Yewen Jin

Final Paper
History of Ancient Philosophy
Prof. Phillip Mitsis
On Aristotelian Virtue and Its Comparison with Modern Day Moral
Intuition
In Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics, he gives an account of virtue in the
exploration of its content and how one can become virtuous. As his account serves as
an ethical theory, virtue is the exemplified moral goodness. However, the given
example of John and Mary reveals a conflict between the demand of Aristotelian
virtue and our common sense moral intuition. In this paper I will give a brief
introduction to Aristotles account of virtue, defend Aristotelian virtue account from
the give challenge, explain the distinction between this theory and most modern moral
theories and further explore the value of Aristotelian virtue.
Aristotle divides virtue into virtue of character and virtue of thought. Virtue
of thought includes the capacity to obtain the knowledge of what is good and moral.
Aristotle, inherited from Plato, believes that goodness and bad are objective values
that are assigned to actions and characters. Presumably, goodness is the goal that
everyone strives towards. Thus virtue of thought is such characters that better guide us
towards actions that conduce to goodness. Virtue of character, on the other hand, is a
habituated state of doing what is good given the knowledge of it. A virtuous person
would display both virtue of thoughts and virtue of character. That is to say, he/she
knows what is the right thing to do, decides to do it when faced with options in
circumstances and does it with a firm and unchanging character.
Neither virtue of thought nor virtue of character arises naturally. We have to
acquire virtue of thought from proper education, and virtue of character by forming
the right habits. Our discussion will be centered on virtue of characters, since it is

more closely related to the given scenario. John grew up with proper education to not
feel tempted to steal, and Mary formed the habit of stealing since she was a child and
thus feels pain whenever she refrain from the temptation to steal things. Holding the
same moral belief that stealing is wrong, both of them are aware of its impropriety,
and rationally decide not to steal. Under such condition, both of them possess virtue
of thought, as they were able to rationally calculate and recognize the virtuous action.
The only difference is that, in doing so, Mary experiences an inner conflict whereas
John does not. In this example, John represents what Plato called the virtuous person,
and Mary is a continent person, but not a virtuous one.
As Aristotle states in his account of virtue of character, the virtues arise in
us neither by nature not against nature. Rather, we are by nature able to acquire them,
and reach our complete perfection through habits.1 Here nature is referred to the
first nature, which came with us since we were born. First nature is the instinctual
nature that we display without the need to acquire through obtaining habits. For
example, senses are among our first natures. When we exercise our activities in seeing,
hearing and smelling, these functions are ready for us. We do not need to acquire them
with efforts. First nature is our firmest and most fundamental characters, and thus is
unchangeable.
Most of the characters we display are, however, out second nature. As
Aristotle claims, a state of character arises from the repetition of similar activities.2
Second nature is the habituated states that we acquire through practice and repetition,
and our character is formed by the second nature we acquire later in our life. Our
second nature is the displayed characters that were not born with us, but developed on
1

p366 Nicomachean Ethics book2 ch1, 1203a-25

p367, Nicomachean Ethics book2 ch1, 1203b-22

the basis of our first nature. Hence it is not only within our first nature to acquire a
second nature, but also second nature never goes against our first nature. By doing the
same actions repetitively for many times, especially since early age, we would be able
to acquire a firm habit that is hard to change, and thus forms an unchanging state the
habituated state.
The second nature we acquire can be either good or bad, but once formed, it
is hard to change. In order to be a virtuous person, one has to acquire a virtuous
second nature. According to Aristotle, being a virtuous person requires us to form an
unchanging good character. That is to say, to be virtuous is to acquire the right kinds
of second nature that conduce to goodness. Virtue is perfection that we have to refine
ourselves with our second nature to achieve. Hence virtue is in a way analogous to,
though not limited to, the skills of craft. We acquire virtue by doing the virtuous
actions repetitively and acquire them as a second nature.
In Aristotles ethical theory, the habituated state plays an indispensible part in
being virtuous. Aristotle explains that, pleasures and pains are appropriately taken as
signs because virtue of character is concerned with pleasure and pain.3 Thus one of
the reasons why forming a habituated state it is of great importance is that our habits
can change the way we feel pleasure and pain. Our pleasure and pain is associated
with not only our first nature, but also our habituated state - our second nature. We
naturally feel pain when we get hurt, and feel pleasure when our desires are satisfied.
These pains and pleasures are results of our first nature, but with different second
natures we habituate ourselves into, the cause of our pleasure and pain are able to shift
in different directions.
In further examination, Aristotle claims that pleasure and pains are causes of
3

