Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences

Vol. 4, Spring 2014

The Dynastic Elites and its Recruitment in

Political Process of Pakistan
Nabila Akhtar
Sadia Mushtaq

Abstract
The presence and emergence of dynastic elites in any society cannot be denied. In
almost every society, their presence can be seen, however the dynasties become an informal
extension of the state in countries where democratic politics has not yet taken strong roots.
Elite of that dynasty perpetuates his/her position and influence partuclaury in political
process. These dynastic elites can twist public opinion get their support for holding public
office. There is a lot of debate around the set-ups of control that these dynastic elite can
exercise.

The dynastic elite, in many views, recruit themselves in political process while
manipulating the name identification of their dynasties or taking advantage during electoral
campaign for the purpose of reputation building and stockpiling or respiratory wealth. The
recruitment of elite configures both replicates and affects the social set up of a state. In case
of Pakistan as well, the big share in political system is occupied by the dynastic elite politicians.
These elites are either the product of any political event or assassination. They hold the
public office and manipulate the resources i-e political and economic.
In this paper, concentration is put on the different aspects of the dynastic elite politics in
the political process. The focus is on the theorization of dynastic elite politics, factors of their
emergence and recruitment. This paper also presents an overview of dynastic elites and the
recruitment in Pakistan. It also highlights the few dynasties in Pakistan which are at high level
of entertainment of the political scenario either due to disequilibrium in political participation or
the domination of their position..

Key Words: Dynastic Elite, Political Recruitment, Colonial Legacy, Political

Development,

Brand-Name

Advantage,

Campaign

Advantage,

Reputation-Building

motivation, Stockpiling-Wealth motivation

Nabila Akhtar is Ph.D Scholar, Department of Political Science, GC University Lahore

Dr. Sadia Mushtaq is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, GC University
Lahore

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Vol. 4, Spring 2014

Introduction:
Dynasties are existed in almost every society which has strong hold on political
process interms of recruitment which is quite often informal, assuming the public offices,
controlling over the finance and power. These dynasties, in which many of its members have
held political offices, existed due to a patron client characteristic of the political system. the
elites of the dynasty enjoy identity name benefits, which gives them a significant edge over
comparable non-dynastic elite The electoral roots of this phenomenon firmed that adherent of
dynastic elites have a substantial advantage over first-generation political office-bearers.
These dynastic elite enjoy both supply and demand sides of the process of political
recruitment as compare to non-dynastic elite. Elite recruitment patterns define ways for
political participation and status, influence. The various activities of politics that will be
enacted, accelerated or retard changes, effect the distribution of status and prestige and
influence the stability of the system.1
To understand the concept of dynastic elite, factor responsible for its recruitment and
case study of Pakistan, it is imperative to have a view about the political recruitment process
first as it is the repercussion of the concept of political participation.2 According to Dwaine
Marvick, political recruitment denotes to institutional processes by which political jobs
beyond the citizenship level are filled.3 As per the defining argument of Rush and Althoff,
Political recruitment is the process by which individuals secure, or are enlisted in the roles of
the office-holders in a formal or informal manner___ by means of selection or election, or
they may be recruited privately.4In this respect political recruitment is a two way process in
which people may induct them by seeking opportunity or may be accosted by others to
become the owners of such positions. But in any specified social set up the ratio of the active
participant sat top level of political recruitment procedure is very limited of the whole
population. Some sources/factors become more significant in elite recruitment process i-e
entitlement by hereditary claim, elections, nominations, selection and un-constitutional
means.5
Elite recruitment has become an important feature of any political system, therefore,
in this paper, effort is made to define and explain the concept of elite and dynastic elite,
1

L .G Seligman, Elite Recruitment and Political Development. Journal of Politics,26(3) (August,1964):612

Urmila Sharma and S.K. Sharma, Principles and Theory of Political Science, Vol.II (New Delhi: Atlantic
Publishers&Distributors,Pvt.LTD.2007),P. 364
3
Dwaine Marvick, Political Recruitment and career in David I.Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences, Vol.XII,P. 277
4
Michal Rush and Philip Althoff, An Introduction to Political Sociology, London: Nelson,1971, P. 14
5
Urmila Sharma and S.K. Sharma, op. cit., p,.365-366

