872010 .............. 32
4.4 Syrias Minimum Winning Coalition under Bashar al-Asad 2000-2011 ................................. 39
4.5 The Tunisian Uprising and State Repression ........................................................................... 46
4.6 The Syrian Uprising and State Repression ............................................................................... 48
4.7 Loyalty and Defections in Tunisia ........................................................................................... 49
4.8 Loyalty and Defections in Syria ............................................................................................... 52

5.Analysis..................................................................................................................54
5.1 Between-Case Comparison of Minimum Winning Coalition .................................................. 54
5.2 Between-Case Comparison of State Repression ...................................................................... 56
5.3 Summary of findings ................................................................................................................ 57
5.4 The Causal Chain ..................................................................................................................... 57
5.5 Additional Observations and Alternative Explanations ........................................................... 60
5.6 Limitations ................................................................................................................................ 63

6.Conclusions............................................................................................................64
6.1 Directions for Future Research ................................................................................................. 65
6.2 Implications for Policy ............................................................................................................. 66

7.Bibliography...........................................................................................................67

1.Introduction
Recent years have seen a wave of popular uprisings against autocratic regimes. Across
different regions of the world, dissenting groups have gathered on streets and in squares
to express their demands for reform, change, and even revolution. Sadly, many peaceful
protest movements have been met with brutal repression; in some cases leading to
prolonged armed conflict between regime forces and opposition groups. At the same
time, some regimes gave in to protesters demands by either conceding through reforms,
or by resigning. The purpose of this study is to investigate the mechanisms behind state
responses to popular dissent, explaining why these may differ in terms of repression
intensity.
Several studies have previously suggested a relationship between different types
of minority rule, and violent outcomes. Heger and Salehyan (2007) studied the relation
between Minimum Winning Coalition (MWC) size and conflict intensity, demonstrating
a negative correlation between these variables. While a similar relationship would be
expected between coalition size and severity of state repression, there is a lack of studies
delving deeper into the mechanisms behind this correlation. By looking at state
repression instead of conflict intensity, cases where armed conflict according to the
conventional definition did not erupt, can also be included.
This study seeks to explore the effect of MWC size1 on state repression as a
response to popular dissent,2 and answer the following research question; Why do some
authoritarian states respond to popular dissent with more severe repression than others?
In order to do this, two cases from the recent wave of uprisings in the Middle East
and North Africa will be examined and compared, by means of a structured, focused
comparison. The Arab Spring provides us with several cases of popular dissent against
long-standing autocratic regimes. At the same time, regime responses to initially mainly
peaceful popular protests varied significantly across the region. While some leaders fled
or provided concessions and initiated reforms, others attempted to quell the challengers
with various repressive means, resulting in some instances in prolonged armed conflict.
The regimes in Syria and Tunisia both saw the rise of initially peaceful dissent
1

When referring to MWC size, the distinctions small/large, and narrow/broad will be used
interchangeably.
2
The terms popular dissent, popular uprising, and protest movement, will be used interchangeably.

movements, but responded in vastly different ways. Given their commonalities in terms
of politics, history, culture, and geography, the two cases provide an interesting
opportunity for comparison of the effect of the size of the MWC on levels of state
repression.
Assuming that the ultimate objective of all incumbents is political survival, the
severity of state repression as a response to uprisings, is likely strongly influenced by the
leaders ability to recruit members of their MWC in the fight against the opposition. This
in turn will be a function of the level of loyalty among MWC members, and their
expectations of what will happen in case of regime change. The smaller the MWC, I will
argue, the higher the loyalty among MWC members, and greater their fear of permanent
exclusion in case of regime change, leading to increased severity of repression in
response to popular dissent. The hypothesis is formulated as follows; The size of the
minimum winning coalition is negatively correlated with the severity of state repression
as a response to popular uprisings.
The findings of this study support the hypothesis. In the two cases investigated, a
narrow minimum winning coalition correlated with an increasing severity of state
repression in response to the uprisings explored, and vice versa. Several indicators also
point to the existence of a causal link between these variables.
In the following section, a theoretical framework will be provided for my
argument, beginning with a review of previous research aimed at identifying the research
gap this study will fill. The main concepts of this study will then be explained and
defined, followed by a clarification of the main argument and causal chain. In the third
section, the research design will be introduced including operational definitions for the
variables of interest. The fourth chapter contains the empirical findings from the case
studies. After a short introduction to each case, the explanatory variable is explored for
the respective countries. The outcome variable is then assessed for each case, followed by
indicators for the mechanism. In the fifth section, the analysis will be presented including
between-case comparisons and alternative explanations. Finally, the sixth chapter will
conclude and suggest directions for future research.

2.TheoreticalFramework
This section will begin by reviewing the literature on the connection between minority
rule and violent outcomes, with the purpose of identifying the gap which this thesis will
contribute to fill. Subsequently, theory on the two main concepts of this study will be
presented and the variables will be conceptualized. Finally, the main argument and the
causal chain will be developed.

2.1PreviousResearch:IdentifyingtheGap
Scholars have for decades sought to account for variations in violent outcomes. Different
outcome variables have been in focus, including the likelihood or intensity of civil
conflict, the likelihood of genocide and politicide, or violent state repression. One strand
within this research explains conflict likelihood or severity using factors relating to
characteristics of the political elite, suggesting that countries where the elite is dominated
by representatives of a minority group are more likely to see violent outcomes.
A common tendency within this field of research is to focus on ethnicity as the
main explanatory factor. Barbara Harff (2003) attempts to explain the outcome of
genocide and politicide, and finds that ethnic conflict often precedes these outcomes. One
of the links between ethnicity and genocide and politicide, Harff argues, is the size of the
ethnic base of the regime. When the ethnic base of the regime is narrow, there is a high
risk that underrepresented groups will challenge the regime. As a response, the elite may
out of fear for this challenge, adopt ideologies that systematically exclude certain groups.
This can be seen for instance in the Apartheid ideology of South Africa, or the extreme
nationalisms of former Yugoslavia. Harff finds that the risk of genocide and politicide
was significantly more likely in countries where the political elite was based mainly or
entirely on an ethnic minority (Harff, 2003, p. 67).
Whether ethnic minority rule also leads to a heightened risk of civil war has been
questioned (Cederman & Girardin, 2007). James Fearon et al. (2007) attempt to answer
this question using data on the ethnicity of the top political leader for 161 countries since
1945. They find that while there is a tendency for countries where the leader belongs to
an ethnic minority group to have a heightened likelihood of civil war, the relationship is

weak and not statistically significant. The mechanism suggested by Fearon et al. is
similar to the one Harff argues for; the perception among plurality groups of being
underrepresented causes antagonism and perceived opportunities to take over power
(Fearon et al., 2007, p. 192).
Heger and Salehyan (2007) also investigate the effects of minority rule, arguing
that such systems are more likely to experience higher conflict intensity. The mechanism
argued for is in fact not related to ethnicity, but in absence of a better indicator, the
authors use the size of the ethnic group of the leader as a proxy for winning coalition size.
Instead, the mechanism has to do with the private benefits doled out to supporters of the
regime. In countries where the leader relies on a narrow winning coalition, private
benefits are more substantial, resulting in strong bonds of loyalty towards the regime. As
a result, supporters are more likely to strongly oppose any challenges to the leadership,
leading to more violent outcomes. This mechanism, and especially the winning coalition
concept, is adopted from Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003). The
indicator used, however, seems unrelated to the mechanism and the findings can therefore
be questioned.
Hanne Fjelde (2010) argues that regime type influences the likelihood of civil
conflict, and looks beyond ethnicity in accounting for this link. Research has previously
tried to explain how political institutions affect the risk of civil war in a country. Fjelde
distinguishes between different types of authoritarian regimes. She finds that countries
ruled by more narrow coalitions, such as military regimes or monarchies, face a higher
risk of civil war, while states where the leader relies on political parties avoid violent
conflict to a greater extent. The idea is that leaders who exercise power through party
structures possess the means to both coerce and co-opt potential challengers, thus
avoiding the high costs of using violence. Davenport (2007) titles this phenomenon the
tyrannical peace. He finds that single party regimes possess some characteristics of
democracies which allow them to incorporate a greater proportion of the population into
the political process, thus reducing the risk of state repression.
What all these studies have in common is the difficulty in finding a good indicator
for minority rule, that is practical for use in large-n studies. The first group of studies
mentioned here use the size of the ethnic group of the leader as an indicator. However, it
is not entirely convincing why ethnicity is a more salient issue than any other basis for
7

creating a sense of community or belonging. Nor does looking at ethnicity only account
for shifts and changes in how societies, sometimes quite suddenly, mobilize along
identity lines. The other group of studies has used regime type as an explanatory factor
for why more narrow coalitions tend to be more violent. Focusing only on regime type
does not take into account social structures within the population which may affect
violent outcomes.
In this thesis, I will investigate the causal mechanism suggested by Heger and
Salehyan (2007), and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) through a qualitative study. This
approach will allow me to probe the mechanism in depth, and to observe it in action.
Furthermore, my contribution is also that I will investigate the relationship between
minimum winning coalition size and severity of state repression. Instead of looking at
likelihood of civil war, or conflict intensity as the outcome variable, my study will focus
on regime responses to challenges against the political survival of leaders. This focus
better corresponds with the causal mechanism hypothesized, which suggests that
supporters of the regime who benefit from its rule are more likely to strongly oppose
challenges to the leaders dominance (Heger & Salehyan, 2007). As mentioned, it also
allows for including cases that do not qualify as armed conflicts.

2.2TheMinimumWinningCoalition
Many theories tasked with explaining political violence tend to view the state as a unitary
actor, and to use structural factors to account for variations across countries. However,
the decision of leaders to use violence is ultimately a product of a cost-benefit calculation
on behalf of those individuals who are needed by the leadership to commit violent crimes
against citizens. Conceptualizing and understanding the MWC provides a useful
framework for explaining variations in state repression, where the size of the coalition
determines the outcome.
The MWC is defined as the subset of the population whose support is necessary
for the political survival of the regime. This subset can be identified as the group of
people within a state, which support the leadership politically in return for substantial
private benefits, and whose support is necessary for the political survival of the leader
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Heger & Salehyan, 2007, p. 387).

The MWC concept might at the same time seem obvious and abstract. The fact
that no leader can rule alone, and that even the most autocratic of dictators need a support
base, no matter how limited, seems intuitive. At the same time, asked to identify the exact
MWC for any given country proves impossible. One way to approach the MWC is by
understanding the notion of the selectorate.
The selectorate refers to the set of individuals who are qualified, by possessing
some combination of characteristics, to select the leadership, and to gain access to private
benefits from the government. Membership of the selectorate differs depending on the
type of regime, where different polities have different criteria for inclusion into the
selectorate. In hereditary monarchies, for instance, selectorate membership is determined
by lineage; being born into the aristocracy or nobility is a requirement for becoming the
monarch, but not always sufficient. Military regimes, by contrast, are an example of
polities where possession of a special proficiency determines selectorate membership.
Monarchies and military regimes are both examples of polities with small selectorates,
while democracies typically have large selectorates, including those eligible to vote; in
most cases all adult citizens (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).
Another important characteristic of the selectorate is that its members serve as a
base of recruitment for the MWC. In other words, selectorate members not only possess
qualities and characteristics required to select the leadership, they also have the
possibility of qualifying to become part of the winning coalition. The winning coalition is
defined by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) as a subset of the selectorate of sufficient
size such that the subsets support endows the leadership with political power over the
remainder of the selectorate as well as over disenfranchised members of the society. (p.
51). The prefix minimum is added to winning coalition, in order to emphasize that it will
always be the smallest possible coalition needed to ensure the political survival of the
leader. The MWC tends in general to be smaller in autocratic systems than in
democracies, but the variation among authoritarian states is nonetheless significant
(Heger & Salehyan, 2007).
Both the leader and the members of the MWC have an interest in keeping the
coalition to a minimum; the members in order to maximize their individual share of
private benefits, and the leader in order to minimize the total amount of private benefits
paid out to supporters. This also demonstrates the mutual nature of the relationship
9

between MWC members and the leadership; the members of the MWC provide political
support in return for private benefits (Heger & Salehyan, 2007).
While the size of the winning coalition is a function of the size of the selectorate,
it also varies with other, societal factors. For instance, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)
argue that in heterogeneous societies, where affinity is likely to be lumpy in its
distribution (p. 63), bloc identities are more likely to form. Leaders in heterogeneous
societies tend to use bloc identities, such as religion, ethnicity or union membership, to
create groups of voting whereby a few key individuals, bloc leaders, can deliver bloc
votes, essentially representing a larger group of selectorate members with similar affinity.
Bloc identity voting will tend to create smaller winning coalitions, since a small number
of individuals in the winning coalition can represent a larger group in the selectorate.
I will argue that MWC size has crucial importance for the political survival of
leaders, and also helps explain states use of violence. The smaller the size of the MWC,
the more loyal its members will be. The implication is a negative relationship between
MWC size and severity of repression as a response to dissent.
Below is a table outlining the criteria, which can be used to conceptualize the
MWC, and help identify groups in society who can be considered to be included in the
MWC. The criteria are all necessary, but none is sufficient by itself.

10

MINIMUM WINNING COALITION

Criteria

Explanation

Qualified to select leadership

Members of the selectorate have the necessary

qualifications needed to endow the regime
with the mandate to rule, and have the
possibility of qualifying to become part of the
winning coalition.
Members of the MWC support the leadership
politically, either by virtue of their
membership of a political party, union, ethnic
group, class, or other collective which
evidently supports the leadership, or by virtue
of their direct relation to the leader.
Members of the MWC are the receptors of
benefits from the regime, which sets them
apart from the majority. Can be for instance
favorable business deals, targeted subsidies,
policies, tax benefits, or protection etc.