P368, Nicomachean Ethics book2 ch3, 1104b-8,9

our actions. When we know what is morally good and bad, the only reason that drives
us to do base action is the pleasure we gain from doing it. Vice versus, what prevents
us from doing the good actions is the pain that we are trying to avoid. Since there are
objective goodness and vices, it is important for us to be in a proper state in which we
feel pleasure in doing what is good and feel pain in doing the bad. In this way, we are
naturally driven, with our second nature, to actively seek the goodness and avoid the
bad actions.
Given the proper education and upbringing, a virtuous person thus gains
pleasure in doing good actions and feels pain to do base ones. He/she would have
formed such a character with which there is no conflict between his/her reasons and
drives. This kind of people not only are aware of what is good, but also are driven by
the most powerful motivation to do good. In a firm and unchanging state like this, the
virtuous person would produce virtuous and good actions as naturally as a stone
rolling downwards in every possible position.
The opposite of a virtuous person is a vicious person. When someone is
considered vicious, it is because this person takes vicious actions. Due to a deficiency
in virtue of thought such as intelligence, wisdom or understanding, a vicious person
lack proper knowledge of what is morally good. Therefore he/she acts only on the
instant feelings or desires, seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. If pleasure leads him
to do base action, he/she would not be aware of the wrongness of his/her action; and if
pain prevents him/her from doing what is good, he/she would not resist the pain for
higher goodness without having the knowledge of it being good.
Between these two extreme cases, including perhaps the majority of us, are
the continent and the incontinent people. A continent person acts in accordance with
rationality and chooses the good thing to do, but feels a conflict in doing so. The

conflicts are as a result of the persons second nature in which he/she feels pain in
doing some of the good actions or feels pleasure in doing base actions. A person who
feels no temptation and pain from doing good actions is what Aristotle calls a
temperate person, but in comparison, a continent person must experience pain and
pleasure from the wrong causes and feels the conflict. He/she still possesses what
Aristotle calls base appetites, which are desires that leads to morally wrong actions.
In this case, the continent person is not doing the good action from a
habituated character that drives him/her to do it, but rather rationally resists part of
his/her own drives and temptation to act in accordance with reason. Continence itself
is praiseworthy, for when base appetites and drives are overcome by continence, the
person takes good actions. Yet a continent person is not a virtuous person yet, because
the inner conflict that he/she experiences reveals the imperfection of his/her overall
character. Since reasoning is a rational process, continence is the rational counterpart
of pleasure and pain as a motivation to peoples action.
Like the continent type of people, the incontinent also experience appetites
that are in conflicts with their reasons, but unlike the previous kind, they display a
lack of resistance against these appetites. They easily yield to instant feelings and
desires when an inner conflict arises between desire and rational calculation. As a
result of the lack of resistance, an incontinent person is more likely to take
blame-worthy actions, driven by their sense of pleasure.
Some believes that the incontinent type of people does not exist. The most
famous holder of this view is Socrates, who claims virtue is knowledge. He
contends that when a person chooses to act in accordance with pains and pleasures
rather than rational calculation, that is only because his rational belief is not
knowledge. If one possesses moral knowledge, he/she would not choose otherwise but

to act in accordance with knowledge.

Put into Aristotles view, John is the more virtuous person. He not only
knows that stealing is wrong, but also has formed the unchanging habit to not to steal.
Not stealing has become part of his second nature, in which he does not feel pain in
taking the right actions not stealing. Mary, on the other hand, is what Aristotle calls
a continent person, since she knows that it is wrong to steal, resists her temptation and
acts upon reason.
By Aristotles standard of virtue, Mary is supposedly less praiseworthy than
John for not yet being a virtuous person, despite the fact that their actions are of the
same rational calculation and strive for the same moral goodness. In our common
sense moral intuition, however, we are more inclined to consider Mary at least as
morally correct as, if not more praiseworthy than, John, since they make the same
rational decision to do the righteous thing.
Some may claim that Mary is the morally superior person, since Mary makes
an effort to resist the temptation so as to take the morally righteous action, but John
only does what he naturally would do. While resisting ones own evil temptation to
make the moral decision always seem to be praiseworthy, those who experience no
pain in doing the right things are hardly impressive to us. Aristotles moral standard
appears here to be counter-intuitive for making the latter kind of people morally
superior.
Also, it is assumed in many contemporary moral theories and in our common
sense moral intuition that only when an agent is being judged on his/her moral
standing, he/she should be judged for the actions within their control. What is not up
to us should not be a factor of moral judgment, and if two persons make the same
rational decision, they should be judged by the same criterion. When faced with this

situation, it is not up to Mary to control her urges of stealing, and thus the opponents
may argue that she should not be blamed for her feelings and inner drives.
Indeed, from Aristotles account of virtue, continence itself is a praiseworthy
character in contrast with incontinence, as it conduces to good moral behavior
regardless of whether the person has acquired a virtuous character. When compared
with an incontinent person, the continent is better in that they resist their desires and
drives that lead to ethically bad decisions, but when compared with the virtuous
person, what the continent lacks is the habituated state. Thus as a good habituated
state is the essential part of being a virtuous person, the goodness of continence is
rooted in actions, but not in character. Being virtuous and maintaining the goodness of
character should be a perfected state, in which one feels pleasant is doing what he/she
rationally believes to be good. Yet being a continent person implies that there is a
conflict in doing what he/she rationally believes to be good, and thus there is an
imperfection in character.
The challenges of Aristotelian virtue may be as a result of some confusion in
understanding the connotation of virtue, and if we further examine the indications
of virtue, we will find that this example does not affect the consistency of the whole
account of virtue. In fact, Aristotle may readily admit that there is a degree of luck
involved in the how virtuous a person is. Aristotle believes that upbringing is an
important factor in becoming a virtuous person, since it is a huge factor that
determines a persons second nature. Without a good moral education and habituation
of good activities, one cannot become virtuous. Yet at the same time, the assumption
that ones moral standing should not be judged by factors within the control of the
agent does not hold in Aristotles standard of virtue. Being a virtuous person,
according to Aristotle, does not entail such equality that, if two people make the

rational decision, they should be judged by the same standard.