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Vol. 4, Spring 2014

objectives of elites requirement and factors responsible for their recruitment in political
process. Pakistan is taken as case study.
Meanings of Elite and Dynastic Elite:
The English term "elite," restructured from the French term elite, that again derives
from the Latin eligere,6 a verb implied to pick out, choose, or select. The term Elite refers to
those who are superior, top or surpass. The classical elite theorizers classify the governing
elite in terms of exclusive subjective abilities of those who exercise power. There is implied
the concept of meritocracy on the basis of the competency and ability. Vilfredo Pareto,
Gaetano Mosca and Roberto Michel are the classical theorizers of elite theory. Mosca and
Pareto are of the opinion that in any political system the members of elite secure a huge share
in political offices. In Marxian and his followers point of view, it looks all offices are shared
by men belonging to the dominant class of society.
Focusing on Moscas point of view which he mentioned in his book The Ruling
Class that in all societies___ from societies that are very meagrely developed and have
barely attained the drawings of civilisation, down to the most, advanced and powerful
societies ___two classes of people appear____ a class that rules and a class that ruled. The
first class always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolises power and
enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second the more numerous classis
directed and controlled by the first...7
Among these classical theorists of elite theory, Pareto has given the concept of elite in
a very distinctive way and addresses particularly the ruling elite. He is of the view that there
is no parity among people. They are different with respect of their peculiar competencies and
capabilities. On the bases of these differences people are stratified in social ranking classes.
Few belong to upper superior class for their greater proficiencies.8 System can never be
liberated from the subjugation of an elite structure.
In Paretian scheme, there are two classes, elite and non elite respectively from upper
stratum and lower one and further the upper class of elite is categorized into governing elite

Ibid, 365-366
Gaetano Mosca, , The Ruling Class, New York: McGraw Hill,1939 , p.50
8
Urmila Sharma and S.K. Sharma, op. cit., p. 367
7

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and non-governing elite. 9 The governing elites have the qualities and influence to dominate
and govern because of strong hold of on political process. The stress of elite theory however,
is not only on the peculiar qualities of the powerful but the formal framework of the society
itself as well. In their opinion, the society itself allows a minority to exploit. In their view,
power is always exercised by a small cohesive group of the elite. Elite theory argues that all
societies are divided into two main groups a governing minority and the governed. This
situation is preordained. If the democratic revolution occurs it will just outcome in the
replacement of one ruling elite by another. In this regard, the dynastic elites is the exclusive
elites of the society and struggle for managing and sustaining their power as ruling elite
through their relatives or by hereditary transformation of the power. These elites are further
prone to dynasties. The elite class when perpetuating their political power role through
transforming and supporting their kinship relations may called dynastic politics.
Dynastic elite Politics therefore, may define as a sequence of rulers from the same
family or stock or group, ruler or a leader, hereditary is called a dynastic. It also means a
perpetuation of political power in one or more relatives or kinfolks. The predecessor leads a
political party or any public office which is then handed over to a member of the family
instead of a merit, potentials or capabilities. The supporters and followers of this political
leader find some spiritual continuity with family inheritors becoming political successors.
Dynastic politics remains a prominently existing feature of politicians in all polities, Dal
B, Dal B10 Van Liefferinge and Steyvers,11 Hess,12 Laband and Lentz 13all have studied the
dynastic elites politics and emphasized on the source of political recruitment of the members
via dynastic politics. The studies of Prewitt and Czudnowski focus on political socialization
of the members. Fox and Lawless proposes political motivation of the members of dynasties
which lead them to include in the realm, and Dal B et al, Laband Lentz presents the concept
of career gains that may be associated with intergenerational following in politics14. Basically

Anup Kumar Dash, The Political Elite in a Developing Society, Delhi: Academic Ffoundation,1994,P.12
Dal Bo Ernesta, Pedrro Dal Bo and Jason Snyder, Political Dynasties, In Review of Economic Studies 76,
(2009 ), pp115-142
11
Hilde Van Liefferinge, Carl Devos, Kristof Steyvers, In the name of the father? The role of family
politicization in Belgian Election Candidates, in Politics Culture and Socialization, Vol.1. Issue No. 3, (2010),
p,217-238
12
Hess , Stephen, America's Political dynasties, New Jersey: Transactions publishers,1997
13
Laban .D.N and Lentz,B. F, Favourite Sons; International Wealth Transfers Among Politicians, in Economic
Inquiry, Vol.23, (1985) pp .395-414
14
. Ibid
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these studies provide an analysis of the reasons of more inclination towards induction in
political arena of the members of any dynasty i-e the diverse socio-economic outcomes
contributors in emergence of dynastic politics and occurrence of various political
backgrounds events that caused elites their perpetuation. In this regard, the event that led to
the emergence of dynastic elites is, political assassinations or attempt of assassinations
whether they die or survive it contribute to shape out the emergence of important political
families like in assassinations side Indira Gandhi, Benazir Bhutto and his fathers
assassination etc. But some time it does not contribute for example the assassination of
Liaquate Ali Khan in Pakistan did not support to emerge any dynasty. However, once a
leader is protected his position of power, a group of mentors and a successor in the event of
demise or overthrow is hand-picked.15
The rises of dynastic elites in politics can be further explained. For instance, Ritcher
and Mark R. Thompson provide a comparative analysis to understand the rise of female
dynastic leaderships in South and Southeast Asia. The authors note that martyrdom of their
political male counterpart (father or husband) has played a pivotal role in making them a
symbol of opposition struggle against autocratic regimes, and thereby promoting their
emergence in their respective political landscapes.