Support the leadership

politically

Mutual relationship

Adapted from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)

Table 1. Conceptualization of minimum winning coalition

2.3StateRepression
Research on state repression has made significant strides in the past two decades.
Conceptualizations have been many, but most tend to emphasize similar aspects.
Davenport and Inman (2012) use the following conceptual definition, which will also be
applied in this research;

actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization,

within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the
target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to
government personnel, practices or institutions. (Davenport & Inman, 2012, p. 620).

Much of the literature on state repression is concerned with increasing our

understanding of what influences repression. A common argument among state
11

repression scholars is the interdependence between dissent and repression. Most

researchers within this field seem to agree that challenges to the regime through some
form of popular dissent leads to repression. This finding is very robust, proving to be
consistent across space, time, context, and type of challenge (both violent and nonviolent). However, most scholars will agree that this is not a unidirectional relationship;
rather, the finding is more commonly referred to as the conflict/dissent-repression nexus,
indicating an interdependent, or circular, relationship between challenges to the
government and its response in form of repression (Christian Davenport & Inman, 2012).
Within the literature on the dissent-repression nexus, one can find both studies
seeking to explain dissidents behavior as a response to state repression, as well as the
impact of dissent on leaders decision to repress (Carey, 2006; Christian Davenport &
Inman, 2012; Lichbach, 1987). Dissent is defined by Ritter (2013) as a coordinated
attempt by non-state actors within the territorial jurisdiction of the state to influence
political outcomes that is not organized by the state. (p. 145). In other words, methods of
political participation such as voting or running for office are excluded, while both legal
and illegal forms of dissent are included. This ranges from non-violent methods such as
sit-ins or peaceful protests, to violent methods such as riots and violent attacks on person
and/or property (Ritter, 2013).
While research has shown a strong connection between dissent and repression,
repression is not always a response to dissent, protests, or revolutions. Many authoritarian
regimes maintain some sort of constant level of repression as a standard tactic aimed at
either imposing fear on citizens with the purpose of deterring potential challenges, or
restricting individuals from organizing against the government. Indeed, for many of the
Arab Spring states, repression was part of the daily routine. However, simply being
authoritarian does not explain variations in repression over time within the same state.
Similarly, the incidence of dissent cannot alone account for the variation in regimes
responses to these occurrences.
The literature on dissent and repression suggests a highly interdependent
relationship between the two phenomena. However, the relation between dissent and
repression is not the main focus of this study. Neither is the purpose of the study is to
explain what caused the onset of the popular uprisings and expressions of dissent of the
Arab Spring. Rather, the aim is to investigate under what conditions state repression as a
12

response to popular dissent is likely to be more severe. In other words, the causality
between dissent and repression is already assumed to be present, building on the above
reviewed literature.

2.4TheArgumentandtheCausalChain
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) show that large coalition size is correlated with a
significantly lower probability of war. Heger and Salehyan (2007) argue that the size of
the winning coalition is negatively correlated with severity of conflict. In brief, the link
between MWC size and violence is loyalty; the smaller the MWC, the higher the loyalty
of individual members towards the leader, and thus the more likely are members to
engage in more severe acts of repression against dissenters. The creation of loyalty within
small coalitions can be explained by two mechanisms.

Small
Minimum
Winning
Coalition
(X)

Higherlevel
ofper
person
bene<its

Increased
fearof
future
exclusion

Increased
loyalty

Increased
severityof
state
repression
(Y)

Figure 1. Causal chain

The first mechanism is the private benefits provided by the leadership to its
supporters. The smaller the winning coalition, the larger the individual share of private
benefits. Leaders, and coalition members, tend to prefer to keep the coalition size to a
minimum. This is done to maximize the individual share of benefits to each member,
while minimizing the total amount of benefits paid by the leadership. However, a range
of factors, such as the political institutions of the country, present limits to how narrow
the winning coalition can be for the leader to be able to sustain her rule. In democracies
13

for instance, where the MWC is very broad, public goods are often provided instead of
private, since this becomes cheaper and more efficient. But even in autocracies and semiautocracies with relatively broad MWCs, the provision of private goods is more difficult
and more expensive, leading to a smaller per-member share of benefits. The higher level
of per-person private benefits paid to members of small MWCs, implies that these will
have a stronger interest in maintaining the current regime, leading to increased loyalty
towards the regime and greater willingness to use violence to curb uprisings threatening
the current order (Heger & Salehyan, 2007, pp. 387388).
The second mechanism has to do with MWC members fear of permanent
exclusion in case of a regime change. In countries with a relatively small MWC,
supporters of the regime will be easier to identify and exclude in case of regime change.
As such, members of narrow coalitions are more likely to fear permanent exclusion as a
result of shift in power, making them more desperate to defend the current leadership
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Heger & Salehyan, 2007).
Both of these mechanisms hinge on the fact that there can be no guarantee for
individual members of the MWC to become part of the new coalition in case of regime
change. The commitment problem implies that leaders cannot credibly commit to include
a minority in a future MWC, due to the shift of bargaining power associated with regime
change (Fearon, 1998). While the commitment problem is relevant for members of both
broad and narrow MWCs, the problem will be more accentuated the smaller the coalition,
due to the mechanisms explained above.
The causal mechanisms can be better understood with help of the principal-agent
logic. If members of a narrow MWC are more likely to commit more (severe) acts of
repression, agents personal motives can be a useful way of framing this theoretically.
The principal-agent approach stands in contrast to the more structural approaches where
the state is seen as a unitary actor with a single interest. Such studies may for instance
conflate the regime with the security forces, while these two actors are in fact different
with regards to interests and capabilities. Distinguishing between principals and agents,
and between different agents, allows for understanding the goals of agents as independent
of those of other agents and of the principal. Motives for exercising repression may
indeed be more or less selfish, generating private benefits for agents such as loot, revenge

14

or other types of satisfaction, while lacking more obvious strategic benefits (Butler,
Gluch, & Mitchell, 2007).
Heger and Salehyan (2007), and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) use level of
violence, and conflict severity as their outcome variables, both measured as the number
of deaths on both sides during a conflict. Using state repression as a response to dissent
as the dependent variable offers a more conceptually clear argument, where the actions of
the state are isolated as the outcome, and both violent and non-violent acts are included.
It also allows for including cases where armed conflict did not take place according to
the conventional definition.
As such, the hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows; As the size of the
minimum winning coalition decreases, the severity of state repression in response to
popular dissent will increase.

15

3.ResearchDesign
This chapter will present and motivate the choice of methodology, and critically discuss
the case selection process. Following, the independent and dependent variables will be
operationalized and the sources and time frame of the study will be discussed.

3.1Method
For this study, a comparative case study approach is chosen. As the main goal of this
study is to elaborate causal mechanisms, a small-n case study may prove more revealing
than a quantitative approach. Studying a small number of cases closely allows for
observing the interaction of the independent and dependent variables, and as such
provides the possibility to see the causal mechanism in action (Gerring, 2007).
In this study, the main purpose is to investigate the causal mechanism that
explains the effect between the size of the MWC and the severity of state repression as a
response to popular dissent. The causal effect between MWC and conflict severity (which
is conceptually close to the dependent variable of this study) has previously been
established in a large-n study by Heger and Salehyan (2007). In order to more closely
investigate the causal mechanism suggested by Heger and Salehyan, a case study
approach is chosen.
The case study approach can also be advantageous in the sense that it allows for a
more flexible operationalization whereas large-n studies often force researchers to make
unsubstantiated assumptions in order to score their variables (Gerring, 2007). The
operationalization of MWC size in the study by Heger and Salehyan (2007) can be
questioned, and is discussed further below. The difficulties concerned with that task led
to the utilization of indicators that are more or less detached from the actual concept.
Indeed, MWC is by definition a concept, which cannot be precisely determined when it
comes to size or composition. As such, this approach allows for developing an
operationalization that is more flexible than what a large-n study allows for.
Further, the conditions influencing the size of the MWC is thought to vary from
state to state, and over time, making it difficult to find any universal indicators. A
comparative case study is expected to allow for more flexibility in terms of analyzing the
size and composition of the MWC in the countries studied.

16

More specifically, with regards to the research design, the hypothesis will be
tested through a so-called structured, focused comparison. The comparison will be
structured in the sense that a set of questions is developed to reflect the theoretical focus
and research objective of the study. This set of questions is posed to each of the cases in
the comparison, ensuring that the investigation does not simply handle the issues of
interest to the researcher, or those issues where information is readily available. Also,
formulating a standardized set of questions allows for replication in future research.
Further, the study will be focused in the sense that it will maintain focus on one single
research objective rather than aiming to study all interesting aspects of the events
(George & Bennet, 2005). The questions will be formulated to measure the independent
and dependent variables in each case.
In order to observe the causal mechanism in action, I will also briefly trace the
process of how MWC members reacted to the popular dissent in the two cases. Processtracing can be described in its simplest form as a detailed narrative or story presented in
a form of a chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event came about (George
& Bennet, 2005, p. 182). In other words, the idea is that the researcher simply describes
the chain of events, linking the explanatory variable to the outcome. Process-tracing is
believed to make up for some of the limitations of Mills method of difference (explained
below). As most case studies are flawed in the sense that the cases chosen are not exactly
similar, implying a risk that alternative explanations or confounders may play a role,
process-tracing allows for proving that the causal relationship suggested in fact exists.

3.2CaseSelection
In this study, the cases will be chosen according to the most-similar case design,
also referred to as Mills method of difference, where two cases are chosen which are
similar in all important respects except the outcome variable. This method is commonly
used in the exploratory stages of research, in order to generate hypotheses, but may
transform over the duration of the research to become more confirmatory in nature.
(Gerring, 2007). In other words, the research process started out by identifying a relevant
puzzle; in this case I sought to explain why some regimes affected by the Arab Spring
responded to the popular dissent with more repression than others. The aim was then to

17

find two cases, which differed in outcome, i.e. severity of repression, but were similar in
most other important respects. Simultaneously, I searched for theories explaining
variation in repression, and developed a hypothesis, which I believed would be able to
explain a significant amount of the variation in the outcome of my two cases.
Based on these considerations, I chose two cases which displayed variation on the
outcome variable, and were most similar on other potential causal factors. The cases
chosen are Tunisia and Syria, which display different levels of state repression as a
response to the popular dissent that erupted in 2010 and 2011, but where a number of
other factors can be held constant. Before going into which these factors are, and why
they are considered important, it should be recognized that while the aim is to compare
two most similar cases, they inevitably differ on several points. Indeed, no two
countries are fully comparable. Nevertheless, the ambition is to compare two cases where
most of the factors, which can be considered alternative explanations to the outcome, are
held constant. Furthermore, the cases are also chosen to avoid any potential confounding
factors, that is, factors that could potentially explain the variation in both the independent
and dependent variables.
In both Tunisia and Syria, groups of dissenters came together to demand regime
change; starting in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, and in Syria on March 16, 2011. The
outcome, as is well known, is vastly different. In Tunisia, while security forces initially
made some attempts to quell protests using repression tactics, within a month, the
President had left the country. In Syria, however, large-scale military operations were
deployed against demonstrators resulting in a protracted, still ongoing, civil war between
regime forces and opposition groups.
Furthermore, the hypothesis was formulated expecting that a small MWC had
caused the high levels of repression in Syria, while a relatively broad MWC in Tunisia
meant that repression was constrained and violent conflict thus contained. This
assumption was inspired by several empirical studies and the authors own knowledge of
these countries. For instance, Heger and Salehyan (2007) suggest that a narrow MWC in
Syria explained the brutal repression of a Muslim Brotherhood revolt in 1982.
Assumed to be different in terms of MWC size, Tunisia and Syria are similar
when it comes to a number of other factors including colonial history, geographical
region, culture, and religion. Both countries have a background within the Ottoman
18

Empire, and were released from several decades of French administration in 1956 and
1946, respectively. Tunisia and Syria are both Arab countries, members of the Arab
League, and are populated by a majority of Sunni Muslims.
In the last three decades, both countries had been relatively stable, seeing only
one succession of power in each country, both non-violent, where executive recruitment
occurred through designation.3 No armed conflicts occurred in either country during this
time (UCDP).
Perhaps the most important factor held constant is the incidence of popular
dissent. In both Syria and Tunisia, organized dissent movements came together to
demand regime change. Assuming that demands for regime change would be considered
the most threatening to leaders, compared to demands for economic and political reforms,
the level of threat posed is held constant. Additionally, in neither case did the protesters
start out with violent protests; they only turned violent after the regime had started with
violent repression.
One of the most robust relationships found within the repression literature, is what
is sometimes referred to as the domestic democratic peace; the negative impact of
democracy on repression. According to Davenport and Inman (2012), the level of
democracy has no effect on repression below a certain threshold; 0.8 on the Polity
measure. As of 2010, both Tunisia and Syria measured well below this threshold on the
Polity measure, with scores of -4 and -7, respectively. Thus, the level of democracy is
held constant, to the extent that it is not believed to have caused the variation in
repression.
Economic development has also been found to have an effect on state repression
(Davenport & Inman, 2012). In 2011, GDP per capita in Syria was USD 5,100, and USD
9,500 in Tunisia. While it is obviously difficult to determine whether two countries are
similar enough in terms of economic development to ensure that this is not an alternative
explanation, it is also difficult to find two countries for comparison that are more similar
than Tunisia in Syria. Among the 22 Arab League countries, Tunisia ranks tenth and

In Syria, Bashar al-Asad took over from his father, Hafiz al-Asad in 2000, which may indicate some sort
of hereditary system, this is in many ways a flawed picture of Syrian politics, given the crucial role of the
Baath party in selecting Bashar al-Asad for leader (Polity IV Country Report 2010: Syria).

