Jan 4

Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences
Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
India-United States Strategic Partnership:

Implications for Pakistan
Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari
INTRODUCTION
India United Stated relations have seen many ups and downs from the formative phase of their
relations to the nuclearization of South Asia. The emergence of India as an independent state
during the cold war was one of the significant reasons of not so much warm relations between
the two states. The factors that kept the both states estranged from each other were all the
creation of US cold war priorities which did not match with the interests and policies of India.
With the end of cold war, the all reasons of estrangement were vanished and it took a very short
time to bring bilateral relations to the extent of the conclusion of strategic partnership. Now,
United States declares its commitments to assist India in emerging as a new major power. The
beginning of 21st century marked an important development in Indo US relations started with
Clintons visit to India by the end of 20th century and further followed by Bush administration
during its first term as well as continued in its second term. The current Indo-US rapprochement
has been termed as irreversible and is known as Strategic Partnership. Both states took several
initiatives which lead them to develop a strong strategic partnership. This strategic partnership is
comprised of a broader range of areas for mutual cooperation which includes economic, trade,
space, nuclear technology, missile technology, and defense cooperation.
The security environment of South Asia has always been characterized by the traditional rivalry
between Pakistan and India; the key states in the region. The whole security structure of the
region depends upon the nature of mutual relations between these two states. The rise of one of
them as a regional power is meant to be the destabilization of the region. In this context, India
United States cooperation in high-tech defense equipments has raised concerns in Pakistan
which may compel Pakistan to look for advanced weapon technology. Such compulsions may
create a path towards the destabilization of strategic balance in the region. Pakistan is already
cautious about Indian pre-dominance in conventional warfare capability, which will be further
enhanced through defense cooperation between India and United States. Pakistan said that
making a special exception for India would have adverse effects on security affairs of South
Lecturer Department of Political Science, Islamia University Bahawalpur

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
Asia. Keeping in view the history of Pakistans defense and foreign policies, Dr Rasul Bakhsh
Rais says, they have always been India-centered from the beginning; for over half a century
Pakistans security dilemma has centered on how to balance, counter, and if necessary, fight the
Indian threat; unconsciously borrowing from the Realist paradigm, the managers of Pakistans
security tried to address this dilemma by adopting two classic approaches: alliances with major
world powers to augment defense capability, and (from the 1970s onward), nuclear deterrence to
offset Indias conventional superiority.1 Now both of these approaches are tilting towards India
because of recent cordial relations between United States and India to the extent of cooperation
in nuclear technology. Apparently, it is claimed to be cooperation only for civil purposes but the
history shows that nuclear technology achieved for civil purposes is mostly used for military
purposes in the future. India has also developed its nuclear weapon capability through similar
means. The pretext of peaceful uses of the atom, particularly for nuclear power plants has
mostly given the opportunity to use this technology for military purposes. Atoms for peace
have mostly been diverted to making of bombs, a route that India took. It is therefore argued that
India will use this nuclear technology for military purposes in future, which may erode strategic
balance in the region.
Security cooperation between New Delhi and Washington is very significant to Islamabad for the
reason that it can deteriorate Pakistans deterrence capabilities against India and can tilt balance
of power in favor of India. Further this collaboration with India by US can convince Pakistan to
make arrangements for similar agreement with China, and China too will not hesitate because of
US motive to counter China through this collaboration with India in the region. It may not only
be harmful for Pakistan but also can shatter strategic balance in Asia which shall affect the whole
gamut of international politics (Probability of a New Cold War between China and United
States). In the wake of India United States evolving cordial relations through a comprehensive
strategic partnership; the security structure in South Asia may change with due course of time.
Therefore, the paper intends to explore the relationship between India - United States Strategic
partnership and Pakistans Security. It will further examine the potential of Indo-US cooperation
to disturb the Balance of Power between Pakistan and India and what options are available for
Pakistan to curtail such kind of imbalance.
1
Rasul Bakhsh Rais. "Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Posture." India Review 4, no. 2 (April 2005):
144.

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
HISTORY OF INDIA-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

The history of India-United States relation comprises a broad range of areas such as political,
economic, trade, technological, security etc. Each area has a lot of information in each sphere,
which cannot be covered as a whole. Therefore it shall be tried to cover the most related history
in specific spheres concerning the research topic only: which includes a brief history of IndiaUnited States political relations concerning the foreign relations of both countries.
Winston Churchill said Americans always do the right thing after they have tried everything
else. But, Americans were five decades late to recognize and do the right thing in their relations
with India. It was a period of Cold War. Former American Ambassador to India, Senator
Moynihan commented this period as half century of misunderstandings, miscues, and mishaps.
The leading Indian Politician and Ex-Foreign Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh called them the fifty
wasted years.2 The largest democracy in the world could not maintain cordial relationship with
the most enthusiastic proponent of democracy in the world. Due to multiple differences between
them, both were coined as estranged democracies3 but the civil nuclear technology agreement
between them has converted these estranged democracies into engaged democracies.4 The
United States and India have been described as unfriendly friends. Before the official US Indian
relations commenced in 1947, dealings between the two countries were minimal. Before 1947,
India was a British colony and Americas limited activism in world affairs had not extended to
India.5 When India finally gained freedom in August 1947, the United States was shaping the
concept of containment of communism that became the driving force behind the US National
Security Policy for the next 44 years.6 Each country had different opinion about its role in the
world politics. The United States considered itself as the savior of the Free World contending the
evil forces of Communism while India was not involved in such kind of opposition against
2
Lalit Mansingh, India-United States Strategic Partnership: Are We Yet There? (Institute of Peace And Conflict
Studies), no. 39 (October 2006): 1
3
The term estranged democracies was introduced by Dennis Kux who used this term to define indo US relations
while writing his book titled India and United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941-1991.
4
Annpurna Nautiyal, Current Trends in India-US Relations: Hopes for a Secure Future. Strategic Insights V, no. 4
(April 2006): 1
5
Satu P limaye. US Indian The Pursuit Relations of Accommodation. Oxford, Sanfrancisco: Westview Press,
Boulder, 1993: 5
6
Dennis Kux, India and United States: Estranged Democracies 1941-1991. Washington: DC: National Defense
University Press, 1993: 55.