We must note that there is a distinction between virtue in Aristotles account
and the modern day conception of morality. Contemporary moral discussions, on
which our moral intuition is based, analyze moral rightness and wrongness on actions
in specific circumstances, but Aristotles notion of virtue is a broader concept.
In contemporary moral discussion, the factor of habit is usually neglected. In
terms of any specific circumstance, rightness and wrongness of an action are rooted in
actions, and the judgment is placed on an action, not the agent. But in terms of the
moral judgment placed on a person, one specific action is not sufficient to be
characterized the nature of a person. Moral goodness of a person has to be revealed in
more consistent and intrinsic property of a person. It is the characters that are
constituted by habits and has become ones second nature that is internalized by a
person.
Aristotles account of virtue, however, is covering a larger scope than what a
moral theory attempts to do. His purpose is not only to inquire into what is morally
right or wrong, but also is about what is the best way to live a life. Our present
inquiry does not aim, as our others do, at study; for the purpose of our examination if
not to know what virtue is, but to become good, since otherwise the inquiry would be
of no benefit to us4 The purpose is to advocate people to become a better person.
Aristotles virtue-centered ethical theory aims at the ultimate goodness
happiness. Happiness itself is the aim of everything one tries to achieve in his/her life,
and thus what makes a person good and complete is within the content of happiness.
Happiness is more than pleasure and good feelings. Counter-intuitively, it is not a
feeling but an activity that involves doing well and flourishing as a human being.
4

p267 Nicomachean Ethics, 1003b, 27

Agreeing with the common belief, Aristotle attribute happiness as the ultimate
goodness, most people virtually agree about what the good is, since both the many
and the cultivated call it happiness, and suppose that living well and doing well are
the same as being happy.5 But the specific connotation of happiness and good is
differed among different people. He disagrees with the common peoples pursuit of
pleasure and honor as happiness and claims that virtue is higher than these common
beliefs of what happiness is.
For Aristotle, virtue is the goodness of soul and thus most fully conduces to
the happiness of a human life. Goods are divided, then into three types, some called
external, some goods of the soul, others good of the body; and the goods of the soul
are said to be goods to the fullest extent and most of all, and the souls action and
activities are ascribed to the soul6 He highly praise virtue as the most essential, even
though not complete, part of living a happy life. In order to achieve the highest aim
happiness in ones life, one has to live in accordance with virtues.
Living a virtuous life includes forming the habituated state in which the
correlation between actions and pains and pleasures are consistently driving a person
towards goodness. Since there is something objectively existing as the good, and the
good is end we pursue in everything, it can be known by us with rational activities.
When we have the knowledge of what is good and conduces to our happiness, we
have to pursue it with action. Continent people is doing better than the incontinent, as
Aristotle states that, but results from being immature person, like an incontinent
person, gets no benefit from his knowledge. If, however, we are guided by reason in
forming our desires and in acting, then this knowledge will be of great benefit.7
Thus being a virtuous person rather than being a continent person is in a
5
6

p350, Nichomachean Ethics, 1095a, 18

p358, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098b, 14

better state towards happiness. Without having formed the habituated state in which
one gains pleasure in making the good actions and feels pain in doing the evil things,
one suffers from doing certain good actions. Yet happiness should not be unpleasant.
If one constantly refrains oneself from doing what one desires to do, it is as if there is
an illness of soul, since when we experience the pain of our body, it is usually when
we are physically ill. Therefore it is only with virtue that we are eventually led to the
final goal of happiness. Also, a habituated state of virtuous character is a tendency that
serves as a motivational force to drive a person to act in accordance with rational
decision, which naturally inclines one in striving towards the goodness. Thus the
moral standing of a virtuous person is better than being without the virtuous
habituated state. This correlation between pleasures and the virtuous state manifests
why the human good turns out to be the souls activity that expresses virtue.8
In contemporary moral discussion, the value of Aristotles account of virtue
lies in its emphasis on a habituated state, the idea of which is not taken seriously
enough by the contemporary moral discussions that mostly aims to find what is right
or wrong in specific circumstances and actions. Aristotles emphasis on a habituated
state that has become ones second nature provides a complementary view that not
only gives an account of what is good, but also how to actualize the good. If we
understand this point fully, the doubts and objections raised by the example of John
and Mary would cast no threat to Aristotles account of virtue, for the whole theory
aims at a different goal from judging people for the imperfections that they cannot
control. Instead, his description of virtue strives to give guidance for people to
become better members of a society and accomplish a happy life.
7
8

p349, Nichomachean Ethics, 1095a, 8

p357, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a, 17