19

Syria sixteenth on GDP per capita. Nevertheless, the link between democracy, economic
development, will be further elaborated on in the discussion.
It is worth to make a note of the population size in the respective countries. While
Tunisia is home to around 10 million people, Syria has approximately 17 million
inhabitants (The World Factbook, 2014). One could argue that a country with a larger
population would be more likely to have a larger MWC. Since this argument runs counter
to the findings of this thesis, it is not considered to be a problem. Furthermore,
population size is not generally considered to have an effect on state repression. A
potential argument could be that it is more difficult to repress an uprising in a state with a
large population. This also runs counter to the findings of this research and is therefore
not assumed to be an issue.
In sum, Tunisia and Syria pose an interesting case for comparison, since they are
both cases of authoritarian regimes, similar on a number of important points, that faced
popular dissent in 2010-2011, but where the outcome in terms of state repression
differed.

3.3OperationalDefinitions
3.3.1MinimumWinningCoalitionSize
The operationalization of MWC size in this study will build on the theory constructed by
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). Elements are identified which are measurable and can
function as operational indicators for the size of the MWC. This operational definition is
constructed with the ambition of providing a replicable and practical framework for
estimating MWC size across cases.
First of all, MWC members need to be part of the selectorate, that is, have the
necessary qualifications needed to endow the regime with the mandate to rule. Depending
on the country, this could for instance be citizenship, or membership in the ruling party or
union. The minimum criteria for selecting the leadership, and joining the MWC will be
identified. A country with strict criteria for selectorate membership is assumed to be more
likely to have a narrow MWC. In the operationalization used by Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2003), selectorate size is assumed to depend on the breadth of the selectiveness of

20

members of a countrys legislature. In other words, a legislature which is directly elected

in popular elections is assumed to be an indicator of a broad selectorate, while a
legislature chosen by heredity is though to indicate a smaller selectorate. I will also look
at the election of the executive as an indicator of selectorate size.
Second, what essentially defines MWC members is their support for the regime,
and that they are considered by the regime to be vital supporters in the sense that regime
survival would be seriously threatened without their support. Support can be manifested
either at the individual level, for instance close associates of the leader such as members
of the cabinet, or at the group level where the leadership relies on an entire group or
social segment for support. As it is oftentimes difficult to identify the support base of a
regime, I will also identify those excluded by the regime. A country with a broad MWC is
assumed to include larger and more groups into its support base, while a regime resting
on a narrow MWC is expected to rely on the support of relatively few individuals and/or
groups.
Third, the level of private benefits paid to each member of the MWC is expected
to be higher the smaller the MWC is. Private benefits may include favorable business
deals, targeted subsidies, policies, tax benefits, or protection etc. With fewer members,
the leader can afford to provide each member with a larger share of benefits. The nature
of the benefits received by members of the MWC can vary greatly, and therefore it is
difficult to measure this indicator in quantitative terms.
A final indication of the size of the MWC will be the extent to which there are
stable and enduring oppositional groups. The assumption here is that oppositional groups
would not persist if they did not believe they had an opportunity to influence politics and
becoming part of the MWC in the future (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). As such, a
country with many stable and enduring oppositional groups will indicate broader criteria
for inclusion into the MWC.

21

Selectorate size
The degree to
which the
legislature and the
executive is
selected in direct,
popular elections.
Direct election
indicates broad
selectorate, which
indicates broader
MWC.

MINIMUM WINNING COALITION SIZE

Political support
Per-member level
for the leadership of private benefits
The groups and
The private
individuals whose
benefits afforded
support is
supporters in return
considered by the
for their backing of
regime to be crucial the regime. A
to its survival.
lower level of perSupport from more member benefits
and larger groups
indicates broader
and individuals
MWC.
indicates broader
MWC.

Opposition groups
Many and enduring
political opposition
groups indicates
broader MWC.

Adapted from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)

Table 3. Operationalization of minimum winning coalition size

Based on these indicators, the following questions will be posed to each case:
1. How are members of the legislature and the executive selected?
2. What groups can be identified as the support base for the regime?
a. What groups in society can be characterized as excluded from the
support base of the regime?
3. To what extent do supporters of the regime benefit from private benefits
which sets them apart from the rest of the population?
4. Are there any stable and enduring oppositional groups? Which are these?

Since the exact size of the MWC in a given country cannot be determined, I will
use the following categorization to operationalize the independent variable:
1. Broad/inclusive MWC democracies (while there are segments of the
population who are not supportive of the regime, there are institutions guaranteeing a
more or less equal distribution of goods), or authoritarian states where the entire (native)
population is patronized by the regime.

22

2. Relatively broad/one-party state MWC authoritarian states where the MWC

constitutes a simple majority of the population, while there are substantial segments of
the population, which are disenfranchised or excluded from private benefits.
3. Narrow MWC states where the leadership depends on a MWC, which
constitutes a small minority of the population, and where most members of the MWC
have direct relation to the leadership.
3.3.2StateRepressionasaResponsetoPopularDissent
In order to assess whether protests in Syria and Tunisia during the Arab Spring qualify as
popular dissent according to the conceptualization of the term, I will use the
operationalization of campaigns in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. This operationalization is
corresponds sufficiently to what is referred to here as popular dissent. The definition
takes into account both participation and goals. First of all, campaign onset occurs when
at least 1,000 observed participants gather in a coordinated, contentious, collective action.
Second, the campaign must have maximalist goals in order to ensure the existence of
conflict conditions. This includes goals of regime change, secession, or the removal of a
foreign occupier (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). Popular dissent will not be measured in
terms of intensity, but rather as a dichotomous variable (existence or not existence of
popular dissent).
Repression tactics and repression outcomes will be used to determine repression
severity in this study. While state repression can be both physical and non-physical, this
study will focus on physical sanctions. The reasoning behind this is that non-physical
sanctions, for instance, domestic spying or restrictions of speech and assembly, is
difficult to measure in the short term. Since this study is concerned with the first month
since the start of the uprising, physical sanctions are both more likely to be observed as a
direct consequence of the protests, and easier to measure.
Regarding the tactics, Hendrix and Salehyan (2013) separate between lethal
repression (i.e. resulting in deaths) and non-lethal repression. Since the dependent
variable in this study is the severity of state repression, non-lethal repression will be
classified as less severe. Further, the degree to which the use of lethal tactics was
systematic and deliberated will be assessed. The more systematic and deliberated the use
of lethal tactics against protesters, the higher the severity of repression. Repression tactics

23

will be measured using qualitative sources, including International Crisis Group reports
on the uprisings, and scholarly articles and books.
Repression outcomes will be measured in terms of number of deaths, and number
of illegally detained journalists, in the first month from the start of the uprising. Number
of deaths will be measured using an indicator of the level of violence from the SIPRI
Yearbook of 2012 (Allansson, Baumann, Taub, Themnr, & Wallensteen, 2012), namely
the number of people killed in Arab Spring-related violence in each country4. There are
some problems with this measurement. First of all, it measures the total level of violence
in 2011 which does not allow for the isolation of the first month of protests. Second, it
does not only include violence directed at protestors, but also any violence directed at
government forces. Still, it is considered to be a good complement to the other indicators
used in this study. The number of illegally detained journalists will be measured using
data from Reporters Without Borders. The level of violence, and the number of
journalists arrested, helps refine the distinction between lethal and non-lethal, providing a
continuous measurement of severity within these categories. The choice to look at the
treatment of journalists by the regime forces was made deliberately. Crackdowns on the
media are a frequent tactic used by governments to quell dissenters and therefore a good
indicator of state repression as a response to popular dissent (Reporters Without Borders,
2011, 2013).
Since this study is concerned with measuring state repression, only repressive
acts perpetrated by state actors will be considered. State actors foremost includes the
military, security forces and police forces, but can also include any individuals which
were demonstrably recruited by the regime.

Low level of violence will indicate 1-24 deaths, Intermediate 25-999 deaths, and High 1000 or more
deaths.

24

POPULAR DISSENT
Participation

Goals

The gathering of at
least 1,000 participants
in coordinated,
contentious, collective
action.

Maximalist goals, i.e.

regime change,
secession, or the
removal of a foreign
occupier.

Adapted from Chenoweth and Lewis (2013).

Table 4. Operationalization of popular dissent

SEVERITY OF STATE REPRESSION

Repression tactics

Lethal vs. non-lethal

tactics
Degree to which tactics
are deliberate and
systematic
Lethal tactics (resulting in deaths),
and tactics that are systematic and
deliberate, will be considered to
indicate higher severity of
repression.

Repression outcomes

Number of deaths
Number of
illegally detained
journalists
Higher numbers of deaths
and detainees indicate
increased severity of
repression.

Table 5. Operationalization of state repression severity as a response to popular dissent

Based on these indicators, the following questions will be posed to each case:
1. Did popular dissent occur?
2. What types of repression tactics were used by state actors against dissenters in
the first month after popular dissent started?
3. What were the outcomes of the state repression in terms of number of deaths
and detainees?

3.4LoyaltyandDefectionsTracingtheMechanism
Observing and estimating the outcome and the explanatory factors in both cases can give
an indication of the existence of a relationship between these two variables. In order to

25

demonstrate a causal relationship, it is necessary to also observe indicators of the causal

mechanism. The hypothesis states that in countries with narrow MWCs, the response to
popular uprisings is likely to be more repressive. This is explained by the high degree of
loyalty among members of the MWC towards the regime, caused by a higher per-person
level of benefits, and their fear of exclusion in the future.
As such, in a country with a narrow MWC, I will expect that members of the
MWC remain loyal to the regime in the face of a challenge from a popular uprising. The
degree of loyalty among MWC members can be indicated by the participants of the
uprising. In a country with a narrow MWC, I expect that those participating in the
protests are chiefly from sectors of society which are not included in the MWC. The
leadership will thus be able to recruit its coalition members to participate in repression of
the uprising. Another indicator of loyalty among MWC members is the level of
defections, expecting few defections from within the MWC when the coalition is narrow.
Contrarily, in a country with a broad MWC, I expect that members of the MWC
will defect to a higher extent and also join the protest movement against the regime rather
than help to repress it. The leadership will therefore face difficulties in recruiting
members from its support base to repress the uprising.

To test for this, the following questions will be posed to each case:
1. Who participated in the protests?
2. Who participated in the repression of the protests?
3. To what extent did defections occur from within the MWC during the first
month of the uprising?

3.5SourcesandTimeFrame
The independent variable, MWC size, is believed to be relatively constant over time,
given that there are no radical changes such as civil war, or coups. At the same time, it
would be impossible to determine the size of the MWC at one specific point in time, due
to the nature of the concept and the availability of source material. Since autocratic
regimes tend to be shaped by the leader in power, I will look at the MWC in the course of
the regime which was in power at the time of the uprisings, but maintain a specific focus
on developments in the years leading up to the uprising.

26

For this, a range of secondary sources will be consulted, mainly scholarly

literature on the internal politics of the countries, country reports, and news reports,
combined with relevant data on ethnicity, political party affiliation, legislation etc.
The dependent variable, state repression, will be measured starting from the first
identified act of popular dissent in the respective countries according to the SIPRI
Yearbook. In Tunisia, this is December 18, 2010, and March 16, 2011 in Syria. I will
look at state repression in the first month from the start of the uprising. This is considered
to be sufficient time for the state to react to the uprising but too short for external actors
to get heavily involved, which could alter the dynamics of the conflict.
Also, since the Tunisian uprising only went on for about one month before
President Ben Ali fled the country, it would not be possible to measure state repression
after the first month in Tunisia. Since it is the size of Ben Alis MWC which is expected
to have an effect on his regimes use of state repression, it would make little sense to
measure repression after he was no longer the incumbent. Using the same time frame for
Syria allows for a high level of comparability between the two countries.
The incidence of dissent, and the first act of state repression will be identified
using news sources and data from UCDP and SIPRI, as well as country reports from
various NGOs. For repression tactics and outcomes, data from UCDP and SIPRI as well
as from Reporters Without Borders will be used together with some secondary material.

27

4.CaseStudies
After a short background on each case, the empirics from the case studies will be
presented separately for each variable. The MWC of each case will be discussed,
followed by state repression as a response to the uprisings. Lastly, the indicators for the
mechanism will be assessed.

4.1Tunisia:Background
Tunisia is often characterized as a fairly homogeneous society in terms of demography.
The majority, around 98 percent, are Sunni Muslims, and minority groups are relatively
few and small. The Tunisian Berber minority is smaller than in neighboring countries,
and they live mainly in isolated communities in the south of the country. While official
numbers for the indigenous Berber group are hard to come by, estimates range between
one and two percent (Minority Rights Group International, 2011). Observers have
described Tunisia before the revolution as a socially cohesive state, much owing to its
ethnic homogeneity, but also to a high degree of political legitimacy. However, the notion
of homogeneity can be questioned. Religious-secular cleavages have been significant in
Tunisias social and political arena since independence. Regional differences have also
divided the nation, between the developed coastal towns (from where most of the
political and industrial leadership were drawn), and the less privileged rural areas in the
middle of the country (Alexander, 2010; Maddy-Weitzman, 2011). Another criticism of
the idea of Tunisia as homogeneous consists of the fact that, traditionally, the country has
been characterized by tribal loyalties. However, these assumed lesser significance in the
period of independence in part due to the unification policies of the state (al-Qassemi,
2012; Boutaleb, 2012).
In order to understand the MWC which worked to sustain, and benefited from, the
rule of Ben Ali, one must start with the basis of the rule of Habib Bourguiba, who led the
country from independence in 1956 until 1987. The institutions Bourguiba used to build
support for his government transformed, but to some extent remained the basis and origin
of political power even under Ben Ali.
Habib Bourguiba originated in the new, Western influenced elite which had
broken with the old traditional ruling class. (King, 1998). Bourguiba ruled Tunisia for

28

three decades through the New Constitutional (Neo-Destour) Party, later renamed the
Socialist Constitutional (Destour) Party (PSD). Bourguiba had during the period of
nationalist struggle prior to independence established a support base which followed him
into the period of sovereignty. He came to base his rule on a broad coalition of organized
labor and other left-leaning interests. Two institutions were crucial in the formation of
this coalition. First of all, the Neo-Destour Party was the basis of support and legitimacy
for Bourguiba throughout his years in office. It started out as a mass party uniting
Tunisians in the struggle for independence, and transitioned over time into the institution
through which Bourguiba exercised his increasingly authoritarian rule (Alexander, 2010;
Moore, 1962). The Neo-Destour had a broad base and included intellectuals in the cities
as well as rural tribal communities. According to an estimation, by 1955, one third of all
male adults in Tunisia were members of the party (Charrad, 2001).5
Bourguiba is often described as Tunisias founding father; he embarked the
country on a wide-reaching nation-building project, including all sectors of society. Still,
Bourguiba maintained an authoritarian rule throughout his decades in office. (Alexander,
2010). Once the state was established, top party officials were assigned leading positions
within the newly formed government. Over time, all significant opposition parties were
banned or rendered harmless and Tunisia morphed into an increasingly authoritarian oneparty state. In 1963, the Neo-Destour national council declared its official support for a
single-party regime and subsequently the party and the state became indistinguishable
from one another; the ruling party had become little more than a transmission belt for
the government (Alexander, 2010, p. 41).
The other institution which served as a fundament for Bourguibas rule, and
indeed played an important role in the formation of the modern Tunisian state, was the
Tunisian General Labor Union, the UGTT (Union Gnrale Tunisienne du Travail). The
UGTT was established in 1946 from sectors of society which had been vital in the
nationalist movement led by Bourguiba prior to independence. Through the UGTT,
Bourguiba co-opted the Tunisian workers movement and gained their support for the
independence movement in return for salary increases and improvements in working
5

This estimation corresponds roughly to the figures available; in 1957, the party supposedly had 600,000
members. With a population of around 4 million this translates into approximately one-third of the male
population at the time (Moore, 1962).