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
communism. India declared itself to remain non-aligned and emerged as a leader of nonalignment movement which was stated as immoral by US administration to the extent that
Eisenhowers secretary of state John Foster Dulles described it as incompatible with friendship
with the United States.7 This relationship saw short episodes of blossom during the Korean War
but soon vanished in 1956 due to Indian policy on the twin crises of Hungary and Suez. India
condemned the invasion of Suez by Israel, Great Britain and France but did not condemn brutal
crushing of the Hungarian revolt by the Soviet Union.8 Despite its declaration as non-aligned
state, India moved closer to chief US enemy, Soviet Union which emerged as a principle source
of major military equipment in sixties.9 Moreover, United States efforts to bring India and
Pakistan to negotiating table for resolution of Kashmir dispute compelled the Indian government
distance itself from the United States.10
There was a brief period of a little bit cooperation between the two countries when during the
1962 India China war led Nehru to put aside the non-alignment drama and look towards United
States for help against China on urgent basis. It was the zenith of India United states relationship;
United States supported India on all political, diplomatic and international fronts along with
military cooperation11. At the same time, India-Soviet Union relations got more momentum
especially in military cooperation due to increasing Sino-Soviet rivalry. At the moment, the US
administration was also divided on cooperation with India; Pentagon opposed it due to its
implications on strategic ties with Pakistan, and therefore, India remained strategically
irrelevant to the United States.12 Due to Indian tilt towards Soviet Union, though claimed to be
non-aligned, India-United States relations could not develop friendly and further fueled during
India-Pakistan war in 1971. Indian officials believe that the Nixon administration sent an
aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise, into the Bay of Bengal to put pressure on India to halt the
military campaign against Pakistan.13 The events in Middle East along with other important
7
8
Amit Gupta, The US-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests? February 2005: 1-2
9
Dennis Kux, A Remarkable Turnaround: US-India Relations. (Foreign Service Journal) October 2002: .2
10
Ibid: 2
11
Ashley J. Tellis. The Transforming US-Indian Relationship and Its Significance for American Interests.
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 1-2
12
13
Dennis Kux, India and United States: Estranged Democracies 1941-1991. Washington: DC: National Defense
University Press, 1993: 307.

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
issues also diverted US foreign policy priorities; therefore, relations could not develop further in
70s. The first Indian nuclear device test in 1974 led to worsen the relationship by activation of
automatic US non-proliferation measures against India. It furthermore, compelled United States
to strengthen more its nonproliferation policies with the Glenn-Symington Amendments to the
Foreign Assistance Act and the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act along with formation of the
London Club, which included western suppliers, in 1975 imposing full scope safeguards in
future technology transfers.14 Two more little spans of cooperation arose, one in 80s when a
Memorandum of Understanding 1985 was signed on transfer of Technology and other in 90s
when the Kick lighter proposals introducing a common strategic vision 1991. These two
developments promoted Indo-US relations and resulted in agreed minute of defense cooperation
signed during US Defense Secretary, William Perrys visit to India in January 1995.15 In the
wake of defense cooperation minutes, the Joint India-United States steering committees were
established to promote coordination between the armed and naval services of both countries.
The end of the Cold War brought a significant change in United States towards relations with
India.16 The US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot commenting on United States relations
with India said that these relations were victim of incompatible obsessions, Indias with
Pakistan and Americas with the Soviet Union, both were Guilty of being on best terms with
each others principal enemy.17 India has now adapted to new global realities and changed its
policies, alliances, and roles in international politics. The collapse of Soviet Union resulted in
collapse of Indias most reliable producer of military equipment as well as economic assistance.
Now, India needed not only a new and reliable trading partner but also a dependable support
against its traditional rivals in its immediate neighbors Pakistan and China. Moreover, the end
of a bipolar world has made India's traditional, though often symbolic, role as a leader of the
nonaligned world essentially obsolete.18 Talbot writes that India was cropping up frequently in
Clintons conversations in the very first year of his presidency and the Clinton regarded India a
14
Amit Gupta, The US-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests? February 2005: 2
16
Dennis Kux, A Remarkable Turnaround: US-India Relations. (Foreign Service Journal) October 2002: 19
17
Strobe Talbot, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb. (Viking) 2004: 7
18
Barbara Leitch LePoer, India - US Relations. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, 1996 :
15

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
potentially important power for the United States if indeed19 while India felt the heat of
Clintons zeal in pursuing nuclear non-proliferation20, In Talbotts words, the NPT represented
for Indians, the three Ds of US nuclear policies: dominance, discrimination and double
standards21. One of the most significant reasons for Indian suspicion about United States was
US tilt towards Pakistan on Kashmir issue. One of the newly appointed Assistant secretary of
State under Clinton administration, Mr. Robin Raphel questioned the legality of Jammu and
Kashmirs accession to India.
22
In response to Indian nuclear tests in 1998, Washington
imposed bitter sanctions on India and Pakistan and condemned both fiercely on the UN Security
Council and the G-8 forums but United States remained intact with both neighboring nuclear
rivals to reduce the chances of escalation and try roll-back the nuclear program of both countries.
As a part of this exercise, Mr. Strobe Talbot, Deputy Secretary of State, hold nine rounds of talks
with Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh, which brought up a significant policy shift in US
thinking about nuclear matters in South Asia. The earlier position of the Clinton administration
was to cap, reduce, and rollback the nuclear programs of both countries but changed to the
extent of keeping the nuclear forces non-deployed at the possible lowest level.23 In Talbotts
words, India had put on notice that it was now unambiguously, unapologetically and
irrevocably, a nuclear armed power.24 United States also offered India to lift all other sanctions
if India sign the CTBT, Negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), Enforce world
class export controls on nuclear and missile technology and observe a non-threatening Defense
posture25 but dialogue in this direction could not succeed towards the achievement of US
objectives while India succeeded in achieving its objectives of paving a way forward to the
legitimization of Indias nuclearization and creating a shift in US thinking about India. At the
same time, one more incident contributed a lot towards re-building the India United States
relations when US president Bill Clinton played a proactive role in resolving the Kargill issue.
19
20
Ibid :.2
21
Ibid :2
22
Ibid :2
23
Amit Gupta, The US-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests? February 2005: 3-4
24
25
Ibid: 3