Brownlee provides an insightful analysis of hereditary successions in modern

despotisms16. More specifically, the research shows that whether elites will assist
dynastic succession depends on the precedent for leadership selection. That is, where
rulers are preceded by parties, surrounding political elites will accept to the party as
the recognized arbiter of succession. Alternatively, where rulers precede their parties
and political elites lack an established precedent for an orderly transfer of power,
hereditary succession offers a focal point for reducing uncertainty, achieving
consensus, and forestalling a power vacuum.

There are micro-level qualitative studies which also investigates the feasible factors
that groom dynasty politics, for example, Sidel in his comparative analysis of
bossism17 argues that when the structure of the state apparatus allows local leaders

15

Mahmud Ali, Electoral Politics in Bangladesh: An Experience in Transitional Democracy, in Subho Basu
and Suranjan Das (eds.), Electoral Politics in South Asia. K.P. Bagchi and Company, Calcutta, 2000.
16
Brown Lee J, Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies. In World Politics, Academic Journal Vol. 59,
Issue No. 4. 2007, pp 595-628
17
John Sidel, Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand , and Indonesia: towards an alternative
framework for the study of "local strongmen". In; Harris , John and Stokke, Kristin and Tornquist, Olle, (eds.)

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to enjoy monopolistic control over a states resources, then a dynastic succession in

local leadership is easily feasible to implement.

Empirical studies in this context also highlight contributing factors for political
dynasties, Dal Bo in its investigation of political dynasties in U.S Congress; show that
political power is self-perpetuating in nature18. Similarly, Querubin empirically
examines the evolution of political dynasties in the Congress of Philippines and
identifies that non-dynastic candidates who win their first election by narrow margin
are four times more likely to have later relative in office in comparison to those who
lost their first election my a thin margin and never serve.

Additionally, evidence from 1983 Congress of Argentina is also suggestive that

legislators with longer tenure in office have a higher likelihood of having posterior
relative in office.

In south Asian perspective, Marium Mufti presents two features of dynastic politics
that arise as more prominent;
a. Nomination by ruler of a person related to him by tie or blood to replace him
in the event of the death.
b. A prior acceptance of the legitimacy of this act by the ruler as well as by the
ruled.19

Laband and Lentz (1985)20(1986)21 and Feinstein22 write in their article about the political
dynasties and families occurrence that there may be a probability of two supportive factors:
1. Name Identification (Brand-Name advantage)
2. Campaign Advantage

1. Name Identification (Brand-Name) of the Dynasty

Dynastic elites enjoy brand-name gain that results from additional electoral
preference for politicians from certain family. The argument is discussed in Lott, (1986;
1987a & 1987b) papers that long exposure to political power creates a brand-name for

Politicising Democracy: The New Politics of Democratisation. ( Basigstoke,UK: Pal grave Macmillan,2004),
pp51-74
18
Dal Bo Ernesta, Pedrro Dal Bo and Jason Snyder, Political Dynasties, In Review of Economic Studies 76,
(2009 ), pp115-142
19

Marium Mufti, Dynastic politics in South Asia, South Asian Journal,15

Laban .D.N and Lentz, B. F. 1985, op.cit; pp .395-414
21
Laband .D.N and Lentz, Bernad. F. The roots of success Why children follow in their Parents Career Foot Step
22
Feinstein, Brian. D, The Dynasty Advantage; Family ties in congressional Elections,( Legislative studies Quarterly,
XXXV (4),2010,) 571-598 Article first published online: 7 JAN 2011DOI: 10.3162/036298010793322366, 2010
20