29

conditions. More than that, the UGTT gained wide-reaching influence over policy in
return for their support for the president. In addition to allocating nearly one-fourth of the
seats in the National Assembly to the UGTT, Bourguiba also adopted large parts of the
unions economic program. This included centralization of economic planning,
nationalization of major industries, and land reform aimed at creating cooperatives
(Alexander, 2010; Moore, 1962). The latter policy was especially targeted to gain the
support of rural-based peasants. Peasants were indeed an important interest group for
Bourguiba and their support was, in addition to land, traded for credit, technical, and
marketing assistance. Co-opting the peasants was particularly important for the regime in
its attempt to diminish the influence of urban elites (King, 1998).
A combination of circumstances had by the 1980s accumulated to pose mounting
challenges to the Bourguiba regime. First of all, economic conditions were deteriorating
with soaring unemployment and inflation rates. An attempt by Bourguiba to use the
UGTT in order to constrain the rising tensions among workers backfired, causing a split
within the union. This period also saw a rising popularity for the Islamist movement in
Tunisia, leading to escalating conflict with the incumbent regime (Alexander, 2010;
King, 2003).
Coupled with Bourguibas poor health and alleged senility, these conditions
eventually led to the overtake by Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in a bloodless coup in 1987
(Alexander, 2010; King, 2003). The former general changed the name of the PSD to the
Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), to emphasize his commitment to democratic
reform. Ben Alis rule was indeed characterized by political and economic reform and
Tunisia has been lauded for its progress in terms of economic liberalization. The political
arena opened up to allow for new parties to form and run in elections, and for other
candidates to run for the presidency. The reforms were also a way to deescalate the
conflict with the Islamists. However, Ben Alis continued strong grip on power raises the
question whether or not these reforms were simply a faade (Alexander, 2010; King,
2009).

30

4.2Syria:Background
In Syria, groups are defined by different combinations of religious or ethnic belongings.
Around two-thirds of Syrias population is Sunni Muslim, although not all of these are
Arab. The largest minority groups, representing around ten percent each, are Alawis,
Christians of various denominations, Iraqi refugees,6 and Kurds. The presence of around
two million Alawis is worth noting, not least due to the groups political significance.
Historically, the Alawi minority has suffered from persecution and conflict with the
dominant Sunni culture. Under the French rule in Syria, Alawis were in many ways
privileged, which both set them apart from the rest of society, and allowed for the
creation of an Alawi middle class; well educated and economically powerful. However,
the group faced discrimination as heretics by the Sunni majority during the early years of
Syrian independence. With the rise to power of Hafiz al-Asad in 1970, many Alawis
regained their privileged positions (Minority Rights Group International, 2011).
Following a period of instability and a series of coups after independence in 1946,
representatives of the Arab Socialist Baath Party assumed power in 1963. The Baath
Party has since been the formal source of political power in Syria for half a century. This
seeming continuity does not imply political stability; rather, the institutions of the Baath
Party have been used for different political means by those in power at the time. After the
coup, it replaced the urban-Sunni political dominance with a radicalized ruralminoritarian rule. After decades of antagonism and conflict between urban and rural
groups, this shift marked the first challenge to the Sunni dominance in Syrian politics
since independence (Haddad, 2011).
When Hafiz al-Asad came to power in 1970, it signified both the gain of privilege
and status for many Alawis, but also the rise of more pragmatic elements within the
Baath Party. The party preceded Hafiz al-Asads presidency and has as mentioned been
used for different political purposes depending on the ruler and the hegemonic ideology
at the time. During Hafiz al-Asads presidency, the Baath transformed from a vehicle of
rural mobilization against the urban elites into a central pillar which the state rested on.
The broadening of the partys support base was accomplished through an increased

While Syria started accepting Iraqi refugees already in the 1940s, a majority of the current refugee
population arrived to Syria after the 2003 U.S. invasion.

31

emphasis on pan-Arabism. Arab nationalism seemed to be the only ideology able to unite
a majority of Syrians in an attempt to produce a politically stable future without further
coups. But the politicization of the party implied that the elites maintained some
autonomy vis--vis the presidency. The Baath became an indispensible, unifying
political tool for Asad, while it at the same time meant that he had to deal with a strong,
in some areas independent, political institution (Haddad, 2011; Stacher, 2012).
In the later years of Hafiz al-Asads presidency, the Baath Party became
increasingly irrelevant, as the president solidified his rule, and indeed became the symbol
of the nation. But as succession neared leading up to Hafiz al-Asads death in 2000, the
party experienced a revival. The task to select a successor fell on the top leadership
within the party. Bashar al-Asad was chosen to succeed his father not because he was a
strong leader with roots in the party; rather the opposite. The choice to promote Bashar to
the presidency was a way for the old elites to avoid fragmentation within the coalition.
Bashar al-Asad was considered a weak and malleable leader, and his appointment was a
consensus decision thought to ensure regime survival after Hafiz al-Asads death. In
other words, Bashar al-Asad stepped in as the president within a regime of strong,
politicized institutions and elites; the Baath, the military, and the security services
(Stacher, 2012).

4.3TunisiasMinimumWinningCoalitionunderZineelAbidineBenAli1987
2010
4.3.1SelectorateMembership
While popular elections prior to the revolution were held in Tunisia every five years,
restrictions on oppositional candidates and parties, together with election fraud, implies
that the power to select the leadership is not entirely with the people. Other
characteristics seem to be of importance, rendering certain individuals more qualified and
able to select the leadership and more likely to become part of a future ruling coalition.
One such characteristic has been membership in the RCD, the ruling party. In
fact, the system of executive recruitment was designed in such a way that non-RCD
candidates were practically excluded from winning in presidential elections, and from
selecting the leadership. The Constitution required presidential candidates to secure
support from at least 30 legislators or mayors, which all belong to the RCD. As a result of
32

this system, since his first election in 1989, Ben Ali was reelected every five years, never
gaining less than 89 percent of the vote (Polity IV, 2010b).
RCD membership was a crucial factor also in legislative selection. The electoral
system in Tunisia was a mix between majority list and proportional representation. The
majority list system entailed that a party had to present a list of candidates and obtain the
exclusive support of 75 voters in that district. This was difficult for the opposition parties
since they lacked national organizations and constituencies, but was no match for the
RCD. The share of the seats distributed proportionally among the opposition parties was
successively increased since 1994. Prior to the 2009 elections, the government approved
yet another amendment increasing the oppositions share to 25 percent; a share which
they could probably not have received by competing in free elections. As such, this was a
way for Ben Ali to maintain RCD hegemony while ensuring that the opposition parties
were content and non-disruptive (Alexander, 2010, pp. 5662).
In 2002, a second chamber was created. The Chamber of Advisors had 126
members elected by professional organizations, municipal councilors, members of the
first chamber, or appointed by the president. In 2004, over 90 percent of those selecting
the members for the Chamber of Advisors were RCD members (Alexander, 2010, p. 62).
As such, the system for legislative selection was neither hereditary nor one of direct
popular election. Tunisias legislature and presidency are de jure selected by the all
Tunisian adult citizens, but the de facto selectorate was smaller than that. The dominance
of the RCD in Tunisian politics and the institutionalized exclusion of non-RCD members
implies that the minimum criteria for selectorate membership in Tunisia was RCD
membership.
Before the 2011 uprising, the RCD had around two million members, which is a
fifth of the population. This meant that each Tunisian family had at least two RCD
members on average (Sadiki, 2002, p. 66). The party has been largely synonymous with
the state for a long time, with strong grass root and student movements. Even if the mass,
populist character of the party has somewhat faded in recent years, the strong social base
and popular anchoring meant that the RCD has been available as a means for political
participation to most Tunisians.
Tunisia under Ben Ali cannot be said to have ruled on the exclusion of any
particular group or segment of the population. Political opposition parties (except the
33

Islamists) were offered a political opening under Ben Ali. While privatization policies in
recent decades to some extent have favored urban elites, the considerations of the rural
population have constantly been incorporated. The one exception would be the Islamists,
whose political participation Ben Ali restricted by law. Still, Ben Ali occasionally let
even the Islamists into the political arena, mainly at the beginning of his rule (Alexander,
2010; King, 2003).

4.3.2TheSupportBaseofZineelAbidineBenAli
In contrast to Habib Bourguiba, Ben Ali did not have a strong popular base of support
when he entered office. In spite of his political career as interior and prime ministers, as
well as a general in the army, he was not part of the old ruling party elites, and did not
have any strong alliances to base his rule on. Ben Ali used different strategies to
consolidate and legitimize his rule. The fact that he opted to move away from the
patrimonial one-party state of Bourguiba and ground his legitimacy in the ideas of liberal
democracy, can be seen as a strategy to compensate for the lack of a strong constituency.
And while Tunisia indeed did become increasingly authoritarian after the new
millennium, Ben Ali played a constant game of maintaining his and the RCDs hegemony
while co-opting the opposition. This strategy was most obvious in the early years of his
presidency (Alexander, 2010).
The RCD continued to be an important support base for Ben Ali during his
decades in power, and indeed the source of political power in the country. But its social
base shifted as Ben Ali worked to co-opt certain segments of society. Over the course of
his rule, the rural bourgeoisie assumed a central role in the Tunisian political arena. The
rural bourgeoisie, or notables, included the large landowners of the countryside, which
had been instrumental for the French during the protectorate. The socialist-leaning elites
of the Neo-Destour under Bourguiba believed the rural bourgeoisie to have been the
allies, if not the basis of colonization, and opted instead to garner support from the rural
masses (King, 1998, p. 59). During the 1980s and 1990s, the rural bourgeoisie had grown
increasingly discontent with the governments socialist policies, in particular the land
reforms which implied the transformation into cooperatives of large landholdings.

34

In other words, as it became more difficult to uphold the catch-all character of the
RCD, Ben Alis tactic not only involved instrumentalization of the language of liberal
democracy, but also the co-option of influential social groups such as the rural
bourgeoisie. This group of rural elites, as well as their urban offshoots, served as an
important support base during the privatization of the 1990s. The privatization and
market-oriented policies of the government were mutually beneficial for the regime and
the new capitalist elites. In essence, Ben Ali used mix of neo-liberal reforms and state
corporatism to redistribute wealth to, and buy the support of, urban and rural economic
elites (Alexander, 2010; King, 1998, 2003). This process involved a transformation
whereby the RCD turned in to largely a party of rural notables and well-connected
capitalists (King, 2009, p. 170).
But while the social base of the RCD shifted under Ben Ali in the years of
economic liberalization, the Tunisian President also continued to value the constituents of
the countryside. Ben Ali turned to the UGTT to ensure their support from peasants and
workers for his regime in spite of privatization efforts which tended to disadvantage this
group. In this sense, the trade union was an important component in the consolidation of
his economic and political project. Ben Ali instituted close ties between the unionists and
the state authorities, and the former signed on to his economic reform policies as well as
his political project. In presidential elections, the UGTT leadership appealed to its
members and to Tunisian workers at large to vote for Ben Ali (King, 2009).
It is also worth to make a note of the relationship between the regime and the
military and security forces. Tunisia was unique among Arab states in the sense that the
armed forces were highly independent from the ruling regime. Even though Ben Ali was
a general, he came from the intelligence services rather than the regular army.
Furthermore, he constantly tried to limit the armys influence in political matters, creating
a depoliticized military with limited resources. The Tunisian military also stands out in
the region by its lack of corruption and cronyism. Instead of relying on the armed forces,
Ben Ali used the internal security and intelligence agencies as his power base, which
were significantly larger, and given more resources, than the regular military (Lutterbeck,
2013, pp. 2122).