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
Bruce Riedel says that The events of that 4th July 1999 accelerated the road to a fundamental
reconciliation between the worlds two largest democracies, India and the United States.26
TOWARDS STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

In year 2000, US President Bill Clinton paid a visit to South Asia which proved to be a turning
point towards improved security relations between the two countries. It was evident from the
Joint Statement that pledged to deepen the India-American partnership in tangible ways.27
President Clinton himself said that the US had ignored India over the preceding 20 years and
indicated that it would end the passive impact caused by nuclear issues in future.28 According to
Delhi Declaration of March 2000, US President and Indian Prime Minister decided to take
further steps to institutionalize and intensify the mutual relationship.29 Soon after the visit of US
President Clinton to India in early days of year 2000, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee paid a visit to
United States later in the same year, where he addressed a joint session of Congress and met US
President. Both leaders issued a joint statement agreeing to cooperate on arms control,
terrorism, and HIV/AIDS.30 Before departing from White House, Clinton administration laid
down solid foundations for enhanced cooperation between the both countries.
The September 2001 terrorist attacks on twin tower in USA provided an opportunity to India to
offer United State full cooperation and the use of Indias bases for counterterrorism operations,
the offer reflected the sea change that has occurred in recent years in the US-India relationship,
which for decades was mired in the politics of the Cold War and Indias friendly relations with
the Soviet Union.31 President George W. Bush continued the same policy of Clinton
Administration. September 11 brought an impetus into this changing relationship. The two
countries together implemented a co-operative framework of relationships based on three
dimensions: democracy, economy, and security.32 In due course of time, United States began to
feel that nuclear India has potential elements of cooperation with United States as well as on a
Bruce Riedel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House. Policy Paper Series, 2002: 1
President Clinton and Prime minister Vajpayee. Joint Statement. New Delhi, March 21, 2000.
28
Minhaj Qidwai, US-India Nexus: Implications to China and Pakistan. Al-Jazeerah,
29
Joint Statement of President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpaye on March 21, 2000, Delhi.
30
K. Alan Kronstadt, India-US Relations. Issue Brief for Congress, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division,
The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2006: 3
31
Ibid: 2
32
Minhaj Qidwai, US-India Nexus: Implications to China and Pakistan. Al-Jazeerah,
26
27

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
variety of areas. Moreover, India supported United States policies on many issues of key
importance like missile defense program, which India could never do during cold war in wake of
its relations with the former Soviet Union, and the US war against terrorism.33 The Indo US
relationship began to improve in better way in the second tenure of Bush administration when
US officials felt a potential in India as a reliable ally for US policy objectives in Asia. As
Secretary of State Colin Powell said, There is another country...that I want to mention before I
leave this regional perspective, a country that should grow more and more focused in the lens of
our foreign policy, that country is India.34 He again mentioned, We must deal wisely with the
worlds largest democracy. Soon to be the most populous country in the world, India has the
potential to help keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery; we need to work
harder and more consistently to assist India in this endeavor, while not neglecting our friends in
Pakistan.35 Indo-US relation were further strengthened and accelerated after a meeting between
Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee & US President Bush in November 2001. Both
agreed to expand their mutual relations in a variety of areas, which included economic, security,
space, counterterrorism, arms sales, scientific collaboration, regional security, civilian nuclear
safety, and joint military exercises. In December 2001, the US-India Defense Policy Group met
in New Delhi for the first time since Indias 1998 nuclear tests and outlined a defense partnership
based on regular and high-level policy dialogue.36 Moreover, The National Security Strategy
2002 of Bush Administration stated that US interests require a strong relationship with India.
We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative
government.37
By 2001, India began to pursue United States for cooperation in three important areas known as
trinity which included easing restriction on dual-use high-technology goods, civil nuclear
cooperation and civilian space cooperation. The top Indian officials stated that progress in these
areas was necessary to provide tangible evidence of a changed US-India relationship.38 In
January 2004, President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee said in a joint statement that the
33
Ibid.
Colin L. Powell, Confirmation Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Washington File. 2001.
35
Ibid.
36
37
National Security Strategy. March 2006: 27
38
The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2006: 6-7
34

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US-India strategic partnership included expanding cooperation in the trinity areas as well as
expanding dialogue on missile defense.39 It was later termed as quartet. Cooperation in
quartet areas further expanded through reciprocal steps between both countries, which were
known as Next Steps Strategic Partnership (NSSP). Cooperation through NSSP helped out to
establish enhanced cooperation in the fields of dual-use, space and nuclear technology. These
forward step inter-actions not only developed trust and harmony in joint activities between the
two states but also broadened defense sales opportunities for US companies in India.40 In Oct.
2004, the both countries agreed to create a working group, which presumably will negotiate not
only the scope of nuclear cooperation, but also Indian commitments to nonproliferation.41
During the Manmohan Singhs US visit on July 2005, issuing a joint statement the Indian Prime
Minister conveyed that for his part, India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to
assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as
other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States.42 On June
2005, A new framework of Defense relations was agreed upon between India and United States
in which both countries agreed to expand their cooperation in the area of defense relations and
sketch out a framework for the next ten years which further strengthened India Unites States
relations in Strategic partnership.
During Indian Prime Ministers visit to United States in July 2005, a landmark joint statement
was issued by India and United States in which the US President, George W. Bush declared a
promise to help India become a major world power in the 21st century43, and decided to
conduct India - United States relations in three main areas which consist of strategic, economic
and energy areas. The State Department announced a milestone in the US- India strategic
relationship: successful completion of the NSSP, allowing for expanded bilateral commercial
satellite cooperation, removal of US export license requirements for unilaterally controlled
nuclear items to most end users, and the revision of US export license requirements for certain
39
Ibid: 6-7
Shyam Saran, Transforming US-India Relations: Forging A Strategic Partnership. Carnegie Endowment For
International Peace, December 21, 2005: 4
41
Ibid: 4
42
President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Joint Statement. july 18, 2005.
43
40