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mandatory, which is often non-transferable in nature. This brand name can produce greater
popular support for mandatory politicians who care about both net-support and
commission that he or she receives for transferring wealth. This additional level of support
for politicians with brand-names generates barriers to entry for hypothetically more capable
candidates with no brand-names. Thus, this can mean that mandatory dynastic elite politician
with brand-names can find it easier to remain in office by restricting contestants even when
there exist, more capable, less renowned candidates. Consequently, dynastic identity among
politicians can promote more avoiding as they face lower levels of competition from their
rival candidates.
This have played a significant role for the over first-generation politicians. For
instance, in America as examined by Feinstein, during elections which held between 1994
and 2006, the dynastic elites revel in brand name advantages, that support them
significantly as compare to non-dynastic rivals.
The prior twigs from the following particular factors:
a. Inherited human resources
b. Inherited financial resources
c. Voters aspiration formed brand-Name
d. Family Identification and repute advantages
e. Longer time span
a. Inherited Human Resources
To be precise, inherited human capital refers to the familiarity a dynastic politician
has with key people in important positions within the party. This connection is inherited due
to his or her familys long exposure to politics. This can also allow the dynastic politician to
ensure his or her potential dynastic successor is picked up for lower level positions, so that
such political experience and exposure allows the potential dynastic successor to succeed his
or her dynastic parents electorally. For example, in case of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari
facilitates Bilawal Bhutto by giving him the surname of Bhuttos and also nominates him
Chairman of Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians and the Central executive Committee.
This raised the assumption that such kind of decisions are taken to confirm the political
continuousness and permanence of the Bhutto-Benazir Dynasty in Pakistan.
b. Inherited Financial Resources
The inherited financial affluence is also transferred to the potential heir of a dynastic
leader along with the brand- name identification. Such interlink can make electoral
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competition less costly for dynastic contestants as compare to non-dynastic politicians. This
family association permits second generation political elite to earn the financial network that
the first political generation seeded in this context the explicit example of the Bush Family in
States of United States of America, for example, created a fundraising milestone during
George W Bushs two Presidential campaigns in 2000 and 2004.
c. Voters aspiration formed brand-Name
From the demand side, voters are also aspired with the brand name of dynasty. This
third factor for Brand-name advantage is formed by voters, who might have an additional
preference for dynastic candidates due to their familys generosity, prestige and goodness in
their particular political area. , Hilde Van Liefferinge, Carl Dvos, Kristof Stayers, in their
article support this argument that from demand side the brand-name or name identification is
also very advantageous for the dynasties. Such an advantage emerges out of voters choice
for political legacies of a dynasty, irrespective of the observable differences in leader quality
between dynastic and non-dynastic politicians.
d. Family Identification and repute advantages
Dynastic politicians can enjoy family advantages beyond the human capital and
financial advantage, as voters simply favour a name that they recognize due to its association
with important political events. In United States, for example, Feinstein shows that for all
open seat House contest between 1994 and 2006, dynastic politician entertain significant
brand name advantage23. Moreover, this advantage provides them a considerable edge over
comparable non-dynastic opponents. In Pakistan PPP gain the votes on the name of Bhutto
dynasty. After Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Bhutto dynasty got the vote on the repute of him that
he built in 1970 elections.
e. Longer time span
There are some, empirical proof that in 1983 Congress of Argentina is revealing that
legislators with longer tenure in Public Office have a higher

degree of probability in

posterior or later relative in office. This dynastic transmission of political power is

particularly aided by the fact that long tenure in office allows legislators to accumulate assets
in the form of name recognition
2. Campaign benefit and implications
In the same way, a dynastic politician often get support from Campaign advantage
that is a product of pre-established patron network, which can make electoral competition less
23

Feinstein, Brian. D, The Dynasty Advantage; Family ties in congressional Elections, 2010, op.cit; p. 571

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costly in comparison to a non-dynastic legislator. The preponderance of dynastic elite politics

also has much to do with the capital, longer time span and affinity links that can only
originate from being part of the dynasty. Kristoff highlights in this regard that an increase in
the size of electorates and the rising expenditures of election campaigns that make it difficult
for an unfinanced unknown to enter politics due to the political monopoly that these
families have.24 So it is worth to note here that wealth and affluence inherited does matter and
dynastic elites gain the campaign advantage too as compare to the non-dynastic elites.
The motivation of political leaders, as noted earlier, influential political dynasties
have emerged in almost all forms of governments. Their presence and often long endurance is
a paradox in political science discipline. For example, what unique factors allowed the
Nehru-Gandhi Dynasty of India to produce five heads of Indian National Congress and three
former Prime Ministers of India are still not clear. All this, and many other numerous cases,
makes it vital to analyse and identify some objectives and motivation that can influence the
rise of dynastic politicians.
The objectives and motivations of Elite dynastic politicians
The important issue is that what are the motivations and objectives that lead the Elite
dynastic politicians. By tradition in political economics, the hypothesis is that the behaviour
of the political players i.e. political parties or political elite is driven by their self- vested
interests. According to this concept, in other words we may assume that these political
players act in a same manner, in certain institutions, despite of their identity. Recently, the
empirical studies of political economy have put focus on the role of leader-identification in
order to examine the behaviour of statesmen.
In this regard, Rehavi works on election to pin down the womens representation that
affects policy design in Americas state parliaments25. The same theme is replicate in the
studies of Chattopadhyay and Duflo. They examines two Rajasthan and West Bengal the two
Indian states. They highlight that the issues that are raised or favoured females get more
attention when women leaders selection held26. In the same manner, the study of Pande

24
25

Nicholas D. Kristoff, The Dynastic Question,The New York Times, 31 January 2008.
Marit Rehavi, Sex and Politics : Do Female Legislators Affect States, 2007

26

Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra and Esther Duflo, Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from India -Wide
Randomized Policy Experiment" Econometrica Vol.72 .No.5 , 2004pp 1409-1444