35

4.3.3PrivateBenefitsunderZineelAbidineBenAli
The most obvious beneficiaries of the Tunisian regime prior to the revolution were the
Ben Ali and Trabelsi families. It is estimated that their families together controlled nearly
50 percent of the Tunisian business sector. The Presidents second wife, Leila Ben Ali
(formerly Trabelsi) was particularly infamous for her extravagant lifestyle supported with
public funds. In addition to this inner-most circle of beneficiaries, a number of top
officials in the party and government were paid off to ensure their continued support for
the incumbent (Murphy, 2011). In the course of privatization of the economy, which had
been underway since the 1980s, these close associates of the government had been able to
benefit from the growing private sector (Murphy, 2011). At the same time, the Tunisian
private sector continued to be dominated by small firms, struggling to survive rather than
grow, unable to respond to the growing unemployment and poverty rates (Alexander,
2010).
As mentioned above, the social base of the RCD shifted during Ben Alis rule as
privatization efforts accelerated. The alliance between this new base, the rural and urban
economic elites, and the regime, was mutually beneficial. In the words of Payne, the
new ruling elite was united not so much by its institutional basis as by a common
allegiance to the (economic) reform policies (Payne, 1991, 144-45, in King, 2003, 137).
And while the economic reforms undertaken in this period were to some extent aimed to
address real needs, they were also designed to redistribute income and access to land to
these notables. In other words, the large landowners who had been privileged during the
French protectorate but neglected under Bourguiba, were now enriched and empowered
by the Ben Ali regime. This was perhaps most obvious through the distribution of
300,000 hectares of cooperatively held agricultural land exclusively to large landowners
in the 1980s and 1990s. The rural elites not only gained access to more agricultural land,
they were also enabled to diversify their investments to other sectors than the
agricultural; access to the transport, construction, and hotel management sectors was
aided by preferential access to government and private credit (King, 1998, 2003).
As privatization policies in many ways naturally disadvantaged the rural masses,
the workers and the peasants, Ben Ali had to find other ways to co-opt these important
constituents. Indeed, party membership in poor and underdeveloped areas remained high.
Joining the RCD was considered an investment by many hoping for material benefits

36

such as employment for family members. But under Ben Ali, such benefits gradually
diminished, disappointing many of the party members (International Crisis Group, 2011,
p. 9).
In an attempt to gain the support from the less wealthy segments of the
population, Ben Ali offered the leadership of the UGTT, which represented the workers
interests, access to policymaking as well as closer ties to the leadership and a hegemonic
position in the political arena, shared with the RCD. In return, the union provided its
support for the President and backed him in elections. Having the backing of the UGTT
was crucial for Ben Ali. The trade union had demonstrated its independence and ability to
disrupt the order through the national strike in 1978 and in other open conflicts with the
government , which had shaken the regime fundamentally (King, 2009).

4.3.4PoliticalOppositiontotheBenAliRegime
Under Ben Ali, the political space was opened up to oppositional groups albeit in a
limited manner. While liberal democracy never fully materialized, the country did
transform into some form of an electoral democracy, through the introduction of a
certain degree of political pluralism and multiparty competition. Democracy came to gain
new meaning in the Tunisian context. Ben Ali started using language inspired by Western
ideas of liberal democracy, talking about notions such as the rule of law, and individual
rights and liberties. Furthermore, under Ben Ali, the state party to a lesser extent sought
to be the inclusive, catch-all party of the Neo-Destour era. The RCD still aimed to catch a
majority of Tunisians, but the political space was simultaneously opened up, albeit slowly
and not fully, to opposition groups. Manifesting this change, by the end of his first year in
power, Ben Ali, together with sixteen political parties and organizations, signed the
National Pact. The document opened for the inclusion of oppositional elements within
certain boundaries (Alexander, 2010; King, 2003).
The most serious political challenge for Ben Ali at the beginning of his
presidency, in terms of how obviously it contested the status quo, was the Islamic
Movement, the MTI, which later formed a political party, al-Nahda (sometimes referred
to as Ennahda). The MTI was legalized by Ben Ali on the condition that they renounced
violence and accepted the democratic rules of engagement (Alexander, 2010; King,

37

1998).7 Both the MTI and the party were led by Rashid Ghannushi until his exile in 1989.
Bourguiba had heavily repressed the MTI and restricted its ability to organize. Ghannushi
was imprisoned until Ben Ali released him, and several other prominent members of the
movement, in 1988. Al-Nahda was banned from participating as a party in the 1989
elections, but were allowed to run as independents, gaining around 15 percent of the
vote. In some of the Tunis suburbs, al-Nahda candidates gained as much as 30 percent of
the vote. Had the al-Nahda candidates been allowed to run as a party, it would have been
the second largest party after the RCD. Even if the 1989 elections did not give the
Islamists any real power, the results did establish them as a political factor for the
government to consider (Perkins, 2014).
During the 1990s and early 2000s, al-Nahda displayed little political activism.
Restrained by the imprisonment or exile of thousands of its members and activists, alNahda virtually disappeared from political life in these years. But the Islamists were not
the only oppositional players in Ben Alis Tunisia. In 2010, there were eight legal
opposition parties in addition to the RCD. In spite of the restrictions that did exist on
freedom of expression, the reforms instituted by Ben Ali enabled these parties to make
their voices heard; [Ben Alis] reforms have created formal space for public discourse
and engagement that did not exist under Bourguiba. (Alexander, 2010, p. 115). The
three main oppositional parties, the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), the Tajdid
Movement, and the Democratic Front for Labor and Freedom (FDTL), were given a
space to participate in the day-to-day political life, even if they faced some restrictions
(International Crisis Group, 2011).
A sign of the pragmatism on behalf of both the Islamist and the secular-left
opposition, in 2005 these seemingly disparate groupings came together to form the 18th of
October Front. The Front was a coalition between the moderate Islamists of al-Nahda
and other oppositional elements including liberals, leftists, centrists and nationalists. The
Front united under three principles; opposing authoritarianism, ending corruption, and
restoring civil liberties (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012, p. 199). This Left-Islamist alliance
was central in the 2011 uprisings and came together after the elections to form a broad
interim government (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012).
7

The MTI later formed a political party, al-Nahda, which won nearly 14 percent of the vote in the 1989
elections, offering the only challenge to RCD hegemony (King, 1998).

38

The persistence on part of the Islamists in spite of the government bans and
imprisonments implies not only widespread grass root support of the movement, but also
that its leaders believed there to be an opportunity in the future to compete for power and
become part of the ruling coalition. Similarly, the organization of the secular-left
opposition and its alliance with the Islamists indicates a pragmatic approach hinged on
the assumption that political compromise between ideological enemies had the potential
of breaking Ben Alis long-standing autocracy.

4.3.5ConclusionTunisianMWC
The answer to who belonged to Tunisias MWC under Ben Ali is complex; on the
one hand it seems that the regime benefited a relatively small segment of society; the
families of the President and his wife, as well as the wealthy party elites of the
countryside and their urban offshoots. On the other hand, Ben Ali did not seem to be
content with this core support base as he worked hard to gain the support also of the
workers and peasants through co-opting the UGTT, and the land redistribution efforts.
This desire to appease and co-opt different societal interests left Ben Ali with a relatively
broad MWC. Opposition groups, although facing severe restrictions in the political arena,
persisted as a result of their belief that they could influence politics.

4.4SyriasMinimumWinningCoalitionunderBasharalAsad20002011
4.4.1SelectorateMembership
Parliamentary elections in Syria have been held approximately every four years since the
1970s. But whether the right to select the parliament equals any real influence over
political outcomes in the country is highly questionable. The Syrian legislature is neither
independent nor particularly active; all laws passed by the parliament have been
introduced by the government. Furthermore, independents and legal opposition parties
are allocated a predetermined share, around 30 percent, of the total 250 parliamentary
seats prior to elections, implying that the competition for power is staged rather than real
(Stacher, 2012).
While Syria under Bashar al-Asad could formally be considered a one-party state,
and the Baath Party indeed was one of the most influential political institutions, the state
39

also bore close resemblance to a more narrow, personalistic dictatorship. One way in
which this was manifested was the fact that party membership was not a sufficient
condition for selecting, and being elected to, the parliament.
Judging from the 2003 parliamentary elections, the first held under Bashar alAsads rule, money and connections seemed to be important qualifications. According to
one estimation, more than one million dollars was spent by potential candidates in the
election campaign; a figure which is immense in the Syrian context. Moreover, the
independent candidates that won seats were mainly businessmen with connections to the
ruling elites (Stacher, 2012, p. 142).
The President is elected for seven-year terms, although clearly not in free and
open elections. However, while it may seem like Syria has a hereditary system of
executive recruitment, given that Hafiz al-Asad was succeeded by his son, the influence
of the top leadership and the Baath Party executives in this decision rather implies a
system of designation. Since the coming to power of Bashar al-Asad, who was chosen
through a consensus among the ruling elites, he has been backed by the same. The
president in turn has the power to appoint the ministers in the cabinet (Polity IV, 2010a).
In other words, the system of legislative and executive selection in Syria was far
from direct popular election, but neither was it strictly hereditary even if it bore close
resemblance to such a system. Rather, the system was one where a very narrow segment
of the population in practice selected the rulers, and had the opportunity to be selected
themselves.
Several factors indicate that selectorate membership in Syria was quite rigid and
closed, excluding large segments of the population. Haddad argues that a majority of
Syrians are excluded from politics as a result of informal structures which comes at the
expense of the largest segments of Syrian society, which continue to be disenfranchised
both politically and economically (Haddad, 2011, p. xii).
The rule of Hafiz al-Asad was based on the deliberate exclusion of some groups;
the Kurds, who made up around twelve percent of the population, as well as landowners
and merchants who were part of the former ruling elite. While the former group felt
excluded on grounds of ethnicity (Hafiz grounded his legitimacy in an Arab nationalist
identity), the latter group were disenfranchised by the governments socialist policies
(Phillips, 2012, pp. 6869). As Bashar al-Asad came to power, his economic reforms
40

served to further narrow the social base upon which he relied. Privatization and
liberalization reforms alienated the Sunni Arab workers and peasants, who had previously
been supporters of Hafiz al-Asads regime. The poorer segments of Syrian society in
general were excluded by Bashars economic policies and his concentration of capital in
the urban centers. As a part of the privatization effort, public sector employment
decreased and many of those who remained saw their salaries cut, forcing them to take on
second jobs. The poor Sunni Arab classes now started to show resentment towards the
enrichment of the mainly Alawi elites (Phillips, 2012, p. 69).

4.4.2TheSupportBaseofBasharalAsad
In 2000, Bashar al-Asad inherited a strong centralized state with a narrow but loyal
support base from his father. While power was concentrated in the office of the president,
the regime was vulnerable. The domination of rural Alawi officers provoked resentment
among the Sunni urban community and the Muslim Brotherhood. Hafiz al-Asad had dealt
with these challenges by means of repression, and concentration of power, as well as
enriching his core supporters. To a great extent Bashar al-Asad inherited his fathers loyal
supporters but he ruled the country differently. Since his installment, power has been
more decentralized and the presidency is only one of several power centers (Haddad,
2011; Hinnebusch, 2012).
Syrias ruling class 8 , also referred to as the state bourgeoisie, consists of
individuals who hold either official or para-official positions in the state bureaucracy,
ruling party, military forces or public economic sector. Their interest is mainly economic,
providing the imperative to support a certain course of politics (Haddad, 2012). The
ruling class may be described as decentralized in the sense that the ruling elites often
contest and sometimes overrule Bashar al-Asads policies. However, when it comes to
regime survival, cohesion and loyalty is strong within this group. The different power
centers are strongly united to protect the president and the regime at any rate. As Stacher
puts it, because the Syrian system lacks the ability to change the coalition without

Whether or not the state bourgeoisie should be referred to as a class, or simply social stratum, can be
discussed. See Haddad (2012) for a discussion on this.

41

inviting the collapse of the regime, the senior elites have to unify behind force to save the
regime (Stacher, 2012, p. 112).
For the last three decades, as privatization efforts intensified, members of the state
bourgeoisie have been approaching business leaders in order to form informal business
networks to promote mutually favorable deals, with the effect of creating a new economic
elite. Given the rural-urban tensions and the lack of trust, at the group level, between the
Alawi rulers and the Sunni business community, the process of building alliances and
cooperation between the state and the business elites was slow and careful. Eventually,
Hafiz al-Asad consolidated the business networks that were to dominate Syrian politics
for decades to come. Together, the state bourgeoisie and the private business elites are
referred to as the new economic elite, or the new bourgeoisie. According to
estimations they make up around one percent of the Syrian population (Borshchevskaya,
2010; Haddad, 2011, 2012).
In 2005, Bashar al-Asad introduced what he called a social market economy.
The initiative was an attempt to formalize the business networks and broaden the support
base of the regime. The success of this endeavor can be questioned; in his attempt to
broaden the coalition, Bashar al-Asad lost many of the old guard, especially from the
Baath party and the unions, and as a result became even more dependent on the family
clan and the state bourgeoisie, ending up narrowing the coalition. Interestingly, it was the
bourgeoisie, and not the Baath party, that funded Asads election campaign in 2007. The
social market initiative also resulted in a shrinking public sector, to the disadvantage of
the great majority of Syrians (Haddad, 2011, 2012; Hinnebusch, 2012).
The role of the military in Syrian politics is worth to note separately. As
mentioned, military officials are included into the state bourgeoisie. The Syrian armed
forces have especially strong ties to the regime. A sign of these close ties, as Bashar alAsad was selected to succeed his father, he received military training and promotion to
the highest rank in the armys hierarchal structure. During the course of Bashar al-Asads
rule, the military has been politicized and instrumentalized to sustain his rule. The Syrian
president maintained these patrimonial relations with the military by appointing friends
and family members to the top ranks. In fact, Alawis account for 70 percent of career
soldiers in the Syrian army, compared to their twelve percent share in the general
population (Lutterbeck, 2013, pp. 4748).
42

While the ethnic factor should not be overstated, it is necessary to consider this
dimension when talking about the ruling coalition in Syria. As mentioned, Alawis had
traditionally been privileged and since the coming to power of Hafiz al-Asad, also given
disproportional influence. Hafiz did however make some efforts to balance the
concentration of Alawis in the ruling elite by promoting prominent Sunni Arab families,
an effort which his son did not undertake. The top leadership, the sector that wield the
most power, came to be dominated by Alawis under Bashar al-Asad. Other minorities,
especially Christians, were also overrepresented among government employees. Sunni
Muslims from the urban centers were included in the new economic elite, especially
within the private component (Haddad, 2011; Hinnebusch, 2012; Phillips, 2012).