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
items used in safeguarded civil nuclear power facilities. 44 US President emphasized that he will
also seek adjustment in US policies and laws from Congress. Moreover, US President also
committed to get relaxations from its friends and allies to adjust the international regimes to
enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.45 Taken together, the both
statements of June 2005 on DFA (Defense framework Agreement) and the July 2005 Joint
statement by India and United States, the provisions for further enhancement of cooperation were
provided in all four areas of Next Step Strategic Partnership.46 Significantly, the July 2005
Statement emphasized that as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India
should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states, and President Bush vowed
to work on achieving full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India.47 The Indo US
Strategic Partnership advanced more in 2006 and United States declared India as a key player in
enhancing US role as a major power. The NSS 2006 claims that India now is poised to shoulder
global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power.48 On
March 2, 2006, a Joint Statement by the both leaders, President George W. Bush and Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh expressed satisfaction with the great progress, United States and
India have made in advancing strategic partnership to meet the global challenges of the 21st
century.49 This statement declared successful completion of Indias [nuclear facility]
separation plan. Both leaders showed their satisfaction on the successful completion of
dialogues on the Indias separation plan and looked forward to the full implementation of the
commitments in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement on nuclear cooperation.50 Under this
landmark nuclear cooperation, both India and the United States have agreed to promote full civil
nuclear cooperation and providing India an opportunity to pursue cooperation and trade in this
area. Under the provisions of agreed separation plan on March 2, 2006, India appears to place
14 of 22 reactors under safeguards, equaling about 65% of Indias total nuclear energy output.51
Both countries agreed to enhance their cooperation in each area of strategic significance that
includes cooperation in the fields of Economy (Trade, Investment and Agriculture), Democracy,
44
Ibid: 6-7
Ibid: 6
46
Ibid: p.7
47
Ibid: p.7
48
National Security Strategy March 2006, White House, Washington D.C : 39
49
President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Joint Statement. March 2, 2006.
50
Ibid.
51
Sharon Squassoni, Indias Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views. Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade
Division, The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2006: i
45
10

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Energy and The Environment, Security (Maritime Security Cooperation, Counterterrorism,

Military Logistics Support, Defense Trade and Non-proliferation), Innovative and Advanced
Technologies (Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), Science, and Space) and Public Health.52
The most recent visit of US President Barack Hussain Obama has further strengthened the
partnership with India by endorsing Indias bid for permanent seat in United Nations Security
Council while forgetting his earlier commitments towards the resolution of Kashmir, the nuclear
flashpoint in South Asia. At the end of his three day visit to India, speaking to the Indian
Parliament, President Obama said, "I can say today -- in years ahead, I look forward to a
reformed UN Security Council that includes India as a permanent member." Moreover, during
his visit, President Obama committed to forge ties with India by giving it a role in Afghanistan
and Africa. Alongwith the acknowledgment of Indian role in political affairs of the world US
President also declared $10 billion trade deals, take measures for the removal of Indian space
and defense companies from a restricted entities list and made agreements with New Delhi to
provide C-17 and F35 aircrafts along with latest defense-related equipments from
Washington.53
PAKISTANS INDIA CENTRIC SECURITY PARADIGM

In modern state system, state security is a complex phenomenon; each state in international
sphere has its own specific security definition according to its strategic interests, therefore, one
cannot confine any specific concept of security which could cover the concept and definition of
security in general and would be acceptable for all states in the world. Besides this, there are
some general elements which are usually found in the security policy of almost all the countries
in the world, i.e. Identifying and preserving core values, internal security, preservation of the
ideology of the state, security from external intervention and threats, economic security, political
independence, avoiding hegemony, border security, avoiding disintegration, security from state
and non-state terrorism, maintaining a favorable regional and international environment etc.
Among all the above elements of security different states may have different priorities, for
52
53
President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Joint Statement. March 2, 2006.
Sajjad Shaukat, "Impact of Obamas visit." Pakistan Observer, December 01, 2010.
11

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example United States priority may be avoiding terrorism, Chinas may be avoiding hegemony,
Indias may be avoiding disintegration etc.
As far as Pakistans security is concerned, it is India centric; from the very first day of its
independence from British rule, it has been caught in the security enigma by Indian activities in
effort to undo the partition of India. The newly emerged state of Pakistan faced a lot of hurdles
created by the new Hindu rule in India that included many issues like division of resources and
wealth left by British Raj, dispute on water distribution, border conflicts, and the most important
issue of Kashmir which was occupied through use of force by Indian government in the initial
days of the new state of Pakistan. Several other efforts were made to kill the new state in its
infancy. The studies on India Pakistan relations reveal competing causal claims from both sides.
Both have always dealt with each other as their prime enemy. The roots of this animosity can be
found in the anxieties and suspicion of each state for the other which emerged from the very first
days of independence of both countries. In the wake of partition, India did never accept the
existence of Pakistan and always tried to destabilize it to the extent of threatening its survival.
The typical Indian nationalism and its designs for regional hegemony have been the main source
of threat to the very existence of Pakistan as an independent state. Moreover, India has never left
any opportunity to destabilize Pakistan to the extent of splitting the country in 1971. Other major
sources of conflict include Kashmir Dispute, Water Disputes, border disputes, a great legacy of
wars and intense conflicts; have created the rancour strategic perceptions between the both states.
The whole history of India Pakistan relations has never been free of tensions. Pakistans policies
have always been concentrating on to counter Indian threats, deter against any sort of aggression
and even fight if needed. According to Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, unconsciously borrowing from
the realist paradigm, the managers of Pakistans security tried to address this dilemma by
adopting two classic approaches: alliances with major world powers to augment defense
capability, and from the 1970s onward, nuclear deterrence to offset Indias conventional
superiority.54 The nuclearization of South Asia in 1998 unveiled the equivocal nuclear postures
of both countries which had been a continuous source of nuclear tension between the two states
for over a quarter of 20th century. Now, there was no ambiguity about their pursuing the nuclear
option for military purposes, but that they would come out in the open by conducting tests and
54
Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistans Posture. India Review 4, no. 2 (April
2005): 144
12