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displays that reservation for scheduled tribes and scheduled castes at the state level in India
affected policies towards these groups27. Asaka explains the role of dynastic character in
influencing the behaviour of dynastic legislators in Japan Diet between 1997 and 2007, and it
discovers that dynastic contestants enjoy a higher possibility of winning and higher vote
share in comparison to non-dynastic candidates28.
Moreover, it also identifies that financial allocations commenced by dynastic elite
politicians. But it does not essentially that it ends in higher economic performance. On the
whole the ultimate end of the dynastic elite politicians is that they aim at the succession of
their dynasty. It means that, the aspiration of dynastic elite politicians is that their dynasty
stands within their respective political sphere. After managing this status the dynastic elites
pursue for the future outcomes of their accomplishment for their prosperity, and the
possibility that they will assist the dynastic succession.
The non-dynastic politicians act on other way round, are also have longing that their
family will inherit their political position. Assuming that dynastic politicians are partially
motivated by the desire to promote a dynastic succession, the relationship between a
legislators dynastic identity and his or her behaviour in the political arena is still
theoretically not clear.
This is because their decision-making process is likely to be affected by two opposing
incentives. In this regard Ashikur Rehman in his paper points out two factors that can be
enhanced in holding the Public office by dynasties
a. The Reputation-Building motivation
b. The Stockpiling-Wealth motivation14
a. Reputation-Building
This incentive implies that when members of political dynasties are in office, they
will use this opportunity to build a positive reputation for their family. In other words, they
will abstain from behaviours that decrease their familys goodwill, as much as possible. This
will allow them to signal voters that their family embraces a vocation for public interest.
Therefore, if dynastic politicians succeed in creating a positive reputation for their family,
then dynastic successions have a greater likelihood of being seen legitimate and acceptable.
27

Rohini Pande, Minority Representation and Policy Choices: The Significance of Legislators
Identity,American Economic Review,Vol. 93. No. 4 (2003), pp,1132-1151
28
Asako et al,(2010) Cited from Ashikur Rehman, Essays on Political dynasties: Evidence from Empirical
Investigations,( Unpublished Thesis of Ph.D
London School of Economics and Political Science,
London,2013), p.14

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As a result, if this line of reasoning holds, then one will expect legislator with dynastic
identity to be more caring in comparison to legislator of non-dynastic identity. Another aspect
is also very contributing in this regard and that is a political capital means the contacts with
other high level officials or party Del Bo the authors argue that political dynasties may
entertain higher level of political capital in the form of contacts with party machineries and
name recognition which allows them to endure in their respective political arena. In line with
this, a recent model developed by Asako to predict the behaviour of dynastic legislators
assumes that dynastic legislators have a high bargaining advantage, since they are likely to
inherit personal ties with other key political figures, bureaucrats and special interest groups
that make them more influential.
b. Stockpiling or repository of wealth
Under this incentive that while dynastic politicians are holding a Public office then
they have the longing to accumulate a affluence so that their future generation can inherit
their political position on the base of their financial and political assets. To achieve this end,
the dynastic elite politicians induct their favoured people in vital positions in the government
and bureaucracy, and during their tenure they amass wealth and political assets to have
smooth dynastic succession. If this is the end of the dynastic politicians then they misuse their
power and indulge in corruptions. In context of all above theoretical perspective it is admitted
fact that there is a minority class that born to rule for its self- interests.
Dynastic Elites and Politics in Pakistan
Dynastic elite recruitment in politics is a peculiar feature of South Asia in general and
Pakistan particular. It is existed in almost every country in any shape. For example in India,
Nehru-Gandhi Dynasty, in Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehaman-Hasina dynasty, in Burma
Aung San Suuki the leading opposition leader struggling against military rule and in Pakistan
Bhutto-Benazir-Zardari and number of others like Shrifs, Zias, Ayubs, Noons, Doltanas,
Mazari, Bugties, dynasties etc. Political dynasties exist and have emerged across the
generations and place in various shapes and levels. The existing scenario of the world is that
about one -third of the population regales political venue where dynastic politicians play an
important role in ruling positions and in decision making process. Monarchy to authoritarian
rule and stable to unstable countries these kind of politicians have put forth their power in all
types of polities.
In this respect, the Pakistani political picture has been ever slated due to the elite
representation through the dynastic politics. The political locus of the country is captured by
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the few elite personalities of political parties. Since its inception, the Pakistan is under the
few dynasties' politics. The political elite of Pakistan have a very conical origin. According to
Zahid Hussain, only few families have domination over legislation of Pakistan since it has
come into being.29 These families traditionally are from rural landowning aristocrat and tribal
backgrounds whom are bestows of colonial rule and its legacy. The political scenario in the
twenty first century remains mostly unaffected. Indeed, the principle change may be the
expansion of dynastic elite politics to include families from urban, religious and military
backgrounds.
In Pakistan the recruitment of the dynastic elites in the political process of Pakistan
is firmly fixed with patron- client politics. That is interrelated with caste, ethnicity and
identity. The identification ethnicities like biraderi clan, tribe and caste are major predictors
in elections and in out lining general politics. These affinities also allow and sanction the
political dynastys hold on resources and then transformation of them as colonial legacy to
coming generations of dynasty members. In this regard, the claim of the study is that in
Pakistan the political system supports the recruitment of dynastic elites as compare to nondynastic elites.
Dynastic elite in Pakistan, originating from the traditional rural dynasty of the
Bhuttos, then meanwhile by the support of military new spell of the urban dynasty of the
Sharifs has been recruited in political dispensation of Pakistan and the other dynasties with
religious and military milieus too.
Dynastic elite in Pakistan mostly related with feudalists politics but both are not the
similar. These dynastic elites remain in the political process of Pakistan. It does not mean that
contemporary dynastic elites in Pakistan have not the feudal origins; they have but the
political process revolves around the chronologically succession of a few specific dynastic
elites. With the passage of time the typical phenomenon, feudalism has become declining in
Pakistan. Many feudal aristocrat families ingrained with huge land holdings have been
sponged out through elections, apart from for sporadic inclusion in caretaker governments by
the military. There is a long list of these elite dynasties Daulatanas,the Gardezis,the Nawabs
of Qasur and the Mamdots , Tiwanas, the Qazi Fazlullah, Khuhros ,Raisanies Gilanis,
Qureshis, Tamans, Mehars, Bijranis, Rinds, Jhakaranis, Seyeds ,the Khan of Kalabaghs more
or less always are resumed the parliaments.30
29