4.4.3PrivateBenefitsunderBasharalAsad
It clear that members of the new economic elite, both the state and private components,
benefited politically and economically from the Asad regime. The state bourgeoisie can
be divided into different tiers, starting with the top leadership. While these do not all have
official posts, they are directly connected to the Asad family. The family factor is not
irrelevant here; the Asad, the Shalish and the Makhlouf families9, as well as a few more,
dominate the top of the Syrian elites. Together, they control both public sectors, such as
oil, as well as private sector markets including communication and information
technology. The continuity and low turnover within this class has allowed them to
accumulate immense personal wealth over the past three decades (Borshchevskaya, 2010;
Haddad, 2012).
Second, military generals, heads of the security apparatuses and several other
loyal deputies, benefit from their support of the regime in terms of personal privileges as
well as from their partnerships with private businesses. This way, these individuals have
also been able to amass significant wealth (Haddad, 2012).
Third, several hundred civil servants, party functionaries, and heads of labor
unions, also exchange political loyalty for personal gain. The mutual nature of the
relation between these supporters and the regime is illustrated by Haddad; Loyalty, often
9

The Shalish family is connected to the Asads through Hafiz al-Asads sister who married in to the Shalish
family. The Makhloufs are connected to the Asads through Hafiz al-Asads wife, Anisa, who was born
Makhlouf.

43

manifested by party membership and backing from a member of the regime elite, is
usually a prerequisite for such post holders to become far more powerful, and richer, than
their post may suggest. (Haddad, 2012, p. 241).
Finally, salaried bureaucrats receive benefits on in the shape of subsidies on food,
education, and health in return for their support for the state (Borshchevskaya, 2010;
Haddad, 2011, 2012).
The private component of the new economic elite in Syria consists of business
actors connected to the state bourgeoisie through largely informal networks. Research
shows how these private actors have been allowed to wield significant influence over
policy. The highly entrenched networks between the state and private elites has had a
deteriorating effect on the Syrian economy. The business elites are through their
privileged positions, enabled to avoid regulation and manipulate the law in a way that has
been ultimately detrimental to economic efficiency and productivity. (Haddad, p. 84).
The interests of these elites have prevented new actors from entering and developing
various sectors of the Syrian economy. Successful new businesses are prevented must
struggle to maintain their independence; as soon as they become profitable, a share of the
profit must go to the government, or it will not be allowed to operate (Borshchevskaya,
2010).

4.4.4PoliticalOppositiontotheAsadRegime
Elections in Syria were far from competitive, and the right to political organization and
expression are severely limited. In spite of calling itself a multiparty state, Syria under the
Asads remained for all intents and purposes ruled by an autocratic regime (Polity IV,
2010a).
It is difficult to talk about any independent political groups or candidates in Syria.
In 1972, Hafiz al-Asad created the Progressive National Front (PNF), with seven political
groups in addition to his own Baath party. However, rather than giving these parties a
platform, the PNF was designed to fragment the opposition and make them subservient
to the ruling party in exchange for parliamentary and ministerial representation.
(Stacher, 2012, p. 126). The same goes for the agricultural union; rather than representing
the interests of the rural population in opposition to the government, it operated to

44

support the regime and allowed it to reinforce the power and reach of the Baath (Stacher,
2012). Since 1990, the government permitted independent candidates to run for a limited
number of seats in the Peoples Council, but their autonomy is severely restricted.
Instead, the allocation of seats to the National Assembly is designed to ensure a
permanent absolute majority for the PNF; 167 of the 250 seats (Polity IV, 2010a).
Traditionally, the strongest opposition faction in Syria has been the Islamists,
organized as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB). Even though the SMB has not been
allowed to participate in political life within Syria, they have to some extent continued to
operate from outside. After the SMB insurrection in the early 1980s and Hafiz al-Asads
brutal repression of the Brotherhood in Hama, the former president sought to incorporate
elements of moderate Islam into his rule in an attempt to sideline the more radical
version. Bashar continued this effort and managed to limit Islamist influence to nonpolitical issues. The SMB subsequently operated mainly outside of the country, allying
with the Iraqi Baath party among others. In 2002, after renouncing violence, they met
with other opposition groups in London and issued the National Pact in Syria. Another
program was published in 2004, also indicating a moderation of the Islamist group
(Hinnebusch, 2012; Talhamy, 2012).

4.4.5ConclusionSyrianMWC
In sum, the core supporters of the Syrian regime, without which support the survival of
the regime would be seriously threatened, can be found within the so called new
economic elite, which contained both private and public components. A small portion of
society, comprised of individuals from influential backgrounds such as the political
leadership, the military, the bureaucracy, and the business world, not only wield political
power but also benefit in material terms from their positions. The criteria for membership
in this coalition seem to be rigid and difficult to attain. Becoming member of the ruling
party is not sufficient; networks and personal connections play an important role. As a
result of the strong concentration of power in this narrow coalition, stable and enduring
political groups are difficult to find. Opportunities to join or challenge the ruling coalition
through legal means were close to inexistent under the Asads, with the result that
independent opposition groups were close to nonexistent. The exception is the Syrian

45

Muslim Brotherhood. But while the SMB has persisted for decades, it has almost
exclusively operated from outside of Syria, and it is unclear how it would act in case of a
regime change in the future.

4.5TheTunisianUprisingandStateRepression
4.5.1PopularDissentinTunisiaDecember2010January2011
The trigger for the uprising in Tunisia, and indeed the spark that lit the entire wave of
Arab uprisings, was the self-immolation of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi on
December 17, 2010 in the town of Sidi Bouzid. Subsequently, riots, mostly involving
local youth, broke out in Sidi Bouzid and lasted for several days. On December 27,
thousands of people gathered in Tunis to show their solidarity with the protesters in
Sidi Bouzid, and to show their discontent with the government (Honwana, 2013, p. 74).
The protests were also highly coordinated; exemplified by the organization of trade
unions, lawyers and doctors associations. The successful strike by virtually all of the
countrys lawyers especially required a high degree of coordination (Murphy, 2011;
Perkins, 2014, p. 223). As such, in terms of participation, the protests can be defined as
mass protests according to the NAVCO 2.0 definition (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013).
After a week of protests, the uprising spread to other parts of the country and
intensified, and also acquired a political character. While the demands of the
demonstrators had initially concerned mainly socio-economic issues, including
corruption and unemployment, calls for regime change and the ousting of Ben Ali were
now starting to be heard (Honwana, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2011; Murphy,
2011).

4.5.2RepressionTacticsandOutcomes
According to the SIPRI Yearbook, the level of violence in Tunisia, referring to the
number of people killed in Arab Spring-related violence, was classified as intermediate.
This means that between 25-999 people were killed (Allansson et al., 2012). According to
a senior UN official, Juan Mendez, around 300 people were killed in the DecemberJanuary uprising in Tunisia (Mustapha Ajbaili, 2011). In addition, the regime did not
seem to deliberately target reporters. Between December 17, 2010, and January 14, 2011,
only six journalists were arrested in Tunisia (Reporters Without Borders, 2011).
46

Qualitative sources also contribute to the picture that the regime in Tunisia responded to
the uprising in a limited manner, mixing concession and repression. Furthermore, when
lethal tactics were deployed, this was mostly by the police forces and not the regular
army (Lutterbeck, 2013, pp. 2223).
Responding to the initial protests in Sidi Bouzid, the Tunisian police used nonlethal tactics such as tear gas and police brutality, arresting and injuring several. A week
or so into the protests, the police forces turned to using lethal repression tactics. In
Menzel Bouazaiane, on December 24, two people died after being shot by the police
during a demonstration (Honwana, 2013). In the first weeks of the uprising, Ben Alis
police forces continued to shoot at protesters. By January 13, nearly 70 protesters had
been killed according to official sources (Murphy, 2011).
The killings of protesters during the uprising in Tunisia seem to have been mostly
the results of confrontations between demonstrators and police (even though the police
most likely had weapons that outweighed those of the demonstrators), where police
officers started shooting at individuals which they reportedly perceived as a threat to
their own safety (Perkins, 2014, p. 226). While this in no way legitimize the killings, it
does indicate that the decision to employ lethal tactics against the protesters was not
highly systematic nor deliberated. It should also be mentioned that there are reports of
snipers shooting at protesters during the uprising, with lethal outcomes. However, the
identity and origins of these snipers remains uncertain (Ryan, 2013), for which reason
their actions cannot be clearly defined as state repression in the framework of this
study.
Throughout the uprising, Ben Ali constantly mixed repression with concession,
making grand promises of reforms. And while civilians were being killed by his police
forces, he seemed to show some remorse at this, promising to launch an investigation into
the killing of civilians thus far in the uprising. Nevertheless, the use of lethal tactics
remained limited, and mainly perpetrated by members of the police corps. A full-blown
assault on the protesters was avoided as the army chief of staff, Rachid Ammar, refused
to order his troops to fire on protesters (Murphy, 2011).
The refusal of the army chief to fire on protesters is noteworthy. As Ben Ali
started to realize that his mix of repression and concession did not succeed to contain the
protest movement quickly enough, he ordered the army, which was already present on the
47

streets, to crack down on the demonstrators with force. Ammar ignored these orders, and
instead informed Ben Ali that the will of the people was for him to resign. As long as he
defied the peoples wishes, Ammar warned, no level of security could guarantee the
Presidents safety (Murphy, 2011; Perkins, 2014).

4.6TheSyrianUprisingandStateRepression
4.6.1PopularDissentinSyriaMarchApril2011
As the Arab Spring started to spread across the region in early 2011, the Syrian regime
believed itself to be different, and immune to the upheavals experienced by its neighbors.
This assumption would soon prove to be mistaken. In February of 2011, minor protests
started to break out in Syria, but were quickly contained by the regime. However, on
March 18, after Friday prayers, thousands of protesters gathered in the town of Daraa in
the southwest of the country. The trigger for this gathering was the arrest and torture of
some young boys who had sprayed anti-government graffiti on their school.
The protests were mostly peaceful for the first few months. However, there were
incidents where damage was inflicted on government offices such as the Baath Party
headquarters, the governors office and the headquarters of the security forces. The
gatherings were coordinated via social media and cell phones, and usually took place
after Friday prayers or funerals of victims of the government crackdown.
The protesters soon started to demand the removal of Bashar al-Asad, as well as
free and fair elections, implying that the participants of the uprising expressed maximalist
goals (Allansson et al., 2012; Lesch, 2012).

4.6.2RepressionTacticsandOutcomes
In Syria, the level of violence in 2011 was defined as high by the SIPRI Yearbook
(Allansson et al., 2012), meaning that more than one thousand deaths were recorded in
Arab Spring-related violence in that year. While this data does not allow for monthly
disaggregation, it serves as an indication. Furthermore, qualitative data tells us that
repression was high already from the outset of the protests with many civilians killed.
Moreover, not only did repression result in a high number of deaths; between March and
April 2011, 34 journalists were arrested by the regular army in Syria, indicating that the

48

assault on journalists was a deliberate strategy on behalf of the regime forces (Reporters
Without Borders, 2013).
The security services almost immediately started using lethal tactics in response
to the protests. On March 18 in Daraa, the government forces first tried to stop the
protests using tear gas and water ammunitions but subsequently used live ammunition to
kill four people. This date is recorded by SIPRI as the first death connected to Arab
Spring-related violence in the country. As protests continued, the security forces
combined non-lethal tactics such as mass arrests, systematic torture of detainees, deprival
of medical treatment to wounded persons, with the use of snipers to kill protesters
(Allansson et al., 2012).
Following protests on March 23, security agents raided the Omari mosque where
wounded protesters were being treated, killing at least fifteen civilians and wounding
hundreds. Government forces surrounded Daraa that evening, hoping to contain the
protests and prevent it from spreading to other cities (Lesch, 2012).
The uprising quickly spread to other locations, and within a month from the start
of the protests, the government then started to besiege and shell entire cities, using tanks
and snipers against the demonstrators (Allansson et al., 2012; Nepstad, 2011). Hard-liners
within the regime were empowered by the ongoing civil instability and triumphed over
those who were in favor of a negotiated solution. These hard-liners in the government
and security forces, led by Bashars younger brother Maher, supported the idea that
tolerance would lead to more unrest, and as such prompted the use of excessive violence
(Hinnebusch, 2012, p. 109; Phillips, 2012, p. 71).
Not only the use of lethal tactics, but the deployment of the security forces to use
such systematic violence against the protesters is telling. The siege and shelling of an
entire city indicates a certain level of planning and deliberation from the top ranks of the
political and military leadership.

4.7LoyaltyandDefectionsinTunisia
The Tunisian uprising started as a protest against deteriorating socio-economic
conditions. Unemployment rates had been high for years, especially for youth. As a result
poverty levels were high, especially in the rural and southern areas. At the same time, the
protests were not constricted to the poor and marginalized, but came to include people

49

from different areas and social classes (Honwana, 2013; Murphy, 2011). Honwana (2013,
p. 48) identifies four groups that played significant roles in the uprising; young cyber
activists, unemployed university graduates, civil society organizations, and political
opposition parties. The two first groups had a triggering role in the uprising; they were
the ones primarily marginalized by poverty and unemployment, and frustrated by the lack
of political rights and freedoms. The protest movement started in regions rid by poverty
and unemployment, but later spread to the wealthier coastal regions. The Arab Barometer
Study 10 shows that participation in the uprising was not significantly related to
unemployment or poverty, implying that also the wealthier, more privileged classes
participated in the uprising. In fact, the middle class was overrepresented in the protests
compared to their size in the population. (Beissinger, 2012; Perkins, 2014, p. 223).
Civil society had an important role in taking the uprising to the next level and
spreading the movement beyond the youth. As mentioned, the lawyers association
staged a nationwide strike. The UGTT also assumed an important role in the uprising.
The actions of the national trade union is especially interesting as it had been such crucial
ally to the Tunisian regime both under Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Initially, the UGTT acted
as a mediator between the protesters and the government, but not long after protests
started spreading across Tunisia, local and regional UGTT unions joined the protest
movement. It did not take long for the unions national leadership to follow their lead and
on January 11, 2011, they called for peaceful marches across the country. A few days
later, the UGTT organized the national strike which in retrospect is viewed as a turning
point for the uprising, bringing about the resignation and departure of President Ben Ali
(Honwana, 2013, pp. 6667; International Crisis Group, 2011, pp. 56).
The legal opposition parties played a limited role in the uprising. As a result of
their limited independence, they took their time, but eventually they did act in support of
the protest movement. Illegal leftist parties supported the demonstrators early on. AlNahda was absent in the beginning of the protests, as a result of the ban on their political
participation, but some activists from the Islamist movement did take part in the uprising
(Honwana, 2013, pp. 6869). As such, political parties did not have a decisive role in the
10

The Arab Barometer study was conducted in Tunisia in October 2011. A number of questions in the
survey allows for identifying who participated in the revolution, and individual attitudes related to the
revolution. The sample size was 1,196 (Beissinger, 2012, p. 11).