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
55
declaring themselves nuclear powers surprised the world community. In the wake of Indian so
called nationalism and claims to have major role in the regional affairs of South Asia, India
wanted to be recognized as a nuclear weapon state in international politics but it was of the
utmost concerns for Pakistan as compare to any other state in the world if India emerged as the
sole nuclear power in South Asia, therefore, Pakistan had to follow the suit and declared its
intensions to use nuclear capability for military purposes in the event when there was a grave
disparity in conventional warfare capabilities of both countries.
56
It is argued by some authors that India Pakistan foreign policy behavior exhibits strong shortterm relations in the context of long-term memories that shape future expectations of their
bilateral relations. The findings highlight the legacy of suspicion between these two countries
that provides sober insight into the possibilities for reducing conflict and promoting cooperation
in South Asia.57 Therefore, the nature of threat and threat perception in Pakistan has always
been relevant to Indian ambitions regarding existence of Pakistan; thus, the approaches to
security in Pakistan are totally focused on Indian developments in the region and their impact on
Pakistan, which provides sufficient evidence that main determinant of Pakistans security is
Indian developments in all areas such as political, economic, military, nuclear and as regional
hegemony.
INDIA PAKISTAN STRATEGIC RIVALRY

India and Pakistan relations have passed through many crises and conflicts in which they
witnessed different grades of strategic instability generating fears of possible break down of
nuclear deterrence. The last major war between the two countries was fought in 1971. In 1974,
India showed its nuclear capability for the first time and soon after that Pakistan also started its
nuclear programme. Till 1998, the nuclear weapon capability of both countries remained
ambiguous for both countries as well as before the world community. Discussing the logic of
nuclear balance in South Asia, Kamran Shahid depicts that the national security is a
fundamental and uncompromising goal of every nation state. The problem of security logically
55
Ibid: 155
Ibid: 157
57
Sheen Rajmaira, Indo-Pakistani Relations: Reciprocity in Long-Term Perspective, International Studies
Quarterly (September 1997)
56
13

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arises with countries that are close enough, powerful enough, and significant to us in both
positive and negative way, so that their action can threaten our national interests and national
security.58 In this scenario, Pakistans security problem arises with the developing Indian
national and military power, which is thought to be an un-ignorable threat for the prestigious
survival of Pakistan in the region. There are two effective methods to avert national threats; the
political policies (such as the Anglo-American Special Relations or American and Canadian
political, cultural relations). The second is a military strategy. In the political world of realism, it
is naive for any state to consider that the friendly political ties with another state can alone
guarantee the security of a state. Todays friends can be tomorrows enemy and vice versa. The
security policy therefore by its very nature is based upon caution and realism and not
sentimentality and hope. Given this, it is rational to think that the significance of military force
will always remain the most striking mode to secure the national sovereignty and security of a
nation state.59 Given the realist security paradigm and analysis of facts given discussed earlier
denotes that Pakistani security officials as well as public have always been conscious about
Indian developments in combat capabilities, because Pakistans existence revolves around Indian
threat perception, which India has already proven in various courses of time that it could make
use of force against Pakistan whenever needed, but Pakistan has always deterred Indian
aggressive posture by the threat of massive retaliation in order to ensure its security. There have
been a lot of crises between India and Pakistan in different spans of time after the independence
of both countries which include three large scale wars and some limited wars that were based on
conventional weaponry, but after the advent of nuclear weapons, only one limited war on Kargill
have been fought which too had a hairs breadth from nuclear escalation.
In their conventional warfare capabilities, India Pakistan balance is in India's favor. Pakistani
capabilities are inferior in both quantity and quality from that of India in many categories,
especially in mechanical land forces, naval, and air defense capabilities. According to an analysis
by Rodney Jones, President of Policy Architects International and specialist on nuclear security
policy issues, on several features of the increasing conventional military imbalance between
India and Pakistan. The growing disparities over time in defense expenditures and acquisition of
58
Kamran Shahid, Logic of Nuclear Balance of Power in South Asia. Special Report on Pakistans Independence
Day, Khaleej Times, 2008.
59
Ibid.
14

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
major conventional military equipment suggest that India's capabilities to fight with combined
arms techniques have significantly outpaced Pakistan's, which implies that India could pursue
military goals of conventional warfare against Pakistan more rapidly today, shortening the
duration of a conflict, and limiting the time frame for international involvement. The same
factors tend to abbreviate the time available for deliberation and increase the chances of
escalation to the nuclear level.60 Being the traditional rivals in South Asia, Pakistan and India,
both have established military force postures for conventional warfare. India adopts offensivedefensive doctrine, which believes in aggressive build-up and offensive action against the
adversary in case of attack. Pakistani military establishment also adopts an offensive-defensive
strategy with some addition to have sufficient reserves, surprise attacks, and aggressive
leadership; one can establish reliable deterrence against any aggressor. Rodney Jones further
explained by taking a historical review that In the late 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan was powerful
enough militarily to believe it had a chance of shaking India's hold over Kashmir in a localized
conflict. But Pakistan never enjoyed a military capacity to invade India deeply, or to press for
anything like a strategic advantage. Even after the 1971, Pakistan's conventional military
capacity to block an air and armored assault by India was substantial. But this blocking
capability has been eroding as a consequence of India's ambitious military modernization of the
1980s and 1990s. Constraints on Pakistan's ability to acquire modern systems have slowed its
own conventional modernization by comparison with India's, so that the capability gap continues
to widen.61
Pakistans security measures have always been India centered because of Indian intentions for
regional hegemony and Pakistans efforts to survive its independence from Indian dominance.
Like Pakistan, Indian security measures are also centered at Pakistan. Countering Pakistans
stand on Kashmir and tilting balance of power in south Asia have been the corner-stone of Indian
strategic policies. According to Indian prime minister's principal secretary Brajesh Mishra,
Threats of war from Pakistan soon after Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee assumed office in
1998 led India to conducting the Pokhran nuclear tests,62 while the BJP insists that the nuclear
tests have nothing to do with its aggressive stand on Kashmir, diplomatic experts predict that the
60
Rodney W Jones, Strategic Stability and Conventional Force Imbalance: Case of South Asia. :3
Ibid: 2
62
Rediff News. November 10, 2000. http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/nov/10nuke.htm (accessed July 29, 2008).
61
15