Zahid Hussain, House of feudal, Monthly Herald, Karachi April 1985

30

http://pakistaniat.com/2007/12/26/politics-and-the-urban-middle-class/.

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The dynasty of Bhutto has recruited from rural and feudal back ground of Sindh in
national mould of the state. It journey stared from the politics of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. After
the death of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, her daughter the Late Benazir Bhutto became the successor
of PPP and after her death in 2007, it transferred through a handwritten legal document the
will of Banzir; to her son Bilawal Bhutto and to her husband Asif Ali Zardari Ex President of
Pakistan through succession. The Bhuttos have a distinctive base, they benefited through both
brand name following and also through political assassinations, as previously described the
recruitment of the dynastic elites. Gazdar also points out it as a trend of martyrdom, drawing
on the widespread belief that the senior Bhutto, his two sons and daughter were all directly or
indirectly murdered at the directives of agencies.
The charisma of the Bhuttos has strengthened with a longer time span too as this
family remains either by having the membership in the public offices or by penalised by these
offices. This dynastic transmission of political power is particularly aided by the fact that
long tenure in office allows legislators to accumulate assets in the form of name recognition.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhuttos judicial murder in 1979 through a divided Supreme Court bench was
always a disputed action in the eyes of the general masses. This case was reopened in
Supreme Court by Asif Ali Zardari in his tenure. However, the charisma would not have
excavated had Benazir Bhutto not politically struggled; putting in jail, house arrest, solitary
detention and expatriate among brief interims of power, to continue the democratic brand
name of her fathers politics. Benazir Bhutto was voted two times as Pakistans Prime
Minister, in complete insolence of the patriarchy standards.
Her both terms in office were not even and did not give enough scope to her (Benazir
Bhutto) to implement the general programmes that her party had anticipated for the poor.
Then superfluity of corruption atrocities determined her image as a political leader and ruler.
Due to this she was politically inert and remained in exile about 10 years till 2007 when she
returned to Pakistan.
Second time when she returned it proved to be a landmark in political history of
Pakistan as millions received her when she landed at the Karachi airport, thereby endorsing
her acceptability as the dynastic successor of Bhutto politics, as well as establishing her own
independent legitimacy as a leader. First return of Benazir Bhutto was on 10 April 1986,
under the Martial Law rule of General Zia-ul-Haq. It was a clean act of succession politics
and therefore settled her claims of being the only inheritor of Zulfiqar Ali Bhuttos political
legacy.
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This status of being the sole inheritor did not go unconcealed, as brother of Benazir
Bhutto Murtaza Bhutto also had claimed the succession as an eligible, patriarchal nominee.
He came back in Pakistan during Benazir Bhuttos era when she was the Prime Minister and
endeavoured to mobilize the devotee forces within the ranks of the Pakistan Peoples Party to
make that claim factual. However, his claim to the dynasty was curtailed by his tragic murder
in 1996, when his sister was the Prime Minister and this incident was ironically used by the
sceptics of the PPP (chiefly the security establishment and the right-wing political parties) to
weaken the authenticity of Benazir Bhutto, by expressing direct allegations of her husbands
involvement in her brothers murder. It is a separate matter that a high-level judicial
commission vindicated Benazir Bhutto and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, a few years later
when Benazir Bhutto was not holding the Prime Minster office. However, though the grand
scam as noted by the judicial commission has to date not been uncovered, in public
memory the allegation continues to spate the credibility of Benazir Bhuttos husband, who
emerged as the successor after her murder in December 2007.
After the assassination of Murtaza Bhutto, his widow Ghinwa Bhutto, formed a bloc
of the PPP and has motivated Murtazas ostentatious daughter, Fatima Bhutto, as the actual
and genuine inheritor of the Bhutto dynasty. Fatima Bhutto confronts Benazir Bhuttos son,
Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, as the formally nominated heir and clearly this epic of succession is
far from over. Fatima Bhutto in her recent book has envisaged intra-dynasty feud and has
been regularly criticize her aunt Benazir Bhutto and her husband. In fact, such was her
acrimony in 2008 after her aunts death, that a leading academic and activist of Pakistan
authored an open letter to Fatima Bhutto and stated:31
You and your stepmother argue that the Bhutto name should not determine
political success nor should it give privilege. I agree, but then why does Ghinwa
Bhutto lead her faction of the PPP as Murtazas widow? Is it not her husbands name
that she exploits and is the Bhutto legacy not being used here, and, Fatima, is not
the media and political and social circles focusing on you only because you are a
Bhutto?
This open letter concludes it all and specifies the use of dynastic approach not only
offers legitimacy, but ironically, also challenges validity. Thus, dynasty becomes the political
framework of understanding and negotiating politics in a post-colonial society such as
Pakistan.
31