50

uprising, but this is not to say that the protesters were apolitical. Rather, the protest
movement was one driven by a highly politicized youth, supported by influential civil
society organization that helped spread and extend the movement.
In addition, there is evidence that a significant amount of individuals closely
related to the regime and the RCD took part in the protests demanding the resignation of
Ben Ali. The Arab Barometer shows that government employees participated in the
uprising to a relatively high degree. According to the survey, twelve percent of Tunisian
protesters were employed by the government, compared to seven percent in the
population (Beissinger, 2012). Furthermore, many of the protesters were RCD members
who had been politically disillusioned. Interestingly, Sidi Bouzid, where the protests first
started, was an RCD stronghold but not a single loyalist protest was organized there
(International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 9). A quote from an RCD leader demonstrates how a
lack of loyalty among party officials made it difficult to recruit members of the party to
counter the anti-government protests:

When orders were given to mid-level party officials to mobilize their men, their
situation was difficult because much of their rank and file were sympathizing
with the demands of the protesters. Many members of the RCD were opposed to
power that was based on the party but was wielded by two families and the clans
that hovered around them (Crisis Group Interview with Mohammed Gheriani,
former RCD Secretary General, Tunis, 11 February 2011, in International Crisis
Group, 2011, p. 9).

There are reasons to believe that the unwillingness of RCD officials to mobilize
against the uprising was directly related to the low level of material benefits doled out by
the regime. A common reason for joining the RCD was the prospect of receiving material
advantages, for instance in terms of employment opportunities for family members.
When this was not provided to the extent that was expected, loyalty among party officials
seemed to suffer (International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 9).

51

4.8LoyaltyandDefectionsinSyria
The Syrian uprising initially mobilized those who had been excluded under the Asad
regime. To start with, the protests were concentrated to areas which are considered to be
peripheral in relation to the power centers; villages and medium-sized cities. Protests
reflected a number of different grievances; unemployment, poverty, and corruption, as
well as bans on Islamic practices such as the niqab in schools. Deraa, where the protests
began, is a good example of these conditions. It is a medium-sized rural town in the
periphery, which has suffered not only from government neglect, but also from a long
drought in an already dry region. It is also a town where deteriorating economic
conditions had led to the spread of Islamism among the youth. Furthermore, most of the
early participants in the uprising were Sunni Muslims, many of whom identified as
Islamists (Hinnebusch, 2012, pp. 106107; Lesch, 2012, pp. 5557).
By contrast, those areas that remained least active the early stages of the uprising
were generally those where either Asads economic policies had been beneficial, such as
Damascus and Aleppo, or those where Alawis were dominant, such as Tartous and
Lattakia (Phillips, 2012, p. 70). Furthermore, when protests did occasionally take place in
areas with strong pro-Asad support bases, the regime was able to mobilize counterdemonstrations in support of the government (Hinnebusch, 2012).
There has been a high level of cohesion among the segments which are
considered to be part of the MWC in Syria. The ruling coalition, and especially the state
bourgeoisie, but also the economic elite, remained remarkably intact during the first
month of the uprising. Surprisingly few defections occurred, and mainly at the lower and
lower-middle levels within the army. (Haddad, 2012, p. 231). Even a year into the
uprising, the Syrian military remained intact. No entire units had by that time defected,
and the military had avoided the move of heavy weapons from the hands of the state to
the rebels (Phillips, 2012, p. 73).
The regime was able to mobilize loyalists to repress the uprising. Mainly Alawis
were recruited into thuggish militias, so called Shabihas, and into the military reserves.
In the early stages of the uprising, these Shabiha militias were responsible for most of the
violence against the largely peaceful demonstrators. Phillips argues that the fear among

52

regime supporters was one factor motivating them to take part in the repression of the
uprising:
The loyalists motives vary. Some genuinely support the regime More likely is that
many fear for their fate if the regime collapses. Christians are wary of the terrible fate of
their Iraqi co-religionists after Saddam Husseins demise, with over a quarter fleeing
targeted sectarian killings The Alawites also fear for their future, concerned that
they will be blamed for Assads violence (Phillips, 2012, p. 73)

Hinnebusch also relates the willingness of members of the Alawi sect to join the
regime in suppressing the uprising to their privileged position; with much to lose if the
regime fell, they remained its most reliable shock troops. (Hinnebusch, 2012, p. 108).

53

5.Analysis
The analysis will begin by a between-case comparison of each variable, followed by a
summation of these findings. I will then return to the causal chain and assess to what
extent I found evidence for it in the empirics. Subsequently, alternative explanations will
be presented followed by a brief discussion of the limitations of the study.

5.1BetweenCaseComparisonofMinimumWinningCoalition
As the case studies have shown, both Tunisia and Syria were ruled with the support of a,
more or less clearly defined, set of supporters, which were considered by the leaders of
each country to be crucial to the regimes survival. These supporters all received some
amount of private benefits in return for their political loyalty. While both countries were
indeed autocratic, and as such excluded segments of society, the empirical findings
indicate that Tunisias minimum winning coalition was broader than the Syrian.
To begin with, the selection of the Tunisian legislature and executive was mainly
based in the RCD. The RCD has a legacy as a broad, all-inclusive mass party that
attended to all segments of the population. While the state party in recent years moved
more towards land-owning influential elites, it maintained the ambition to represent the
interests of all segments of the Tunisian population. As such, it served as a vehicle for
political participation for most Tunisians, obviously with the exception of those
belonging to opposition parties. While opposition parties were granted a share of
parliamentary seats, the system was constructed in such a sense that they could never
gain majority. The Islamists were subject to harsher means of exclusion, but even this
group was allowed limited participation.
In Syria, the legislative and executive selection was more narrowly defined. To
select the members of the ruling coalition, and to be able to be selected, resources in
terms of financial means, and not least connections within the ruling elites, were crucial.
Even the so-called independent candidates in the legislative elections were wellconnected businessmen with clear ties to the regime. Furthermore, the regime based its
rule on the deliberate exclusion of certain segments of the population.
As regards the political support base of the regime, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali
stepped into office without any preexisting alliances or support base to draw from.

54

Instead, the Tunisian President worked hard to co-opt different sectors of society
throughout his decades in power, not least through the instrumentalization of democratic
reforms and multiparty elections. Ben Ali incorporated different social groupings into
his MWC; the core made up of his and his wifes families, while the broader coalition
included the RCD through which he enriched the rural elites, as well as the UGTT
representing the interests of workers and the rural masses. Distributing the state resource
pie between that many different actors left each of them with a relatively small share.
Trying to appease rich landowners while co-opting the national workers union and the
peasants of the countryside left no one happy. With the exception of the small circle of
family members, patronage was handed out mainly in terms of beneficial policies. As
such, trying to appease these fundamentally different social sectors meant that, inevitably,
patronage was only superficial. This is not to say that the Ben Ali had no loyal
supporters. His closest circles, mainly family members and some top officials, were
personally enriched by his rule to such an extent that they remained loyal. But Ben Alis
appeasement strategies directed at different segments of Tunisian society indicated that
this core was not a sufficient minimum winning coalition by itself.
By contrast, Bashar al-Asad inherited his fathers tight-knit, small, core of
supporters which support together with that of the powerful businessmen of the new
economic elite, was enough to uphold the survival of his regime. The inclusion of persons
and groups into the MWC from important political, economic, and military functions was
crucial to the political viability of this narrow coalition. Several of the top officials within
the armed forces and other institutions were personal friends or relatives of the president.
In this sense, the boundaries of the ruling coalition were quite rigid and inflexible.
Bashars attempts to exchange members of the old guard for his own personal appointees,
served to narrow the ruling coalition even further, increasing his dependence on a couple
of influential families, including his own. Furthermore, the members of the Syrian MWC
received benefits not only in terms of favorable policies, but personal enrichment and
control over entire business sectors. The loyalty instilled through personal ties and an
institutionalized system of patronage was infallible.
The strong distinction between insiders and outsiders in Syria, and the fact that
the insiders were clearly outnumbered by the outsiders, further served to amplify fears
among those belonging to the ruling coalition, of exclusion in the future. In Tunisia on
55

the other hand, those benefiting from the regime were not as clearly defined. As such, it
would be more difficult to exclude these in case of regime change.
In sum, both Tunisia and Syria were before the revolutions, on paper, one-party
states, but portrayed significant differences when it comes to the coalition of supporters
that upheld the regimes. Tunisias history of inclusion of different segments of society
and the tendency of Ben Ali to appease and co-opt a multitude of interests to uphold his
rule meant that the MWC was relatively broad, typical of the authoritarian one-party
state. In Syria under Bashar al-Asad, on the other hand, the legacy of ruling by exclusion
of certain clearly defined groups, and the strong patronage system, meant that Syria was
for all intents and purposes a narrow MWC state.

5.2BetweenCaseComparisonofStateRepression
Both Tunisia and Syria experienced popular uprisings in 20102011, and the regimes
responded with varying degrees of repression in the first month since the start of the
protests.
As protests erupted in Tunisia in late 2010, the states repression tactics in the
first month seemed to be of dual nature. While on the one hand Ben Ali ordered his
police forces to fire on protesters to contain the uprising, he also showed restraint in his
response, mixing repression with concessions. Additionally, in some instances where
violence got out of hand, it seems as if these initiatives were not planned nor deliberated
to any greater extent. Non-lethal tactics, such as arrests, were not employed to any greater
extent either. The outcomes demonstrate this fact; only six journalists were detained in
the first month. The refusal of the army chief to deploy his forces against the protesters is
a critical fact in the Tunisian case. Without the backing of the armed forces, coupled with
the diminishing overall support for his regime, Ben Ali could not fulfill his plan to
repress the uprising, and the number of deaths was limited. As such, the tactics and
outcomes of the state repression as a response to the Tunisian uprising can de defined as
intermediate in severity.
The regime response to the Syrian uprising in the spring of 2011 was not as
limited in nature. Both the tactics and outcomes of state repression in the first month
demonstrate a high level of deliberation behind the extremely violent response. Severe

56

repression tactics were used by the regime forces, on orders from the leadership. The
armed forces were deployed to surround and shell entire cities, and snipers fired at
demonstrators. These harsh, lethal tactics resulted in over one thousand deaths in the first
year of the uprising. Non-lethal tactics were used as well, resulting in the detainment of
34 journalists in the first month since the start of the uprising. As follows, it can be
concluded that state repression as a response to the popular dissent in Syria can be
classified as high in severity.

5.3Summaryoffindings
In sum, after analyzing the empirical findings of the explanatory and outcome variables
in both cases, it can be concluded that the hypothesis was supported, and a correlation
was found between the size of the minimum winning coalition, and the severity of state
repression as a response to popular dissent. Tunisia had a relatively broad winning
coalition under President Ben Ali, and in response to the 2010-2011 uprising, state
repression was intermediate. In Syria, the minimum winning coalition was narrow and
the severity of state repression as a response to the 2011 uprising was high. This is
demonstrated in the table below.

Case

Minimum Winning State Repression as Support for

Coalition
a Response to
Hypothesis
Popular Dissent

Tunisia
Syria

Relatively broad
Narrow

Intermediate
High

Yes
Yes

Table 5. Illustration of empirical findings

5.4TheCausalChain
I will now return to the causal chain presented in the beginning of this thesis, presenting
how the empirical results corresponds with the hypothesized chain of events. To recap, I
theorized that if a relationship exists between MWC size and repression severity, I would
find that a popular uprising is more likely to include members of the MWC in a country

57

with a broad MWC. Also, where there is a broad MWC, I would expect members of the
MWC to defect from the regime to a higher extent, rather than participate in the
repression the uprising. The leadership will therefore face difficulties in recruiting
members from its support base to repress the uprising in countries with broad MWCs.
The contrary was expected for countries with a narrow MWC. As shown in the empirical
section, I found support for the existence of a causal link between the suggested
explanatory and outcome variables.
In Tunisia, the uprising mobilized members of the MWC. While the protests were
started in areas affected by high levels of poverty and unemployment, they soon came to
include participants from within the regimes MWC. The high participation rate of
government employees in the protests is especially noteworthy as it is a clear example of
how members of the MWC defected from the side of the regime. The UGTT took an
important role in the uprising, in spite of the fact that its leadership had been closely tied
to, and co-opted by, the Tunisian regime. The trade union had been considered by Ben
Ali as a crucial component of his MWC. Yet, as the opportunity arose to join the protests
demanding the presidents resignation, the national leadership of the union chimed in.
Finally, it was the defection of the army chief, in combination with the lack of
loyalty within the support base of the regime, that prevented repression from taking on
larger proportions, and forced Ben Ali to depart. In his last days as president of Tunisia,
Ben Ali was ultimately alone, a fact that convinced him that departure was the only
option. Even his own army had turned its back on him, refusing his orders to use force
against the protesters demanding his resignation. As if this were not enough, the very
crew that had escorted Ben Ali into exile had ignored his orders to stand by and await
further instructions. The former president had intended to return to Tunisia once the
uprising had quieted down, but was unable to do so as the presidential aircraft left
without him (Perkins, 2014, p. 228). This final example is an illustration of how the lack
of a narrow, tight-knit coalition of supporters left Ben Ali without the option to stay and
fight, forcing him to step down and hand over power.
The fact that members of the MWC in Tunisia defected to join or support the
protest movement indicates that they did not experience any greater fear of permanent
exclusion in the case of regime change. Rather, they likely believed that they would
benefit more from a situation in which the current regime was replaced, in spite of the
58

fact that they were included in the MWC. The defections and lack of loyalty were also
demonstrably a result of the perceived shortcomings in private benefits from the regime.
The relatively low levels of loyalty among MWC members, demonstrated by defections,
prevented state repression of the uprising from increasing in severity, and ultimately
forced Ben Ali into exile.