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
Vajpayee doctrine on Kashmir will push India's foreign policy towards Pakistan in adventurist
directions." It has now culminated in the nuclear tests. The Vajpayee government cannot claim
that the nuclear tests and its belligerent stand on Kashmir are not related," an Indian home
ministry official told.63 Just three days before Pakistani nuclear explosions, Indian home minister
L.K.Advani adopted aggressive attitude towards Pakistan that is evident in a report by online
news resource of India, Rediff On The NeT; The report said that the home minister Lal
Kishinchand Advani, who had just taken charge of the Jammu and Kashmir cell at the Centre,
would launch a policy of hot pursuit to quell the proxy war by Pakistan in the state.64
Furthermore, Ministry sources said, Advani has finalized a strategy to keep up the Bharatiya
Janata Party's aggressive position on Kashmir, especially in the wake of the Pokhran nuclear
tests, the home minister has given his nod to the state government and central security forces to
carry out deep strikes into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to destroy the training camps for
mercenaries and terrorists. Report also asserts quoting a senior official at the Jammu and
Kashmir cell, The BJP has always been very aggressive on Kashmir. The nuclear tests have
given the BJP's belligerence a new kind of volatility. 65
In contemporary international system, if there is an event of war between the two countries,
states usually conduct war by conventional weapons and if one of the belligerent states have the
capability of using nuclear weapon then it is used for an ultimate destruction to defeat the
enemy(Japan case) but when both belligerents have nuclear weapons then there are much larger
chances of their use due to uncertainty about first strike by any one party to the dispute,
therefore, in India-Pakistan case, there have been greater chances of nuclear escalation. After the
advent of nuclear weapons by Pakistan, it has always relied on the threat of use of nuclear
weapons to deter India from aggression because Pakistans conventional warfare capabilities are
much weaker than that of India even if India launches a limited war or follows the policy of cold
start. Professor Zafar Iqbal Cheema analyses that the emergence of Nuclear deterrence in South
Asia evolved as a prevailing condition rather than an articulated policy, before the May 1998
nuclear tests. Even after the 1998 nuclear tests, explicit nuclear deterrence postures and policies
63
George Iype, News report. May 25, 1998. http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/may/25geo.htm (accessed 2008 29,
july).
64
Rediff News. November 10, 2000. http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/nov/10nuke.htm (accessed July 29, 2008).
65
George Iype, News report. May 25, 1998. http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/may/25geo.htm (accessed 2008 29,
july).
16

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
emerged incrementally, usually driven by events and reactions to each other's conduct in crisis
contexts; India and Pakistans divergent perceptions about various levels of conventional conflict
inject further complexity in the nuclear stability.
66
INDIA-US COOPERATION & STRATEGIC BALANCE IN SOUTH ASIA

The term "strategic balance" refers to the relative capabilities of the two sides to achieve their
respective strategic objectives in relation to the other. For India, this strategic objective may be
the Indian dominance in the region as a major power, while Pakistans objectives can be to
maintain its political independence, freedom of action, and way of life, free from coercion or
undue influence from India, and to prevent Indian pre-dominance in the region. The concept of
a strategic balance encompasses but is broader than an assessment of the military balance
between the two sides. It includes, for instance, assessing the impact of economic, social and
cultural ties between the adversaries across the regional strategic dynamics; the influence of
changing social developments on each side as they affect notions of self-identity, mutual
identity, etc.; and the effect of international perspectives and involvement in regional affairs." 67
Strategic balance in South Asia has always been maintained through two significant actors. i.e.
Nuclear Deterrence (Nuclear Weapon, Nuclear Doctrines, and Missile developments), and Role
of Major Powers (US Role). Most of the part, strategic stability in South Asia has been
maintained through American involvement; especially after nuclearization. Pakistans most of
the defense equipment is also either produced by America or obtained through American
financial and political assistance. Though China too is one of the significant actors, but United
States has major contribution towards strengthening the Pakistans defense equipment. In this
scenario, US tilt towards India can put Pakistans security interests at stake. The convergence of
US interests with India will ultimately push United States to prefer India against Pakistan on
each political, economic, defense and international front. Therefore, Pakistan will lose the prime
source of its military equipment as well as political support at international level vis--vis India.
66
Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Conflict, Crisis and Nuclear Stability in South Asia." 2004. 1.
Strategic Balance. 2006. http://csis.org/programs/international-security-program/asia-division/cross-straitsecurity-initiative-/strategic-ba (accessed June 22, 2010)
67
17

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
As a part of their basic instinct, major Powers always gaze for the opportunities to gain
superiority over their rivals to achieve or maintain hegemonic status as their final objective.
There are multiple reasons for such behavior, i.e. international anarchic system, uncertainty
about other state's intentions and survival as primary objective that encourage states' intentions to
look for power and influence others. Therefore, the system encourages states to look for
opportunities to maximize their power vis--vis other states.68 India United States Strategic
Partnership is also an expression of such power politics. So far as the study is concerned, It is
argued that India United States partnership shall have far reaching implications on Pakistan's
security in a way that emergence of India as counterweigh to China shall not only tilt balance of
Power between China and United states in favor of USA but it will also tilt power equilibrium in
favor of India against Pakistan, if materialized. Therefore, a co-relation does exist between IndiaUS partnership and Pakistan's security assurances. The study suggests that the Indo-US strategic
partnership is an expression of US policy of pre-emption, which is adopted to maintain the unipolar system intact and ensure the survival of US hegemony in the world. But, if US continue to
support India as a part of its grand strategy to counter China, its side effects shall have far
reaching implications on Pakistans security.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Indo US strategic partnership became a favorite topic of discussions among various academic
and political circles in the world from the very first days of its inception. There had been intense
debate on this cooperation regarding its various aspects at various levels. At international level, it
provoked non-proliferation concerns while at regional level, it triggered the debate about its
implications on China and emergence of India as an Asian power; a counter-weigh to China. But
there has been hardly a significant debate about its implications for Pakistan. Government of
Pakistan too did not seem to be much panic about the deal and did not show any prudent
resistance against it. While commenting on Indo US cooperation, the Pakistan foreign office
spokesman said on June 30, 2005 that Pakistan had already conveyed its concern to Bush
administration over its negative consequences of the Indo-US strategic partnership, in particular,
68
J. J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001. pp. 29-31
18