Nighat Said Khan, An Open Letter to Fatima Bhutto, The Friday Times, Lahore, 25 January 2008.

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Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Group (PML-N) in the Punjab is headed by

Shahbaz Sharif on behalf of his brother Nawaz Sharif at centre. These dynastic elites
recruited from a non-feudal base in political process of Punjab in eightys under martial rule
and relished twice as the chief minister of the Punjab (1985-90) then climbed two times the
office of Prime Minister, first in 1990 and again in 1997. In his second term, he appointed his
brother Shahbaz Sharif as the Chief Minister of Punjab. The military coup of 1999 pushed
him to the detention and following exile of both the brothers in 2000. The Sharifs struggle
against their former patrons, i.e., the Pakistan Army, permitted them to enter the traditional
political amphitheatre of civil-military contest and legitimated their general political place in
the state.
The Sharifs exile ended in 2007 and after the 2008 elections, the younger brother was
reappointed by the party as the chief minister of Punjab. As the younger Sharif had also
earned the reputation of being a good administrator in his earlier tenure, his return to power
was seen as a formidable re-entry into the power matrix. Currently, the elder Sharif is the
Quaid (or the great leader) of the party while the younger brother is the elected head of the
party. Now the daughter Nawaz Sharif Mariam Nawaz and son of Shahbaz Sharif Hamza
Shahbaz have also been groomed as the next generation of leaders.
The recruitment of Sharif dynasty is from the side of urban mercantilist and
industrialists of post-independence Pakistan and their sustenance base is decisively in grained
in the cities and towns of the state. However, their politics especially its patrimonial nature
persists not too different from the tribal and feudal setting. This is the predicament of
politics of Pakistani. As Lodhi points out the personalized nature of politics is closely related
to the leading position enjoyed through-out Pakistans history by a narrowly-based political
elite that was feudal and tribal in origin and has endured so in outlook even as it with the
passage of time came to share power with well-to-do urban groups. The latter is exemplified
by the rise of Mian Nawaz Sharif who came from a mercantile background. While different
in social origin and background, members of this power elite share a similar feudal-tribal
style of conducting politics: personalized, based on primordial social hierarchies,
characterized by patronage-seeking activity and preoccupied with protecting and promoting
their economic interests and privileged status.32
A parallel elite dynasty has recruited in political arena of Pakistan is belong to at wig
of the Muslim League from the Punjab that has also arisen about 30 years ago. Former
32

Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan; Beyond the Crisis State. Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2011. P 81-83