Relatively
broadMWC

Lowlevelof
private
benfeitsper
member

Lackof
loyalty
(defections)

Severityof
state
repression=
intermediate

Nogreatfear
offuture
exclusion

Figure 2. Causal chain for Tunisia.

The Syrian uprising has turned out to be the longest lasting, and most deadly,
among the revolutions of the Arab Spring. The deliberate, large-scale use of lethal tactics
against civilians could not have been possible without the strong cohesion within the
regimes support base in the early stages of the revolution. The low rate of defections
from within the MWC enabled the regime to violently repress the uprising. Loyalists
were recruited to take part in the repression against the dissenters, and organized
counterdemonstrations in favor of the regime. Furthermore, those participating in the
uprising were mainly individuals from sectors not included in the regimes MWC. The
initial protests were mainly concentrated to areas in the periphery, where regime support
had traditionally been low as a result of disenfranchisement and government neglect.
The low degree of defections from the MWC in Syria during the uprising was a
result of the high level of private benefits paid by the leadership to the members of the
coalition, as well as their fear of exclusion in case of regime change. Members of the
MWC likely feared exclusion in the future both because of their high level of private
benefits, and due to the awareness that minority groups are more easily excluded and

59

even persecuted. The high degree of loyalty towards the regime meant that members of
the MWC were willing to participate in repression of the uprising, allowing Bashar alAsad to stay in Damascus and enabling an increased severity of state repression of the
uprising.

Narrow
MWC

Highlevelof
private
benfeitsper
member

Highdegree
ofloyalty
(lowlevelof
defections)

Severityof
state
repression=
high

Fearof
future
exclusion

Figure 3. Causal chain for Syria

5.5AdditionalObservationsandAlternativeExplanations
5.5.1Ethnicity
As mentioned in the section on previous research, many studies explaining violent
outcomes have focused on ethnicity. Heger and Salehyan (2007) used size of the leaders
ethnic group as a proxy for minimum winning coalition size when testing for the effect
on conflict severity. I have argued that minority ethnic rule is not a sufficient explanation
for repression severity. The concept of MWC contains more than ethnic belonging.
Having said that, ethnicity does indeed provide a natural basis for inclusion and
exclusion. Surely, it played a role in Syria, which can be seen from the Alawi
overrepresentation in the military for instance. At the same time, not all Alawis were
included in the winning coalition, and not all members of the MWC were Alawis. In
Syria, well-connected Sunni businessmen were an important component of the ruling
coalition. Capital and influence can thus trump ethnicity. Also, other minorities,
especially Christians, were included in the winning coalition. In Tunisia, on the other

60

hand, ethnicity is not a salient cleavage, but other bases for identification and belonging
do exist.
The factor of interest is then not the size of different ethnic groups in a country,
but rather factors that may influence when and how different ideas of group belonging
may be activated. In Syria, the notion of belonging on basis of adherence to the Alawi
tribe has been activated in different times by different rulers, from the French to the
current regime. In Tunisia, tribal and other identities have at different points in time been
activated for various purposes. Under Bourguiba and Ben Ali, these means for
distinguishing between people were not particularly salient, and even underplayed for
nationalist purposes (al-Qassemi, 2012). However, since 2011, tribal tensions in Tunisia
have increased and even led to deadly clashes (al-Jazeera, 2011).
In sum, the existence of reinforcing ethnic cleavages can exacerbate a conflict and
serve to increase fears among members of the ruling coalition in case of a challenge
against the incumbent. Alawis who did not support Asad or benefit from his rule
probably fear for exclusion simply by ethnic association. In other words, it is not
ethnicity as such which makes a difference for violent outcomes but rather the activation
of identities and the instrumentalization of policies of inclusion and exclusion. The
concept of minimum winning coalition and the mechanisms proposed in this study for
explaining violent repression can indeed account for such developments in a more
proficient manner than the ethnic makeup of a country.

5.5.2Theroleofarmedforces
Several studies have emphasized the importance role and actions of the armed forces for
the success of resistance movements (Bellin, 2004; Lutterbeck, 2013; Nepstad, 2011).
The basic argument is that the success of a resistance movement in deposing the regime
depends on the military to shift allegiance from the state to the opposition. This claim is
consistent with the empirical evidence from Tunisia and Syria, but also from Egypt. In
Tunisia and Egypt, the military shifted their allegiance to the side of the people
demanding regime change. In both countries, the incumbent was ousted. In Syria, on the
other hand, the military remained loyal to the regime and indeed, Bashar al-Asad is still
in Damascus. The success of resistance movements can be assumed to be highly

61

correlated to repression severity as a response to popular uprisings, meaning that this

could be seen as an alternative explanation.
However, this does not necessarily disprove the argument that the size of the
MWC explains variation in severity of state repression as a response to popular uprisings.
Indeed, one of the factors which Bellin (2004) argues increases the willingness of the
armed forces to support political reform (i.e. take the side of the opposition), is the level
of institutionalization of the armed forces. A high level of institutionalization here refers
to a bureaucratic meritocracy. By contrast, in more patrimonial systems where discipline
is maintained through the exploitation of primordial cleavage, regimes may build a
loyal base through selective favoritism and discretionary patronage (Bellin, 2004, p.
145). In such systems, officers cannot see a future separated from the state, and as such
believe they will be ruined by reform. In other words, Bellins argument and causal
mechanism is very similar to the one put forward in this thesis. The question then, is
whether or not it is sufficient to look at the role of the armed forces to explain the success
of popular uprisings, and thus the severity of state repression in response to such events.
The broader picture is that it does not only matter if the military remains loyal to
the regime. The ability of a regime to repress a popular dissent movement depends on the
loyalty of the support base at large. The MWC is a combination of groups and individuals
without which the regime cannot survive. When individuals, or entire segments, of the
MWC start defecting, the regime loses the pillars on which it has rested and is forced to
end its repression of the popular challengers.
In order to repress an uprising, there is no denying that a regime needs someone to
exercise the use of force against those challenging its power. Theoretically, if members of
the military start defecting, the regime can recruit soldiers from other loyalist groups in
society. The overall level of loyalty (which I argue is a result of the size of the MWC)
will ultimately be the determinant of the severity of repression. In cases when the military
shifts allegiance to the opposition, this indicates that other members of the MWC are
disloyal to the regime as well. As in the case of Tunisia, it was not only the army chief
who denied to follow the presidents orders. In fact, other groups such as the UGTT and
the RCD were the first to reject the incumbent and go over to the side of the opposition.

62

5.6Limitations
The choice of research design presents several limitations to the results of the study.
which will be discussed in the following section. Case selection in qualitative studies is
always fraught with potential issues, which need to be recognized. One central issue is
the fact that in contrast to quantitative studies, case studies do not allow for
randomization in the case selection, which introduces the possibility of selection bias.
Since the task of selecting cases falls upon the researcher, there is a risk that cases will be
selectively chosen to prove the hypothesis (George & Bennet, 2005; Gerring, 2007). This
was a risk also in this study. While the method of case selection is meant to address this
issue, it is difficult to guarantee that no selection bias was present. For instance, previous
knowledge about the cases meant that some assumptions were made about the
explanatory variable, the size of the MWC, as the cases were selected.
The choice of methodology also implies a shortcoming in terms of external
validity, or generalizability. Case studies in general will inevitably have weaker external
validity than large-n studies. In other words, the findings will be less representative and
less generalizable to the larger population (Gerring, 2007). While choosing to compare
two most-similar cases served to control for a number of factors, it also raises the
question of whether the findings and conclusions can extend to cases in for instance other
geographical regions. This shortcoming should be considered when interpreting the
results of this study. Meanwhile, doing case study research one has to admit to the losses
in terms of external validity, and at the same time recognize the gains in terms of internal
validity. Indeed, the main purpose of this study was to explore and observe the causal
mechanism, for which purpose the methodology chosen was deemed the most
appropriate.
Other limitations regarding the research design regard the sources used. Relying
only on secondary material, the study is subject to any potential bias or shortcoming in
the sources used. To avoid this, sources were triangulated whenever possible, meaning
more than two sources were used to prove the same fact, and the reliability of the sources
was carefully considered. Any remaining errors fall on the researcher.

63

6.Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to investigate the mechanisms behind state responses to
popular dissent, explaining why these may differ in terms of repression intensity. The
puzzle which motivated this study had to do with the varying responses to the popular
uprisings of the Arab Spring; why did some leaders show restraint and concede, while
other regimes used extreme violence to repress the protests? By examining two cases
with different outcomes, this study has argued that the size of the MWC, that is, the
segments of the population without which support the regime would not survive, varies
with the severity of repression. Evidence has also been found to support the existence of a
causal link between these two variables.
The main contribution of this study has been to elaborate on the causal
mechanism linking MWC size to severity of state repression, and to observe this
mechanism in action. The findings suggest that the more narrow the winning coalition,
the more likely is a popular uprising to be met with increasingly severe repression from
the state. The loyalty of coalition members to the regime as well as their fear of
permanent exclusion in the future were identified as two factors linking coalition size to
repression severity. By contrast, in states where the regime is supported by a relatively
broad coalition, the supporters are less likely to be loyal, more likely to defect, and as
such repression is less likely to be as severe. Loyalty and fear are strongly influenced by
coalition members level of private benefits, which in turn is influenced by the size of the
coalition. The size itself has an impact on the fear of members to be excluded in the
future; it is easier to exclude and persecute small groups.
The findings suggest that violent outcomes are products of complex processes and
calculations of costs and benefit that take place within societal groups as well as within
the top leadership. Rulers, no matter how autocratic, are dependent on a certain set of
supporters for their survival. As such, the findings of this study urge that explanations
conceptualizing the state as a unitary actor should be used carefully. Rather, this research
has suggested that a disaggregation of the state into principals and agents, and a
differentiation between different agents, is useful when explaining violent outcomes. In
other words, the severity of state repression is not an outcome of a decision made solely
by the leader of the country. All leaders want to survive, but only some have the means

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and the support needed to repress uprisings successfully. Further, severe repression is not
always a success strategy for the state. The extremely violent response by Bashar alAsads regime to the Syrian uprising has by many commentators been interpreted as a
strategic mistake. The decisions of leaders to use extreme violence to repress an
uprising may seem irrational, but are in fact the result of coalition members expectations
and fears about the future. Leaders are, even in the most autocratic states, restricted by
those groups and individuals on which they have based their rule. The outcome in terms
of severity or repression will, as demonstrated in this thesis, depend on the size of the
winning coalition.

6.1DirectionsforFutureResearch
One of the main challenges that remain for future research concerns the conceptualization
and operationalization of minimum winning coalition. Researchers have previously raised
the difficulties with developing a good proxy for MWC size for quantitative research.
The aim of this research was to explore and observe the causal mechanism which
explains the correlation between MWC size and violent outcomes, in this case, state
repression. The question remains of how one can operationalize MWC for future
quantitative research, and hopefully this study has provided some insights on how this
can be done.
One lesson that can be drawn from this research is that MWC is a complex
concept which is difficult to proxy with a single indicator, such as for instance the
leaders ethnic group. Complexity is not necessarily negative, but the difficulty to
operationalize MWC could also point to the limited analytical value of the concept. The
concept has a sound theoretical basis, and seems intuitive. However, the difficulties
concerned with measuring it points to the fact that it is quite a broad concept which can
be imagined to include a number of different dimensions. If researchers interested in the
MWC continue to use different operationalizations, we may ask ourselves if we are at all
measuring the same thing? This presents a problem of reliability in the research. As such,
efforts should be made to continue developing reliable indicators for this concept.
In addition, this research has only been concerned with the behavior of autocratic
regimes. While one could assume that the relation between coalition size and repression
severity would hold also for democracies, this needs further investigation.

65

Another suggestion for future research is to investigate the effects of external

factors on elites decisions to participate in repression or join the protests movement. The
explanatory framework employed in this thesis is limited to domestic factors,
disregarding any potential external factors which could have an effect on the outcome.
For instance, it is possible that the behavior of other states, such as the imposition of
sanctions against the regime, could affect elites behavior in the face of a popular
uprising. It would therefore be interesting to study the interaction effects of domestic and
external factors in this regard.

6.2ImplicationsforPolicy
At the time of writing, the civil war in Syria which followed from the 2011 uprising is
still ongoing, with devastating consequences. The severe repression that met the
protesters in the first months of the uprising led to escalating conflict after the opposition
militarized in mid-2011.
This research has suggested that resistance movements including segments of the
population which the regime has relied on for support, are less likely to face severe
repression, and as such perhaps more likely to succeed. This is supported by the
suggestion that cross class coalitions are vital for the success of revolutions (Goldstone,
2011, p. 462), assuming that broad class coalitions are more likely to form in countries
with broadly formulated MWCs. The implication then from a policy perspective would
be to encourage broad winning coalitions, the idea being that violent outcomes and
prolonged civil conflict can be avoided this way. Broad coalitions will institutionalize
limits on autocratic rulers capabilities to repress uprisings violently. When the
broadening of the coalition is combined with democratization, revolutions can be avoided
in favor of legal, non-violent paths to turnover of power.

66

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