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
over the induction of new weapons system such as missile defense that would destabilize the
strategic balance in the region and may trigger an arms race here69 While highlighting the
regional implications of deal Michael Krepon said that no attention on the regional implications
of the nuclear agreement
have been discussed except non proliferation.70 Regarding its
implications on regional stability, a Pakistani analyst Adil Sultan warned that the Indo-US civil
nuclear cooperation agreement if implemented without checking Indias potential to increase its
fissile stocks and eliminating any possibility by India of improving its nuclear weapons could
lead to arms competition in the region involving Pakistan, India and China, thus destabilizing the
entire region.71 Though India-United States strategic partnership has a lot of implication in
general but some of the purely Pakistan specific implications are given below.
The value of nuclear deterrence will be reduced due to advanced weapon system in
Indian nuclear arsenal along with sophisticated missiles and missile defense systems.
Now, India is seeking to emerge as an Asian power rather than a regional power.
Giving an alarming implication of Indo-US deal, a special report of US council on

foreign relations highlights that India has not accepted any legal obligation against
nuclear testing, therefore, nuclear testing by India might enable it to wield nuclear
weapons with much larger explosive power than those currently in the Indian arsenal;
that in turn would allow important changes in Indian nuclear strategy- for example, it
might let India target Chinese or Pakistani nuclear sites that were previously safe; driving
Beijing or Islamabad to develop new weapons themselves or to change their currently
restrained strategies for using nuclear arms.72
Keeping in view the Indian hegemonic designs, Indian ambitions of pre-dominance in

South Asia will be fulfilled due to its strategic relationship with United States which will
have significant negative implications on weaker states in the region and Pakistan shall
be the foremost target in this regard.
69
The News, Islamabad, July 1, 2005.

Michael Krepon, Indo-US Nuclear Initiative. Henry L Stimson Center.
71
Adil Sultan Muhammad, Indo US Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Implications on South Asian
Security Environment. Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006.
72
Michael A. Levi and Charles D Ferguson, U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation A Strategy of Moving Forward.
Council Special Report, Council on Foreign Relations, 2006: 11
70
19

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
The strategic partnership provides India with an opportunity to use its increased leverage
with the United States, and manipulate US influence on Pakistan in its favor regarding
multiple outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan has lost its
stature in US foreign policy preferences due to India United States cooperation. Pakistan
has now become only the tactical partner of US while India has emerged as strategic
partner.
Adil Sultan argues that the deal could force major stakeholders to re-evaluate their
security interests in the face of emerging Indo-US strategic partnership thus triggering
transformation of regional alliance structures, where India is seen decisively shifting
towards the United States and Pakistan being compelled to explore options that could
best serve its security interests independent of the United States.
The vagueness of separation plan and freedom of choice in categorizing nuclear reactors
as civilian or non-civilian provides India with the opportunity to misuse civil nuclear
technology for military purposes. The differentiation among reactors geared to armed
requirements and those destined for civilian purposes are very skinny. Any Indian administration
can reroute products of civilian amenities to armed ones if and at what time it decides to carry out
accordingly.73
There is no profound guarantee about the non-diversion of nuclear technology towards

military purposes. India can make qualitative and quantitative improvement in its nuclear
arsenal through transfer of nuclear technology. There is no assurance that India would not
use transferred technology for military purposes through the newly trained manpower
equipped with advanced American nuclear technology.
Keeping in view the history of Indias honesty about the non-diversion of civilian
technology towards weapon purposes, it is a well-known fact that NSG was created in
response to Indian misuse of civilian nuclear technology for conducting the 1974 nuclear
tests. Therefore, it is certain that India will use the given nuclear technology towards the
advancement of its weapon program through clandestine ways.
Safeguards by International Atomic Energy Agency even cannot stop the transfer of
technology provided for civil purposes towards weapon development because according
73
Muhammad Ishaque Fani, "The Indo- US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan." Journal of
Pakistan Vision (Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab) 10, no. 2: 149.
20

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
to reliable sources a significant proportion of Indias nuclear complex would remain

outside IAEA safeguards and continue to have a strategic function74
The immense US assistance to India in technological development will compel Pakistan

to seek such kind of deal with other countries, which may trigger arms-race between the
two rivals and may possibly rejuvenate instability in the region.
Momin Iftikhar, a Pakistani analyst argues that Indias utilizes 11% of various available
energy sources including oil, gas, coal, wind and nuclear power for producing electricity.
Out of this only 2-3% is produced through nuclear power. The civil nuclear cooperation
agreement, once materialized in its true essence by 2025 could increase this production to
a maximum of 6.5 - 8% only. Therefore it is not clear how this increase of 4.5 - 6% in
nuclear electricity could make any substantial difference in global climatic conditions or
in the Indian economy. Therefore it is more likely that India will continue to divert
nuclear expertise and materials, provided for producing cheap, efficient and clean
energy, towards accelerating her ambitious nuclear weapons program.75
United States has conditioned nuclear technology transfer with no more nuclear tests. In
the event of breaching this condition United States may cancel the agreement but no
measures have been taken regarding Indias agreements with other NSG countries in the
event of Indian nuclear tests.
The strategic partnership agreement is aimed at to assist India not only in nuclear
technology but it also offers a huge sophisticated conventional arms sales to India which
includes supersonic fighter jets, highly sophisticated missiles and other major military
equipments. This arms sale offer is likely to widen the already prevailing conventional
imbalance between India and Pakistan.
Pakistans minimum credible deterrence strategy will need a new look in wake of
evolving high-tech warfare structures including nuclear weapon development capacity,
delivery system in Indian defense arrangements.
India has been granted unlimited freedom regarding qualitative and quantitative development of
its nuclear arsenal. Dr. Shaista Tabassum highlighted that the accord only talks about on the
subject of the civilian nuclear services while the quantity and capability of weapon programmes,
74
Zia Miana; A. H. Nayyarb; R. Rajaramanc; M. V. Ramanad. "Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications
of the U.S.-India." Science & Global Security (Routledge) 14, no. 2 (2006): 125
75
Momin Iftikhar, "Indias Civilian Nuclear Energy Program Hype or Reality?" South Asia Research and Analysis
Studies. June 12, 2006. www.saras.org.pk/viewarticle.php?topicid=149.
21