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Speaker and Chief Minister of the Punjab province (2002-2008), Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi,
have succeeded his cousin and brother-in law, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, as the chairperson
of the Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q). Chaudhry Shujaats brother, Wajahat Hussain,
and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahis son, Moonis Elahi, have already occupied their first political
routes by contesting provincial assembly seats in the 2008 elections. The origin of the
Chaudhrys is found in their opposition to the Bhuttos in the Punjab. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the
1970s when he was the Prime Minister of the Pakistan was persecuted the father of Chaudhry
Shujaat Hussain Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi. After the military coup of 1977, the military regime
found a natural ally in the resentful and influential politicians from the Punjab in their effort
to form a grand anti-Bhutto alliance in the Punjab. During the 1980s and 1990s, the
Chaudhrys were cohorts of Nawaz Sharif until the military coup dtat of 1999. For the next
decade, these political dynastic elites were become loyal supporters of General Musharraf
and formed a new, pro-military faction of the Muslim League, PML-Q, which is now a
political force in its own right.
In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa the dynastic elite political family of Asfandyar Wali Khan,
the grandson of Bacha Khan, (Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan) who was a confidante of Gandhi
and an ally of the Indian National Congress in pre-independence period, has recruited in
political process before emergence of Pakistan through the secular Pashtun nationalist his
entitlement over the party is also dynastic based, leads the Awami National Party
(ANP).33Earlier to Khan, the ANP was headed by Wali Khans wife, Begum Naseem Wali
Khan. After the death of Wali Khan, an intra-dynasty conflict led to the ascent of the son as
the party chief.
The religious parties are also inclined to perpetuate dynastic elites in their part such
as the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)34 and the national Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)35 are no
exemptions either in political dynastic elite recruitment. Maulana Fazlur Rahman inherently
replaced the leadership of JUI from his father, Mufti Mahmmood, and formed his own party,
JUI-F, when he was challenged and denied to consent his leadership. His party also remains
the dynamic one in politics. Similarly, JUP leader Shah Ahmad Noorani was followed by his
son, Anas Noorani. Incidentally, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), though reputed as comparatively non-

33

An article from APS Diplomat News Service.31 March 2010.

See detail in Ayoob, Mohammad. The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim
World.P.43.
35
See details in Akhtar, Muhammad Javeed. Dilemma of Political Culture: Case Study of Pakistan. Pp.33-45
34

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dynastic political formation, too has assisted the rise of Samia Raheela Qazi, daughter of Qazi
Hussain Ahmad to the position of a Member of Parliament.36
The military dynastic elites too have their share in political process of Pakistan. Not
unsurprisingly, they are also not unenthusiastic to create an elite political legacy. The first
Martial ruler General Ayub Khans (1958-69) son entered politics while his father was at the
helm of affairs. He associated himself with right-wing politics in the later epochs and rose to
various positions of power. Likewise, the sons of third Martial law Administrator General Zia
ul Haq too have been facilitated by Zia himself and become active in politics during his era
and elected as parliamentarian in 1985 elections and after their fathers accidental death in
1988 they have been elected repeatedly from their respective constituencies. In the era of
Musharraf his son also recruited in politics, he elected and became Finance Minister of the
state.
Another example of the military dynastic elite is of the General Akhtar Abdur
Rehman the powerful general who headed the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). He also died
along with his superior commander Zia-ul-Haq in 1988. He left behind a political legacy
here again his name and demise facilitated his sons to recruit in political process. Both his
sons are now active statesmen and have persistently secured their seats in elections. In all
three cases, right-wing nationalistic ideology, wealth cumulative during subjective rule and
the obvious backing of intelligence agencies has been manifested. In all the three cases
mentioned, rural or tribal networks have mattered less than using the family legacy and
creating a network of clients in the local constituencies.
The civil-military bureaucratic establishment of Pakistan for most of its existence,
directly or indirectly, has also fortified in recruitment of dynastic elites in political process of
Pakistan. The military in Pakistan has found it easier to negotiate and handle political
dynastic elites due to the inter-dynastic politics. If anything, the military has also joined in the
trend and their long periods of rule have contributed to the strengthening and mayhap
entrench political dynastic elites. They too have exploited on the timidity of politicians due to
the interfering of unelected institutions such as the military by keeping it all in the family.
It is evident by the name of the Dynastic elite Politics that it is totally against the
democratic norms. It restricted the large segment of society to be recruited in the political
participation. However, the alternative argument in this regard that support the elite dynastic
politics is that it fills the gap of leadership and political parties when the democratic values
36

Kunwar Idris, Leaders by Inheritance, Dawn News, 9 March 2008.

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are not entrenched and implanted in the political system. There are many scholars who also
believed that the presence of the dynastic elites or politicians is the outcome of inequalities,
disparities in allocation of powers. The inequality in the allocation of political power proved
to very devastating for the economic development and growth of the democratic transitions.
It is probable to logically infer that the dynastic elite politicians are motivated by
reputation building stimulus. As, under the cover, they misuse their power, authority, capital
both economic and political, for self-perpetuation by setting aside the democratic norms and
ethics of equality.

Conclusion
The above debate presents that how and in what ways the dynastic elites perpetuate in
political realm of any country while designing their objectives and setting-agenda. The
dynastic elites enjoy the favourable environment internally and externally to be induct at
large in public offices due to their reputation strong hold on political process. The same is the
case in Pakistan where it is evident that the dynastic elites rule and control the political
process. Both from demand and supply side, the induction of dynasties is continued. The
misuse of authority, motivation and keeping the politics within kinfolk is affecting the
democratization process in Pakistan. The role of political parties has been considered nothing
more than platforms of political families. This is because political traits, such as family
connection, charisma, wealth etc allow elites to facilitate dynasty formation in society.

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