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
which is unlimited, is not discussed and deal does not require India to restrict or limit its fissile
material manufacturing.76
In order to curtail Indian advancements and maintenance of credible minimum deterrence,

Pakistan will have to increase its defense budget which is already too much burdensome due to
heavy spending on war against terrorism. The Pakistan budget for 2009-2010 has already added
to the defense expenditure by 22 percent while proposed allocation for 2010- 2011 is Rs 442
Billion showing an increase of 16.5%.77
In terms of agreements on defense cooperation with India during US Presidents visit to

India, Sajjad Shokat says that one of the alarming implications is that Obamas
irresponsible approach to boast Indian defense is likely to initiate a new, but dangerous
arms race between Pakistan and India.78
United States offer to give India a role in Afghanistan is also alarming for Pakistan
because of Indian presence on western borders of Pakistan. According to Ashley Tellis,
such as the commitment of the US and India to cooperate in Afghanistan and Africa for
the US, to have India as a partner in two very sensitive regions sends a signal to
important countries like Pakistan and China.79
Regarding Kashmir conflict between Pakistan and India, Sajjad Shoukat observes that
quite contrary to his earlier statements; President Obama flatly refused to resolve the
Kashmir issue, while saying that both India and Pakistan, themselves, can settle this
dispute.80 Shoukat argues that the exclusion of Kashmir from Obamas policy is likely
to become a basic obstacle to South Asian peace. 81
United States endorsement to support India for permanent seat in UNSC has intrusive
implications for Pakistans interests on number of outstanding conflicts with India. After
having a permanent seat in UNSC, India shall become in a position to exploit Pakistans
interests through the power to Veto. At the moment, United Nations Security Councils
resolutions are the only amicable source for settlement of Kashmir dispute between
Pakistan and India, which is seen as the possible ray of hope in Pakistani policy circles.
76
Dr Shaista Tabassum, Emerging Indo-US Relations: Concerns for Pakistan. Area Study Centre for Europe,
University of Karachi, Karachi: Dawn, 2008.
77
Dr Huma Mir, Pakistans defense budget 2010-11. Pakistan Observer, 2010.
78
79
Ashley Tellis, "The Real Meaning of Obamas visit." Forbes India, November 24, 2010.
80
81
22

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
Enabling India to exploit the interests of Nuclear Pakistan through Veto power shall be a
suicidal act for international peace.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of India-United States strategic partnership suggests that it will have a lot of
implications for Pakistan beginning from defense arrangements to the international relations.
One can imagine a regional security system of South Asia in which mutual alliance between two
powers India and United-States places a third state Pakistan in a less-secure position. If two
nations expand their cooperation in strategic partnership areas vis--vis each other, the newly
created advanced technology, surplus nuclear fuel and resources are now available for use
against the third state (Pakistan). The implication is that cooperation created by the strategic
partnership would offset the Indo-Pakistan balance of power. Keeping this in view, it can be
argued that when Indo-US partnership will mature, ultimately the balance of power between
Pakistan and India shall tilt in favor of India not only in terms of nuclear capability but will also
affect Pakistan's interests in terms of Defence, Political, Economic and External Relations.
Moreover, if India emerges as a major power with a permanent seat in UNSC having power to
Veto, it will come in a position to manipulate and influence Pakistan in international affairs, as
the great powers usually do.
In order to dilute these implications, Pakistan needs to adopt intense diplomatic measures to cater
international support against Indian hegemonic designs. Pakistan must use diplomatic channels
to get the same exceptions, which have been granted to India by the United States, by projecting
its energy crises. Moreover, Pakistan must work to seek such kind of deal with other states along
with putting pressure on United States by conditioning its role in war against terror with
provision of the same cooperation to Pakistan. Pakistan should highlight hypocrite acts taken by
non-proliferation regimes to facilitate India on international forums. Pakistan must also unveil
Indias phony democratic posture by highlighting grave human rights violations against
minorities as well as low-caste Hindus in various parts of India. In this way Pakistan will be able
to cater international support and cooperation in her favor that may contribute a lot towards
curtailing Indian danger and ensuring international peace.
23

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari

shahidpolsc@yahoo.com
24

Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011
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Asia and the Implications of the U.S.-India." Science & Global Security (Routledge) 14,
no. 2 (2006): 125.
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Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences

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India-United States Strategic Partnership:

Lecturer Department of Political Science, Islamia University Bahawalpur

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In response to Indian nuclear tests in 1998, Washington

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TOWARDS STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

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Energy and The Environment, Security (Maritime Security Cooperation, Counterterrorism,

PAKISTANS INDIA CENTRIC SECURITY PARADIGM

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INDIA PAKISTAN STRATEGIC RIVALRY

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INDIA-US COOPERATION & STRATEGIC BALANCE IN SOUTH ASIA

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IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

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have been discussed except non proliferation.70 Regarding its

Giving an alarming implication of Indo-US deal, a special report of US council on

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to reliable sources a significant proportion of Indias nuclear complex would remain

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Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari

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